India nuclear news and discussion

[Philip]

Rajesh,RR,that is what many experts have been saying all along.Don't crawl for membership of anything,build up our home strength,warheads,delivery systems,etc., and they will come crawling later on!

As for the NSG and pressure upon those nations,in today's changed geo-political scenario,Russia will care two hoots about what the US feels.It will sell us reactors galore.So will the French,who take a more realistic view of the situ and would not want to forgo the largesse of orders from India.Bush is on his way out and so what do they have to care about? They can tell his successor that he was wrong to have imposed impossible conditions upon India when there are still so many violators of the nuclear regime and its inequality outside the N-club!

Just in and very relevant to the topic.We now need have no fear about Russia stepping in and assisting us in any N-way!With Medvedev coming in Dec.,this is the time to go for it if our good "spin-doctor" can manfully,painfully,about-turn his fascination for Dubya Bush and seek A comforting shoulder ,that of Russia's pres. !

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/w ... 821234.ece
Moscow quits sanction talks about Iran

Catherine Philp in New York
Russia pulled out of talks on tighter sanctions against Iran despite warnings yesterday that Tehran was racing towards producing a nuclear bomb.

The apparent failure of the diplomatic initiative leaves the West without a strategy to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Moscow pulled out of multilateral talks planned for today on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly amid tensions with the United States over Russia's military action in Georgia.

Washington said that the meeting between the five permanent Security Council members and Germany had been cancelled. France, however, urged the remaining parties to go ahead with the discussions.

Nuclear tests that will spread gloom
Russia defies West over nuclear Iran

The negotiations took on greater urgency yesterday as the European Union cautioned that Iran was moving ever closer to the capacity to arm a warhead with a nuclear core, despite its continued insistence that its nuclear programme was a peaceful one in pursuit of civilian energy.

Britain, Germany and France called the findings of the report on Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency “decidedly bleak”.

Tehran is continuing to enrich uranium in defiance of a UN ban, and UN inspectors are in despair at their inability to assess adequately its capabilities because of continued stonewalling.

“The report presents a decidedly bleak picture,” a statement said. “We now seem at a particularly critical juncture, with Iran now asserting there is nothing for the agency to investigate as far as possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme are concerned.”

The German Foreign Minister gave warning yesterday that the frosty state of US-Russian relations could imperil action on Iran for months to come and could further aggravate a range of pressing global problems that needed a multilateral approach.

Frank-Walter Steinmeier told reporters at the General Assembly that US-Russian co-operation was essential to bring pressure to bear on Tehran.

“I am very worried,” he said. “None of the international crises, from the Middle East to the Caucasus, Iran — we see it also in the six-party talks on North Korea — can be resolved if we do not have the two big players, Russia and the US, on board.”

He said that the decision by Washington to withdraw from a planned meeting of foreign ministers from the Group of Eight industrialised nations had prompted Russia to withdraw from talks today. “We're going in the wrong direction, I am completely convinced of that,” he said.

Diplomats from the six countries of the so-called 3+3 will meet instead of their foreign ministers. Mr Steinmeier said, however, that damage had already been done, with Tehran capitalising on the disunity of world powers.

“I see our common chance in being able to demonstrate the international community's decisiveness and unity to Iran,” he said. “That is difficult when we six are not speaking to each other. I see no more chance of that happening this week.”

Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, was preparing yesterday for what promised to be a tense encounter with her Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, with whom she has clashed repeatedly even before the Georgian crisis.

“We are obviously in a rocky period in our relations with Russia,” a senior American official said.

David Miliband will meet Mr Lavrov today — their first encounter since their now infamous telephone conversation during which the Russian swore at the Foreign Secretary in a decidedly undiplomatic exchange.

[RajeshA]

Phillip,

I guess the nuclear deal will always remain an issue of contention and much heated debate. People will debate, "What have we gained and what have we lost?" Since everybody has a slightly different vision for India: the Japanese Model vs the Independent Model vs the many gradations in between, everybody would give the gains and losses different weightage. Then there will be those, who will argue based on their political coloration, Congress, BJP or Commie view. Add to that the difference in nationalistic viewpoints on the road to greatness: economically facilitating international environment leads to stronger economy leads to overall increased national power, including military power and independence; versus stronger economy and military power leads to international clout leads to dismantling of sanctions. The first route stresses that the transition is accelerated while the second route stresses that the national fortitude is preserved.

Regardless of how one views this nuclear deal process, I think, one needs to come out of this cycle of international review of India's position in the world with maximized advantage.

In some respects, I would consider, this debate similar to the one in America and the Presidential Candidates on how to proceed with the troop withdrawal from Iraq. Obama believes that the War was unjustified and one should wash one's hand off it as quickly as possible so USA should withdraw asap. McCain believes that the War was executed poorly but he wants to still extricate a victory out of a misadventure.

I am with McCain on this one, because we may not have much of a choice. That is why, I am supportive of a Jekyll Act by Indian Parliament. We should try to hang America with its own rope and limit American nuclear business in India.

[Muppalla]

That is why, I am supportive of a Jekyll Act by Indian Parliament. We should try to hang America with its own rope and limit American nuclear business in India.

What is the use? Nuclear commerce with other countries is also controlled by uncle's clout.

[RajeshA]

That is why, I am supportive of a Jekyll Act by Indian Parliament. We should try to hang America with its own rope and limit American nuclear business in India.

What is the use? Nuclear commerce with other countries is also controlled by uncle's clout.

One purpose of the Jekyll Act is simply to build up a case for the American nuclear industry to put pressure on the US Congress to undertake changes in its Legislation regarding nuclear commerce with India. US Congress and US Administration have during the process created many rifts in Indian polity. The Jekyll Act can create a similar rift in USA where US Businesses feel that the US Congress has given them a $hitty deal.

Some other uses of a Jekyll Act, have been mentioned in previous posts also.

[Muppalla]

Jekyll Act is useful only when the following happens sequentially:

(1) if India goes with seperate agreements(123s) with each seller country. These 123s should mention clearly "inspite of US or others' influnece there should be no stoppage fuel" as part of the deals.
(2) After the various 123s they should boldly buy reactors and fuel in large scale from the countries that agreed to India. This will help the US Biz to put pressure on US congress.

I have serious doubt that (1) itself may not be a possibility as these countires have to ruffle Uncle's feathers. I don't expect France or any European country doing things in that fashion. Russia might do biz with India but we have to see how far they will go to help India these days.

[RajeshA]

Jekyll Act is useful only when the following happens sequentially:

(1) if India goes with seperate agreements(123s) with each seller country. These 123s should mention clearly "inspite of US or others' influnece there should be no stoppage fuel" as part of the deals.
(2) After the various 123s they should boldly buy reactors and fuel in large scale from the countries that agreed to India. This will help the US Biz to put pressure on US congress.

I have serious doubt that (1) itself may not be a possibility as these countires have to ruffle Uncle's feathers. I don't expect France or any European country doing things in that fashion. Russia might do biz with India but we have to see how far they will go to help India these days.

Yes, that is the intention. With France, India might sign an agreement on the 29th of September. With Russia it would in be December this year when Medvedew visits India.

[Philip]

The only problem with our own piece of nuclear legislation is that it will end up with us and the US talking at each other instead of to each other later on.Chaos and confusion will result and the entire relationship will be soured for decades.The goal should be a good equal partnership with the US and other NSG nations based upon a clear agreement.Yes,there are advantages to be "inside the tent",but not at the expense of an agreement that is so ambigous and open to dispute.MMS will win much plaudits if he asks for time to study the new clauses/conditions spelt out by the US,inasmuch as our own Parliament has every right to debate it as much as the US Congress has the right to impose conditions!

