India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008

[amit]

Read the message and not the messenger. By putting things on paper the voluntary part is being negated. You cant say later it was voluntary. Right here its being said on paper. its not verbal anymore. Its being cast in stone. And its being done by GOI.

Sorry Ramana but I'll have to agree to disagree with you on that.

I don't see how something which India is not signing and is not even present at during the meeting can become cast in stone for India. Everything IMO will depend on the individual treaties that India will sign.

Anyway let's see how things pan out.

[svinayak]

The expected behaviour (of GoI) is starting to show up, I suppose

The above is not a personal opinion? I didn't find that comment in the TOI article, maybe I missed it.

Even this is a personal opinion. This thing was taken care in BR long time ago. - No prescription on fellow posters.

It sometimes helps if personal prejudices are put aside when trying to understand something as complex as the nuclear deal.

[amit]

The above is not a personal opinion? I didn't find that comment in the TOI article, maybe I missed it.

Even this is a personal opinion. This thing was taken care in BR long time ago. - No prescription on fellow posters.

It sometimes helps if personal prejudices are put aside when trying to understand something as complex as the nuclear deal.

Sure Acharya that was a personal opinion. I'm not afraid to express my personal opinion. I, however, try to do so in a civil and respectiful manner - something which has been eluded to be as being my eloquence.

Incidentally this:

This is blackmail

is also a personal opinion.

Cheers!

[svinayak]

So!

[amit]

So!

So!

So I hope that it does not mean that there are personal opinions and then there are personal opinions on BRF!

[svinayak]

Ignore it

[RajeshA]

Read the message and not the messenger. By putting things on paper the voluntary part is being negated. You cant say later it was voluntary. Right here its being said on paper. its not verbal anymore. Its being cast in stone. And its being done by GOI.

Ramana,
I think there is a fine line, which analysts are not taking note of. Part 2 of the Waiver, esp. 2g, is a list of favorable conditions which motivated the NSG to make amends in their guidelines. This is not to be mixed up with future acceptable behavior of India, in whose absence India would have to pay a price. That future acceptable behavior has not been put on paper as yet, but is only hinted at by Part 2.

These are all conditions for initiation of the waiver but not for the continuation of the waiver. India's interest is in ensuring that there are no further conditions than to which she has agreed to for the continuation of the waiver.

In part 2, they could have even put, that India produces the juiciest mangoes, and it would have been OK.

Just my opinion!

[amit]

Ignore it

If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches, and poor men's cottages princes' palaces. ...

Alas if only we followed our own advice!

[Raj Malhotra]

When somebody sets out a "specific written condition" to trade and then even if without signing that document, you do trade then it is legally assumed that you have accepted those conditions on the principle of "estoppel" or "acquiescence".

[kshirin]

http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files ... yAug15.pdf
(How does one attach documents on BR?)

NPAs have written to German FM. Has someone already posted this?

