Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stability

[Paul]

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/map_site ... .html#asia

[ramana]

Often new people come to BR and we have to start again.

Andre Gunder Frank's Essays

Scroll to middle of page and see his views on Central Asia.

[ramana]

Need to raise the worth of Asian religions and thought process in the world. If it going to be an Asian century the thoughts have to be Asian or else its another false start.

[Philip]

See how Russia is playing the "Great Game" after NATO's naughtiness in European expansion and criticism of Russia in Georgia.Supporting ethnic cleansing agent Shaky-Willy in Georgia is costing NATO dear.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/w ... 608250.ece
Russian threat to Nato supply route in Afghanistan
Nato imports about 70 per cent of its food, fuel, water and equipment from Pakistan via the Khyber Pass

Jeremy Page in Kabul

Russia played a trump card in its strategic poker game with the West yesterday by threatening to suspend an agreement allowing Nato to take supplies and equipment to Afghanistan through Russia and Central Asia.

The agreement was struck at a Nato summit in April to provide an alternative supply route to the road between the Afghan capital and the Pakistani border, which has come under attack from militants on both sides of the frontier this year.

Zamir Kabulov, the Russian Ambassador to Afghanistan, told The Times in an interview that he believed the deal was no longer valid because Russia suspended military cooperation with Nato last week over its support for Georgia.

Asked if the move by Russia invalidated the agreement, he said: “Of course. Why not? If there is a suspension of military cooperation, this is military cooperation.”

Russia votes to recognise Georgia breakaway

Kabul: a city under siege from the Taleban
Mr Kabulov also suggested that the stand-off over Georgia could lead Russia to review agreements allowing Nato members to use Russian airspace and to maintain bases in the former Soviet Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

“No one with common sense can expect to cooperate with Russia in one part of the world while acting against it in another,” he said.

His remarks are likely to alarm Nato commanders because the Taleban have been targeting the supply routes of the alliance this year, mimicking tactics used against the British in 1841 and the Soviet Union two decades ago. Nato imports about 70 per cent of its food, fuel, water and equipment from Pakistan via the Khyber Pass, and flies in much of the rest through Russian airspace via bases in Central Asia. It has not started using the “northern corridor” because the deal – covering nonmilitary supplies and nonlethal military equipment – has yet to be cleared with the Central Asian states involved.

The need for an alternative route was highlighted by recent attacks on Nato supply convoys, including one that destroyed 36 fuel tankers in a northwestern Pakistani border town in March. Four US helicopter engines worth $13 million (£7 million) went missing on the way from Kabul to Pakistan in April. Last week militants killed ten French soldiers on the same route 30 miles from Kabul.

Western officials fear that such attacks could increase in the power vacuum in Pakistan created by the resignation of Pervez Musharraf as President last week and the collapse of the coalition Government yesterday.

Vladimir Putin, Russia’s President-turned-Prime-Minister, was the first foreign leader to telephone President Bush after the attacks on September 11, 2001, and has supported the War on Terror ever since. The Kremlin has fears about the spread of Islamic extremism into Central Asia and Muslim regions of Russia, especially Chechnya, where it fought two wars with Muslim rebels in the 1990s.

However, many Russian officials have bitter memories of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and strong reservations about the US presence in Central Asia, which they see as their strategic backyard.

“It’s not in Russia’s interests for Nato to be defeated and leave behind all these problems,” Mr Kabulov, who worked at the Soviet Embassy in Kabul from 1983 to 1987, said. “We’d prefer Nato to complete its job and then leave this unnatural geography.

“But at the same time, we’ll be the last ones to moan about Nato’s departure.”

A Nato spokesman declined to respond to Mr Kabulov’s comments and said that Russia had not informed the alliance officially of any decision to annul the northern corridor agreement.

[SSridhar]

not fully topical to the discussion, but here goes
after '47 our forex was held in pounds. when did we shift to dollars and why ?

Rahul M, I saw your post just now. I think that the decision to keep foreign exchange in dollars came in 1955 or thereabouts. This followed the sterling crisis of the UK and the condition imposed by the US for assistance that the Sterling should become freely convertible. India's huge sterling reserves were kept with the Bank of England, from where India was getting dollars whenever it needed to make dollar-denominated transactions. This was because of the inability to freely convert pound sterling. In the meanwhile, the US was becoming an important trading partner and the UK was losing its sheen. So, when the sterling reserves ran out, India decided to keep its foreign exchange in dollars, IMO. By that time, free convertibility of Pound Sterling had also come into being.

There were interesting events during this period. Britain devalued the Sterling and India had to similarly do so for INR but Pakistan didn't follow suit.This caused resentment within GoI and some tit-for-tat actions followed. Also, it was the partitioning of the India reserves held in the Bank of England that Gandhi had to intervene in, earning the displeasure of many.

[svinayak]

Paul this is for you. You should read this book
THe author is the grand daughter of the UK PM Lloyd George in 1919.
It explains the current situation in the world

Holbrooke may become the UN rep for US and become influential in Obama adminstration.
He looks at 1919 framework as the foundation for world peace


Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World
by Margaret MacMillan (Author), Richard Holbrooke (Foreword)


# Hardcover: 608 pages
# Publisher: Random House; 1 edition (October 29, 2002)
# Language: English
# ISBN-10: 0375508260
# ISBN-13: 978-0375508264

A joke circulating in Paris early in 1919 held that the peacemaking Council of Four, representing Britain, France, the U.S. and Italy, was busy preparing a "just and lasting war." Six months of parleying concluded on June 28 with Germany's coerced agreement to a treaty no Allied statesman had fully read, according to MacMillan, a history professor at the University of Toronto, in this vivid account. Although President Wilson had insisted on a League of Nations, even his own Senate would vote the league down and refuse the treaty. As a rush to make expedient settlements replaced initial negotiating inertia, appeals by many nationalities for Wilsonian self-determination would be overwhelmed by rhetoric justifying national avarice. The Italians, who hadn't won a battle, and the French, who'd been saved from catastrophe, were the greediest, says MacMillan; the Japanese plucked Pacific islands that had been German and a colony in China known for German beer. The austere and unlikable Wilson got nothing; returning home, he suffered a debilitating stroke. The council's other members horse-traded for spoils, as did Greece, Poland and the new Yugoslavia. There was, Wilson declared, "disgust with the old order of things," but in most decisions the old order in fact prevailed, and corrosive problems, like Bolshevism, were shelved. Hitler would blame Versailles for more ills than it created, but the signatories often could not enforce their writ. MacMillan's lucid prose brings her participants to colorful and quotable life, and the grand sweep of her narrative encompasses all the continents the peacemakers vainly carved up. 16 pages of photos, maps.
Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal
In an ambitious narrative, MacMillan (history, University of Toronto) seeks to recover the original intent, constraints, and goals of the diplomats who sat down to hammer out a peace treaty in the aftermath of the Great War. In particular, she focuses on the "Big Three" Wilson (United States), Lloyd George (Great Britain), and Clemenceau (France) who dominated the critical first six months of the Paris Peace Conference. Viewing events through such a narrow lens can reduce diplomacy to the parochial concerns of individuals. But instead of falling into this trap, MacMillan uses the Big Three as a starting point for analyzing the agendas of the multitude of individuals who came to Versailles to achieve their largely nationalist aspirations. Following her analysis of the forces at work in Europe, MacMillan takes the reader on a tour de force of the postwar battlefields of Asia and the Middle East. Of particular interest is her sympathy for those who tried to make the postwar world more peaceful. Although their lofty ambitions fell prey to the passions of nationalism, this should not detract from their efforts. This book will help rehabilitate the peacemakers of 1919 and is recommended for all libraries. Frederic Krome, Jacob Rader Marcus Ctr. of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati

At the end of World War I, between January and July 1919, many of the world's leaders gathered In Paris to draw up a peace treaty and to plan the formation of a League of Nations. Although hundreds of delegates arrived from nearly every would-be state in Europe and from as far away as Australia, Japan, and Vietnam, most of the important decisions at the Paris Conference were made by Woodrow Wilson, England's Lloyd George, and France's Georges Clemenceau, with Vittorio Orlando of Italy playing a secondary role.

