Draft IAEA Safeguards Agreement Discussion

[jash_p]

few question to gurus?

1) Is this draft is real or like showing is diferent and signing is diferent (showing teeth and biting teeth)

2) is it possible that NPA mullahs and Uncle(plus all 45 countries) is working in tandem and throwing a bait, knowing that when all NPA Mullahas make noice than people of India think it is good for them and take the bait and sign and get traped ?

3) is it not worrieing that China is not making noices ?

[Raja Ram]

Read the draft completely. My view is that there is nothing in this draft that is a cause for concern for India.
First of all it positions India clearly as 5+1 - a clear acceptance of India as de facto NWS, with only very limited level of difference between official NWSs. It will signal a death knell to the discriminatory NPT arrangement.
Specific to this Draft some observations:
(i) It is clear that what will be offered for safeguard will be solely at India's descretion
(ii) It is clear that any facility can revert to unsafeguarded status if all fuel and other equipment and material are returned - again at India's sole discretion and without any provision that can allow the agency to stall or stop it. The conditions for revert are clear and final
(iii) The separation is logical and based on accounting and not physical - however, physical may be preferred for all purely strategic facilities in the future - IAEA means spooks looking at you
(iv) It is clear that this arrangement will not mean IAEA inspectors (amerikhans or any poodle land origin ones) roaming unrestricted and at will even in safeguarded reactors - there are clearly laid out provisions on inspections
(v) It is clear that no unilateral action by IAEA on safeguarded reactors or facilities can be taken without India being consulted.

This in my opinion is in line with June 18 and the PM announced redlines in the Lok Sabha.

The 123 agreement and Hyde Act are another matter. If we have an act passed in Indian parliament that enables our own soverign protection to nullify impact of some of the noxious provisions of Hyde Act we can go ahead.

Good jod done by Indian negotiators. If only this sails through IAEA without nasty surprises like Hyde Act we should be ok.

Will read it once again carefully. Paragraphs highligheted by ramana for example need multiple takes to get all possible nuances.

[ramana]

The Draft is real. I think basically its an agreement between India and IAEA as to how they plan to safeguard facilities which are put on the Annex. It documents the process and the procedures that will be used. Now there will be bi-lateral and may be mulit-lateral agreements for fuel, reactors, intstruments and whatnot between India and other countries. It is there that they will invoke all those Hiranyakasyapa clauses - not inside or outside, neither animal nor human, neither daylight nor darkness etc etc.

At a big picture level the NPT which does not have scope for any more additions/amendments has now a codocil which brings in India. This is a very big gain for the nation-state of India that is Bharat. Kudos to KS who has been pushing for this since 1992 atleast as I was aware. Could be earlier but I dont know.

The only limit is the testing clause which is outside. It invokes the Hyde gulliotine but that as MMS says will be based on "supreme national interests" which implies there are bigger things to worry about then some piddly fuel. Only if CTBT is rammed through then there will be some tensions and again implies that US is getting silly and committing harakiri. Note there will be need to test in future for atleast the three powers that have the facilities and more importantly the interests.

[ramana]

jash_p, Your last question is very intriguing and I spent last evening talking to one of our members on the very subject. Need to post it in the Geopolitics thread. Thanks, ramana

[NRao]

This doc is the result of umpteen negotiations between the DAE (India) and the IAEA. IF Chicom had any noise to make, she should have done it long back. She and all other nations had access to those within IAEA that were on the negotiating team.

And, also, there really cannot be a Hyde Act WRT IAEA. The IAEA has a framework and such negotiations are basically what in that framework will be altered. Something like you as a landlord has a generic contract and you modify it depending on the tenant. Built exceptions to the rules.

Most agreements are very small - a few pages long, some IIRC are just a page.

[RamaY]

Amit, I don't see that early release would have affected China any - surely the IAEA negotiators included reps of the PRC junta? In fact I don't see what is the PRC game is. The news reports say that China plans to support India's proposal at the NSG. Then why did the Comrades in India commit political hara kiri? The text off the agreement as I see it, seems eminently saleable to the Indian public, since there is no gimmick seen here, and in fact the only reference to the US-India agreement is to the JULY 18, not to "Hyde&Singh". The above excerpt posted by DD says it all about the NWS status, explicity recognizing the existence and halalitude of materials, equipment and facilities outside the IAEA agreement. There is no reference to the "t" word. The "Annex" seems to be just the list of facilities that India volunteeers.

This is as it should be - the agreement is to enable construction and sales of new reactors and other equipment, and the handling of imported fuel lifecycle. So it says clearly that as new facilities are added, the Annex will be updated and published. IOW, there is really no requirements to place existing reactors there at all - except that fuel may not be provided under this agreement to those reactors. This last point may bother, say, Russia-Kodamkulam if Russian fuel / heavy water was supposed to be used here. Or maybe it is "grandfathered" in. Probably, India wants to add Kodamkulam to the Annex - why not?

So, as CRamS says, there may be treachery involved, and I agree there is, if China and the Commies are involved. What is their game, and why did the Left go so far out on a limb for this if China is going to agree? is it timing?

China is playing the game well, so far:

1. Its first tool was NPAs and Pakistan - Asking == deal for Pakistan&C >> This didnt work
2. Second Step is commies >> They delayed the process by atleast 1 year. Nuke-deal apart, this put india's other plans (whatever techno-business deals, including MRCA contract) 1 year behind. If this impacted our GDP-growth (wholistically) by 1%, then we lost $100B productivity in real terms. We could have used this money to develop the all the easteren states (seven sisters) to China levels (if this is the yardstick)
3. Third Step is IAEA >> We will see the game in next 20-30 days.
4. The fourth Step is NSG >> In the meantime China can decide whether it want to vote it down or play along, for the time being.
5. The final step will be the UNSC expansion - IMHO, this is what China is trying to stop.

China doesn't want to come overt with its intentions, yet. It is currently playing the soft game using the above mentioned strategies to contain India. The hard option would be to see if it can do another 1962, which would put down India's aspirations for good.

