Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

enqyoobOLD
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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby enqyoobOLD » 10 Jun 2008 07:30

I think there must be reports, though, of damage at that village. I remember a lot of DDM going there to :(( about the gross negligence of the brutal Guvrmand in conducting such tests. Damage sounded significant. So yes, there was a good shock there. If the radius of damage doesn't increase significantly, there is not much point in going to higher yield, is there? So circular logic forces us to conclude that the village would not have survived, say, an 80kT.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby enqyoobOLD » 10 Jun 2008 07:34

Why not a 5km long tunnel starting at LOC and going at 45 degrees down into TSP? Roll the bugger down the shaft, seal the shaft and hit the "send" button. Try to aim to be below a terrorist camp or a Pak Army division HQ.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby SaiK » 10 Jun 2008 07:50

why not use the tunnel already built by those terrorists who are still busy digging? two birds in one stroke. :mrgreen:

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby ShauryaT » 10 Jun 2008 07:53

shiv wrote:One of the things I did was to Google for information on what kind of building damage could occur from underground tests and whether it could be a bluff to give a Khetolai excuse for a 45 kt yield.
I tried this but could not find much. Hence, I have presumed that the damage will be bad enough to require compensation and advance evacuation.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby shiv » 10 Jun 2008 07:55

enqyoob wrote:I think there must be reports, though, of damage at that village. I remember a lot of DDM going there to :(( about the gross negligence of the brutal Guvrmand in conducting such tests. Damage sounded significant. So yes, there was a good shock there. If the radius of damage doesn't increase significantly, there is not much point in going to higher yield, is there? So circular logic forces us to conclude that the village would not have survived, say, an 80kT.


From 1998
http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/nov/24pokh.htm
Loyalty, I learn, both from him and from people I talk to in Pokhran proper, has come at a price. Narsing Rao points to a corner of his hut, with an irregular crack running down the length of the granite wall. Later, as I walk around the village, I notice similar cracks on almost all the walls. Mementoes, I'm told, of the May blasts.
Cracking granite takes some doing. But then, a series of nuclear blasts is some force, when you are just 4 km from the epicentre. And the real damage, I am told, is the cracks in their water tanks.
In Khetolai, there are granite tanks in each home to hold precious drinking water, bought at Rs 300 per 3,000 litres, from tankers that come to the village thrice a week. That, by quick calculation, makes for less than a litre of potable water per head -- and now, even that is jeopardised.
Didn't the government repair the damage, I wonder. That opens the floodgates -- the locals all talk at once, till Narsing Rao looks angrily at them, the mien of village elder very much in evidence. He then tells the tale:
May 11, the first blasts, the first cracks. May 13, more blasts, and a couple of homes collapse, though no one is hurt. Five days later, they were told of the impending visit of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to their village, on May 20.
The village got ready -- but Vajpayee did not come.
Why?


Image

To my mind this settles it.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby ShauryaT » 10 Jun 2008 08:02

Shiv, note that they indicate more damage from the May 13 blasts too. Those were sub KT and were not even detected by seismological detectors. Sounds suspicious.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby shiv » 10 Jun 2008 08:19

ShauryaT wrote:Shiv, note that they indicate more damage from the May 13 blasts too. Those were sub KT and were not even detected by seismological detectors. Sounds suspicious.


Nothing suspicious unless you suspect May 13 yields were higher than stated.

Cracks appear on May 11, Two weakened homes collapse May 13

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby ShauryaT » 10 Jun 2008 08:51

shiv wrote:
ShauryaT wrote:Shiv, note that they indicate more damage from the May 13 blasts too. Those were sub KT and were not even detected by seismological detectors. Sounds suspicious.


Nothing suspicious unless you suspect May 13 yields were higher than stated.

Cracks appear on May 11, Two weakened homes collapse May 13
The May 13 events would be in the microearthquake category, i.e: less than 2.0 on the Richter scale. There are 8000+ events of these types in a day, causing no damage and are never felt.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby Bade » 10 Jun 2008 09:13

Regarding the utility of keeping Khetolai village

1) The device was known to people who matter in India to be not a 100+kt device (designers have to know it) so safe enough to test there.

2) It would be a dead giveaway to relocate the villagers, which is exactly what the eyes in the sky would look for. Since, they would have never expected India to test anything lesser than a 100kt device for the Oomph factor, which would require a relocation. In the western eyes Khetolai was the signature to look for activity.

India choosing a different path to deterrence with lower yield devices must have come as a surprise to many in the west, and hence all the initial heart-burn over partial-burn etc. From, India's point of view Khetolai's location was perhaps never a constraint as many see here. Instead , it provided for a natural alibi in the course of preparation for the tests. There was never a 100kt device to be tested. So no 'fizzle' whatsoever ?

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby pradeepe » 10 Jun 2008 09:37

Also folks might want to consider that in a place like India - opinions of fizzle, quater fizzle, three-quarters fizzle etc will always have a place. So Sri. PKI's voice is just one among that. This is unlike the west where for all its media freedom, such a declaration would invite visits from Agent K and agent J.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby disha » 10 Jun 2008 09:39

Bade wrote:Regarding the utility of keeping Khetolai village

2) It would be a dead giveaway to relocate the villagers, which is exactly what the eyes in the sky would look for. Since, they would have never expected India to test anything lesser than a 100kt device for the Oomph factor, which would require a relocation. In the western eyes Khetolai was the signature to look for activity.



Has anybody wondered what would have happened if we did not relocate khetolai, exploded a 100 KT which would have caused say some houses to collapse and killed say a few persons? Note that the exact time of detonation was not going to be known, based on prevailing wind conditions so one cannot ask the villagers to be outside the home in May heat all day long [and that also would be a dead give away]. Why local winds are important? In case some venting occurs and causes more than necessary problems?

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby disha » 10 Jun 2008 10:16

shiv wrote:One of the things I did was to Google for information on what kind of building damage could occur from underground tests and whether it could be a bluff to give a Khetolai excuse for a 45 kt yield....

But as far as I can tell - there is no clear information to say whether 100 kt at 5 km is bad or not bad.


A question, to your mind what is bad?

1. Venting? Note that the bum should be deep enough to ensure that no venting or minimal venting occurs!
2. Ground Shake? Several villages around, and not all of them "quake proof" - remember Killari? No government wants that.
3. Pollution of ground water veins [or even closing down some]? Remember several villages around actually depend upon dug wells for all seasons!
4. All of them above?

Will this information help? From the link http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/new_nuclear_weapons/loyieldearthpenwpnrpt.html

I will highlight items that buttresses some of the above ...

Containment

Just how deep must an underground nuclear explosion be buried in order for the blast and fallout to be contained?


The US conducted a series of underground nuclear explosions in the 1960s — the Plowshare tests — to investigate the possible use of nuclear explosives for excavation purposes. Those performed prior to the 1963 Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty, such as the Sedan test shown in Figure 4, were buried at relatively shallow depths to maximize the size of the crater produced.