In spite of (or, perhaps, because of) Wilson's uncompromising idealism, Lloyd George's lack of confidence, and Clemenceau's fears of German reemergence, the Conference assembled a treaty that "grappled with huge and difficult questions," and, MacMillan argues, "if they could have done better, they certainly could have done much worse." One thing is clear, however: regardless of their rightness or wrongness, expertise or incompetence, the peacemakers made decisions that resonated for the rest of the century and still echo in the 21st century: between Serbia and Croatia; among Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus; throughout the Middle East (especially Iraq and Palestine); across the African continent; and in the Korean peninsula. Because of the importance of the Treaty of Versailles on subsequent events, "Paris 1919" is essential--and riveting--reading for understanding the world today.

At times, the conference proceedings display all the gravity of a game of Risk. The major participants repeatedly exhibit an appalling ignorance of geography, an artlessness in dealing with non-European powers, and (for all their talk of self-determination) a callousness towards territorial viability. During one of the Conference's nadirs, when the future of Asia Minor was thrashed out, Arthur Balfour exclaimed in disgust: "I have three all-powerful, all-ignorant men sitting there and partitioning continents with only a child to take notes for them." MacMillan acknowledges that the "offhand treatment of the non-European world" caused serious problems that we are still paying for today. And, among many other examples, she indicates how actions taken at the Peace Conference led to the horrifying destruction of Smyrna three years later.

By the end of such a fascinating narrative, one that almost insistently seems to portray the superpower leaders as unsophisticatedly idealistic and patronizingly egocentric, it is still startling for the reader to come across this argument: "The Treaty of Versailles is not to blame" for World War II and the subsequent rise of Germany.

True, MacMillan makes a strong and convincing case (as have other historians before her) that German reparations were not as injurious as many have claimed. She further argues that the real problem was not the treaty itself but that it "was never consistently enforced." But this begs the question: what good is a treaty that, as she repeatedly indicates, never had a chance of enforcement?


For the last couple of weeks, since finishing "Paris 1919", I have grappled with writing a review that would do justice to a book that is not only excellent reading, but also has the potential to reshape the way a reader views current events. Rather than wait longer for the writing muse who refuses to appear, I will take the more direct approach and simply write, "Buy this book and read it. It will afford you a greater understanding of international events unfolding in the world today."

Margaret Macmillan is an exceptional history writer: engaging, direct and interesting (sometimes even funny), but also a wide-ranging thinker who see and explains the vast sweep of history as well as the apparently minor ripples. She juggles the enormous cast of characters in the drama that unfolded in Paris, 1919 and explicate the myriad brought to the major players at the peace conference. Her knowledge of world history and her ability to explain it concisely are fully illustrated in her explanations of the various ethnic claims for land and self-rule individual; her ability to compare and contrast these claims is extraordinary.

She quickly reduces the Big Five to the Big Four, as the Four themselves did when they eliminated the Japanese representative from most of the debate and negotiation - he could barely follow the mostly English conversation anyway. Her descriptions of the Big Four (who eventually operated, without Italy, as the three), though apparently honest and precise, are hardly flattering:

*Wilson, preoccupied with his Fourteen Points and convinced that all would be well if the peoples of the world were allowed to practice self-determination (even though the definition varied depending upon the case and people)
*Lloyd George, determined to expand the British Empire at all costs, but who proved, ultimately, to be the mediator between Wilson and Clemenceu
*Clemenceu, torn between extracting vengeance on Germany (in the form of reparations and a land buffer) and expanding French holdings
*Orlando, whose overwrought, weeping behavior eventually embarrassed the other three and led them to exclude him from many major decisions, eliciting further weeping and an eventual walk-out (followed by a less-than-noble return)

That these four thought they could accomplish the multi-pronged task they assigned themselves - to deal with the defeated Germany, to establish national boundaries that would help ensure future world peace and to establish an organization to help enforce that peace - now seems naïve. As Ms. Macmillan illustrates, the participants appear to believe they could accomplish their goals. However, as she also illustrates, time and again, as each the discussion on question reached a stale
There's an old adage that posits that the real outcome of a war is to teach one to hate one's allies more than than opne's enemies. Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World by Margaret Olwen MacMillan and Richard Holbrooke outlines why this old adage exists. The book covers the 6 month period in mid 1919 where the victorious allies of WW I converged to carve up the spoils of war and how this exercise set the stage for most of the subsequent conflicts of the 20th century.

While the book focuses on the Big Three Personalities of this exercise--Wilson (United States), Lloyd George (Great Britain), and Clemenceau (France) who dominated the critical aspects of the Paris Peace Conference-this focus doesn't detract from providing an encompassing review of the entire process as well as a detailed analysis of the devastating results of the conference. It delineates all too clearly how the best intentions can be overwhelmed by both insatiable avarice as well as unencumbered and unchecked egos in conflict.

This is a timely book. As we are poised to invade Iraq and effect "regime change" it would be wise to look at a previous exercise in managing post war victory to be reminded of both the complexities as well as the risks involved in such an undertaking.

Although an expressly historical tome, this is a well written and fast paced read.
mate, the Four either delayed a final decision or deferred the question to a committee for further study. As a result, many decisions remained unresolved while others had less-than-satisfactory solutions.

She neatly and convincingly debunks the theory that the financial burden placed on Germany as part of the war reparations was a major factor leading to Hitler's rise and WWII. Not only were the reparations significantly less than those Germany extracted from France after the 1870s Franco-Prussian War, but Germany never paid the WWI reparations and, indeed, indulged itself in such tactics as scuttling part of its navy rather than turn it over to Britain. On the other hand, she reinforces the argument that Germany did not feel compelled to accept terms of an agreement that were enforced rather than negotiated - and were determined to avenge the humiliation their representatives endured during the conference.

This is an extremely interesting book and, as another reviewer has mentioned, a real page-turner. Read it.

[Paul]

Thanks Acharya Saar: will catch this on my next visit to Border's.

The penny pinching Yindoo desi that I am, I do not spend my hard earned money buying books containg dubious content from western publishers. All my money is saved to be splurged on buying books at BR Bookstore, Gangarams (BGL), or Hussain (Abids - Hyd).

[svinayak]

Thanks Acharya Saar: will catch this on my next visit to Border's.

The penny pinching Yindoo desi that I am, I do not spend my hard earned money buying books containg dubious content from western publishers. All my money is saved to be splurged on buying books at BR Bookstore, Gangarams (BGL), or Hussain (Abids - Hyd).

