And I'm willing to bet its not going to be. However, I'm willing to bet that once we see the actual NSG waiver, we will argue over what is "clean and unconditional" and what is not.ramana wrote:Its time to put your money and knowledge. I am willing to bet that the NSG waiver will be clean and unconditional. PERIOD despite what the supporters say.
Otherwise GOI will walk away.
AK is setting the goals very clearly.
How many takers?
Will pay or the Bay Area BRF meet lunch.
India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Seriously,RajeshA wrote: So no more Austrian Pastries, Irish Butter, Dutch Gouda Cheese, Kiwi Fruits, and Nestle Chocolates for me anymore.
We must let it be known that business interests of these nations *will* suffer if they voted against the deal at the NSG.
It needs to be further emphasised that the deal is Environment friendly as otherwise india will be a source of immense greenhouse gases as it seeks to meet its sky high energy needs.
Plus it will lead to a new renaissance in nuclear tech development and a revival of the entire industry with next generation technologies and safty measures.
Non seriously, for example letting the swiss know privately that a negative vote from them will lead to a campaign that will favour Amul over Nestle in india ought to bring these guys down from stratosphere by several notches. India's emissaries need to be brutal with these governments and deliver the carrots and the bambu in the same breath and with a smile

Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
More insight into the India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement
India, the IAEA and the art of ‘reservation’: Hindu
More insight into Asian thinking on nuclear deal
East Asia and India’s civil nuclear odyssey: Hindu
India, the IAEA and the art of ‘reservation’: Hindu
More insight into Asian thinking on nuclear deal
East Asia and India’s civil nuclear odyssey: Hindu
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
quote]So no more Austrian Pastries, Irish Butter, Dutch Gouda Cheese, Kiwi Fruits, and Nestle Chocolates for me anymore. I'll have to go on a diet.[[/quote]
Let us all resolve to do this and spread the message, losing the market of potentially 1 billion people has to count even if it is only Irish butter and kiwi fruit. I am really angry at the Dutch, this book Deception by Adrian Levy & Catherine Scott Clark finally nails the lie unlike other western publications and says it straight (to give him credit so does Ahmed Rashid) - what all these hypocrites did and what a massive cover up, destruction of evidence etc. was undertaken to hide Pak -China N proliferation, and they have the right to preach? Why dont we say so more openly in these forums? Actually I have always felt small countries have small minds, and ALL have the BBC - big brother complex. Some one called it pipsqueak syndrome. How right...
Let us all resolve to do this and spread the message, losing the market of potentially 1 billion people has to count even if it is only Irish butter and kiwi fruit. I am really angry at the Dutch, this book Deception by Adrian Levy & Catherine Scott Clark finally nails the lie unlike other western publications and says it straight (to give him credit so does Ahmed Rashid) - what all these hypocrites did and what a massive cover up, destruction of evidence etc. was undertaken to hide Pak -China N proliferation, and they have the right to preach? Why dont we say so more openly in these forums? Actually I have always felt small countries have small minds, and ALL have the BBC - big brother complex. Some one called it pipsqueak syndrome. How right...
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
No need to show teeth unless we mean to draw blood. Rest assured our guys were not born yesterday. Of course, some may be a bit more blunt than others - what can you do, its not a cookie cutter situation here. WYSI is not always WYG. I'm guessing that pretty much everybody will fall in line.
As for the Dutch, let their key guys come to Kerala... We can head for the high hills, smoke some grass and chill it down completely. Grassroots diplomacy.
As for the Dutch, let their key guys come to Kerala... We can head for the high hills, smoke some grass and chill it down completely. Grassroots diplomacy.

Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Hello:
Kiwi fruits are grown in Kerala and other parts of India, not imported from NZ. We had/have a tree in our backyard. I never ate the stuff anyway.
Kiwi fruits are grown in Kerala and other parts of India, not imported from NZ. We had/have a tree in our backyard. I never ate the stuff anyway.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Good then we can eat Kiwis in India and boycot them abroad. Who brought them to India?
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
And they destroyed all records like the ISI periodically does.RajeshA wrote:NSG to meet twice to decide Indian waiver: IANS
It is indeed funny, that Netherlands is opposing India. They themselves gave away technology to A.Q. Khan, allowing him to go and build his nuclear bombs, but want to deny India civil nuclear commerce with third countries.![]()
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Ban "NZ", charge NZ planes using Indian air space a ton more than a ton, ban Swiss watches, Swiss bank accounts (my fav),.......................IF it passes at the NSG, take Bush out for biryani and masala dossas.
BTW:
INDIA/US: Racing to Clear Last Lap of Nuke Deal
US expects deal in Congress by Sept 9
And, why not. After all it was passes by the Indian parliament. Bush should be able to twist and churn. Votes are rather cheap now-a-days.
Time to celebrate - get that yellow cake.
BTW:
INDIA/US: Racing to Clear Last Lap of Nuke Deal
US expects deal in Congress by Sept 9
And, why not. After all it was passes by the Indian parliament. Bush should be able to twist and churn. Votes are rather cheap now-a-days.
