War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 04 Jul 2008 16:25

Rahul M wrote:they would keep their ground forces under the protection of their own simple but massive AA assets. I'm not talking about LR/MR-SAMs. MANPADS, AA guns, even small arms are notoriously effective against low flying a/c in a mountainous terrain. they would use their real high performance aircraft(flankers/flanker copies/J-10) to give some kind of air cover against our high flying a/c. we could see some counter value attacks against high value targets but that would be the extent of it. no CAS ability to speak of if the conflict is in India.

Exactly. However, I would advise keeping one eye out towards the Myanmar airspace beyond the Chaukan pass hills in the extreme east. Basically, speaking, the low altitude airbases spread beyond that region are too tempting to ignore on the basis of not overflying Myanmar for political reasons. It brings more PLAAF firepower to bear on us and spreads the IAF even thinner in that region that what they already are. Add to that issue the question whether we would overfly Bangladesh or not if the situation in the eastern skies gets desperate.

But the BMs/CMs would get used against high value targets in India, like FABs, field HQs, ammo and fuel dumps, rail yards etc.

most certainly true. they can ill afford to use these against all and sundry. the need to rationalize targeting would be a major planning headache for them, IMO.

I have to ask: Just how much damage do you think a single BM targeted for example on the weak road network that tethers Tawang to the south will be able to cause and how much time would be required for the road to be reopened should that happen?

How many parallel roads exist so that if one road get's blocked for some time, the other branches can compensate?

Given the precarious roads leading to Tawang, just how much time would be required to bring in repair vehicles and equipment to bring the road to operational status again? A day? more?

And if the above is known, what is the frequency of missiles (BM/CM) might be required per day to ensure the logistical train never reopens for days on end? What if this tactic is used just after a surprise attack or the spillover of border skirmishes to ensure the Indian reinforcements to the region never reach the forward areas in time? And if that is the case, can the IAF compensate by providing emergency airlift to make up for the delays?

Once you start looking at the numbers to the above questions, you will begin to see why the BM/CM saturation attack option is such a tempting thought process.

Of course, then you can ask in return: can't we do the same to the Chinese? And to answer that look at the above questions again from a Chinese POV and you will see why or why not.

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 04 Jul 2008 16:36

Nayak wrote:Isnt using missiles the final escalation. If they decide to use BMs, how will the SDREs know they are convention or not ?

And that is the main question, isn't it?

IMO there is no fixed answer to the above. It depends on the perceptions of one side on how the other side will perceive a said detection of missile launches to be. If the Chinese think that the Indian government during the crisis is mature, and that they will not launch in a panic mode, then you can expect them to try and use these weapons in the conventional capacity.

If however, the Indian Government is considered weak and panicky, the Chinese might hold back. The same goes for the other side as well.

Further, since I mentioned the word perceive, it might also happen that mistakes in character evaluations on either side may lead to wrong conclusions about the other's side's matureness or the lack of it. Which is what makes the whole question so very dangerous.

Of course, you hold the assumption that we will in fact detect the missiles in time for us to worry about what to do about them. With cruise missiles in terrain following mode, you might learn of their launch only when you hear the boom! In this case the results will be available for the other side to decide whether the attack was conventional or not and what to do about them.

-Vivek

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 04 Jul 2008 16:52

Nayak, you have a point about the accuracy.

Vivek, PRC missiles, especially the BMs are not frighteningly accurate just yet, AFAIK. they can however compensate to some extent by using a lot of bomblets and such warheads.

even so, I doubt they would be accurate enough to completely shut down a road network, but the possibility of serious disruption is quiet real.

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 04 Jul 2008 17:03

Rahul M wrote:even so, I doubt they would be accurate enough to completely shut down a road network, but the possibility of serious disruption is quiet real.

Of course there is no such thing as complete shut down, but my point is that it would not be a one off strike. If a "serious disruption" means several hours, then that is the time gap after which the next barrage would come in and cause disruption again for around the same time.

And since both sides can do this to each other, the question comes down to this: which side can take more damage and cause more damage to/than the other side?

Is the Indian Infrastructure in Arunachal capable of matching the chinese counterpart across the border in such a slugging contest?

-Vivek

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 04 Jul 2008 17:53

road attack needs thawk or jassm type accuracy or manned ac but general mayhem can be caused in nodes like bomdila nd tezpur also plaaf frm yunnan can fly into india without entering myanmar brdo tends to keep eqpt in camps strung out on such rds not in one place anyway tawang is quite close to bomdila

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 04 Jul 2008 18:59

Singha

would not advise you to jump with joy on reports which are based on hmmm - inside info.