Per my analysis, if India doesn't get its act right by 2025, it will have very slim chance to counter China's influence in political/economic/military spheres for the rest of the century. It will have to settle to defencive strategies to secure its borders only.

[Suppiah]

Now that carrot has failed, china may be forced to try the stick..in a way that is good because it will expose its hand clearly. On the UNSC issue it could fudge - because it was all backroom maneuvering and it could pass blame around.

[ramana]

Please stick to the topic in this thread. You can post the above two posts in the geo-political thread.
Thanks, ramana

[Virupaksha]

(ii) It is clear that any facility can revert to unsafeguarded status if all fuel and other equipment and material are returned - again at India's sole discretion and without any provision that can allow the agency to stall or stop it. The conditions for revert are clear and final

Raja Ram
Could you please specify where you found this interpretation? I am trying to read and understand the agreement, specifically paragraph 32 says

Safeguards shall be terminated on a facility listed in the Annex after India and the Agency have jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards. Safeguards on non-nuclear material, equipment and components subject to this Agreement may be terminated as and when the non-nuclear material, equipment or components have been returned to the supplier or arrangements have been made by the Agency to safeguard the non-nuclear material, equipment or components in the State to which it is being transferred, or when India and the Agency have jointly determined that the non-nuclear material, equipment or component in question has been consumed, is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards or has become practicably irrecoverable. Safeguards may be terminated on heavy water upon India’s placing under safeguards as substitute the same amount of heavy water of equivalent or better heavy water concentration.

I have interpreted the bolded part as, India cannot unilaterally remove any facility from safeguards without IAEAs approval, even if all the foreign material has been removed. I am still confused about what it means "point of view of safeguards".
Edit : Now when seen in conjunction with paragraph 22

The application of safeguards under this Agreement to nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment or components subject to safeguards under such other Agreements shall
commence as of the date of receipt by the Agency of India’s notification. India’s undertaking not to use items subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose, and its undertaking that such items shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device, shall continue to apply.

So the nuclear equipment, once it commences, cannot be used for military. I am reading this as a reactor under perpetuity, under legalese language.

My interpretation: Once a reactor comes under safeguard, it cannot be used for military. However the catch is, to keep it running, stuff from military can come in, but this material becomes civilian.

[jash_p]

Safeguards shall be terminated on a facility listed in the Annex after India and the Agency have jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards

.

ha ha !!!

key is jointly determined. If India determined but Agency don't than safeguard will cont. in perpetuity.

[sugriva]

The agreement says that upto a total of 20 tonnes of thoorium may be removed from
safeguards per year. Is this amount useful for any purpose ? The amount of Pu that can
be removed is 1kg which is equivalent to 20kT of TNT.

[enqyoob]

Has anyone done a survey on just how much indigenous thorium is actually left in India? There seems to be a lot of exporting going on. Could we be heading for a disaster where the "thorium-based energy economy" suddenly finds itself having to import the stuff?

Also, ramana, could the thorium mention have to do with exports, not imports?

[ramana]

Basically it says thorium over 20t has to be safeguarded. Could be both exports and imports to ensure that is not a new proliferation concern. I am sure when India exports the thorium it would be under safeguards. Dont want something comeback to bit you know where.

But then this applies to annex 1 facilities only.

[enqyoob]

Concern may be about thorium being brought into Annex 1 facilities, refined and shipped out. OTOH, we may be reading it wrong - it may be that they WANT Annex 1 facilities to be able to participate in thorium research, so they are specifically allowing research/ university reactor levels of thorium to go in and out. This may be an enabling statement rather than a limiting statement. (Bridges for sale! Buy now! Avoid the price hike tomorrow..)

[Amber G.]

Has anyone done a survey on just how much indigenous thorium is actually left in India? There seems to be a lot of exporting going on. Could we be heading for a disaster where the "thorium-based energy economy" suddenly finds itself having to import the stuff?

Short answer is, I think, India has plenty. It is not going to decay so fast (half life being about 3 times the age of earth and all that) or going to be used up in near future by any reasonable export either.

Here is Us survey report in 2006.

[ramana]

Pioneer, 11 July 2008

Scientists wary of IAEA draft

PTI | Mumbai

Flaying the draft text of the India-specific safeguard agreement, two top scientists have warned that it is "prejudicial" to the national interest and that it was in no way different from the safeguard agreement of non-weapon states.

Former Atomic Energy Commission Chairman P K Iyengar and former Atomic Energy Regulatory Board Chairman A Gopalakrishnan said the draft text was identical to the IAEA Circular 66 on safeguards to non-weapon states and that it provided no assurance on fuel supply.

A third scientist, former BARC Director AN Prasad, however, said the text is generally all right but there is nothing India-specific.

Gopalakrishnan said although the preamble mentioned about the corrective measures promised by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the floor of the House, the text is not satisfactory. But Prasad said though corrective measures may not be very clear in the text, they are there without being explicit.

"There is nothing India-specific except that IAEA has not made objection to India's strategic programme," Iyengar said.

Regretting the "colonial mentality", Iyengar said the draft text was made public by the Indian Government only after it was "leaked" first by an American website.

"Even after 60 years of Independence, the colonial thinking persists," he said adding that the Government was terming the text as "classified documents" until an American website put it out.

Even the IAEA had said in its Press release last night that the text would not be made public.

"It is interesting to note that the text which was announced on Wednesday as 'classified' by the External Affairs Ministry was made public today just based on a leakage of the text in some American website this morning," Iyengar said.

Prasad said the safeguards text was unduly kept under wraps by the Government for reasons best known to it and created a turmoil of sorts.

"On a quick look at the text it is evident that it generally follows the standard safeguards practices already in vogue in the IAEA and there is hardly any India specific article," he said.

IAEA has guarded against Indian withdrawal from safeguards at any time without mentioning the word "perpetuity". Corrective measures are not explicitly dealt with and left somewhat vague, he said.