For Immediate Release: August 15, 2008
Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, Exec. Director, Arms Control Association 1-202-463-8270 x107; Philip White, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, Tokyo, and Coordinator, Abolition 2000 U.S.-India Deal Working Group 81-3-3357-3800
(Washington, D.C.-Tokyo, Japan): In a letter sent this week to the foreign ministers of the participants in the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, a prestigious and broad array of more than 150 experts and nongovernmental organizations from 24 countries urged that they reject a George W. Bush administration proposal to exempt India from longstanding global nuclear trade standards.
The experts and NGOs argue in the August 15 letter that “India's commitments under the current terms of the proposed arrangement do not justify making far-reaching exceptions to international nonproliferation rules and norms.”
The Nuclear Suppliers Group will convene on August 21-22 in Vienna to discuss a U.S. proposal to relax longstanding NSG restrictions on trade with states, such as India, that refuse to allow comprehensive international nuclear safeguards. (For the text and an analysis of the U.S. proposal see < http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3274>.) Opposition from several countries is expected.
The appeal is part of a global NGO campaign to influence governments’ views about the controversial nuclear trade proposal.
“Unlike 178 other countries, India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It continues to produce fissile material and expand its nuclear arsenal. As one of only three states never to have signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), it has not made a legally-binding commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament,” the letter notes.
“Yet the arrangement would give India rights and privileges of civil nuclear trade that have been reserved only for members in good standing under the NPT. It creates a dangerous distinction between ‘good’ proliferators and ‘bad’ proliferators and sends out misleading signals to the international community with regard to NPT norms,” according to the letter.
“In the absence of a suspension of fissile material production for weapons by India, foreign nuclear fuel supplies would free up India’s relatively limited domestic supplies to be used exclusively in its military nuclear sector, thereby indirectly contributing to the potential expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal,” the signatories warn.
The NGOs and experts call upon NSG participant countries “to support measures that would avert further damage to the already beleaguered global nonproliferation and disarmament regime.”
Among the former government officials and experts endorsing the letter is Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala, the former UN Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs and President of the 1995 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference. Other notable signatories include the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, former U.S., Canadian, and Australian ambassadors, and the former U.S. official responsible for civilian nuclear trade negotiations.
NGOs from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, India, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere endorsed the letter, which was organized by the Tokyo-based Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center and the Washington-based Arms Control Association.
Given that the IAEA Board and the NSG traditionally operate by consensus, the signatories point out that each member state “has a pivotal role to play.” If the NSG is to allow nuclear trade with India, the experts and NGOs urge NSG participants to establish meaningful and common sense conditions and restrictions on nuclear trade with India, including:
• Terminating nuclear trade with India if it resumes testing;
• Prohibiting any transfer of sensitive plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, or heavy water production items to India, which can be used to make bomb material;
• Before India is granted a waiver from the NSG’s full-scope safeguards standard, it should join the other original nuclear weapon states by declaring it has stopped fissile material production for weapons purposes and transform its nuclear test moratorium into a meaningful, legally-binding commitment.
Unfortunately, Indian officials are demanding a so-called “clean” and “unconditional” exemption from NSG guidelines and are seeking bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements that help provide India with strategic fuel reserves and/or lifetime fuel guarantees in order to allow it to resume nuclear testing in the future without fear of a fuel supply cut off.
The August 15 letter warns the foreign ministers of the NSG countries that “if nuclear testing is to be deterred, meaningful penalties must be available. If NSG states do agree to supply fuel for India’s ‘civilian’ nuclear sector, they must avoid arrangements that would enable or encourage future nuclear testing by India. Otherwise, you and your government may become complicit in the facilitation of a new round of destabilizing nuclear tests.”
For the full list of endorsers and the text of the letter, see < http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files ... yAug15.pdf >.

[Sanatanan]

From The Financial Express, with dateline as "Dhaka, Thursday August 16 2007" and quoting AFP.

US to scrap nuclear deal if India tests weapons

WASHINGTON, Aug 15 (AFP): The United States will scrap a landmark nuclear deal with India if New Delhi conducts an atomic weapons test, the State Department said Tuesday.

The statement came as the two governments gave different interpretations of the controversial nuclear deal's recently adopted operating agreement, also known as the 123 agreement.

"The proposed 123 agreement has provisions in it that in an event of a nuclear test by India, then all nuclear cooperation is terminated," State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said.

There is also a "provision for return of all materials, including reprocessed material covered by the agreement," he said.

His comments came a day after Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told parliament that the agreement would not affect the Asian giant's military programme or any plans to test nuclear weapons. {Is this old story getting rehashed now?}Singh said "the agreement does not in any way affect India's right to undertake future nuclear tests, if it is necessary."

"There is no question that we will ever compromise, in any manner, our independent foreign policy. We shall retain our strategic autonomy," Singh had said.

The operating agreement was officially approved by the two governments about two weeks ago after exhaustive discussions spanning two years.

But US law also requires mandatory Congress approval of the pact.

Legislators, who have vowed to go scrutinise the pact, last year approved in principle the "Henry Hyde Act" allowing export of civilian nuclear fuel and technology to India.

The move reversed decades of sanctions imposed after India's nuclear tests.

[Gerard]

India agrees to US draft on NSG waiver with strings

[ramana]

When somebody sets out a "specific written condition" to trade and then even if without signing that document, you do trade then it is legally assumed that you have accepted those conditions on the principle of "estoppel" or "acquiescence".

Thak you Raj. I have been pressing the estoppel arguement for ages on this very forum. Again thanks for giving the legal view as you know the law.

When one side has lawyers and the other side has none this is what happens.

[RajeshA]

When somebody sets out a "specific written condition" to trade and then even if without signing that document, you do trade then it is legally assumed that you have accepted those conditions on the principle of "estoppel" or "acquiescence".

Thak you Raj. I have been pressing the estoppel arguement for ages on this very forum. Again thanks for giving the legal view as you know the law.

When one side has lawyers and the other side has none this is what happens.

I agree with this. However IMHO, I also think that Daryl Kimball is also right.

Section 3 would allow individual NSG members to engage in a full range of nuclear trade with India without any legally or politically meaningful requirement that would link nuclear trade with India to implementation and compliance with the commitments and actions mentioned in section 2.

U.S. Proposal for India-Specific Exemption from Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines

Since the conditions for termination have not been spelled out, there are no conditions to which India would agree on basis of the principle of "estoppel" or "acquiescence".