We still have a long ways to go.

Plus any report which says the Chinese defence expenditure is correct is suspect.

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 04 Jul 2008 19:51

there's been some stuff in the press about shadow defense expenditure in china, bit of accounting creativity - but basically much higher than the public figures one way or the other

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 05 Jul 2008 00:16

Just in case anyone wants to play around and share maps, you can do it on google maps without th eneed to go thru google earth.

turn on 'terrain' feature and the maps are quite enlightening.

Heres a sample

http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?hl=en&gl ... f&t=p&z=10

rajrang · Post by **rajrang** » 05 Jul 2008 07:00

rohitvats wrote:This appeared on the ORBAT dot com website maintained by Ravi Rikhye:

Is This What China Wants?

By defeating India in 1962, China established its claim lines on the Sino-Indian border as the reality. For 35 years, India adopted a strong defensive posture on the border, with no intent of attacking China to recover lost territory, or even to do more than simply throw back a Chinese offensive should that take place. In the 1990s India agreed to substantially reduce forces on its side of the border to show it considered a peaceful solution to the border issue the only way to go.

China's reaction to the winning hand it held for 35 years and the even bigger hand it managed by making complete idiots of the Indians in the 1990s - in fairness it takes little to make complete idiots of the Indians was - you've guessed it: to push the Indians harder than it has done before, with hundreds of intrusions and a massive infrastructure buildup in Tibet's remote regions including roads in areas India has controlled since before the coming of the British Raj.

We are being neither cynical, bitter, or angry when we make the above comments. China sees itself as the eventual world superpower, this attitude is written into Chinese genes, and the country cannot help itself in taking every opportunity to push its neighbors as much as it can. Peaceful coexistence to the Chinese means accepting China as the suzerain, and that mans everyone else must accept vassal status. What China is doing is absolutely natural.

But is it the right way to advance China's interests?

Consider the following. India has already raised two mountain divisions in 2008, the very first divisions it has raised since 1984. One is clearly a strike reserve against China, the other, while it has a role against Pakistan, has been created very much with China in mind. It is a strike reserve primarily for Ladakh.

Now Mandeep Singh Bajwa tells us that the next step in a decade-long buildup against China is being prepared.

A third new division, specifically for offensive operations in Ladakh, will be raised. Mr. Bajwa naturally cannot give any details as the information is classified. India at this time has 7 regular army battalions and perhaps 2 Scouts battalions oriented to covering the Ladakh border. The existing division is to get a third brigade, additional corps artillery is to be inducted; armored battlegroups - withdrawn under the reduction agreements with China - are to be reinducted; three long-closed airfields have been reactivated, and several Scouts battalions of specialized high mountain troops for offensive operations are to be added.

In other words, not only does Indian Northern Command now have a mountain strike division that is not committed to the Pakistan front, Indian forces in Ladakh are to more than double. As important, nowhere in this buildup is the word "defense" mentioned.

Ladakh has four sectors. One faces Pakistan, and it already has five brigades. Ladakh has three sectors. Even at it the height of its 1960s buildup against China, India's offensive component was a single, limited division attack in the southern sector, intended purely to throw off a Chinese offensive.

But now India is building the capability to launch three simultaneous offensives, one of a brigade in the north, very high and very rugged terrain, a brigade in the center, and a full division in the south.

BUT please consider this. These five brigades are the first wave of the offensive. Behind them will be five other brigades, and behind these will be at least that many more drawn partly from reserves committed primarily to Pakistan front and only secondarily to the China front.

In other words, where India before the buildup essentially had 4-5 brigades for Ladakh, it will soon have 15+, or a tripling of strength. and again, we need to emphasize, no one at Army HQ is talking about defense. These forces are being planned and will train for a straight, heavy-duty, combined air-ground offensive aimed at regaining Ladakh, and completely disrupting China's links with Sinkiang and Central Tibet.

China meanwhile has been steadily reducing its formation and upgrading them. But you see, the upgraded Chinese formations actually still have less capability than the Indians formations of today, unit for unit, because the Indians have steadily continued upgrading their army in general. And a new round of modernization/reequipment is in the works so that the capability gap will be even larger, unit for unit. India is going for mass AND quality, whereas China is going for the discredited American doctrine of quality without mass.