The broad contours of the Additional Protocol could have been discussed since the most intrusive aspects of the implementation of safeguards are usually packed in the protocol, Prasad said.

However, safeguards is one aspect but the deal as a whole has many larger issues on which India has to be concerned about including those which could be detrimental to the long-term national interests, Prasad said.

In the whole agreement there is no recognition of India's weapons status, he said.

Other DAE scientists under the condition of anonymity said the separation plan that has invited much controversy in the country is inviable and formed the core of this safeguard agreement text.

"The concerns that inspections as applicable to non-nuclear weapon states allowing intrusive, at-site inspections 'on intent' has not gone away," one of the DAE scientist said.
"Such inspections have become the norm under the Additional Protocol following the problem in Iraq," he said.

It is still unclear how military installations and facilities that do not attract safeguards like the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research will remain exempted and protected from intrusion in the course of such safeguards that are applicable in perpetuity as indicated in the text, the scientists said.

Somewhat better comments. The key is what India puts into Annex 1. All those come under safeguards dont have restrictions as regards the transfers. It is in Indian interests to have as large a group as needed in that category. And it is in Indian interest to separate the non-civilian program from the civilian program as that ends the ambiguity. So there is ipso facto/defacto if not dejure recognition of the non-civilian program. IAEA is a UN Organization and cannot replace the treaty mechanism. IOW it cant confer what it does not have authority to confer ie NWS status.

On to NSG approval milestone or hurdle.

[ramana]

Google Cache of News stories

The PTI headline from Hindu is one big reason to have a severe regime change in the Indian press. Who does that worthy think he is serving? Indian public or his international beer buying buddies? He needs a through re-education of his interests. His POV is if he gets fired he can join the intl press badmouthing India.

Meanwhile a different prespective on the corrective measures. Looks like the concern is coercive measures like carrot and stick at the wrong ends.

What do the scientists say?

Nuclear deal – what the scientists say news

10 July 2008

Defence scientists say that after the last tests they may no longer need to carry out further nuclear tests, should India choose to develop nuclear weapons, writes Rajiv Singh.

New Delhi: The UPA government has submitted a draft text of the safeguards agreement to the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) for clarification before formal ratification. The safeguards text, worked out with IAEA inspectors early this year, has been sent to the agency's 35-nation board in Vienna for approval.

The text reportedly envisages support for Indian efforts to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors. (See: Text of Draft)

The draft reportedly says that the Indian government may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.

The draft also says that the Indian government will ensure that none of the materials produced in the safeguarded facilities shall be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, or to further any other military purpose. Such material, according to the Indian government, shall be used for peaceful purposes only and not for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

These provisions are already beginning to raise eyebrows amongst the international community of 'experts'. They are pointing to a number of 'ambiguities', which they say need to be clarified by the UN watchdog body before ratification.

The draft, according to certain Washington-based think tanks, contains several points that "raise questions that board members need to get clarity on", according to a report in the International Herald Tribune. The report quotes Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association, as saying that the clause in the draft that says India "may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies," could potentially restrict international monitoring of India's atomic programme.

Disruption of fuel supplies, he argues, would happen only if India were to resume testing of nuclear weapons. "Does that mean that India intends to withdraw from what are supposed to be permanent safeguards if it tests and other states decide to terminate fuel supplies?" asks Kimball. "If so, that is a big problem and the Indian government has not clarified what that means," he said.

Kimball conveniently omits to look at the other - the Indian - side of the picture, where if a consortium of states, or any member of such a consortium of states, which supply nuclear fuel around the world, should act in an arbitrary manner and impose sanctions on India for any reason. In such an eventuality, the Indian state would need provisions to safeguard its interests. This is not just a theoretical position that India may adopt for the sake of argument, because it is evident from recent history that there is nothing to prevent supplier nations, belonging to different political camps in a polarised world, from acting in a unilateral manner.

As has become evident over the previous decade or so, at times the UN umbrella appears to unify the nations of the planet only in a nominal way.

Kimball also finds it ''abnormal'' that the Indian government has omitted to submit a list of reactors that it intends to place under IAEA scrutiny. He reasons that though India's motives are not clear, it may be that "they're trying to preserve their options to put some reactors in or take some out" from IAEA scrutiny, depending on future bilateral nuclear cooperation

Reports over the years have suggested that intense negotiations, both internal, amongst the Indian scientific community, and external, with US interlocutors, have finalised the number and types of nuclear facilities that will be placed under international safeguards. Indeed, it was only once these details were finalised between Indian and US teams that the Indo-US deal moved forward to the stage where it is today. There really is no great 'secret' that the Indian government is holding close to its chest here.

Till the deal reaches a stage where such details come into play meaningfully, such details are matters of academic interest, which the Indian government very sensibly may not feel like advertising internationally - particularly to members of Washington-based think tanks. {My first one!}

Long time watchers of the Indian subcontinent, such as Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, also a supporter of the deal, is quoted as saying that fears of another Indian nuclear weapons test are theoretical and India risks too much by testing.

"With the investments that they have made in this deal, the incentives not to test actually grow," he said.

"If India tests in the future, it will not be the first to test. It will test most likely in response to somebody else testing," added Tellis.

When the Buddha smiled

The debate, domestically at least, hinges around the nuclear deal ''impinging'' on our sovereignty in any way by preventing the country from testing nuclear weapons. Internationally, particularly amongst the non-proliferation lobby in the US, fears also revolve around the issue of testing and weaponisation. It may be useful to revisit the 1998 nuclear tests conducted by India for the clarifications that the scientific community had issued at that point of time.

Two years after the 1998 Pokharan nuclear explosions – the so-called 'Buddha smiles' tests - Dr R Chidambaram, then chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), confirmed some facts about the explosions in response to a persistent controversy regarding the supposed yields. He said that of the five nuclear devices exploded in Pokhran two years ago, "The 15 kiloton device was a weapon, which had been in the stockpile for several years. Others were weaponisable configurations." This then begged the question whether more tests were required to convert these "weaponisable configurations" into weapons.

