from Kimball & Lizard?
NSG may in future adopt a policy prohibiting transfer of ENR technology to non-NPT signatories...atleast that's what Kimbal bhai isnarayanan wrote:Item 4: What does this mean?
Consultations with India regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their effective implementation by India
What proposed amendments? Do they mean the NSG waiver itself or something else?
for.. 
JEM: Nicely summed up.JE Menon wrote:The BJP's position is finely tuned and well calibrated. It is an opposition position, not a government position. It must be seen in that light, because that is what it had to do. They have gone to remarkable lengths to reiterate that their position is not anti-American but rather that it is anti-erosion of strategic autonomy.
As such, their emphasis in recent months has been less and less on technological issues (the inadequacy of the Shakti series, for instance) than on the potential losses to be incurred if we test after years of investment in the sector. This is not a particularly strong argument, and we can be quite certain they know that. But it is one that is convenient because, should they come to power, it is a position they can comfortably retreat from as developments show that the investments will not come under serious threat as the sanctioneers, for lack of a better word, will effectively have to strike at their own companies to some considerable degree.
Please note that, as was repeatedly stated on this forum, the BJP did not put anything more than rhetorical spokes in the wheel - all the while offering reassuring noises, through Mishra in particular. We can predict with a fair degree of confidence that the BJP's aversion to the deal will decline to the point of enthusiasm in the coming years. I hope that the process begins soon... Some recent appearances by their point men on TV have hardly been edifying.
On the other hand, the BJP is not exactly long experienced at being the primary opposition party... So rough edges may be expected. But we should refrain from looking too closely. The Congress does not exactly come through with shining colours either. They could have managed the whole thing with a little more finesse, if they looked at a little more of the horizon than their petrifying ideological blinkers allowed... But then again, they too cannot be viewed monolithically.
On the whole, all's well that ends well - at least the way I personally see it.
Now to watch the commies deal with the joker in their pack: Karat.
N, absolutely... The Americans are certainly getting itchy fingers on the other side as well... The timing could not have been more exquisite... NSG Waiver for India, Mr. 10% for Pakisatan. Each gets what it deserves.
Kimbal and LizardPulikeshi wrote:Nice to see the lungi dances are being allowed this special occasion!
What no
:
PS: Will miss the whining on the Nooculr noose & discoosion thread.
Points 1,3,4 can be undertaken by anti-India groups no matter what positon India is in, strong, powerful, & self confident or abjectly weak and pussilanimous as it is today. But its frightening and disconcerting and rather shameful that TSP can undertake #2 with impunity and at any time of their choosing. How does this deal enhance India's ability to thwart TSP, espcially given the constraints this deal places (directly or indirectly) on India's strategic development?Rangudu wrote:I think we can expect the following immediate reactions from the anti-India groups:
1. There will be news that TSP is working on a nuclear sub, SLCM, SLBM or all of the above. That will be courtesy of the Dragon.
2. TSPigLets will launch attacks on temples or other Hindu sites, BARC/TIFR or some major national symbol.
3. NPAs inside US will release real or imaginary dirt on India, order arrests of people supplying dual use tech etc. as a last ditch attempt to thwart the 123 clearance
4. Other anti-India lobbies in US will use usual cleavages such as EJ issues to rake up muck on India
Even I was thinking the same when I went through the draft document. The 3rd statement clearly says " Based on commitments and actions mentioned above", and in #2, the last commitment says " Continuing its unilateral moratorium on testing". So does it mean that if any commitment in #2 is violated, then the approval doesn't hold?Manny wrote:http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3340
Text, Analysis, and Response to NSG "Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India"
Note for Reporters by Daryl G. Kimball (202-463-8270 x107)
Japan noted that the exemption for India was decided on the condition that India continues to observe its commitments, especially its nuclear test moratorium pledge. Japan noted that if India resumed testing, "the logical consequence is to terminate trade." Most of the other statements also made this point.