You see, India now has a trillion dollar economy and it spends just a bit over 2% of it on defense. The economy is expected to grow by 50% in the next five years - that is the reduced target given the recent distortions caused by oil and food. And India has decided it needs to going back to spending 4% of GDP on defense - all thanks to China. India's defense budget looks set to triple in the period 2007-2012 - and the irony of it, people are beating up China for its defense expenditure, which - believe it or not - is actually about China says. In other words, China is NOT lying about its expenditures, sorry to disappoint everyone.

So, back to our original question. Does China really think the Indian buildup is in its interest. India did not want to undertake the buildup, it wanted to normalize relations and to demilitarize the border, and it agreed to the latter. So what exactly has China gained by not keeping its end of the deal?

Tomorrow we will talk about the political calculations China is making in the face of this massive Indian buildup, which has just begun, by the way. There are many more divisions on the way. And we will show that those political calculations, while entirely appropriate for the past, are now hopelessly outmoded.

I feel glad to read this article - however it is at odds with the following assessment of Gen Jacob (of Bangladesh fame):

http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?id=14706725

Quoting: "With the improved rail, road and air communications in Tibet, the Chinese can build up to 30 divisions in Tibet in a matter of weeks."

Then, the above Indian build-up will not be sufficient. Any comments?

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 05 Jul 2008 07:14

rajrang wrote:Quoting: "With the improved rail, road and air communications in Tibet, the Chinese can build up to 30 divisions in Tibet in a matter of weeks."

Then, the above Indian build-up will not be sufficient. Any comments?

Sure. How about: strike first and take out the roads and bridges in a preemptive strike to prevent the Chinese buildup or let them build up, deploy and bring in war supplies while we try diplomatic means and then lose the war later.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 05 Jul 2008 07:41

http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratco ... 060706.htm

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Busi ... 5Cb01.html

Tibet Main Road Conditions
http://www.tibet-tour.com/ontheway/tibe ... ition.html

The western development bureau affiliated to the state council released a list of 10 major projects to launch in 2008, the total investment is 151.6 billion yuan (US$20 billion).

The 10 projects are as follows:

* New railways linking Dali to Ruili; and Kuitun to Beitun in Yunnan Province are to be built.

* Railways linking Baotou to Xi'an, and Xining to Ge'ermu are to be reconstructed.

* Highways between Tianshui and Dingxi, Duyun and Xinzhai are to be built.

* Kunming airport is to be relocated.

* Branch airports in western China are to be constructed.

* Hydropower stations in Dagang Mountain and Shi Gorge hydropower station are be built.

* A purified terephthalic acid project, the chemical used to make polyester, (0.6 million ton) made by Chongqing Pengwei Ltd is to be set up.

* A 10 million-ton oil refining project in Guangxi and Sichuan Provinces is be constructed.

* The Huangyuchuan coal mine and Suanci Ditch's 10 million ton coal project in Inner Mongolia.

* Other projects dealing with education, health and other social projects.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 05 Jul 2008 07:42

yes but in those weeks we need to hammer the supply lines.

they may bring in 30 divisions but they need to keep those 30 divisions supplied.

It depends on how aggresive we are willing to get.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 05 Jul 2008 07:51

taking a look at terrain map Jagan posted, its clear there is a flattish belt area
N->S coming down to Tawang from Tibet side while our area is hilly.
in north sikkim again their side is a flat desert while we have giants like kanchenjunga
and some big glaciers spilling over into nepal.

so it is definitely easier for them to gather resources quickly near the border.

if we can get air superiority these things can be targeted, there are not too
many escape routes out there.

the three big cities east of tibet are chengu, chonquing and kunming(capital of yunnan).
each is around 1000km from our border and not suitable for directly launching air ops
but there could be PLAAF bases much closer and at lower altitude. these three big
cities are probably the railway nodes for feeding in men and materials from eastern
seaboard. there is also Lanzhou a bit west of these which is the garison HQ for their
eastern tibet military region.

we must be prepared to launch deep strikes on logistical targets atleast upto these
three cities...i.e around 1300km from Tezpur. thats the extreme of SU30 combat
radius on internal fuel, buddy refueling is very risky to depend on over enemy
airspace. bombload will not be heavy - perhaps PGMs and KH59 type missiles
are best bag for buck there.

the 1000km range brahmos would have helped considerably. or Nirbhay GLCM ofcourse.

Don · Post by **Don** » 05 Jul 2008 07:52

Singha wrote:PLAs total holding of S300PMU alleged to be around 190 TELs each for 2-3 tubes.

