Just some inconvenient history that we should remember:
In 1962, PLA whupped IA not because of superior logistics.
In 1962 PLA whupped IA not because of superior firepower.
In 1962 PLA whupped IA not because of superior manpower.
The chinese soldier climbed up the mountain with a gun in his hand and a pig on his back. He ate the pig and shot at the Indian soldier from behind.
That's why PLA whupped IA.
Strategy counts.
War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Vivek K wrote:Rajrang, you expect Indian politicians to actually buy 200 aircraft in 2 years? India's messy politics and soalition tamashas make governing the nation a "Tamasha". And there is no visible urgency expressed by the IA/IAF/IN chiefs. Everyone is enjoying their prosperity!!
If we can buy 2 MRCA in the next 2 years, that will be a miracle!!
I was thinking in terms of an immediate transfer not buy. For instance several hundred numbers of equipment that India alread operates - Mig 29, Su 30/27, Bofors 155 mm preferably self propelled (it was effective in Kargil), helicopters, transports etc.
India has the cash. This will be savings by preventing a war (that also costs money), preventing a military defeat (that will cost a hell of a lot more money plus), allow the economy to maintain its present rapid growth for some more years and stop Chinese misbehavior.
Again for this you need a leader with a tremendous self-confidence, decisiveness, killer instinct and savvy - former PM Mrs Gandhi comes to mind. After all she won one of India's biggest military victories in centuries - in spite of oppositon from the entire West - including the US - and China. All she had was the veto power and defense supplies of the former SU and the free worldwide press of democracies that largely supported India.
Last edited by rajrang on 19 Jul 2008 18:23, edited 1 time in total.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Y I Patel wrote:Just some inconvenient history that we should remember:
In 1962, PLA whupped IA not because of superior logistics.
In 1962 PLA whupped IA not because of superior firepower.
In 1962 PLA whupped IA not because of superior manpower.
The chinese soldier climbed up the mountain with a gun in his hand and a pig on his back. He ate the pig and shot at the Indian soldier from behind.
That's why PLA whupped IA.
Strategy counts.
I agree with you in some respects - to fight and win a war in the mountains you need well trained light infantry and artillery. It is men like Bana Singh that win mountain wars. India has built up remarkable experience thanks to Kargil and Siachen and should use that learning to good effect against an invasion by the barbarians. That is why a large number of mountain infantry divisions populated with soldiers with a demonstrated track record of bravery in cold mountainous conditions together with daring leadership is needed. Should India sign an urgent treaty with Nepal to recruit more Gurkhas? Give Nepal whatever it takes in return.
Air power can also be used with effect when backed with intelligence: eg Muntho Dalo. The US, NATO and Israel may be able to help with intelligence. But India needs to have stronger military / security pacts with these countries. Again, we need a tough decisive leader like former PM Mrs Gandhi.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
That is not true.Y I Patel wrote:Just some inconvenient history that we should remember:
In 1962, PLA whupped IA not because of superior logistics.
In 1962 PLA whupped IA not because of superior firepower.
In 1962 PLA whupped IA not because of superior manpower.
The chinese soldier climbed up the mountain with a gun in his hand and a pig on his back. He ate the pig and shot at the Indian soldier from behind.
That's why PLA whupped IA.
Strategy counts.
They had superior logistics -a 7-tonne road as compared to a non-existent one on the Indian side.
Superior firepower - off-course they had that. Compare their infantry Mortar that out-shot our Artillery guns!!! They had brand new shiny automatic weapons compared to what we had. Most soldiers of 7 Brigade had 100 rounds only.
Superior Manpower - They had 3 divisions (based on Brig. Dalvi's guesstimate) approximately 20,000 soldiers in comparison to our 2000 odd and this mismatch only in relation to 7 Brigade.
Our soldiers were wearing cotton clothes and many of them did not have studs on their boots. It was lack of logistics, Weaponry, proper outfit, unsound strategy, lack of higher direction (Army HQ and Cabinet) and most of all lack of training as an infantry, training as a brigade and training on an offensive basis after training defensively since Independence with regard to the Chinese..
I am not sure on what basis you posted that unless you were being sarcastic.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Sanju wrote:That is not true.Y I Patel wrote:Just some inconvenient history that we should remember:
In 1962, PLA whupped IA not because of superior logistics.
In 1962 PLA whupped IA not because of superior firepower.
In 1962 PLA whupped IA not because of superior manpower.
The chinese soldier climbed up the mountain with a gun in his hand and a pig on his back. He ate the pig and shot at the Indian soldier from behind.
That's why PLA whupped IA.
Strategy counts.
They had superior logistics -a 7-tonne road as compared to a non-existent one on the Indian side.
Superior firepower - off-course they had that. Compare their infantry Mortar that out-shot our Artillery guns!!! They had brand new shiny automatic weapons compared to what we had. Most soldiers of 7 Brigade had 100 rounds only.
Superior Manpower - They had 3 divisions (based on Brig. Dalvi's guesstimate) approximately 20,000 soldiers in comparison to our 2000 odd and this mismatch only in relation to 7 Brigade.
Our soldiers were wearing cotton clothes and many of them did not have studs on their boots. It was lack of logistics, Weaponry, proper outfit, unsound strategy, lack of higher direction (Army HQ and Cabinet) and most of all lack of training as an infantry, training as a brigade and training on an offensive basis after training defensively since Independence with regard to the Chinese..
I am not sure on what basis you posted that unless you were being sarcastic.
I thought 3 divisions are more than 20,000 soldiers
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Rajrang, I was giving the numbers facing 7 Brigade as guesstimated by Brig. Dalvi. Typically:rajrang wrote: I thought 3 divisions are more than 20,000 soldiers
1 Unit = 800 to 1000 personnel
1 Brigade = 3 units
1 Division = 3 Brigades (sometimes 2)
Based on the above, yes 3 divisions typically would be more than 20,000 soldiers. Ray Sir please do correct me where necessary.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
edited.
Last edited by Rahul M on 19 Jul 2008 20:34, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: OT post deleted.
Reason: OT post deleted.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
soviet and PLA divisons are typically around half the size of western style divisons.
that would make 3 divisons @ ~ 5000 men (add 1000 since this is mountainous terrain) => 18000 men.
I know this for sure of the soviet army of WW2. would have to check for the others.
that would make 3 divisons @ ~ 5000 men (add 1000 since this is mountainous terrain) => 18000 men.
I know this for sure of the soviet army of WW2. would have to check for the others.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
vivek, this is not the thread to discuss politics. and kindly don't use words like traitors at the drop of a hat.Vivek K wrote:With the current crop of Baniyas and traitors, the threshold for action has been breached several times over yet they sit around as if nothing has happened......
I do not see even a single strong leader on the horizon. And coalition politics is the biggest disaster that the Indian public has brought upon themselves.
regards,
Rahul.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
rajrang, bravery or warfighting abilities aren't limited to the gurkhas or other mountain dwelling communities. in kargil and in the previous wars, soldiers from the plains and coastal areas of India showed as much courage as the hill's people.rajrang wrote:That is why a large number of mountain infantry divisions populated with soldiers with a demonstrated track record of bravery in cold mountainous conditions together with daring leadership is needed. Should India sign an urgent treaty with Nepal to recruit more Gurkhas? Give Nepal whatever it takes in return.
this is not to mean that hill people don't enjoy some natural advantage in the mountains, but it is nothing that a well trained IA soldier can't match after acclimatisation.
search for "HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE: THE KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE" by marcus p acosta in google.
read it.
regards,
Rahul.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Even if you have all three (logistics, firepower, manpower), your objectives come to a naught if not supported by a well-deliberated strategy. In Operation Parakram we had three and yet...; the strategy piece in that context has now hopefully been implemented with Cold-Start and creation of IBGs. The example may be a little off-color and the intention is not to start a flamewar here - only hope to illustrate a point.Sanju wrote: That is not true.
They had superior logistics -a 7-tonne road as compared to a non-existent one on the Indian side.
I hope you will agree that sending unacclimatized, .303 equipped, cotton clad soldiers 70 kms from the nearest "roadhead" in a high-altitude battleground "to throw out 'em out of Thagla" is bankruptcy at best in the name of strategy. The PLA on the other hand had it all figured out from building roads to stockpiling reserves in forward areas etc, all while people in Delhi were celebrating the gains of the "forward policy". And then in one swift maneuver they brought the sledgehammer to bear against what stood between them and their objectives. I hope that can be called strategy - and that is probably what YIP meant.
Then again, we do not need to match an adversary gun to gun and boot to boot to be able to achieve objectives. Would the PLA been able to pull the surprise on us with an army of well-armed, well-trained Khampas marauding their tail? And that is just one way to bring down their advantage...