Germany, and perhaps others, added that it expects India to take further nonproliferation and disarmament measures, including "entry into force of the CTBT and a termination of fissile material production for weapons."
And Kimball also mentions this in his article
Therefore, if India tests, the NSG would immediately meet in an emergency session (as already allowed for in the NSG guidelines) and the widespread expectation would be for all NSG states to terminate nuclear trade immediately. And despite the Indian government's false representations to its public and parliament, neither the United States nor other responsible nuclear suppliers are going to feel obliged to respect earlier fuel supply guarantees or help find some other country to supply India with nuclear fuel if India tests for any reason or violates its safeguards commitments.Enrichment and Reprocessing Transfers: International safeguards cannot prevent the replication or possible use of sensitive fuel cycle technologies transferred to India for "civilian" purposes for use in its military sector. The NSG should have explicitly banned such technology transfers. India Paragraph 3.a in the NSG statement on India maintains that Paragraphs 6 & 7 of the current NSG guidelines will continue to apply. This means that NSG states must continue to exercise "utmost restraint" with respect to transfers of sensitive dual use technologies and enrichment and reprocessing technologies to India or any other state.
In addition, in the course of the NSG meeting, the United States confirmed that participating NSG governments expressed assurances that they did not intend to transfer enrichment or reprocessing technology to India.
But India, being India can be counted on to do this?narayanan wrote: So the game is far from one. We may be euphoric because our criterion was whether the NSG clears it clean, which clears the way for Russia etc., but after the herrowic 48-hour marathon performance by the GOTUS with WHOTUS on the phone etc. etc., to get what should have been done with a 5-minute vote on the first morning, there is no way that India, being India , is going to go and start nuclear commerce until the COTUS approves it.
narayanan wrote: Time to start attacking, IMO. The world has recognized that right is on our side, no need to be shy any more. Expose the China-Pakistan perfidy as NOW revealed by Reed, and ask why Kimball and Sokolski and all their gang didn't tell the US people about this long ago. Start exposing the Chinese PLA penetration of US Think Tanks like ACUS - just take a look at their staff/ Visiting Researcher rosters and u'll c what I mean. Look at Chinese penetration of COTUS. Publish lists of the NPAs and their lack of honesty, the real victims being the US taxpayer and the Indian civilian and soldier who have fought off the Chicom terrorist threat.
Expose the Chinese hand in the FOIL, the "Coalition Against Genocide", the Phillippines "islamist" terrorism, Iran's missiles, the China-NoKo connection, and generally the China-Islam conspiracy against democracy and freedom.
Consultations
16.
(a) Suppliers should maintain contact and consult through regular channels on matters
connected with the implementation of these Guidelines.
(b) Suppliers should consult, as each deems appropriate, with other governments
concerned on specific sensitive cases, to ensure that any transfer does not contribute to
risks of conflict or instability.
(c) Without prejudice to sub-paragraphs (d) to (f) below:
− In the event that one or more suppliers believe that there has been a violation of
supplier/recipient understanding resulting from these Guidelines, particularly in the
case of an explosion of a nuclear device, or illegal termination or violation of IAEA
safeguards by a recipient, suppliers should consult promptly through diplomatic
channels in order to determine and assess the reality and extent of the alleged
violation. Suppliers are also encouraged to consult where nuclear material or
nuclear fuel cycles activity undeclared to the IAEA or a nuclear explosive activity
is revealed.
− Pending the early outcome of such consultations, suppliers will not act in a manner
that could prejudice any measure that may be adopted by other suppliers concerning
their current contacts with that recipient. Each supplier should also consider
suspending transfers of Trigger List items while consultations under 16(c) are
ongoing, pending supplier agreement on an appropriate response.
− Upon the findings of such consultations, the suppliers, bearing in mind Article XII
of the IAEA Statute, should agree on an appropriate response and possible action,
which could include the termination of nuclear transfers to that recipient.