[Pulikeshi]

There may be a case made for Promissory Estoppel here. That said...
However, the NSG waiver is not a contract between GOI and NSG - AFAIK.
Further, is the NSG granting this waiver based on India's actions to date, or are they relying on India to continue down a path implicitly. Here is where it gets tricky.

In India for example:

The Indian Evidence Act 1872, deals estoppel under Section 115 to 117. So far as sec. 115 as it stands now reads as under ;

Sec. 115. Estoppel.-When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing.

Example: If I promised to take a friend to Orlando. She now buys a ticket based on that conversation. I need to honor the promise and go to Orlando with her or cough up the difference.

If my friend, relied on my promise and got four other friends to buy tickets to Orlando.
I am still liable for those four tickets as well.

In the case of the NSG waiver, such waiver is being granted based on Indian commitments.
Even voluntary ones, become a promise!

The only caveat is that the waiver is not a legal contract between India and the NSG.

[enqyoob]

Sorry, I don't agree. The "take a friend to Florida" is a promise, plain and simple.

What applies here is different. This is more like Abdul saying:

I won't wave the Pakistani flag in the garden on August 15th any more!

in the presence of everyone, several times.

So, the National Society of Garderners considers this, and says: "Look, we've kept Abdul out of the August 15th garden celebration for the past 5 years, and it turns out he's actually pretty decent. In fact, Bubba here (of whom we are all a bit scared) swears that Abdul is pretty decent, and Bubba has even threatened to quit our gang if we don't admit Abdul. So, hey, given that Abdul has promised that he won't be waving the Paki flag in the garden, we vote to admit him".

So if Abdul ABSOLUTELY MUST wave the Paki flag, then, yes, the Society will turn around and diss him again. Abdul's goats are in a tizzy about this, because they love that green flag which they get to chew on and Pu on later. Tough luck. Abdul has opened his big mouth and made his declaration to too many people.

And anyway, the NSG is in no mood to put up with any Abduls who plan to wave the Paki flag at their garden conventions again.

[NRao]

When somebody sets out a "specific written condition" to trade and then even if without signing that document, you do trade then it is legally assumed that you have accepted those conditions on the principle of "estoppel" or "acquiescence".

1) What if you trade, but BEFORE the first trade you clearly state that you do not agree with the "written condition", and
2) What if you trade and break the "written condition" PRIOR to trading - knowingly?

Further, is the NSG granting this waiver based on India's actions to date, or are they relying on India to continue down a path implicitly.

The US wants the NSG to grant a waiver based on conditions set with the Hyde Act, 123 and the IAEA agreement.

From Indian PoV, there is no conditions set for a waiver granted by the NSG.

Ramana,

The issue is not lawyers. No lawyer can really come to a legal agreement between two nations that have no common ground. The reason being - in THIS case - the law agrees to a NWS and NNWS. Which Indian lawyer will agree to India being a NNWS, and, which non-Indian lawyer will agree to India being a NWS? They are trying to create something in-between, which does not exist and cannot exist and therefore cannot come to an agreement (naturally). India will have to break or challenge "estoppel" at some point in time (under some circumstances granted) to maintain both a civilian and a strategic set of nuclear plants, and, the "West" will have to circumvent or even break rules to supply India under some circumstances. (Actually, the Georgian fiasco has put India in a small bind, siding with the Russians may bring a break up of NSG at some point in time. What is the price remains to be seen. The old Indo-Chin-Russo axis may be revived in some quarters.)

[Pulikeshi]

Sorry, I don't agree. The "take a friend to Florida" is a promise, plain and simple.

What applies here is different.

N, You seem to still be making a case for promissory estoppel with your example.
In any case, I hope you saw what I said:
"The only caveat is that the waiver is not a legal contract between India and the NSG."

In this case - to further my example. The girls (including my friend) decide to buy bikinis because they will look good together.
Such an agreement may or may not have anything to do with my original promise to go to Orlando with my friend.

The only question in my mind is if the waiver can be withdrawn under certain circumstances.
If so, under what circumstances, what are the mitigation plans and what are the risks.

The US and India are creating a Trishanku Swarg for India. I fully support that!
However, the said Swag being created by Vishwamitra (US) ought to be stable!

The Devataa (NSG) with the waiver agree to the sapta rishi stars being created
and the suspension of Trishanku (India) in space for duration of creation.

[svinayak]

The US and India are creating a Trishanku Swarg for India. I fully support that!
However, the said Swag being created by Vishwamitra (US) ought to be stable!

But it will also invite blackmail in the future when situation changes.