The 100 KT Sedan nuclear explosion, one of the Plowshares excavation tests, was buried at a depth of 635 feet. The main cloud and base surge are typical of shallow-buried nuclear explosions. The cloud is highly contaminated with radioactive dust particles and produces an intense local fallout.


In addition to the immediate effects of blast, air shock, and thermal radiation, shallow nuclear explosions produce especially intense local radioactive fallout. The fireball breaks through the surface of the earth, carrying into the air large amounts of dirt and debris. This material has been exposed to the intense neutron flux from the nuclear detonation, which adds to the radioactivity from the fission products. The cloud typically consists of a narrow column and a broad base surge of air filled with radioactive dust which expands to a radius of over a mile for a 5 kiloton explosion.1 In the Plowshare tests, roughly 50 percent of the total radioactivity produced in the explosion was distributed as local fallout — the other half being confined to the highly-radioactive crater.

In order to be fully contained, nuclear explosions at the Nevada Test Site must be buried at a depth of 650 feet for a 5 kiloton explosive — 1300 feet for a 100-kiloton explosive. Even then, there are many documented cases where carefully sealed shafts ruptured and released radioactivity to the local environment.


To keep calculations simple, if I directly apply the above calculations to pokhran test range to get quick rule of thumb estimates:

1. 1 mile =~ 1.5 km. Hence anything above 15 KT if *not* contained will put Khetolai in Jeapordy.
2. For 100 KT, > 1300 feet implies @400 mtrs. But from BR page, the S1 shaft was over 200 mtrs but *not* @400 mtrs.

If I would be tasked and with my bird brain, if I have @200 mtrs of shaft, I will aim for less then <50 Kt, to avoid any venting! Note that the mandate is to test and not to kill.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby p_saggu » 10 Jun 2008 10:32

A question to lakshmi C and all gurus.
1. Please enlighten us more about sub critical and sub component testing.
I know that the proof of the pudding lies in eating it, but isn't it possible to test components individually without actually resorting to a bang any bigger than a few tons?

2. About dial a yield. How is the yield varied from say (B-61) 0.5 to 360 kilotons? Are all components therefore "movable" so to speak?

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Re:

Postby merlin » 10 Jun 2008 10:40

shiv wrote:
merlin wrote:
Unfortunately the forum has fallen for psy ops. Luckily the nation has not.


When you take yourself too seriously, that's what happens. Witness the desperate need to rebut the "fizzle theory" elsewhere, to the point where a poster is personally attacked and his motives questioned (NPA anyone?).

The amount of energy expended to rebut the "fizzle theory" both here and elsewhere is truly enormous. Why? Because people feel that the "fizzle theory" had undermined deterrence in the eyes of the adversaries?


shiv wrote:Merlin the comment about taking oneself too seriously was unnecessary if it was directed at me.The comment seeks to find something to grab on to me personally in order to make a connection between a personal attribute of mine and the debate.


Shiv, I think you know me better than that. It was not directed at you. Snide comments just detract from the focus of the thread and I don't want to do that.

shiv wrote:In fact, whether I take myself seriously or not, the facts, as they are known from public source information will not change.


Correct

shiv wrote:But you may have forgotten or chosen to ignore that I was very serious to start with when I started these threads that no derogatory personal attributes or motivations should be attached to anyone when we discuss this subject on here.


I have not forgotten.

shiv wrote:The reason is simple and I will state it again in case you have not read it or it has slipped your mind. This debate has a wide variety of opinions being expressed. When you call one person a liar or a traitor, you are automatically downgrading the value of his opinion and equally upgrading the value of opposing opinions.

There appears to be an irresistible human urge to make an argument stronger by pulling down the person who makes an argument. The downside of this attractive trick is that if the same thing is applied to everyone - the whole debate gets bogged down in accusations that one person or the other is a liar or a traitor or, if you like "taking himself too seriously" (and should take himself less seriously).


Taking himself seriously - maybe I should have used "When one takes oneself seriously" - if that sounds better. I'm making the statement that we are taking this whole think too seriously. All the pro-dealers and anti-dealters. All of us.

shiv wrote:If we remove these personal bells and whistles that are used to make arguments stronger or weaker, we are left with people's statements that can be taken at face value.

The so called "fizzle" argument has been known for a decade.

The argument had some value. That value was increased a great deal by the allegation that people who were opposed to the fizzle argument may have been liars or traitors. Every statement made by one person was dissed and torn apart to push through a viewpoint that was diametrically opposite to what that person stated. Once the specific accusation against that one person was removed, the fizzle argument lost value and returned to its original value.

Now you have yourself stated that so much energy was not needed to rebut the fizzle argument. I humbly submit to your view and accept that you are completely and wholly correct. Nothing was needed to rebut the fizzle argument other than removing the accusation that people opposed to the fizzle argument were liars or traitors.Once that was done, the fizzle argument disappeared in a cloud of 14 MeV neutrons.

No liars. No fizzles. I presume we can drop that business now?


This whole business will make a good case study someday. I have a question for you personally - do you think that all this casting doubt on yields, etc. has undermined deterrence? Is that why a strong rebuttal was necessary?

shiv wrote:Added later: What is this "elsewhere" business in your post? Would you be so kind as to explain that more clearly?

Sorry, I should not have said that :rotfl: Idhar ki baat udhar and udhar ki baat idhar does not serve any purpose at all.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby disha » 10 Jun 2008 10:47

p_saggu wrote:A question to lakshmi C and all gurus.
1. Please enlighten us more about sub critical and sub component testing.
I know that the proof of the pudding lies in eating it, but isn't it possible to test components individually without actually resorting to a bang any bigger than a few tons?

2. About dial a yield. How is the yield varied from say (B-61) 0.5 to 360 kilotons? Are all components therefore "movable" so to speak?


On your second question, one cannot have such a high variance from 0.5 to 360 KT. That is like having 720% growth unless it is a paki bum coming out of musharafs.

The yield of primary can be varied from say 20 Kt to 100 Kt based on the amount of tritium injected into the pit of the weapon. But again I am talking about FBF and I do not understand the ratios of TN weapons.

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Re: Re:

Postby shiv » 10 Jun 2008 16:31

merlin wrote: I have a question for you personally - do you think that all this casting doubt on yields, etc. has undermined deterrence? Is that why a strong rebuttal was necessary?

No to both. More when we meet or on email.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby Gerard » 10 Jun 2008 16:59

About dial a yield. How is the yield varied from say (B-61) 0.5 to 360 kilotons? Are all components therefore "movable" so to speak?


While it appears that some American weapons had versions with higher yields obtained from adding oralloy rings to the secondary at the weapons depot or manufacturer, the actual dial-a-yield options on the B61 were set by the bomber crew itself.

here is some idle speculation... assume some mechanism to decouple the primary from the secondary (disrupting x ray flux inside radiation case?)