Try used books online for $1 or less. That is the max I pay for the books

[surinder]

Acharya,

Where do you buy them from?

[ShauryaT]

On the issue of the elite being the impediment to take over POK and NA, I would say that ground realities indicates it is not feasible.

The terrain, the time slot given for a war by international powers that be, the nuclear threat are the obstacles to such a scheme.

Just as an example - how long did it take to take over the areas occupied by Paksitan in Kargil? It is not that the nation or the Army was not eager to ''throw the Pakistanis out'', it was just that the terrain made operations intensely difficult to accomplish in a jiffy. Now, given the same type of terrain all the way, just calculate how long it will take and while Pakistan could not counter attack in Kargil, would they just sit pretty as they see their area being taken over? Add that factor. How long will that take to take over POK and NA?

One has to be realistic.

Further, these areas are very under developed. If artillery and logistics cannot keep pace with the attack because of a lack of roads, then how will one take over NA and POK?

Ideal would be to encourage sub nationalism in Paksitan and to will crumble on its own.

To paraphrase Sun Tsu, the acme of skills it to make the enemy capitulate without a fight!!

RayC Sir, thanks for that dose of cold water, to wake us up from our dreams. But some dreams do not die, the message of the dream needs to be worked upon to translate them to reality. Some thoughts from your post.

POK and NA are not just some bit of territory, it is strategic and would mean the strategic end, to the problem of Pakistan. The next war, with Pakistan has to have a decisive purpose. Without this purpose, It will be a wasted effort, as in a few years or decades, it will be again back to square one.

The popular “solution” to Pakistan is the breakup or the balkanization of Pakistan. This popular notion primarily stems from the fact that Pakistan can be divided along its provinces. Here are the facts: Over 60% of the population of Pakistan and its revenues come from the Punjab. The Army is overwhelmingly Punjabi. Sindhis are a minority in Sindh, with the Baluchs, Mohajirs, Punjabis and other minorities such as Hindus, Christians and others overwhelmingly in Karachi and Sindh. The Baluchis and Pathans are too tribal to challenge the Pakistan army directly, without active outside help of Iran or Afghanistan with the blessings of the big powers. So depending upon a balkanization of Pakistan along regional lines is difficult due to the overwhelming superiority of Punjabis in the economic and military spheres.

The above is compounded by the huge population that Punjabis comprise in Pakistan. Except for POK/NA, none of the other areas of Pakistan are disputed by India and India recognizes the sovereignty of the state of Pakistan, while rejecting its ideological premise.

I think you will agree that the likelihood of conventional conflict with masses of traditional forces, fighting a war of attrition in the conflict spectrum is shrinking.

What we need more of is decisive capability in the two ends – strategic and sub conventional. An effective TN triad along with special forces to fight dirty in counter insurgency operations and to further India’s foreign policy goals is the need of the hour for likely future conflicts. The real value of traditional mechanized forces, artillery and supporting elements are more and more to act as a conventional deterrent.

Given the above, it is imperative to think about the issue of NA beyond traditional terms of the need to have X men and Y materials in support for every soldier on the battlefield.

India would have to do, many things towards building such a capability. Prime on this list is the enlargement and modernization of special forces (some Indian military planners and analysts dream of two entire divisions dedicated to the purpose and a separate command, for special forces some day) along with the modernization of the entire military infrastructure, with a focus on mountain warfare, light artillery and serious airlift capabilities. But that alone will not be enough.

The overwhelming native population of the NA is Shia. Organizations such as the Balwaristan National Front and at least a couple of others, who are opposed to Pakistan can be leveraged.

The US and China will have to be tackled, something which is possible only if India forces the issue.

The investments we make into Afghanistan should be of a lasting nature and backed by hard power of the Indian state. It is through Afghanistan that the Pashtuns can be won over and an environment for the takeover of NA and the marginalization of TSP can be done.

If we want the enemy to give up without a fight then it is imperative that India builds the capabilities to let the enemy know that India is fully capable and willing to annihilate the enemy on all fronts of the battle field. Only then will the enemy be willing to lay down arms and concede to Indian geopolitical goals, hopefully without a fight.

The Northern Areas is a strategic piece of geography, the raison d’etre for the big powers to pander to Pakistan. Without this piece of property in its possession, the US would care less, China’s ability to encircle would be jeopardized. Without the Pandering, the military in Pakistan will be in no position to conduct asymmetric or cross border war with India. Also, this solution has the least impact on population as the NA is sparsely populated and most of them are still Shias/Ismailis. We cannot change Pakistan’s intent, the only thing we can do is to restrict its capability.

[ramana]

I have been reading Brobst's Caroe and the Great game and one name keeps turning up- Guy Wint. Guy Wint's name comes up in K.M. Pannikar's book on Western Dominance in Asia from 1498. I had read Guy Wint's book Total War as history of WWII with Peter Calvacoressi in my college days.
I think Guy Wint is underrated and needs to be studied. Caroe got the pass as he was a Govt Official and also good at self praise.

Guy Wint's book British In Asia

Please read it. Thanks, ramana

[svinayak]

I have been reading Brobst's Caroe and the Great game and one name keeps turning up- Guy Wint. Guy Wint's name comes up in K.M. Pannikar's book on Western Dominance in Asia from 1498. I had read Guy Wint's book Total War as history of WWII with Peter Calvacoressi in my college days.
I think Guy Wint is underrated and needs to be studied. Caroe got the pass as he was a Govt Official and also good at self praise.

Guy Wint's book British In Asia

Please read it. Thanks, ramana

The British Empire in Asia began its mature life in the eighteenth
century, and in the nineteenth grew to be a system of terri-
tories, protectorates and alliances covering the southern part
of the Asiatic continent. The circumstances in which the Empire came
into being explain some of the peculiarities and indeed the paradoxes
of its later history.

The home government in London never planned its Asiatic con-
quests. The parliamentary system would have prevented that ; public
opinion would not have tolerated the upkeep of a large army, ex-
pensive and a threat to the personal liberties of the subject in the home
country. Thus the Empire was not built by a national effort of the
British people.

The Empire was in fact the result of a more or less private enterprise
of a relatively small number of British expatriates. After the British
Navy opened the Eastern seas in the eighteenth century (without
which no Empire could have been thought of), the British Govern-
ment gave its more audacious subjects an authority, or licence, or en-
couragement, to win in the East whatever by intrigue and the most
economical use of a small white force they could seize and, by their
own devices, hold. Occasional help in emergency was forthcoming
from the British Government, as in the crisis of the Indian Mutiny in
1857; but beyond this the home government was unwilling to com-
mit any large force to the support of its subjects in the East.

This charter, limited as it was, satisfied the adventurers because at
the time certain extraordinary circumstances in the East gave them
all the other opportunity they needed. The adventurers were at hand
because, as Jeremy Bentham remarked at the beginning of the nine-teenth century, the expanding British middle class had produced
families which could find employment only in an expanding Empire.

By the achievements of the new conquistadores Britain enjoyed
much of its wealth and standing throughout the century and a half
which followed.

[Paul]

So Johann was technically correct when he said:

Britain very rarely took a lead role in setting the conditions of the balance of power within Continental Europe. It functioned very much like an outside power, without particular affection or animosity to any particular player. Its geographical permanent interests were the British isles, Holland/Belgium/northern atlantic France

as the task of expanding the British empire was outsourced to the private sector. All HMG had to do keep a strong navy and keep potential rivals off balnce through offshore balancing.

some subtle casuistry this eh!!