[Arun_S]

When somebody sets out a "specific written condition" to trade and then even if without signing that document, you do trade then it is legally assumed that you have accepted those conditions on the principle of "estoppel" or "acquiescence".

Thak you Raj. I have been pressing the estoppel arguement for ages on this very forum. Again thanks for giving the legal view as you know the law.

When one side has lawyers and the other side has none this is what happens.

All along in the interaction and negotiations Indian side had no lawyers in the team, while Unkill side had lawyers in foreground and background.

Now with US state department issuing official statement and ManMohan Singh repeating like the scripted sales talk, as if Indian people don't know English to understand what US State Department statement means and the NSG legal document explicitly referring nuclear test monetorium there is no unambigious language left.

There is no doubt in my mind India is now screwed eitherway. IMHO MMS is left with "Trishankhu" option having burnt the boat and bridge in the last no-confidence vote in Sansad.

Carry on friends, as India has carried on last 61 years. "Estoppel arguement" can go to hell, as long as there is nuclear electricity to light up huts of people who don't have money for a bulb or fan, much less spare money for electricity bill.

In the end there will be no estoppel, nor electricity, it is just illusion/maya after all, while some rope in maya with both hands. And I will bet "Haldiram Mithaii in the weight of Akula's propeller" that "there will be no 40GWe LWR nuclear energy generated by 2020", not withstanding India signing on dotted line on this nuclear deal, DAE/Anil Kakodkar making the power point presentation of growing nuclear electricity generation, nor the business incentive of this $100 billion LWR nuclear power plant opportunity.

Anyone to take on my wager of "Haldiram Mithaii in the weight of Akula's propeller" versus "10% of Haldiram Mithaii in the weight of Akula's propeller"? Try put your money where the mouth is, else talk is cheap.

[Gerard]

From the ayatollah blog

If you are lucky enough to have a subscription to Nuclear Fuel, check out Mark Hibbs’ article “Some in NSG predict prolonged debate over conditions for Indian exemption” (33:16, August 11, 2008). Diplomatic sources tell Hibbs the NSG debate will last “several weeks, perhaps longer” because of opposition to a “clean” exemption.

Groendahl goes on to speculate that the US is hoping the NSG will “fix” the deal by conditioning the exemption on India not testing — something that would be more palatable to the anti-American left in India if it came from the international community.

[enqyoob]

Bottom line: Whether we like it or not, the ABV guvrmand went out and declared a Unilateral Morarjithorium on Testing.

We won't debate whether that got India anything or not.

Now we seem to expect countries outside to ignore that, and say, "Diyar yindoos, here, take this waiver, we were wrong all these many years, sorry, and by the way, we DON'T want you to continue a test ban".

I quit hoping for such things since I was in kindergarten. Maybe the ppl brought up like I see in the Hindi movies still believe that the whole world is out there to give them mitthai-laddoo. Good 4 u, keep up the optimism.

[Raj Malhotra]

Concepts of "promissory estoppel", "waiver", "acquiscence" or "doctrine of election" are NOT contracts per se, but in legal parlance are called "deemed contracts" or "quasi contracts" where even though you have not directy signed the contract or agreed to be bound by it explicitly, even then one is "deemed" to be bound by operation of these legal principles

[Shivani]

Bottom line: Whether we like it or not, the ABV guvrmand went out and declared a Unilateral Morarjithorium on Testing.

The moratorium on testing was a domestic decision which -for all anyone here knows- could have been driven by the fact that the scientific establishment needed time to come up with future designs and tests. A diplomatic de-escalation trick.

But when you make this moratorium a part of an agreement with another country (US) this has wider implications. And then you go further to get a 'waiver' from NSG, no matter what some might "argue", that waiver is being based on certain conditions being met, certain tenets remaining sacrosanct. These might included no future testing as well as all that 'harmonization' of the missile program.

So this "argument" being offered is not an argument at all. It is the petulant nah-na-na-nah-na of a child who makes an error and does not want to admit it. A quick slap across the face will help see the error of the ways but the pain when it comes will be felt by ordinary Indians and not our elites.

[sivab]

http://www.hindu.com/2008/08/17/stories ... 920100.htm

On eve of NPT, U.S. knew India would go nuclear
Siddharth Varadarajan
Declassified documents reveal Chester Bowles’ junket diplomacy

New Delhi: So simplistic was America’s understanding of Indian nuclear policy in the late 1960s that Ambassador Chester Bowles believed sending the country’s top atomic official on a junket to Washington could help make New Delhi sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty — under negotiation at the time — as a non-nuclear weapon state.

As the NPT talks neared completion in 1967 and 1968, Delhi loomed large in Washington’s sights because it considered India the country most likely to make nuclear weapons in the “near term.”

