War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

[malushahi]

singha, that s~cks - if only the desi jingos can pick up the cue and look for the bugs under the rocks..

[malushahi]

There is now talk about the Chinese setting up a military bases in one of the Maldivian islands.

some payback for saving gayoom and co's skin (aka operation cactus)...

and i struggle with the question "why can't we encourage a taiwan, tibet and garam masala ala kosovo.."

http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41248

[Singha]

http://www.scramble.nl/cn.htm click on the PLAAF orbat.

this has known orbat of PLAAF though its hard to imagine how they
can be sure which a/c is based where on a continuing basis.

looking at the bases in east, if you move your mouse over name there
is one site with J10 and one with su27.

number of bases is only around 7 within 500km but the IAF station chief
mentioned 14. we can add +1 for the Linzhi. rest 6 are still unmarked
and must be satellite bases activated or new bases they have built up.

[Singha]

at present 100s of daily civilian flights have been reduced by airlines
because they make less losses sitting on the ground than flying.

this presents an opportunity because for a limited period, the airlines
can be paid and asked to deploy some of these machines (lets us say
20 A321/737) on national exercise duty. better to learn our weakness
in peace than find out in war.

REFOR-A/REFOR-L (return of forces to assam/ladakh)

- Take place at night for cover at the landing zones
- Each plane with 180 people, light arms and clothing in hold
- lightning fast x-country deployment from hyd/blr/nagpur not
delhi/agra
- 10 planes to Leh, 10 to dibrugarh , all to land and leave within
a single 1 hr window to minimize vulnerability to counter strike
- cargo hold and people to be loaded into presited convoys of
trucks which would again do a speed test to a certain place like
DBO or Bomdilla
- procedures like interacting with civil police and TA to hold open
roads can be fine tuned.
- 1800 people (2 batallions+) landed in 3 hrs from starting pt,
2 hrs back to start, another 3 hrs to return and unload.
i.e 1 brigade+ inducted by air in 8 hrs from x-country

- goal is to induct one brigade every night starting at dusk
using 10 planes and repeat that for 3 nights at a stretch
so that 1 division can be covertly inducted and dispersed
with no trace left to satellite imagery

[Sanju]

Maybe the reason for all the hurry was due to PM informing them that the UPA Govt was going ahead with the Nuclear Agreement with US. The Chinese may have indicated that it would be construed as an offensive act directly aimed at containing China and that China will respond in an aggressive manner. So all the rush in upgrading the infra in the border areas.

Whatever happens on the North and NE, we should not forget our "friendly neighbourhood brothers" to our West?

[HariC]

- Take place at night for cover at the landing zones
- Each plane with 180 people, light arms and clothing in hold
- lightning fast x-country deployment from hyd/blr/nagpur not
delhi/agra
- 10 planes to Leh, 10 to dibrugarh , all to land and leave within
a single 1 hr window to minimize vulnerability to counter strike
- cargo hold and people to be loaded into presited convoys of
trucks which would again do a speed test to a certain place like
DBO or Bomdilla
- procedures like interacting with civil police and TA to hold open
roads can be fine tuned.
- 1800 people (2 batallions+) landed in 3 hrs from starting pt,
2 hrs back to start, another 3 hrs to return and unload.
i.e 1 brigade+ inducted by air in 8 hrs from x-country

- goal is to induct one brigade every night starting at dusk
using 10 planes and repeat that for 3 nights at a stretch
so that 1 division can be covertly inducted and dispersed
with no trace left to satellite imagery

Due to safety concerns, I am very skeptical if night landings are allowed at Leh. All the information i read talk about flights during day time. Any supporting evidence to the contrary?

[bhavin]

Hope this is the right thread to post.....

Underground expressway proposed between Siliguri & Sikkim

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/New ... 221985.cms

Will this be better for the troop movement to the tri-junction?

Something is shady in this deal.. Google search reveals no company called Star Universal Resources Company... It does not even have a website and this company is a US construction major?? Surely somebody is jesting....

[Singha]

Due to safety concerns, I am very skeptical if night landings are allowed at Leh.

during wartime there are no rules. secondly what cant the necessary eqpt to permit instrument
landings be installed in vital logistical nodes like Leh ? our A321/737 pilots are all trained to use
these and also land in considerabel fog.

[Kakarat]

Manali-Leh railway link soon
In a major move to push tourism in the hill states and counter Chinese expansion in the Tibetan region, the Railways ministry has prepared a blueprint to set up an ambitious 480 kilometre Manali - Leh railway line link criss-crossing the treacherous mountains in Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir.

The project according to experts will cost over Rs 16,000 crore and the ministry is already preparing a detail survey plan for the project.

A top level government meeting took place in Delhi recently to discuss the survey and other modalities of the project. The distance, according to the plan, will be traversed in around ten hours.

A senior Railway Ministry official said, "A detailed survey plan for the proposed Manali-Leh railway line has been prepared and is under the active consideration of the Railway Board. The expenditure for the survey will be shared jointly by the Himachal Pradesh government and the centre."

The plan is to lay a broad gauge railway track between Jogindernagar and Manali via Mandi and extend it 480 kilometre further to Leh via the Rohtang pass and beyond.

The security concerns are a key reason for building the train line.

"With China building the Beijing-Lhasa railway track, it is critical for India to respond and build the Manali-Leh route both from the security and tourism point of view of India," said Prem Kumar Dhumal, chief minister, Himachal Pradesh.

The proposed railway project is strategically important for India as experts opine that a railway line will be a viable transport alternative in extreme weather conditions.

At present, the main source of connectivity to the border areas is either through the road or air, which frequently gets affected during adverse weather conditions.

Manali - Leh highway which connects tribal areas of Lahaul, Udaipur, Pangi and Ladakh with the rest of the country and goes through the highest mountain passes in the world, remains closed down during the entire winter season.

A rail link will definitely serve India's defence purpose at a time the Chinese are flexing their muscles at our backyard, said an industry expert.

Apart from serving the India's defence interest, the proposed project will provide a fillip to the tourism industry that is one of the major source of revenue generation for the state of Himachal Pradesh.

"I have just returned from Leh and the response I received from the people of Ladakh has been tremendous. The private sector is already showing a keen interest in building this railway track," Dhumal said.