We are all big believers in the build-up in NE – however one also does hope there is a strategy to go with it too, especially for the hordes that will come down the valleys and the swarms that will alight from their airfields.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Malusahi,
You are just adding to my initial post - in support of what I said.
Especially since I had mentioned about the "unsound strategy" as shown below. My point was that we were no match to them on all areas including strategy.
Peace Birather!
You are just adding to my initial post - in support of what I said.
Especially since I had mentioned about the "unsound strategy" as shown below. My point was that we were no match to them on all areas including strategy. Like Brig Dalvi quoted Time Magazine, "that the Indian Army needed everything except Courage!" (paraphrasing)Sanju wrote:Our soldiers were wearing cotton clothes and many of them did not have studs on their boots. It was lack of logistics, Weaponry, proper outfit, unsound strategy, lack of higher direction (Army HQ and Cabinet) and most of all lack of training as an infantry, training as a brigade and training on an offensive basis after training defensively since Independence with regard to the Chinese..
Peace Birather!
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Good point. Thanks.Rahul M wrote:rajrang, bravery or warfighting abilities aren't limited to the gurkhas or other mountain dwelling communities. in kargil and in the previous wars, soldiers from the plains and coastal areas of India showed as much courage as the hill's people.rajrang wrote:That is why a large number of mountain infantry divisions populated with soldiers with a demonstrated track record of bravery in cold mountainous conditions together with daring leadership is needed. Should India sign an urgent treaty with Nepal to recruit more Gurkhas? Give Nepal whatever it takes in return.
this is not to mean that hill people don't enjoy some natural advantage in the mountains, but it is nothing that a well trained IA soldier can't match after acclimatisation.
search for "HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE: THE KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE" by marcus p acosta in google.
read it.
regards,
Rahul.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
One can discuss shape and form a potential future armed conflict with a powerful neighbor would look like. Or, one can refight the last war. If the choice is to be the latter, then at least it is good to be aware of what really happened.
A lot of mistakes were made on the Indian side, and a lot of people were to blame for what happened. Unfortunately, given the government's own silence into the matter, the quickest and most voluble in exculpating themselves and finding scapegoats are the ones who ended up shaping our perceptions of the war. That's how it is, in any time and place. However, it is also usual as time goes by to listen to alternative viewpoints. That is how pragna grows. Prakarena yaanena, iti prgna.
We have refought the India China war several other times on BRF. This thread, unfortunately, is going over the same ground. Worse, people still see Brahma Chellaney as some kind of wise voice in the wilderness. His brand of hawkishness is seductive; this is no different in any culture where those appealing to fears and insecurities are the ones who who get heard first and most clearly. But he is no wise voice in the wilderness.
So it is important to be aware that it was voices like his that shaped the debate within India in unwholesome ways. Also, thankfully that the other culprits at that time have learned their lessons and are silent this time. It is also very important to go beyond the artful defenses put out at that time by the generals of a losing army.
Do we remember our own General Malik saying that we would need 16:1 superiority to dislodge the infiltrators from Kargil? Do we forget how long it took and how bloody it was to actually evict them, with all the firepower IA could throw at them? This, even with the enormous weaponry differential represented by IAF being able to pound them day and night, often with PGMs.
So why would the same not hold for IA in 62? Certainly they did not lack in courage. But whatever the mistakes committed leading up to the war, once the shooting started, IA generals of that time committed some egregious blunders.
Yes. We were not defeated by the superior infrastructure, manpower, or weaponry. Like I said, we were defeated by a seasoned army that overcame logistical hurdles by fighting in light, nimble, small groups that infiltrated behind Indian lines and wrecked physical and psychological havoc. No wonder we keep hearing about hordes of Chinese aggressors that were fought back until the brave Indian soldier ran out of his last bullet. Please. Read past the Musharraf style propaganda if you want to win the next round. They swarmed because they were not tied down by logistics. Remember the pig on the back? What does it stand for. They surrounded IA not because of large numbers, but because Indian generals idiotically refought the first world war in the mountains. Indian soldiers were sitting ducks in far flung posts without any covering patrols. The Chinese, seasoned and fit from their campaign in Korea, out-generalled the Indian generals in areas that were and have always been under to sole purview of the Indian Army. They fought with a clear idea about their political goal: a huge slap on India's face to "teach it a lesson". Oh yes. They taught it real good, and their students are still parroting it. They fought with a strategy designed to deliver on their goal. once they had entered a mere 30 kilometers into Indian territory, they declared victory and withdrew before India could get its act together and figure out a response. Their tactics were shaped by logistical and operational needs, not based on rote learning from British Army manuals. They deliberately fought in small groups with almost non existent logistical tails. And they used their weapons appropriately. Someone just posted something above: they used light mortars to take out our bloody artillery. How fcuking shameful is that???
That's why they won. That's why a discussion like this should not rehash the tactics of the last round. Why would the political imperative for the next round be the same? If it is the same, shouldn't we have learned enough from the last round to never let it come to actual shooting? What will the causus bellum of a next round be? Why would capturing land be the only strategy for that round? Why can't we just sit back and pound them with Brahmos and arty and Rambha and let them run out of pigs (a variant of what Surya was suggesting)? Or are we going to fight to liberate Tibet? In that case, would we need to race to Lhasa from Sikkim? Or can we not just crown Karmapa Lama as the next ruler of Tibet and let them try to come to us and be slaughtered? There is more than one way to skin a cat, and using a broken and blunt knife is not the best one.
A lot of mistakes were made on the Indian side, and a lot of people were to blame for what happened. Unfortunately, given the government's own silence into the matter, the quickest and most voluble in exculpating themselves and finding scapegoats are the ones who ended up shaping our perceptions of the war. That's how it is, in any time and place. However, it is also usual as time goes by to listen to alternative viewpoints. That is how pragna grows. Prakarena yaanena, iti prgna.
We have refought the India China war several other times on BRF. This thread, unfortunately, is going over the same ground. Worse, people still see Brahma Chellaney as some kind of wise voice in the wilderness. His brand of hawkishness is seductive; this is no different in any culture where those appealing to fears and insecurities are the ones who who get heard first and most clearly. But he is no wise voice in the wilderness.
So it is important to be aware that it was voices like his that shaped the debate within India in unwholesome ways. Also, thankfully that the other culprits at that time have learned their lessons and are silent this time. It is also very important to go beyond the artful defenses put out at that time by the generals of a losing army.
Do we remember our own General Malik saying that we would need 16:1 superiority to dislodge the infiltrators from Kargil? Do we forget how long it took and how bloody it was to actually evict them, with all the firepower IA could throw at them? This, even with the enormous weaponry differential represented by IAF being able to pound them day and night, often with PGMs.
So why would the same not hold for IA in 62? Certainly they did not lack in courage. But whatever the mistakes committed leading up to the war, once the shooting started, IA generals of that time committed some egregious blunders.
Yes. We were not defeated by the superior infrastructure, manpower, or weaponry. Like I said, we were defeated by a seasoned army that overcame logistical hurdles by fighting in light, nimble, small groups that infiltrated behind Indian lines and wrecked physical and psychological havoc. No wonder we keep hearing about hordes of Chinese aggressors that were fought back until the brave Indian soldier ran out of his last bullet. Please. Read past the Musharraf style propaganda if you want to win the next round. They swarmed because they were not tied down by logistics. Remember the pig on the back? What does it stand for. They surrounded IA not because of large numbers, but because Indian generals idiotically refought the first world war in the mountains. Indian soldiers were sitting ducks in far flung posts without any covering patrols. The Chinese, seasoned and fit from their campaign in Korea, out-generalled the Indian generals in areas that were and have always been under to sole purview of the Indian Army. They fought with a clear idea about their political goal: a huge slap on India's face to "teach it a lesson". Oh yes. They taught it real good, and their students are still parroting it. They fought with a strategy designed to deliver on their goal. once they had entered a mere 30 kilometers into Indian territory, they declared victory and withdrew before India could get its act together and figure out a response. Their tactics were shaped by logistical and operational needs, not based on rote learning from British Army manuals. They deliberately fought in small groups with almost non existent logistical tails. And they used their weapons appropriately. Someone just posted something above: they used light mortars to take out our bloody artillery. How fcuking shameful is that???
That's why they won. That's why a discussion like this should not rehash the tactics of the last round. Why would the political imperative for the next round be the same? If it is the same, shouldn't we have learned enough from the last round to never let it come to actual shooting? What will the causus bellum of a next round be? Why would capturing land be the only strategy for that round? Why can't we just sit back and pound them with Brahmos and arty and Rambha and let them run out of pigs (a variant of what Surya was suggesting)? Or are we going to fight to liberate Tibet? In that case, would we need to race to Lhasa from Sikkim? Or can we not just crown Karmapa Lama as the next ruler of Tibet and let them try to come to us and be slaughtered? There is more than one way to skin a cat, and using a broken and blunt knife is not the best one.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Rahul,
Any war against China will face the wrath of the Communists in India. And they are as much a threat to Indian security as the Chinese divisions and MKKs based on the other side.
