Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stability

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Paul
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by Paul »

Surinder, think of your house as 50x80 sq ft area with a compound wall. You have a beautiful daughter and half of the neighbourhood mongrels lust after her. The concept of a buffer (or a frontier) is like the area between the fence and the actual house. If an intruder wants to get into your house, he has to cross the fence and get across the open space before getting to the window or some other opening to get in. Chances are, you may see this guy jumping the fence or at the space and this may give some time to get your pea shooter out to deter this romeo.

If you live in Sunnyvale in the bay area in US, chances are all you need is a picket fence. But if your house is in the yakutpura area of the old city in Hyderabad, then you probably need to build a 6 ft fence and metal gates to keep these fellows out.

A neighbour’s neighbour is always a good friend as a rule. But if this fellow is going to gain your neighbour’s jaydaad because your neighbour is unable to maintain the fence on that side default then you have to be careful because the relationship is changing now….To add to this you are all distant relatives and these plots have been decided by a elder who gave more land to your immediate neighbour.


Hope my shiv-esque analogy makes sense. :)
Paul
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by Paul »

Paul wrote:Chances are, you may see this guy jumping the fence or at the space and this may give some time to get your pea shooter out to deter this romeo.
The Greek invasion of India wherin they were stopped in the buffer zones is very relevant to my analogy.
shaardula
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by shaardula »

John Snow wrote:I want to xerox couple of pages from a book and post here, which is relavant. How do I do that?
you can scan the document. if it is in english, many scanners will allow you to scan as a pdf. otherwise you can scan it as an image.

the scanned documents can be uploaded on rapidshare.com so that the rest of us can see it.

if in the US, places like office depot should have scanners if you dont have on personally.

ps: does google books, jstor or anybody have an online version of the book?
ShauryaT
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by ShauryaT »

Deleted...
Last edited by ShauryaT on 14 Aug 2008 19:59, edited 1 time in total.
ramana
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by ramana »

Its OK. he has deleted it. It was in haste. Chalo.
ShauryaT
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Post by ShauryaT »

Continued from Nuclear Thread:
Acharya wrote:They have accepted China as the only nuclear power in the region and do not want any others.
They also smell that they can affect mass conversions in China due to Mao's cultural genocide of the 60's and their success in Korea, a cousin civilization. Finding the links of the game that track the participants of the old adherents of the Anglican Church, who had an interest in India and the American led evangelical organizations with influence in the region will likely show another dimension of the successor status of the US in this game.

E.g: The groups in Aussie and NZ have links with the Anglican or American Protestant origin or both?
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by ramana »

ShauryaT, According the Pannikar's book the conversion process was going on right after the Opium wars. one of the demands sought and obtained was to allow missionaries everywhere in China and not just the coastal towns. The Chinese even had their own prophet who claimed to be a saviour and declared independence. All these were crushed militarily but monarchial China was getting old and unstable. I have this hunch that communism was a away to modernize China and soften it up for later evangelization. From KMP's book China was always uncle's munna and preffered rising power. I havent understood the rise of Mao in this context. Caroe's VSG papers talk of a threat to India from Chinese modernization but London didnt see it that way. Again a gap in knowledge because if London was all seeing and all connected and had dismissed the rise of China then what happened? VSG papers lament that Indian nationalists see a pan-Asian solidarity and ignore potential for threat from China. Nehru's accomodating the PRC is due to this pan Asian solidarity in my view.
svinayak
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Post by svinayak »

ramana wrote:ShauryaT, According the Pannikar's book the conversion process was going on right after the Opium wars. one of the demands sought and obtained was to allow missionaries everywhere in China and not just the coastal towns. The Chinese even had their own prophet who claimed to be a saviour and declared independence. All these were crushed militarily but monarchial China was getting old and unstable. I have this hunch that communism was a away to modernize China and soften it up for later evangelization. From KMP's book China was always uncle's munna and preffered rising power. I havent understood the rise of Mao in this context. Caroe's VSG papers talk of a threat to India from Chinese modernization but London didnt see it that way. Again a gap in knowledge because if London was all seeing and all connected and had dismissed the rise of China then what happened? VSG papers lament that Indian nationalists see a pan-Asian solidarity and ignore potential for threat from China. Nehru's accomodating the PRC is due to this pan Asian solidarity in my view.
Communist movement in that period looked at universal movement against the colonial powers. Hence Indian communist looked at CPC as similar to them. But CPC had other ideas about India. London was afraid of communist revolution spreading to India which would be out of control.
Mao used the communism revolution to take China out of old monarchy into the modern world. Reading his book and his bio talk about this
Paul
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Post by Paul »

Ramana, wasn't Chiang Kai Shek's wife a catholic who grew up in Georgia (heard this from a Taiwanese co-student). If PRC is to be evangelized, would it not be easier for Chiang to rule china.
ShauryaT
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by ShauryaT »

Acharya wrote:
ramana wrote:ShauryaT, According the Pannikar's book the conversion process was going on right after the Opium wars. one of the demands sought and obtained was to allow missionaries everywhere in China and not just the coastal towns. The Chinese even had their own prophet who claimed to be a saviour and declared independence. All these were crushed militarily but monarchial China was getting old and unstable. I have this hunch that communism was a away to modernize China and soften it up for later evangelization. From KMP's book China was always uncle's munna and preffered rising power. I havent understood the rise of Mao in this context. Caroe's VSG papers talk of a threat to India from Chinese modernization but London didnt see it that way. Again a gap in knowledge because if London was all seeing and all connected and had dismissed the rise of China then what happened? VSG papers lament that Indian nationalists see a pan-Asian solidarity and ignore potential for threat from China. Nehru's accomodating the PRC is due to this pan Asian solidarity in my view.
Communist movement in that period looked at universal movement against the colonial powers. Hence Indian communist looked at CPC as similar to them. But CPC had other ideas about India. London was afraid of communist revolution spreading to India which would be out of control.
Mao used the communism revolution to take China out of old monarchy into the modern world. Reading his book and his bio talk about this
Let us spell that out. Lulling the Indian leadership with a false sense of solidarity, resulting in the reduction of military capabilities in the post independence period to execute their Geo-Political plan for Tibet and Xinjiang. Also, to ensure that India will not be able to challenge China's pre-dominance in the geo-political landscape for a very long time to come.

I see Afghanistan as the only territory to launch a breakup to change the map. More on this later.
svinayak
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by svinayak »

ShauryaT wrote:
Communist movement in that period looked at universal movement against the colonial powers. Hence Indian communist looked at CPC as similar to them. But CPC had other ideas about India. London was afraid of communist revolution spreading to India which would be out of control.
Mao used the communism revolution to take China out of old monarchy into the modern world. Reading his book and his bio talk about this
Let us spell that out. Lulling the Indian leadership with a false sense of solidarity, resulting in the reduction of military capabilities in the post independence period to execute their Geo-Political plan for Tibet and Xinjiang. Also, to ensure that India will not be able to challenge China's pre-dominance in the geo-political landscape for a very long time to come.

I see Afghanistan as the only territory to launch a breakup to change the map. More on this later.

