Gerard wrote:India gave permission for the US to take back the Tarapur spent fuel. It remains in India.If India tests in future, the US can take back the fuel, plant, machinery and spare parts without India’s permission.”
WRT to the US, what options are there?vishwakarmaa wrote:So you assume they will repeat that?Gerard wrote: India gave permission for the US to take back the Tarapur spent fuel. It remains in India.
In Indian Gokhle Act(Hyde's equivalent),NRao wrote:WRT to the US, what options are there?vishwakarmaa wrote: So you assume they will repeat that?
The Russian VVERs are being sold with the rights to reprocess the spent fuel. Russia doesn't want spent fuel back and it is happy to let India keep it.IF reproc techs are not given then the issue of what to do with the "waste" arises
I suspect this entire reactor, fuel and reproc cycle is under IAEA. So, out of curiosity, whose reproc tech/s is under use here? Or does it even matter?The Russian VVERs are being sold with the rights to reprocess the spent fuel. Russia doesn't want spent fuel back and it is happy to let India keep it.
Sanatanan wrote:
1) Can a "jugad" (= fixture, robotic, if you will) be designed and used in such a way that the assembly of the parts is made in (or at near) vacuum? This way, even manual handling (using gloves to prevent contamination from the human hands affecting the assembled parts) may not be required. More importantly, if the material happens to have any traces of radioactivity, then, even that situation could probably be overcome.
2) There is an effect called "wringing" between two highly polished surfaces; this is commonly used in metrology labs to put together several precision machined slabs so as to make up a single block - usually for accurate measurement of height of a component. (Also please see here.) Will there be unacceptable quantity of air, in the case of the assembly under discussion, even if the mating parts are made to wring together?
For good reason I carefully chose the word "ANY density discontinuity in plutonium sphere". Does vaccum remove density discontinuity?Sanatanan wrote:Since what won't work for air, most likely won't work for Araldite (as has been, I think, proposed in jest in a subsequent post in this thread) either, I ask the following questions out of genuine curiosity:Arun_S wrote:
Any engineer in the trade of shockwave driven compression will never go for inherently poor design of assembling a spherical body by intentionally introducing metal-air discontinuity at the worst possible place by making slices (I.e. poor design choice is use of any angle different from direction of the radial compression. ANY density discontinuity in plutonium sphere has to be minimized at great cost. The obvious and direct method is thus to partition pit segments where every cut is a diameter cut of the sphere, that passes through center of the sphere).
1) Can a "jugad" (= fixture, robotic, if you will) be designed and used in such a way that the assembly of the parts is made in (or at near) vacuum? This way, even manual handling (using gloves to prevent contamination from the human hands affecting the assembled parts) may not be required. More importantly, if the material happens to have any traces of radioactivity, then, even that situation could probably be overcome.
Foreign Minister Stephen Smith has also indicated that Australia will support the deal at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which meets on August 21 and 22. If the NSG is able to ratify the deal in one meeting, it could get approval by the US Congress, and final ratification by the Indian parliament, before November.
Sir ji.. point is the JUGAAD worked as intended , I know zilch about these things and quoting half truths from www might not help my case , but if end results are to go by and even the article which you are reffering to ;the POK-I did achieve 8kT which was pretty much around the design yield (8-10kT).Arun_S wrote:Any surprise that jugaad fabrication, based on jugaad sandwich design, only worked like a jugaad !
The effect will be the same as India going and setting up the NAM. Entirely useless. The FMCT is being setup to secure the power base of the NWS, just as the NPT, CTBT and NSG were. BTW: India is not even needed for the FMCT to take effect, as per the US draft. India has committed itself to work towards an FMCT. For, how long do we think, we can avoid the stick?Gerard wrote:What FMCT? The US has submitted one version to the conference on disarmament. It has not yet been accepted. Suppose India submits its own FMCT draft that includes verification and a 10 year grace period after signing?
Do you have anything to substantiate the above assertion?Katare wrote:In other words 123-deal would over rule hyde acts since it is the last legislative expression of congress on the matter.
Can you cite instances, especially recent ones, where the US courts have upheld a ratified treaty, especially when in conflict with its own laws?Also he quoted from US constitution that "any treaty signed by govt of united state becomes the supreme law of the land".
Can you substantiate that 123 agreements and especially the IUCNA, is subject to the Vienna convention?He also quoted Vienna convention in reference to 123 deal's mention of principles of international law which reads 'a party can not invoke a domestic law to amend or abrogate an international treaty".