A senior executive of an infrastructure company undertaking railway projects said that the cost of laying a railway track at such a high altitude will be more than double the cost of laying a normal railway track.

Because of the difficult terrain, the movement of vehicles carrying raw materials and other equipment for the project will become costlier.

Moreover, a large amount of tunneling work will have to be undertaken along the proposed route.

[HariC]

Due to safety concerns, I am very skeptical if night landings are allowed at Leh.

during wartime there are no rules. secondly what cant the necessary eqpt to permit instrument
landings be installed in vital logistical nodes like Leh ? our A321/737 pilots are all trained to use
these and also land in considerabel fog.

Because, Leh is a special airfield and according to group cpt bewoors articles - the approach has to be done from one side regardless of wind direction (always in the West -> East direction) - and things like ground mapping radar do not help much.

Flying into Leh is not like getting into a holding pattern at Chicago’s O’Hare. There is only one way to fly into what we call ‘Forward areas’, using ones eyes, and that’s all. Pilots have to be geographically educated on every peak, every valley, every lake, and also how to fix ones position by cross reference to what Nun Kun, Sasar Braganza, Sasar Kangri, Nanga Parbat, Goodwin Austin( K2) look like from ‘present position’. An NDB beacon is useless as is a VOR.

We keep cancellilng flights in conditions of fog . Are there enough civilian pilots out there who have the expertise of landing at Leh - and that to under IMC and/or using IFR?. We need to post data to support the capability - not just wish for it.

Naturally there are no nav aids or radio aids. Flying into Leh is not like getting into a holding pattern at Chicago’s O’Hare. There is only one way to fly into what we call ‘Forward areas’, using ones eyes, and that’s all. Pilots have to be geographically educated on every peak, every valley, every lake, and also how to fix ones position by cross reference to what Nun Kun, Sasar Braganza, Sasar Kangri, Nanga Parbat, Goodwin Austin( K2) look like from ‘present position’. An NDB beacon is useless as is a VOR.

There is a small lake called Kar Tso which is a reporting point 2 mins before descent is initiated to enter the Indus valley. If the AN12 established its position at Kar Tso, then a descent up to a pre determined height was allowed on a pre determined heading, keeping the known winds in mind. The ground mapping radar was a help, but that’s about all.

If the landing is on RW 07, then the Downwind is on a heading of approx 250 degrees, and if that is correct, then the Downwind leg has to be North and not South of the RW. if one were to do a downwind leg South of the R/W, the ground actually rises instead of falling away as the aircraft reaches the end of downwind and prepares to turn RIGHT onto final approach. IAF pilots have spent years mastering the technique of flying into Leh. Every approach and landing is an education.

It is true that once a pilot commits himself to a landing at Leh, he should go through with it. Actually, is this not applicable any where in the world? Anyway, it is not true that a 3 engine overshoot and climb out is precluded. On the AN 12, we teach and practice overshoots at Leh from about 200 metres above ground. It is a Standard Operating Procedure,(SOP) for a flying instructor to teach and test pilots and flt engineers for this critical overshoot at Leh. And it is very safe and the drill is to climb out towards the South, get to 4.2 kms, turn around, and come in for another approach and landing. The reasons for overshooting could be many and it has to be demonstrated & practiced before a pilot is considered fit to command an aircraft into Leh.

For any reason, if the aircraft cannot climb to the required height for the return flight to Delhi or Chandigarh, then a very well reconnoitered and frequently used Escape Route has been included in the SOP for Forward Area Flying. It was in use well before the Herk came to India in 1962. The pioneers of the AN12 fleet established this escape route after much deliberations and trials. It is pertinent to inform all the readers that all SOPs and other methodologies in flying are made so that “ an average pilot can adhere and comply with them”. The SOPs are not designed for Test pilots and highly experienced aircrew. Indeed, one wrong turn would get you into a blind valley, and because the aircraft was not climbing to the desired height it was curtains. But in all the 32 years that the AN12 flew to Leh, not once did any pilot and navigator combination get into a blind valley. Like the overshoot at Leh, flying the escape route was mandatory to get cleared for Leh and also for Supply Drops. The escape route is also used during hostilities. I vividly recollect many of us flying into Leh between 05 Dec 1971 and 16 Dec 1971, and returning by the Escape Route because Pakistani fighters were reported to be around. There is no way a fighter can find an AN12 flying at 18000 feet in the Zanskar valley or over Bara-La-Chala, and finally across Rohtang Pass, into the Kulu valley.


Never in the history of AN12 operations at Leh has the aircraft even attempted to land Downhill. To land downhill means landing in a Westerly direction. There are many reasons why it is impossible. First, to land downhill the circuit pattern would force the Downwind leg to be South of the RW. This is contrary to SOP as it interferes with overshoot procedures. Second, there is no space East of the airfield to maneuver an AN12 for the final approach. It is full of mountains Third, to kill the issue, it is not possible to fly a downwind leg North of the RW and then make a Right hand turn onto final approach. Fifth, an overshoot in a westerly direction is far too dangerous. There is not enough space to do a safe Left hand turn after the overshoot, the mountain to the West is far too close to the RW, where as the mountains to the East and East South East are far away, giving much needed space to climb out and circle around. Besides, if as Col Howe correctly says, the AN12 had no reverse props for short landings why in the world would the AN12 be landed downhill? We, in the IAF may be crazy, but we are certainly not suicidal. To once again make abundantly clear, the AN12 always landed Uphill in an Easterly direction, and always took off downhill in a westerly direction.

[Singha]

well there being regular daytime flights of IA and Jet there , why cant more beacons be seeded all over the
place and a good GPS set with moving map display improve the situation? and jets with the Leh reduced
payload would have better climb rates than AN12 (I hope)

the only way to find out is to prepare and try these things...landing in Leh itself was considered a real
feat back in 1948 when air comodore Meher Singh was around.

if this were chipanda they'd have dug up a mountain or two to improve the flight path and shopped/stolen
the worlds best eqpt to make it possible.

another base between Leh and Kargil to support Thoise and another one along the manali highway would
be good inshallah.

[Singha]

from the articles it appears there are routine IAF night sorties to Leh.
Allah! it also seems lower temperature at night aids in having more payload...avoiding
the hot _and_ high penalty.