Time to celebrate - get that yellow cake.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
So were the Swiss. They have probably destroyed all evidence of their nationals' involvement with AQK. What did the Swiss PM say ? That the information contained in the files "was "explosive" for Switzerland's security and foreign policies." ! Exact words.shiv wrote:And they destroyed all records like the ISI periodically does.RajeshA wrote:NSG to meet twice to decide Indian waiver: IANS
It is indeed funny, that Netherlands is opposing India. They themselves gave away technology to A.Q. Khan, allowing him to go and build his nuclear bombs, but want to deny India civil nuclear commerce with third countries.![]()
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 4325
- Joined: 30 Aug 2007 18:28
- Location: The Restaurant at the End of the Universe
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
NRao ji,
Why are you giving click thru views to turds like Purefool?

BRF has a lot of casual readers who come to get an update on what's happening in the N-deal
And then they read s**t like this:
The idiot Purefool is getting khujli as, for a change, India is batting for it's self interests.Not just the U.S., but even India, is now using coercive diplomacy on some of the NSG member-states. "We have never seen India using a 'with us or against us' approach before," says the Western diplomat quoted earlier. "India's traditional style of diplomacy is based on invoking principles and rational arguments of a non-discriminatory and universal kind."
But now, he adds, "India is leveraging its bilateral relations in a crude fashion, warning countries of unpleasant consequences if they don't support India, an emerging economic giant and a major military power that is also an ally of the U.S."
An avid supporter of the deal from the Indian media has described India's diplomatic approach as "pretty brutal".
Pushing the nuclear deal has taken a heavy toll of India's image as a state which professes and largely practices non-coercive diplomacy and commands a degree of moral authority because of the progressive positions it used to take in the past.
"That is a sad comment on the role India is playing to promote its narrow military interests and its strategic alliance with the United States, and to preserve and expand its arsenal of mass-destruction weapons," says Vanaik.
"It would be an even greater disgrace", he adds, "if the NSG grants its approval to the deal, subverting its own rules. That would only show that the world's elites have no compunctions in capitulating to crass coercive diplomacy in violation of the principles and policies they advocate—even if that works against the interests of global security and peace."

Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
It's not at all a bad thing for these ******s to spread the idea that opposing India brings "brutal" diplomatic consequences. And hopefully even more brutal economic consequences as desis
to products from those who oppose India. Wouldn't it be sweet irony to see some REAL "Sanctions" hit these *****s because PEOPLE boycott their snake-oil sales? I have already sworn off Irish whiskey and switched to Idaho potatos (what else does Ireland produce? marsh gas?), Danish cookies, and Dutch tulips (the deer ate all 2000 bulbs I planted in the freezing November winds). As I mentioned, already 400% self-sufficient in Kiwi fruit, and I plan to avoid the New Zealand route on my trips, and. Also, I am hereby putting a Fatwa on The Sound of Music and Eidelweiss flowers and switching to Rap from Beethoven.
Take THAT, nonprollotullah commiepakis!

Take THAT, nonprollotullah commiepakis!
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
what would I not give for a face to face encounter with purefool in front of an audience !amit wrote:The idiot Purefool is getting khujli as, for a change, India is batting for it's self interests.

Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
The hypocrite Sarkozy is hotfooting it to China. All because the Chinese issued a call for a mass boycott of the French retail chain Carrefour, which was clearly effective. The Germans are also sanctions busting, Israel and others have complained regarding Iran. Everyone is doing it when it suits their interests.
We should compile a list of these products and PUBLICISE what all we are planning to boycott, and give it mass media coverage, it will be more effective than high tariffs and anything else. People should know we Indians have a tolerance limit. And we should say we will boycott products from unfriendly countries for many many years as our market grows (we wont hurt much since these are pipsqueak countries). I am tired of being taken for granted while everyone else flouts international law. Anyway let us have a more substantive list since agricultural products still cannot be freely imported- let us target items we can do without and which hurts them. Nestle is a very good idea. Not consuming their products will not hurt our technological progress at least.
We should compile a list of these products and PUBLICISE what all we are planning to boycott, and give it mass media coverage, it will be more effective than high tariffs and anything else. People should know we Indians have a tolerance limit. And we should say we will boycott products from unfriendly countries for many many years as our market grows (we wont hurt much since these are pipsqueak countries). I am tired of being taken for granted while everyone else flouts international law. Anyway let us have a more substantive list since agricultural products still cannot be freely imported- let us target items we can do without and which hurts them. Nestle is a very good idea. Not consuming their products will not hurt our technological progress at least.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
I don't remember who it was, but some Indian Minister in the late 90's had said something to the effect that the greatest geopolitical weapon that India has today is the vast and growing Indian market.
So many BRF-ites post messages such as "When we develop ICBMs, then the US and the Europeans will listen to us". That is so far-fetched. We have an arsenal of ICBMs in the form of our market. We have to use this power ruthlessly.
Imagine the effect on Swedish Govt's behaviour when, in retaliation for selling AWACS to the Pakis, Ericsson is blacklisted and forbidden from bidding on any Indian telecom contracts.
If we had a blanket policy of cutting off access to Indian market to any companies/ countries that supply weaponry to Pakistan, I bet that other than the US and China, no other country in the world would then sell arms to Pakistan.
But, unfortunately, we ban only those companies (Bofors/ HDW/ Denel etc.) that supply sophisticated arms to India.
So many BRF-ites post messages such as "When we develop ICBMs, then the US and the Europeans will listen to us". That is so far-fetched. We have an arsenal of ICBMs in the form of our market. We have to use this power ruthlessly.
Imagine the effect on Swedish Govt's behaviour when, in retaliation for selling AWACS to the Pakis, Ericsson is blacklisted and forbidden from bidding on any Indian telecom contracts.