Israel apparently managed to jam S300 defences in Syria when they took out the reactor
side and Cyprus also fields S300 which I am sure IDF have snooped on. we must try level
best to incorporate these countermeasures in our EW gear asap. perhaps "trial" some S300
systems in India also and learn their characteristics.

Here is an informative article about the S-300 on PLA :

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/Security/2 ... ssia/3682/

China to receive lastest SAMs from Russia

ANDREI CHANG

Published: May 02, 2008

HONG KONG, China, Russia will deliver to China four battalions of 200-kilometer-range S-300PMU2 surface-to-air missiles this summer, the last batch in a series ordered by China. The first batch of four battalions of the same missiles was delivered in July 2007.
Starting in 1993, China received 12 battalions of S-300 SAMs, four of them S-300PMUs and eight S-300PMU1s. This means there are a total of 20 battalions of S-300 SAMs deployed in China. These missiles are expected to play a major role in China's core air defense system.

These missiles now cover the whole of the Chinese coast facing the Taiwan Strait. Positions previously covered by HQ-2 ground-to-air missiles have been upgraded to S-300 launch positions.

In the combat theater centered on the city of Fuzhou in Fujian province, Longtian Airport is armed with S-300s, which are intended to cover the whole northern section of the combat area. The S-300PMU1/2s deployed along the Taiwan Strait are right along the coastline, providing the first line of air defense for the operations of AWACS and bombers behind the front lines.

Since H-6H bombers are armed with long-range YJ-63 air-to-surface missiles, the KJ-200/2000 AWACS and H-6H/Ks outer-line protection is supported by the S-300 SAMs. These land-based SAM systems will provide effective protection against attacks from the air.

The objective of deploying S-300 SAMs at Longtian and Huian Airport is to protect the airports during a confrontation, and provide emergency landing sites for damaged combat aircraft. The mainstay third generation fighter aircraft including Su-27, J-11, Su-30 and J-10A fighters will not directly use these airport facilities due to their long flight ranges.

Originally, there was one S-300 position and one HQ-2 ground-to-air missile position at Longtian Airport. The S-300 position is composed of four launch vehicles and uses 64N6E search radar. This indicates that the ground-to-air missiles deployed at this airport are at least S-300PMU1s, because in the early phase the first batch of these missiles imported from Russia used ST-68UM (36D6) search radar produced by the Ukrainian Iskra Industrial Complex.

One battalion of the PLA Air Force's S-300PMU1 missiles normally uses four launch vehicles. The HQ-2 ground-to-air missile launch positions originally deployed at Longtian Airport are probably being rebuilt at the present time. A standard HQ-2 launch position usually has six launch sites, but currently the position has a layout of four launch sites and is equipped with a new warehouse. This is very likely prepared for the deployment of the S-300s. Nonetheless, the latest Google Earth satellite images show that S-300 missiles have not yet taken up this position.

Huian Airport is located in the north-central section of the Fujian coast directly facing the Taiwan Strait, and S-300s are also deployed at this airport. Besides, S-300 SAM positions have also been built in the Xindian area close to the city of Xiamen, where HQ-2 SAM positions have been upgraded to S-300 positions.

The HQ-2 positions in the Jiaomei area have also been rebuilt into S-300 positions. An analysis of images of the two positions released by Google Earth indicates that S-300 missiles have not yet been deployed here, however. HQ-2 SAMs were originally deployed at Zhangzhou Airport. The structure of the position currently being rebuilt is rather blurry. It is worth watching whether S-300 SAMs will be deployed here in the future.

In sum, there are five S-300 positions and two HQ-2 positions along the Taiwan Strait, the latter two located at Zhangzhou and Shantou Airports, with altogether 20 S-300 launchers. The No.2 Ground-to-Air Missile Brigade is stationed in this area.

S-300 positions are also found under construction in Beijing and Qingdao. The missiles have been sighted at the Zhonghuabu position near Qingdao, indicating this is the newest S-300 position, probably intended for the deployment of the latest S-300PMU2s. The importance of Qingdao lies in that the S-300s deployed here can be used to provide protection for the PLA Navy's No.1 Nuclear Submarine Base currently under expansion.

Almost all the S-300PMU1s are concentrated around Beijing. The No. 5 Ground-to-Air Missile Division was the first air defense unit to receive the S-300 missiles. It deserves close attention whether the No. 6 Ground-to-Air Division has been equipped with, or will receive, S-300 SAMs.

A new HQ-9 ground-to-air missile position has been observed at Fangezhuang, indicating that at least two battalions of HQ-9s are now under operational deployment. The first HQ-9 launch position was discovered at Jiuquan. Different from the S-300 position, the HQ-9 position is rectangular in shape, with eight launch sites. This means that one launch battalion is composed of eight launch vehicles, and the fire control radar is placed in the middle of the rectangular-shaped launch position.