[Paul]

Ralph Peters on Pakistan: Page 139 onwards

[Paul]

The west will not let POK areas come to India easily.

For this reason I think it was very machiavellian move by JN Dixit to open up road traffic between POK and J&K.

However it is very important to open to up kargil-skardu and other routes to northern areas.

[ramana]

In J&K thread I asked about access to Northern Areas too. Maybe this is why TSP is reluctant to open the Sirnagar -M'Bad highway.

[ShauryaT]

In J&K thread I asked about access to Northern Areas too. Maybe this is why TSP is reluctant to open the Sirnagar -M'Bad highway.

in pre-partition days, that was the primary road. The most accessible roads were always from west Punjab into J&K. If India ever, decides to move, it has to be through POK and this M'Bad road. Pathways from Dras/Kargil will have logictics issues. But, the only way to really do this would be by air.

[ShauryaT]

The west will not let POK areas come to India easily.

For this reason I think it was very machiavellian move by JN Dixit to open up road traffic between POK and J&K.

However it is very important to open to up kargil-skardu and other routes to northern areas.

Paul: The game is changing. The reasons why NA was important, to the west, do not hold as much value. The real impediment to the NA is China.

[ramana]

here is a map of POK transportation links

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:KKH.png

[Paul]

ShauryaT: It could be China + west. Neither of them benefits from providing India overland access to the central asia.

But the indians working on building relationship with the Tajiks gives hope.

[SRoy]

On the issue of the elite being the impediment to take over POK and NA, I would say that ground realities indicates it is not feasible.

The terrain, the time slot given for a war by international powers that be, the nuclear threat are the obstacles to such a scheme.

Just as an example - how long did it take to take over the areas occupied by Paksitan in Kargil? It is not that the nation or the Army was not eager to ''throw the Pakistanis out'', it was just that the terrain made operations intensely difficult to accomplish in a jiffy. Now, given the same type of terrain all the way, just calculate how long it will take and while Pakistan could not counter attack in Kargil, would they just sit pretty as they see their area being taken over? Add that factor. How long will that take to take over POK and NA?

One has to be realistic.

Further, these areas are very under developed. If artillery and logistics cannot keep pace with the attack because of a lack of roads, then how will one take over NA and POK?

Ideal would be to encourage sub nationalism in Paksitan and to will crumble on its own.

To paraphrase Sun Tsu, the acme of skills it to make the enemy capitulate without a fight!!

RayC Sir, thanks for that dose of cold water, to wake us up from our dreams. But some dreams do not die, the message of the dream needs to be worked upon to translate them to reality. Some thoughts from your post.

POK and NA are not just some bit of territory, it is strategic and would mean the strategic end, to the problem of Pakistan. The next war, with Pakistan has to have a decisive purpose. Without this purpose, It will be a wasted effort, as in a few years or decades, it will be again back to square one.

The popular “solution” to Pakistan is the breakup or the balkanization of Pakistan. This popular notion primarily stems from the fact that Pakistan can be divided along its provinces. Here are the facts: Over 60% of the population of Pakistan and its revenues come from the Punjab. The Army is overwhelmingly Punjabi. Sindhis are a minority in Sindh, with the Baluchs, Mohajirs, Punjabis and other minorities such as Hindus, Christians and others overwhelmingly in Karachi and Sindh. The Baluchis and Pathans are too tribal to challenge the Pakistan army directly, without active outside help of Iran or Afghanistan with the blessings of the big powers. So depending upon a balkanization of Pakistan along regional lines is difficult due to the overwhelming superiority of Punjabis in the economic and military spheres.

The above is compounded by the huge population that Punjabis comprise in Pakistan. Except for POK/NA, none of the other areas of Pakistan are disputed by India and India recognizes the sovereignty of the state of Pakistan, while rejecting its ideological premise.

I think you will agree that the likelihood of conventional conflict with masses of traditional forces, fighting a war of attrition in the conflict spectrum is shrinking.

What we need more of is decisive capability in the two ends – strategic and sub conventional. An effective TN triad along with special forces to fight dirty in counter insurgency operations and to further India’s foreign policy goals is the need of the hour for likely future conflicts. The real value of traditional mechanized forces, artillery and supporting elements are more and more to act as a conventional deterrent.

Given the above, it is imperative to think about the issue of NA beyond traditional terms of the need to have X men and Y materials in support for every soldier on the battlefield.

India would have to do, many things towards building such a capability. Prime on this list is the enlargement and modernization of special forces (some Indian military planners and analysts dream of two entire divisions dedicated to the purpose and a separate command, for special forces some day) along with the modernization of the entire military infrastructure, with a focus on mountain warfare, light artillery and serious airlift capabilities. But that alone will not be enough.

The overwhelming native population of the NA is Shia. Organizations such as the Balwaristan National Front and at least a couple of others, who are opposed to Pakistan can be leveraged.

The US and China will have to be tackled, something which is possible only if India forces the issue.

The investments we make into Afghanistan should be of a lasting nature and backed by hard power of the Indian state. It is through Afghanistan that the Pashtuns can be won over and an environment for the takeover of NA and the marginalization of TSP can be done.

If we want the enemy to give up without a fight then it is imperative that India builds the capabilities to let the enemy know that India is fully capable and willing to annihilate the enemy on all fronts of the battle field. Only then will the enemy be willing to lay down arms and concede to Indian geopolitical goals, hopefully without a fight.

The Northern Areas is a strategic piece of geography, the raison d’etre for the big powers to pander to Pakistan. Without this piece of property in its possession, the US would care less, China’s ability to encircle would be jeopardized. Without the Pandering, the military in Pakistan will be in no position to conduct asymmetric or cross border war with India. Also, this solution has the least impact on population as the NA is sparsely populated and most of them are still Shias/Ismailis. We cannot change Pakistan’s intent, the only thing we can do is to restrict its capability.

Good post.

Just the balkanization of Pakistan is an useless exercise. West Punjab morphed into a mini Pakistan will be just as effective as the current entity.

Decisive victory is required. All infrastructure bombed. Top brass shot. Urban stretches flattened. POWs and working population from captured territories used as forced labourers to extract war damages etc. Only than PoK and NA will be recovered.

Brig. Ray's post is interesting. Realistic. If we take it forward ... is there a long term plan / mission statement to recover PoK?

Sorry, statement's in Lok Sabha like "PoK is ours" don't count.

Adding to Shaurya's post...beside conventional modernization, what kind of strategic arsenal is needed? Are we assuming we'll have a one front clash or do we factor in a two front fight with Chinese throwing in their lot?

I assume people have considered the second possibility...which leads us to the nuclear thread. There is a nonsense notion that India will test a N device only when Pakis or Chinese test, first they really don't need to test, second if we really are serious about recovering PoK and NA then testing is must to be followed by kicking NFU w.r.t to Pakistan. We won't wait for the first hit and that must be conveyed in no uncertain terms if the need arises.

Sometime people talk of minimal credible deterence with NFU in same sentence without calculating the cost of such an arsenal. For Pakistan it should be a policy of no 'withholds' minus NFU.