If we had a blanket policy of cutting off access to Indian market to any companies/ countries that supply weaponry to Pakistan, I bet that other than the US and China, no other country in the world would then sell arms to Pakistan.
But, unfortunately, we ban only those companies (Bofors/ HDW/ Denel etc.) that supply sophisticated arms to India.

Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
I agree. But this requires policy coordination which can only come about if we have a powerful National Security Council (preferably wo/manned by BRFites).But, unfortunately, we ban only those companies (Bofors/ HDW/ Denel etc.) that supply sophisticated arms to India.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
I guess we will see such a thing in a generation.kshirin wrote:I agree. But this requires policy coordination which can only come about if we have a powerful National Security Council (preferably wo/manned by BRFites).But, unfortunately, we ban only those companies (Bofors/ HDW/ Denel etc.) that supply sophisticated arms to India.

Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade
by Bill Emmott (Author)
Last is India, the oft-forgotten emerging power whose role as a strategic counterweight on the balance-of-power chessboard could be the determining factor in the future course of the region. While India remains nowhere near as developed as China or Japan, it is nevertheless beginning to make its presence felt in some regional institutions, joint military exercises, and through the modernization of its forces. Furthermore, sensing its utility as a means to tie down China, the US and Japan have struck deals with India that could help buttress the modernization of the world's largest democracy.
In fact, Emmott opens his book by arguing that even if it meant blowing a hole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, US President George W. Bush's nuclear pact with Delhi in 2006 was a strategic tour de force, as it added a third leg to the regional balance and ensured that Delhi would side with the US and Japan should relations with China deteriorate. In response, Beijing has continually sought to exclude India from regional multilateral organizations.
From another forum
by Bill Emmott (Author)
Last is India, the oft-forgotten emerging power whose role as a strategic counterweight on the balance-of-power chessboard could be the determining factor in the future course of the region. While India remains nowhere near as developed as China or Japan, it is nevertheless beginning to make its presence felt in some regional institutions, joint military exercises, and through the modernization of its forces. Furthermore, sensing its utility as a means to tie down China, the US and Japan have struck deals with India that could help buttress the modernization of the world's largest democracy.
In fact, Emmott opens his book by arguing that even if it meant blowing a hole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, US President George W. Bush's nuclear pact with Delhi in 2006 was a strategic tour de force, as it added a third leg to the regional balance and ensured that Delhi would side with the US and Japan should relations with China deteriorate. In response, Beijing has continually sought to exclude India from regional multilateral organizations.
From another forum
US Foreign Policy during and since WWI.
In WWI, US intervened on side of Anglo-Saxons to ensure Balance of Power in Europe. Here they borrowed a leaf from the Great Britain. The fact they intervened means there was no single major power in Europe henceforth for the rest of the century. Yes GB was there but with US help.
During WWI, Japan after breakup of Anglo-Japan alliance(1920) went to intervene in China(1931) as European powers were unable to intervene. So in the aftermath of WWI, US offered the Washington Treaty on naval ship tonnage to induce GB to break its Japan alliance. This ensured the viability of China as a nation state. All the Western powers intervention in China was removed when power for tariffs was restored to China.
During WWII, US pressured the GB to give up the colonies especially India for that was the basis of power for GB.
Then Cold War came and ended with FSU dissolution.
The purpose of the narration is that US goal is to ensure there are no single challengers to its power since WWI.
However PRC emerged with no competition and would require a challenger. Has to be indirect as there is a lot at stake.
So this deal is a step in that direction . As important as the Washington Treaty.
So the deal will go thru with out anymore conditions as should not give any chance for India to walk away.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
New Zealand's governer-general is this guy. Anand Satyanand


Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
I've heard the brightest are not even looking at services, seeing it as their last choice. Besides, we need good leaders now...I guess we will see such a thing in a generation. the future mandarins who are growing up now !
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
"N-deal will be consistent with US domestic law"
Again a Howard Berman story. This man is getting very hyper-tight about his non-proliferation responsibilities. Perhaps India would really need to approach our Israeli or Jewish-American friends. Howard Berman is a Jew, so he will only listen to another Jew.
Of course, it wouldn't harm, if some Residents of California's 28th Congressional District would like to call him up and find out why he is getting all worked-up. Is he looking for some campaign financing? Is he looking for some sign, that India likes Israel? Did he have a fight with his wife? I mean what IS WRONG.
Share with us Representative Berman. Waat is yor Praablam Yaar?
Again a Howard Berman story. This man is getting very hyper-tight about his non-proliferation responsibilities. Perhaps India would really need to approach our Israeli or Jewish-American friends. Howard Berman is a Jew, so he will only listen to another Jew.
Of course, it wouldn't harm, if some Residents of California's 28th Congressional District would like to call him up and find out why he is getting all worked-up. Is he looking for some campaign financing? Is he looking for some sign, that India likes Israel? Did he have a fight with his wife? I mean what IS WRONG.
Share with us Representative Berman. Waat is yor Praablam Yaar?
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 4727
- Joined: 26 Mar 2002 12:31
- Location: searching for the next al-qaida #3
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
US gives NSG exemption draft, minus offending para
NEW DELHI: After working through Indian concerns, the US on Thursday circulated a draft exemption text to Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) members. Earlier, national security advisor M K Narayanan joined the high-level negotiating group of foreign secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and William Burns to address Indian concerns on the draft text.