At the outer rim of the launch position, circular roads connect the launch sites to enhance mobility and logistic efficiency. The deployment of HQ-9s in Beijing means that China's air defense capability has improved greatly, with a network that provides multiple-system, long-range and deep air defense. However, observers outside China have little knowledge of the technical parameters of the HQ-9. At least six S-300 SAM positions have been noticed around the Beijing region.

Other S-300 positions have been identified in Dalian and Lushun. This region is given special attention as it occupies a strategically important location; any aerial attacks upon Beijing launched by U.S. forces based on the Korean peninsula would have to go through this region.

Another major city currently protected by S-300 SAMs is of course Shanghai, where the No. 3 Ground-to-Air Missile Brigade is stationed. The Nichung and Minhang S-300 positions to the south of Shanghai are very close to the shore, and are obviously intended to deal with air attacks on Shanghai by Taiwan's tactical air force units in the event of a confrontation.

The 64N6E search radar used by S-300 SAM systems has also been sighted in the area close to Gongjialu, which very likely transmits aerial information data to other S-300 positions deployed in the neighboring area. One S-300 position is found at Liuhe to the north of Shanghai. The whole Shanghai area seems to be under the protection of four S-300 SAM positions.

The layout of the above missile positions reveals to some extent the tactical intentions of the PLA Air Force, that is, to give priority protection to Beijing and the coastal region with its S-300 SAMs. In particular, the air defense network along the coastal region including the Taiwan Strait and Shanghai has been greatly reinforced. A total of 18 S-300 SAM positions have been identified.

After receiving the new batch of four sets of S-300PMU2 missiles this year, and with the deployment of the HQ-9s, it deserves close observation whether China will continue to purchase new S-300 serial SAMs from Russia.

--

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 05 Jul 2008 07:59

indeed I have also posted a carlo kopp article in china mil watch thread with
an estimated 20 batteries of PMU1/PMU2 and 700-1000 missiles purchased.
we can expect atleast 10 to be railroaded into tibet if they expect a war..
....any sign of these appearing at key points in tibet will tell us their
mood.

> 646NE

its a huge radar with SPY1 aperture and there is a sleeker looking but
equally big replacement in the S400. definitely a big threat and very
capable though not as a high end like spy1d/apar/empar/sampson.

the entire S300 pantheon is bulky and cannot fire on the move.
and for cost reasons most are on wheeled tractor trailers not their
original tracked vehicles. so they will basically need to stick to roads.

I figure air launched brahmos from 120km range at low level is the
only weapon we have of sufficient range to target these sites at
low risk to the attacker. the KH31P is a bit short on legs.

sunilUpa · Post by **sunilUpa** » 05 Jul 2008 08:32

Singha wrote:
the three big cities east of tibet are chengu, chonquing and kunming(capital of yunnan).
each is around 1000km from our border and not suitable for directly launching air ops
but there could be PLAAF bases much closer and at lower altitude. these three big
cities are probably the railway nodes for feeding in men and materials from eastern
seaboard. there is also Lanzhou a bit west of these which is the garison HQ for their
eastern tibet military region.
.

There is an airbase 150 km north of Sikkim. Well, not exactly airbase, but more like an airstrip when GE photo was taken. However it has one of the longest runways in the world...5 km long! Will post co-ordinates later.

29 21'17.57" N 89 18'43.80"E

You can see that construction is still on going.

BTW, the airstrip in coochbihar is a new one or old being renovated? You can see machines paving on runway.

Don · Post by **Don** » 05 Jul 2008 08:40

Singha wrote:indeed I have also posted a carlo kopp article in china mil watch thread with
an estimated 20 batteries of PMU1/PMU2 and 700-1000 missiles purchased.
we can expect atleast 10 to be railroaded into tibet if they expect a war..
....any sign of these appearing at key points in tibet will tell us their
mood.

> 646NE

its a huge radar with SPY1 aperture and there is a sleeker looking but
equally big replacement in the S400. definitely a big threat and very
capable though not as a high end like spy1d/apar/empar/sampson.

the entire S300 pantheon is bulky and cannot fire on the move.
and for cost reasons most are on wheeled tractor trailers not their
original tracked vehicles. so they will basically need to stick to roads.

I figure air launched brahmos from 120km range at low level is the
only weapon we have of sufficient range to target these sites at
low risk to the attacker. the KH31P is a bit short on legs.