For this we need to go back further in time to 1998, to a joint statement issued by then AEC chairman and the scientific adviser to the defence minister shortly after the nuclear tests. The statement said: "The three tests conducted on May 11, 1998, were with a fission device with a yield of about 12 kt, a thermonuclear device with a yield of about 43 kt and a sub-kilo tonne device. On May 13, 1998, two more sub-kilo tonne nuclear tests were carried out".

Further, the statement said, "The tests ... have provided critical data for the validation of our capability in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for different delivery systems. These tests have significantly enhanced our capability in computer simulation of new designs and taken us to the stage of sub-critical experiments in the future, if considered necessary."

As should be evident from this last statement, the need for further testing is already significantly reduced - if not done away with altogether. In any case, if ''weaponisable configurations'' still need to be tested, the statement is unambiguous about the fact that India will conduct ''sub-critical experiments in the future, if necessary,'' as data from the tests had ''significantly enhanced'' capability in ''computer simulation of new designs.''

A Los Alamos laboratory text from September 2006 describes sub-critical testing in the following way: ''Sub-critical experiments examine the behaviour of plutonium as it is strongly shocked by forces produced by chemical high explosives. Subcritical experiments produce essential scientific data and technical information used to help maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The experiments are subcritical; that is, the quantity of plutonium used is below the so-called critical mass required for a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction, thus, there is no nuclear explosion.''

If there is no nuclear explosion then a lot of debate about ''nuclear testing'', and how its absence, thanks to the provisions of the nuclear deal, may impinge on our ''national sovereignty'' dies a natural death.

Amongst the defence scientific community, the debate would still continue – whether India had reached a level of sophistication and confidence that its weaponisation programme could move ahead on the basis of computer simulations, and that ''weaponisable configurations'' would not require field testing.

But then, it stands to reason that the scientific community would have already conducted this debate a long time back. The conclusions they would have drawn would have allowed the political establishment to proceed with the Indo-US nuclear deal.

India's defence and civilian scientists have had a critical role to play in the formulation of the nuclear deal. Their reluctance was perhaps the biggest hurdle the government had to cross. Once they came on board the process of settling details with US interlocutors really took off.

These scientists do not have axes to grind, the way the various political parties do. In more ways than one the debate over the nuclear deal (not just with the US but with the entire global community) should be dominated by what these experts say rather than politicos hogging the airwaves on every TV news talk show.

and enjoy this one

Senior US lawmaker criticises India-IAEA safeguards accord

Washington, July 10: A senior Democratic lawmaker has slammed the India-IAEA safeguards agreement as "worse than useless" and said there were loopholes in the agreement that contradicted promises made by the Bush administration.

"The India-IAEA safeguards agreement is worse than useless; it is a sham. Safeguards agreements should ensure a bright red line between civilian and military nuclear facilities. Instead, this agreement lays out a path for India to unilaterally remove international safeguards from reactors," said Massachusetts Congressman Ed Markey.

Markey is a senior member of the house energy and commerce committee and the founder and co-chair of the house bipartisan task force on nonproliferation. He has been opposing the nuclear deal from the very beginning.

"This pathetic safeguards agreement not only seriously undermines the non-proliferation treaty, but it also sends the exact wrong message to Iran: that international nuclear safeguards are only for show. With this agreement, the IAEA has thrown its principles out the window and has abandoned its most important responsibilities," he said.

"Contrary to everything the Bush administration has claimed about the US-India nuclear deal, if this safeguards agreement is approved, India will be allowed to make electricity one day and bombs the next," he added. { Only if you cut off fuel on the days you feel off!}

Markey has pointed out that the Bush administration pledged to Congress repeatedly that the IAEA safeguards agreement would be permanent and not allow India to take facilities out of safeguards for any reason.

On April 5, 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "once a reactor is under IAEA oversight, safeguards will be in place permanently and without any conditions."

"The Hyde Act, which the Congress passed govern nuclear transfers to India, also requires that the IAEA safeguards agreement be in perpetuity," he said.

"Rice testified before Congress that safeguards on Indian nuclear facilities would be 'permanent' not 'as long as India wants'. She and the Bush administration will need to answer to Congress as to why this safeguards agreement is the complete opposite from what they told US it would be.

"This safeguards agreement contradicts what the Bush administration has said for three years, and it contradicts the law," Markey said.

Nice to see a good whine form folks who used to use India as a whipping boy for NPAs.

Magumbo kush hain! Double scotch on rocks!

[Gerard]

The additional protocol that India signs will have to be India specific since the standard model protocol isn't meant to operate in a state that possesses a nuclear weapons infrastructure in addition to its safeguarded civilian facilities.

Standard "pursuit" may be harmful to non-proliferation itself since it has the potential of providing nuclear weapons information to an inspector from a NNWS.

IAEA Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/nuke.pdf

Model Protocol additional to the agreement(s) between state(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Docume ... rc540c.pdf

[sraj]

Thanks, Bhavin and Rangudu for the links to the safeguards agreement text.

Gerard, the intrusive pursuit clauses would show up in the Additional Protocol, not in this agreement. At least, the Preamble explicitly recognizes the existence of India's military facilities and programme (and does not use the term NNWS anywhere, contrary to press reports) -- which should make it much harder to shove the NNWS Model Additional Protocol down India's throat. But that is a future battle.

Some issues:

1. Section 32 definitely puts all facilities listed in Annex under safeguards until they are no longer usable (i.e in perpetuity).

32. Safeguards shall be terminated on a facility listed in the Annex after India and the Agency have jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards. Safeguards on non-nuclear material, equipment and components subject to this Agreement may be terminated as and when the non-nuclear material, equipment or components have been returned to the supplier or arrangements have been made by the Agency to safeguard the non-nuclear material, equipment or components in the State to which it is being transferred, or when India and the Agency have jointly determined that the non-nuclear material, equipment or component in question has been consumed, is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards or has become practicably irrecoverable. Safeguards may be terminated on heavy water upon India’s placing under safeguards as substitute
the same amount of heavy water of equivalent or better heavy water concentration.