Indian leadership like Menon and other communists never had much choice. With colonial powers still controlling lot of world events Indian leadership went to CPC to avoid being sandwiched. Did India ever get out of this situation.
svinayak
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Paul wrote:Ramana, wasn't Chiang Kai Shek's wife a catholic who grew up in Georgia (heard this from a Taiwanese co-student). If PRC is to be evangelized, would it not be easier for Chiang to rule china.
They needed the PLA to control and stabilize the large geo-political space to contain Stalins Russia. Stalin was the most feared after the WWII in 1946. He could gobble up vast regions without any resistance.
Chaing Kai Shek was not able to create that large folloMao was able to get more followerswing. Mao and Shek were together but Mao was able to get more followers
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by surinder »

Paul,
I understand your analogy. You are basically saying that a buffer region is a good security measure, and I whole heartedly aggree. But if partition had not happened, and India extended up to Rawalpindi (and beyond), then the concept of buffer would dictate that Durand line be upheld. Ranjit Singh did that.

But we have lost all of that land beyound Amritsar. NWFP is no longer the buffer. The buffer from CA is now Pakiland. Now other principle kicks in: (a) Enemy's enemy is your friend, (b) balance of power, & (c) Kautilya's circle. All of them dictate that we must weaken and TSP and keep it occupied to the West, rather than East. So that automatically implies Durand line should be abolished. That will also deprive TSP Pakjabis of the manpower of the Pashtuns, which they have used quite effectively against India. It will strengthen A'stan and balance TSP for posterity (or as long as TSP will exist). Secession of NWFP will create unmanagable centrifugal forces that will destroy TSP. Baluchistan will go, so will Azad K. Sindh will make efforts to get out too. Dissolutio of the Durand Line is the end of road for TSP. I see this as an unalloyed good thing.
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by Bharati »

[url]http://india_resource.tripod.com/mideastoil.html[/url]
Johann
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by Johann »

Re. the future of Pakistan, a lot of it comes down to the question of dar-ul-Islam vs. dar-ul-harb

Once a land shifts from dar-ul-harb to dar-ul-Islam, then its an obligation of the Muslim community there and the wider ummah to keep it that way. The decline of Mughal power in the face of Sikh and Maratha expansion, and its total abolishment by the British was regarded by many Muslims in the subcontinent as the unthinkable - dar-ul-Islam shifting back to dar-ul-harb.

India has tried to convince as many Muslims as possible that the formation of the Republic of India represented no loss to the ummah of dar-ul-Islam. It is still trying to do that.

The lynchpin of Pakistan's ideological appeal to Muslims worldwide is that it remains the stronghold of dar-ul-islam in the subcontinent in the face of kafir counter-attacks spreading a return to jahilya. It is the stronghold from which Muslim power will one day return the Subcontinent to dar-ul-Islam.

That automatically will set it in confrontation with
a)any major non-Muslim power on its borders
or
b)any other power that seeks to be the heart of dar-ul-islam in the region.

At an ideological level, I dont know how easy it will be to convince the overwhelming majority of Muslims that either
a) the Republic of India is dar-ul-Islam
or
b) that there's no need, or no point in trying to establish a dar-ul-Islam in the subcontinent.

What I'm getting at is that the intermediate goal with the constituent parts of Pakistan is to convince them to become 'ordinary' Muslim states, rather than ones charged with the special mission of preserving and extending dar-ul-Islam.

This is not something that can be done through negotiation of course, but by events as a whole grinding down such grandiose dreams in a separated Pakjab in particular through the painful reality to the point that the middle classes, and even ruling classes are willing to exchange such dreams for normality.

The idea of returning India to dar-ul-Islam in the old era of Ghoris and Badshahs is a hard one to kill. It will keep coming back and will always pose a threat, but perhaps it can be channeled in to more fragmented, more isolated and less contiguous areas.

But when Pakjab gives up its Delhi/UP Mohajir inspired dreams, it can potentially work with the Indian Republic as a cooperative client and buffer state against the dar-ul-Islams of the emerging Talibanistan.

Ramana, Paul

Chiang Kai Shek's wife was the youngest of the three Soong sisters. They were brought up Methodists by their father who was a hugely succesful banking and publishing entrepreneur as well as a methodist missionary.

There was a great deal of private American support in the late 19th and early 20th cntury for the emerging Chinese nationalist movement against the corrupt and moribund Manchu dynasty which was generally supported by European powers despite conflicts like the Opium wars.

Sun Yat Sen who founded the nationalist movement is accepted as a father figure by both the CPC and the KMT. He incidentally married the second of the Soong daughers. In any case RoC/Taiwan has not seen much conversion to Christianity despite such long and deep ties to the US. In that sense it is closer to Japan than to Korea.

After the Bolshevik revolution, Soviet communism and the USSR became the first serious ideological and national competitor to the Americans for the hearts and minds of the growing numbers of Chinese who demanded change and reform.

The Americans began the process of abandoning the KMT around 1944, disgusted by the corruption and misrule within Chiang's personal circle. The decision to treat the CPC as legitimate players and abandon Chiang to his fate was unfortunately to a great extent influenced by the significant communist penetration of the US diplomatic corps and intelligentsia in the 1930s and 1940s. The Soviets of course only redoubled support for the CPC, and the result was communist victory in 1949. The shocking loss of China played a major part in conving the American public and establishment that internal communist penetration was a serious problem - unfortunately that led to the excesses of the McCarthy's witch-hunts.
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by ramana »

Welcome Johann to the thread.

If one looks at the Caroe's seven theaters jgp, the Middle East impacts four theaters. After the oil crisis of the 70s, and the Iraq wars it impacts all the theaters. Again after collapse of FSU theater 7 dominates every other theater.
Next see the countries in theater 4. Now it explains Cawthorn's role in ISI. He was hedging for his country.

This map is a key to understanding world news even now. So print them both and hang them by your desk when you read world news.

Unfortunately Indian thinking is limited, as Alberuni was saying, to only the confines of the borders of India let alone the frontiers or the theater it is situated in. Earlier this was termed koopaka manduka.
The other chart shows the area of influence for India and 'near abroad'. Again note the countries. But even this has changed with golablization and has spread beyond the areas envisaged by Caroe.

The idea of these charts is to stimulate Indian thinking beyond what has been the norm since 1947.
-----------
Coming to Johann's comments, Yes Republic of India has been trying to convince the ummah that even though it is not Dar-ul-Islam at least its Muslims citizens are a millat and are governed by their own laws and modes. Even parts of the Shariat are codified as Muslim personal law. however radicalized Islamists inside and outside work to destroy this image. That is why communal harmony is important. What the elite have forgotten is to preserve the millat status not augment it for vote bank reasons. That is the problem of Indian politics which causes the strains.

This might satisfy Turkicised ummah (I dont mean those from Turkey but those of the third phase of political Islam). However it wont satisfy the Wahabised ummah especially socially engineered during the Afghan war against Soviet Union for they hanker after the earlier strain of political Islam with all the trimmings like- Dar-ul-Islam, Reconquista of Islamic lands etc..