Friday, May 26, 2000,
Chandigarh, India

First night sortie to Thoise
By Vijay Mohan
Tribune News Service

CHANDIGARH, May 24 — Night sorties over the rugged Himalayas may not be new to the IAF, with training and terrain familiarisation sorties by transport aircraft to airfields located in the Northern Sector being undertaken in the past. But Operation Vijay in the Kargil Sector last year has given an impetus to operational night flying for carrying out air maintenance to support Army formations deployed along the Line of Control.

The emphasis on night flying has resulted in another landmark achievement for the IAF, when the first night sortie to Thoise by an IL-76 was undertaken last week. This maiden night flight to Thoise, earlier virgin territory as far as night operations are concerned, was preceded by trial landing at night by the smaller AN-32 aircraft earlier. All trial flights were from the Chandigarh airbase.

Though Operation Vijay had required the IAF to carry out round-the-clock air maintenance, the sorties were to Leh, with flights to Thoise and other Advance Landing Grounds (ADG) being restricted to daytime. The IAF, had soon after started regular operational night sorties to Leh.

“Prior to Kargil, night sorties to Leh used to be for training purposes. One such sortie was carried out in about three or four months. It is now a regular task,” an officer here commented.


Both Leh and Thoise are high-altitude airfields situated at about 10,000 metres above sea level and at this altitude, the temperature is a major factor in the aircraft’s performance and load-bearing capacity. “At temperatures above 25 degrees Celsius, the AN-32 is forced to return without taking even a single person or any cargo on board,” an officer said. Even the much more capable IL -76 with its four jet engines and a load carrying capacity of up to 45,000 kg finds itself in the same predicament. “This is where the significance of night operations — when temperatures are low and consequently the load carrying capacity is at its maximum — lies,’’ the officer explained.

The IAF had been, in fact, exploring the possibility of night sorties to Thoise soon after the Kargil conflict had ended, but it required the installation of navigational aids on the approach leg to the airfield as well as prior sanction from Air Headquarters.

Night flying is done during the “moon phase”, when visibility is adequate for navigation, which means that sorties can be undertaken only during a few specific days in a month. Inclement weather conditions prevailing at Thoise even during the moon phase further put a spanner in the works.

Even though the IL-76s have been flying regularly to Thoise, the maiden night sortie had involved a series of exercises and precautionary measures. A special daytime sortie was carried out to re-map the air-route and identify navigational features en route. Flying time from one point to another was recorded for reference and cross-checks made during the night sortie.

[Singha]

while pvt airlines skimped on pilot training for Cat2+ ILS, indian airlines has a big roster of pilots trained to Cat3.
thats why when fog shuts down palam for most, IA is the only one chugging along.

some of them may even be ex transport pilots who cut their teeth on an32/il76 in younger days.

there wont be a lack of volunteer pilots who want to contribute if GOI asks around.

and anyway, nothing prevents the concept being tried into bases in Assam valley...perhaps
simultaneous sorties to GAU, tezpur, jorhat and dibrugarh.

[HariC]

Good article on the IaF night flights.

The following are the constraints that i foresee
* the flying is restricted to nights in moon phase with sufficient light to aid navigation.
* you need experienced navigators aboard who can do these navigation tasks.
* you need to have the cream of the civilian pilots to do these flights.
* If Il-76s need navigators, then so will B737s and A320s

On the plus side, i remember reading a Jet airways flight to Thoise done for the Army. So they probably can do this stuff during daytime to thoise and leh on a smaller scale.

“At temperatures above 25 degrees Celsius, the AN-32 is forced to return without taking even a single person or any cargo on board,”

if that is the case with fixed wing aircraft, can you imagine what it might do for choppers? (harking back to the old discussion)

[Lalmohan]

some decent radio landing aids in all these fwd bases, more gps and digi-maps and NVG's in the cockpit - 24 x 7 transport ops is a must. and ofcourse there is that gem about cooler night ops

[Singha]

do the RAF GR4 Tornado pilots undertake NVG equipped takeoff and landing? I read they like to
flit around the countryside at night lo-lo-lo using flir & nvg.

[Singha]

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m ... tBody;col1
F-16 Risk Analysis: Block 60 FLIR-Assisted Landing Instruction

excerpt:

The following is a summary of F-16 night-landing mishaps learned from these interviews.

Four F-16 mishaps at night were detailed in these interviews. Two involved using the FLIR to help land and two did not. The first mishap described happened at an overseas base while landing at night. The approach was to the south, and just short of the runway was a valley with lower terrain than the landing surface. This created the illusion that the F-16 was high on glide path. The valley also produced a thick fog that crept up to the threshold of the runway and obscured visibility in the initial landing phase. With fog obscuring the landing zone, the pilot perceiving that the jet was above glide path, and no FLIR available to assist, the Air Force lost an F-16 when it crashed short of the runway.

A similar event happened at a continental United States F-16 base. The pilot was only able to get a few sorties prior to the event and was therefore not as proficient at night operations when the mishap occurred. On recovery to landing, the runway assigned was the opposite from the landing surface where the pilot was accustomed to landing. This particular runway had few city and other natural lights. This situation then created a black hole effect where the pilot had few visual cues to tell that he was descending. On this mishap, low proficiency, vectors to an unexpected runway, a black hole effect on short final, and no FLIR available to assist, all combined to produce a low situational awareness for the F-16 pilot. The result was a very hard landing followed by main landing gear failure.

The next two accounts involve emergency F-16 diverting to strange fields using the FLIR to assist. In the early 1990s, an F-16 flying a night low-level mission developed an engine oil problem. This particular low level was in Arizona, and the nearest divert for the pilot was the city of Kingman. Kingman's runway was not controlled at night and was a shorter-than-normal landing surface for the F-16. Using the F-16 navigational waypoints to find the airfield, the pilot then used the FLIR of the Block 40 to line up and land uneventfully on this short airfield. Further, the entire airfield was blacked out, with no lights on the runways or taxiways. A similar event also happened during an emergency divert due to an engine oil problem. This time, the aircraft was in Saudi Arabia on a night mission when the problem developed.

The airfield chosen for divert was entirely blacked out, and the pilot successfully used the FLIR to line up and land uneventfully.