2. Would the "Corrective Measures" stipulation in the Preamble override Section 32? Otherwise the two are contradictory.

3. IAEA can in any case not provide any enforceable fuel supply assurances to India. Therefore, the mention in the Preamble, together with the lame language in 123 and the distinctly negative language in Hyde, add up to nothing that is enforceable by India.

[ramana]

OK here is Brhama Chellaney's take in Deccan Chronicle, 11 July 2008

A flawed nuclear safeguards accord
By Brahma Chellaney

It must be doubly embarrassing for New Delhi to see the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency let the cat out of the bag before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had returned home from the G-8 summit. By revealing that “at the request of the Government of India” it had circulated the safeguards accord’s text to its board members and begun the process for an extraordinary board meeting, the IAEA belied New Delhi’s assurance to the nation not to approach the Agency before Dr Singh had won a vote of confidence in Parliament.

Also, in helping to make the text public, the IAEA only mocked New Delhi’s claim that it cannot share the text even in confidence with “third parties”, like the Left, which had been propping up the governing coalition. In fact, after the text had appeared on various international websites since Wednesday night, New Delhi claimed credit on Thursday afternoon for “unveiling” it!

Now we know why the accord was shrouded in such secrecy. A careful reading of its text raises several red flags: l Far from it being an India-specific agreement, the accord resembles IAEA agreements with non-nuclear-weapons states. With the exclusion of the first two pages that contain the preamble, the accord starting from Section I, “General Directions,” on Page 3 to the very end, is largely modelled on IAEA safeguards agreements with non-nuclear-weapons state. In fact, there is no direct reference in this accord to the existence of an Indian nuclear military programme or an acknowledgement of India’s special status — a nuclear-weapons state uniquely doing what no other nuclear power has done: putting its entire civilian nuclear programme under permanent, legally irrevocable international inspections.

{But this is the point. It ignores that side of the equation. What India does there is none of IAEA or NSG or any mai baap's business from the time this comes to force.It was not so before.}
{I would like to quote Rayc's grandmother and her ancestors: "to talk well and eloquently was a very great art, but that an equally great one was to know the right moment to stop. ~Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart}[/i[[/b]

All the accord contains is a oblique reference in the preamble in the following words: “Noting the relevance for this Agreement of the understandings between India and the United States of America expressed in the India-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, in which India, inter alia, has stated its willingness: to identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner”. In fact, the accord lays the ground for IAEA inspectors to enforce safeguards with the same stringency applicable to non-nuclear-weapons states.

l It carries a cosmetic reference to “corrective measures” in the preamble, but gives India no actual right to take corrective measures. The earlier 123 agreement with the US, instead of granting India the right to take corrective measures in response to a fuel-supply disruption, merely recorded that New Delhi will seek such a right in the IAEA accord. But in the India-IAEA accord, no such right has been secured in definable terms.

There is only one reference to “corrective measures” in the entire text of the India-IAEA accord, and that reference occurs in the preamble. That reference reads: “India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies”. The use of the term “may” instead of “shall” shows there is no legal entitlement. Moreover, far from “corrective measures” being defined, the accord explicitly forecloses that option by making it clear that, under no circumstance, will India be allowed to withdraw from its safeguards obligations, which are legally immutable.

The term, “corrective measures”, indeed does not figure in the accord’s Section XI on “Definitions”. l Not only is there no guaranteed fuel supply, the accord also discredits what Dr Singh had pledged in Parliament — to link perpetual IAEA inspections to perpetual fuel supply. Put simply, India has willingly forfeited the right to enforce lifelong fuel supply for safeguarded reactors by agreeing to remain powerless in a Tarapur-style fuel cut-off situation.

Indeed, the only reference to fuel supply occurs in the preamble, in the form of a note by India. It reads: “An essential basis of India’s concurrence to accept Agency safeguards under an India-specific safeguards agreement (hereinafter referred to as “this Agreement”) is the conclusion of international cooperation arrangements creating the necessary conditions for India to obtain access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations, as well as support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors”.

There is, however, no reference in the body of the text to “fuel supply” or to a “strategic reserve of nuclear fuel”. The ornamental reference in the preamble was inserted to save face because its language makes explicit that India is not tying the IAEA to assured fuel supply but merely recording that the safeguards accord follows the “conclusion of international cooperation arrangements creating the necessary conditions for India to obtain access” to assured fuel supply and to receive support to build a strategic fuel supply.

But the harsh truth is that no such international arrangements have thus far been concluded. This attempt to pull the wool on public eyes flows from India’s failure to secure its rights in the 123 agreement, which confers enforceable powers only on the supplier-state. In fact, the Indian fuel supply-related claims about the 123 agreement have bordered on comedy: The US assurances in Article 5.6 are all prospective, not present-day, with the US “committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws” and “prepared to take” additional steps.

l The safeguards accord, like the 123 agreement, is consistent with the provisions of the Hyde Act. Section 104(b)(2) of the Hyde Act stipulates that the US Congress can consider ratifying the final deal only after, inter-alia, “India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps required prior to signature by the parties of an agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to India’s civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programmes…”

The safeguards accord, as mandated by the Hyde Act, is firmly anchored in the GOV/1621 (1973) document. For example, the safeguards accord’s Clause 29 reads: “The termination of safeguards on items subject to this Agreement shall be implemented taking into account the provisions of GOV/1621 (20 August 1973).”

Although the text of the GOV/1621 document is not public, its stipulation is well-known — that facility-specific safeguards shall be “in perpetuity”, allowing for no suspension of international safeguards and shutting out room for corrective measures. Clause 29, however, raises the question whether India, faced with a fuel cut-off, will have the right to withdraw from safeguards the eight indigenous power reactors it is opening to outside inspection. According to papers published by two legal experts on GOV/1621, Antonio F. Perez and Laura Rockwood, the answer may be yes, if India first removes, to IAEA’s satisfaction, supplied fissionable material used or processed in those reactors.
l India will not only open its entire civil programme to external safeguards, but also help pay for such inspections.