There is no need at all for India to now sign anything with the US in haste.We have the NSG approval to enter into agreements with France and Russia.The rest will follow once they smell the gravy train! We can keep the kettle on the boil as far as the agreement with the US goes,especially as a new president is shortly to take over and we have to see which way his face smiles towards India or not.

However,the N-deal is only the tip of the iceberg that is visible in the entire Indo-US realtionship proposed by the Bush neo-cons and enthusiastically agreed to by the good spin-doctor and the Congress hierarchy.A servile neo-colonial relationship that includes "twinning" India's military to US forces in its geo-strategic plans,a foreign policy that mirrors that of the US,also aimed at Iran and China,massive defence sales ,are just part of it all.The largesse that Pakistan and its leadership get above and below the table from the US for being "rent-boy" of the Indian sub-continent is what is attracting our equivalent species.

[ShauryaT]

economically facilitating international environment leads to stronger economy leads to overall increased national power, including military power and independence;

RajeshA: It will be more accurate to say: Higher economic power is the preferred way to sustainable higher military power. Ideally both reinforce each other. It is possible to attain higher economic power without accopmanied military power, ONLY IF, a nation, mortgages its security interests with another power. (like Japan).

Let us all stop playing with words. Strategic subservience is the route taken by MMS. What this means is that India will remain a status quo power. Its military capabilities will have limits and so will its national aspirations. Its geo-political goals can be achieved, only if, they are alligned and sanctioned by the US. MMS has chosen to exclusively focus on the economy, and keep our geo-political ambitions in abeyance.

There is another view, that we get in the tent and break out, after taking the benefits, when we are stronger. To me, that is a recipe for war with the United States, either directly or by proxy.

Cannot have it both ways. Many in the past have tried that strategy and FAILED.

[NRao]

Do not have the time to extract what is relevant, so here is S.3548, United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act (Placed on Calendar in Senate)

[NRao]

Looks like thsi is it:

S.3548
United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act (Placed on Calendar in Senate)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I--APPROVAL OF UNITED STATES-INDIA AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION ON PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Sec. 101. Approval of Agreement.

Sec. 102. Declarations of policy; certification requirement; rule of construction.

Sec. 103. Additional Protocol between India and the IAEA.

Sec. 104. Implementation of Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA.

Sec. 105. Modified reporting to Congress.

TITLE II--STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES NONPROLIFERATION LAW RELATING TO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

Sec. 201. Procedures regarding a subsequent arrangement on reprocessing.

Sec. 202. Initiatives and negotiations relating to agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Sec. 203. Actions required for resumption of peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Sec. 204. United States Government policy at the Nuclear Suppliers Group to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Sec. 205. Conforming amendments.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) AGREEMENT- The term `United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy' or `Agreement' means the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that was transmitted to Congress by the President on September 10, 2008.

(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES- The term `appropriate congressional committees' means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

TITLE I--APPROVAL OF UNITED STATES-INDIA AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION ON PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

SEC. 101. APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT.

(a) In General- Notwithstanding the provisions for congressional consideration and approval of a proposed agreement for cooperation in section 123 b. and d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153 (b) and (d)), Congress hereby approves the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, subject to subsection (b).

(b) Applicability of Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Hyde Act, and Other Provisions of Law- The Agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8001 et. seq; Public Law 109-401), and any other applicable United States law as if the Agreement had been approved pursuant to the provisions for congressional consideration and approval of a proposed agreement for cooperation in section 123 b. and d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(c) Sunset of Exemption Authority Under Hyde Act- Section 104(f) of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8003(f)) is amended by striking `the enactment of' and all that follows through `agreement' and inserting `the date of the enactment of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act'.

SEC. 102. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY; CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT; RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

(a) Declarations of Policy Relating to Meaning and Legal Effect of Agreement- Congress declares that it is the understanding of the United States that the provisions of the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy have the meanings conveyed in the authoritative representations provided by the President and his representatives to the Congress and its committees prior to September 20, 2008, regarding the meaning and legal effect of the Agreement.

(b) Declarations of Policy Relating to Transfer of Nuclear Equipment, Materials, and Technology to India- Congress makes the following declarations of policy:

(1) Pursuant to section 103(a)(6) of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8002(a)(6)), in the event that nuclear transfers to India are suspended or terminated pursuant to title I of such Act (22 U.S.C. 8001 et seq.), the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law, it is the policy of the United States to seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or from any other source.

(2) Pursuant to section 103(b)(10) of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8002(b)(10)), any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements.

(c) Certification Requirement- Before exchanging diplomatic notes pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Agreement, the President shall certify to Congress that entry into force and implementation of the Agreement pursuant to its terms is consistent with the obligation of the United States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly known as the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'), not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(d) Rule of Construction- Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to supersede the legal requirements of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

SEC. 103. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL BETWEEN INDIA AND THE IAEA.

Congress urges the Government of India to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies, at the earliest possible date.

SEC. 104. IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND THE IAEA.

Licenses may be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for transfers pursuant to the Agreement only after the President determines and certifies to Congress that--

(1) the Agreement Between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities, as approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on August 1, 2008 (the `Safeguards Agreement'), has entered into force; and

(2) the Government of India has filed a declaration of facilities pursuant to paragraph 13 of the Safeguards Agreement that is not materially inconsistent with the facilities and schedule described in paragraph 14 of the separation plan presented in the national parliament of India on May 11, 2006, taking into account the later initiation of safeguards than was anticipated in the separation plan.

SEC. 105. MODIFIED REPORTING TO CONGRESS.

(a) Information on Nuclear Activities of India- Subsection (g)(1) of section 104 of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8003) is amended--

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) as subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new subparagraph:

`(B) any material inconsistencies between the content or timeliness of notifications by the Government of India pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of the Safeguards Agreement and the facilities and schedule described in paragraph (14) of the separation plan presented in the national parliament of India on May 11, 2006, taking into account the later initiation of safeguards than was anticipated in the separation plan;'.

(b) Implementation and Compliance Report- Subsection (g)(2) of such section is amended--

(1) in subparagraph (K)(iv), by striking `and' at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (L), by striking the period at the end and inserting `; and'; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

`(M) with respect to the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter in this subparagraph referred to as the `Agreement') approved under section 101(a) of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act--

`(i) a listing of--

`(I) all provision of sensitive nuclear technology to India, and other such information as may be so designated by the United States or India under Article 1(Q); and

`(II) all facilities in India notified pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Agreement;

`(ii) a description of--

`(I) any agreed safeguards or any other form of verification for by-product material decided by mutual agreement pursuant to the terms of Article 1(A) of the Agreement;

`(II) research and development undertaken in such areas as may be agreed between the United States and India as detailed in Article 2(2)(a.) of the Agreement;

`(III) the civil nuclear cooperation activities undertaken under Article 2(2)(d.) of the Agreement;

`(IV) any United States efforts to help India develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel as called for in Article 2(2)(e.) of the Agreement;

`(V) any United States efforts to fulfill political commitments made in Article 5(6) of the Agreement;

`(VI) any negotiations that have occurred or are ongoing under Article 6(iii.) of the Agreement; and

`(VII) any transfers beyond the territorial jurisdiction of India pursuant to Article 7(2) of the Agreement, including a listing of the receiving country of each such transfer;

`(iii) an analysis of--

`(I) any instances in which the United States or India requested consultations arising from concerns over compliance with the provisions of Article 7(1) of the Agreement, and the results of such consultations; and

`(II) any matters not otherwise identified in this report that have become the subject of consultations pursuant to Article 13(2) of the Agreement, and a statement as to whether such matters were resolved by the end of the reporting period; and

`(iv) a statement as to whether--

`(I) any consultations are expected to occur under Article 16(5) of the Agreement; and

`(II) any enrichment is being carried out pursuant to Article 6 of the Agreement.'.