Please feel free to delete this post if you continue in your belief about the post being off topic. No hard feelings.
Any war against China will face the wrath of the Communists in India. And they are as much a threat to Indian security as the Chinese divisions and MKKs based on the other side.
Please feel free to delete this post if you continue in your belief about the post being off topic. No hard feelings.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
vivek, I fully agree with your comments about the communists but this is not the thread for it.
I'll delete the OT posts after this. PLZ check PM.
I'll delete the OT posts after this. PLZ check PM.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Strategy apart, nowhere have I read the Chinese soldier of the 1960s to be the Rambo-esque "living off the land" rover as is being made to sound here. If that were the case they would have walked all over Vietnam in 1979. Aren't we borrowing a little too heavily from the Afghanistan and Vietnam wars...Y I Patel wrote:Yes. We were not defeated by the superior infrastructure, manpower, or weaponry. Like I said, we were defeated by a seasoned army that overcame logistical hurdles by fighting in light, nimble, small groups that infiltrated behind Indian lines and wrecked physical and psychological havoc.
The Han may have had his tactics honed from the Korean conflict - but to insinuate that he became the master of the domain in Tibet in the 12 short years between 1950-1962 is far-fetched. And then to come out of Tibet and kick us around in a starkly contrasting landscape, to be able to operate at an average altitude in the excess of 12,000 feet with "almost non existent logistical tails" is a model I'm sure every military in the world would like to emulate. Who needs the "Brahmos and arty and Rambha" when the war in Arunachal and elsewhere can be won with "a pig on the back". Maybe they should stop the upgrades in the Assam valley and send the birds back to Lohegaon or wherever they were.
Or as an alternative it may help to read this article before commenting on the Chinese preparedness in NEFA and elsewhere (but then there is always the possibility that people on this thread know something these Indian POWs didn’t know/see):
"On our way, we passed huge stocks of unfired mortar shells by the sides of all the mortar positions, while on the northern side, we saw Chinese parties bringing up 120mm mortars on a man pack basis."
http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/nov/06chin.htm
Or this:
"• 34 Heavy Mortar Battery less platoon - Tsangdhar (no ammo)
• Field Regiment - 17 Para
1 Troop - Tsangdhar (2 operational - 260 rounds of ammo, no radio sets for OP)"
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORC ... Namka.html
If there is some pragna to be grown, I'm listening.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Leaving apart Namka Chu, some of what YIP said does applies to the other battles fought after the first ones in the NEFA sector.
in the NEFA sector, there was another opportunity for the Indian forces to hold their ground - this was the Sela - Dirang Dzong - Bomdi La battles. Indian forces were well trenched and adequately armed and supplied, but the deployment and bad decision making from our side, coupled with outflanking / infilitration moves by the Chinese ensured a collapse that turned into a rout.
in the NEFA sector, there was another opportunity for the Indian forces to hold their ground - this was the Sela - Dirang Dzong - Bomdi La battles. Indian forces were well trenched and adequately armed and supplied, but the deployment and bad decision making from our side, coupled with outflanking / infilitration moves by the Chinese ensured a collapse that turned into a rout.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
X-posting.
Rahul M wrote:Sorry for linking to an external site (my blog)
The article is too big for the forum page I think ! (sorry about that too !!)
http://brfrahulm.blogspot.com/
and the important part :Mountain Warfare Lessons : The Soviet Afghanistan Campaign
Rahul M (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com)
(This is one of the chapters of a larger report that I hope to compile on the PRC military posture vis-a-vis India. I am starting with particular wars in which Mountain Warfare have been relevant. There would be a summary piece on the requirements of Mountain Warfare at the end of it. The nest part of this series would cover the 'US approach to High Altitude Warfare.')
thanks guys !Acknowledgements : My thanks goes out to BRFites ChandraS and tsriram for their help in proof reading the report and preparing the glossary. I’m grateful to RayC for his corrective comments. Let me also acknowledge Singha Ji’s Tibet Thread on BRF as the source of my inspiration to start on a mountain warfare analysis on my own.
NOTE : The Air Power analysis may see an addition in the future with the assistance of another esteemed BRFite. The page will be modified as and when required.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Hey, that's pretty cool - how can I do that?
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Although it is true that the natural defense in the Kameng sector lay in Bomdila (and not at Se La or Dirang Dzong), not quite sure what a hastily assembled force (aptly called a "paper force" by a few commentators) comprising elements from the plains of Ambala, Secunderabad and Ramgarh, and the tropical jungles of Nagaland, resplendent in bolt action rifles, summer clothing and canvas shoes, could have done at Bomdila (9,200 ft) as many would like to think. With the loss of 7th IB was lost all the terrain knowledge in Kameng sector. The only unit with anything remotely similar to the 7th was the 5th IB moved from Walong sector. Not sure if these elements were adequately armed and supplied - the logistic HQ was at Misamari - a good hike even today, and we are talking about NEFA in early 60s. And then there are always those stories of unit commanders sending messages written on chapatis (ok, ok not that they did not have the paper, but you get the idea).Jagan wrote:there was another opportunity for the Indian forces to hold their ground - this was the Sela - Dirang Dzong - Bomdi La battles.
Contrast this to the Han conditioned in Tibet (or at lease Chengdu), on a adrenaline high after smashing through Dola/Zimithang, Bumla and Tawang, ably supported by his local intelligence and guides in the of use long forgotten roads and trails, unlike our own intelligence that did not have a clue that these existed in the first place and even where they were aware, believed PLA would not use them. Bad/sparse communications + Bad intelligence? Haven't we heard more of it more recently in our history? Was it the average jawan's fault that such intelligence was not available to him? Or in contrast did it make the Han any more of a killing machine than he was?
And these are only a few symptoms of the many strange episodes that fateful autumn when three bright stars aligned in the Indian firmament. I do not see anything that made the Han any more of the uber fighting machine than he can be credited for. The fact that a national hara-kiri was committed instead of trying to strategically utilize the lull after Oct 1962 to regroup and live to fight another day is exactly the bankruptcy in the name of strategy I mentioned before.
My last post on this issue.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
hey, why a last post. this is very educative.
Correct me if I am wrong - The following things went wrong in the campaign in the Kameng division.
*There was a lull in the fighting after Namka chu - till the the point where the Sela collapse happened. it was not a hurried deployment, there was about a three week lull between Namka Chu and the battles of se la , DZ and bomdila. The fact that the presence in Kameng was built from a single or two brigade force to a very strong three brigade force (Despite loss of 7 Brigade) showed that the build up happened at a good pace.
* As you said Bomdi La was the best place to defend. However once the decision to split troops along bomdila AND SeLa was taken, it was a fatal decision to place the Div HQ in between the two places at Dirang Dzong - there were not enough defensive troops.
*You have to give credit to the chinese for using other trails, bypassing SeLa and attacking the div hq at Dirang dzong , effectively unsettling the Div commander and his staff. What did they call that - Positional Warfare?
* The Div Commander made a fatal mistake of ordering the Se La brigade to withdraw - inspite of the protests of Brigadier Hoshiar Singh - and especially when the lead elements were coming under attack. The result, the Brigade broke up just as it was coming under attack and simultaneously withdrawing. they might have held their ground if they had been holding se la as a fortress.
*From what I read, While deploying at SeLa was not a wise decision, withdrawing the force while under attack when they still had resources to defend was even worse. You can say that the battle was lost in the mind and not on the ground.
*The story of the Div Commander calling the Corps HQ frantically for permission to withdraw from Se La is well known. The COAS and the Army Commander were there but refused to give any firm decision to the Div Cdr. The Corps Commander returned from his sortie, and while insisting there is no withdrawal , passed the buck and left the div commander to take the decision to teh best of his abilities , who promptly issued the order to withdraw.
The gist of all this is.
The Chinese did show initiative in outflanking maneuvers and not sticking to the road and bypassing strong defences.
The top brass (Atleast in Kameng) lost the battle in their mind - a chance to redeem ourselves in kameng was lost.
The losses at SeLa had very little to do with the "Chinese human wave attacks" or "heavily outnumbered indian troops" and more due to bad decision making by div hq
I leave with you some comments from the official history Chapter 5
Correct me if I am wrong - The following things went wrong in the campaign in the Kameng division.