India additionally has agreed to protect the Agency and its inspectors against “third-party liability, including any insurance or other financial security, in respect of a nuclear incident”, even though the IAEA is to vet the design of new facilities. The accord lays out the cost of inspection of each Indian facility at 1.2 million euro annually.

India is to place more than two dozen facilities under safeguards in a phased manner.
Without making clear what will be New Delhi’s share, Clause 101 says: “India and the Agency shall each bear any expense incurred in the implementation of their responsibilities under this agreement”. But with the Hyde Act mandating “fallback US safeguards” in case “budget or personnel strains in the IAEA” render it “unable” to fully enforce inspections, India may be compelled to pick up most of the IAEA expenses to avoid parallel US inspections.

The costs of IAEA inspections will be high because, under the accord, India has agreed to be subject to rigorous safeguards, not the token inspections the Agency carries out in nuclear-weapons states. India indeed has granted the IAEA the right to carry out “special inspections” at will. While civil nuclear research institutions bereft of atomic material will escape inspection, commercial power reactors, reprocessing and other facilities with an annual throughput of more than 60 kgs of nuclear material are to be subject to “continuous inspection”, with the IAEA having the right of access at all times.

The Agency, however, has agreed to implement the accord in a manner not to hamper “India’s economic or technological development, and not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any activities involving the use by India of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by India independent of this agreement for its own purposes”.

Contrast the accord’s provisions with Dr Singh’s solemn assurances to Parliament on several occasions. For example, speaking in Parliament on March 7, 2006, the Prime Minister had given the following assurance: “In essence, an India-specific safeguards would … permit India to take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.

Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA”. The deal has progressively picked up such tougher conditions that today few remember that the July 18, 2005, agreement-in-principle had promised India “the same benefits and advantages” as the US. What is on offer now is restricted cooperation tied to intrusive conditions, to the extent that the G-8, in its chair’s summary this week, put the focus on advancing “India’s non-proliferation commitments and progress so as to facilitate a more robust approach to civil nuclear cooperation…” The deal is the means to tether India to the non-proliferation regime.

The India-IAEA safeguards accord compounds the mistakes Indian diplomacy made on the civil-military separation plan and the 123 agreement. Its operative parts mirror the clauses found in the IAEA agreements with non-nuclear-weapons states.

Sorry he is on auto -pilot. There are merits tot he IAEA agreement that was negotiated and should be recognized. The bad should be pointed out to take corrective action for risk mitigation. To piss on the agreement is not BR.

[ChandraS]

Safeguards shall be terminated on a facility listed in the Annex after India and the Agency have jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards

.

ha ha !!!

key is jointly determined. If India determined but Agency don't than safeguard will cont. in perpetuity.

I believe it is somewhat similar to safeguards in the 'campaign' mode that we have had for several years now. My take on it:

Facility X is designated 'civilian' and hence eligible to use imported U and any equipment. This will be subject to IAEA inspections to verify compliance. When India feels the need to use it for military/non-civilian use, the IAEA is notified about it and all the remaining imported U and equipment is taken out and certified to that effect. The facility then reverts to unsafeguarded status and leaving India free to do what it wants.

The key to this sentence IMO is '...any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards.'.

I am willing to be corrected on this.

[Gerard]

Would the "Corrective Measures" stipulation in the Preamble override Section 32

Isn't a preamble used to as a guide in interpreting a law or agreement? It cannot explicitly override a specific section or clause (the actual law).

[Rangudu]

I've lost respect for Chellaney after this hit piece. A honest maximalist or hardliner objection would have acknowledged that the safeguards agreement is about as good as hoped for while asking if the NSG clearance would be as simple and also how 123/Hyde ties into all this.

Simply opposing something for the sake of opposing it is dishonest and betrays intellectual sloth.

[Virupaksha]

The questions which arose from the agreement for me are:

i) What is the "India-specific" about this agreement? Seems like one which any NNWS will have.
ii) With the Tarapur experience in background, what exactly are the safeguards
iii) If fuel interruptions, would they allow us to take it back to the non-civilian

What are the corrective measures, we are allowed? Can we break some sections of the treaty and have the remaining facilities go on?

Points ii and iii hinges on interpretation of '...any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards.'

But my interpretation of that statement is the exact opposite of what ChandraS came about, in other words, "in perpetuity".

Edit: This agreement as of today is good enough for us, but what of tomorrow? We need to understand what options we are foreclosing.

[Rangudu]

NNWS don't have the right to specify what facilities and at what times the safeguards apply. For an NNWS, IAEA safeguards apply to all facilities, all the time. So to say that this agreement is like that of an NNWS would be erroneous and misleading.

Anyway, here is a delicious that will need a lot of cheese to accompany it.

A Nonproliferation Disaster

By Jayantha Dhanapala, Daryl Kimball
Proliferation Analysis, July 10, 2008
Published: July 10, 2008

Decision time has arrived on the controversial nuclear cooperation proposal that was first proposed by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005.

After a long delay, the Indian government has sidestepped domestic critics of the deal and is asking the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors to consider a new “India-specific” safeguards agreement that would cover a limited number of additional “civilian” reactors. The IAEA Board could meet on the matter by the end of July.

Shortly thereafter, the Bush administration will ask the other 44 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to exempt India from longstanding NSG guidelines that require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply. Comprehensive safeguards are intended to prevent the use of civilian nuclear technology and material for weapons purposes.

Because the NSG and IAEA traditionally operate by consensus, any one of a number of states can act to block or modify the ill-conceived arrangement. They have good reason and a responsibility to do so.

Contrary to the claims of its advocates, the deal fails to bring India further into conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of the member states of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Unlike 178 other countries, India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It continues to produce fissile material and expand its arsenal.