TITLE II--STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES NONPROLIFERATION LAW RELATING TO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

SEC. 201. PROCEDURES REGARDING A SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENT ON REPROCESSING.

(a) In General- Notwithstanding section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160), no proposed subsequent arrangement concerning arrangements and procedures regarding reprocessing or other alteration in form or content, as provided for in Article 6 of the Agreement, shall take effect until the requirements specified in subsection (b) are met.

(b) Requirements- The requirements referred to in subsection (a) are the following:

(1) The President transmits to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing--

(A) the reasons for entering into such proposed subsequent arrangement;

(B) a detailed description, including the text, of such proposed subsequent arrangement; and

(C) a certification that the United States will pursue efforts to ensure that any other nation that permits India to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material that the nation has transferred to India or nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or equipment that it has transferred to India requires India to do so under similar arrangements and procedures.

(2) A period of 30 days of continuous session (as defined by section 130 g.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159 (g)(2)) has elapsed after transmittal of the report required under paragraph (1).

(c) Resolution of Disapproval- Notwithstanding the requirements in subsection (b) having been met, a subsequent arrangement referred to in subsection (a) shall not become effective if during the time specified in subsection (b)(2), Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution stating in substance that Congress does not favor such subsequent arrangement. Any such resolution shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 i. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159 (i)), as amended by section 205 of this Act.

SEC. 202. INITIATIVES AND NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is amended by adding at the end the following:

`e. The President shall keep the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate fully and currently informed of any initiative or negotiations relating to a new or amended agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to this section (except an agreement arranged pursuant to section 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d., or an amendment thereto).'.

SEC. 203. ACTIONS REQUIRED FOR RESUMPTION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

Section 129 a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158 (a)) is amended by striking `Congress adopts a concurrent resolution' and inserting `Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution'.

SEC. 204. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY AT THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP TO STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME.

(a) Certification- Before exchanging diplomatic notes pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Agreement, the President shall certify to the appropriate congressional committees that it is the policy of the United States to work with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), individually and collectively, to agree to further restrict the transfers of equipment and technology related to the enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

(b) Peaceful Use Assurances for Certain By-Product Material- The President shall seek to achieve, by the earliest possible date, either within the NSG or with relevant NSG Participating Governments, the adoption of principles, reporting, and exchanges of information as may be appropriate to assure peaceful use and accounting of by-product material in a manner that is substantially equivalent to the relevant provisions of the Agreement.

(c) Report-

(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every six months thereafter, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on efforts by the United States pursuant to subsections (a) and (b).

(2) TERMINATION- The requirement to transmit the report under paragraph (1) terminates on the date on which the President transmits a report pursuant to such paragraph stating that the objectives in subsections (a) and (b) have been achieved.

SEC. 205. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

Section 130 i. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159 (i)) is amended--

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking `means a joint resolution' and all that follows through `, with the date' and inserting the following: `means--

`(A) for an agreement for cooperation pursuant to section 123 of this Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `That the Congress (does or does not) favor the proposed agreement for cooperation transmitted to the Congress by the President on XXXXX .',

`(B) for a determination under section 129 of this Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `That the Congress does not favor the determination transmitted to the Congress by the President on XXXXX .', or

`(C) for a subsequent arrangement under section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `That the Congress does not favor the subsequent arrangement to the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that was transmitted to Congress by the President on September 10, 2008.',

with the date'; and

(2) in paragraph (4)--

(A) by inserting after `45 days after its introduction' the following `(or in the case of a joint resolution related to a subsequent arrangement under section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, 15 days after its introduction)'; and

(B) by inserting after `45-day period' the following: `(or in the case of a joint resolution related to a subsequent arrangement under section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, 15-day period)'.
Calendar No. 1048


110th CONGRESS

2d Session

S. 3548

A BILL
To approve the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and for other purposes.

[Rupesh]

learn't a new jholawala word "social-Darwinist elite "

Nuclear hubris


PRAFUL BIDWAI


Nationalist euphoria over the NSG waiver will breed monumental arrogance, great-power delusions, and contempt for peace among our social-Darwinist elite.




THE headlines reporting the waiver granted to India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) from its nuclear trade rules could not have been more breathless or gung-ho – to the point of hysteria: “Nuclear apartheid ends”, “Nuclear dawn”, “India N-abled”, and so on. Even more excessive were the television and newspaper comments that followed.

This was India’s Moment of Triumph, its arrival on the world stage as The Sixth Power, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s “Second Revolution” (the first being the 1991 neoliberal policy), as well as the world’s acceptance of India’s indispensability as a fully-paid member of the cabal that sits at its High Table.

Why else would the major powers, which set up the NSG in response to the Indian nuclear test of 1974, now bend over backwards to legitimise India’s nuclear weapons and agree to resume nuclear trade with it by granting it the “clean and unconditional waiver” it wanted? Why should they accommodate India into the world’s apex power structure unless they genuinely respect its strategic importance, its burgeoning economy, its “unimpeachable” non-proliferation record, its robust democracy, and growing status as a “knowledge-based” society, much like the United States?

For supporters of the waiver, and more generally, of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, a major point to celebrate was that India did not merely win a moral victory at Vienna. It played the power game, ruthlessly and consummately, and demonstrated it does not lack “the killer instinct”, which does not come easily to this “non-violent and peace-loving” land. India must now savour this power and its exercise – in a word, flex its muscle and make the transition to Great Powerdom that it has shied from making.

The NSG waiver was going to be an uphill task. It did not go through at first shot, on August 21-22, because as many as 20-odd of the NSG’s 45 member-states moved more than 50 amendments to the U.S.-drafted resolution. Besides, a “like-minded” group of six states – Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland – crystallised, which led the opposition. The group was cautious and stressed that it was all in favour of the waiver but wanted to weave it in with the NSG’s all-important non-proliferation objectives.

The U.S. and India jointly managed to break the solidarity of the “like-minded”. The U.S. used crude, raw power, thuggish tactics (what else is ‘strong arming’?), and all manner of threats. The pressure it exercised was described as “brutal and unconscionable” by former United Nations Disarmament Undersecretary Jayantha Dhanapala. Regrettably, India too used ‘with-us-or-against-us’ threats – in a sharp, shameful departure from its normal diplomatic approaches based on reasoning and invocation of universal principles.

On September 5, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee issued a statement saying that India had always believed in nuclear disarmament, and opposed proliferation and an arms race. This, it was claimed, brought about a change of heart among the dissenting six and others, eventually ensuring the victory of ‘sweet reason’.

Pranab Mukherjee’s statement does not square up with India’s record in initiating and sustaining a nuclear race in South Asia for three decades. Nor did he offer the much-sought legally binding commitment not to test. He only reiterated India’s unilateral moratorium, which can be lifted easily and unilaterally. The plain truth is that the waiver was not a victory for India based on a shared commitment with the NSG to nuclear arms control, restraint and non-proliferation. It was a triumph of crass realpolitik, based on bribery, muscle power and coercion.

Pranab Mukherjee’s statement, however, offered an opportunity to many NSG member-states, including Japan and Germany, to enter reservations in the form of “national statements”. They interpreted it to mean that nuclear cooperation with India would cease in case India tested. According to reports, there was also an informal understanding amongst many NSG members that they would not transfer “sensitive” technologies such as uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing to India.

Is the waiver, then, “clean and unconditional”, as India all along insisted? Strictly speaking, no. India formally accepted only one of the three conditions proposed by NSG dissenters: periodic review of compliance with its non-proliferation commitments. But the other two conditions – exclusion of enrichment and reprocessing from nuclear trade, and terminating trade in the event of testing – were inserted into the “national statements”.