In a secret cable to the State Department on December 12, 1967, Bowles said Vikram Sarabhai, then chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, was “one of the primary architects” of the Indian government’s position on the NPT. “One of Sarabhai’s main weaknesses is his vanity. We wonder if it might be worthwhile inviting him during his next trip abroad to stop in Geneva (and perhaps Washington) for the ‘full treatment’ by [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency head] Ambassador [William] Foster and his associates. Conceivably, his emotional and somewhat irrational position on NPT might be modified by such an exposure.”

The Bowles cable is one of dozens of U.S. documents, in the run up to the NPT, declassified in June 2008 and recently made available by George Washington University’s National Security Archive.

Describing Sarabhai as “a nationalist first and scientist second,” Bowles said the AEC chair’s influence on then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was rising. The cable gives an account of a meeting Canada’s High Commissioner in Delhi had with Mrs. Gandhi where he warned of economic “repercussions” if India chose not to sign the NPT. “Mrs. Gandhi reportedly replied she was fully aware of the implications non-accession held for India,” Bowles’ note says. But with “China at her back, and Pakistan lurking on the sidelines, she foresaw no alternative but to keep open her option on the production of nuclear weapons.”

That foreign trips had no effect on Sarabhai’s approach to the NPT is apparent from another secret cable, sent to the State Department by the U.S. mission in Geneva on April 3, 1968. The cable, a record of discussion between Sarabhai and Myron Kratzer of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, lists the changes India said must be made in the treaty text before it could think of signing the NPT.

“Sarabhai stated four requirements,” the cable notes. First, was “complete freeze on current posture of nuclear powers,” second, “equality of treatment with regard to nuclear explosions, i.e. all nations should be permitted to design and manufacture PNEs [peaceful nuclear explosions] or none should.”

Sarabhai also said stronger security guarantees were needed and that there would have to be “non-discriminatory application of safeguards to all signatories.”

[sivab]

http://www.hindu.com/2008/08/17/stories ... 491000.htm

India headed U.S. list of countries likely to reject NPT
Siddharth Varadarajan
But Washington also feared nuclear ambitions of Israel, Sweden, Japan, Germany, Pakistan, Switzerland and Australia

New Delhi: Recently declassified State Department papers provide a compelling snapshot of Washington’s fears about a handful of countries most likely to develop nuclear weapons as the world moved towards adopting the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in the late 1960s.

But unlike today, when ‘rogue states’ loom large in the U.S. imagination, American anxieties about proliferation then centred around some of its closest allies. India, not yet an ally or ‘strategic partner,’ topped the list. But following right behind were Israel, Sweden, Japan and Germany, all of whom were described as “nuclear capable countries of principal concern” in a secret report of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council in February 1966. Of these, India and Israel were described as countries “where the problem is reaching acute proportions.”

Also mentioned as possible proliferators over a 10-year horizon were Pakistan, Switzerland, South Africa and Australia. The erstwhile United Arab Republic (of Egypt and Syria) was also considered a potential danger.

The report was declassified in June this year and recently made available online by the National Security Archive of George Washington University.

Though international negotiations on a treaty to limit the spread of nuclear weapons started in 1958, the NPT text was only finalised on July 1, 1968.

The U.S. policy was aimed at securing the early ratification of countries with the technological capability of challenging the monopoly of the five established nuclear weapon states.

“Now pre-occupied with more immediate problems,” the report said presciently, “India may defer a decision for several years. However, the political and military challenge posed by Communist China will probably lead to an eventual Indian decision to join the ‘nuclear club’.”

The U.S. saw Israel’s motivation as driven by “fears that it will eventually be overwhelmed by its more populous Arab neighbours.” Sweden, the report said, “sees a possibility that nuclear weapons may be required to defend the principle of neutrality.” Stockholm “does not wish to lead a parade but might follow,” it noted. And the approach of Japan and Germany was being driven by problems related to collective alternatives to national deterrence and “the sense of discrimination and second class status.”

Barring “unexpected acts of careless generosity” by countries which have already tested nuclear weapons, the report did not believe there was a danger of proliferation in the near term beyond this “limited number of nuclear capable countries.” But what India would do held the key in more ways than one.

Pakistan was considered a derivative potential proliferator because its policy was tied to that of India. Apart from advising its leaders that its image “would be greatly enhanced worldwide” if it were to sign the NPT in the face of India’s refusal, Washington told Pakistan it could always quit the treaty if India ever developed nuclear weapons.