On non-military aspects there will need to be certain level of economic / industrial development that allows us to (1) absorb sanctions from the West (2) domestically produce conventional weaponary at a sustained pace (3) assured food security for a prolonged warfare (4) energy resources..how much?

At some point in future, once these conditions are met the decision to recover NA and PoK should be taken...not earlier. #4 enery resource...is a serious problem, and if not tackled NA and PoK will remains pipe dream, but not unsurmountable.

Recovery of NA and PoK in decisive action will change the geo-politics of the region and tapping into CA's energy resources will me met with manageable resistance.

Still a lot to be considered...duration of conflict that we are willing to undertake...role of China /USA.

Lets put a timeframe and calculate back and define the scope and cost or else we should forget about PoK and NA and should bow out of the Great Game.

To be contd..

[svinayak]

"The decline of the British Empire started in World War II..."

What planet is this guy from?

The decline started before WWII as evidenced by the Empire's inability to evict an upstart regime from its closest neighbor, France. A regime that had been in power for less than ten years, but whose armed forces were better equipped and better prepared. Does anyone recall Dunkirk?

While the British military and citizenry both demonstrated great courage throughout the entire conflict, it was Hitler's decision to bomb London rather than continue the bombing of the RAF airfields which proved to be his undoing during the Battle of Britain.

Further, had Hitler decided to take and hold Western Europe prior to invading Russia, the alleged British Empire would have been powerless to stop him. Fighting wars on two separate fronts proved to be his regime's undoing even though his army enjoyed a distinct advantage in military technology.

While we Americans played a major role in the defeat of fascism in Europe (and Imperialism in Asia), it is lucky for all of us that Hitler turned out to be his own worst enemy.

The end of the British Empire was clearly in evidence in Munich in 1938. I'm sure that "real historians" can put a better date on it, but the actual decline began long before WWII's first shot was ever fired.

So much for Debusmann's theories.

[Paul]

In the last Afghan war in 1905, the afghans were able to wrest significant concessions from the British.

Very canny people, these Afghans.

1905 seems to be a landmark year marking decline of Europe as Russia lost resoundingly to Japan this year.

[Sanjay M]

If the US doesn't play ball with India on the Nuclear Deal, then failing that, India can re-constitute its relationship with Iran, and use this to resume support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

In my opinion, re-energizing "Setami" politics in Afghanistan would earn a strategic coup for India, in the sense that it would simultaneously throw both the American and the Pakistani positions in Afghanistan into chaos.

Were the northern ethnic groups of Afghanistan to achieve autonomy and de facto independence from the rest of the country, then the US-supported Kabul govt would be reduced to an impotent tottering figurehead, while the remaining Pashtun rump of Afghanistan would slide into Pashtun nationalism.
Pakistan would face a moment-of-truth, being either forced to endure the rampant spillover of Pashtun nationalism into NWFP, or else being forced to resume support for Taliban and its Islamist glue, at the cost of undermining War on Terror and rupturing ties with the US.

This is an option that India should seriously look at, if faced with a serious debacle on the nuclear treaty.
Options are always available to us -- we just have to notice them.

[Sanjay M]

Btw, even the Russians could benefit from stoking up Setami politics in Afghanistan. Thus there would be room not just for Indo-Iranian cooperation, but 3-way Russia-India-Iran cooperation in this direction.

The Americans and their allies in Afghanistan would be left twisting in the wind.

We should definitely do preparatory work in this direction, as both an insurance policy and also as a signal that our interests in this nuclear deal must be taken more seriously.

[svinayak]

http://www.wintersonnenwende.com/script ... index.html
http://www.wintersonnenwende.com/script ... n1919.html

Hidden Historical Fact:

The Allied Attempt to Starve Germany in 1919

Hidden Historical Fact: The Allied Attempt to Starve Germany in 1919. Fred Blahut.
If one word could describe Germany during the immediate aftermath of World War I, it would be "starvation." Even after an armistice ended World War I, some 900,000 German men, women and children were starving to death - a tragedy deliberately caused by the continuation of a wartime British naval blockade for eight months after the end of the war! [56Kb / 1 page]

Even after an armistice ended World War I, the rapacious victors continued a devastating blockade of Germany.

If one word could describe Germany during the immediate aftermath of World War I, it would be "starvation." And yet, while some 900,000 German men, women and children were starving to death, the American and British public knew nothing about the reason for this holocaust, deliberately caused by the continuation of a wartime British naval blockade.

Britain's post-war naval blockade of food to Germany in 1919 matched the then current blockade of news by the American and British press. Even today, only a few non-Germans know the truth, and American and British historians, for the most part, have participated in the coverup of this most appalling crime.

The guilt of the world press in covering up the atrocity is compounded by the fact that the American and British public were told of the starvation itself, but were kept ignorant of the criminal policies of the Allies which produced it.
The food blockade was not terminated until July 12, 1919. On May 7 of that year, Count von Brockdorf-Rantzau had indignantly referred to this fact in addressing the Versailles assembly. "The hundreds of thousands of noncombatants," the German chief delegate had stated, "who have perished since November 11, 1918, as a result of the blockade, were killed with cold deliberation, after our enemies had been assured of their complete victory."19

The murderous Allied blockade, which continued for eight months after the end of the war, was one reason why a German war veteran who decided to go into politics a decade later was able to revive the seared memory of a German nation which had suffered greatly and vault himself to absolute power. His name, of course, was Adolf Hitler.

http://www.wintersonnenwende.com/script ... plans.html

Stalin's Secret War Plans

Why Hitler Invaded the Soviet Union

Article from The Barnes Review, Nov./Dec. 2000,

When the German armed forces invaded the USSR on June 22, 1941, Berlin described the offensive as preemptive in the face of imminent Soviet aggression. The claim was generally dismissed as Nazi propaganda. Recently disclosed evidence from Soviet sources, however, suggests that Moscow's foreign policy was not governed by neutrality when Europe went to war in 1939.

Challenging established social and political structures through internal subversion, armed violence and terrorism, the Soviet Union was considered an outlaw state. It advocated the overthrow of all capitalist regimes and supported anti-colonial "independence movements" in underdeveloped territories. "This will invariably provoke the ruling classes of the Great Powers against us," the Communist Party's general secretary, Josef Stalin, told its Central Committee in 1925.1

During the 1930s, Stalin, now dictator of the USSR, observed how Germany, revitalized under Adolf Hitler's leadership, worked to revise the post-World War I structure of Europe imposed by the United States, England and France. Stalin and Hitler, therefore, were both at odds with the West.

[svinayak]

http://www.wintersonnenwende.com/script ... opsis.html

The Unknown History
of the 1939 German-Polish Conflict

A Brief Synopsis

By W. R. (Name initialized by The Scriptorium for security reasons.)
Published here with permission.

And again: "The overall state of the German war economy ... was not that of a nation geared towards total war, but rather that of a national economy mobilized at first only for small and locally restricted wars and which only later succumbed to the pressure of military necessity after it had become an incontrovertible fact. For instance, in the fall of 1939 the German preparations for provision with steel, oil and other important raw materials were anything but adequate for an intense engagement with the Great Powers."32 One only has to compare Mr. Klein's observations with what Mr. Bavendamm wrote about the British preparations for a major war at the same time, and the blurred picture that is painted by historians becomes much more transparent: the Germans were not the ones to provoke WW2.