The big picture it understand that there is split between these two and develop strategies to handle it. The bigger challenge for West is to revive the Turkic phase of political islam and downgrade the Wahabi phase. However this is difficult as it needs to be defeated on many fronts and with KSA holding the Wells of Power and oil dependency of the world economy its very remote probability.

What can be looked at is the ruling setup in KSA. The Wahabi faction has to be downgraded and de-emphasized.

Nearer to India TSP has to be watched and carefully supported. As I said before in an Islamist country the harder faction only can over throw the milder faction. So Pakiban in FATA will consolidate and that has to be seen as whether it supports Indian interests and Asian stability.

I am studying Indian Islam that was prevalent before Deobandis setup shop. i believe that it could provide an answer to the problems confronting political Islam.

The principle of Zawabit (The ruler must rule) that Ziauddin Barrani enunciated during Feroz Shah Tughlaq has to be modernized to free the rulers of modern Islamic states and give them space to operate in the modern world. one debilitating aspect of colonialism and the rise of the West through Industrial Revolution is that rulers in Islamic states have become subservient to the ulema and the latter have gained primacy instead of being lower or equals. thus Shariat is gaining an upper hand. For over three hundred years in some instances the ulema has had upper hand.
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by ramana »

We need to see how Kashmir plays into the game through our on eyes and not the standard pat replies. I believe its part of a communication corridor to Central Asia. Yogi Patel's earlier remarks keep bugging me.

Are there any detailed maps of the Indian leg of the Silk route?
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Post by svinayak »

ramana wrote:Welcome Johann to the thread.

If one looks at the Caroe's seven theaters jgp, the Middle East impacts four theaters. After the oil crisis of the 70s, and the Iraq wars it impacts all the theaters. Again after collapse of FSU theater 7 dominates every other theater.
Next see the countries in theater 4. Now it explains Cawthorn's role in ISI. He was hedging for his country.

This map is a key to understanding world news even now. So print them both and hang them by your desk when you read world news.

Unfortunately Indian thinking is limited, as Alberuni was saying, to only the confines of the borders of India let alone the frontiers or the theater it is situated in. Earlier this was termed koopaka manduka.
The other chart shows the area of influence for India and 'near abroad'. Again note the countries. But even this has changed with golablization and has spread beyond the areas envisaged by Caroe.

The idea of these charts is to stimulate Indian thinking beyond what has been the norm since 1947.
You have missed something important here.
The theater 7 and theater 4 was not linked. But now will be linked with Indian ocean becoming an high strategic theater.
The stability of theater 4 and ME which theater 7 wants can only be done with India's help
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by ramana »

I stated.
Again after collapse of FSU theater 7 dominates every other theater.
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Post by svinayak »

Theater 7 and theater 4 ME was linked only after 2003 Iraq war.
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Post by svinayak »

There is one more article which talks about this area

http://www.scribd.com/doc/4812906/INDIA ... OPOLITICS-
Mackinder summarised his theory in Democratic Ideals and Reality (1919) thus:
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; (Eurasia)
Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; (Eurasia and Africa)
Who rules the World Island commands the World.

Eighteenth-century Britain, as an island, enjoyed the freedom of the seas; eighteenth-century Prussia was ringed by foes on all sides. One of the US's current great advantages is that, in contrast to Prussia then or Russia today, it has no great powers on its borders.
Here's how the Heartland Theory would apply to Iraq: Get a globe and put your finger on Iraq. Notice how your finger is resting right in the middle, the "heartland," of the Middle East, halfway between Egypt and Pakistan. In 1904, British geographer Mackinder placed his finger on Eastern Europe and declared that to be the "pivot area" or "heartland" of Europe. He declared: "Who commands Eastern Europe commands the heartland; who rules the heartland commands the world island; and who rules the world-island commands the world." (By world-island, he meant the Euro-Asian-African landmass.)
Did anyone buy the Heartland Theory? Yes. Napoleon understood it even before Mackinder was born. That is why he attacked czarist Russia. Moreover, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Adolph Hitler, Josef Stalin and three generations of the world's foremost military strategists embraced it as gospel and acted upon it. Even now, the United States is steering NATO's drive into Mackinder's Heartland with the addition to its ranks of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The essential element in the Heartland Theory is simply "being there." There have been two great shifts in the international balance of power over the past 500 years. The first was the rise of Western Europe, which by the late 17th century had become the richest, most dynamic and expansionist part of the globe. The second was the rise of the United States of America, which between the Civil War and World War I became the single most important country in the world. Right now a trend of equal magnitude is taking places—the rise of Asia, led by China, which will fundamentally reshape the international landscape in the next few decades. For America, whether it is preserving jobs or security, recognizing and adapting to this new world order is key.
Today in the beginning of the 21st century; the question might be rephrased: "What is the purpose of international affairs?" and the answer: "To keep the Americans in, the Americans out, and the Americans down." The United States, as the world’s only superpower, provides the only game in town. How a nation plays this new game depends on what it needs most and wants most.
"I confess that countries are pieces on a chessboard," said Lord Curzon, viceroy of India in 1898, "upon which is being played out a great game for the domination of the world." Zbigniew Brzezinski, adviser to several presidents and a guru admired by the Bush team, has written virtually those same words. In his book The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, he writes that the key to dominating the world is central Asia, with its strategic position between competing powers and immense oil and gas wealth. "To put it in terminology that harkens back to the more brutal age of ancient empires," he writes, one of "the grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy" is "to keep the barbarians from coming together".

Geography

The first person to mention "the Middle East" in print seems to have been General Sir Thomas Gordon, a British intelligence officer and director of the Imperial Bank of Persia. In an article published in 1900, Gordon, who was concerned with protecting British-ruled India from Russian threats, located it in Persia, or present-day Iran, and Afghanistan. Two years later, an US naval historian, Captain Alfred Mahan, also referred to the Middle East in an article entitled The Persian Gulf and International Relations. Despite Gordon's earlier article, Mahan is usually credited with coining the term, and as an enthusiastic advocate of sea power, he centered his Middle East on the Gulf and its coasts.
The term was brought into popular usage by a series of 20 articles that appeared in the Times in 1902 and 1903 under the heading The Middle Eastern Question. Written by Valentine Chirol, head of paper's foreign department, the articles expanded Mahan's concept of the Middle East to include all land and sea approaches to India - Persia, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, the east coast of Arabia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. Wherever the Middle East may actually be, the common thread in all these early debates was how to control it in order to safeguard India, the jewel in Britain's imperial crown. This set a pattern that continues even today: there is nothing within the Middle East, as generally conceived, that binds it together. Yes, it has oil, Islam and the Arabic language, but there are major sources of oil and important centers of Islam outside it too. It is not a region in its own right but a concept devised to suit the policies of outsiders, and it changes shape according to their strategic interests.
The word "middle" was used initially to distinguish the region from the "far" east - India and beyond - and the "near" east - the lands of the eastern Mediterranean sometimes also known as the Levant. By the end of the first world war, however, the distinction between "near" and "middle" was becoming blurred, at least in the minds of British policy-makers. The war had brought the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the rise of Arab nationalism. Britain had gained control over Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and its strategic interests were changing. Protecting the route to India was still a vital concern, but there was also a growing awareness of the importance of oil.
The analysis of Asian security dynamics is a growth field of late. Many observers characterize schools of thought on the region’s future in terms of a debate between the “optimists” and the “pessimists” (as with the dialogue on nuclear proliferation). Optimists point to economic growth and interdependence, and the spread of democracy as reasons to believe that 21st century Asia will be more peaceful than was 20th century Asia. Pessimists, however, envisage rampant anarchy and conflict, sometimes characterized as a move “back to the future.” It is likely, however, that if the future holds in store calm and prosperity the traditional tools of military force projection will be of minimal utility. On the other hand, if we do see the emergence of rife instability, these tools may well play a major role in bringing about such a circumstance, and perhaps even in making it worse.
It would seem that the “post-post colonialist” era for Asia entails a more autonomous system than during the cold war, with security dynamics being driven more by indigenous actors and a somewhat reduced US role. In many ways the existence of contested nation-states, political-military conflict, and economic interdependence and cooperation make the region of Asia a serviceable, and perhaps even the best, microcosm of the world as a whole. The South Asian region today is particularly vulnerable to conflict. It has a higher absolute poverty rate than sub-Saharan Africa, abundant transnational ethnic groups, sectarian disputes, terrorist groups, nuclearized powers, massive migration and refugee problems, narcotics trafficking, disputed borders, resource disputes, and rampant political corruption .