In each of these four accounts, the pilots involved were fully qualified in the F-16. None were beginners in an FTU environment. In the case of the fog landing, it is not certain if the runway threshold would have been adequately indicated on the display. The end result might have been the same. But in the case of the hard landing, utilization of a FLIR may have changed the outcome. At minimum, having the FLIR turned on would lessen the black hole effect on short final by providing an IR picture of the runway environment. Conversely, the FLIR could also have led to a low situational awareness because it is another sensor which must be turned on, adjusted, and cross-checked. In this case of low proficiency, adding another sensor only increases pilot workload and may be more of a distraction than a help. FLIR utilization then is not an overall solution to preventing night-landing mishaps in the F-16, but rather another tool that can be used to enhance situational awareness.

....
there is a extremely detailed discussion of teaching FLIR assisted landings to the UAE
pilots converting to the F16-block60.

----

[malushahi]

methinks our level of preparedness in the north/western chInd sector is much higher given over half-century of devotion to the maid in the west. the remnants of old infra have been there in most cases (dbo, fuchke et al), and there has been steady investment over the years to create an additional redundancy over the zanskars (getting accelerated no doubt with the proposed plans for manali-leh rail/highway).

it is the eastern sector that gives reason for worry. there is no doubt that things have come a long way since the mule train to tsangdhar led by brig dalvi. but even today one only has to see the infra around namka-chu to realize that things can go bad very quickly should push come to shove over tawang (which may not be very far considering dalai's age).

or is it just me imagining..

[malushahi]

although to be fair, there seems to be a belated realization that investing in tourism is beneficial in many ways.

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/New ... 177940.cms

[rajrang]

Manali-Leh railway link soon
In a major move to push tourism in the hill states and counter Chinese expansion in the Tibetan region, the Railways ministry has prepared a blueprint to set up an ambitious 480 kilometre Manali - Leh railway line link criss-crossing the treacherous mountains in Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir.

The project according to experts will cost over Rs 16,000 crore and the ministry is already preparing a detail survey plan for the project.

A top level government meeting took place in Delhi recently to discuss the survey and other modalities of the project. The distance, according to the plan, will be traversed in around ten hours.

A senior Railway Ministry official said, "A detailed survey plan for the proposed Manali-Leh railway line has been prepared and is under the active consideration of the Railway Board. The expenditure for the survey will be shared jointly by the Himachal Pradesh government and the centre."

The plan is to lay a broad gauge railway track between Jogindernagar and Manali via Mandi and extend it 480 kilometre further to Leh via the Rohtang pass and beyond.

The security concerns are a key reason for building the train line.

"With China building the Beijing-Lhasa railway track, it is critical for India to respond and build the Manali-Leh route both from the security and tourism point of view of India," said Prem Kumar Dhumal, chief minister, Himachal Pradesh.

The proposed railway project is strategically important for India as experts opine that a railway line will be a viable transport alternative in extreme weather conditions.

At present, the main source of connectivity to the border areas is either through the road or air, which frequently gets affected during adverse weather conditions.

Manali - Leh highway which connects tribal areas of Lahaul, Udaipur, Pangi and Ladakh with the rest of the country and goes through the highest mountain passes in the world, remains closed down during the entire winter season.

A rail link will definitely serve India's defence purpose at a time the Chinese are flexing their muscles at our backyard, said an industry expert.

Apart from serving the India's defence interest, the proposed project will provide a fillip to the tourism industry that is one of the major source of revenue generation for the state of Himachal Pradesh.

"I have just returned from Leh and the response I received from the people of Ladakh has been tremendous. The private sector is already showing a keen interest in building this railway track," Dhumal said.

A senior executive of an infrastructure company undertaking railway projects said that the cost of laying a railway track at such a high altitude will be more than double the cost of laying a normal railway track.

Because of the difficult terrain, the movement of vehicles carrying raw materials and other equipment for the project will become costlier.

Moreover, a large amount of tunneling work will have to be undertaken along the proposed route.

Hope it doesn't take 10 years to finish it. By that time the Chinese may even build a railway from Lhasa to Aksai Chin.

[RayC]

Due to safety concerns, I am very skeptical if night landings are allowed at Leh.

during wartime there are no rules. secondly what cant the necessary eqpt to permit instrument
landings be installed in vital logistical nodes like Leh ? our A321/737 pilots are all trained to use
these and also land in considerabel fog.

Apart from the problems of flying in High Altitude, it is the hills that makes landing difficult at Leh. The funnel is very narrow.

Bad weather is a frequent cause for cancellation of flights.

It was interesting to note that night landings did take place after Op Vijay.

[malushahi]

number of bases is only around 7 within 500km but the IAF station chief
mentioned 14. we can add +1 for the Linzhi. rest 6 are still unmarked
and must be satellite bases activated or new bases they have built up.

scramble orbat shows what has been declared as "military" by plaaf (luliang, mengzi and yuanmou in chengdu mraf would be of interest to us with yuanmou at 700 kms being the closest to chabua). however in counting 14 the station chief probably alluded to mil-grade airports more along the lines of bagdogara on the other side. i could see 13 numbers of > 2200m airports within a range of appx 600 kms from chabua (i'm considering the upper bound for j-10 combat radius). one more airport tengchong (adjacent to manipur) is expected to be completed by later this year (ironically christened "hump airport").

http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/logi ... igers.html

not sure if we are witnessing the makings of the "21st century hump", with the intention of flowing matériel in a direction opposite to one in 1942-45.

i can post the image grab from GE showing the 13 airports. not sure how i can do it. guru-jan??

[Singha]

if you have a yahoo account post it on flickr.com if you have google there is picasa web albums.
or just email it my addr, I will post it in a couple days.

[malushahi]

thanks singha. here is the jpeg on flickr:

http://www.flickr.com/photos/28677717@N02/2675668299/

[Singha]

wow..thicker than fleas on a pakdog's hide. a damaged aircraft has plenty of
options to land going back home and damaged airbases have lot of friendlies
in the same patch. if they fill these upto potential not less than 300 a/c
could be launched enmasse in a overwhelming flashmob attack.

I saw Linzhi on goog-e last night, stunning piece of work and hires imagery.
seems to be almost on a sandbar of the brahmaputra.

how big are the runways in yunnan? that place is not at sea level...very rugged
terrain...with characteristic stone towers at prominent outcrops..a tradition in
that area.