Besides Chamberlain, there were others in influential and powerful positions in England who were much more outspoken about their wishes. Winston Churchill, for instance, said before the House of Commons on October 5th, 1938: "... but there can never be friendship between the British democracy and the Nazi power, that Power which spurns Christian ethics, which cheers its onwards course by a barbarous paganism, which vaunts the spirit of aggression and conquest, which derives strength and perverted pleasure from persecution, and uses, as we have seen, with pitiless brutality the threat of murderous force."33

Hitler, of course, knew this very well. In Saarbrücken, on October 9th, 1938 he said: "...All it would take would be for Mr. Duff Cooper or Mr. Eden or Mr. Churchill to come to power in England instead of Chamberlain, and we know very well that it would be the goal of these men to immediately start a new world war. They do not even try to disguise their intents, they state them openly..."34

As we all know, the British government under Chamberlain gave Poland the guarantee that England would come to its aid if Poland should be attacked. This was on March 31st, 1939. Its purpose was to incite Poland to escalate its endeavors for war against Germany. It happened as planned: England declared war on Germany on September 3rd, 1939, but not on the Soviet Union who also attacked Poland, and this is proof enough that it was England's (and Chamberlain's) intention in the first place to make war on Germany. Thus WW2 was arranged by a complicity between Britain and Poland. It was not Hitler's war, it was England's and Poland's war. The Poles were merely the stooges. Some of them knew it too - Jules Lukasiewicz, the Polish ambassador to Paris, for instance, who on March 29th, 1939 told his foreign minister in Warsaw:

http://www.wintersonnenwende.com/common ... rgestevens

[ramana]

Paul, Here is the Ralph Peters map.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/e ... ideast.jpg

It has the before and after. And I guess that gives us an understanding of his Point of View.

[Paul]

Thanks Ramana

X-post, Tibet and Xinjiang should be our lebensstarum

Singha Post subject: Re: NUKKAD - 48Posted: 09 Sep 2008 03:09 am

BRF Oldie


Joined: 13 Aug 2004 11:12 pm
Posts: 3329
Location: wielder of Mjoelnir, the mystic Uru hammer if you read on prof riley's 1950s paper posted by ramana in the strat forum,she makes some good points.

- north and south europe had their demographic bulge (need to find new land and resources
for their hordes) between 1800-1920.
- they were lucky on many fronts
- world had weak or unexplored areas like N/S america,africa,india,china,australia to exploit
of settle down in
- superiority of arms and technology
- good seafaring skills

thats why they are "in charge" today

for Indian case now that we have demographic bulge,
- there are no further colonies to conquer and settle
- water, energy, arable land are tight
- we do not have superiority in arms or tech to subdue the periphery and
export some of our hordes

so our path to Trantor/Coruscant has to be based on
- population control
- energy and financial efficiency
- superb education and human resources
- protection of every inch of existing territory, small as it is for our hordes
- cash surpluses generated by robust trade and technology flows



Top

Paul Post subject: Re: NUKKAD - 48Posted: 09 Sep 2008 03:18 am

BRFite


Joined: 25 Jun 1999 03:01 pm
Posts: 653 Good post...this is why I had said on the great game thread that one of three asian powers has to go when music stops. Russia needs to make way for PRC's demographic bulge to spill over into SIberia. That way we get breathing space in Tibet and Xinjiang.

Those remarks were lost as in the straightjack of the present great game rules...we cannot even dare to think of such audacious alternatives

[ramana]

X-posted...

The origins of the Taliban, the Pashtun Civil war and the Pakiban are all tied to the role and mission of the ISI. The three phenomenons are unexplainable without understanding the ISI.
The ISI was formed in 1948 after Partition. There was no such organization in the British Indian Army. As such it is difficult for Indians to comprehend what it is? In British India intelligence was civil/police function. Military intelligence that existed as such was more for battlefield knowledge of opposition forces. The ISI was setup by Major General Cawthorn, a former British Indian Army officer who opted for Pakistan at the time of Partition. Prior to that Lt. Gen Cawthorn was the Director General of Intelligence for the British Indian Army and the Allied forces during World War II. The published accounts state that he formed the ISI with MI5 and MI6 as role models but staffed with military personnel. We don’t have accounts of Lt. Gen Cawthorn’s WWII experience.
Lt Gen Cawthorn later headed the Australian SIS after reverting back to his native country. Prior to that, he was High Commissioner to Pakistan and later Canada. In addition during the war he was in the Olaf Caroe’s Viceroy Study Group (VSG), which studied the future of the Great Game - the British –Russian struggle to control Central Asia. One can’t discount the possibility that Lt Gen Cawthorn was nurturing his creation even when he was the Australian High Commissioner and it was part of outcome of the VSG studies.

Later the ISI was tasked to its current charter by Field Marshal Ayub Khan with defending Pakistan. Its role expanded with Zia’s coup to be all encompassing the security of Pakistan state. It developed ties and linkages to the CIA during the Afghan war and channeled the US support to the mujahedeen. It was this role that allowed it to develop covert armies of irregulars who later were molded into the Taliban. After 9/11, these armies of irregulars were sheltered in the FATA region and morphed into the Pakiban also known as Tehreek –e- Pakistan (TEP). The ISI also developed other irregular armies in Pakistan: Lashkar –e- Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e- Mohammad (JEM) for terrorist acts on India. They also developed links with radicalized elements of the SIMI in India. The question then is the TSP state is fighting the Pakiban and other radicals then who is it fighting and what is its effectiveness?

The Pashtun Civil War is a result of the channeling of Pashtun nationalist aspirations which were thwarted in 1947 by the merger into the newly formed state of Pakistan. The nationalist desire was subsumed till the formation of the Taliban after the Afghan War ended. The corralling of the Taliban forces in the FATA region allowed the Pashtun nationalist aspirations to take on Islamist fervor to achieve their goals by creating a state within a state inside Pakistan as first step.

India is unable to fathom the ISI as it does not fit the profile of a standard intelligence agency for it was not created to be one but an operations directorate like SOE. The question of who really tasks it is not clear. The day to day tasks are possibly from the military chain of command but its strategic perceptions and tasking seem to be more part of the Great Gamesque mode of thinking.
..
Moe when I think it over....

[ramana]

X-posted...

Capt. Bharat Verma :

Stable Pakistan not in India’s interest

....... Many conveniently propose the myth that a stable Pakistan is in India’s favour. This is a false proposition. The truth is that Pakistan is bad news for the Indian Union since 1947–stable or otherwise.

Islamabad has enjoyed brief periods of political stability since the birth of Pakistan. But even during these interludes, it continued to export terrorism, fake currency and narcotics to India. It continued its attempts to change the demography along our borders, and cultivated sleeper cells and armed groups inside our territory to create an uprising at an appropriate time.

Also, it aligned with Beijing and other powers, in a mutually beneficial scheme, to tie-down and ultimately cause a territorial split of the Union.

With Pakistan on the brink of collapse due to massive internal as well as international contradictions, it is matter of time before it ceases to exist.
Multiple benefits will accrue to the Union of India on such demise.

If Indian national interests are defined with clarity and prioritised, the foremost threat to the Union (and for centuries before its birth) has consistently and continuously materialised on the western periphery.