Since then, some of the euphoria over the waiver has been dampened by the realisation that it was not quite unconditional, and that the U.S. is stalling over honouring the commitments made in the 123 Agreement, which it says are only “political” and not legally binding. Whether this is only a tactic to sweeten the 123 Agreement for the consumption of the U.S. Congress before it ratifies it, or a line drawn in stone, will soon become clear.

However, another media campaign has now broken out, which insinuates that the George W. Bush administration was never entirely serious or unanimous about pushing the deal through on the terms agreed with India, and that a certain “non-proliferation lobby” or “the non-proliferation underground” has been active in ensuring that the Hyde Act prevails over the 123 Agreement as far as Congress goes. This has the potential of nullifying a substantial part of the deal, one which concerns the leading power that took the initiative in proposing it and piloting it through numerous fora.

Yet, none of this is likely to temper the irrational exuberance of the powerful pro-deal lobby, which sees the waiver as a sign of India’s triumph and rectification of a historic wrong via the lifting of “unfair” sanctions through which “innocent India” was punished for conducting the 1974 test. But contrary to received wisdom, rather propaganda, India did not conduct the test by using “indigenously developed” materials or self-reliant technologies.

The critical materials were imported or illegitimately procured. The plutonium for the test came from the CIRUS reactor built with Canadian-U.S. assistance, which was only meant for “peaceful purposes”. Hence, the hypocritical “peaceful nuclear explosion” description. In reality, India had cheated the world by diverting civilian material to military use – thus becoming a proliferator.

Unfortunately, the NSG made a dangerous distinction between “good” and “bad” proliferators and rewarded India for being Washington’s friend. Tomorrow, another country could exploit the same distinction. This will undermine the global non-proliferation norm. What of the claim that the deal will bring India into the global “non-proliferation mainstream”? The deal will do nothing of the sort. It will allow India to produce more bomb-grade material. Under it, India will separate military-nuclear facilities from civilian ones.

However, India will only put 14 of its 22 operating/planned civilian reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. It can use the remaining eight to produce weapons-grade plutonium – estimated as enough for 40 Nagasaki-type bombs annually. India can produce additional bomb-fuel from military-nuclear facilities and fast-breeders.

This makes nonsense of India’s professed “credible minimum deterrent”, understood as a few dozen weapons. (How many bombs would it take to flatten five Chinese or Pakistani cities? 15, 20, 50?) India already has an estimated 100 to 150. Adding to them will accelerate the vicious nuclear arms race with Pakistan, and more ominously, with China. Yet, the mainstream Indian nuclear debate reflects none of these anomalies, hypocrisies and contradictions.

The nuclear hawks are jubilant that even if the 123 Agreement is not quickly ratified by the U.S. Congress, the NSG waiver will remain a major achievement – and a tribute to India’s rising power in the world. It effectively allows India not only to keep its nuclear weapons, but to expand its atomic arsenal although it is not a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – the only state to have that privilege.

This mindless celebration of power, that too of power based on mass-destruction capabilities, represents a serious retrogression from the ethical and political imperative of a nuclear weapons-free world. It is profoundly tragic and deplorable that within this framework, India’s growing power is separated from its larger, global and universal, purposes. It is not the kind of power that can be used to make the world a better place, only to threaten non-combatant civilians with mass annihilation.

It is not a sign of policymakers and shapers in a responsible rising power that they should be oblivious to the consequences of a narrow, parochial decision that helps their weapons arsenal but harms the world. Quite simply, the Indian elite has erased its own memory. Nuclear weapons are nothing to be proud of. They are an unmitigated evil and must be eliminated. So greatly is it in the thrall of social Darwinism that it has come to believe that nuclear weapons give security, prestige, real power and even respect. This is reflected in the mainstream nuclear debate, too, where the dimension of peace and disarmament has been absent – unlike after the 1998 tests.

The sad truth is that by making the peace dimension disappear from public discourse, the United Progressive Alliance has achieved what the far more right-wing National Democratic Alliance could not

http://www.frontlineonnet.com/stories/2 ... 010500.htm

[RajeshA]

The only problem with our own piece of nuclear legislation is that it will end up with us and the US talking at each other instead of to each other later on.Chaos and confusion will result and the entire relationship will be soured for decades.The goal should be a good equal partnership with the US and other NSG nations based upon a clear agreement.

Philip,

That is exactly how one negotiates, when the other is not listening. One changes the situation in such a way, that the attention of the other is stimulated. Then one creates an incentive in one's pocket and a lobby behind the negotiator's lines. One ensures that there is a budding relationship and the environment is conducive to friendly discussions. And then one negotiates hard. If no pinprick is left after the current negotiations cycle, then the laws and policies would again get frozen in time, to our detriment. If there is some pinprick, the issue would be revisited.

Yes,there are advantages to be "inside the tent",but not at the expense of an agreement that is so ambigous and open to dispute.MMS will win much plaudits if he asks for time to study the new clauses/conditions spelt out by the US,inasmuch as our own Parliament has every right to debate it as much as the US Congress has the right to impose conditions!

There is no need at all for India to now sign anything with the US in haste.We have the NSG approval to enter into agreements with France and Russia.The rest will follow once they smell the gravy train! We can keep the kettle on the boil as far as the agreement with the US goes,especially as a new president is shortly to take over and we have to see which way his face smiles towards India or not.

This way, one only wins a few more months time, while frustrating and provoking the Americans. They will feel betrayed, that Indians have taken their gifts (NSG Waiver) and not returned the favor. The bonhomie could evaporate very quickly. It will be far better, if India allows the deal to go through, just as the Americans are allowing, but put in our own conditionalities and hurdles. It is better that US Business is the one breathing down the necks of US Congress, rather than the Administration down the necks of GoI. They gave us a deal, we give them a deal. They gave us an imperfect deal, we give them an imperfect deal.

However,the N-deal is only the tip of the iceberg that is visible in the entire Indo-US realtionship proposed by the Bush neo-cons and enthusiastically agreed to by the good spin-doctor and the Congress hierarchy.A servile neo-colonial relationship that includes "twinning" India's military to US forces in its geo-strategic plans,a foreign policy that mirrors that of the US,also aimed at Iran and China,massive defence sales ,are just part of it all.The largesse that Pakistan and its leadership get above and below the table from the US for being "rent-boy" of the Indian sub-continent is what is attracting our equivalent species.

In the aftermath of this deal, this is indeed a widely supported view. I do think, that because of a fractured polity in India, too much closeness with USA would not be possible. The elections are approaching. The euphoria of having Amreeka as our new best friend would soon evaporate. We will recover our posture soon enough.

The Jekyll Act and some ensuing rancour can help in recovering our backbone sooner rather than later.

[ezra]

Mmm why is America so eager to provide nuclear technology at this point in time?

All that glitters is not gold

[sivab]

http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/st ... 56:00%20PM

N-deal tabled in House of Representatives
Barkha Dutt
Thursday, September 25, 2008, (New York)
The Indo-US nuclear deal has been tabled in the House of Representatives. Republican Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced what is called a companion Bill that is the identical Bill that was passed by the Senate committee on Wednesday.

National Security Advisor M K Narayanan, Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and special envoy Shyam Saran have left for Washington. They will meet America's National security advisor to push harder for the deal.

In about less than twenty-four hours the Bill is set to get the approval of the House of Senate. (Watch)

However, there may be some changes in the language of the Senate Bill.

The text under question uses strong words that says America will prevent the transfer of nuclear fuel and technology from the NSG countries to India if India conducts nuclear tests. It also says that the deal will be subject to provisions of the Hyde act and other US laws.

This is not the first time India and America have differed on this issue. Nuclear fuel supply assurances has been a controversial issue here in the US too with some Congressmen threatening to block approval of the deal until they are sure that it conforms to the Hyde act.