*There was a lull in the fighting after Namka chu - till the the point where the Sela collapse happened. it was not a hurried deployment, there was about a three week lull between Namka Chu and the battles of se la , DZ and bomdila. The fact that the presence in Kameng was built from a single or two brigade force to a very strong three brigade force (Despite loss of 7 Brigade) showed that the build up happened at a good pace.
* As you said Bomdi La was the best place to defend. However once the decision to split troops along bomdila AND SeLa was taken, it was a fatal decision to place the Div HQ in between the two places at Dirang Dzong - there were not enough defensive troops.
*You have to give credit to the chinese for using other trails, bypassing SeLa and attacking the div hq at Dirang dzong , effectively unsettling the Div commander and his staff. What did they call that - Positional Warfare?
* The Div Commander made a fatal mistake of ordering the Se La brigade to withdraw - inspite of the protests of Brigadier Hoshiar Singh - and especially when the lead elements were coming under attack. The result, the Brigade broke up just as it was coming under attack and simultaneously withdrawing. they might have held their ground if they had been holding se la as a fortress.
*From what I read, While deploying at SeLa was not a wise decision, withdrawing the force while under attack when they still had resources to defend was even worse. You can say that the battle was lost in the mind and not on the ground.
*The story of the Div Commander calling the Corps HQ frantically for permission to withdraw from Se La is well known. The COAS and the Army Commander were there but refused to give any firm decision to the Div Cdr. The Corps Commander returned from his sortie, and while insisting there is no withdrawal , passed the buck and left the div commander to take the decision to teh best of his abilities , who promptly issued the order to withdraw.
The gist of all this is.
The Chinese did show initiative in outflanking maneuvers and not sticking to the road and bypassing strong defences.
The top brass (Atleast in Kameng) lost the battle in their mind - a chance to redeem ourselves in kameng was lost.
The losses at SeLa had very little to do with the "Chinese human wave attacks" or "heavily outnumbered indian troops" and more due to bad decision making by div hq
I leave with you some comments from the official history Chapter 5
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
seems to be effects base warfare done by japan in
early WW2 myanmar,malaya and later chindits.
"we are here there everywhere and you cant find us"
when people are unsure who's lurking behind their
backs, morale can suffer....thats why rangers/SF are
given addl training to fight alone, in small units, in positions well behind enemy lines.
if we want isolated bastion strategy, we need to train
intensively for it...just wishing it so in a war wont make
it happen.
early WW2 myanmar,malaya and later chindits.
"we are here there everywhere and you cant find us"
when people are unsure who's lurking behind their
backs, morale can suffer....thats why rangers/SF are
given addl training to fight alone, in small units, in positions well behind enemy lines.
if we want isolated bastion strategy, we need to train
intensively for it...just wishing it so in a war wont make
it happen.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Why - your post is educative too. Re: my last post?? - not sure if I expected this kinda reaction having lurked these forums for over 10 years (the good, the bad and the ugly - if you know what I mean…)Jagan wrote:hey, why a last post. this is very educative.
The gist of all this is.
The Chinese did show initiative in outflanking maneuvers and not sticking to the road and bypassing strong defences.
re: Se La - could it have been any other way for the Himalayan egos once expert advice had been rendered to them that the next stand was at Se La (all in 4 days after HAPO?). Hint: think "Forward policy".
Could I point out that the "Official 1962 War History" is no Henderson Brooks report? I agree that the "Chinese human wave attacks" is not an Eastern sector phenomenon. I also agree with the other facts you present on a macro level, however, considering that the "counter-attack" began on 14 November in Walong (what an irony), here is the orbat:
7th Infantry Brigade (Tawang): met the hordes in the highest traditions of Indian Army at Namka-Chu. Out of commission for the rest of the campaign.
5th Infantry Brigade (Walong): the only brigade with any semblance to fighting capacity/capability in NEFA.
48th Brigade (Ambala): October 23rd: left Ambala, October 28th: at Misamari, November 6th: reached Bomdila
62nd Brigade (Ramgarh): October 25th: moved to Se La
65th Brigade (Hyderabad): left for Siliguri October 14th, October 23rd: arrived Misamari
67th Infantry Brigade (Nagaland): Arrived after October 23rd (decimation of the 48th)
If I remember correctly 3 weeks is the thumb rule for acclimatization for those heights. Did we expect these outgunned and outmaneuvered troops to give a fitting fight in 3 weeks from the time they left the plains (and after the harrowing transit to NEFA)? With faulty intelligence and limited bearings (in the absence of the sole brigade manning the sector)? And a tail stretching from Se-La to Misamari – all being garnered exclusively for consumption by Brigs and above? And amidst the "march forward... retreat…" commands being issued from Delhi at whim?
Nowhere in your post do I see a reason for the Han being the "smart" soldier. Outmaneuvering the enemy is an age-old phenomenon in the subcontinent, from the time Sikander's armies outflanked Puru's. Are you suggesting we did not learn in 2200 years since his attack?
Point being this - the 1962 debacle was not so much a medal on the Han's chest; it is a shame on the doorsteps of you-know-who. May they enjoy their stay in the netherworld.
Calling the last stand of Gurkhas and Rajputs and Kumaonis and Sikhs and Garhwalis and everyone else who died or became disabled in the icy heights far away from their homes, unsung and forgotten, "Musharraf style propaganda" is understandable in an era where battlegrounds have been turned into "Madhuri lakes" - Bollywood style.
But then "'A nation that does not honour its dead warriors will perish."
Anything less would be a shame on the likes of LtCol Awasthy and Rfn Jaswant Singh.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
First let me point out - I am not disputing the bravery of the various heroes of the 62 war. I am more interested in the overall planning and execution at higher levels.
After a series of posts, we have come to a point where instead of attributing the reason for the losses to the usual 'overwhelming chinese forces superiority' and 'human wave tactics' to atleast some incompetency at our end and bad decisions. Thats probably the point YIP is trying to make. Dont blame it all on Chinese numbers and human wave tactics. Look at some of the blunders we did - and look at the blunders that the chinese didnt do.
The reason I posted the Official 62 history is because its the only one available on the net. But all the histories - the books on 62 war (Kaul, Saigal ) , Pravals books (Indian Army , 4th Division) repeat the same facts (Pathania panicked, Hoshiar didnt want to withdraw but was forced, It was a fatal decision to put the Div HQ at Dirang Dz, the best stand should have been at Bomdi La (The only person to disagree was DK Palit who was a Se La fan).
I am pointing out that in Kameng, where we suffered the highest losses in terms of man power, the overall approach towards the war was executed better by the Chinese than by us. You yourself had pointed out the many things that went wrong in the sector for the Indian Army. Lack of intelligence, lack of knowledge of terrain, slow deployment and acclimatisation, lack of manuevering , lack of experience etc. We can lay the blame at the door of the indian top brass or politicians of those times for all these. But at the same time the Chinese covered their side of it on all these fronts (intelligence, knowledge of terrain, out maneuvering the enemy, sufficient build up of troops and the supply chains for them etc). Wouldnt you give them *some* credit in planning and strategy? I mean, if we did some blunders and our enemy didnt do the same mistakes, I would consider them to be somewhat smarter in their approach to the war than us.
I would also like to bring in a bit of 71 war here. Its like the West Pakistanis talking about Bangladesh and saying that Indian planning and logistics in Bangladesh was not the reason for losing but its either a)thier own general's incompetency b) some other reason like Muktis, c) politicians, d) lack of arty, tanks e) lack of chinese and US support etc etc, anything other than our planning..
If we take some credit for the maneuvering war we did in 71 (Which we do), we have to give the same credit to the chinese for the advances they did in kameng in the 62 war.
After a series of posts, we have come to a point where instead of attributing the reason for the losses to the usual 'overwhelming chinese forces superiority' and 'human wave tactics' to atleast some incompetency at our end and bad decisions. Thats probably the point YIP is trying to make. Dont blame it all on Chinese numbers and human wave tactics. Look at some of the blunders we did - and look at the blunders that the chinese didnt do.
The reason I posted the Official 62 history is because its the only one available on the net. But all the histories - the books on 62 war (Kaul, Saigal ) , Pravals books (Indian Army , 4th Division) repeat the same facts (Pathania panicked, Hoshiar didnt want to withdraw but was forced, It was a fatal decision to put the Div HQ at Dirang Dz, the best stand should have been at Bomdi La (The only person to disagree was DK Palit who was a Se La fan).
It could be an age old thing - but lets say that the Indian Army of 1962 didnt expect the Chinese to outmaneuver them in the terrain of 62. And the Chinese actually did that. Shouldnt they get credit for employing tactics that the Indian Army of 62 didnt expect them to use? If the IA expected them to outmaneuver them, then having the Div HQ at Dirang Dz and stringing out troops from the foothills to Se la piecemeal doesnt make sense at all.Nowhere in your post do I see a reason for the Han being the "smart" soldier. Outmaneuvering the enemy is an age-old phenomenon in the subcontinent, from the time Sikander's armies outflanked Puru's. Are you suggesting we did not learn in 2200 years since his attack?