It is not called the Persian Gulf for nothing. Iran. Iran. Iran. Should be the Indian Mantra.Arun_S wrote:Yup, we need that beachhead in Gulf pronto!Singha wrote:I keep reading of this "vast deposits" of thorium in some kerala beaches.
if we are serious about this line of work, isnt it time to dredge and dig out all
the material thats lying there, transport it inland to storage pens and replace
the lost beach with normal sand shipped in from elsewhere like gulf?
shiv wrote:No politics
No whines or celebratory lungi dances
Wonleee nook noos pliss.
Negi ji, I have made my position and its basis clear in the intense discussion with Shiv et al, on PoK-1 yield in last 3 months. Am sure you can find that in the archive (if it yet exists). I have no intention of getting into a another round of showing the light. Even V.Sundar the key subject matter expert who authored the original BRM paper on Shakti yield had in those threads stated his mis-assessment of Pok-1 and the aberration it caused on his Pok-II assessment.negi wrote:Sir ji.. point is the JUGAAD worked as intended , I know zilch about these things and quoting half truths from www might not help my case , but if end results are to go by and even the article which you are reffering to ;the POK-I did achieve 8kT which was pretty much around the design yield (8-10kT).Arun_S wrote:Any surprise that jugaad fabrication, based on jugaad sandwich design, only worked like a jugaad !
And I am sure if start digging up the www and put the tests conducted by other nations to same sort of scrutinby as ours we will always find some scare mongers quoting a discrepancy between the designed and actual yields of the tests in question.
You probably know as much as anyone here. Dr Kakodar, who designed the Plutonium pit and actually helped assemble the device at Pohkran is the one who really knows his stuff. He went on to design and build the Dhruva reactor, where most of India's weapons Plutonium comes from. He probably passes Pu in his stool.negi wrote: I know zilch about these things
I wonder how many people who have ever posted on BRF have actually seen an atomic bomb? Of those that have, it would be rather presumptuous to assume they know more about bomb pits and their design than the people who actually designed and worked intimately with the material.The pieces had to fit together with an accuracy of one-thirty second of an inch (0.8 mm) to prevent irregularities in the shock wave. Accurate alignment of the lens surfaces was even more important than a close fit. A great deal of tissue and blotting paper and adhesive tape was also used to make everything fit snugly together with no air gaps.
Just the thought of seeing it, gives me the chill. Must be awsome..I wonder how many people who have ever posted on BRF have actually seen an atomic bomb? Of those that have, it would be rather presumptuous to assume they know more about bomb pits and their design than the people who actually designed and worked intimately with the material.
Did you read the post before asking all these questions?ShauryaT wrote:Do you have anything to substantiate the above assertion?Katare wrote:In other words 123-deal would over rule hyde acts since it is the last legislative expression of congress on the matter.
Can you cite instances, especially recent ones, where the US courts have upheld a ratified treaty, especially when in conflict with its own laws?Also he quoted from US constitution that "any treaty signed by govt of united state becomes the supreme law of the land".
Can you substantiate that 123 agreements and especially the IUCNA, is subject to the Vienna convention?He also quoted Vienna convention in reference to 123 deal's mention of principles of international law which reads 'a party can not invoke a domestic law to amend or abrogate an international treaty".
Where is the pit?narayanan wrote:I have. It IS Awesome.
Hi Narayanan,narayanan wrote:I have. It IS Awesome.
to that. 
which seems to be the case. http://www.opinionasia.org:80/ASchoolofRedHerrings
OPINION ASIA -- GLOBAL VIEWS ON ASIA
The Indo-US Nuclear Deal: A School of Red Herrings
Sumit Ganguly | 04 Aug 2008
On August 1, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unanimously voted in support of the US-Indian civilian nuclear agreement. Now the agreement goes before the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on August 21 for a second approval before the final nod from the United States Senate. Already a small handful of members of the NSG, most notably, Austria, Brazil, Iraq, Japan and Switzerland have expressed some reservations about the deal because of India’s failure to accede to the long-stalled Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
As the agreement makes its way to the NSG, the ardent members of the nonproliferation brigade are now gearing up for a last-ditch effort to hobble it from reaching the United States Senate for final ratification. To that end they have gathered a school of red herrings that they intend to let loose in an effort to prevent the deal’s passage to its final destination.
Their arguments are tired and specious. Nevertheless, unless they are forthrightly addressed they could easily sway popular and elite opinion in a number of key countries thereby contributing to the demise of this revolutionary agreement. What exactly are the dubious claims that are trotted out with predictable regularity?