On April 8, 1968, the U.S. embassy in Rawalpindi sent a secret cable to the State Department saying the Pakistani Foreign Ministry had been told that “escape clauses of treaty would prevent GOP from being disadvantaged if it signed and GOI did not and GOI proceeded development nuclear weapons and means of delivery.”

As far as the Indian government was concerned, the 1966 Policy Planning document said China’s nuclear weapons programme “has been perceived by India as a direct blow to its own prestige and political position, and as a potential threat to its security.”

It noted India’s nuclear weapons capability was a “by-product” of its civilian programme and that India “might be ready to test a nuclear weapons device in perhaps a year’s time.” However, it said obtaining a suitable delivery capability would present more substantial difficulties. “It is likely that India would feel compelled to seek missiles. If they could not be procured, India would have to undertake a prolonged development program for which its industrial base is not well suited.”

The development of nuclear weapons was not a priority for the Indian government, the report said, but China’s growing capability would “probably bring the issue of India’s ‘going nuclear’ to a head earlier than in the case of the other nuclear capable countries.” This in turn would spur Pakistan towards nuclear weapons. “Although now lacking in the technical capabilities necessary for a nuclear weapons program, Pakistan would undoubtedly seek to acquire them ... A new Pak alignment with Communist China could result.”

Having identified the India problem, the report said alternative ways had to be found “to meet the political and security incentives that are at the root of the ‘nuclear proliferation’ issue as it has arisen in India.” The secret report cited a “recent discussion between the U.S. representative in Geneva and his Indian counterpart” — presumably Ambassador V.C. Trivedi — in which “the latter said explicitly that a non-proliferation treaty would not be worth having if it focused on what he termed the hypothetical Nth Country problem rather than the real problem posed by Communist China’s growing nuclear capability.”

On the security front, therefore, the report urged U.S. “military aid ... to strengthen India’s defence against the Communist Chinese conventional threat” and also “firm assurances against Chinese Communist nuclear attack.”

Since India’s domestic energies at the time were absorbed by the country’s development needs, the report urged the West’s cooperation in providing economic and technical assistance as a means of delaying the exercise of the Indian nuclear option. Ways should also be sought, it said “to make clear to India that she does not have to consider exploding a nuclear device to achieve ... recognition” of its scientific and technical achievements.

The report regretted that India’s policy of non-alignment barred any “collective alternatives to national deterrence [involving] a closer nuclear relationship with the U.S.” The political basis for such arrangements did not exist at present, the report said, “and is not likely to materialize before many years have passed, if, indeed, it materializes at all.”

Despite this assessment, the U.S. tried tempting India with security assurances. The Bowles (Chester Bowles, who was U.S. Ambassador) cable of December 1967 indicates New Delhi was unconvinced. (Then Prime Minister) Indira Gandhi asked what significance would such assurances hold for India. “If the Americans want to come to our aid against an attack by the Chinese, they will, even if we don’t sign the NPT. And if they don’t want to come to our aid, they won’t, even if we do sign the treaty,” the cable quoted her as saying.

But if an American nuclear umbrella was not acceptable to India, ‘collective arrangements’ held the key to preventing Germany and Japan from going nuclear.

Washington also believed at the time that this had to involve bringing British and eventually French nuclear weapons under some sort of pan-European nuclear-sharing arrangement. “The need for such arrangements is the more urgent since an Indian national nuclear program, which may prove difficult to avoid, could well have serious repercussions in two key allied countries: Germany and Japan,” the report stated. “It will be important to have developed a workable collective arrangement in Europe, which will meet German aspirations and — by subsuming the U.K.’s national capability — set a useful example for Japan, before India goes nuclear.”

India went nuclear in 1974, setting off a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ — the same kind Vikram Sarabhai had said every country had the right to do — in the desert sands of Pokhran. Washington’s prediction about India had come true, even if its wider fears about proliferation had proved unfounded.

Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. Germany signed it in 1969 but only ratified it in 1975. Japan, which signed in 1970, was ready for ratification by 1976.

There were, of course, dozens of holdouts, but by the end of 1990s, their number was down to three: India, Pakistan and Israel.

GoI exactly knew what kind of sham NPT was and called Unkil's bluff. An enraged West intentionally let Chicom arm TSP ...

[NRao]

"Estoppel arguement" can go to hell, as long as there is nuclear electricity to light up huts of people who don't have money for a bulb or fan, much less spare money for electricity bill.

And, IF I may add, after "ordering" umpteen aircrafts, it looks like they will no arrive in India ....... problem ..........no one has fixed a predictable infrastructure problem.

IF only we could import better politicians!!!!

There is a more fundamental problem and it is not technical in nature.

[ramana]

Bottom line: Whether we like it or not, the ABV guvrmand went out and declared a Unilateral Morarjithorium on Testing.