India during Colonial times

Currently there is the longest cold war which precedes the cold war of the 20th century after the rise of communism. Russian expansion to the east to the pacific by the 1700 triggered the Europeans to expand worldwide. By the 1800 Europeans (British) had the southern end of the Asian landmass under their control. Russians had expanded towards the central Asia and consolidated by 1900. By the 1900 the British and the Russians were locked in the central Asia for control and influence. By 2000 the Russian empire had receded back to its position in 1800. The Asian landmass has been in the eyes of the Europeans even before America was born. After the dependence of oil for the growth of the modern economy after 1900s the MiddleEast and central Asia have taken a new role in geo-politics. Central Asia has become the center stage of the 21st century and is right in India's backyard. Hence Kashmir takes a prominent place in the Indian geopolitical strategy.
Two people invoked Lord Curzon ideas to define India's new standing in the world. The first was Henry Kissinger, a former American Secretary of State who was talking about India's role in the region stretching from Aden to Singapore. The second was none other than the former External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh. Lord George Nathaniel Curzon, Viceroy of India (1898- 1905) and British Foreign Secretary (1919-24), might only be mentioned in our text books as the man who partitioned Bengal. But within the foreign policy elite, he is recalled as the man who outlined the grandest of the strategic visions for India. Why should the imperialist vision of Lord Curzon - outlined nearly a century ago for British India - be of any significance to New Delhi's foreign policy? Some diplomatists suggest that the political context might have changed, but geography has not. If geography is destiny, India has a pivotal role in the Indian Ocean and its littoral, irrespective of who rules New Delhi.
In his book `The Place of India in the Empire', published in 1909, Lord Curzon talks of India's geopolitical significance. ``On the West, India must exercise a predominant influence over the destinies of Persia and Afghanistan; on the north, it can veto any rival in Tibet; on the north-east and last it can exert great pressure upon China, and it is one of the guardians of the autonomous existence of Siam,'' he wrote.
However, much one might dream about India's strategic future, this is not the kind of role India can play now. Nor is the world going to parcel out the Indian Ocean littoral to India. New Delhi can, however, significantly contribute towards the advancement of the region through political cooperation with other great powers. That precisely is what Mr. Kissinger was talking about when he referred to the ``parallel interests'' of India and the United States from Aden to Singapore. These shared interests include energy security, safeguarding the sea lanes, political stability, economic modernization and religious moderation.

Lord Curzon's emphasis on the value of fixing boundaries, conceived in the context of expanding empires, remains very relevant for India. Settled boundaries can make India's frontiers into zones of economic cooperation rather than bones of political contention. The assessment that ``frontiers, which have so frequently and recently been the cause of war, are capable of being converted into the instruments and evidences of peace'' is even more true in a globalizing world. By leaving territorial and boundary disputes with its key neighbors - Pakistan and China - unresolved for so long, India has tied itself down. Lord Curzon seems to have been aware of the tendency to avoid boundary settlements. ``In Asia,'' he wrote, ``there has always been a strong instinctive aversion to the acceptance of fixed boundaries arising partly from the nomadic habits of the people, partly from the dislike of precise arrangements that is typical of the oriental mind, but more still from the idea that in the vicissitudes of fortune more is to be expected from an unsettled than from a settled frontier.'' Can India take Lord Curzon's advice on frontiers and seek a final resolution of the Kashmir problem with Pakistan and the boundary dispute with China?
ramana
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Post by ramana »

A thing to remember is that even if the British Empire is dead its thinking is not. So its useful to go back to the thinkers of the British Imperial idea to see the future trajectory.

Thanks for that article. Does anyone know the author?
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Post by Sumeet »

Paul sorry for making a wrong post in your thread. I would immediately edit it but I cannot see edit option for it even though its mine and I am logged in. Request to moderator to delete it. It appears on page 5. thanks.
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Post by ramana »

X-Posted...
Muppalla wrote:1953, a lesson in Krisis management

17 Aug 2008, 0001 hrs IST, M J Akbar

On August 8, while the same politicians spluttered in Delhi and spleened in Srinagar, Farooq and Omar Abdullah chose to ignore the 55th anniversary of a seminal event in the history of Jammu and Kashmir. On the evening of August 8, 1953, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, using the powers of the Sadar-i-Riyasat Dr Karan Singh, dismissed the government of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, authentic hero of the freedom of India and patriarch of a dynasty that has lasted three generations.

The trigger was an intelligence report, sent by the IB officer in charge of Kashmir, B N Mullik, that Abdullah had left for Gulmarg that morning to make secret contact with a representative from Pakistan. The authenticity of this claim remains in doubt, even if time has made its veracity irrelevant. But for Nehru it was part of a pattern that he could not ignore. Abdullah's unhappiness with Delhi, and Delhi's disenchantment with Abdullah had become a public fact. Abdullah was certain that India was not secular enough; Delhi was equally sure that Abdullah was not Indian enough.

The suspicion had become septic during an agitation in Jammu that summer, spearheaded by the Jana Sangh (predecessor of the BJP). The Jana Sangh was formed in 1951 by Shyama Prasad Mookerjea, a Bengali stalwart of the freedom movement and member of the first Nehru Cabinet after 1947. One of the four points on the Jana Sangh's first manifesto, released on October 21, 1951, was full integration of J&K into India. At its second annual session, in December 1952, Mookerjea announced a popular agitation for the abolition of Article 370, which gave the state specific rights.