Don't forget the HQ-9, I think they will eventually deploy more of them than the S-300. There are rumours they also help financed the development of S-400 but we shall see....

Karan Dixit · Post by **Karan Dixit** » 05 Jul 2008 09:26

Singha wrote:oldies will recall the IAF silver jubilee magazine back around 1984 had 4 jaguars launching a
cluster bomb attack on a truck convoy in Tibet on its front and back cover. the lead pair had
already released a shower of cluster bomblets and in the distance the second pair had already
struck the rear of the convoy. they were flying fast and low down a dry sandy valley.

superb painting it was.

Singha,

Do you happen to have a link that will give me a bit more detailed info on this?

Thanks,
- Karan

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 05 Jul 2008 09:32

the small pic of front cover is there in BR (posted earlier in this thread). book was by pushpinder chopra and a couple of others with official backing of IAF since it was a golden jubilee edition. its available used on some websites abroad.

Karan Dixit · Post by **Karan Dixit** » 05 Jul 2008 09:50

Thanks!

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 05 Jul 2008 10:20

http://www.tibet-tour.com/tibet/

Although a part of China, Tibet has a unique culture of all there own. It is mainly inhabited by Tibetans, a minority nationality of old and mysterious people. Tourist attractions include the Potala Palace in Lhasa, Jokhang Temple, and a number of Buddhist sacred places.

Chinese description of Tibetan people

Anantz · Post by **Anantz** » 05 Jul 2008 11:28

sunilUpa wrote: BTW, the airstrip in coochbihar is a new one or old being renovated? You can see machines paving on runway.

Well AFAIK the airbase in Coochbehar is a civilian airstrip which was used by Vayudoot way back in the 90s i guess. It is being renovated at the initiative of the WB govt to improve communication to that part of Bengal. Its was assumed that regular Air deccan flights would start operation once it is renovated.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 05 Jul 2008 12:51

the latest issue of outlook traveller mag has a manali-leh road trip as its
cover story. they took some diversions east also to a great cold lake..needs
inner line permit for that. spectacular maps and photos.

will post link when it appears online.

the road seems to have 4 high passes including rohtang but is otherwise
quite decent and navigable , with typical ladakh type brown rocky hills
and cold shallow rivers.

so tunneling under rohtang and maybe couple more passes is the key
to completing our logistical chain from the east. unlike the srinagar-kargil
road, the rest of this road probably is not snowbound in winter, so it
can be all weather when the tunnel is completed.

the description of the climb to rohtang is scary...hordes of tourists..1 mile
long convoy of 4x4s trampling all around...heavy snowfall...no guard rails
...a brown khaki type of stretch

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 07 Jul 2008 23:45

ramana wrote:Good questions. Look up DRDO techfocus and past IAF exercises. FAE is there.
Next look at OFB and see if they have proximity fuses for shells. There was supposed to be a 155mm shell factory to be set up post Kargil. Dont know status.

I asked for Krasnopol status in the Arty thread for same reason.

OFB link on shells

I dont see any FAE in the OFB products range. They have other type of basic ordnance. Maybe the RM mandarins decided that they were too 'offensive' and didnt productionize the stuff.
Atleast can they look into developing larger cargo containers for IAF and IN use with the basic sub-munition unit in the 155mm cargo shell? Or will the new cluster bomb treaty come in the way?

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 08 Jul 2008 03:15

Ramana, I distinctly remember IAF using FAE in vayushakti 99 and another earlier exercise in tilpat range.
may be they are sensitive about putting the info on the web page but not in producing it ?

sunilUpa · Post by **sunilUpa** » 08 Jul 2008 03:32

I don't see any air delivered munitions in that OFB page.

ManuJ · Post by **ManuJ** » 08 Jul 2008 04:28

Manali-Leh railway link soon

In a major move to push tourism in the hill states and counter Chinese expansion in the Tibetan region, the Railways ministry has prepared a blueprint to set up an ambitious 480 kilometre Manali - Leh railway line link criss-crossing the treacherous mountains in Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir.

The project according to experts will cost over Rs 16,000 crore and the ministry is already preparing a detail survey plan for the project.

The plan is to lay a broad gauge railway track between Jogindernagar and Manali via Mandi and extend it 480 kilometre further to Leh via the Rohtang pass and beyond.

The security concerns are a key reason for building the train line.

"With China building the Beijing-Lhasa railway track, it is critical for India to respond and build the Manali-Leh route both from the security and tourism point of view of India," said Prem Kumar Dhumal, chief minister, Himachal Pradesh.