India has all along maintained that the only wording that concerns then is that of the 123 agreement and every thing else are internal American concerns. Prime Minister Singh perhaps explained it best when he said that India has a right to test and America has a right to respond.

Sources say that tough negotiations are on behind the scenes, and that India has made its reservations clear to the US.

Final statement by US President George W Bush can override any change of language in the Senate Bill, sources told.

[vishwakarmaa]

Once again.

An explicit condition was included in 'Berman Bill' being considered in Congress right now. Now, a news ticker says its being omitted.

Any update?

[sanjaykumar]

Hasn't Praful learnt that he is now totaly irrelevant-the clown wont stop barking his song of woe.

[NRao]

For what it is worth, the House version. I have not compared it to the Senate bill:

United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act (Introduced in House)

HR 7039 IH


110th CONGRESS

2d Session

H. R. 7039
To approve the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and for other purposes.


IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

September 24, 2008
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. BOEHNER, Mr. BLUNT, Mr. MCCOTTER, Mr. FORTUN.AE6O, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. KIRK, and Mr. ROYCE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


A BILL
To approve the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, and for other purposes.


Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the `United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act'.

(b) Table of Contents- The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

TITLE I--APPROVAL OF UNITED STATES-INDIA AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION ON PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Sec. 101. Approval of Agreement.

Sec. 102. Declarations of policy; certification requirement; rule of construction.

Sec. 103. Additional Protocol between India and the IAEA.

Sec. 104. Implementation of Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA.

Sec. 105. Modified reporting to Congress.

TITLE II--STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES NONPROLIFERATION LAW RELATING TO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

Sec. 201. Procedures regarding a subsequent arrangement on reprocessing.

Sec. 202. Initiatives and negotiations relating to agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Sec. 203. Actions required for resumption of peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Sec. 204. United States Government policy at the Nuclear Suppliers Group to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Sec. 205. Conforming amendments.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) AGREEMENT- The term `United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy' or `Agreement' means the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that was transmitted to Congress by the President on September 10, 2008.

(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES- The term `appropriate congressional committees' means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

TITLE I--APPROVAL OF UNITED STATES-INDIA AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION ON PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

SEC. 101. APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT.

(a) In General- Notwithstanding the provisions for congressional consideration and approval of a proposed agreement for cooperation in section 123 b. and d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153 (b) and (d)), Congress hereby approves the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, subject to subsection (b).

(b) Applicability of Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Hyde Act, and Other Provisions of Law- The Agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8001 et. seq; Public Law 109-401), and any other applicable United States law as if the Agreement had been approved pursuant to the provisions for congressional consideration and approval of a proposed agreement for cooperation in section 123 b. and d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(c) Sunset of Exemption Authority Under Hyde Act- Section 104(f) of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8003(f)) is amended by striking `the enactment of' and all that follows through `agreement' and inserting `the date of the enactment of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act'.

SEC. 102. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY; CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT; RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

(a) Declarations of Policy Relating to Meaning and Legal Effect of Agreement- Congress declares that it is the understanding of the United States that the provisions of the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy have the meanings conveyed in the authoritative representations provided by the President and his representatives to the Congress and its committees prior to September 20, 2008, regarding the meaning and legal effect of the Agreement.

(b) Declarations of Policy Relating to Transfer of Nuclear Equipment, Materials, and Technology to India- Congress makes the following declarations of policy:

(1) Pursuant to section 103(a)(6) of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8002(a)(6)), in the event that nuclear transfers to India are suspended or terminated pursuant to title I of such Act (22 U.S.C. 8001 et seq.), the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law, it is the policy of the United States to seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or from any other source.

(2) Pursuant to section 103(b)(10) of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8002(b)(10)), any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements.

(c) Certification Requirement- Before exchanging diplomatic notes pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Agreement, the President shall certify to Congress that entry into force and implementation of the Agreement pursuant to its terms is consistent with the obligation of the United States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (commonly known as the `Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'), not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(d) Rule of Construction- Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to supersede the legal requirements of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

SEC. 103. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL BETWEEN INDIA AND THE IAEA.

Congress urges the Government of India to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies, at the earliest possible date.

SEC. 104. IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND THE IAEA.

Licenses may be issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for transfers pursuant to the Agreement only after the President determines and certifies to Congress that--

(1) the Agreement Between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities, as approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on August 1, 2008 (the `Safeguards Agreement'), has entered into force; and

(2) the Government of India has filed a declaration of facilities pursuant to paragraph 13 of the Safeguards Agreement that is not materially inconsistent with the plan described in India's Separation Plan tabled in Parliament on May 11, 2006, taking into account the later initiation of safeguards than was anticipated in the Separation Plan.

SEC. 105. MODIFIED REPORTING TO CONGRESS.

(a) Information on Nuclear Activities of India- Subsection (g)(1) of section 104 of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8003) is amended--

(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) as subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E), respectively; and

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new subparagraph:

`(B) any material inconsistencies between the content or timeliness of notifications by the Government of India pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of the Safeguards Agreement and the facilities and schedule described in paragraph (14) of the separation plan presented in the national parliament of India on May 11, 2006, taking into account the later initiation of safeguards than was anticipated in the Separation Plan;'.

(b) Implementation and Compliance Report- Subsection (g)(2) of such section is amended--

(1) in subparagraph (K)(iv), by striking `and' at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (L), by striking the period at the end and inserting `; and'; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

`(M) with respect to the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (hereinafter in this subparagraph referred to as the `Agreement') approved under section 101(a) of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act--

`(i) a listing of--

`(I) all provision of sensitive nuclear technology to India, and other such information as may be so designated by the United States or India under Article 1(Q); and

`(II) all facilities in India notified pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Agreement;

`(ii) a description of--

`(I) any agreed safeguards or any other form of verification for by-product material decided by mutual agreement pursuant to the terms of Article 1(A) of the Agreement;

`(II) research and development undertaken in such areas as may be agreed between the United States and India as detailed in Article 2(2)(a.) of the Agreement;

`(III) the civil nuclear cooperation activities undertaken under Article 2(2)(d.) of the Agreement;

`(IV) any United States efforts to help India develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel as called for in Article 2(2)(e.) of the Agreement;

`(V) any United States efforts to fulfill political commitments made in Article 5(6) of the Agreement;

`(VI) any negotiations that have occurred or are ongoing under Article 6(iii.) of the Agreement; and

`(VII) any transfers beyond the territorial jurisdiction of India pursuant to Article 7(2) of the Agreement, including a listing of the receiving country of each such transfer;

`(iii) an analysis of--

`(I) any instances in which the United States or India requested consultations arising from concerns over compliance with the provisions of Article 7(1) of the Agreement, and the results of such consultations; and

`(II) any matters not otherwise identified in this report that have become the subject of consultations pursuant to Article 13(2) of the Agreement, and a statement as to whether such matters were resolved by the end of the reporting period; and

`(iv) a statement as to whether--

`(I) any consultations are expected to occur under Article 16(5) of the Agreement; and

`(II) any enrichment is being carried out pursuant to Article 6 of the Agreement.'.

TITLE II--STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES NONPROLIFERATION LAW RELATING TO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

SEC. 201. PROCEDURES REGARDING A SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENT ON REPROCESSING.

(a) In General- Notwithstanding section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160), no proposed subsequent arrangement concerning arrangements and procedures regarding reprocessing or other alteration in form or content, as provided for in Article 6 of the Agreement, shall take effect until the requirements specified in subsection (b) are met.