[abhischekcc]

Hey, any body has vivek_ahuja's phone no? Please send it to me pronto. He seems to have dropped off the planet.

vivek, if you are reading this, please contact me at my email.

[malushahi]

yunan's "dual purpose" runways are on average > 2,100m (7,000ft).

amsl (in ft): zhongdian (10,700), lijiang (7,300), dali (7,000), midu (6,400), yuamou (3,800), baoshan (5,400), luxi (2,800), lincang (6,200), simao (4,300), jinghong (1,800).

as i said, gotta give it to them for building and maintaining mil-grade airports in a terrain not very different from arunachal.

[Singha]

arunachal and yunnan are very alike from photos I see. recall the famous 22
serpentine bends on the kunming road (stillwell road) that enters myanmar in
pangsai pass nagaland.

we whine and puff at the thought of building some good roads there, but they
walk the talk and make it happen. the qinghai-lhasa railway is also a incredible
and very costly feat of high alt engineering with a good stretch above the
permafrost line. the trains are sealed and pressurized for passenger comfort.

Yindia gives a befitting reply by pushing a file for rohtang-leh railway when
they havent even managed to complete a few freakin tunnels in 10 yrs after
kargil for the existing road.

only danger for PRC seems to death at our inept attitude.

we need atleast 4 big greenfield fighter-bomber bases in north and 4 in east
at par with gwalior/jamnagar to even start attacking this problem.

and massive new funds need to be made available for road building in a
time bound and closely tracked manner (at PMO level) in border areas.

hate saying this, but we are like pantless and bent over in a gay colony.

[malushahi]

that pic is on wiki (22 serpentine bends)..

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Ledo ... -China.gif

methinks the signals emanating from iaf (expansion, movement etc.) portends good. however, what is the state of preparedness with specials like ssb and sff. last i heard ssb had been relegated to danda-wielding duties along panchand-da-land - what a waste of an outfit trained for decades exactly for this scenario.

[Rupesh]

http://pagesperso-orange.fr/tibetmap/mapbr1.html

High resolution maps of tibet...

[Sanju]

only danger for PRC seems to death at our inept attitude.

Well this was the same in 1962 - our ineptitude. However, this time around it will be more Govt based rather than Govt and the Army HQ like in 1962.

[ramana]

X-posted.. Looks like mainstream opinion makers are also seized about this issue...

From http://www.covert.co.in/brahma.htm

China's next India war

CHINA’S RAPIDLY ACCUMULATING POWER is emboldening Beijing to pursue a more muscular foreign policy. After having touted its “peaceful rise”, it has shown a creeping propensity to flex its muscles — a tendency that has become more pronounced since it surprised the world with an anti-satellite weapon test in January 2007. Once the Beijing Olympics are over, it may not be long before China takes its gloves off. In fact, over the past year, its actions have ranged from provocatively seeking to assert its jurisdiction over islets claimed by Vietnam and staging large-scale war games in the South and East China Seas, to showcasing its new nuclear submarine capability and whipping up diplomatic spats with countries that grant official hospitality to the Dalai Lama.

What stands out the most is the perceptible hardening of China’s stance towards India. This is manifest from the Chinese military assertiveness on the ground — reflected in rising cross-border incursions — the supply of Chinese arms to rebels in India’s Northeast, the instigation of the Gorkhaland agitation via Nepal connections, and the waging of intermittent cyber-warfare by targeting official Indian websites. From Chinese forces in November 2007 destroying some makeshift Indian Army bunkers near Doka La, at the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction, to the Chinese Foreign Minister’s May 2007 message that Beijing no longer was bound by a 2005 agreement that any border-related settlement should not disturb settled populations, bellicosity has been writ large.

Recent unfriendly actions include the post-midnight summoning of the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, slighting visiting External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee by cancelling his scheduled meeting with Premier Wen Jiabao, and deputing a junior functionary to receive earthquake-related relief from Mukherjee. These and other actions run counter to the stated aim of the high-level visits between the two countries to build a stable Sino-Indian relationship based on equilibrium and forward thinking. The public statements coming out from such visits, of course, are deceptively all sweetness and light.
The big question is: What objectives is China seeking to achieve by hardening its position? Indeed, it has gone to the extent of warning India of another 1962-style invasion through one of its state-run institutes. In a recent Mandarin-language commentary posted on the website of the International Institute of Strategic Studies of China, http://www.chinaiiss.org/, the author, using an assumed name, cautioned an “arrogant India” not “to be evil” or else Chinese forces in war “will not pull back 30 kilometres” like in 1962. Such belligerence, which has led to more than three dozen Chinese military forays into Sikkim alone this year, has prompted India to redeploy forces by beefing up defences in the vulnerable Siliguri Corridor, stationing Sukhoi-30s in Tezpur and initiating moves to reactivate seven abandoned airstrips along the Himalayas.

China’s motives remain a puzzle. Yet there are several disturbing parallels between what is happening now and the events between 1959 and 1962 that led to the Chinese invasion. That aggression had been cleverly timed to coincide with the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of a nuclear Armageddon. Consider the following parallels:

» Like in the pre-war period, it has now again become commonplace internationally to speak of India and China in the same breath. The aim of “Mao’s India war” in 1962, as Harvard professor Roderick MacFarquhar has called it, were mainly political: to cut India to size by demolishing what it represented — a pluralistic, democratic model to China’s totalitarian political system. As Premier Zhou Enlai publicly admitted then, the war was intended “to teach India a lesson”. The swiftness and force with which Mao Zedong managed to teach India a lesson not only discredited the Indian model in the eyes of the world, but boosted China’s international image and consolidated the Chinese strongman’s internal power to the extent that he could go from his disastrous 1957-61 Great Leap Forward — the greatest genocide in modern history, surpassing even the Holocaust — to wreaking more damage in the name of the Cultural Revolution. It has taken India more than 45 years to again be paired with China — a comparison Beijing viscerally loathes.

» In the Mao years, China instigated and armed major insurgencies in India’s Northeast. That included the Naga rebels, with the China-trained Thuingaleng Muivah still the military chief of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah faction); the Mizo guerrilla movement whose leader Laldenga was openly embraced by Chinese leaders; and Manipur’s so-called People’s Liberation Army. Such assistance ceased after Mao’s death. But today, China may be coming full circle, with Chinese-made arms increasingly flowing into guerrilla ranks in the Northeast. Although an 11-year-old ceasefire between Naga militants and New Delhi has brought peace to Nagaland, several other parts of the Northeast are today wracked by insurgencies, allowing Beijing to fish in troubled waters.