Yet, the arrangement would give India the rights and privileges of civil nuclear trade that have been reserved only for members of the NPT. It creates a dangerous distinction between "good" proliferators and "bad" proliferators sending out misleading signals to the international community with regard to NPT norms.

In fact, the current proposal threatens to further undermine the nuclear safeguards system and efforts to prevent the proliferation of technologies that may be used to produce nuclear bomb material. It would also indirectly contribute to the expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal with possible consequences for a nuclear arms race in Asia.

In particular, India is seeking an "India-specific" safeguards agreement that could – depending on how it is interpreted -- allow India to cease IAEA scrutiny if fuel supplies are cut off even it that is because it renews nuclear testing. In the preamble of the proposed safeguards agreement, which was distributed yesterday, India states that it may take unspecified "corrective actions" to ensure fuel supplies in the event that they are interrupted. IAEA Board members should get clarification before taking a decision and reject any interpretation that is inconsistent with the principle of permanent safeguards over all nuclear materials and facilities.

As part of the carefully crafted final document of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, all NPT states-parties endorsed the principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. A decision by the NSG to exempt India from this requirement for India would contradict this important element of the NPT bargain.

India also pledged in July 2005 to conclude an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement. Given that India maintains a nuclear weapons program outside of safeguards, facility-specific safeguards on a few additional “civilian” reactors provide no serious nonproliferation benefits. States should insist that India conclude a meaningful Additional Protocol safeguards regime before the NSG takes a decision on exempting India from its rules.

Incredibly, Indian officials also want exemptions from NSG guidelines that would allow supplier states to provide India with a strategic fuel reserve that could be used to outlast any fuel supply cut off or sanctions that may be imposed if it resumes nuclear testing.

This flatly contradicts provisions in the 2006 U.S. implementing legislation that were authored by Sen. Barack Obama. If NSG supplier states should agree to supply fuel to India, they should clarify that if India resumes nuclear testing, all nuclear cooperation with India shall be terminated and unused fuel supplies from NSG states shall be returned.

India is also demanding “full” nuclear cooperation, including access to advanced plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, and heavy water production technology. This is extremely unwise given that IAEA safeguards cannot prevent such sensitive technology from being replicated and used in India’s weapons program.

Recall that India detonated a nuclear device in 1974 that used plutonium harvested from a heavy water reactor supplied by Canada and the United States in violation of earlier peaceful nuclear use agreements. U.S. officials have stated that they do not intend to sell such technology, but other states may. Virtually all NSG states support proposals that would bar transfers of these sensitive nuclear technologies to non-NPT members and should under no circumstances endorse an NSG rule that would allow the transfer of such technology to India.

Unfortunately, India has refused to join the five original nuclear-weapon states in suspending the production of fissile material for weapons and signing the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Not only would these measures curb nuclear competition in Asia, but it would avoid the possibility that foreign fuel supplies will free-up India’s limited uranium supplies for weapons use and help India to accelerate the buildup of its arsenal. This would contradict the goal of Article I of the NPT, which prohibits direct or indirect assistance to another state’s nuclear weapons program.

All UN members states are also obligated to support UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which calls on India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) stop producing fissile material for weapons, and undertake other nuclear risk reduction measures.

The Indian nuclear deal would be a nonproliferation disaster, especially now. The NPT is in jeopardy and diplomatic efforts to address the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran are at a delicate stage. For those world leaders who are serious about ending the arms race, holding all states to their international commitments, and strengthening the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, it is time to stand up and be counted.

Jayantha Dhanapala is a former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs (1998-2003) and a former Ambassador of Sri Lanka who was President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Daryl G. Kimball is the executive director of the Washington, D.C.-based Arms Control Association.

[ramana]

Dhanapala is sheltering with the NPAs. How the mighty have fallen. he was to be the UN secy gen for his services rendered for extending the NPT in perpetuity! Now it has a codocil!

Rangudu will have to order biryani to go with the double scotch! Ok formage with the merlot for you!

[Rangudu]

NPAs lie openly and shamelessly. See the big lie about all five NWS agreeing to stop fismat production. China has not and God knows their situation. Yet these guys lie openly. Pathetic!

[sraj]

Would the "Corrective Measures" stipulation in the Preamble override Section 32

Isn't a preamble used to as a guide in interpreting a law or agreement? It cannot explicitly override a specific section or clause (the actual law).

Yes. There is very little room for a different interpretation of Section 32 in light of anything contained in the Preamble. So Section 32 provides the last word -- i.e. in perpetuity safeguards on facilities listed in Annex.

[Virupaksha]

NNWS don't have the right to specify what facilities and at what times the safeguards apply. For an NNWS, IAEA safeguards apply to all facilities, all the time. So to say that this agreement is like that of an NNWS would be erroneous and misleading.

yes, I completely agree with your statement.
Can I invert the question? If some one could explain, What is the difference between what NWS have and India doesnt, it would be great.

[Gerard]

NNWS don't have the right to specify what facilities and at what times the safeguards apply

They also don't have the right to substitute (place under safeguards) an identical quantity of fissile material for other fissile material that was previously safeguarded but is no longer.
India has this right under the agreement.

In a NNWS, ALL fissile material is safeguarded. Period.

[Sanjay M]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but we get to declare certain reactors as "not civilian" (ie. military), and these get to be exempted from the inspections regime. We'll then have to make do with domestic resources to sustain these reactors.

Meanwhile, our civilian reactors will get access to international technology and materiel, including fuel.

That's fine, as long as those few military reactors and their production can meet our military deterrence needs.

Regarding Hyde Act and nuclear testing, this US domestic law can force it to cut off fuel supply to us, in the event we test. However, we seem to be allowed to build up a strategic fuel reserve in the meantime, in order to tide ourselves over in the event of a cutoff.

But what happens to our thorium program in the meantime? My understanding is that we have to place the breeder reactors under the civilian/inspection regime.
This N-Deal is then effectively shuttering our Thorium program, leaving us with only a strategic fuel reserve to safeguard our sovereignty against foreign blackmail.