By this time Abdullah had begun to openly flirt with ambivalence. While he had little sympathy for Pakistan, he began to crouch and leap towards the idea of independence, an option promoted by America without the camouflage of subtlety. In his biography of Nehru, S Gopal, referring to Volume 5 of The Papers of Adlai Stevenson (edited by W Johnson) notes that "some Indian leaders believed that it was Mrs Loy Henderson, wife of the United States Ambassador, and some CIA agents who encouraged Abdullah to think in these terms".

In the summer of 1950, Abdullah was confident enough to drop broad hints to Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations representative and publicly rebuke Delhi for giving advice outside defence, external affairs and communications. When Nehru protested, Abdullah sent a letter, dated July 10, 1950, that was a rap on the knuckles rather than a gentle hint: "I have several times stated that we acceded to India because we saw there two bright stars of hope and aspiration, namely Gandhiji and yourself, and despite our having so many affinities with Pakistan we did not join it, because we thought our programme will not fit with their policy. If, however, we are driven to the conclusion that we cannot build our state on our own lines, suited to our genius, what answer can I give to my people and how am I to face them?"

Nehru's debilitating patience was tested further when Abdullah, in a speech at Ranbirsinghpura on April 10, 1952, dismissed full integration into India as "unrealistic, childish and savouring of lunacy". He personalized Kashmir's accession, saying that if anything happened to Nehru, Kashmiris would have to "provide for all eventualities". Although Abdullah tried to make amends in Delhi and at the Madras Congress session by dismissing the idea of independence as foolish, the nuances of doublespeak (a practice that still flourishes among Kashmiri politicians, and which we have been witness to in the last few weeks with increasing intemperance) increased apprehension. Nehru wrote to Maulana Azad on March 1, 1953, "My fear is that Sheikh Sahib, in his present frame of mind, is likely to do something or take some step, which might make things worse..."

America seemed comfortable with what would be worse for India. Between May 1 and 3, Abdullah met Adlai Stevenson (Democratic candidate against Eisenhower and later to serve as US ambassador to the United Nations), their dialogue ending with a seven-hour conversation at which no one else was present. Rumours of American support for independent Kashmir became rampant, and have still not quite died. (Conferences are still frequently held in Washington offering "solutions" that are akin to independence; one such coincided with the present crisis.) On July 13, 1953, Abdullah went a stage further, saying in public, "Kashmir should have the sympathy of both India and Pakistan...It is not necessary for our State to become an appendage of either India or Pakistan."

In that fateful summer of 1953, Jammu became the epicentre of a full-blown agitation in collaboration with the Akali Dal, led by Master Tara Singh. Nehru had added some fuel to this fire by conceding a psychologically provocative demand in what has come to be known as the Delhi Agreement, signed in 1952, by which J&K was granted its own flag. The agitation had a powerful slogan: Ek Desh mein do Vidhaan, Ek Desh mein do Nishaan, Ek Desh mein do Pradhaan, nahin challengey nahin challengey. On May 8, 1953, Mookerjea tried to cross the Madhopur bridge on the Jammu border in order to lead the agitation in Jammu. Abdullah ordered his arrest. On June 23, 1953, he died while still under detention in Abdullah's jail.

The decision to remove Sheikh Abdullah from office had been made at least a week before August 8, on July 31, at a closed-door meeting between Nehru, Mullik and D W Mehra, deputy director of IB, amidst reports that Abdullah was preparing to dismiss what was considered the "pro-India" section of his Cabinet, including his deputy Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. Mullik describes Nehru as "being nearly overwhelmed by emotion...we realized that he was on the point of uprooting a plant which he had nursed with great care".

There were few contemporaries for whom Nehru had greater affection or admiration. If Sardar Patel brought the rest of the princely states (barring Hyderabad) into the Union of India, then it was the political-personal friendship of Nehru and Abdullah that brought Kashmir to India. Kashmir was not simply the geographical frontier of secular India, it was also its ideological frontier —in Abdullah's words, the "stabilizing force for India".

Nehru began the process of assimilation with geography. There were two pre-Partition routes linking Srinagar to its south, one via Murree, Rawalpindi and Lahore, and the second through Sialkot. Neither would be available to India after Partition. There was a miserable third option, a dirt track via Gurdaspur vulnerable to weather.

Gurdaspur was a Muslim-majority district and the whole of it could have easily gone to Pakistan. Before Sir Cyril Radcliffe arrived in India to map partition, Nehru lobbied hard with Mountbatten to keep this dirt tract within India. When the Radcliffe Award was announced on August 16, Gurdaspur had been split along the line of the Ravi, and Nehru had achieved his purpose. Pakistan has consistently claimed that this was done because of the "personal" influence that Nehru had on the Mountbattens. The road link proved vital when war broke out over Kashmir within six weeks of Partition. It is ironic that the first country to blockade supplies to Srinagar was Pakistan, in early October 1947, as a prelude to hostilities. The official excuse was communal disturbances.

Keeping Kashmir in India proved more difficult than its accession: against the war-energy of Pakistan, international pressure and domestic turmoil. Nehru had made one mistake, when taking, under Mountbatten's advice, the Kashmir issue to the United Nations. He was not going to make another. Friendship with Abdullah became irrelevant. There could be no compromise with the security of India. Sixty people died in the disturbances that followed Abdullah's dismissal, but a potential threat to Indian unity had been averted.

Five and a half decades later, a successor government of the Congress seems impotent as allies like Mehbooba Mufti brazenly threaten to open links with Pakistan, friends proclaim nationalism in Delhi and duplicity in the valley, and pro-Pakistan leaders like Geelani are "liberated" by crowds with utter contempt for authority.
When did Caroe visit US?
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by svinayak »

ramana wrote:X-Posted...
Muppalla wrote:1953, a lesson in Krisis management

17 Aug 2008, 0001 hrs IST, M J Akbar

By this time Abdullah had begun to openly flirt with ambivalence. While he had little sympathy for Pakistan, he began to crouch and leap towards the idea of independence, an option promoted by America without the camouflage of subtlety. In his biography of Nehru, S Gopal, referring to Volume 5 of The Papers of Adlai Stevenson (edited by W Johnson) notes that "some Indian leaders believed that it was Mrs Loy Henderson, wife of the United States Ambassador, and some CIA agents who encouraged Abdullah to think in these terms".


America seemed comfortable with what would be worse for India. Between May 1 and 3, Abdullah met Adlai Stevenson (Democratic candidate against Eisenhower and later to serve as US ambassador to the United Nations), their dialogue ending with a seven-hour conversation at which no one else was present. Rumours of American support for independent Kashmir became rampant, and have still not quite died. (Conferences are still frequently held in Washington offering "solutions" that are akin to independence; one such coincided with the present crisis.) On July 13, 1953, Abdullah went a stage further, saying in public, "Kashmir should have the sympathy of both India and Pakistan...It is not necessary for our State to become an appendage of either India or Pakistan."
Vir Singhvi wants to give independence to kashmir

Think the Unthinkable


Think the Unthinkable

August 16, 2008
First Published: 22:55 IST(16/8/2008)
Last Updated: 23:15 IST(16/8/2008)
Have you been reading the news coming out of Kashmir with a mounting sense of despair? I know I have. It’s clear now that the optimism of the last few months — all those articles telling us that normalcy had returned to Kashmir — was misplaced. Nothing has really changed since the 1990s. A single spark — such as the dispute over Amarnath land — can set the whole valley on fire, so deep is the resentment, anger and the extent of secessionist feeling. Indian forces are treated as an army of occupation. New Delhi is seen as the oppressor. There is no engagement with the Indian mainstream. And even the major political parties do not hesitate to play the Pakistan card — Mehbooba Mufti is quite willing to march to the Line of Control.