» Like in the period up to 1962, there is a mismatch today between Indian talk and capability, offering a potential incentive to China to try and put India in its place. India’s power pretensions today are such that it believes it can punch above its weight. Yet the gaps in its defences make the parallel with the pre-1962 period glaring.

More than a decade after it went overtly nuclear, the country still lacks a barely minimal deterrent against China. To have peace with China, India needs to be able to defend peace. The advantages China has over India in military infrastructure and logistics, size of conventional forces and being on the upper heights can be neutralised only through an effective nuclear-missile capability. But India has still to deploy its first Beijing-reachable missile. Three decades after China tested its first intercontinental ballistic missile, India doesn’t have an ICBM programme even in the pipeline, although it is spending a staggering $3.4 billion on a lunar project bereft of security benefits. While Jawaharlal Nehru made the mistake of chasing romantic goals, the present Prime Minister has consciously chosen deal-making over deterrent-building.

» Mirroring the confusion in New Delhi’s Beijing policy from the mid-1950s to 1962, India today lacks clarity on the ends and means of its strategy vis-à-vis China. Just as there was a propensity in the pre-war period to take Chinese statements at face value and condone furtive Chinese moves, including the nibbling at Indian territory, the Indian establishment today willingly makes allowances for China’s assertiveness. Nothing better illustrates this than Army Chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor’s public assertion that India is as culpable as China in committing cross-border intrusions. His shocking statement not only made light of the increasing number of Chinese incursions, but also implicitly condoned China’s calculated refusal to clarify the frontline. To say the “Chinese have a different perception” of the frontline, as he did, is to disregard the fact that it suits China not to clarify the line of control and keep India under military pressure.

Such wanton indulgence — reminiscent of India’s pre-war miscalculations — can only embolden China to step up intrusions. In another reminder of that era, New Delhi first sought to sweep under the rug the November 2007 Chinese military action near Doka La, only to sheepishly admit the truth four months later, with Pranab Mukherjee telling Parliament last March that although Beijing accepts the Sikkim-Tibet border “as settled in the Anglo-Sikkim Convention of 1890”, “some bunkers have been destroyed and some activities have taken place”.

» Just as India retreated to a defensive position in the border negotiations with Beijing at the beginning of the 1960s after having undermined its leverage through its formal acceptance of the “Tibet region of China”, New Delhi today has drawn back to an untenable negotiating position. Instead of gently shining the spotlight on the core issue of Tibet and China’s continuing occupation of Aksai Chin, India is willing to discuss the newly assertive Chinese claim on Tawang. By contrast, Beijing sticks to its tested old line that what it occupies is Chinese territory and what it claims is also Chinese territory. So what it claims has to be on the negotiating table — a cynical stance India meekly countenances. As a consequence, the wounds of that 32-day war have been kept open by China’s claims to additional Indian areas even as it holds on to the territorial gains of that conflict.

The reality is that the trans-Himalayan military equations have been significantly changed by China’s July 2006 opening of the new railway to Lhasa. The railway, which is now being extended southward to Xigatse and then beyond to Nepal and to two separate points along the Indian border, arms Beijing with a rapid military deployment capability. It may not be a coincidence that China’s growing hardline approach has followed its infrastructure advances on the vast but sparsely populated Tibetan plateau, including the building of the railway and new airfields and highways. It is now constructing the world’s highest airport at Ngari, on the southwestern edge of Tibet. India can expect little respite from the direct and surrogate pressure China is mounting. Through Burma, Bangladesh and Nepal, it will seek to destabilise the Northeast. It will continue to prop up Pakistan militarily to help keep India boxed in on the subcontinent. In fact, it is now seeking to do a Burma in Sri Lanka by emerging as a key arms supplier to Colombo and building a billion-dollar port at Hambantota. More broadly, China has aggressively pursued port-related projects in the Indian Ocean rim countries. The symbols of such Chinese activity include Hambantota, Chittagong and Gwadar, now being expanded into a deepwater naval base. China’s ravenous pursuit of resources, including in India’s periphery, is another factor New Delhi cannot ignore. Constraints on resources are likely to become pronounced as more and more Indians and Chinese gain income to embrace modern comforts. The global demand for resources is set to soar, along with their prices. Beijing’s energy-import needs have come handy to expand Chinese maritime presence along vital sea-lanes.

An imperial energy age indeed appears to be dawning as a result of China’s aggressive resources-related diplomacy. Consider the following developments:

» The emergence of a 21st-century, energy-related Great Game, with China outmanoeuvring India. Beijing has used its rising energy imports as justification for openly advancing military objectives. While conserving its own oil-and-gas reserves, it has stepped up imports — a strategy it is also pursuing on key minerals. For example, it has more iron-ore reserves than India, yet 52% of Indian exports to China now consist of just one item — iron ore.

» Determined efforts to assert control over energy supplies and transport routes, including mercantilist moves to lock up long-term supplies. Such is China’s emphasis on legal ownership that it has been buying energy assets in faraway lands often at inflated prices.

The popular perception is that Chinese and Indian energy companies are engaged in fierce bidding wars to acquire overseas assets. But the cash-rich Chinese companies have easily beaten Indian competition everywhere. The only exception was the Akpo deepwater oil field in Nigeria, where India’s ONGC won the right to buy South Atlantic Petroleum’s 45% stake. The irony, however, is that New Delhi blocked ONGC from picking up that stake on grounds that the $2-billion investment entailed unacceptable risks as the Nigerian majority stakeholder was a dubious, politically manipulated shell company. But no sooner had ONGC backed out from the deal than the state-run China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) Ltd., China’s largest offshore oil producer, signed an accord on 9 January 2006, to pay $2.27 billion for the same 45% stake.