After India objected to a paragraph in the draft, Indian and US officials took the easy way out, by deleting the offending paragraph. India objected to a line in the draft that referred to a key paragraph in the NSG guidelines, where supplier countries are to push the recipient (in this case, India) to accept full-scope or comprehensive safeguards (known as CSA in NSG jargon).
The draft asks NSG countries or “participating governments (to) transfer trigger list items and/or related technology to the safeguarded civil nuclear facilities in India... as long as the participating government intending to make the transfer is satisfied that India continues to fully meet all of the aforementioned non-proliferation and safeguards commitments”.
Germany, the current chair of NSG, has called a plenary session of the group on August 21-22, with a second plenary possibly in early September. Some of the member countries have called for a meeting of a “consultative group” next week, before the plenary, but it’s not yet clear whether that meeting will be held.
The Indian objections were clarified by DAE chief Anil Kakodkar after the IAEA vote in an interview.
“India is not a non-nuclear weapon state. NSG guidelines are essentially meant for non-nuclear weapons states. Now, while India will maintain its responsible behaviour all along, we will expect the world community to also treat us the way we are. The NSG, which has comprehensive safeguards agreement as a condition for supply, is clearly not applicable in the case of India because India has its own strategic programme and it is this that has to be waived. They have to treat India as India is,” he said.
India’s strongest argument, said officials, is that this guidelines apply to non-nuclear weapons state, and India hardly qualifies. The offending Paragraph 4 of the NSG trigger list guidelines, and its CSA conditions, does not apply to transfer of nuclear items to nuclear weapon states (NWS). As with other NWS, India argues it is up to the supplier country to define the safeguards requirements it intends to impose on India and should not be a “front-loaded” condition to the exemption.
The acceptance of this condition would, in effect, nullify the special safeguards agreement India has just concluded with the IAEA, which acknowledges India’s special status as a non-signatory to the NPT, with a sharply designated nuclear weapons programme and an expanded civilian programme. Agreeing to any clause that opens the door for India’s forced compliance to the very regime India opposes would be reversing the entire basis for the deal.
The US text is the same one circulated by it in 2006, but with some changes that take into account the developments of the past year, the 123 agreement, safeguards agreement and the separation plan. The offending clause, which comes at the end of the draft, had been retained in the 2008 version, which is now no longer there.
Removing this paragraph from the draft may be a start, but it does not mean that it has disappeared from the NSG consciousness. Or that the hurdles facing the India exemption at the NSG are in any way lessened. This, sources said, will certainly be raised and demanded by other NSG states during the debates ahead.
Courtesy: www.timesofindia.com
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
We discussed before that there is a problem with agreement and it does not have bipartisan support. Even then it was carried over by the lobby assuming that it will get clearance. Reading the posts before this we see that India can what it wants in the deal if it is assertive and firm - including India's ability to test further and not be tied to Hyde act.RajeshA wrote:"N-deal will be consistent with US domestic law"
Again a Howard Berman story. This man is getting very hyper-tight about his non-proliferation responsibilities. Perhaps India would really need to approach our Israeli or Jewish-American friends. Howard Berman is a Jew, so he will only listen to another Jew.
Of course, it wouldn't harm, if some Residents of California's 28th Congressional District would like to call him up and find out why he is getting all worked-up. Is he looking for some campaign financing? Is he looking for some sign, that India likes Israel? Did he have a fight with his wife? I mean what IS WRONG.
Share with us Representative Berman. Waat is yor Praablam Yaar?
Geopolitics demands that
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
I don't think, that the problem is the lack of bipartisan support. The Democrats would vote for the nuclear deal, only they would be less than enthusiastic, considering that it bears George W. Bush's signature on it. Then there are others, like Joseph Biden, who would work like the devil for it.Acharya wrote: We discussed before that there is a problem with agreement and it does not have bipartisan support. Even then it was carried over by the lobby assuming that it will get clearance. Reading the posts before this we see that India can what it wants in the deal if it is assertive and firm - including India's ability to test further and not be tied to Hyde act.
Geopolitics demands that

The problem, in my opinion, remains that there was lack of communication between Indians and Americans in 2006, when the Hyde Act was passed. GOTUS was focussed on getting the Act passed, that they lost sight of the contents and provisions which were allowed to slip into the enabling legislation. There were too many voices in Congress, and every Congressman wanted to have the name of his dog in the Act, that it ballooned too much. After that they tried to deflate it, but the compromises they reached at, created an equilibrium amongst themselves but destroyed the understanding with the Indian team. GOTUS was itself not quite aware, what all it would have to promise the Indians. They thought, they would be able to bring down the expectations on the Indian side, rather than fight with COTUS. That did not happen. The square remained a square and a circle a circle.
123 Agreement was truly a feat, for trying to force the square into the circle, and both the teams were able to find a fine balance, which would break down at the slightest tugging.
123 Agreement's conformance to the Hyde Act follows the principles of Heisenberg. Too much scrutiny destroys the conformance, but otherwise it is assured. Then the House of Cards comes tumbling down.
That is why, it is important for POTUS and India, that Positive Rhetoric replaces close scrutiny. Scrutiny is in itself sufficient to torpedo the nuclear deal. In which case, Representative Howard Berman from the 28th District of California is doing a disservice to Hyde Act itself, as the Act is supposed to be an enabling piece of legislation.