I am pointing out that in Kameng, where we suffered the highest losses in terms of man power, the overall approach towards the war was executed better by the Chinese than by us. You yourself had pointed out the many things that went wrong in the sector for the Indian Army. Lack of intelligence, lack of knowledge of terrain, slow deployment and acclimatisation, lack of manuevering , lack of experience etc. We can lay the blame at the door of the indian top brass or politicians of those times for all these. But at the same time the Chinese covered their side of it on all these fronts (intelligence, knowledge of terrain, out maneuvering the enemy, sufficient build up of troops and the supply chains for them etc). Wouldnt you give them *some* credit in planning and strategy? I mean, if we did some blunders and our enemy didnt do the same mistakes, I would consider them to be somewhat smarter in their approach to the war than us.
I would also like to bring in a bit of 71 war here. Its like the West Pakistanis talking about Bangladesh and saying that Indian planning and logistics in Bangladesh was not the reason for losing but its either a)thier own general's incompetency b) some other reason like Muktis, c) politicians, d) lack of arty, tanks e) lack of chinese and US support etc etc, anything other than our planning..
If we take some credit for the maneuvering war we did in 71 (Which we do), we have to give the same credit to the chinese for the advances they did in kameng in the 62 war.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
I was revisiting the BR Monitor, In the battle of Namca Chu I found this exceptional piece
[quote]"I can tell this House that at no time since our independence, and of course before it, were our defence forces in better condition, in finer fettle, and with the background of our far greater industrial production...to help them, than they are today. I am not boasting about them or comparing them with any other country's, but I am quite confident that our defence forces are well capable of looking after our security."
- Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru addressing the Lok Sabha on 25th November 1959.[/quote]
And yet the jawans were deployed in cotton clothing and canvas shoes in the middle of october at those heights ...
[quote]"I can tell this House that at no time since our independence, and of course before it, were our defence forces in better condition, in finer fettle, and with the background of our far greater industrial production...to help them, than they are today. I am not boasting about them or comparing them with any other country's, but I am quite confident that our defence forces are well capable of looking after our security."
- Prime Minister Jawarharlal Nehru addressing the Lok Sabha on 25th November 1959.[/quote]
And yet the jawans were deployed in cotton clothing and canvas shoes in the middle of october at those heights ...
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
“I am more interested in the overall planning and execution at higher levels.” Lofty ideal indeed. Top down approach? I'm sure the soldier who died in BomdiLa would like that.
"lets say that the Indian Army of 1962 didn’t expect the Chinese to outmaneuver them in the terrain of 62. And the Chinese actually did that.". A lot of assumptions there - Monday morning quarterbacking - are we??
Not sure who suggested that the reasons for the debacle lay in "Chinese numbers and human wave tactics", just that I took umbrage to the suggestion of the uber smart Han soldier with a pig on his back descending the eastern Himalayas to cut the petty Desis to size - and please note I'm in no way diminishing the Han's achievement in 1962.
No one's disputing the blunders "we" did and the Hans didn't do. But to insinuate that the Han knew exactly where we lacked is baloney in the least. "Indian Army of 1962 didn’t expect the Chinese to outmaneuver them in the terrain of 62". Disagreements apart, is that the credit you give the subaltern Indian officer in 1962 (admittedly his superiors were incompetent, immoral and corrupt)?
The comparisons to '71 would be good if we were making good use of the SFF and SSB and the Khampas and all else in the vicinity of mustang in 1962.. Would you care to comment about the outcome given these magnifiers?
We can let the comparisons to 1971 take their own life at a later date. Hopefully!
Peace for now!!! "at least some incompetency at our end and bad decisions"? I agree the "real" difference here is between our jarnails and their jarnails (being polite here), and not so much between the morale or finesse of the soldier who died between Thag/Bum-la and Tezpur on either side.
Point taken... and hopefully made…
"lets say that the Indian Army of 1962 didn’t expect the Chinese to outmaneuver them in the terrain of 62. And the Chinese actually did that.". A lot of assumptions there - Monday morning quarterbacking - are we??
Not sure who suggested that the reasons for the debacle lay in "Chinese numbers and human wave tactics", just that I took umbrage to the suggestion of the uber smart Han soldier with a pig on his back descending the eastern Himalayas to cut the petty Desis to size - and please note I'm in no way diminishing the Han's achievement in 1962.
No one's disputing the blunders "we" did and the Hans didn't do. But to insinuate that the Han knew exactly where we lacked is baloney in the least. "Indian Army of 1962 didn’t expect the Chinese to outmaneuver them in the terrain of 62". Disagreements apart, is that the credit you give the subaltern Indian officer in 1962 (admittedly his superiors were incompetent, immoral and corrupt)?
The comparisons to '71 would be good if we were making good use of the SFF and SSB and the Khampas and all else in the vicinity of mustang in 1962.. Would you care to comment about the outcome given these magnifiers?
We can let the comparisons to 1971 take their own life at a later date. Hopefully!
Peace for now!!! "at least some incompetency at our end and bad decisions"? I agree the "real" difference here is between our jarnails and their jarnails (being polite here), and not so much between the morale or finesse of the soldier who died between Thag/Bum-la and Tezpur on either side.
Point taken... and hopefully made…
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
The Chinese were acclimatised.Y I Patel wrote:Just some inconvenient history that we should remember:
In 1962, PLA whupped IA not because of superior logistics.
In 1962 PLA whupped IA not because of superior firepower.
In 1962 PLA whupped IA not because of superior manpower.
The chinese soldier climbed up the mountain with a gun in his hand and a pig on his back. He ate the pig and shot at the Indian soldier from behind.
That's why PLA whupped IA.
Strategy counts.
They had roads to Ladhak.
They could move superior fire power and they used attack by infiltration in NEFA and because of poor lgs pulled back.
They had superiority in acclimatised and better quipped manpower.
Why have they have not 'whupped' IA as you put it, thereafter?!
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
four of us br members met in a tibetan restaurant in blr yesterday to
discuss various issues. one point which came up was to study the
Quinghai-Lhasa railway lines current frequency and logistical capacity.
http://www.tibeteveresttravel.com/china ... ilway.html
above suggests three trains up and three trains down daily
from beijing, chongquing/chengdu and lanzhou. all are 48hr+ journeys.
there are obviously multiple trains enroute at any given time
to maintain the daily arr and dep frequency.
the part upto Quinghai I believe uses existing rail infra though
being mountainous would be interesting to know the quality and
frequencies there also.
immediate need is to see how many trains are accomodated on
the quinghai-lhasa stretch at any given time?
pics indicate it as a single line track
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006 ... 652320.htm
http://www.chinahotelsreservation.com/lhasa.html
The trains with oxygen and ultra-violet windows
The trains traveling across the roof of the world are well equipped with extra oxygen pumped into the cabins to help passengers to combat the thin air and from suffering altitude sickness. The train carriages have windows with ultra-violet glass filters to keep out the sun's glare. The carriages were installed with environment-friendly toilets, wastewater deposit tank and garbage treatment facilities to protect environment along the railroad. All the Chinese characters that appear on the electronic screen have been translated into Tibetan and English.
Three trains to Lhasa Railway station
Every day there are three trains: to Lhasa:
- a first train from Beijing to Lhasa via Xian
- a second train from Chongqing (also via Xian) or Chengdu (depending on the day)
- a third train from Xining or Lanzhou every second day.
Below are some facts about the Qinghai-Tibet Railway
* Qinghai-Tibet Railway is the world's highest railway. Some 960 kilometers of its tracks are located 4,000 meters above sea level and the highest point is 5,072 meters,at least 200 meters higher than the Peruvian railway in the Andes,which was formerly the world's most elevated track.
* The railway is the world's longest plateau railroad, extending 1,956 kilometers from Qinghai's provincial capital Xining to Lhasa in Tibet. The newly completed Golmud-Lhasa section zigzags 1,142 kilometers across the Kunlun and Tanggula mountain ranges.
* About 550 kilometers of the tracks run on frozen earth, the longest in any of the world's plateau railways.
* Tanggula Railway Station,5,068 meters above sea level,is the highest railway station in the world.
* Fenghuoshan Tunnel,4,905 meters above sea level,is the world's most elevated tunnel on frozen earth.
* Kunlun Mountain Tunnel,run ning 1,686 meters,is the world's longest plateau tunnel built on frozen earth.