0.3kt might be the unboosted primary yield (fizzle)
15kt might be full primary yield (tritium boost) but no secondary ignition
150 kt might be yield with secondary but without boosting of the spark plug (partial burn)
300 kt might be full bomb yield

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby enqyoobOLD » 10 Jun 2008 17:16

Aha! NOW I can speak to my TRUE area of expertise. Pls kindly go back and look at that picture of the cracked wall in the village onlee. This is what is called a "Brick Separation Crack" (DO NOT APPLY PINGREJI-ANGREJI TRANSLATOR TO THAT! :eek: ). I spent $$300,000,000,000,000,000 not many saal ago to fix the beginnings of one like that on the wall of my ghar, so I keenly feel the effect. :cry:

Given that there was no air blast wave (the ppl seem to be standing up OK) then this was caused by a shifting or settling of the foundation. Where I live, this may happen because
(a) Big tree close by sticks roots under the foundation
(b) Big tree nearby drains water from under the ground, causing foundation to settle
(c) Fancy exterior brick chimney is beginning to slant out and declare independence from rest of house.

Since trees are not an issue here, one must conclude that there was a big enough disturbance to cause a PERMANENT change in the ground support beneath the foundation in some parts. Key word is permanent - not just a passing wave. A house may have collapsed due to a wave, but leaving a nice brick separation crack (note that the crack propagated along the mortar, not actually breaking many bricks) is a pretty sure sign of a foundation settlement.

GOOGLE "Foundation settling" and u will c what I mean. The fix is not easy: They dig holes next to the foundation, and insert several steel jacks under the foundation. Then they use hydraulic presses to raise each jack a fraction of a millimeter at a time until it takes the load. Then they cover everything back up and tell the homeowner, now poorer by $$299,999,999,999,999,990 : "That should prevent FURTHER settling. Six maheene from now, pls call our friendly brickmason and he will fill the cracks". The settling cannot be REVERSED because they fear that other cracks may appear elsewhere if they try. So moi learned to mix cement and fill in the cracks with the remaining $10. Did not learn the art of mortar-color-matching, unfortunately. :((

Bottom line: 4km from Ground Zerrow, the ground experienced permanent settling in parts. Some serious changes must have occurred below. I doubt if there is a big water reservoir close to the surface, or it wouldn't be called a desert. So what other changes occurred?

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby John Snow » 10 Jun 2008 20:49

enqyoob saar too much complication, not sinking no winking, it was bad curing( water shortage) onlee and or bad maal (mixture of Raasi cement and too much sand from Pokhran), no need th jack up hydraulic or pneumatic)

:wink:

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby SaiK » 10 Jun 2008 22:47

Can't we come up with a formula from that cracked building?, keeping the building distance from the epicenter, construction quality, blah blah.. and come to an yield figure: that 2"crack, means a vibration of x wavelength, and thus the yield. Somebody in the village should get the thesis awarded..call it khetlai theory of yield determination.

:mrgreen:

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby Anujan » 10 Jun 2008 22:57

p_saggu wrote:A question to lakshmi C and all gurus.
1. Please enlighten us more about sub critical and sub component testing.
I know that the proof of the pudding lies in eating it, but isn't it possible to test components individually without actually resorting to a bang any bigger than a few tons?

p_saggu-saar,
Here is a link from Lawrence livermore about subcritical testing. Keeping in mind that the info is likely to be (a) incomplete (b) misleading. Some choice qutotes
Unkil wrote:The tests focus on ejecta and spall, phenomena that are thought to affect the performance of a nuclear warhead, specifically that part of the warhead called the primary. Ejecta are a violent spray of plutonium particles that are propelled from a material's surface when it is compressed by a powerful shock wave. Spall is the breakup of plutonium from the explosive shock wave reflected back from the surface.

accumulation of alpha particles (helium nuclei) produced by the radioactive decay of plutonium atoms is thought to cause imperfections in the material's crystalline structure and thereby possibly affect its performance. To investigate the consequences of aging, subcritical tests compare the behavior of newly machined plutonium with that obtained from old, dismantled warheads.

The primary diagnostic is a laser-based imaging system that captures the cloud of plutonium ejecta flying out from the shocked surface at the moment of explosion (called shock breakout). The film of this experiment is actually a hologram, which, when projected with a laser, allows experimenters to "walk through" a cloud of plutonium particles in three dimensions. The hologram provides data on the size, shape, number, and velocity of the particles. High-speed cameras also record images of the shocked plutonium over time.

In any case, for SDREs to engage in subcritical testing, they need to build up their capabilities in diagnostic instrumentation. Dont know the state of that.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby enqyoobOLD » 10 Jun 2008 23:15

In any case, for SDREs to engage in subcritical testing, they need to build up their capabilities in diagnostic instrumentation. Dont know the state of that.

NOW v r using MY brain, as Laurel told Hardy. Lasers used in such imaging come under either HEL (high energy lasers, like things that can weld metal) or LEL (Low energy lasers). Both are on the ITAR/Dual use / Munitions list, so easy import requires sweet relations with the NSG, Unkil etc. Until recently, it was not possible to import these things into even the academic institutions, forget BARC etc.

Do a couple of tests under I2T or N2TN, and we can forget diagnostic instrumentation. Will take only another 15 years a few billion $ worth of R&D to develop these.

More than the average power of the laser, it's the pulse energy and the pulse WIDTH that matter. For such short-term events, one needs femtosecond pulse durations, so if a 100milliJoule pulse is delivered in 1 femtosecond (= 1 E-15 second), the laser power becomes 100E-3 / 1E-15 = 1E14 watts. This will come under HEL, I believe.

This is one of many reasons why I2T and N2TN will lead to stagnation in technological progress. OTOH, I believe that Sanction-giri brings out the best in Indian innovation.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby ShauryaT » 10 Jun 2008 23:30

enqyoob wrote:This is one of many reasons why I2T and N2TN will lead to stagnation in technological progress. OTOH, I believe that Sanction-giri brings out the best in Indian innovation.
There is one more path. Not easy or complete but still a path. Encourage private industry to take the lead in such dual use technologies and assure them that, GoI will support them and have a business for them locally and internationally, when they prove themselves. Government cannot do it alone.

The very fact that we have two competing bad choices to make should require us to question, why do we have these bad choices in the first place and what can be done to ensure we do not get into such a situation again and again. Do not forget that multiple PM's of India did compromise on security interests (by deciding not to test earlier) and succumbed to the economic argument.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby Rye » 10 Jun 2008 23:35

ShauryaT wrote:
Encourage private industry to take the lead in such dual use technologies and assure them that, GoI will support them and have a business for them locally and internationally, when they prove themselves.