Last edited by RajeshA on 08 Aug 2008 05:15, edited 1 time in total.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
India might have to express the regret they will have when they are forced to make the RAW files on AQK public highligthing the role of Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland in the Nukemart. A hint is already there in the book Islamic Bomb published in the late 1970s.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Rep and his group may have felt that the international round in IAEA and NSG has been too easy for India that now they should provide some spoke in the wheel to discomfort the Indian govt.RajeshA wrote:
That is why, it is important for POTUS and India, that Positive Rhetoric replaces close scrutiny. Scrutiny is in itself sufficient to torpedo the nuclear deal. In which case, Representative Howard Berman from the 28th District of California is doing a disservice to Hyde Act itself, as the Act is supposed to be an enabling piece of legislation.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Thanks this is good news material to read.RajeshA wrote:More insight into the India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement
India, the IAEA and the art of ‘reservation’: Hindu
More insight into Asian thinking on nuclear deal
East Asia and India’s civil nuclear odyssey: Hindu
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
From the above, the following is important:RajeshA wrote:East Asia and India’s civil nuclear odyssey: Hindu
The NSG’s status as a cartel, different from the IAEA’s high standing within the United Nations’ system, will leave the nuclear suppliers in Greater East Asia with individual choices about India, should it fail to a get the NSG’s nod.
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Just as FYI, Israel is against this deal with India.RajeshA wrote:"N-deal will be consistent with US domestic law"
Again a Howard Berman story. This man is getting very hyper-tight about his non-proliferation responsibilities. Perhaps India would really need to approach our Israeli or Jewish-American friends. Howard Berman is a Jew, so he will only listen to another Jew.
Of course, it wouldn't harm, if some Residents of California's 28th Congressional District would like to call him up and find out why he is getting all worked-up. Is he looking for some campaign financing? Is he looking for some sign, that India likes Israel? Did he have a fight with his wife? I mean what IS WRONG.
Share with us Representative Berman. Waat is yor Praablam Yaar?
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Article By Brahma Chellaney, Covert magazine, August 16-31
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Thanks Santanam for that piece,that exposes the sheer shamelesness,duplicity and chicanery of the current PM.From Bhagat Singh to Man Mohan Singh,what a fall in patriotism of our countrymen!
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 4325
- Joined: 30 Aug 2007 18:28
- Location: The Restaurant at the End of the Universe
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Philip wrote:Thanks Santanam for that piece,that exposes the sheer shamelesness,duplicity and chicanery of the current PM.From Bhagat Singh to Man Mohan Singh,what a fall in patriotism of our countrymen!
And pray Philip Sir, can you tell us what exactly new does that article by BC expose?
Sorry to say but BC is increasingly sounding like a broken record.
He's also got into the game of predicting the future it seems.
How does the word more come in here? What major conditions have been attached till now that India did not anticipate and factor in? To think that a major international deal of this nature can be struck without mutual give and take is very stupid to say the least.In that light, it is predictable that the deal would attract more grating conditions as it traverses the final two stages — clearances from the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and the U.S. Congress.
I wonder what BC and his admirers will do if there are no "grating conditions" attached at the NSG stage?
I guess there will either be a deafening silence like when it was proved that the honorable Arun Shourie ji was pulling a fast one by claiming Kalam was against the deal after talking to him.
Or something like this will be spun in right earnest:
See even the template is ready courtesy BC!When the new conditions (don't) come, you can be certain that ...(deal opponents) would spin reality to present the outcome as another “(defeat)” for India
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
It is true, that in the beginning, MMS wasn't sure of how this was going to play out, when he made his state visit to USA in 2005, and he did not take any nuclear scientist with him in his delegation. I suppose, it was not expected that any breakthrough would be achieved, but with time and helpful guidance from Anil Kakodkar and others, India has been able to firm up her negotiating position.Sanatanan wrote:Article By Brahma Chellaney, Covert magazine, August 16-31
In the end, when one considers, where India did not get the "same rights and benefits as the US", then what springs to mind is mainly:
a) India has put a lot more nuclear installations under safeguards as the other NWS.
b) These safeguards are permanent in nature, and one cannot suspend them at will and whim.
c) US-specific terms (Hyde Act) of termination of agreement on nuclear testing.
d) US-specific export restrictions on enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water technology.
In order to compensate for these limitations,
a) India still retains the right to put up more strategic nuclear installations outside the purview of IAEA inspections,
b) India can build up a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel for life of a safeguarded reactor, and
c) the severity of nuclear testing triggered termination clause has been diluted through mechanisms of consultation process, Presidential determinations of Indian security compulsions, and commercial buy back requirements and compensations.
d) there is no global termination clause triggered by nuclear testing
e) remaining import restrictions are temporary and also not global
In the end what we win is Nuclear Commerce with the World without acceding to NPT as a NNWS state.
There is not even a prescription for Disarmament as yet, unlike other NPT NWSs, though it can come as part of NSG waiver.
I would consider that a pretty good gate-crash.
There will always be spin. All the points, where one has been proven wrong, are suddenly forgotten and one jumps to the next hair-splitting. If it is Arun Shouri, he will protest that there is a big conspiracy, because the commas are wrong.amit wrote:I guess there will either be a deafening silence
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 4325
- Joined: 30 Aug 2007 18:28
- Location: The Restaurant at the End of the Universe
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Boss this is a very good summary of the million N-threads that we've seen here!RajeshA wrote:All the points, where one has been proven wrong, are suddenly forgotten and one jumps to the next hair-splitting.

Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Excellent analysis:
http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com/2008/0 ... r-nsg.html
07 August 2008
Eleventh hour for the NSG
Though the Nuclear Suppliers Group was set up as a response to India's 1974 nuclear test, its seven founding members today all support the idea of allowing nuclear trade with the country. Surely the time has come for the cartel to stop looking at India as a non-nuclear weapon state. Siddharth Varadarajan
As international cartels go, the Nuclear Suppliers Group is perhaps unique in having a DNA structure that is schizophrenic. One-part exporters' club and two-parts recruiting sergeant for the international non-proliferation system, the NSG can certainly take credit for helping some fence-sitters make up their mind over the years about joining the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). But with the number of holdouts now down to three -- including India -- a form of natural selection is leading to the 'export' part of the group's genetic code slowly triumphing over the nonproliferationist part.
By September 8, we shall see whether this process is allowed to reach its logical end -- the lifting of the group's anachronistic ban on nuclear sales to India -- or whether a last ditch effort by the non-proliferationists within produces a mutation that will only end up harming the NSG in the long-run. That is the date by which the United States hopes to shepherd through an amendment to the NSG's highly restrictive export guidelines. Will the waiver India is given be clean and unconditional, thereby allowing the country to participate in full civil nuclear cooperation? Or will a partial, conditional waiver force India to walk away from the nuclear deal and free us of our commitment to place a number of indigenous reactors under international safeguards? This is the stark choice the 45-nation nuclear cartel must make in the next four weeks.
Set up in 1975 as an ad-hoc body, the purpose behind the 'London Club' as it was known then was to tighten export controls to ensure nuclear facilities and materials sold exclusively for peaceful use were not diverted to military purposes. Though a control regime in the form of the Zangger Committee and its 'trigger list' had existed from 1971 and 1974 respectively, its applicability was confined to states that were party to NPT. The London Club -- whose seven founding members were the United States, Russia, France, Britain, Germany, Japan and Canada -- incorporated the Zangger trigger list of nuclear items and export guidelines, and made them applicable to all 'non-nuclear weapon states', i.e. the whole world other than the five countries that had nuclear weapon state status under the NPT.
Despite being provoked by India's alleged misuse of Canadian equipment in its 'peaceful nuclear explosion' of 1974, the NSG's first guidelines did not prohibit nuclear sales to the country or to others that were not members of the NPT. Of course, individual NSG members like Canada and the U.S. quickly adopted national export rules requiring full-scope safeguards of recipient states. But the group's guidelines merely demanded an assurance of non-explosive use, the acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on the items to be sold, physical protection and controls on any re-transfer of imported material to a third party. That is why India and Russia could go ahead and sign the Koodankulam agreement of 1988 for the supply of reactors. On so-called sensitive nuclear technologies such as enrichment and reprocessing equipment, the NSG went beyond Zangger by calling on its members to exercise restraint on sales but did not bar their sale.
By the start of the 1990s, the number of countries that remained outside the NPT was down to under 20, excluding the successor states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Apart from several Arab and African nations, the major nuclear-capable countries that had yet to join the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states were Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa. Mainly in order to push these states towards explicitly renouncing the weapons option once and for all, the NSG in 1990 began discussing the possibility of requiring the acceptance of comprehensive, or full-scope, safeguards on all nuclear facilities in a country as a condition for making any nuclear sales to it. This suggestion had first been mooted in the 1970s and 1980s but resisted by suppliers for commercial reasons. The end of the Cold War and the discovery that Iraq -- an NPT signatory -- had developed a clandestine nuclear weapons programme prompted the NSG to adopt two major new guidelines. The first guideline, finalised in May 1992, adopted the full-scope safeguards requirement and was intended as a means of pushing NPT holdouts towards accepting the treaty. The second set of guidelines was aimed at tightening export controls on dual use items so that non-nuclear weapon states would not be able to divert them towards a military purpose. Linked to this was the push at the IAEA for a more stringent set of safeguard controls known as the Additional Protocol.
After the NSG adopted the full-scope safeguards requirement for nuclear sales, key holdouts like Brazil and Argentina eventually acceded to the NPT. Today, the only countries left outside are India, Pakistan and Israel. All three countries possess nuclear weapons, though Tel Aviv has not officially declared this to be the case. In the case of India, the decision formally to embrace nuclear weapons was prompted in part by the efforts of America and its NSG allies to force the country to give up its nuclear option through a tightening of international restrictions. Once India tested its nuclear weapons in May 1998, Pakistan had no option but to follow. The fact that the two countries became de facto nuclear weapon states, then, is proof of the failure of the NSG's strategy towards them.
As the NSG reviews its achievements, it is worthwhile asking what possible utility the full-scope safeguards guideline can have in today's world. India and Pakistan will never accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and Israel's status cannot be resolved without the Middle East peace process reaching a definitive stage. Thus, if retention of the guideline is intended as an incentive for accession to the NPT, there is no question of it working in the case of the remaining three holdouts. But what about the guideline's use as a means of curbing the risk of further proliferation? It is clear that supplying nuclear material to Pakistan, given Islamabad's abysmal proliferation record, will entail significant proliferation risks. Similarly, allowing Israel to access civil nuclear cooperation will surely place stress on the acceptability of the NPT in West Asia. For these two countries, then, there is considerable merit in retaining the NSG's guideline for the time being. In the case of India, however, there is no reason to assume allowing the country to engage in safeguarded nuclear commerce with NSG members will increase the danger of proliferation. Not only has India demonstrated responsibility and restraint in its nuclear and dual-use export policies, but it has also additionally committed itself to placing a number of its indigenous reactors under IAEA safeguards in exchange for imported fuel, thereby reducing the potential size of its military nuclear sector.