So it then comes down to how much confidence we can place in this strategic fuel reserve in safeguarding us, as compared to continuing our development of our Thorium program. We are trading away continued Thorium tech development against gaining easier civilian energy development which is buffered only by a temporary strategic reserve.

Which is more preferable? The Thorium in our hand (which limits the pace of our energy development) or the Uranium in the Bush (which is immediate but tenuously buffered by a limited fuel reserve)?

How much of a reserve are we allowed to stockpile? Is there a cap on the strategic fuel reserve's size?

[sraj]

Can I invert the question? If some one could explain, What is the difference between what NWS have and India doesnt, it would be great.

NWS have the truly sham safeguards that Malarkey is wailing India has been allowed! He should look inwards for a change.

All NWS offer a token 1 or 2 facilities for IAEA safeguards (out of hundreds that they have). IAEA does not actually carry out any inspections even on these token 1-2 facilities, claiming it would be waste of their scarce budget resources. NWS can also take back these so-called safeguarded facilities out of safeguards any time they wish.

The total number of facilities offered for safeguards by the 5 NWS combined is less than the 14 offered by India up-front, together with a commitment that all future civilian facilities will be offered for perpetual safeguards.

[Rangudu]

One difference is that NWS have the right to buy a foreign reactor kit and kaboodle under safeguards and then withdraw it from safeguards to use it for weapons purposes.

For instance, China can theoretically say f.u and use the reactors it is buying from Areva of France for bomb fuel.

But then again, it is a theoretical right because no one would want to do that because of bilateral issues.

India on the other hand has to place an imported reactor under safeguards as long as it is operational. However, this agreement allows us to classify and reclassify Indian made reactors as we wish, as long as we don't use foreign fuel for bombs. In other words, we can classify Rawatbhata-1 as civilian and run it for 10 years with imported fuel and then say next year onwards we will make it non-civilian and here is our account for nuke fuel until next year. I think that is an okay enough compromise.

[Virupaksha]

India on the other hand has to place an imported reactor under safeguards as long as it is operational. However, this agreement allows us to classify and reclassify Indian made reactors as we wish, as long as we don't use foreign fuel for bombs. In other words, we can classify Rawatbhata-1 as civilian and run it for 10 years with imported fuel and then say next year onwards we will make it non-civilian and here is our account for nuke fuel until next year. I think that is an okay enough compromise.

Rangadu,
I got the impression that the safeguard was perpetual even though the word has not been used from article 32.

[sraj]

India on the other hand has to place an imported reactor under safeguards as long as it is operational. However, this agreement allows us to classify and reclassify Indian made reactors as we wish, as long as we don't use foreign fuel for bombs. In other words, we can classify Rawatbhata-1 as civilian and run it for 10 years with imported fuel and then say next year onwards we will make it non-civilian and here is our account for nuke fuel until next year. I think that is an okay enough compromise.

Rangadu,
I got the impression that the safeguard was perpetual even though the word has not been used from article 32.

Facilities offered for safeguards under 11(a) are covered by 32 which is perpetual. However, India can also offer facilities under 11(f).

[KLNMurthy]

One way to understand the IAEA draft is to read it closely, parsing in minute detail.

Another way is to recognize that when it comes to the crunch, the actual interpretation, and actions taken by various parties would be driven by the international and domestic exigencies of the moment, regardless of micro-legalities. It won't matter too much if we have 'the law' and 'right' on our side if we don't have the clout to get our way when it counts.

[Gerard]

Facilities offered for safeguards under 11(a) are covered by 32 which is perpetual. However, India can also offer facilities under 11(f).

11(f) is meant for the fuel fabrication and Plutonium reprocessing facilities (campaign safeguards).

Safeguards shall be terminated on a facility listed in the Annex after India and the Agency have jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards.

Safeguards are not relevant to bomb making activities but I doubt such an interpretation for 11(a) facilities would find many takers...

[NRao]

India on the other hand has to place an imported reactor under safeguards as long as it is operational. However, this agreement allows us to classify and reclassify Indian made reactors as we wish, as long as we don't use foreign fuel for bombs. In other words, we can classify Rawatbhata-1 as civilian and run it for 10 years with imported fuel and then say next year onwards we will make it non-civilian and here is our account for nuke fuel until next year. I think that is an okay enough compromise.

Rangadu,
I got the impression that the safeguard was perpetual even though the word has not been used from article 32.

Article 32:

32. Safeguards shall be terminated on a facility listed in the Annex after India and the Agency have
jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the
point of view of safeguards.

Could this not be interpreted in two ways?:

1) If a facility is no longer in need of safeguards, then it is going to be unplugged - shutdown, or
2) I am going to take it across the fence and therefore it requires no safeguards

Again, if we revisit AKs ppt, he intends "importing" 40 GWe - total. No more. After that he will reprocess from these 40GWe reactors to feed the FBRs that are on the civilian side of the fence.

Aks intent is rather clear. It is these FBRs that are on the civilian side that he intends to reclassify. IMHO of course.

Who cares in 2050 when FBRs contribute to 400 GWe - the energy deficit. IF the contributing agencies want to take their ball and go home, so be it. 40GWe is 10% and rather easily filled. In fact if the heat gets too much they can be deactivated and shipped earlier.

On Markey and Kimball, etc, I would track younger NAPs. This deal is going through. IF at all it may get stuck in teh US Congress, which I highly doubt.

[enqyoob]

Same question as b4: What is the sequence? What happens if the NSG passes it, but COTUS drags feet? IOW, I forget - is the NSG being asked to pass the IAEA agreement, or the US-India 123? Or is the NSG deciding if THEY all want to deal with India since IAEA says it's OK?

[Rangudu]

Guys

The US Congress is no more relevant. If the IAEA BOG and NSG clear the deal, US Congress has to decide if they let India's new market be cornered by Russia and France or to let US firms have a chance.