Private industry does not run on charity -- unless there is a clear benefit to their bottomline and not vague promises like "we will support you when you prove yourself", why pretend that "rich patriots" will come and do their "patriotic duty" of setting their personal wealth on fire (by spending it on vague promises from the GoI)? If there is no guarantee of monetary support or even a business contract in the end, which Indian entrepreneur in his right mind will put his money for the sake of patriotism?

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby enqyoobOLD » 11 Jun 2008 00:16

Shauryaji. I would say "NOW u r using MAH brain" 2 u 2, but, it would really be "NOW u r saying what I USED to say 15 saal pehle"

The harsh reality is in the following post by Rye - "bottom line". IOW, each company's musharraf is on the line. India cannot provide the market volume to support such things. In 199x, someone I know very well used to preach this self-reliance in the case of lasers, because at the time Indian combustion and supersonic research (critical to this field and others) was really hurting. Very advanced concepts, but 1960s instrumentation for doing experimental diagnostics. So western ppl were simply taking the nice concepts, and putting them in their labs where they had the instrumentation, and figuring out what was needed to develop the concepts.

Look up things like "Air Liquefaction" (the idea that you can separate out liquid oxygen from the compressed air coming into an airbreathing engine as you climb, then use it as rocket fuel when you get so high that there is no more air). Indian-developed, and even the better western papers acknowledge it, but obviously it hasn't gone far enough to allow any Indian tests of airbreathing orbital access. Similar things for petal-shaped supersonic flameholders, and a few other things. Indians think them up, do rudimentary experiments, then someone else takes and refines them and takes the credit.

Same some1 I know, has won some 4 large grants from certain US DoD entities, and several $millions worth of smaller funding chunks, to acquire advanced equipment over 20 years, competing on merit. Most of this $$$$ went to buy advanced laser-based diagnostic systems including advanced cameras, etc. These grants do what you suggest: Guvrmand gives $$$ to research establishments (incl. university profs) to buy the best and most advanced instrumentation to do very difficult things. PhDs generated, patents won, algorithms created and tested, complex problems cracked, pretty pictures generated. Everyone wins. Point is, MOST of the companies from which these systems were bought, have gone out of business. It's not the systems didn't work, they worked very well, it's just that volume did not pick up.

Sad reality. So now I am in agreement that it's OK to buy expensive systems from phoren vendors if it gives you a boost in some critical research area. "Swadeshi" is a noble principle, but "bottomline" is more effective. of course, if GOI were REALLY serious about this, some1 like my acquaintance could figure out how to organize the engineering and R&D to systematically develop the customer base, suppliers and experts needed to generate the "critical mass". But like I said, "if GOI were serious". Not likely.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby Arun_S » 11 Jun 2008 00:32

SaiK wrote:Can't we come up with a formula from that cracked building?, keeping the building distance from the epicenter, construction quality, blah blah.. and come to an yield figure: that 2"crack, means a vibration of x wavelength, and thus the yield. Somebody in the village should get the thesis awarded..call it khetlai theory of yield determination.

:mrgreen:

Earth shaking rebuttal to those who did not fizzle. :rotfl: :rotfl: :twisted:
In Laloo speak to disarm those verbose long Laloo speeches.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby enqyoobOLD » 11 Jun 2008 00:39

Its actually quite possible. Take the brick separation gap width, find height above foundation, and you can calculate the settlement depth. Use the radius (distance to tbe bum) and the bum shaft depth to figure the depth of the heating there. Estimate the fraction of the soil/rock that has been vaporized and escaped, to cause the settlement. Look up data on outgassing of such strata vs. temperature, and you can estimate the temperature reached. The temperature is mostly due to heating due to compression, I assume, so far away from the blast, not due to direct heat transfer. This gives a measure of the blast wave intensity there.

Send the $300,000,000,000 grant to Abdul Enqyoob Faisalabadi, abdul.enqyoob@hotmail.com pls.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby ramana » 11 Jun 2008 02:42

N^3, It is not correct to think that the deterrent was based on fizzles for the following reasons. One, there were other arrows in the quiver and even more so other bows. Second, the other side did not know about the estimated fizzle for the stuff was proofed many times at full value. Third, look up the full value of the estimated fizzled models. On the other hand the same cannot be said about present case under discussion.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby enqyoobOLD » 11 Jun 2008 04:59

yo ramana, you are being waaaay too kind and optimistic if you think I understand any of that. Anyway, I don't agree that the Indian tests fizzled. OTOH, I find that I have argued myself into a corner. It looks like the yield in the most important tests (May 11) was way OVER the best estimates of the designers, because they came very very close to destroying that village. Or else their measurements of the properties of the strata (or of the construction of the houses) were way off. Either way, if they expected a lot higher yield, it's clear that they would have gone and done it somewhere else. The political fallout from casualties at the village would have been way too bad.

So I could "prove" by this argument that the S-1 yield was pre-calculated to plus or minus 1 KT, and they had so much sheer confidence that they bet the lives of the villagers on this. But of course I don't believe that myself. So what happened? Did the simultaneous blasts occur SO perfectly simultaneously that the wavefronts amplified in non-linear manner? If so, the yield calculations are hopeless, because you are solving a nonlinear integral equation with limited sensor locations, and uncertain properties of the propagation medium. Did they just plain mess up and forget about the village, and were incredibly lucky?

These all lead me to believe that they either made calculation errors in predicting effects, or the intended yield of S1 was only, say, 30 KT. The 44KT shocked the heck out of the designers.

If OTOH their predictions were so accurate and they had such confidence, then I read your above post differently, and conclude that there were other tests before. Of course in that case there may have been other tests since and there can be other tests again too, and no one need know. But I can't believe that things that shake the earth or the sea-bed can go undetected these days. So that doesn't work either. Then again, as shaurya says, the tests on May 13 were only felt as Magnitude 2 earthquakes of which there are plenty, then I don't see why those cannot be tested whenever desired.

All of which leaves only one issue: Should India test 1MT functioning weapons? There I still say, NO, not any time soon. It's just not smart policy, and I don't see that any critical deterrent need is met through that anyway, so it's mostly an ego thing based on the H&D criteria of the 1960s.
Of course, if you say: "this N^3 doesn't understand anything of what I've been saying!" You are 400% right. I don't, and its no fault of yours.

P.S. One more issue. Why were the tests on May 13 all so small? I would think that the 24 hours on May 11-12 was truly hectic, and they got preliminary yield estimates before deciding what to test on May 13. So the choices are:
a. The big one(s) on May 13 fizzled
b. The big one on May 13 became unnecessary because the S1 worked well.
c. The big one on May 13 was cancelled because the effects of thre May 11 tests were WAY beyond what was expected, and they were not contained, so it would have been fatal to test the big one on May 13. If there was to much atmospheric release, or the village was wiped out, the damage would have been unacceptable. IOW cancellation was because the pit depth calculation or the village damage calculation was shown to be wrong.

But in case (c), I think India may have announced that there were 3 more tests to come, in a week, and gone digging a big pit deeper into the desert.