We won't debate whether that got India anything or not.

Now we seem to expect countries outside to ignore that, and say, "Diyar yindoos, here, take this waiver, we were wrong all these many years, sorry, and by the way, we DON'T want you to continue a test ban".

I quit hoping for such things since I was in kindergarten. Maybe the ppl brought up like I see in the Hindi movies still believe that the whole world is out there to give them mitthai-laddoo. Good 4 u, keep up the optimism.

Which government is in power now? Which government won the confidence vote willy nilly? Which government has agreed to allow a voluntary moratorium, in a multilateral document?
Citing the ABV declaration is for that time and is not forever as it hedges India's options. had the scientists delivered a weapon there would be no qualms. Instead it was weaponisable configuration. Prudence requires hedging the option and that was done. Here the hedge is being whacked away.

It was understandable to have restated the voluntary moratorium in the J18 agreement for continuity and its a bilateral matter. The test prohibition clause being iin Hyde was acceptable as its domestic legislation. Its not there in the US123 agreement wherre it matters. Now the NSG waiver has an explicit ref to the voluntary commitment that India has stated in different context.
Bottom line is the MMS govt for what even reasons has agreed to make the bilateral J18 commitment into a multilateral one which is the basis for the NSG waiver.

And the press claims that the US presented the draft with GOI approval? This is self conquest at its worst. The MMS govt will go away unwept, unsung and more importantly unhung as Churchill said on a different occasion. This govt will be remembered as the Chamberlain govt of India.

One cannot hope to advance Indian interests by citing a previous govt statement for all times.

What this also means is the UPA and INC will never exercise the option ever again after the PNE 1974. They are just afraid of the responsibility that comes with power.

If the kitchen was too hot why are they there and preventing others from taking care of the national interests?


With power comes responsibility. They are two faces of the coin. one cant have just power and no responsibility.

[Pulikeshi]

And I'm willing to bet its not going to be. However, I'm willing to bet that once we see the actual NSG waiver, we will argue over what is "clean and unconditional" and what is not.

Maybe time to give this BRFite an award!

[Gerard]

India's NSG battle to focus on nuclear tech

The battle for India's nuclear exemption is likely to focus on access to enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology and equipment and to avoid a "testing" condition included in the final waiver document by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) when it meets on August 21-22 at Vienna.

[Gerard]

India's outstanding metallurgist C V Sundaram passes away

He contributed to the establishment of production plants for Nuclear Grade Zirconim sponge metal and electronic grade Tantalum anodes and a pilot plant for the Titanium sponge metal at Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad. During his tenure as Director, IGCAR, the first criticality of Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) was achieved on October 18, 1989.

[Gerard]

A “shocking” approach

Ambassador Chester Bowles’s secret cable of December 12, 1967 reveals that after being rebuffed by Indira Gandhi, the Canadian High Commissioner tried his luck with Rajeshwar Dayal, who was Foreign Secretary at the time. “Our informant characterized Dayal’s reaction to the High Commissioner’s approach as ‘shocking’,” notes Bowles.

“Dayal reportedly said India would never give up an iota of hard-fought independence by signing the NPT... Let everyone stop their aid. India would survive. The important thing was to protect the nation’s freedom and independence from foreign domination, whatever the source and whatever the guise.”

[rajrang]

http://www.hindu.com/2008/08/17/stories ... 491000.htm

India headed U.S. list of countries likely to reject NPT
Siddharth Varadarajan
But Washington also feared nuclear ambitions of Israel, Sweden, Japan, Germany, Pakistan, Switzerland and Australia

New Delhi: Recently declassified State Department papers provide a compelling snapshot of Washington’s fears about a handful of countries most likely to develop nuclear weapons as the world moved towards adopting the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in the late 1960s.


Despite this assessment, the U.S. tried tempting India with security assurances. The Bowles (Chester Bowles, who was U.S. Ambassador) cable of December 1967 indicates New Delhi was unconvinced. (Then Prime Minister) Indira Gandhi asked what significance would such assurances hold for India. “If the Americans want to come to our aid against an attack by the Chinese, they will, even if we don’t sign the NPT. And if they don’t want to come to our aid, they won’t, even if we do sign the treaty,” the cable quoted her as saying.

GoI exactly knew what kind of sham NPT was and called Unkil's bluff. An enraged West intentionally let Chicom arm TSP ...

Mrs Gandhi's wisdom is apparent in her comments above. I hope India's leaders of today have a bit of this foresight.

Since it was the West led by the US that isolated India's nuclear programme, it should be their responsibility to undo this - especially if they want to sell billions of $ worth of nuclear reactors. Not pretend like they are doing India a great favor and get India to sign all sorts of papers.