This project would benefit greatly from the expertise gained in the J&K rail-link project. To gauge govt.'s seriousness, we need to keep an eye on the progress of the Rohtang road tunnel and the J&K rail tunnel projects.

rajrang · Post by **rajrang** » 08 Jul 2008 05:36

ManuJ wrote:Manali-Leh railway link soon

In a major move to push tourism in the hill states and counter Chinese expansion in the Tibetan region, the Railways ministry has prepared a blueprint to set up an ambitious 480 kilometre Manali - Leh railway line link criss-crossing the treacherous mountains in Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir.

The project according to experts will cost over Rs 16,000 crore and the ministry is already preparing a detail survey plan for the project.

The plan is to lay a broad gauge railway track between Jogindernagar and Manali via Mandi and extend it 480 kilometre further to Leh via the Rohtang pass and beyond.

The security concerns are a key reason for building the train line.

"With China building the Beijing-Lhasa railway track, it is critical for India to respond and build the Manali-Leh route both from the security and tourism point of view of India," said Prem Kumar Dhumal, chief minister, Himachal Pradesh.
This project would benefit greatly from the expertise gained in the J&K rail-link project. To gauge govt.'s seriousness, we need to keep an eye on the progress of the Rohtang road tunnel and the J&K rail tunnel projects.

I wish India will plan a Delhi to Kathmandu and Calcutta to Kathmandu rail links to counter China's plans for Lhasa to Kathmandu rail link. Even without China, such links will help India develop closer relations with Nepal.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 10 Jul 2008 18:31

data points from the akash yodha commentary:

road density in arunachal pradesh is 17 kms/100 sqkm against national avg of 73km.

there are concreted helipads in certain spots usually on hilltops to land Mi17 helis or
just drop off supplies

Indira Point in car nicobar also has a helipad. the ATC is a guy sitting on a machan in
the nearest tree. 114 HU siachen has highest ATC in world, its a container with
windows on back of a truck with antennas sticking out so that people can evade the
weather.

Mi26 seems to carry around as much people as a An32. commentary did mention
it can carry 60 stretcher patients in tiers.

Nayak · Post by **Nayak** » 11 Jul 2008 12:02

Need help on high altitude exercises/wargames conducted by PLA. Google-search does not yield much of results. IA has good experience in Siachen/Kashmir and knows how to keep the logistics open and running like the back of it's hand. What about PLA ?

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 11 Jul 2008 12:20

Nayak,

Let's not confuse the logistical trains for Kashmir with those of Siachen or those for Laddakh. These are three very different regions. And while Kashmir is relatively easy to maintain logistically, Siachen and Laddakh are vastly more difficult terrain for which I would not be so confident of the robustness of the supply network.

As regards the PLA, it depends on what you mean by "High Altitude". Technically, most of western Tibet is high altitude, but being a plateau, the logistics are far simpler and the infrastructure is well developed. Any PLA action in this region can therefore be a gold mine of details, assuming that's what you are looking for.

But if it is the Great Himalayan range region that you are referring as High-altitude, then given the proximity to our border and the Chinese control of Info, you might not come across very much details on the net. Sources such as Sino-defence and PLA Daily are likely to have you believe that all exercises are successes by default.

In any case, what exactly are you looking for? It might be easier to help out if you can be more specific.

-Vivek

Nayak · Post by **Nayak** » 11 Jul 2008 12:26

Hmm I found some info on recent Cheeni-Thai mil-exercise.

As a means to bolster the capabilities of the Thai armed forces, and also to increase its commercial arms sales in the region, Beijing furnished Bangkok with weaponry at no cost, or at greatly reduced friendship prices, and with very generous repayment terms. The first shipment of Chinese weapons, artillery pieces and ammunition arrived gratis in Thailand in 1985. In 1987, the Kingdom became the first ASEAN country to buy weapons from the PRC: 50-60 tanks, 400 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and anti-aircraft guns.

However, Thai purchases of Chinese military equipment during the 1980s was as much for political reasons as military ones, and throughout this period Bangkok continued to rely on the US for its most technologically sophisticated platforms, such as the F-16 fighter jet. Moreover, the Thai military was far from impressed with the poor quality of Chinese-made equipment, and while some of it was employed along the Thai-Cambodian border, much it was reserved for training purposes or simply warehoused and left to rust. Bangkok was also disappointed that Chinese weapons sales had not included technology transfers.