(b) Requirements- The requirements referred to in subsection (a) are the following:

(1) The President transmits to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing--

(A) the reasons for entering into such proposed subsequent arrangement;

(B) a detailed description, including the text, of such proposed subsequent arrangement; and

(C) a certification that the United States will pursue efforts to ensure that any other nation that permits India to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material that the nation has transferred to India or nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or equipment that it has transferred to India requires India to do so under similar arrangements and procedures.

(2) A period of 30 days of continuous session (as defined by section 130 g.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159 (g)(2)) has elapsed after transmittal of the report required under paragraph (1).

(c) Resolution of Disapproval- Notwithstanding the requirements in subsection (b) having been met, a subsequent arrangement referred to in subsection (a) shall not become effective if during the time specified in subsection (b)(2), Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution stating in substance that Congress does not favor such subsequent arrangement. Any such resolution shall be considered pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130 i. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159 (i)), as amended by section 205 of this Act.

SEC. 202. INITIATIVES AND NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO AGREEMENTS FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is amended by adding at the end the following:

`e. The President shall keep the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate fully and currently informed of any initiative or negotiations relating to a new or amended agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to this section (except an agreement arranged pursuant to section 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d., or an amendment thereto).'.

SEC. 203. ACTIONS REQUIRED FOR RESUMPTION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

Section 129 a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158 (a)) is amended by striking `Congress adopts a concurrent resolution' and inserting `Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a joint resolution'.

SEC. 204. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY AT THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP TO STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME.

(a) Certification- Before exchanging diplomatic notes pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Agreement, the President shall certify to the appropriate congressional committees that it is the policy of the United States to work with members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), individually and collectively, to agree to further restrict the transfers of equipment and technology related to the enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

(b) Peaceful Use Assurances for Certain By-Product Material- The President shall seek to achieve, by the earliest possible date, either within the NSG or with relevant NSG Participating Governments, the adoption of principles, reporting, and exchanges of information as may be appropriate to assure peaceful use and accounting of by-product material in a manner that is substantially equivalent to the relevant provisions of the Agreement.

(c) Report-

(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every six months thereafter, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on efforts by the United States pursuant to subsections (a) and (b).

(2) TERMINATION- The requirement to transmit the report under paragraph (1) terminates on the date on which the President transmits a report pursuant to such paragraph stating that the objectives in subsections (a) and (b) have been achieved.

SEC. 205. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

Section 130 i. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2159 (i)) is amended--

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking `means a joint resolution' and all that follows through `, with the date' and inserting the following: `means--

`(A) for an agreement for cooperation pursuant to section 123 of this Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `That the Congress (does or does not) favor the proposed agreement for cooperation transmitted to the Congress by the President on XXXXX .',

`(B) for a determination under section 129 of this Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `That the Congress does not favor the determination transmitted to the Congress by the President on XXXXX .', or

`(C) for a subsequent arrangement under section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, a joint resolution, the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `That the Congress does not favor the subsequent arrangement to the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that was transmitted to Congress by the President on September 10, 2008.',

with the date'; and

(2) in paragraph (4)--

(A) by inserting after `45 days after its introduction' the following `(or in the case of a joint resolution related to a subsequent arrangement under section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, 15 days after its introduction)'; and

(B) by inserting after `45-day period' the following: `(or in the case of a joint resolution related to a subsequent arrangement under section 201 of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, 15-day period)'.

[NRao]

No expert, but I think the following completes the circling, along with the NSG statement:

SEC. 101. APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT.

(a) In General- Notwithstanding the provisions for congressional consideration and approval of a proposed agreement for cooperation in section 123 b. and d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153 (b) and (d)), Congress hereby approves the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, subject to subsection (b).

(b) Applicability of Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Hyde Act, and Other Provisions of Law- The Agreement shall be subject to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8001 et. seq; Public Law 109-401), and any other applicable United States law as if the Agreement had been approved pursuant to the provisions for congressional consideration and approval of a proposed agreement for cooperation in section 123 b. and d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(c) Sunset of Exemption Authority Under Hyde Act- Section 104(f) of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8003(f)) is amended by striking `the enactment of' and all that follows through `agreement' and inserting `the date of the enactment of the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act'.

Seems to me that the 123 "The Agreement" "shall be subject to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8001 et. seq; Public Law 109-401), and any other applicable United States law as if the Agreement had been approved pursuant to the provisions for congressional consideration and approval of a proposed agreement for cooperation in section 123 b. and d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954."

IF I am reading that correctly, 123 has no standing any more -granted from the US point of view.

IF my read is right, then this closes all loop holes from the US side. The NSG statementS complete those from abroad.

It does not say India cannot test. But, IF India does test, then the consequences on the civilian side could be devastating.

India will need some good leaders here on out. Perhaps we should buy a car dealership for Rahulji?

[ramana]

Only deathly silence ? Where are the usual boosters? And how is it in the nether lands?

[RajeshA]

Only deathly silence ? Where are the usual boosters? And how is it in the nether lands?

Ramana Sir, that is the quiet before the storm. Either that or people have lost interest already.

[ramana]

Not really. SS Menon in DC

India downplays provisions in the Senate bill

India downplays provisions in the Senate bill
New York (PTI): India on Thursday sought to downplay the controversial provisions of a bill cleared by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Indo-US nuclear deal with a rider that will prevent the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials or technology from the NSG countries or any other source in the event of New Delhi conducting a test.

"I would not like to comment on their internal process," Foreign Secretary Shivshanker Menon told reporters when asked for the Indian government's reaction to the Senate Committee's clearance of a bill with a rider.

"We are not going to comment on what they (Congress) do internally," he said.

Menon also reiterated the government's position that "we have the right to (nuclear) test and they (US) have the right to react."

See the links below in the article.

Menon's reponse is either shell shocked or he knows something others dont. Eitherway it will drive the NPAS mad!

[nkumar]

The response of GoI is now bordering on idiocy. The have this standard response, "We have the right to test and they have the right to react", for every query! US keeps shifting the goalpost and these guys keep repeating their std response. I wonder what happened to the other std phrases - "This deal is about full civilian nuclear cooperation" , "This deal will bring us energy security" , "US and India will assume same rights and responsibilities" , "Hyde is an internal law of US", "Have faith and look at the final agreement" and other such nonsense. Can anyone in his/her wildest dream claim that this is what GoI expected from J18? Never before in the history of independent India we had such prostrating govt.

[p_saggu]

GOI Babus seem to have a fetish for this Nuclear Testing Right that India has somehow managed to preserve through the rigours of this entire deal making. As if it matters so much to some of the powers that be.
So who does it matter to anyhow.
The electorate?
Most were happy that we tested the Bomb in 1998. We had explosions of self esteem, period. nothing to add further if you talk to the ordinary educated man on the street.

We on BRF or other similary sundry?
Seriously some of the guys here have serious links, are part of the think tanks. But GOI is a bird that eats the worms it likes, not what someone else cooked up.

The Nuclear Sci community?
These were the ones who were hushed up in a hurry. There is more to this testing issue than meets the eye. I mean, I have sufficient faith in Indian Sci-comm's ability to churn out several workable Thermonuclear designs simply based on precedence (If 5 monkeys could do it, surely the sixth could too). That however is not the issue that bugs the end users.

The end users?
It is hard to imagine the Armed forces, so stuffed up with weapon specs that they force weapon vendors to endlessly endure testing rounds of their wares to have quietly accepted the designs that DRDO-BARC have given them. All I am saying is that whatever the weapon designs are Shuddh-Indian / Phoreign design obtained through collaboration/espionage/co-development, need to be proven to the end user.
If the end-users are gung-ho about the maal they have, they know something we don't.