(d) If a recipient is reported by the IAEA to be in breach of its obligation to comply with
its safeguards agreement, suppliers should consider the suspension of the transfer of
Trigger List items to that State whilst it is under investigation by the IAEA. For the
purposes of this paragraph, “breach” refers only to serious breaches of proliferation
concern;
(e) Suppliers support the suspension of transfers of Trigger List items to States that violate
their nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards obligations, recognising that the
responsibility and authority for such decisions rests with national governments or the
United Nations Security Council. In particular, this is applicable in situations where
the IAEA Board of Governors takes any of the following actions:
− finds, under Article XII.C of the Statute, that there has been non-compliance in the
recipient, or requires a recipient to take specific actions to bring itself into
compliance with its safeguards obligations;
− Decides that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of
nuclear material required to be safeguarded, including situations where actions
taken by a recipient have made the IAEA unable to carry out its safeguards mission
in that State. An extraordinary Plenary meeting will take place within one month of the Board of
Governors’ action, at which suppliers will review the situation, compare national
policies and decide on an appropriate response.
(f) The provisions of subparagraph (e) above do not apply to transfers under paragraph 4
(b) of the Guidelines.
What §16 imports is
- Violation of an Agreement
As nuclear testing will not be in the bilateral deals with Russia or France, any testing would not mean a violation of agreement. Even in the case of 123 Agreement, a nuclear testing would not be a violation of the agreement, even if US would be forced to terminate the agreement.
- Consultation only when a Supplier reports a Violation of the understanding
If India has only 'trustworthy' suppliers who do not consider it worthwhile to report such a violation, no action would be taken. So India should try to have agreements only with suppliers, who can swallow nuclear testing by India. It might not come to that, as nuclear testing will not be in the bilateral agreement as being a case of violation anyway.
However as §16 is invoked in the Context of the Waiver, which states that any Participating Member can call for consultations, this advantage has been taken away.
- The Suppliers have to arrive at a Consensus on Consequences and Joint Actions
If USA says, there has been a violation and all nuclear supplies should stop, and Russia or France think otherwise, then of course there is no consensus, so no consequences.
- IAEA References and ConsequencesUpon the findings of such consultations, the suppliers, bearing in mind Article XII
of the IAEA Statute, should agree on an appropriate response and possible action,
which could include the termination of nuclear transfers to that recipient.It is questionable whether nuclear testing as such constitutes a violation of the IAEA Safeguards, as the safeguards are active only on imported fuel and reactors. If the testing has been done with fuel from the strategic program, where IAEA Safeguards are not operating, there would be no violation of Article XII.Article XII of IAEA Statute: Agency Safeguards
7. In the event of non- compliance and failure by the recipient State or States to take requested corrective steps within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate assistance and withdraw any materials and equipment made available by the Agency or a member in furtherance of the project.
As far as consequences is concerned, they are dependent on certain findings (which have to be arrived at on the basis of Consensus). Secondly there is some room between should and must with regard to responsibility of the other suppliers. Russia and France may not wish to go along with the rest of the pack, and hence no consensus either on the findings nor a necessity to follow suit with sanctions.
Conclusions: As far as I see it, nuclear testing does not mean automatically NSG Sanctions. As long as the word Testing does not appear in the Waiver, and all Suppliers are not forced to terminate their bilateral agreements with India should India conduct nuclear testing, Nuclear Testing Ban has not been multilateralized.
You mean Zardari ordered them to back off!Rangudu wrote:It was not Unkil that got China to back off. That's all I'll say.
Putin got China to back off?Rangudu wrote:It was not Unkil that got China to back off. That's all I'll say.
Diversify as much as possible, with Russia being a major part of the mix. India should collaborate with Russia, USA, and France on thorium reactor technology but build them itself. This way issue of return of reactors does not arise when the relationship goes sour.samuel wrote:RaviBG,
We should be importing American or French thorium reactors a few years down the road too.
S
But India, being India can be counted on to do this?