* Upon its completion,the maximum train speed is designed to reach 100 kilometers per hour in the frozen earth areas and 120 kilometers per hour on non-frozen earth.
* Construction of the Golmud-Lhasa section of the landmark railway commenced on June 29,2001 and test runs are set for July 2006.
* 1,686 meters: Kunlun Mountain Tunnel,running 1,686 meters,is the world's longest plateau tunnel built on frozen earth.
* 4,905 meters: Fenghuoshan Tunnel,4,905 meters above sea level,is the world's most elevated tunnel on frozen earth.
* 45 stations: Altogether there are 45 stations along the rail line. Tanggula Railway Station,5,068 meters above sea level,is the highest railway station in the world.
* 120 kilometers per hour: Upon its completion,the maximum train speed is designed to reach 100 km per hour in the frozen earth areas and 120 km per hour on non-frozen earth.
* 1,956 kilometers: The railway is the world's longest plateau railroad,extending 1,956 kilometers from Qinghai's provincial capital Xining to Lhasa in Tibet.
* 5,072 meters: Qinghai-Tibet Railway is the world's highest railway. Part of its tracks are located 4,000 meters above sea level and the highest point is 5,072 meters.
* 550 kilometers:About 550 kilometers of the tracks run on frozen earth,the longest in any of the world's plateau railways.
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
it seems the Lanzhou and Xining run on odd and even days and so does Shanghai/Guangzhou. no doubt these will be daily when need arises.
so we are looking at a easy surge upto 7 daily trains . its a long line and
crossover stations can easily made to accomodate trains in opp directions.
this is how our NFR works
http://www.nordling.nu/schaefer/chinamap.gif
looking at his map of PRC railways it is inevitable they will work with speed to build a
lateral line through tibet from Lhasa to Shiquanhe (a major mil base, see good earth)
and on to Kashgar (kashi) to connect with Urumqi line...somewhere near the road
to lhasa from east turkestan.
they are also reported to be exploring a eastern spur along the arunachal border
featuring places like Linzhi and maybe something near the tri junction.
and they will do it, while we push files around on rohtang rail and score political
points.
and note those new tentacles reaching out into northern myanmar
so we are looking at ability in peacetime to stock up border areas cheaply
with POL, ammo, missile TELs, heavy arty, people, food by just running
daily trains up and down the network than a arduous road base supply
chain more prone to vagaries of weather. trains are simply far more
efficient and heavy hauler.
current estimate of the modified passenger rakes. note goods trains have no issues
and in a pinch military will move in normal rakes also. oxygen is only for civilian
passenger comfort. @ 20 wagons/train thats enough already for 15 trains.
and beyond Golmud normal rakes can used. so bare minimum is 7 up and 7 down
trains strung out on the golmud-lhasa stretch and many good trains.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/e ... iagram.png
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qinghai-Tibet_Railway
* 361 Bombardier Sifang Power (Qingdao) Transportation Ltd./Power Corporation of Canada/China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry (Group) Corporation High-Grade Coach - 308 standard cars and 53 special tourist cars
* GE Transportation NJ2 locomotive (78 GE designation C38AChe locomotives were built)
* Qishuyang Locomotive Factory DF8CJ 9000 series locomotive - similar to the Bombardier Transportation-GE Transportation Blue Tiger diesel electric locomotive
discuss various issues. one point which came up was to study the
Quinghai-Lhasa railway lines current frequency and logistical capacity.
http://www.tibeteveresttravel.com/china ... ilway.html
above suggests three trains up and three trains down daily
from beijing, chongquing/chengdu and lanzhou. all are 48hr+ journeys.
there are obviously multiple trains enroute at any given time
to maintain the daily arr and dep frequency.
the part upto Quinghai I believe uses existing rail infra though
being mountainous would be interesting to know the quality and
frequencies there also.
immediate need is to see how many trains are accomodated on
the quinghai-lhasa stretch at any given time?
pics indicate it as a single line track
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006 ... 652320.htm
http://www.chinahotelsreservation.com/lhasa.html
The trains with oxygen and ultra-violet windows
The trains traveling across the roof of the world are well equipped with extra oxygen pumped into the cabins to help passengers to combat the thin air and from suffering altitude sickness. The train carriages have windows with ultra-violet glass filters to keep out the sun's glare. The carriages were installed with environment-friendly toilets, wastewater deposit tank and garbage treatment facilities to protect environment along the railroad. All the Chinese characters that appear on the electronic screen have been translated into Tibetan and English.
Three trains to Lhasa Railway station
Every day there are three trains: to Lhasa:
- a first train from Beijing to Lhasa via Xian
- a second train from Chongqing (also via Xian) or Chengdu (depending on the day)
- a third train from Xining or Lanzhou every second day.
Below are some facts about the Qinghai-Tibet Railway
* Qinghai-Tibet Railway is the world's highest railway. Some 960 kilometers of its tracks are located 4,000 meters above sea level and the highest point is 5,072 meters,at least 200 meters higher than the Peruvian railway in the Andes,which was formerly the world's most elevated track.
* The railway is the world's longest plateau railroad, extending 1,956 kilometers from Qinghai's provincial capital Xining to Lhasa in Tibet. The newly completed Golmud-Lhasa section zigzags 1,142 kilometers across the Kunlun and Tanggula mountain ranges.
* About 550 kilometers of the tracks run on frozen earth, the longest in any of the world's plateau railways.
* Tanggula Railway Station,5,068 meters above sea level,is the highest railway station in the world.
* Fenghuoshan Tunnel,4,905 meters above sea level,is the world's most elevated tunnel on frozen earth.
* Kunlun Mountain Tunnel,run ning 1,686 meters,is the world's longest plateau tunnel built on frozen earth.
* Upon its completion,the maximum train speed is designed to reach 100 kilometers per hour in the frozen earth areas and 120 kilometers per hour on non-frozen earth.
* Construction of the Golmud-Lhasa section of the landmark railway commenced on June 29,2001 and test runs are set for July 2006.
* 1,686 meters: Kunlun Mountain Tunnel,running 1,686 meters,is the world's longest plateau tunnel built on frozen earth.
* 4,905 meters: Fenghuoshan Tunnel,4,905 meters above sea level,is the world's most elevated tunnel on frozen earth.
* 45 stations: Altogether there are 45 stations along the rail line. Tanggula Railway Station,5,068 meters above sea level,is the highest railway station in the world.
* 120 kilometers per hour: Upon its completion,the maximum train speed is designed to reach 100 km per hour in the frozen earth areas and 120 km per hour on non-frozen earth.
* 1,956 kilometers: The railway is the world's longest plateau railroad,extending 1,956 kilometers from Qinghai's provincial capital Xining to Lhasa in Tibet.
* 5,072 meters: Qinghai-Tibet Railway is the world's highest railway. Part of its tracks are located 4,000 meters above sea level and the highest point is 5,072 meters.
* 550 kilometers:About 550 kilometers of the tracks run on frozen earth,the longest in any of the world's plateau railways.
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
it seems the Lanzhou and Xining run on odd and even days and so does Shanghai/Guangzhou. no doubt these will be daily when need arises.
so we are looking at a easy surge upto 7 daily trains . its a long line and
crossover stations can easily made to accomodate trains in opp directions.
this is how our NFR works
http://www.nordling.nu/schaefer/chinamap.gif
looking at his map of PRC railways it is inevitable they will work with speed to build a
lateral line through tibet from Lhasa to Shiquanhe (a major mil base, see good earth)
and on to Kashgar (kashi) to connect with Urumqi line...somewhere near the road
to lhasa from east turkestan.
they are also reported to be exploring a eastern spur along the arunachal border
featuring places like Linzhi and maybe something near the tri junction.
and they will do it, while we push files around on rohtang rail and score political
points.
and note those new tentacles reaching out into northern myanmar
so we are looking at ability in peacetime to stock up border areas cheaply
with POL, ammo, missile TELs, heavy arty, people, food by just running
daily trains up and down the network than a arduous road base supply
chain more prone to vagaries of weather. trains are simply far more
efficient and heavy hauler.
current estimate of the modified passenger rakes. note goods trains have no issues
and in a pinch military will move in normal rakes also. oxygen is only for civilian
passenger comfort. @ 20 wagons/train thats enough already for 15 trains.