Or perhaps the babus are doing this to remind the americans that we do plan to have one final round of testing in the future, and ya know "we told you so many times"

[RajeshA]

Not really. SS Menon in DC

India downplays provisions in the Senate bill

India downplays provisions in the Senate bill
New York (PTI): India on Thursday sought to downplay the controversial provisions of a bill cleared by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Indo-US nuclear deal with a rider that will prevent the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials or technology from the NSG countries or any other source in the event of New Delhi conducting a test.

"I would not like to comment on their internal process," Foreign Secretary Shivshanker Menon told reporters when asked for the Indian government's reaction to the Senate Committee's clearance of a bill with a rider.

"We are not going to comment on what they (Congress) do internally," he said.

Menon also reiterated the government's position that "we have the right to (nuclear) test and they (US) have the right to react."

See the links below in the article.

Menon's reponse is either shell shocked or he knows something others dont. Eitherway it will drive the NPAS mad!

And all the time, I thought the Babus are saving their ammunition for the moment when they will put up their last stand, when they will take out that Ace out of their sleeves!

Shivshanker's response is depressing. In the end, he destroyed his legacy of astuteness and loyalty to the national cause, even though he, along with others, brought the trophy home, albeit broken and scratchy.

Now that the fog of the future is gone from the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, the Government's explanations and arguments have lost both logic and the benefit of the doubt.

I sincerely hope, that GoI is not morbid with paralysis, because of this Unka Namak Khaya Hai (NSG Waiver) mentality, and Sarkar cannot be annoyed, because if it is so, then that is the tunnel to Hell.

[Gerard]

India to showcase thorium technology at IAEA meet

[Rye]

If India becomes a supplier nation in the NSG down the line, it would seem that all these additions to the Senate bill w.r.t. NSG would be rendered irrelevant.

[John Snow]

Unless India proliferates It won't be NS nuke Supplier.
Once you supply you become A. Member of NSG.
Then you access everthing you ever wanted.
Then you become like PRC and sign NPT

That's what I said in earlier posts

[anishns]

PM meets Bush; no signing of N-deal

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/PM_m ... 528821.cms

Indications that the agreement may not be inked during the meeting were given by David Mulford, US Ambassador to India, who received Singh at the Andrews Air Force base here.

"I can't predict when the 123 agreement would be cleared by the Congress," he told reporters but went on to add, "It is not impossible that the deal will get ratified by the end of the current session." The session which is scheduled to end on September 26, is expected to be extended by a week.

"So far, the signs have been positive. The very fact that the deal is moving forward in the Congress is a tribute to the US Congress despite its pre-occupation with the trillion-dollar financial bailout package," he said.

"There is reasonable prospect for action by the Congress," the envoy said in the context of the deal going forward.

[Arun_S]

Only deathly silence ? Where are the usual boosters? And how is it in the nether lands?

Ramana Sir, that is the quiet before the storm. Either that or people have lost interest already.

No saar, Snake-Oil sellers "ko Sarp Soongh Gaya Hai" ({Hindi: frozen in fright like when person is woken up by a deadly snake that just sniffes by without biting}.
In some ways akin to cognitive dissonance upon realizing "Koylay Ki Dalaali Main Haath Kala".

[Arun_S]

Now that the fog of the future is gone from the Indo-US Nuclear Deal, the Government's explanations and arguments have lost both logic and the benefit of the doubt.

I sincerely hope, that GoI is not morbid with paralysis, because of this Unka Namak Khaya Hai (NSG Waiver) mentality, and Sarkar cannot be annoyed, because if it is so, then that is the tunnel to Hell.

So very true.

[Suraj]

Jeffrey Emmelt, the CEO of General Electric, writes in favour of the deal in Bloomberg;
Congress Should Back U.S.-India Nuclear Power Deal: Jeff Immelt

In the U.S.-India agreement on civilian nuclear-power cooperation, Congress has the opportunity to create thousands of U.S. high-tech jobs, to encourage adoption of the safest, non-polluting energy-generation technology and to help solve the energy needs of India's 1 billion people. It also would solidify relations with a key democratic ally.

In a time of market turmoil and economic instability, this is a remarkable opportunity for the U.S. and a rising economic partner. It must not be missed. Congress should approve the agreement as soon as possible.

Finding a solution to India's mounting energy needs is more important than ever. As one of the world's fastest-growing economies, India has an escalating power demand that is straining international energy supplies. Unchanged, this demand will be met with a greater reliance on fossil fuels, squeezing global oil prices while exacerbating greenhouse-gas emissions.

India understands this. So does the international Nuclear Suppliers Group, or NSG, those countries seeking to contribute to non-proliferation through the implementation of guidelines for nuclear-related exports.

Earlier this month, the NSG waived a 34-year ban on nuclear technology trade with India, giving it access to nuclear services from suppliers around the world. For the U.S., there remains one problem: Without congressional approval, the NSG waiver is moot, as U.S. firms and their employees will, by law, be forced to sit on the sidelines.

Reactor Construction

The agreement is good for the U.S.-India relationship, good for global energy policy and security and good for U.S. jobs. It opens up prospects for U.S. companies to supply potentially billions of dollars worth of reactor technology, fuel and other services to India -- especially given the ambitious nuclear-plant construction program planned by India. About 30 domestic and foreign-supplied reactors may be built by 2030 alone.

As chief executive officer of a company making this technology, I want to retain and hire those workers who can build the products that will help India realize its future. Preventing U.S. companies from competing with international suppliers isn't sensible policy. It risks thousands of high-paying jobs and would diminish the U.S.'s ability to participate in India's peaceful nuclear-power development.

Refusal to approve this agreement would also miss an opportunity to expand the broader U.S.-India trade relationship.

Lackluster Trade

For decades, trade between these two great democracies was lackluster. In 2000, the U.S.'s bilateral goods trade with India was around $14 billion -- less than our trade with Ireland or Venezuela. Today, thanks to concerted efforts by the U.S. and Indian governments, bilateral trade has almost tripled. Still, this is far less than it should be for two of the world's most dynamic economies.

Because nuclear energy can meet so many of India's energy and economic needs, this trade agreement has significance that resonates beyond a single industry. The agreement, if adopted, will strengthen the economic, strategic and diplomatic ties between the world's two largest democracies. To fail to approve the agreement would undermine the goodwill generated in India by U.S. efforts to conclude an agreement.

The U.S. government, and Congress specifically, deserve praise for their hard work in getting us to this point. After all, it was Congress that voted, overwhelmingly and on a bipartisan basis, to support the launch of negotiations two years ago. Now Congress must do its final part by approving this agreement expeditiously. A signed U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement will signal a new era in U.S.-India relations. This is a rare opportunity that must not be missed.

[ramana]

Yeah but how does he hope for trade with such poison pills in the enabling legislation? I think he hasn't done his job well in presenting his case. Also to ponder that US was able to convince the 4 nation NSG members most of whom are prominet members of the AQK proliferation network to vote for the waiver but is unable to convince its own legislators about the importance of a clean waiver. Something is not right. The US exectuive and legislative dont want to do nuke commerce with India. There is something deeply wrong with the picture. And the silence of the lambs is quite compelling.

[NRao]

Why is anyone surprised? Changing any law makes India a NWS, which was never the intent, else J18 would have been codified on day one.

Hopefully India will now wake up from her chai-biscut, bollywood, lack of any appreciable medals in the Olympics, etc sleep.

The good news is that India will get Uranium. Who cares about testing now? Build an economy and infrastructure that no one can deny. Perhaps 2010 Asiad is a good start. Else even all the electricity in 2050 will be useless. India had enough funds to buy more planes than anyone, but had to return many because of lack of infrastructure.

No infrastructure, no respect, no good deals.

Should have made that stand at J-18.

[AnantD]

The US exectuive and legislative dont want to do nuke commerce with India. There is something deeply wrong with the picture.