Thumbs up, nails frayed: Delhi sent demarche to Beijing, Bush called Hu
Pranab Dhal Samanta Posted online: Sunday, September 07, 2008 at 0111 hrs Print EmailVienna, September 6:The Nuclear Suppliers Group, the 45 countries that govern global nuclear trade and who first came together to punish India after its 1974 atomic tests, today changed the very rules they had set to accept the reality of a rising India. The NSG signed off on an unprecedented waiver that makes India the only country outside the NPT to have a nuclear weapons programme and be able to conduct full civil nuclear cooperation with the international community.
It was also a rare occasion where US and Russia — now bitterly adversarial over the conflict in Georgia — worked together with two other nuclear powers to get a waiver for India. And yet, it did not come without fierce resistance. China, which seemed to threaten the entire process yesterday, stood up after the consensus decision was reached this morning here and read out a statement stating its “national position” that essentially urged countries to strive for a balance between non-proliferation and promoting civil nuclear energy cooperation. It also hoped that this decision would stand the test of time and that the NSG would address “aspirations” of all parties seeking peaceful use of nuclear power.
Last night, China had delivered a surprise by threatening to leave, objecting to the manner in which US was “forcing” a consensus. Clearly, Beijing decided to make its dissent open and, very quickly, countermeasures were put in place. Closely coordinating with the US, New Delhi issued a strong demarche to China in Beijing late last night. The same was conveyed to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi this morning, which was gearing up for Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s visit starting tomorrow. Sources said South Block worked through the night passing on the tough message to Beijing that its position was contrary to assurances it had given at the political level that it wouldn’t come in the way of an NSG consensus for India.
Washington simultaneously stepped up gears and US President George W. Bush contacted his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao asking him not to block the waiver. Sources said “everyone in the US government below the President” leaned on someone in the Chinese government in a closely coordinated effort. In short, the US “pulled out all stops,” including reminding the Chinese of the evidence Washington had of its past proliferation activities, particularly in Pakistan.
Bush, along with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns, incrementally leaned on their counterparts in the club of six holdout countries — Austria, Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, New Zealand and Switzerland — to accept the waiver on the basis of the statement on disarmament made by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee yesterday.
As a result of these efforts, it was decided to change the draft and include a reference to Mukherjee’s statement in the final decision which was taken today. While there were dogged efforts to include a provision that would cease cooperation with India in case it detonates a nuclear device, New Delhi stood firm and Washington did not press further. Both India and the US maintained that Paragraph 16 of the NSG guidelines that provide for NSG consultation in such circumstances — where NSG could by consensus suspend further trade — was sufficient. This rule, incidentally, also applies to all countries of the NSG.
On this note, the meeting ended last night at 1 am with countries taking back the new draft for internal discussions. In the end, it was a political call taken by the sceptic countries not to continue with their opposition, particularly after the diplomatic offensive mounted by the US at the highest levels in coordination with India. While the final decision is still to be released, sources confirmed to The Sunday Express that there is no mention of the “testing” word in the draft.
There are changes in language and phraseology in some places but no major amendment except for the reference to Mukherjee’s statement that was included in the revised draft circulated a few days before the NSG plenary started its meeting on Thursday. Officials said Germany, the NSG chair, will now send the decision to IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei by Monday who will then circulate it as an INFCIRC (information circular) document among all members.
"Most" of the NSG doesn't supply nuclear fuel or technology and they can all jump into the Danube. "Serious differences" with Ireland and New Zealand or China "aren't worth a jug of warm spit" (to paraphrase LBJ).Because of the negotiations were tough and the real differences not fully resolved, there will likely be serious differences between India and most of the NSG about the interpretation of what the guidelines allow and don't allow and what the consequences of any violation of India's nonproliferation and disarmament commitments would be.
The NSG statement on India does not meet ACA's standards or that of a large number of NSG states,
US may change law for last-mile sprint up the Hill
Pranab Dhal Samanta Posted online: Sunday, September 07, 2008 at 0113 hrs Print EmailVienna, September 6:The US hardball diplomacy moves from Vienna to Washington.