Again, you have probably given the answers to this question long ago. my apologies for not knowing.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby shiv » 11 Jun 2008 06:03

FWIW, a bit of history as recorded by one firangi source

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaSmiling.html
In keeping with the great secrecy involved in India's efforts to develop and test its first nuclear explosive device, the project employed no more than 75 scientists and engineers working on it in the period from 1967 to 1974. Of course this does not count the thousands of individuals required to build and operate the infrastructure supporting BARC and to produce the plutonium for the device.

Outside of those actually working on the project, only about three other people in India knew of it - Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, her trusted adviser and former principal secretary P.N. Haksar, and her current principal secretary D.P. Dhar. No government ministers, including the Defense Minister, were informed.

The implosion system was designed to compress the core to twice its normal density. The lenses that were developed used the fast-slow explosive design pioneered by the U.S. in World War II. Like the Gadget exploded at Trinity in 1945, they used an RDX-TNT mixture as the fast explosive, with baratol (barium nitrate and TNT) used as the slow explosive. Chengappa descibes the inner slow explosive component as being in the shape of "Shiva ling am" -- a phallus in Hindu religious art which is squat and blunt in form. The device used 12 lens, which is described by Chengappa [pg. 182]: "the way the explosives were placed around the plutonium sphere resembled the petals of the lotus". This presumably indicates that each hemisphere of the implosion system consisted of 6 longitudinal lens segments (asymmetric diamond shaped lenses) joined together at the pole so that they formed triangular teeth at the equator which interlocked with the opposite hemisphere. This design is simpler and less sophisticated than the 32-lens "soccer ball" system developed by the U.S. during World War II. From 1971 through 1973 Venkatesan at TBRL fired over 500 lenses during development.

The detonators developed for the device were lead azide spark gap detonators. These detonators are capable of the very high speed operation needed for an implosion system but are much less sophisticated that the exploding bridge wire (EBW) detonators developed by Alvarez during the Manhattan Project. Spark gap detonators are the most unsafe type of detonator, since static discharges or power surges from lightning strikes can set them off. These detonators were only used for the 1974 test, and were later replaced by safer types (presumably EBWs). In [Chengappa 2000; pg. 184] these detonators are said to have a margin of error of 7 microseconds, a figure that is so large that it is probably incorrect (a figure under 1 microsecond would more plausible).
High speed gas tube switches were developed to trigger the device by the laser division of BARC.

Obtaining the plutonium for the core presented a problem. In 1970 the Phoenix plutonium plant developed a serious leak and had to be shut down. Initial estimates were that the plant could be put back into operation within a year, but by late 1972 it was clear that another year or more would be required before it could again produce separated plutonium. After construction of Purnima there was little plutonium left from which to fabricate the core. So eight months after it began operation, Ramanna ordered Purnima shut down in January 1973 so that part of its fuel could be used to manufacture the nuclear device. This type of solid core device requires about 6 kg of plutonium (the Gadget and the Fat Man bomb each used 6.2 kg; but the design yield of the Indian device was smaller), and Purnima contained 18 kg. Thus in 1974 India's entire inventory of plutonium could have manufactured no more than three bombs.

Instead of fabricating the core as two hemispheres as was done during the Manhattan Project, Soni and Kakodkar designed the core to be made in a number of slices (probably six) that stacked to form a sphere. To ensure a snug fit, the mating surfaces of the slices tapered off with a twist so that they would lock together securely. This design, which they first modeled this in brass, allowed them to work with smaller pieces of plutonium. The actual plutonium core was fabricated by a team led by P.R. Roy of BARC's radio-metallurgy department, who had also made the plutonium fuel rods for Purnima.

The work on the neutron initiator began in mid 1972, and became one of the "critical paths" of the project, a task that prevented completion of preparations before May 1974. The team lead, V.K. Iya, recognizing the difficulties in development after his sojourn at Saclay had recommended in 1965 that development of an initiator be begun immediately. At the start of the project T.S. Murthy estimated it would take 18 months if they were given everything they needed (and estimate that turned out to be too optimistic). A principal difficulty was in learning the techniques to manufacture and handle the large amounts of polonium required (this had been a problem in the Manhattan Project as well).

The initiator was christened the Flower; Chengappa explains "it is believed that the Indian team deposited the polonium on a platinum gauze in the configuration of a lotus to allow maximum surface area". Chengappa claims that the polonium-bearing gauze was enclosed in a tantalum metal sphere, which was nested in a uranium metal shell that had embedded in it beryllium pellets. The system was designed so that the implosion shock wave would drive the beryllium pellets through the tantalum shell to mix with the polonium. Perkovich states that the beryllium was designed to create shape charges, implying a beryllium shell with wedge shaped grooves (like the Manhattan Project's Urchin), or conical or polygonal pits which would form penetrating jets of beryllium when the collapsed. Perkovich gives the diameter of the Flower and 1.5 cm, Chengappa as "about 2 cm".

The Flower was not ready until around 4 May 1974. To get it to Pokhran in time Iyengar and Murthy carried it aboard a regular Indian Airlines flight in a thermos bottle.
A final step in nuclear design verification was taken on 19 February 1974, when a "tickling the dragon's tail" experiment was conducted. The core for the test device was assembled and mounted on a track so that two large blocks of paraffin wax, simulating the high explosive that would surround the core, could be slowly advanced while the neutron emissions from the core were monitored. After 24 hours, the experiment was successfully complete showing that the design was safe to assemble, and that the criticality formulas were correct.

Also in February successful test firings of hemispherical assemblies of the implosion lens were conducted.

The task of sinking the shaft for the test was assigned to the 61 Engineering Regiment stationed in Jodhpur. Ramanna first contacted the regiment commander, Lt. Col. Subherwal, in May 1973 to dig the shaft. The Army did not cooperate until June when PM Gandhi ordered Gen. Bewoor to proceed. The unit had no prior experience in digging shafts and the work got underway with difficulty. The shaft construction project was code named Operation Dry Enterprise, and the engineers and soldiers were told that they were digging a well to supply the Pokhran test range. The project was set back in January 1974 when, unfortunately they did hit water when the shaft tunneled into an aquifer that underlies Pokhran (that this seems to have been a surprise indicates an astonishing lack of preparation, since exploratory drilling would have quickly revealed this). Efforts to pump out or contain the flow of water failed and the shaft had to be abandoned. A new shaft was begun at the site of the abandoned village of Malki which was known to have dug several dry unsuccessful wells many years before. Sinking the new shaft began in February 1974 and was completed only days before the 18 May test.
The fact that two shafts were constructed may account for reports that India actually made two tests in 1974, the first of which failed.