Regarding your comment, who knows, even if India had signed the NPT, the West may have still let Chicom arm TSP. For centuries, the Brits used the "divide and rule" philosophy. Similarly, is it possible that the US and the West had decided that a strong TSP will keep India in check - and therefore give the West more lattitude in dealing with a super power India of the future?

[enqyoob]

ramana, I happen to agree with everything you say there, but the fact remains: To the outside world, India has declared a voluntary moratorium. The NSG is being asked to give a waiver for the US-India bilateral agreement to go into force. And there is no doubt that the US-India bilateral agreement is based on the J-18. The J-18 certainly includes the moratorium. For India to say otherwise now, is "changing the goal-posts" from their pov, no 2 ways about it.

How can India have a moratorium on testing when India talks bilateral with the US, but no moratorium multilaterally? A test is a test, and a moratorium is a moratorium.

So India is well and truly caught in the moratorium of its own making.

Of course, a new government can simply go test, and take what comes. But we all know that is not going to happen unless the situation changes drastically.

BTW, the split-off of Kashmir, as some idiots are now voicing, would be such a circumstance, because it will completely destabilize India. Imagine the map without the head.

[Arun_S]

A “shocking” approach

Ambassador Chester Bowles’s secret cable of December 12, 1967 reveals that after being rebuffed by Indira Gandhi, the Canadian High Commissioner tried his luck with Rajeshwar Dayal, who was Foreign Secretary at the time. “Our informant characterized Dayal’s reaction to the High Commissioner’s approach as ‘shocking’,” notes Bowles.

“Dayal reportedly said India would never give up an iota of hard-fought independence by signing the NPT... Let everyone stop their aid. India would survive. The important thing was to protect the nation’s freedom and independence from foreign domination, whatever the source and whatever the guise.”

That was then and this is what it is now under the present government of India.

That was when India was a cripple and on begging bowl, but its political leaders had known the pain and consequence of "nation’s freedom and independence from foreign domination". Compare that with today where we hear of bleeding hearts who think nothing of nation’s freedom and independence from foreign domination, and will give long lectures on everything come from power of the greenback.

[sanjaykumar]

I tend to think that India knows it is in an incomparably stronger position. Don't forget MMS and his generation have known humiliation that you and I will never see.

[ldev]

NDA government position on CTBT

Navtej Sarna
Counsellor (Press & Information)
Washington, DC
(202) 939-7042


Press Release issued by the External Affairs Ministry
on India's position on nuclear issues/CTBT

New Delhi
October 14, 1999

India's position on the CTBT was articulated in Prime Minister's address to the UN General Assembly in September 1998. This position was reiterated by the Prime Minister in Parliament on December 15, 1998, as follows:

"India is now engaged in discussions with our key interlocutors on a range of issues, including the CTBT. We are prepared to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion, so that the entry into force of the CTBT is not delayed beyond September 1999. We expect that other countries, as indicated in Article XIV of the CTBT, will also adhere to this Treaty without conditions".

The Prime Minister had also announced a voluntary moratorium on any further underground nuclear explosive tests. India also has an unwavering commitment to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and to universal nuclear disarmament.

The situation regarding ratification of the CTBT as well as the
debate in the US Senate clearly indicates that the CTBT is not a simple uncomplicated issue. Among other things it requires building a national consensus in the countries concerned, including India.

This indicates that the audience that ABV addressed in his commitment for India's voluntary moratorium was the international audience in addition to the domestic audience. He gave a speech to that effect at the UN in September 1998.

To now argue that commitment made by a Prime Minister of India means nothing for the international audience, because somehow it was addressed only for domestic consumption is disingenous and naive at best. Full credit to MMS for honoring the commitments made by earlier Indian governments and not "trying to shift the goalposts".

Furthermore, a voluntary moratorium made at the UN by the Prime Minister of India is about as multi lateral as it gets. Nothing bilateral about it.

[NRao]

I am not sure, my sense is that MMS tends to be of the "save face" variety.

What is bugging me now is why did MMS go through a Hyde Act/123/vote of confidence when he knew in 2006 that the US was not willing to produce a "clean, unconditional" NSG draft, which has been the stated position of India since day one!!

To me, IF the NSG does not provide a unconditional waiver, this whole episode is a total waste of time. What in "clean, unconditional" did not the US or the other nations not understand?

[Prem]

We should wait for the final outcome and onlee then pass the Judgement . Nothing Ventured Nothing Gained .End result might suprise many.

[RajeshA]

I can eat Nestle Chocolates again.

Switzerland to support India's case at NSG