The fourth area is combined training and exercises. In late 2005, milestones were reached in both areas. In September the PLA began a three-month landmine clearance training program for the RTA along the Thai-Cambodian border, the first time the Chinese military had extended this expertise to a Southeast Asian country. In December the Thai and Chinese navies conducted their first joint exercise. Codenamed "China-Thailand Friendship 2005," the exercise took place in the Gulf of Thailand and featured the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) guided-missile destroyer Shenzhen and supply ship Weishanhu, as well as the RTN frigate Chao Praya.

Nayak · Post by **Nayak** » 11 Jul 2008 12:31

vivek_ahuja wrote:
In any case, what exactly are you looking for? It might be easier to help out if you can be more specific.

-Vivek

The experience level of PLA in actual combat. What is the 'gut' feel of analysts when it comes to the PLA leadership and actual grunts. When I search the internet, I come across 'plopaganda' (cheeni) 'fear-psychosis' (western) and lot of sun-tzu and mao quotes (which are worthless).

Just thinking like a typical layman sir. That's all. I am nowhere in the expert bracket like you gurulog.

p_saggu · Post by **p_saggu** » 11 Jul 2008 12:57

Sunil UPA,
That is the Shigaste AFB. Question: Can a runway 5 Km long allow aircraft to increase take off load? What will be the likely load of say
1. IL-76 and
2. Su-27?

I have marked out several AFBs and important sites on GE how do I share them?

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 11 Jul 2008 13:11

The experience level of PLA in actual combat

With the weapons they have been copying from western and Russian sources, we can say that the actual combat experience is going to be limited, unless you can call the rapid deployment Operations into Tibet during the Tibetan revolts as "actual combat" (which a surprising number of Chinese sources do).

Still, articles and news info dealing with the above are the places you can look for bits and pieces of Info on Chinese leadership and grunts as also the logistical setup north of our border. I doubt there is a clear cut article available that will tell you what you want to hear without having to join the dots.

What is the 'gut' feel of analysts when it comes to the PLA leadership and actual grunts.

This is a very much dependent on what kind of opposition you are looking at. I know you cannot compare apples to oranges here but I have some papers on this stuff but which is kind of dated. Not sure at the moment how the new and modern weapons being bought will affect the equation, but still close to what you are looking for. If I can find some time off from work, I will dig them up, scan them,clean them and post them here. It has to do with the analysis of Chinese leadership qualities at lower levels.

Just thinking like a typical layman sir.

Same here. Just another person in the dark looking for the light at the end of the tunnel.

vivek_ahuja · Post by **vivek_ahuja** » 11 Jul 2008 13:20

p_saggu wrote:Sunil UPA,
That is the Shigaste AFB. Question: Can a runway 5 Km long allow aircraft to increase take off load?

Yes. These long runways completely remove any high altitude operations problem for the PLAAF.

In fact, I have been looking at these massive runways myself and I cannot deny the fact that they stunned me with their dimensions. I guess I need to update the charts now for the PLAAF tibet region analysis on the other thread.

However, note the relative lack of tarmac area apart from the runway. These are supply node points, not operational airbases.

What will be the likely load of say
1. IL-76 and
2. Su-27?

For these unbelievable length runways, loads are MTOW, no matter what the airbase altitude is!

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 11 Jul 2008 13:46

we must be careful not to comfort ourselves with 'one stout blow and they'll collapse' kind of logic. the PLA has demonstrated during the civil war, korean war and in 62 that it can attack ferociously, sustain huge losses and still keep coming for more. the korean war 'almost' saw a resort by the US to nuclear options to stem the chinese attack - one of the reasons i believe macarthur was 'moved on'. the modern PLA may not be the peasant army that fought in korea, but we must look carefully and learn.

the tibetan plateau is largely flat and devoid of obstacles (and cover) - whilst they can move their trucks up and down easily for logistics, they are vulnerable to air interdiction. we have steep mountains to climb to the front, our logistical challenges are entirely different.

abhischekcc · Post by **abhischekcc** » 11 Jul 2008 16:23

Hey guys,
How about a Bangalore mini-meet - to discuss the Indo-CHina standoff and the possibility of war?

We can have a meet this Sunday, or the next weekend.

It will be much better with maps laid out in the middle of the table - rather than discussing online like this.

Anantz · Post by **Anantz** » 11 Jul 2008 16:47

Great idea.. can I represent Sikkim in that meet?

abhischekcc · Post by **abhischekcc** » 11 Jul 2008 16:48

Newbie question -

Does India have Sensor Fuzed Weapons?