Ramanna indicates in his autobiography that a round of decision making meetings occurred in 1974 prior to the test. The meetings included only Ramanna, Sethna, Nag Chaudhuri, Haksar and Dhar. The first was held probably in February when successful tests indicated the device was nearing completion. The final meeting occurred a "few weeks" prior to the 18 May test. Both Dhar and Haksar opposed the test to varying degrees, the three PNE program leaders supported it strongly. It was of course PM Gandhi's decision, and she ordered it to go ahead.

The completed core (probably packed as separate pieces) was transported to Pokhran from Trombay under the direct supervision of Chidambaram and Roy. They rode in an army convoy carrying the plutonium core packed in a special case for the 900 km journey, which took three days.

The explosive lenses and other components of the implosion system came from TBRL by truck along with high speed cameras to record the detonation.

The device was assembled in a hut 40 m from the shaft. Assembly began on 13 May with a team made up of Soni, Kakodkar, Iyengar, Venkatesan and Balakrishnan. During the assembly process the plutonium core was mounted in a copper disk to act as a heat sink and remove the decay heat. Nonetheless due to the extreme desert heat the core components did not fit together properly, and the assembly attempt was unsuccessful. The next day attempts were started earlier in the day and succeeded, so assembly moved on the lenses. Each of 12 lenses weighed approximately 100 kg and required 4 people to lift. Once both halves of the device were complete, each with 6 lenses, the upper half was raised with a crane to put in place. While this was going on one of the lenses slipped out of its mount and fell to the ground, becoming chipped. There was one (and only one) spare lens on hand to serve as a replacement. The assembly operation was complete after nightfall. The assembled device was hexagonal, yellow, about 1.25 m in diameter and weighed 1400 kg. The device was mounted on a hexagonal metal tripod, and transported to the shaft on rails which the army kept covered with sand.

The device was lowered into the shaft on the morning of 15 May. It was placed in a side cavity at the bottom of the L-shaped shaft. Moisture oozing from the shaft side gave concern about the integrity of the firing circuit, and Balakrishnan volunteered to go down the shaft to check it. Finally the shaft was sealed with sand and cement.

The team retired to an observation bunker 5 km away for the test on 18 May. The entire team of senior leaders and contributors to the PNE project appear to have been present.In addition to the assembly team, also present were Ramanna, Sethna, Nag Chaudhuri, Chidambaram, Sikka, Srinivasan, Dastidar, presumably Murthy and Roy who had helped deliver the nuclear components, Gen. Bewoor, and Lt. Col. Subherwal.
The test was scheduled for 8 a.m., but it was delayed for five minutes because V.S. Sethi, an engineer from TBRL, became stranded at the test site while checking the high speed cameras when his jeep wouldn't start. Sethi hiked out in time for the test to go as scheduled, but the army's efforts to recover the jeep delayed the shot. Finally at 8:05 a.m. Dastidar pushed the firing button.

Aside from the PNE development team members actually at Pokhran, the only other Indians who knew of the test in advance for sure were PM Gandhi and her close advisers Haksar and Dhar. There is disagreement about when the Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram was notified. According to Perkovich [Perkovich 1999; pg. 174] Ram learned of the test on 8 May (but was not consulted for his opinion). Chengappa [Chengappa 2000; pg. 12] asserts that he only learned of the test after the shot. Perkovich also says that the Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh was given 48 hour advance notice.

Efforts to notify the Prime Minister about the success of the test met with some difficulty. Sethna tried to contact P.N. Dhar in the the Prime Minister's Office by prearrangement through a field telephone that had been set up at the bunker, but when he finally succeeded in making a connection (after several attempts) the line went dead before he could pass on the information. Subherwal drove Setha to Pokhran village to make another call, but Sethna had forgotten Dhar's number. Subherwal finally established contact through the telephone operator (after encountering considerable resistance in putting the call through) so that the message could be delivered. However Dhar had already been successfully informed by Gen. Bewoor ten minutes earlier, also by a call placed at Pokhran village.

This test has been known since its public announcement as "Smiling Buddha", a name apparently given to it by Dhar, but the origin of this appellation is somewhat mysterious. The test actually had no formal code name prior to the shot (a pattern that would be repeated with the second test series 24 years later). The test was coincidentally conducted on the Buddhist festival day of Buddha Purnima, perhaps the reason that the association with the Buddha came about. Chengappa relates that the story that Sethna passed on the message to Dhar with the code phrase "The Buddha is smiling" is probably a myth [Chengappa 2000; pg. 3]. Haksar refused to confirm the story in an interview before his death, Sethna denies he used such a code phrase, and Dhar agrees that this phrase was not used, and claims he was not repsonsible for it. Ramanna claims that he had been told by Sethna that the code phrase had been used, and that the phrase was Dhar's idea. Sethna believes that Dhar made up the code name after the test. [There is a bit of a parallel here between the naming of India's first test, and the origin of the name "Trinity" used for the first U.S. test. This test is known to have been named by Robert Oppenheimer, but the reasons for the name are controversial.]
The yield of the PNE has also remained controversial. Although occasional press reports have given ranges all the way up to 20 kt, and as low as 2 kt, the official yield was set early on at 12 kt (post Operation Shakti claims have raised it to 13 kt). Outside seismic data, and analysis of the crater features indicates a lower figure. Analysts usually estimate the yield at 4 to 6 kt using conventional seismic magnitude-to-yield conversion formulas. In recent years both Homi Sethna and P.K. Iyengar have conceded that the official yield is an exaggeration. Iyengar has variously stated that the yield was actually 8-10 kt, that the device was designed to yield 10 kt, and that the yield was 8 kt 'exactly as predicted'. Careful analysis of hard rock cratering effects establishes a tight bound around 8 kt for the yield however. For a detailed discussion of this issue see What Are the Real Test Yields?.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby shiv » 11 Jun 2008 06:19

More History
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1625/16250810.htm