At one level, the current crisis in Kashmir is a consequence of a series of actions by the Indian establishment. New Delhi let the situation fester until it was too late. The state administration veered between inaction and over-reaction. The Sangh Parivar played politics with Hindu sentiment in Jammu, raising the confrontation to a new level.

But we need to look at the Kashmir situation in a deeper way. We can no longer treat it on a case-by-case basis: solve this crisis, and then wait and see how things turn out in the future. If the experience of the last two decades has taught us anything, it is that the situation never really returns to normal. Even when we see the outward symptoms of peace, we miss the alienation and resentment within. No matter what we do, things never get better, for very long.

It’s not as though the Indian state has no experience of dealing with secessionist movements. Almost from the time we became independent 61 years ago, we have been faced with calls for secession from nearly every corner of India: from Nagaland, Assam and Mizoram, from Tamil Nadu, from Punjab etc.

In every single case, democracy has provided the solution. We have followed a three-pronged approach: strong, almost brutal, police or army action against those engaging in violence, a call to the secessionist leaders to join the democratic process and then, generous central assistance for the rebuilding of the state. It is an approach that has worked brilliantly. Even in, say, Mizoram, where alienation was at its height in the 1970s, the new generation sees itself as Indian. The Nagas now concentrate their demands on a redrawing of state boundaries (to take in part of Manipur), not on a threat to the integrity of India. In Tamil Nadu, the Hindi agitation is forgotten and in Punjab, Khalistan is a distant memory.

The exception to this trend has been Kashmir. Contrary to what many Kashmiris claim, we have tried everything. Even today, the state enjoys a special status. Under Article 370 of our Constitution, with the exception of defence, foreign policy, and communication, no law enacted by parliament has any legitimacy in Kashmir unless the state government gives its consent. The state is the only one in India to have its own Constitution and the President of India cannot issue directions to the state government in exercise of the executive power of the Union as he can in every other state. Kashmiri are Indian citizens but Indians are not necessarily Kashmiri citizens. We cannot vote for elections to their assembly or own any property in Kashmir.

Then, there is the money. Bihar gets per capita central assistance of Rs 876 per year. Kashmir gets over ten times more: Rs 9,754 per year. While in Bihar and other states, this assistance is mainly in the forms of loans to the state, in Kashmir 90 per cent is an outright grant. Kashmir’s entire Five Year Plan expenditure is met by the Indian taxpayer. In addition, New Delhi keeps throwing more and more money at the state: in 2004, the Prime Minister gave Kashmir another $ 5 billion for development.

Kashmiris are happy to take the money and the special rights but they argue that India has been unfair to them because no free political process has developed. And, it is true that we have rigged elections in Kashmir. But, it is now nearly a decade since any rigging was alleged. Nobody disputes that the last election was fair. Moreover, even though the Congress got more seats than the PDP, the Chief Ministership went to Mufti Mohammad Sayeed as a gesture.

Given that Kashmir has the best deal of any Indian state, is there anything more we can do? Kashmiris talk about more autonomy. But I don’t see a) what more we can give them and b) how much difference it will make.

If you step back and think about it, the real question is not “how do we solve this month’s crisis”? It is: what does the Centre get in return for the special favours and the billions of dollars?

The short answer is: damn all.

As the current agitation demonstrates, far from gratitude, there is active hatred of India. Pakistan, a small, second-rate country that has been left far behind by India, suddenly acts as though it is on par with us, lecturing India in human rights and threatening to further internationalise the present crisis.

The world looks at us with dismay. If we are the largest democracy on the planet then how can we hang on to a people who have no desire to be part of India?

The other cost of Kashmir is military. Many terrorist acts, from the hijacking of IC 814 to the attack on parliament have Kashmir links. Our response to the parliament attack was Operation Parakram, which cost, in ten months, Rs 6,500 crore and 800 army lives? (Kargil cost us 474 lives.) Each day, our troops and paramilitary forces are subjected to terrorists’s attacks, stress, and ridicule.

So, here’s my question: why are we still hanging on to Kashmir if the Kashmiris don’t want to have anything to do with us?

The answer is machismo. We have been conned into believing that it would diminish India if Kashmir seceded. And so, as we lose lives and billions of dollars, the Kashmiris revel in calling us names knowing that we will never have the guts to let them go.

But would India really be diminished? One argument is that offering Kashmiris the right to self-determination would encourage every other secessionist group. But would it? Isn’t there already a sense in which we treat Kashmir as a special case? No other secessionist group gets Article 370 or so much extra consideration. Besides, if you take this line, then no solution (autonomy, soft borders etc.) is possible because you could argue that everybody else would want it too.

A second objection is that Indian secularism would be damaged by the secession of Kashmir. This is clearly not true. As history has shown, Indian Muslims feel no special kinship with Kashmir. They would not feel less Indian if some Kashmiris departed.

Moreover, too much is made of the size of Kashmir. Actually secessionist feeling is concentrated in the Valley, an area with a population of 4 million that is 98 per cent Muslim. (The Hindus either left or were driven out). Neither Jammu nor Ladakh want to secede. So, is the future of India to be held hostage to a population less than half the size of the population of Delhi?

I reckon we should hold a referendum in the Valley. Let the Kashmiris determine their own destiny. If they want to stay in India, they are welcome. But if they don’t, then we have no moral right to force them to remain. If they vote for integration with Pakistan, all this will mean is that Azad Kashmir will gain a little more territory. If they opt for independence, they will last for about 15 minutes without the billions that India has showered on them. But it will be their decision.

Whatever happens, how can India lose? If you believe in democracy, then giving Kashmiris the right to self-determination is the correct thing to do. And even if you don’t, surely we will be better off being rid of this constant, painful strain on our resources, our lives, and our honour as a nation?

This is India’s century. We have the world to conquer — and the means to do it. Kashmir is a 20th century problem. We cannot let it drag us down and bleed us as we assume our rightful place in the world.

It’s time to think the unthinkable.
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by shiv »

Vir Singhvi wants to cave in?

No way.
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by vsudhir »

I think singhvi has a point.

Everything's been tried in kashmir and nothing's worked. kashmir is indeed special. time to remove its 'specialness' and then try again.