» China is actively pursuing access-gaining projects along the major trade arteries in the Indian Ocean rim. Consequently, it is beginning to position itself along the sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea.
With an increasingly assertive China to the north, a China-allied Pakistan on the west, a Chinese-influenced Burma to the east, and growing Chinese naval interest in the Indian Ocean, India has to foil its strategic encirclement. India’s energy-security interests, in fact, demand that its Navy play a greater role in the Indian Ocean, a crucial international passageway for oil deliveries. In addition to safeguarding the sea-lanes, the Navy has to protect the country’s large energy infrastructure of onshore and offshore oil and gas wells, liquefied natural gas terminals, refineries, pipeline grids and oil-exploration work within the vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

» The establishment of interstate energy corridors (which also double up as strategic corridors) through the planned construction of pipelines to transport oil or gas sourced from third countries. China is busily fashioning two such corridors on either side of India through which it would transfer Gulf and African oil for its consumption, reducing its reliance on US-policed shipping lanes through the Malacca and Taiwan Straits and also cutting freight costs and supply time in the process.
One corridor extends northwards from the Chinese-built Pakistani port of Gwadar, which represents China’s first strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea. Located at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, Gwadar is to link up with the Trans-Karakoram Strategic Corridor to western China. The second is the Irrawaddy Corridor designed to connect Chinese-aided Burmese ports with China’s Yunnan, Sichuan and Chongqing provinces through road, river, rail and energy links.

» Strategic plans to assemble a “string of pearls” in the form of listening posts and special naval-access arrangements along the Indian Ocean sea-lanes. With its new blue-water navy and access arrangements around peninsular India, China is threatening to turn the Indian Ocean into the Chinese Ocean one day. As Navy chief Admiral Suresh Mehta said in a speech last January, “Each pearl in the string is a link in the chain of Chinese maritime presence”. That presence is now being extended all the way to Mauritius, where China is opening a trade development zone at a cost of some $730 million, making it the largest foreign direct investment in that island-nation.

Add to this picture another resource issue, the one with the greatest strategic bearing on the long-term interests of India and China — water. Although India’s usable arable land is larger than China’s — 160.5 million hectares compared to 137.1 million hectares — the source of all the major Indian rivers except the Ganges is the Chinese-held Tibetan plateau. But even the two main tributaries of the Ganges flow in from the Tibetan plateau — the source of the great river systems of China, South-East and South Asia, including the Brahmaputra, Indus, Mekong, Salween, Yangzi and Yellow. These rivers, fed by Himalayan snowmelt, are a lifeline to the 1.4 billion people living in their basins.

Given China’s ambitious inter-basin and inter-river water transfer projects in the Tibetan plateau and its upstream damming of the Brahmaputra, Sutlej and other rivers, water is likely to become a cause of Sino-Indian tensions. If President Hu Jintao — a hydrologist by training who has served as party secretary in Tibet — begins China’s long-pending project to divert the waters of the Brahmaputra northwards to the parched Yellow River, it would constitute the declaration of a water war on lower-riparian India and Bangladesh. Climate change, in any event, will have a significant impact on the availability and flow of river waters from the Himalayas and Tibetan highlands, making water a key element in the national-security calculus of China and India.

The centrality of the Tibet issue has been highlighted both by China’s Tibet-linked territorial claim to Arunachal Pradesh and by its hydro projects on the plateau. Through its water-transfer projects, Beijing is threatening to fashion water into a weapon against India. Also, given the clear link between Tibet’s fragile ecosystem and the climatic stability of the Indian subcontinent, China’s reckless exploitation of Tibet’s vast mineral resources and its large engineering works there are already playing havoc with the ecology.

India and China may be 5,000-year-old civilisations, but it is often forgotten that the two have been neighbours for only the past 58 years. After all, it wasn’t geography but guns — the sudden occupation of the traditional buffer, Tibet, soon after the Communists came to power in Beijing — that made China India’s neighbour. Nehru later admitted he had not anticipated the swiftness and callousness with which China forcibly absorbed Tibet because he had been “led to believe by the Chinese foreign office that the Chinese would settle the future of Tibet in a peaceful manner by direct negotiation with the representatives of Tibet”.

Latest developments are a reminder that the 1962 war did not fully slake China’s geopolitical or territorial ambitions. In fact, instead of building a win-win relationship with India based on a constructive, forward-looking approach, China still harks back to the past, to the unfinished business of 1962, by assertively laying claim to additional Indian territories while blocking progress on defining the long line of control separating the two countries. Such intransigence and expansionist intent come even as it continues to occupy one-fifth of the original state of Jammu and Kashmir and steps up its cross-border incursions into India.

It is against this background that a key question emerges: what if China sets out to “teach India a lesson” again? This is a question that can no longer be brushed aside, considering China’s growing proclivity to up the ante against India. Henry Kissinger once said China is a closed society with an open mind, while India is an open society with a closed mind and a know-all attitude. It was that attitude — and the refusal to heed the warning signs — that caught India by surprise when the Chinese army poured in through two separate fronts in 1962.

Today, two words define India’s China policy: confusion and forbearance. Caution with prudence is desirable. But can India afford to be overcautious, clueless and indulgent? In the celebrated words of Edmund Burke, those who fail to learn from history are sure to repeat history. Whatever India learned from 1962 seems to have been forgotten, with the country now torn by internal squabbling and policy disarray

Brahma Chellaney is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi
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[svinayak]

China became a net importer in 1993 even though it had enough internal supply of Oil

» The emergence of a 21st-century, energy-related Great Game, with China outmanoeuvring India. Beijing has used its rising energy imports as justification for openly advancing military objectives. While conserving its own oil-and-gas reserves, it has stepped up imports — a strategy it is also pursuing on key minerals. For example, it has more iron-ore reserves than India, yet 52% of Indian exports to China now consist of just one item — iron ore.

But the article highlights the reason why Indian testing of nuclear weapons is not over yet.

[ramana]

I posted this sometime ago in this thread that Indian hand wringing and delayed infrastructure could be an enticement.

[Sanju]

But the article highlights the reason why Indian testing of nuclear weapons is not over yet.

Is time on our side? The rate at which the Chinese are going ahead with their projects and acquisitions and their defense expenditure - we are going to be at a similar disadvantage vis-a-vis 1962, if we are not already.
The one difference that I see between the Chinese Armed forces of 1962 and 2008 is that they are not experienced in an actual War unlike their 1962 counterparts who had immense experience following Civil War in 1949 and the Korean War (1950).
While reading the Korean War on wiki, I came across an excerpt on their tactics that they used against the Americans in Korea and subsequently against us in 1962 as described by Brig. Dalvi.