and beyond Golmud normal rakes can used. so bare minimum is 7 up and 7 down
trains strung out on the golmud-lhasa stretch and many good trains.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/e ... iagram.png
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qinghai-Tibet_Railway
* 361 Bombardier Sifang Power (Qingdao) Transportation Ltd./Power Corporation of Canada/China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry (Group) Corporation High-Grade Coach - 308 standard cars and 53 special tourist cars
* GE Transportation NJ2 locomotive (78 GE designation C38AChe locomotives were built)
* Qishuyang Locomotive Factory DF8CJ 9000 series locomotive - similar to the Bombardier Transportation-GE Transportation Blue Tiger diesel electric locomotive
Last edited by Singha on 20 Jul 2008 19:48, edited 2 times in total.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
meantime we persist with idiotic policies like not having a vital BG line along the
arunachal border upto tezu from rangiya with spurs going up into AP as far as possible
to permit easy integration with railway BG supply chain from other parts.
how on earth are we supposed to make transshipment BG->MG at rangiya in a
war situation? no specialized infra for that even exists beyond human coolies.
some loads like tatra TELs, bofors probably are too wide for MG.
the vital 4th brahmaputra bridge(dibrugarh) is a funding orphan in starvation mode.
it is not fed enough to work on completion properly, nor they will cancel
it for political reasons.
it seems we have some kind of deathwish and delhi desires to make job
of IA hard as possible instead of supporting it?
here is a good map of IR network:
http://www.nfr.railnet.gov.in/RLYMAP/Ra ... map_01.gif
look at that pathetic blue MG line snaking out along AP border from rangiya upto
murkongselek.
look at the weak "sapling" MG lines snaking out from the main BG line. why are these
not converted to BG for seamless connectivity
the BG conversion to silchar and kumar ghat(tripura) is proceeding slower than
musharaff's fight against terrorism
arunachal border upto tezu from rangiya with spurs going up into AP as far as possible
to permit easy integration with railway BG supply chain from other parts.
how on earth are we supposed to make transshipment BG->MG at rangiya in a
war situation? no specialized infra for that even exists beyond human coolies.
some loads like tatra TELs, bofors probably are too wide for MG.
the vital 4th brahmaputra bridge(dibrugarh) is a funding orphan in starvation mode.
it is not fed enough to work on completion properly, nor they will cancel
it for political reasons.
it seems we have some kind of deathwish and delhi desires to make job
of IA hard as possible instead of supporting it?
here is a good map of IR network:
http://www.nfr.railnet.gov.in/RLYMAP/Ra ... map_01.gif
look at that pathetic blue MG line snaking out along AP border from rangiya upto
murkongselek.
look at the weak "sapling" MG lines snaking out from the main BG line. why are these
not converted to BG for seamless connectivity
the BG conversion to silchar and kumar ghat(tripura) is proceeding slower than
musharaff's fight against terrorism
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qinghai-Tibet_Railway
Extension to Nepal
In a meeting between Chinese and Nepalese officials on April 25, 2008, the Chinese delegation announced that country's intention to extend the Qingzang railway from Lhasa to Khasha on the Nepalese border. Nepal had requested that the railway be extended to enable trade and tourism between the two nations. Construction of the extension is planned to be completed by 2013.[10]
Possible stations include:
* Khasa
* Xigaze (a major mil airbase?)
* Yatung
* Nathu La - a mountain pass near Indian state of Sikkim.
* Nyingchi - an important trading town north Arunachal Pradesh, at the tri-junction with Myanmar (1000mm gauge).
Extension to Nepal
In a meeting between Chinese and Nepalese officials on April 25, 2008, the Chinese delegation announced that country's intention to extend the Qingzang railway from Lhasa to Khasha on the Nepalese border. Nepal had requested that the railway be extended to enable trade and tourism between the two nations. Construction of the extension is planned to be completed by 2013.[10]
Possible stations include:
* Khasa
* Xigaze (a major mil airbase?)
* Yatung
* Nathu La - a mountain pass near Indian state of Sikkim.
* Nyingchi - an important trading town north Arunachal Pradesh, at the tri-junction with Myanmar (1000mm gauge).
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
in my opinion if we detect that war is imminent we need to attack proactively and deny
them the first mover advantage of choosing the time and place.
hence if we feel prepared at a certain moment and confident of handling them, its better
to be proactive and attack them in any area(s) of our choosing. catching one of their
intrusions and wiping it off the map could be the spark. pounding the crap out of a rear
area supply dump right behind their lead elements forming up could be another.
to give the panda time x space to start the war is losing yet another advantage.
them the first mover advantage of choosing the time and place.
hence if we feel prepared at a certain moment and confident of handling them, its better
to be proactive and attack them in any area(s) of our choosing. catching one of their
intrusions and wiping it off the map could be the spark. pounding the crap out of a rear
area supply dump right behind their lead elements forming up could be another.
to give the panda time x space to start the war is losing yet another advantage.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
C'mon, was the statement actually necessary ?malushahi wrote:“I am more interested in the overall planning and execution at higher levels.” Lofty ideal indeed. Top down approach? I'm sure the soldier who died in BomdiLa would like that.…
Do I have to submit the paperwork to let all deceased soldiers and their families know of my intentions before I embark on an analysis?
Ditto...Disagreements apart, is that the credit you give the subaltern Indian officer in 1962
Same points i have been making all along. And to your credit you did say the Chinese had a better strategy pretty early on in the posts So we are on the same page there. But for every post like yours, there are other members who may believe in the old standard 'human waves stories' . If not for nothing, this discussion would be bring out the other factors in the defeat.malushahi wrote:- and please note I'm in no way diminishing the Han's achievement in 1962.
...(admittedly his superiors (IA) were incompetent, immoral and corrupt)?
I agree the "real" difference here is between our jarnails and their jarnails (being polite here), and not so much between the morale or finesse of the soldier who died between Thag/Bum-la and Tezpur on either side.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Singha, do you want me to move the 62 war related posts to the Indian Army History thread? Or are you okay with them here?
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
One has to understand the Chinese concept of strategy.
To the Chinese military mind and strategic thinking, politics is the soul of Chinese strategy. They look at contradictions as competitive and synthesise it balancing the international factors with the Chinese prerogatives and have a holistic approach called the Comprehensive National Power where all aspect of state power is considered i.e. the economy, culture, the military etc vis a vis other countries. It is reviewed annually.
Deception and stratagems is a close second in their strategic thinking. This is enshrined in their theory of Legalism. They believe in Practice and hence these concepts regularly are tested as with their regular needling at the McMahon Line and should be no surprise. The Chinese also places great emphasis on Prediction. They predicated on a deep analysis of all relevant elements and intentions and a complete understanding of objective conditions, not on simple analogy or inference.
It is pertinent to note that as mentioned before the Chinese divide national interest into it subheads of each aspect of national power and integrity i.e. political interest, national economic interest, national military inter¬est, national cultural interest etc Generally, national interest equates to territorial integrity, security, political sovereignty, development, stability, and dignity. Their Strategic goals involve protecting these vital interests.
Creativity that is, the soul of strategic thinking requires subjective initiative to surpass experience and tradition.
It is true that one should fall prey to fears and insecurities, but at the same time, one should not be complacent as India was pre 1962.
I wonder if Gen Malik said 16:1 is required for HAA since the thumb rule is 11:1.
At this rate one could say 22:1. I will leave it for you all to think about the ratios with the thought that in high altitude, the ledges to the objective are narrow and at times they barely can take four men abreast. Hence it becomes important to divide the enemy’s attention and firepower through multi directional attack, preferably through attack by infiltration. Passing through drills are most complicated and reserves on each axis of attack has to be maintained so ensure the momentum of attack. There has to also be a follow up group with replenishment and reorganisation stores on each axis of attack! All this adds to the numbers.
It took long to clear the enemy in Kargil because of inadequate information of the enemy, but when it was fairly known, the momentum to clear them picked up. To be frank, only one PGM was effective on the objective as far as I can recall. IAF hardly pounded day and night. It is not to say that the IAF did not do their job, it was just that they were new to HAA.
It would be wrong to compare 1962 to modern times. HAA Warfare is totally a different kettle of fish to plains or even mountain warfare. Tactics, logistics, equipment, effects of High Altitude on men and fighting etc are totally different. Therefore to blame the General of 1962 wholesale would not be fair and is quite uncalled for. In fact, the blame heaped on them was just to find scapegoats and save ‘face’. Indeed, there were blunders, but then they were not trained or experienced in High Altitude Warfare. If High Altitude Warfare was the same as plains warfare, then there would have been no HAWS High Altitude Warfare School nor would foreign and modern armies of the First World come to train in India or participate in HAA Warfare exercises!
To understand 1962, one has to understand Chinese strategic thought. It is not similar to Indian or western thoughts. To feel that we were defeated by light, nimble, small groups that infiltrated is simplistically put. This, in itself, indicates that the Generals of IA were not conversant with HAA Warfare where Attack by Infiltration in its various avatars is more the rule than exception. It also proves that the IA was not trained for the same and the IA was facing acclimatised, war veterans of the Korean War Chinese soldiers who had faced a modern army!