To defend this key threat to the Union, New Delhi should extend its influence through export of both soft and hard power towards Central Asia, from where invasions have been mounted over centuries. The cessation of Pakistan as a state facilitates furtherance of this pivotal national objective.

The self-destructive path that Islamabad chose will either splinter the state into many parts or it will wither away—a case of natural progression to its logical conclusion. In either case Baluchistan will achieve independence.

For New Delhi this opens a window of opportunity to ensure that the Gwadar port does not fall into the hands of the Chinese. In this, there is synergy between the political objectives of the Americans and the Indians. Our existing goodwill in Baluchistan requires intelligent leveraging.

Sindh and most of the non-Punjabi areas of Pakistan will be our new friends.

Pakistan’s breakup will be a major setback to the Jihad Factory, which functions with the help of its army and the ISI. This in turn will ease pressures on India and the international community.

With China’s one arm, i.e. Pakistan disabled, its expansionist plans will receive a severe jolt. Beijing continues to pose another primary threat to New Delhi. Even as we continue to engage with it as constructively as possible, we must strive to remove the proxy.

At the same time, it is prudent to extend moral support to the people of Tibet to sink Chinese expansionism in the morass of insurgency. For a change, let us do to them what they do to us.

With Pakistan gone, the chances of Central Asia getting infected with the Jihadi fervour will recede. Afghanistan will gain fair amount of stability. India’s access to Central Asian energy routes will open up.

With disintegration of ISI’s inimical activities of infiltration and pushing of fake currency into India, from Nepal and Bangladesh will cease. Within the Union social harmony will improve enormously. Export of Islamic fundamentalism, with its 360-degree sweep from Islamabad, will vanish. Even a country like Thailand will heave a sigh of relief.

Above all, the gathering threat from a united group of authoritarian regimes along our 14,000 km borders, orchestrated and synchronised by Pakistan, will dissolve.

At the height of the recent disturbances in the Valley, when a general asked me for a suggestion to resolve the issue, I said: “ Remove Pakistan. The threat will disappear permanently.” Today the collapse of Pakistan as a state is almost certain. All the King’s men cannot save it from itself.

Looking ahead, New Delhi should formulate an appropriate strategy for ‘post-Pakistan scenario’ to secure India’s interests in Central Asia.

It is intriguing, therefore, to hear New Delhi mouthing the falsehood that stable Pakistan is in India’s favour. Perpetuation of such illogic for vote-bank politics is harming the consolidation and integration of the Union.

He is thinking of undoing the great game, Paul!

The idea of Caroe has to be understood. When he said a stable India was essential for stable central Asia he ment Punjab. He clearly says that NWFP will align with Punjab and then Sindh will join as it has no choice. Baluch can be integrated. He wasnt talking of Indian India. Instead of stability in Central Asi this state turned eastwards against India. Even Caroe didnt know the forces he was raising like old Merlin.

So what we are seeing is this plan disintegrating again. It first foundered when Punjab got split and then East Pakistan split.

If TSP goes under expect PRC to go to Bangla Desh. So Sheikh Hasina has to be supported.

[ramana]

Something we wanted here!

Deccan Chroncile, 25 Sept 2008

LOC is Line of Commerce


New York Sept. 25: India and Pakistan declared on Wednesday that trade across the Line of Control will begin on October 21 this year while modalities for the opening of the Skardu-Kargil road will be discussed. The decision, coming after the first meeting between the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, and Pakistan’s new President, Mr Asif Ali Zardari, envisages cross-LoC trade on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalkot roads.

It was also decided to open the Wagah-Attari road link and Khokrapar-Munabao railway route to all permissible items. Both countries will also continue “interaction between Planning Commissions to develop mutually beneficial cooperation, including in the energy sector”.

A joint statement issued on Wednesday by Dr Singh and Mr Zardari after they met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, acknowledged that the peace process initiated by both India and Pakistan has been “under strain in recent months”. Terror and ceasefire violations remained high on the agenda, sources said. The one-to-one meet was held at the Millennium Plaza Hotel here.

Hours before the meeting, Mr Zardari tried to play to his domestic gallery by telling Pakistani media that “Kashmir remained the core issue”. But he did not raise the issue of UN resolutions that call for a plebiscite. Prior to the meeting, Mr Zardari hugged an unprepared Dr Singh and hailed the Prime Minister for “changing the face of India.” “You are the leader of modern India,” Mr Zardari said to Dr Singh.

[Paul]

Khokrapar-Munnabao link has opened up only becuz there is a non pakjabi PM at the helm now.

This will accelerate the fraying of Pakistan....however on the flip side, will also lead to rajasthan getting exposed to jehadi virus. Internal security/surveillence in border districts and major cities of rajasthan should be stepped up before this link is opened up.

So far, we seem to be benefiting from the cross border bhai-bandhi...but now it appears the same route will be used by the ISI to return the favor....well but again it had to happen some day anyways.

+++++++++++++

Mohajirs of Hyderabad and Karachi can use this route to come to India. But I think the visas will be issued in Pindi onlee. Hope this does not lead to a concentration of IMs in Rajasthan.

Does anyone know if the indian consulate in Karachi is functioning now.

[SSridhar]

The opening of the Kargil-Skardu is very important. We have so far not been paying attention to Balwaristan. Those people there have numerous grievances with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

[Manu]

Somehow, I do not share in Paul's and SSridhar's excitement.

We know that fully 1/3rd of all the INR 500 and INR 1000 Notes in Circulation in India are said to be fakes, courtesy Pakis.

Each Time 50 Pakis come to India for "watching a Cricket Match", 49 'disappear'. They later become IMs (marriage etc.) with ration cards, and later voting rights. They basically have a criminal mentality. Their 'brethren' in U.P (in North) and Old Hyderabad (in South) are only to happy to welcome them to their homes and communities. They just vanish into the Ghettos. I am not 100% sure, but the Chowls and Jopparphattis in Mumbai must also have a *sizable* number of Paki Illegals (aside from the ever-present, and growing BD population).

How are we going to deal with those problems?

The Samjhauta Express was basically a Smuggler Express. This cross-border trade being good for India notion needs to be given a little more attention, IMO.

In the end, even disgruntled groups of Pakis are Pakis, and living in India (which they will, permanently) can only lead to more trouble.

Someone needs to spell out the Strategic benefits to India (the costs, I just laid out, and are fairly obvious).

[ramana]

X-posted...

When pakistan breaks up after all the billions of dollars has once again been flushed down the drain, India needs to be in a position to (a) claim that the referendum is no longer valid because pakistan is gone (b) have everything in place to reunite all of Kashmir -- direct access to central asia would reduce Iran's leverage on India in the long term and also give space and time to resolve the independence of Balochistan (c) strengthen trade routes from J&K all the way to Afghanisthan as a backup route. Ideally Balochistan would become resurgent with the help of both Iran and India to help the Balochis eliminate the pakjabis in their territory and move on to become a modern nation.

JMT

[Paul]

BOOK REVIEW: Afghan war’s hidden blunders —by Khaled Ahmed

How We Missed the Story:
Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan
By Roy Gutman
Vanguard Books Lahore 2008
Pp322
Available at bookstores in Pakistan

The book brings clarity to the Indo-Pak war number four (or five?) relocated to Afghanistan with India firmly entrenched with the Northern Alliance and the Karzai government, and Pakistan with its proxies embedded in Al Qaeda

[Journalist Gutman has certainly produced the most comprehensive and revealing account to-date of the post-Soviet invasion Afghan war. He has moved from the written sources available to all to interviews that he was able to conduct with such key personalities as were involved in the internecine jihad of the triumphant mujahideen after the defeat of the Soviet Union. Everyone who went into the savage cauldron of Afghanistan today finds himself defeated, including the two states that most preened themselves over the victory: the United States and Pakistan.