The question of nuclear yield

BARC scientists present the proof.
In the wake of the five nuclear tests at Pokhran on May 11 and 13, 1998, some questions were raised about their yield levels. Some Western seismologists said that the total yield of the three explosions on May 11 was between 10 and 15 kilotonnes, while t hat of the two tests on May 13 was 100 to 150 tonnes. Then doubts were raised about whether one of the three devices exploded on May 11 was really a thermonuclear device, or a hydrogen bomb as it is called. In response, Dr. R. Chidambaram, Chairman, Atom ic Energy Commission (AEC), and Dr. Anil Kakodkar, Director, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), asserted that the total yield of the five explosions was around 60 kilotonnes. (Frontline, June 9, 1998 and January 15, 1999). Dr. Chidambaram and B ARC scientists also asserted that it was a thermonuclear device that India had exploded.
In October 1999, questions were raised about whether the two sub-kilotonne tests on May 13 had fizzled out, that is, whether the explosion had occurred at all. The New York Times wrote in October 1999: "Had India faked explosive tests? Were they f lops? Or had small blasts eluded the eavesdroppers?... Though opponents of the treaty point to the Indian claim as a test ban embarrassment, the emerging consensus among nuclear experts is that what failed that day was not global monitoring but the pair of explosive devices."
In January 1999, in an article titled "Nuclear Energy in India," Dr. Chidambaram stated that the sub-kilotonne devices, whose yield is less than one kilotonne (1,000 tonnes), were also fission devices. But designing a sub-kilotonne device was more diffic ult than designing a standard fission device. "In a sub-kilotonne device... where one goes marginally super-critical, one cannot afford to make a mistake. In the case of a mistake, one may have a fizzle. In the case of the May 1998 tests, all the three s ub-kilotonne tests gave a perfect match between the calculated and the measured yields, which is important. In case one signs the CTBT, one cannot carry out tests, which release any nuclear yield. If one can predict accurately the yield of a device whose yield is only a few hundred tonnes, one can also guarantee the design of an experiment where the fissile material in its optimum configuration will go close to criticality and still stay sub-critical. Thus, our sub-kilotonnes tests have also given us a capability to carry out sub-critical tests, if we consider them necessary. We have, however, no plans at the moment to carry out sub-critical tests..."
In order to sustain an informed debate on the subject, Frontline reproduces here an article written by scientists of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay, in BARC Newsletter, September 1999. The authors of the article are R. B. Attarde, V.K. Shukla, D.A.R. Babu, V.V. Kulkarni and Anil Kakodkar.
THE five nuclear tests conducted during May 11-13, 1998 at Pokhran included three sub-kilotonne devices, in addition to a thermonuclear device and a standard fission device. One sub-kilotonne device was tested on May 11, while on May 13, two sub-kilotonn e devices were tested. This report gives some of the results of gamma radiation logging measurements in bore holes at the sites of the sub-kilotonne tests as well as the post-shot radioactivity measurements on the samples extracted from these sites.
Gamma radiation logging
Figure 1. The gamma dose rate at the test site of the 0.5 kilotonne device on May 13, 1998.
Gamma radiation logging was carried out in the bore holes drilled at each of the test sites. The equipment used for this purpose was developed at the Radiation Safety Systems Division, BARC. The equipment consisted of a measuring unit and a detector prob e unit that were coupled by a long cable wound on a cable winch. The main detector probe consisted of two energy-compensated Geiger-Mueller (GM) tubes. It covered six ranges, from 0-2 microGray to 0-200 milliGray. (The actual ranges were 0-2 microGray, 0 -20 microGray, 0-200 microGray, 0-2 milliGray, 0-20 milliGray, 0-200 milliGray.)
Figure 2. The gamma spectrum of a sample from the test of the 0.3 kilotonne device.
The measuring unit incorporates necessary high voltage supply for detectors, a count rate meter, scaling circuits and an audio circuit. All the readings were displayed by the linear 50 division meter. The audio facility was quite useful in monitoring the health of the instrument during logging. Before and after each logging, the instrument was checked with a test source. The instrument was initially calibrated at the BARC for all the ranges - at different points in each range - using various source stre ngths.
These measurements have shown the presence of gamma emitters at all the test sites. Figure 1 gives the variation of gamma dose along depth at the test site of the 0.5 kilotonne device.
Identification of radioactive species
Figure 3 shows the variation of 137Cs activity with depth for the 0.2 kilotonne device.
The samples extracted from bore holes at all the test sites were assayed for radioactivity content at the Environmental Assessment Division of the BARC. The samples were powdered and dried. The homogenised samples were stored in plastic containers of 8 c m height and 7 cm diameter each. For the assessment of radionuclides, two high resolution gamma-ray detectors with efficiency levels of 20 per cent and 30 per cent with respect to a 7.5 cm x 7.5 cm thallium-activated sodium iodide detector (a versatile d etector for radiation) coupled with a multi-channel spectrometer consisting of 8,000 channels, were used. This detector is capable of giving a high-resolution spectrum. Europium-152 sources (as gamma radiation) were employed as standards for efficiency c alibrations of the detectors in the specified geometry.
Figure 2 gives a typical gamma spectre of a sample collected from the test site of the 0.3 kilotonne device. The spectra clearly show the presence of fission products such as Cesium-137, Zirconium-95 and Niobium-95. These isotopes are otherwise not pre sent in nature. Their presence in samples is a signature of nuclear fission.
Figure 3 shows the variation of 137Cs activity with height, from the lowest point at the test site of the 0.2 kilotonne device.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby shiv » 11 Jun 2008 09:00

If we are looking at "uncertainties" in the deterrent, there are many

1) As pointed out by someone, the Indian nuclear tests were stated to be designs that could be weaponized, and not warheads themselves (except one fission bomb)

2) 200kt capability has never been proven in a live test

3) There is no open source proof that any warhead built in India can withstand a 5000 km flight into space and back and survive to work as advertised.

4) Indeed there is no proof that the missiles themselves will reach targets as advertised.

5) We will never ever be able to do a live test in which a live warhead is dropped on a target at a realistic range.

Beyond a particular degree - "proving" a deterrent to the satisfaction of everyone who has doubts becomes an exercise in futility. Relevant to this thread is that a "test" that proves 200 kilotons leaves point 3 unproven, and 5 will not change.

Let me post some speculation - this is pure speculation and has no basis that I have researched or discovered. I just wonder if nuclear weapon designers have discovered that given fissile material and a reasonable engineering capability in any country (notwithstanding racist derision) it is possible for any group to make a working, reliable and frightening nuclear "deterrent" at least as powerful as Hiroshima.

It appears are most countries are deterred even by the prospect of a single Hiroshima, and there is very little public material available quoting leaders and nations who are willing to openly risk several Hiroshima sized bombs dropped on themselves to prove a point. Note that making such a public statement would be a self goal for the person who makes it. Who has said "Go on.. nuke me"? He would have to be a despot/oligarch and a nuke in his hands would be real deterrence.

If "credibility of deterrent" can be achieved by less than complete demonstration of ability to design and live test a bomb on target, I believe that just another test to upgrade the "bang" from the yield, or prove a warhead works and which leaves other uncertainties as they are will need to be considered with great caution. In fact I see the linking of testing with the nuclear deal as a situation in which it may be easy to do an incomplete and unsatisfactory series of tests yet again, and then sign a deal that bans testing saying that "all is well"

After all we said "all is well" in 1998, and as someone asked we may test again and again start crying and saying all is not well in 2018. The testing requirement and the nuclear deal have to be two separate issues and one must not impinge on the other. That means, neither should the deal be linked with testing, nor should we link the deal with testing by testing again quickly and claiming that we are ready for a deal just because we have tested once more and proven 200 or 2000kt.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby enqyoobOLD » 11 Jun 2008 17:14

For that matter, there is another aspect to deterrence. Consider this case:
Dictator (I mean, Chief Executive) Abdul wants to take over, say, the Mashkir province of Namibia, because he has heard that the term "nubile" comes from there, and he wants to increase his harem. He has a fool-proof plan to send his Southern Heavy Mujaheddin division to capture the desert and hold it while his paratroop division prepares to jump in and take over the province. Unfortunately, it is known that civilian-ruled, democratic Namibia has a nuclear deterrent. It is PROVEN, with 5000 tests demonstrating that they have a 400% certainty of their weapons hitting the target to within 1 millimeter CEP. Also, their well-advertised FU doctrine says that they will launch 5MT weapons in a decapitation strike. For these reasons, Namibia, being a responsible nation committed to reducing Global Warming, Global Disarmament, etc., maintains only a Minimum Credible Deterrent: 15 five-MT weapons. Enough to vaporize each of Abdul's 10 Palaces and 5 Cantonments. Applauded all over the world, though the world has ironclad Sanctions on Namibia because those tests violated the NTAT (Nukes to Abdul Treaty) and the CTBT.