The NSG's guidelines were intended to deal with the problem of proliferation in a world where the potential number of countries that could go down the nuclear weapons route was much larger. Its emphasis on regulating the access of non-nuclear weapon states to supplies had a certain relevance in the 1970s, 1980s and even 1990s. But today, it is meaningless for the cartel to continue to treat India as if it does not possess nuclear weapons. If one reviews the national position of NSG states, it is evident that the seven founding members and all members with a significant nuclear export industry are in favour of recognizing the reality of India's status. Those members most opposed to waiving the NSG's rules for India are those who either have a theological position against nuclear energy (e.g. Austria and New Zealand) or who are not major players in the international nuclear industry. When India has been able to negotiate unconditional supply agreements with large nuclear vendors like Russia and France and also with the U.S. after a fashion, it doesn't make sense for the NSG as a whole to impose conditions based on the false assumption that the country is somehow a non-nuclear weapon state.
If the U.S. is serious about delivering its side of the July 2005 bargain with India, it must drive home this fundamental point to the NSG's members. To the extent to which Russia and France will be major beneficiaries of the proposed exemption for India, they too need to stress the importance of the waiver being clean and unconditional. Adding NSG-wide conditions -- such as mandating a supply cut-off in case India tests a nuclear weapon -- will only eat into the autonomy of decision-making of individual countries. Every individual member is free to adopt its own export rules but they should not seek to impose their national standards on NSG states.
India has come this far despite the serious misgivings that exist within the country about the nuclear deal because it believes the NSG would be prepared to look at the matter coolly and rationally. If, however, the suppliers group insists on living in the past and pursuing extraneous agendas, New Delhi will have no option but to walk away.
http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com/2008/0 ... r-nsg.html
07 August 2008
Eleventh hour for the NSG
Though the Nuclear Suppliers Group was set up as a response to India's 1974 nuclear test, its seven founding members today all support the idea of allowing nuclear trade with the country. Surely the time has come for the cartel to stop looking at India as a non-nuclear weapon state. Siddharth Varadarajan
As international cartels go, the Nuclear Suppliers Group is perhaps unique in having a DNA structure that is schizophrenic. One-part exporters' club and two-parts recruiting sergeant for the international non-proliferation system, the NSG can certainly take credit for helping some fence-sitters make up their mind over the years about joining the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). But with the number of holdouts now down to three -- including India -- a form of natural selection is leading to the 'export' part of the group's genetic code slowly triumphing over the nonproliferationist part.
By September 8, we shall see whether this process is allowed to reach its logical end -- the lifting of the group's anachronistic ban on nuclear sales to India -- or whether a last ditch effort by the non-proliferationists within produces a mutation that will only end up harming the NSG in the long-run. That is the date by which the United States hopes to shepherd through an amendment to the NSG's highly restrictive export guidelines. Will the waiver India is given be clean and unconditional, thereby allowing the country to participate in full civil nuclear cooperation? Or will a partial, conditional waiver force India to walk away from the nuclear deal and free us of our commitment to place a number of indigenous reactors under international safeguards? This is the stark choice the 45-nation nuclear cartel must make in the next four weeks.
Set up in 1975 as an ad-hoc body, the purpose behind the 'London Club' as it was known then was to tighten export controls to ensure nuclear facilities and materials sold exclusively for peaceful use were not diverted to military purposes. Though a control regime in the form of the Zangger Committee and its 'trigger list' had existed from 1971 and 1974 respectively, its applicability was confined to states that were party to NPT. The London Club -- whose seven founding members were the United States, Russia, France, Britain, Germany, Japan and Canada -- incorporated the Zangger trigger list of nuclear items and export guidelines, and made them applicable to all 'non-nuclear weapon states', i.e. the whole world other than the five countries that had nuclear weapon state status under the NPT.
Despite being provoked by India's alleged misuse of Canadian equipment in its 'peaceful nuclear explosion' of 1974, the NSG's first guidelines did not prohibit nuclear sales to the country or to others that were not members of the NPT. Of course, individual NSG members like Canada and the U.S. quickly adopted national export rules requiring full-scope safeguards of recipient states. But the group's guidelines merely demanded an assurance of non-explosive use, the acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on the items to be sold, physical protection and controls on any re-transfer of imported material to a third party. That is why India and Russia could go ahead and sign the Koodankulam agreement of 1988 for the supply of reactors. On so-called sensitive nuclear technologies such as enrichment and reprocessing equipment, the NSG went beyond Zangger by calling on its members to exercise restraint on sales but did not bar their sale.
By the start of the 1990s, the number of countries that remained outside the NPT was down to under 20, excluding the successor states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Apart from several Arab and African nations, the major nuclear-capable countries that had yet to join the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states were Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa. Mainly in order to push these states towards explicitly renouncing the weapons option once and for all, the NSG in 1990 began discussing the possibility of requiring the acceptance of comprehensive, or full-scope, safeguards on all nuclear facilities in a country as a condition for making any nuclear sales to it. This suggestion had first been mooted in the 1970s and 1980s but resisted by suppliers for commercial reasons. The end of the Cold War and the discovery that Iraq -- an NPT signatory -- had developed a clandestine nuclear weapons programme prompted the NSG to adopt two major new guidelines. The first guideline, finalised in May 1992, adopted the full-scope safeguards requirement and was intended as a means of pushing NPT holdouts towards accepting the treaty. The second set of guidelines was aimed at tightening export controls on dual use items so that non-nuclear weapon states would not be able to divert them towards a military purpose. Linked to this was the push at the IAEA for a more stringent set of safeguard controls known as the Additional Protocol.