The paragraph below is an excerpt from the above linked Wiki article:

While the Chinese soldiers initially lacked heavy fire support and light infantry weapons, their tactics quickly adapted to this disadvantage, as explained by Bevin Alexander in his book How Wars Are Won:

"The usual method was to infiltrate small units, from a platoon of fifty men to a company of 200, split into separate detachments. While one team cut off the escape route of the Americans, the others struck both the front and the flanks in concerted assaults. The attacks continued on all sides until the defenders were destroyed or forced to withdraw. The Chinese then crept forward to the open flank of the next platoon position, and repeated the tactics."

Roy Appleman further clarified the initial Chinese tactics as:

"In the First Phase Offensive, highly skilled enemy light infantry troops had carried out the Chinese attacks, generally unaided by any weapons larger than mortars. Their attacks had demonstrated that the Chinese were well-trained disciplined fire fighters, and particularly adept at night fighting. They were masters of the art of camouflage. Their patrols were remarkably successful in locating the positions of the UN forces. They planned their attacks to get in the rear of these forces, cut them off from their escape and supply roads, and then send in frontal and flanking attacks to precipitate the battle. They also employed a tactic which they termed Hachi Shiki, which was a V-formation into which they allowed enemy forces to move; the sides of the V then closed around their enemy while another force moved below the mouth of the V to engage any forces attempting to relieve the trapped unit. Such were the tactics the Chinese used with great success at Onjong, Unsan, and Ch'osan but with only partial success at Pakch'on and the Ch'ongch'on bridgehead."[23]

The U.S. forces in northeast Korea, who had rushed forward with great speed only a few months earlier, were forced to race southwards with even greater speed and form a defensive perimeter around the port city of Hungnam, where a major evacuation was carried out in late December 1950. Facing complete defeat and surrender, 193 shiploads of American men and material were evacuated from Hungnam Harbor, and about 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped to Pusan in orderly fashion. As they left, the American forces blew up large portions of the city to deny its use to the communists, depriving many Korean civilians of shelter during the winter.[40][48]

[rajrang]

X-posted.. Looks like mainstream opinion makers are also seized about this issue...

From http://www.covert.co.in/brahma.htm

China's next India war
Like in the pre-war period, it has now again become commonplace internationally to speak of India and China in the same breath. ---------- It has taken India more than 45 years to again be paired with China — a comparison Beijing viscerally loathes.
Brahma Chellaney is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi
-------------------

It will be prudent for India to subscribe to BC's point of view. Specifically the above quote is important in my view. The Chinese do not like to be equated with India.

BC has missed India's rapid economic growth in the last 6 yrs of 8+% is not liked by the Chinese. Similarly, in the 1950s India's economy grew briskly - though not at 8%. Western countries were assisting India with steel plants, universities etc.

Even if India's military puts up a tough resistance, that may not enough in the face of superior Chinese forces and infrastructure. In Ladakh, Indian troops put up a heroic resistance only to be defeated in 1962. India's military leaders should earn from the Vietnamese techniques when they faced off the Chinese forces in 1979.

There is another factor. An Indian military defeat would go against Western interests. The West and Asia will then face a more arrogant China (if that is even possible). So, one can expect strong international support. So, China will probably try for a quick humiliating military victory against India - something like capturing Tezpur or Leh within days (not weeks).

India has started its own buildup during the last several months - new air bases, Sukhois in Tezpur and Chabua, two new offensive divisions etc. Maybe India has been tipped of by Western intelligence or its own intelligence that the Chinese are planning something.

However, if the Chinese attack after the Olympics but before the next snows - then many of the above buildups will not be ready. Then India will be facing the Chinese with whatever it has today.

What India needs is someone like former PM Mrs Gandhi. In the months leading to the Bangladesh war she signed the Indo-Soviet treaty to ensure that the Chinese would not intervene significantly when India was fighting with Pak. The Soviets warned China to stay out.

Maybe India needs to urgently conclude a defense treaty with the US? NATO? That might cause the Chinese to back off. Maybe urgently - in the next 4 months - buy another 200 fighter aircraft of the F16 category - in the form of an immediate transfer from the US. I don't know if pilots can be trained within weeks. Or large numbers of Mig 29 and/or Sukhois for which Indian should have pilots and infrastructure. Again transfers of several hundred self-propelled artillery - 155mm Bofors and helicopters. India definitely has the cash. That should be used today to save India's face.

Even if war predictions are invalid, the above equipment will stop/reduce Chinese misbehavior towards India - if they know that India will take tough, decisive and quick steps - like Mrs Gandhi. It will also prevent war for a few years - enough for India's economy to continue to grow in strength until then.

Need to think outside the box to outsmart the oponent. There is a danger of an attack this autumn.

[sevoke]

http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/jamesreynolds/
"Much of China's sense of humiliation is built on the loss of territory. Therefore, getting land back - and keeping the land the country's already got - is vital. It's why Britain's handover of Hong Kong in 1997 was so important, it's also why so many people email this blog to insist that Tibet will always be a part of China. Some even argue that the Century of Humiliation won't fully be over until China regains Taiwan."
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great analysis of chinese thinking and perception. sooner or later they will come for arunachal.

[sum]

The only exception was the Akpo deepwater oil field in Nigeria, where India’s ONGC won the right to buy South Atlantic Petroleum’s 45% stake. The irony, however, is that New Delhi blocked ONGC from picking up that stake on grounds that the $2-billion investment entailed unacceptable risks as the Nigerian majority stakeholder was a dubious, politically manipulated shell company. But no sooner had ONGC backed out from the deal than the state-run China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) Ltd., China’s largest offshore oil producer, signed an accord on 9 January 2006, to pay $2.27 billion for the same 45% stake.

Wonder how many more reserves will this beancounting by babus cost us!!!!?

[Vivek K]

Rajrang, you expect Indian politicians to actually buy 200 aircraft in 2 years? India's messy politics and soalition tamashas make governing the nation a "Tamasha". And there is no visible urgency expressed by the IA/IAF/IN chiefs. Everyone is enjoying their prosperity!!

If we can buy 2 MRCA in the next 2 years, that will be a miracle!!

[Sanjay M]

There is an additional war going on - among Tibetan Buddhists:

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ ... 31,00.html