Abdul also has a nuclear deterrent. It consists of 100 brand-new missiles imported from China and 50 missiles stolen from the US, each equipped with the new "Red Star" P666 warhead built by North Korea, marketed by AQ Khan Inc, based on the Sandia W88 design. Abdul's missiles have never been tested, but it is presumed that they will cause massive destruction, and no one, including Abdul, can predict where they will land.

What is the deterrence equation here? I claim that advantage is on Abdul's side. If Abdul invades Mashkir and starts a genocide there, Namibia will certainly try to beat back the invasion using conventionalk forces. But if that fails, Namibia has ONLY ONE OPTION: Decapitation strike on Abdul. This will (probably) trigger Abdul's missiles, and since they are so unreliable anyway, Abdul has them programmed to ALL launch at once. They will rain down mass death all over Namibia, but being so inaccurate, will also leave millions of survivors. The survivors will starve to death after they have finished cannibalizing each other. Maybe 10 years of unimaginable horror until the final mutilated skeleton curls up and coughs her last. So Namibia cannot hit the "fire" button.

OTOH, Abdul happily embarks on his project. If he wins, as he knows he will, he and his junta will have wimmens and goats to rape as long as their mijjiles can be erected, and then he can just continue with their even greater pleasure: sadism. He will also be feared all over by fellow-dictators. His H&D will rise unimaginably.

Abdul also feels that the term "Namby-pamby" came from Namibia's well-known democratic, liberal traditions. They won't hit the "Fire" button. BUT IF THEY DO, Abdul knows 400% that he will go to houristan along with all his harem, his generals, and his entire regime, including all the cousins who he knows are waiting to assasinate him. GUARANTEED. It will be over in a flash, no pun there. NO possibility that he will survive, to be handed over to a mob of his erstwhile followers.

I claim that here, Namibia's guaranteed weapons and advertised policy, are in fact a deadly liability to Namibia, whereas Abdul's completely unreliable and unpredictable arsenal is a very successful deterrent.

Any similarities between Namibia, Abdul and any current or recent dictators, governments or countries is completely coincidental and in the imagination of those who see it.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby ShauryaT » 11 Jun 2008 21:50

What is the importance (economic, cultural, strategic) of the "Mashkir" province to Namibia? Can the people of Namibia risk it? What has been its history between Abdul and Namibia? Has the great nation of Namibia taken care to keep its 15 5MT missiles, under hardened conditions that not even 20 missiles from Abdul landing on the same spot can destroy them (6000 PSI level).

In deterrence equations, Abdul being the challenger will have to have a superior force to Namibia to challenge the status quo. Does either nation have a BMD in place? Is it likely that "Mashkir" may be under the threshold for Namibia? What about conventional force strength ratios, how do they match up? Abdul being the dictatorial challenger, may probably not care as much about a few bombs in his terrirory, but is he willing to risk "toast" for his entire country? (if yes, then Namibia has probably already lost the case, as no deterent will work in such a case and it is Namibia's fault for allowing such a case to fester, in the first place). Can Namibia counter strike and capture the province is "Izibikstan"?

Many, many variations and dynamics are possible.


I will come back to the privatization question later.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby Prem » 11 Jun 2008 23:26

So, again It mainly boils down to political action/s rather than technoligical issues.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby enqyoobOLD » 11 Jun 2008 23:48

Well.. Prem said it. In the considerations there, the question of whether Namibia's deterrent is fully validated or not, becomes almost moot, despite 5000 tests and 400% accuracy gained at the expense of stringent sanctions. So, more validation of the deterrent (beyond some minimum level needed to scare ppl) is not much more important than several other issues, as ShauryaT so accurately points out (or implies).

Seems that accumulating a very tough conventional deterrent force is far more effective in scaring Abdul and raising the specter of CEO Abdul becoming a lampost-pendulum minus his golas if he tries any misadventures. Also, a well-dispersed numerous arsenal of nukes with questionable accuracy and yield is nevertheless a powerful deterrent to surprise attack.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby Chandi Prasaad » 12 Jun 2008 00:06

Prem (Location: Free Canadian Visamobile) :rotfl: :rotfl: : How is bijness in Slumabad giving "Free Canadian Visa"? With the 11 pure Islamic faujees sent packing to 'dozak' (by God knows woo can doo), I think there are 55 free wimmin of the X-faujees left to take your aaffer aaf "Free Canadian Visa". Buttt the $1,000,000 qwuztion is how do you do it via mobile/blackberry? Let us meet far kaafee this week.

Sarry far OT dijcujjsion and Enquoob speak.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby enqyoobOLD » 12 Jun 2008 02:39

Gee! Looks like this 2TON2T (2 Test Or Not 2 Test) fun-fest is over. The Brick-Separation Crack Picture nailed it, and the Abdul-Namibia example was just the coup-de-grace, the "Quattal" so 2 spk. IPL is over too, chiyar-leedars all gone home. Looks like it's time to return to the salt mines again. :((

Pls wake me up when there is another love-fest with ppl sending loving emails like the Nuke Thread MegatonWallahs were doing a while back.

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby Prem » 12 Jun 2008 02:48

Kaffe Latte and Baki Baatten ,yum yum.

I think we are forgetting the space factor . The future wars of domination will be fought and won with heavenly vehicles carrying Brahmastras of different denominations. It will all boil do to numbers, speed and accuracy .

OT _ did any one watch Future Dog Flight on History Channel : As per the programme, ultimate dog flight contenders are scramjet powered space planes with Beam weapons built by US and Russia ONLY and no one else .

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Re: Future Nuclear testing: pros and cons-2

Postby John Snow » 12 Jun 2008 03:39

Arre yaroan enqyoob saab ne abhi aachi tarah samjhadiya ki fizzle wuzzle ki baatain sirif FUZOOL ki baatain hain.

Jobhi maal hai woh saree takleef ko aar paar bhagha dega aur tandrusti bhi hojayegi.
Chalo ab khagaz pe kidar angooti nishani chipkana batoh to sahi
Sare jahan se achha hindusutan hamara


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