After the NSG adopted the full-scope safeguards requirement for nuclear sales, key holdouts like Brazil and Argentina eventually acceded to the NPT. Today, the only countries left outside are India, Pakistan and Israel. All three countries possess nuclear weapons, though Tel Aviv has not officially declared this to be the case. In the case of India, the decision formally to embrace nuclear weapons was prompted in part by the efforts of America and its NSG allies to force the country to give up its nuclear option through a tightening of international restrictions. Once India tested its nuclear weapons in May 1998, Pakistan had no option but to follow. The fact that the two countries became de facto nuclear weapon states, then, is proof of the failure of the NSG's strategy towards them.
As the NSG reviews its achievements, it is worthwhile asking what possible utility the full-scope safeguards guideline can have in today's world. India and Pakistan will never accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and Israel's status cannot be resolved without the Middle East peace process reaching a definitive stage. Thus, if retention of the guideline is intended as an incentive for accession to the NPT, there is no question of it working in the case of the remaining three holdouts. But what about the guideline's use as a means of curbing the risk of further proliferation? It is clear that supplying nuclear material to Pakistan, given Islamabad's abysmal proliferation record, will entail significant proliferation risks. Similarly, allowing Israel to access civil nuclear cooperation will surely place stress on the acceptability of the NPT in West Asia. For these two countries, then, there is considerable merit in retaining the NSG's guideline for the time being. In the case of India, however, there is no reason to assume allowing the country to engage in safeguarded nuclear commerce with NSG members will increase the danger of proliferation. Not only has India demonstrated responsibility and restraint in its nuclear and dual-use export policies, but it has also additionally committed itself to placing a number of its indigenous reactors under IAEA safeguards in exchange for imported fuel, thereby reducing the potential size of its military nuclear sector.
The NSG's guidelines were intended to deal with the problem of proliferation in a world where the potential number of countries that could go down the nuclear weapons route was much larger. Its emphasis on regulating the access of non-nuclear weapon states to supplies had a certain relevance in the 1970s, 1980s and even 1990s. But today, it is meaningless for the cartel to continue to treat India as if it does not possess nuclear weapons. If one reviews the national position of NSG states, it is evident that the seven founding members and all members with a significant nuclear export industry are in favour of recognizing the reality of India's status. Those members most opposed to waiving the NSG's rules for India are those who either have a theological position against nuclear energy (e.g. Austria and New Zealand) or who are not major players in the international nuclear industry. When India has been able to negotiate unconditional supply agreements with large nuclear vendors like Russia and France and also with the U.S. after a fashion, it doesn't make sense for the NSG as a whole to impose conditions based on the false assumption that the country is somehow a non-nuclear weapon state.
If the U.S. is serious about delivering its side of the July 2005 bargain with India, it must drive home this fundamental point to the NSG's members. To the extent to which Russia and France will be major beneficiaries of the proposed exemption for India, they too need to stress the importance of the waiver being clean and unconditional. Adding NSG-wide conditions -- such as mandating a supply cut-off in case India tests a nuclear weapon -- will only eat into the autonomy of decision-making of individual countries. Every individual member is free to adopt its own export rules but they should not seek to impose their national standards on NSG states.
India has come this far despite the serious misgivings that exist within the country about the nuclear deal because it believes the NSG would be prepared to look at the matter coolly and rationally. If, however, the suppliers group insists on living in the past and pursuing extraneous agendas, New Delhi will have no option but to walk away.
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 4325
- Joined: 30 Aug 2007 18:28
- Location: The Restaurant at the End of the Universe
Re: India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008
Arundhati Ghose's article, linked by RajeshA, states this:kshirin wrote:Excellent analysis:
http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com/2008/0 ... r-nsg.html
India has come this far despite the serious misgivings that exist within the country about the nuclear deal because it believes the NSG would be prepared to look at the matter coolly and rationally. If, however, the suppliers group insists on living in the past and pursuing extraneous agendas, New Delhi will have no option but to walk away.
And this:The chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Anil Kakodkar, has made it clear that the NSG guidelines are meant for non-nuclear weapon states; India has nuclear weapons and is not in violation of any laws or obligations as it is not a member of the NPT. He was clear that India retained the option to “walk out” of the entire exercise, if unwelcome conditions were attached to the NSG decision. Some might believe that India is in so deep, particularly after the domestic drama of the last few weeks, that it may not be in a position to walk out; this would be a misreading of the situation. It has been India’s reaction to unwelcome international legally binding constraints to walk out of a situation rather than accept a situation and then hope for the best.{Kamal Nath at the recent Doha round trade talks, as an example?}
My questions is since we've come so far, why not wait a few more days/weeks to see how everthing pans out before comparing MMS to Bhagat Singh or starting a fresh round of chest thumping and wailing?The choice before the NSG should be clear; if the waiver is not acceptable to India, it would be free to go its own way. This would surely not be in the interest of the global non-proliferation regime. On the other hand, a clean waiver would make India a powerful partner in the struggle against proliferation and the efforts towards nuclear disarmament.