Nuclear weapons in India will increase risk of terrorism
Namibia on India radar for uranium
Actually the Pelindaba treaty (African nuclear free zone) , unlike the Rarotonga treaty (South Pacific nuclear free zone) doesn't specify that safeguards for NNWS be applied under Article III.1 of the NPT. In contrast, the Rarotonga text seems to have been crafted by an ayatollah to imply full scope safeguardsAccording to experts, once the 1996 African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) comes into force, there is the possibility of these member-nations seeking full-scope safeguards for any transfer of nuclear material to non-Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty states, including India.
this is article 4 of Rarotonga Treaty
This is article 9 of Pelindaba TreatyARTICLE 4: PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES
Each Party undertakes:
(a) not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to:
(i) any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to the safeguards required by Article 111.1 of the NPT, or
(ii) any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Any such provision shall be in accordance with strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful non-explosive use;
(b) to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system.
The NPT article 3.1 saysArticle 9
Verification of Peaceful Uses
Each Party undertakes:
(a) To conduct all activities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy under strict non- proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful uses;
(b) To conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA for the purpose of verifying compliance with the undertakings in subparagraph (a) of this article;
(c) Not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with IAEA.
Uranium from Oz will require interpretation of NPT 3.1 to apply only to peaceful activities while simultaneously military activities are taking place. Military activities are not actually mentioned becasue the NPT doesn't really take into account NNWS with nuclear weapons. These SNWs are an aberration.1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
This could be solved by a minor amendment to the NPT text. Just a single character needs to be changed - a '6' replaced by a '7'
The ayatollahs seem bent on using nuclear weapon free zones (NPT article 7) to enforce full scope safeguards (nowhere mentioned in the NPT). They may propose a protocol to Pelindaba to block Indian access to non-NSG Uranium.For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.
India needs to lock in supply contracts now.
Those African countries should be offered a helping hand up the value added chain. Instead of being confined to raw material exporters (as France and US would like), they should be helped to develop enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing technology in exchange for uninterrupted supply of Uranium to India.
Helping the non-NSG countries break the exploitative hold of the US and France could be the ticket for a reliable supply of Uranium fuel.