BTW, dilli sarkar would do well to announce a valve policy. Pained valley ummah is free 2 leave for TSP on a 1 way ticket.
And welcome home oppressed non-muslim minorities from TSP here.
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Post by ramana »

Midgets like Singhvi shouldnt be opinion makers. He doesnt know what he doesnt know and is giving opinions?

looks like any person can have brain fa*t and print it under freedom of press?
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Post by Paul »

xx. xx. 2005




"China to contain India if it meddles in Pakistan", Reveal Chinese Strategists

. By D.S.Rajan



An unusual disclosure of Beijing’s current strategy towards India and Pakistan has come to notice in China recently, which deserves a careful examination. It has been claimed that this strategy of the "Centre" (Zhongyang, in Chinese, meaning Party Centre/Central government), has two main themes, which are given below verbatim:

" There will be important strategic actions in Pakistan; China hopes that India will not fish in troubled waters. Otherwise, China considers that at the time of necessity, it should certainly carry out containment activities".

" There is a pressing need for China and India, most importantly for India and Pakistan, to obviate any interference and speed up the pace of reconciliation. The restart of India-Pakistan reconciliation process, under suspension for one year, is of great significance. China, realizing the need, is appropriately responding to it. China exhorts India not to continue with its stand of "sitting in the fence" and "enjoying the benefits from both directions" in the war against terrorism. Only by following a just road of geo-political harmony, India-Pakistan reconciliation can expand".

The revelation, made in an article captioned " Uncovering of wisdom in the Centre’s strategy towards India and Pakistan" (by "Zhan Lue", presumably a high level cadre, attached to the International Institute for Strategic Studies-China- CIISS, with headquarters in Beijing, str.chinaiiss.org, Chinese language, 21 July 2008), has listed further implications of the strategy, which are mentioned below:

Russia- China Tacit Understanding against India

The Chinese strategist has argued that at a time when China and Russia are opposing the US shoulder to shoulder, Russia is dissatisfied over the corresponding India’s policy of ‘sitting in the fence ‘ and ‘gaining advantage from the both’. "We have seen that China has had the opportunity to rap India on the border issue, after the meeting between the visiting Russian Prime Minister and ‘elder brother’ Hu Jintao and in this way, India must have become aware of the communication level and tacit understanding between Beijing and Moscow".


The expert went on to say that Russia is also dissatisfied with India’s ‘most negative’ position with regard to expansion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). India, to a great degree, was helped by Russia for gaining entry into the SCO, but Moscow is worried that as time passes, India can further rub on it; the result may be that Russia may not be able to meet the aspirations of Iran and Pakistan for joining the SCO and this in turn, to a certain extent, may lead to a visible or not so visible weakening of Moscow’s power to influence the SCO.

The article has further commented that India, which has assigned itself the position of No.1 power in South Asia, realizes that it cannot equal the status of Russia and China in the SCO and that its position will remain equal to that of Pakistan. This is the reason for its un-enthusiasm for SCO expansion. Pointing out that Russia has its own calculations, the expert has stated that with India in the SCO, a country beset with territorial and traditional contradictions with China, Russia feels that it may be able to at least partially contain China, thereby enabling it to play the role of a ‘peacemaker’ and sit firmly on the SCO as ‘eldest’.

India vs China, Russia and the SCO?

"ZhanLue" has added that in the China-Russia-US confrontation, India is adopting a policy of ‘taking advantage of all sides’ and hoping to become a ‘movable scale’ in the Sino-US strategic relation. If there is continuous expansion of anti-US interests of China and Russia, India’s such a policy can offend Russia. India’s alliance with the US is temporary; as against its ambition in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, India will absolutely not allow the ‘wolf to enter the house’. ‘Not only that, its immediate interests on getting mutual benefit out of US ties, are exhausted. China has really seen through India’s calculations and it is for India to make its choice. India should not be insatiable and offending China, Russia and the SCO will not be in its interests’.

In the view of Chinese expert, Pakistan’s strategic action will certainly be unified with what the SCO does, taking an overall view. Pakistan’s action will be linked to Russia’s basic interests in Iran and Central Asia. This also explains Russia’s tacit understanding to China’s ‘rapping’ India.

The Chinese strategist has, in addition, stated that while assessing China’s containment of India, it should be noted that Pakistan’s ‘big action’ would not be directed at India, but at Afghanistan; the same has a meaning for India-Pakistan reconciliation. Between a hard line and a soft line, it is for India to decide which one to chose. India must have understood Russian attitude. Indians are also clever.

Comments

It is not understood how a think tank like the CIISS could get inside information on the strategy of the Chinese Communist Party/Government High Command on an important subject like ties with India and Pakistan. This organization had been jingoistic in the past while referring to India and there is no open information on who are its top leaders. Started only in 2002, the CIISS appears to be different from the China Institute of International Strategic Relations, with affiliation to the PLA, functioning for longer years, under the chairmanship of General Xiong Guangkai. Any way, it has to be admitted that the views of any think tank do not necessarily reflect those of the government; but they have the blessings of the authorities. However, considering the apparent clout, which the CIISS enjoys in China (reference earlier articles by this writer), its views merit a high degree of attention, particularly in India. Most striking for New Delhi should be the article’s open declaration that Beijing will go in support of Islamabad in the hypothetical case of an India-Pakistan conflict as well as signals that Russia has reached a tacit understanding with China on any action by the latter against India. Notably, no other Chinese media or official comments, leave alone the leadership, have so far expressed such opinions, which go against Beijing’s oft-repeated preference for a ‘balanced’ South Asia policy. Does the article give a signal towards a revision of such policy? Or, is it a deliberate leak to mislead India? These can be valid questions.

(The writer, Mr. D.S.Rajan is Director of the Chennai Centre for China Studies,Chnnai,India. Necessary translation was done by him. Email: [email protected])
Sino-Russian understanding is a cause for concern. With Russia under pressure from NATO it is not inconceivable that they want to keep their borders with PRC quiet and also keep NATO out of Central Asia.

and I thought PRC wanted us out of Shanghai Six....so why is Roos upset about????

Hope it is not a repeat of 1962
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by ramana »

Those silly PRC speaks with such a forked tongue that one doent know wheter they are coming or going. Go only by their actions and not speech.

The headline is silly for PRC has been acting to contain India wheter India acts in Paksitan or not. The missiles were supplied after 1988 when the COld War ended. Thats the key to understand.

if this was 2005, TSP and Mushy have done quite well without India intervening!
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Post by surinder »

Johann wrote:Re. the future of Pakistan, a lot of it comes down to the question of dar-ul-Islam vs. dar-ul-harb

Once a land shifts from dar-ul-harb to dar-ul-Islam, then its an obligation of the Muslim community there and the wider ummah to keep it that way. The decline of Mughal power in the face of Sikh and Maratha expansion, and its total abolishment by the British was regarded by many Muslims in the subcontinent as the unthinkable - dar-ul-Islam shifting back to dar-ul-harb.

India has tried to convince as many Muslims as possible that the formation of the Republic of India represented no loss to the ummah of dar-ul-Islam. It is still trying to do that.

The lynchpin of Pakistan's ideological appeal to Muslims worldwide is that it remains the stronghold of dar-ul-islam in the subcontinent in the face of kafir counter-attacks spreading a return to jahilya. It is the stronghold from which Muslim power will one day return the Subcontinent to dar-ul-Islam.

That automatically will set it in confrontation with
a)any major non-Muslim power on its borders
or
b)any other power that seeks to be the heart of dar-ul-islam in the region.