The reading of the Kargil War is faulted.
The very fact that Musharraf, without a thought on logistic, embarked on this adventure, is what made him slink back. His people ran out of ammunition, rations and medical support. To suggest such a mode is totally unmilitary like.
Let this ‘teach a lesson’ theory of the Chinese not overawe us! Every war for the Chinese is to ‘teach a lesson’. Even the Vietnam aggression was on the same theory. I would not take up any more space on Chinese Military mindset, but their concept of Legalism should be read in this context or that of Confucius’ ‘Wang Dao’.
The Chinese withdrew, as they did in Vietnam, not because of any morality; they withdrew because their logistics could not sustain them and without artillery (since the trails would not permit artillery moving up) they were sitting ducks themselves should the adversary taken heart, regrouped and attacked with fresh troops! Let us not get enamoured by their pious platitudes and propaganda. It is a part of their strategic military thinking.
I am not aware as to how mortars can take on the artillery!
It is time to understand the Chinese mind and not get mystified and giving them the aura of being something unfathomable and superior!
As Sun Tsu said in his Art of War – Know your enemy!!
To the Chinese military mind and strategic thinking, politics is the soul of Chinese strategy. They look at contradictions as competitive and synthesise it balancing the international factors with the Chinese prerogatives and have a holistic approach called the Comprehensive National Power where all aspect of state power is considered i.e. the economy, culture, the military etc vis a vis other countries. It is reviewed annually.
Deception and stratagems is a close second in their strategic thinking. This is enshrined in their theory of Legalism. They believe in Practice and hence these concepts regularly are tested as with their regular needling at the McMahon Line and should be no surprise. The Chinese also places great emphasis on Prediction. They predicated on a deep analysis of all relevant elements and intentions and a complete understanding of objective conditions, not on simple analogy or inference.
It is pertinent to note that as mentioned before the Chinese divide national interest into it subheads of each aspect of national power and integrity i.e. political interest, national economic interest, national military inter¬est, national cultural interest etc Generally, national interest equates to territorial integrity, security, political sovereignty, development, stability, and dignity. Their Strategic goals involve protecting these vital interests.
Creativity that is, the soul of strategic thinking requires subjective initiative to surpass experience and tradition.
It is true that one should fall prey to fears and insecurities, but at the same time, one should not be complacent as India was pre 1962.
I wonder if Gen Malik said 16:1 is required for HAA since the thumb rule is 11:1.
At this rate one could say 22:1. I will leave it for you all to think about the ratios with the thought that in high altitude, the ledges to the objective are narrow and at times they barely can take four men abreast. Hence it becomes important to divide the enemy’s attention and firepower through multi directional attack, preferably through attack by infiltration. Passing through drills are most complicated and reserves on each axis of attack has to be maintained so ensure the momentum of attack. There has to also be a follow up group with replenishment and reorganisation stores on each axis of attack! All this adds to the numbers.
It took long to clear the enemy in Kargil because of inadequate information of the enemy, but when it was fairly known, the momentum to clear them picked up. To be frank, only one PGM was effective on the objective as far as I can recall. IAF hardly pounded day and night. It is not to say that the IAF did not do their job, it was just that they were new to HAA.
It would be wrong to compare 1962 to modern times. HAA Warfare is totally a different kettle of fish to plains or even mountain warfare. Tactics, logistics, equipment, effects of High Altitude on men and fighting etc are totally different. Therefore to blame the General of 1962 wholesale would not be fair and is quite uncalled for. In fact, the blame heaped on them was just to find scapegoats and save ‘face’. Indeed, there were blunders, but then they were not trained or experienced in High Altitude Warfare. If High Altitude Warfare was the same as plains warfare, then there would have been no HAWS High Altitude Warfare School nor would foreign and modern armies of the First World come to train in India or participate in HAA Warfare exercises!
To understand 1962, one has to understand Chinese strategic thought. It is not similar to Indian or western thoughts. To feel that we were defeated by light, nimble, small groups that infiltrated is simplistically put. This, in itself, indicates that the Generals of IA were not conversant with HAA Warfare where Attack by Infiltration in its various avatars is more the rule than exception. It also proves that the IA was not trained for the same and the IA was facing acclimatised, war veterans of the Korean War Chinese soldiers who had faced a modern army!
The reading of the Kargil War is faulted.
The very fact that Musharraf, without a thought on logistic, embarked on this adventure, is what made him slink back. His people ran out of ammunition, rations and medical support. To suggest such a mode is totally unmilitary like.
Let this ‘teach a lesson’ theory of the Chinese not overawe us! Every war for the Chinese is to ‘teach a lesson’. Even the Vietnam aggression was on the same theory. I would not take up any more space on Chinese Military mindset, but their concept of Legalism should be read in this context or that of Confucius’ ‘Wang Dao’.
The Chinese withdrew, as they did in Vietnam, not because of any morality; they withdrew because their logistics could not sustain them and without artillery (since the trails would not permit artillery moving up) they were sitting ducks themselves should the adversary taken heart, regrouped and attacked with fresh troops! Let us not get enamoured by their pious platitudes and propaganda. It is a part of their strategic military thinking.
I am not aware as to how mortars can take on the artillery!
It is time to understand the Chinese mind and not get mystified and giving them the aura of being something unfathomable and superior!
As Sun Tsu said in his Art of War – Know your enemy!!
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
It is OK here.Jagan wrote:Singha, do you want me to move the 62 war related posts to the Indian Army History thread? Or are you okay with them here?
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
One item we have to consider in figuring out Chinese tactics (if we haven't already) is the effect of the one-child policy on the makeup of the PLA soldier. One would assume that these "only children" have been pampered by their parents and in the rural areas, by grandparents and others too. Pretty much like they would be in any other country, including India and with similar results. Add to that the fact that these young soldiers have prospects and dreams beyond the PLA that their human-wave, one-of-many-children counterparts did not in 62 or Korea--job prospects in a zillion factories, the likelihood of owning a mobike,car, house/apt etc. and finally, the empowerment and reach that information via the Internet and sms has given the Chinese aam janta. Witness the vocal and violent protests post earthquake.
Upshot: it is unlikely that the PLA will be ordering these young soldiers to carry out human wave attacks or subjecting them to undue hardship for fear of their mothers marching on Beijing, like the Soviet mothers did re: Afghanistan. Hence we see a huge emphasis on infrstructure--roads, railways, airports--to spare them the drudgery of carrying pigs on their backs up the mountains.
We have here a unique situation--an entire army made up of soldiers who are ALL single children--no brothers or sisters while growing up! What does that tell us? Of course, none of this is to suggest that the PLA soldiers are not tough. Just to give some thought to the mental makeup of the enemy troops and make use of it to the best of our ability.
Upshot: it is unlikely that the PLA will be ordering these young soldiers to carry out human wave attacks or subjecting them to undue hardship for fear of their mothers marching on Beijing, like the Soviet mothers did re: Afghanistan. Hence we see a huge emphasis on infrstructure--roads, railways, airports--to spare them the drudgery of carrying pigs on their backs up the mountains.
We have here a unique situation--an entire army made up of soldiers who are ALL single children--no brothers or sisters while growing up! What does that tell us? Of course, none of this is to suggest that the PLA soldiers are not tough. Just to give some thought to the mental makeup of the enemy troops and make use of it to the best of our ability.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
I could be wrong, but this globalisation which is already encouraging subnationalsim as in Sichuan and other places in southern China (barbarians or wai ren) will have its effect on the do or die attitude of the PLA.
Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment
Consider China’s transformation since 1989 (a watershed year) when it seemed the country was a sea of bicycles to the present when flashy downtowns are sprouting all along the Pacific seaboard. This has fueled the aspirations of the <20-year old generation sky high, while progressively muddying China's image in the world. The defenders of current world order will increasingly attempt to choke the life out of Chinese growth both as a policy imperative and a result of domestic compulsions.
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/656/how-the ... sees-china
And as happens in lean times, the apparatus will get their subjects' attention to outside their borders - in this case Taiwan or "South Tibet". What better way to resolve their dilemma than killing many birds with one stone - keep the restive masses occupied, smash a prosperous competitor, making a case to the status quo-ists that they can take the blade to the throat if it came to it..
Well fed single children or neo-Ghaznavid hordes? Depends on how you slice it.
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/656/how-the ... sees-china
And as happens in lean times, the apparatus will get their subjects' attention to outside their borders - in this case Taiwan or "South Tibet". What better way to resolve their dilemma than killing many birds with one stone - keep the restive masses occupied, smash a prosperous competitor, making a case to the status quo-ists that they can take the blade to the throat if it came to it..
Well fed single children or neo-Ghaznavid hordes? Depends on how you slice it.