The story begins in 1988 with Pakistan in the driving seat, putting together a government in exile — Interim Islamic Afghan Government of the mujahideen — in Rawalpindi near the Pakistan Army headquarters. The 519-member shura that was to choose the government was nominated by the seven jihad militias located in Peshawar and was plied with $26 million from Saudi Arabia. Mujaddadi was chosen president but he travelled to Iran and promised the Shia leaders one hundred seats in the shura. Back in the councils of the Sunni seven, the view was different: one hundred was cut down to sixty after which the Shias boycotted.

Bravery comes only with myopia and that was what was practised by the mujahideen. The government represented only 30 percent of the population of Afghanistan. Saudi money ensured that Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the Wahhabi warlord the Arabs liked, was nominated prime minister, and Pakistan was able to get its favoured warlord Hekmatyar nominated defence minister with Saudi help although the rest of the militia leaders despised him for his tactics. The 1989 plan to attack the Najibullah regime in Jalalabad and establish the jihadi government there was set afoot with ISI chief Hamid Gul promising Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto that the Afghan government would fall in one week (p.28).

The Jalalabad offensive was a fiasco. The great mujahideen suffered their first defeat after defeating the Soviets, one third of the 12,000 killed being theirs. Soon afterwards, the Massoud-Hekmatyar vendetta made its imprint, the latter’s commanders killing 30 of Massoud’s in an ambush. Mujaddidi denounced Hekmatyar as a criminal and Hekmatyar left the government as defence minister. Jamiat commander Massoud caught four of Hekmatyar’s guilty commanders and executed them. Defeats and killings were to have no moral impact on anything in Afghanistan after that. Those who backed the savages sustained all the damage and warded off punishment in Pakistan by the simple device of taking over power.

The second lethal defeat for Pakistan was the Jalalabad-like offensive of Mazar-e-Sharif in 1997, organised by the ISI once again, based on the defection of a Rashid Dostam second-in-command, Malik Pehlawan, in favour of the Taliban. This was the offensive from the west of Afghanistan; another offensive from the south was mounted after buying the defection of a Massoud commander (p.102). Seeing Pakistan involved, Iran weighed in on the other side, training the troops of Jamiat’s other commander Ismail Khan and airlifting munitions and Hezbe Wahdat Shia warriors to them. Uzbekistan sought to make its own chess-move against Pakistan, conscripting Uzbeks to help despatch supplies to Dostam. Uzbek-dominated Tajikistan came down on the side of Massoud.

Another ally of Dostam, General Abdul Majid Rozi changed loyalty in Badghis province and arrested Ismail Khan whom he handed over to Mullah Razzaq who proceeded to Mazar-e-Sharif to take charge of the city abandoned by Malik. Jamiat chief Rabbani fled to Tajikistan and Dostam sent his family away and made himself scarce too. The promise to Malik was that he would be made governor of Mazar, but soon Mullah Razzaq began to enforce the Sharia, beating up unveiled women and destroying shops selling ‘prohibited things’. He entered Malik’s room and tore down a painting of Omar Khayyam with a goblet of wine because that was ‘against Islam’ (p.104). All TV sets were smashed in the city and Malik was told to go to Kabul as a deputy foreign minister while his transport and other assets were simply taken over.

At this point Pakistan recognised the government of the Taliban, but Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif didn’t know who had okayed the recognition because he hadn’t. Foreign Minister Gauhar Ayub followed orders that came from a source other than the prime minister but that was more or less routine in Pakistan by then (p.105). Then the defeat started. Mullah Razzaq went to the Hazara quarters in the city and asked them to disarm. They refused, and already scared by the ‘enforcement’ of Taliban sharia, began hunting for the Taliban under Malik’s command. They killed 350 of them including Mullah Razzaq. They ended up bagging 3,000 as prisoners. What followed was a massive war crime. The prisoners taken in war were all executed.

The book says Pakistan was the dominant power behind the scenes, the ISI putting Malik in touch with Mullah Ghaus the foreign minister, telling the latter the Taliban could capture Mazar without a fight. But uncannily it also sent in Pakistani Kashmiri militants as military assistance. Hamid Gul told the author, ‘ISI brokered a deal but it was the wrong one’ (p.108). Col Imam, the ISI officer called Ruler of Herat, later denied that the Mazar defeat was a big fiasco and funnily also claimed that the Taliban who invaded Mazar were unarmed and were mostly traders! He also put the blame on Iran for asking the Hazara Shias to resist and start the massacre (p.109).

Col Imam was really the American-trained Amir Sultan Tarar, the commando officer who trained the mujahideen in camps run by Pakistan and the US. He was sent into Kandahar in 1994 to keep the Taliban going in the right direction but he soon moved to the more ‘strategic’ location of Herat, which was to put Pakistan and Iran face to face when the Taliban finally got hold of Mazar in 1998 with a massacre to shame all massacres, including the killing of the Iranian diplomats in the Mazar consulate at the hands of the Sipah Sahaba boys sent in from Pakistan. The book says they arrested the officers but, after taking their cash, handed them over to the Taliban for the killing (p.137).

This book is an epitaph for the doctrine of ‘strategic depth’, but the policy of playing proxies in Afghanistan was never abandoned after 9/11; so the war against India goes on while Washington thinks it is against NATO-ISAF. The book brings clarity to the Indo-Pak war number four (or five?) relocated to Afghanistan with India firmly entrenched with the Northern Alliance and the Karzai government, and Pakistan with its proxies embedded in Al Qaeda. The real epitaph will come later and it will be for a much bigger demise than just the fading of the doctrine of strategic depth. *

Home

Khaled Ahmed thinks the war against terror in Afghanistan is actually being fought between Indian and Pakistani interests(not necessarily soldiers, there is a key difference). In essence, it means while soft power of India is coming through "Saas bhi kabhi bahu thi", while hard power is being projected by NATO-ISAF.

It is in indian interests to let status quo continue for some more time.

[Paul]

Key thing to notice is only two powers have escaped defeat so far in Afghanistan - India and Iran.

others superpowers or wannbes- NATO, Ruus, US, Pakistan you name it have been made to smell defeat or will do so soon.

[SSridhar]

Khaled Ahmed thinks the war against terror in Afghanistan is actually being fought between Indian and Pakistani interests(not necessarily soldiers, there is a key difference).

As I have posted in the Pakistani thread, Gen. Gracey etched it in stone in the Pakistani military minds that there should be permanent hostility with India because India was colluding with Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan and the Awami national party was a willing collaborator.That was the parting gift of the British strategists as Gracey was the last British Chief of the Pakistani Army before the first native chief.

[sanjaykumar]

The Pakistani general's mind is able to arrive at the same conclusion without the grace of Gracie. I hope you don't mean it as to absolve Pakistan of this policy.


Perhaps India should begin to fight its own fight in Afghanistan, not neccessarily in Afghanistan. It could apply military pressure along LOC to coordinate the pressure with the US.