First and foremost, the critics claim that this deal rewards India despite its unwillingness to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This is perhaps the most tired argument amongst those that have been arrayed to undermine the deal. As the NPT was being negotiated in Geneva under the auspices of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), India vigorously stated its objections. The India delegate, Vishnu Trivedi, forcefully argued that India would not be a party to a multilateral agreement that created a fundamentally discriminatory regime. In the end, the regime placed no constraints on the nuclear weapons states but prohibited others from acquiring nuclear weapons. Consequently, when the NPT went into force on January 1, 1970, India chose to stay outside its ambit. Since India was never a signatory to the NPT, there is no reason for it to adhere to its expectations.
Second, the critics argue that making an exception for India will weaken the NPT regime. They contend that other states which chose to enter the regime may now re-consider their choices if similar exceptions are not made for them. This argument also defies logic. These states, of their own accord, chose to accede to the NPT. If they now find the demands of the NPT regime too onerous, they can invoke “the supreme national interest” clause in the NPT and withdraw from it after a span of six months. They will then be at liberty to pursue any bilateral nuclear deal that they can negotiate.
Third, in a similar vein, it is now alleged that Iran, Pakistan and North Korea, are now demanding that they too be allowed to pursue nuclear commerce alluding to the exception that is about to be granted to India. It is hardly surprising that these states have resorted to this ploy. However, they are in no position to place themselves on an equal diplomatic and moral footing with India.
Iran has been playing a game of deception and dissimulation with the IAEA and the international community about its nuclear enrichment program. North Korea has been an egregious proliferator of both weapons designs and ballistic missiles. Pakistan, of course, was the source of the infamous A.Q. Khan network. Unlike India, both Iran and North Korea, were signatories to the NPT but chose, knowingly and willingly, to violate its terms. Consequently, they cannot expect the same treatment from the global community. Pakistan, while not an NPT member, has nevertheless been a feckless proliferator of nuclear weapons technology. In this connection, it needs to be underscored that despite offers of oil and natural gas from Iran and Libya, India, an energy-starved state, firmly rebuffed their offers to provide them with nuclear weapons technology. A less scrupulous regime would have gleefully pursued these possibilities to alleviate acute energy shortages.
Fourth, some critics contend that the Indo-US nuclear deal not only undermines the cause of nonproliferation, but is actually a ruse for bolstering India against a resurgent People’s Republic of China (PRC). This may or may not have been the goal of some members of the Bush administration. However, discussions with members of India’s diplomatic and strategic community makes clear that they have do not share this goal despite their deep misgivings about the PRC’s growing military capabilities and its future strategic intentions.
A fifth and final objection needs to be addressed. Critics with long memories are fond of dredging up an allegation that India diverted spent nuclear fuel from a Canadian supplied nuclear reactor to pursue its initial nuclear test in 1974. There may be some element of truth to this allegation. However, even if this did occur, India violated the spirit but not the letter of the Indo-Canadian nuclear agreement. In any case, because of this putative violation, the major industrial powers formed the NSG in 1975. The NSG then proceeded to place the most draconian restrictions on any form of nuclear commerce with India and also denied it various forms of dual-use technology. If India did violate the spirit of the agreement, it has paid a very high price indeed for its actions.
Far from undermining the cause of nonproliferation, this deal has the potential for bringing India into the ambit of the legal regime governing nuclear commerce. It will make the workings of 14 out of 22 of India’s nuclear reactors subject to IAEA inspections and also lead India to tighten its existing export controls. Most importantly, according to some estimates, it may enable the country to generate as much as 25 percent of the nation’s electricity by 2050.
It is time to ignore the partisan carping of the nonproliferation community which fails to recognise India’s unique credentials. It can only be hoped that the 45-nation NSG will speedily grant its imprimatur to this extraordinary agreement. Failing to do so would do little to further the cause of nonproliferation.
Sumit Ganguly is a Professor of Political Science and Director of Research of the Center on American and Global Security at Indiana University, Bloomington.
Glad you said that, I will take you own your word that you indeed want to seek truth...one must first be a seeker of truth, only then truth revels itself.
……, but with clear sight and understanding of what was done right, what was wrong and what was foolish. It is no shame to admit error, it is a virtue to be able to see what went wrong, so that one can learn from it.
Please note that this was not just some idol calculation but your main point in proving AK’s paper was “full of vaporware” and “waking on water.And for 50GWe the lifetime fuel requirement is equivalent to mining 1.513 million tonnes of Natural Uranium and enriching it to medium enrichment. At current price of Uranium @ $68/Lb that is $226.5 Billion cost. Plus the enrichment cost of $77 billion (@$90/SWU). So the minimum cost of avoiding the repeat of TAPS-1 is to buy all that fuel [for 100 years] in next 6 years for a cost of $303 billion.
” smiley which was described by some as a tasteless joke, you never revised, or corrected the calculation following what you say is your own principle - to “see what went wrong”