Faced with a September 26 deadline for the US Congress to ratify the 123 agreement and thus, seal the deal, the Bush Administration is most likely left with little choice but to introduce an India-specific Bill to amend the US Atomic Energy Act.
Reason: The Hyde Act and the US Atomic Energy Act require the agreement to sit on Capitol Hill for 30 days and then give the Congress 60 days to take an “up and down” vote (a yes-or-no vote without any amendments).
The US Congress starts its 17-day session on Monday and although sessions can be extended if House leaders want it, indications are it’s unlikely that the Congress will hold a lameduck session in November given the Presidential elections.
So, a standalone Bill — specifically for the 123 agreement — is the most plausible route to fast-forward the entire process. There’s one catch, though. For, when a Bill is moved, there may be a call for amendments to the 123 which could complicate matters given the non-proliferation lobby on the Hill, including House International Relations Committee Chairman Howard Berman, who released the communication between the State Department and the Congress a day before the NSG meet.
The Bush Administration is banking on the strong bipartisan support the nuclear initiative enjoys in the US Congress. Another argument it could use is that, technically, India can start cooperation with other NSG countries since it now has the waiver. Although sources said India would not, in the larger political interest, like the US to be kept out of high-tech trade with India — to ensure permanency of the waiver — agreements with Russia and France are ready and are likely to be signed within the next couple of months. This is where pressure will increase on the US Congress to act soon.
For the Bush Administration, the immediate step, however, is to submit seven Presidential determinations that certify completion of all pre-requisites stipulated by the Hyde Act. These include the credible separation plan, the NSG waiver, completion of all legal steps towards a safeguards agreement with IAEA, progress on discussions with IAEA on an Additional Protocol.
It’s learnt that these determinations are ready and will be submitted to the US Congress early next week along with the process of moving the Bill. Assuming these steps are completed, the two foreign relations committees in both chambers will carry out hearings. One is headed by Berman, the other by Joe Biden, a strong advocate of the deal. Once the committees clear them, they will be brought before the full Congress for a vote.
According to understanding between India and the US, New Delhi will sign the safeguards agreement only after the 123 agreement is over.
Thus, when we test, if we test in the future, Unkil won't be surprised and will have okayed it, like it okays Israel's bombing runs once in a while.
and 
about "179 countries" blah-blah, he conveniently ignores the fact that his own country, the US, outright rejected the CTBT, has unilaterally withdrawn from the ABM treaty, and is effectively withdrawing from the SALT and the START, and anyway, SALT and START don't deal with TNW. Pity that an Indian official was not present to juveniley cough "AQ Khan" and "Chinese Warhead" during that little speech.China, which seemed to threaten the entire process yesterday, stood up after the consensus decision was reached this morning here and read out a statement stating its “national position” that essentially urged countries to strive for a balance between non-proliferation and promoting civil nuclear energy cooperation
Sean, your idea is tactically correct of course. But, i must apologize first. I was being sarcastic and didn't say so in less subtler ways. The idea that we, India, have to import thorium technology or reactors over our own methods is, to say the least, disgusting. We are doing very well in that space and the govt. needs to do everything to accelerate our competitive advantage! If you caught on to that, then double apology!Sean wrote:Diversify as much as possible, with Russia being a major part of the mix. India should collaborate with Russia, USA, and France on thorium reactor technology but build them itself. This way issue of return of reactors does not arise when the relationship goes sour.samuel wrote:RaviBG,
We should be importing American or French thorium reactors a few years down the road too.
S
SILEX technology would actually be preferable to Uranium.The Australian government says it will trade nuclear technology with India but will not provide uranium.
Didn't know Canada was in the business of selling weapons grade plutoniumThe Nuclear Suppliers Group was set up in 1974 when India exploded a bomb using plutonium from Canada.
No. We took heavy water from China. That was one chankian move!John Snow wrote:and we gave heavy water to China