At an ideological level, I dont know how easy it will be to convince the overwhelming majority of Muslims that either
a) the Republic of India is dar-ul-Islam
or
b) that there's no need, or no point in trying to establish a dar-ul-Islam in the subcontinent.

What I'm getting at is that the intermediate goal with the constituent parts of Pakistan is to convince them to become 'ordinary' Muslim states, rather than ones charged with the special mission of preserving and extending dar-ul-Islam.

This is not something that can be done through negotiation of course, but by events as a whole grinding down such grandiose dreams in a separated Pakjab in particular through the painful reality to the point that the middle classes, and even ruling classes are willing to exchange such dreams for normality.

The idea of returning India to dar-ul-Islam in the old era of Ghoris and Badshahs is a hard one to kill. It will keep coming back and will always pose a threat, but perhaps it can be channeled in to more fragmented, more isolated and less contiguous areas.

But when Pakjab gives up its Delhi/UP Mohajir inspired dreams, it can potentially work with the Indian Republic as a cooperative client and buffer state against the dar-ul-Islams of the emerging Talibanistan.

Johann,

This is one the best, most succint, and most accurate description of the idea of Pakistan. This provides why, despite complete state failure, TSP continues ot be held with such regard by the sub-continental mozlems, even so by Indian mozlems. (B'desh is not, in contrast). We should all read and re-read this post of Johann.

Once the empire collapses, many states sooner or later learn to give up the original idea. The British gave up the idea of the empire surprisingly easily. But they are/were endowed with a special gift of pragmatism. With a little more difficulty the French, and the Turks too gave up on the idea of their old empire.

The complicting thing is that this idea of dar-ul-islaam in TSP is connected with religion. This is not a small incidental connection, but a connection that forms the bedrock principle of the faith.

Ultimately, the reality will have to dawn on the Pakjabis that carrying this idea forward has an unacceptable cost that is impossible to bear. It is upto the Indian state to add to that cost and make it unbearable. But the Indian state has shown weakness of will and nerves, which gives sustenance to the idea. The idea of dar-ul-isalaam was the most difficult to kill in the time of the Marathas and the Sikhs, but their newly-inspired energy and unapologetic warfare sent this idea into a serious remission. The British coddling, as it turns out, helped revive it. But ultimately sooner this idea is brought to its knees, better it is for all of us.
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by surinder »

Ramann, it is not silly for PRC to talk as such. Uptill now, it is the US that has provided the backing to TSP and prevent Indian take over there. As the US recedes and PRC gains in strength, this is a role that PRC will take over. It will try its best to prevent to state-collapse of TSP and will try its best to prevent decisive Indian action on TSP. The desire has always been there for PRC to do so, but the means have been lacking: it has tried to make rattling noises on the border in 1965, 1971, and during Kargil. In 1971, Sam Maneckshaw pre-empted this and deliberately planned the war to occur during December, locking the Chinese out thoroughly. But if the means to match their intent become available, India is going to be in for a long shock. Receding US is not going to mean more freedom of action for India. There is no free lunch for India, it will have to pay a price.
ramana
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by ramana »

Wiki has this article on Great Game

and New great Game

Google books has The new Great Game By Lutz Kleveman.

Need to read it. it links energy tot eh new Great game and we know thats only part of the picture.

Its the traditional version. Also has some excellent links in the bibliography.

I dont know how many recall Flashman the bully in Tom Brown's school days by Thomas Hughes? He gets kicked out of the school and disappears. Some imaginative writer picks up on the theme and makes Flashman a part of the Great Game! A spoof by Fraser.

Flashman in the Great Game

Cant have all serious stuff!
Paul
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by Paul »

Civilizational border of India with CA

1. Gupta Empire

2. Maurya empire

3. Nanda empire

4. British Raj

IMO it would be a mistake to get too fixated on the Durand line.. Durand line is a relatively recent creation. Even then, we should also remember that Afghanistan as buffer state still was under the Raj's influence and not the Tsarist Russia.

we need to pay attention to future possible western frontiers of India. Important thing is that if we take the long view, we see that whenever Indic civilization expanded and was powerful, this region(Indus west) was under Indian sphere of influence, either as a satrapy or a part of the the state.

Western frontiers have traditionally defined all of our border regions as all land based invasions have happened from the west. If we can control our western borders....we can define our northern borders too.
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by Johann »

Surinder,

There will always be a dar-ul-Islam impulse as long as Islam is the most important identity marker for an individual.

In much of the Muslim world Islam co-exists with other identity markers that at the level of matters of state supercede 'Islamic' imperatives - things such as language, tribe, region, etc.

Placing the Islamic identity and imperative above all others is I would say the exception rather than the norm, although Islamism aims to change that.

While it would be 'normal' as far as the Muslim world goes for Pakjab to define itself as a 'Muslim nation' and thus part of dar-ul-Islam, what is *not* normal, what puts it in the rank of Saudi Arabia and Iran is that it believes it speaks and acts for a much larger body of Muslims - in this case all the Muslims of the Subcontinent.

The job is as you say persuading Pakjab that it doesnt want or need the sacred mission of liberating all of the Subcontinents Muslims and return the subcontinent as a whole to dar-ul-Islam.

I dont think its impossible - those kinds of dreams were brought by the Mohajir elite, and they have in many ways buried Pakjabi identity underneath it - the adoption and promotion of Urdu for example. Pakjab needs to shed Urdu and reassert its regional identity, which will pave the way for it to become a 'normal' Muslim state. Once that happened relations with the Indian Republic would improve quite dramatically.
ramana
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by ramana »

Another thing is when Islam meets tribal societies it makes them more virulent. Take a look at the North Africa and the European Islamic states and compare to tribal society dominant countries of Central Asia nd Middle East. And then compare all this to Indonesia and Malaysia. Sindhis are more benign than the tribes in FATA/WANA/and Pakjabi who are remained tribals.

Further it matters what state of societal development the converted are. For example Islam in Indonesia met a civilised society which by and large remained civilised. However when Islam meets a tribla soceity it freezes it at that level of societal development eg Arabia, Afghanistan etc. Iran is better than their neighbors as Persia was igher in the civlizational chain..
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by Paul »

Asia is big but not big enough to accomodate three major powers - one has to go when the music stops.
svinayak
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by svinayak »

Paul wrote:Asia is big but not big enough to accomodate three major powers - one has to go when the music stops.
Which three - Japan, India and China?
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Re: Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stabi

Post by KLNMurthy »

vsudhir wrote:I think singhvi has a point.

Everything's been tried in kashmir and nothing's worked. kashmir is indeed special. time to remove its 'specialness' and then try again.

BTW, dilli sarkar would do well to announce a valve policy. Pained valley ummah is free 2 leave for TSP on a 1 way ticket.
And welcome home oppressed non-muslim minorities from TSP here.
I think Vir Singhvi is an --what's a polite substitute for idiot? for thinking that machismo is the reason for holding on to Kashmir. Winning in Kashmir--at all costs--is the make-or-break issue for national survival. The point of being an independent country is that we would have to make tough decisions and carry them out. I dont think Singhvi gets that.
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