The legislative Branch can't agree on anything, and I can vouch for that. What seems to be cut and dry always gets opposition and someone trying to throw their 2 cents in. It could be for several reasons, but mainly because they can get away with it politically. There is absolutely nothing new with this.

Theoretically, if India gets self-sufficient in nuclear fuel, not necessarily uranium, one day in the future, and has enough tech to build 100% indigenous, they can rip up all the nook related treaties and test 365 days a year. Not that it would make any sense even from a stricticly nuke deterrent POV to do that.

Israel has nukes and it never tests. I don't think theyr'e worried about yields etc.

Noko just signed a deal and now has the IAEA taking the seals of Pyongyang. And who's going to do anything about it. Wonder what made them change their attitude this time.

[NRao]

AnantD,

It is never as simple as that. A simple travel advisory would still be enough. The ONLY way out is for India to get self sufficient SOON. Else India will always be at the beck and call.

Even with these poison pills India still has a chance to break loose. But, an un-fragmented India needs to move. What is testing alone going to do? An India with a tested deterrent is not strong enough.

[Victor]

The section of the bill that was quoted above is simply a restatement of the Hyde Act and nothing new:

(1) Pursuant to section 103(a)(6) of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (22 U.S.C. 8002(a)(6)), in the event that nuclear transfers to India are suspended or terminated pursuant to title I of such Act (22 U.S.C. 8001 et seq.), the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), or any other United States law, it is the policy of the United States to seek to prevent the transfer ......

IOW: We have the right to test and they have the right to respond. What is so problematic about that? It's like saying to the spouse--"I have the right to have an affair and you have the right to file for divorce". Or even more succinctly--"The sky is blue". This language is simply soapbox histrionics for the various clowns in Congress who have to justify their existence to their constituencies. If we were expecting the developed World to yell "welcome to the newkiller club!" and "help yourself to all the goodies!", we were bound to be disappointed. We have a long way to go.

[Arun_S]

Once again.

An explicit condition was included in 'Berman Bill' being considered in Congress right now. Now, a news ticker says its being omitted.

Any update?

Unkill's Indian psyop mouthpiece / musharraf-piece IBN-CNN reports:

N-deal vote put off but India wins over critic

There's just one day left for the Congress Session to end.

CNN-IBN Fri, Sep 26, 2008 at 08:05,
Washington: The debate on the Indo-US nuclear deal is down to the wire yet again with the Congressional vote on the bill postponed till Friday after a pitched debate and mounting suspense.

The postponement has made the next 24 hours extremely crucial for the deal. There’s just one day left for the Congress Session to end and if the deal is not passed in the current session, all hopes will hinge on a lameduck session that may be held after the November presidential elections.

However, there’s hope and a big achievement too. The biggest critic of the deal, Congressman Howard Berman, is now coming around to being a supporter.

Berman is the Head of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He proposed a deal-breaker bill that called for economic sanctions on Iran, something that India wouldn't have agreed to.

After a lot of drama and suspense, Berman introduced the bill which was almost identical to the one that was overwhelmingly adopted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a rider that all nuclear assistance to India would cease if New Delhi conducts a test.

He said, though his bill was different from the one approved by the Senate committee, it was consistent with the provisions of the Hyde Act. But after a lot of persuasion, Berman relented and the controversial provision was dropped. He said, “This India legislation includes provisions to improve Congressional oversight of the India nuclear cooperation agreement and help ensure that the agreement¶is interpreted in a manner consistent with the constraints in the Hyde Act. I will therefore vote in support of this Agreement.”

The US Ambasssador to India David Mulford said the significance of India-US relations was reiterated after Congress took up the deal, despite the domestic economic crisis.

“It is tribute to the Congress that despite their preoccupation at the moment with the US financial crises that you see all the time on TV, nevertheless the Congress has focused on civil nuclear (deal) and has been moving it forward. So it's a very positive statement about the strength of the US-India relationship,” he said.

Suspense mounted over Thursday night over an early Congressional nod just ahead of the meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W Bush at the White House.

The Senate legislation -- that comes with a rider which will prevent the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials or technology from the NSG countries or any other source in the event of New Delhi conducting a test -- was introduced in the House of Representatives by ranking Republican in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Florida Congresswoman Ileana

Ros-Lehtinen.

[RajeshA]

One needs to take this oft-repeated Mantra by the balls:

We have a right to test, they (US) have a right to react.

But because, their reaction is codified in Legislation, it makes our balls to test go soft. WHY is there no Legislation, which makes their balls to react go soft too. Then the Mantra would/should be:

We have a right to test, they (US) have a right to react, and we have a right to react to that.

And the "react to that" too needs to be codified. If our reaction always looms upon their reaction, the Americans may decide that their Legislation is also a seat of thorns, which makes them uneasy, and they would like to change it. For that we need the Jekyll Act. Sorry to be quoting myself here.

Some provisions of this Law could be as follows:

1. Any country, which follows this policy of sanctioning India's strategic program (nuclear testing), would need a prior Parliamentary clearance for each sale of nuclear reactors to India.

2. Any country, which terminates a bilateral civil nuclear cooperation treaty citing Indian activity in the strategic sphere, will also be withheld cooperation in the strategic sphere.
......(a) All privileges to use Indian airspace, ports, fueling facilities and overland routes for military purposes by the concerned country would be canceled.
......(b) India's cooperation in all security initiatives of importance to the concerned country, which do not have UN Sanction, will be terminated (Container Security Initiative, Proliferation Security Initiative, etc)
......(c) Bilateral training exercises between the two militaries would be stopped, while defense intelligence exchange will be minimized.
......(d) Other countries would be favored for major defense acquisitions.

3. This policy will continue, until the Government of India assures the Parliament that the civil nuclear cooperation by the concerned country with India has resumed and India has been sufficiently compensated for the disruption.

If we want to have a good and a somewhat equal relationship with USA as an "ally", then we need to learn quickly how to deal with the Americans, both with US Administration and with US Congress. Unless our Parliament gives an appropriate response to the US Congress right now, we will be starting a marriage on the wrong foot.

Perhaps I am acting a bit like the Mother, Sisters, Aunties and Friends of a bride, who is about to be wed. They always tell the bride, don't let the bridegroom boss you, because if you allow him to do this in the beginning, you will be doing this the rest of your life.

When our Babus say, they would not like to comment on an "internal process of the US Government", perhaps somebody should point out to them, where is the "internal process in the Indian Government", about which the US too would/should also not be commenting about.

Just my Rant!

[Rye]

I think the PM has already made it very clear that there will be no signing of any document during this visit. The documents only speaks broadly about Indian law and international law and US law -- I do not think it states anything about when the laws must come into existence, i.e., India creating the law next week is the same as it creating the law next year, since it is an internal process for India.

[Philip]

At least the US is making its stance exceptionally clear,while our spin-doctor and his coterie of headless chickens keep on making unintelligible noises that clear nothing.The US position is that if India "burps",let alone breaks nuclear wind,it will mean another war of sanctions and we will be unceremoniously thrown out the N-Club and lose our job of being its latrine cleaners.As the Bard said,any contra legislation by India will singify "sound and fury,signifying nothing".The deal is patently one sided.We just have to find willing nations who care a damn if we do not conform to the rules that the US has laid down.The following excerpt indicates that our time-tested frined Russia would be more than willing if it is willing to sell Venezuela N-technology!

http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.htm ... &PageNum=0

Russia ready to consider cooperation with Venezuela in atomic energy

NOVO-OGARYOVO, near Moscow, September 26 (Itar-Tass) - Russia is ready to consider a possibility of cooperation with Venezuela in the civilian use of atomic energy, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said Thursday as he received visiting Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in the government’s countryside residence of Novo-Ogaryovo.

“We’re ready to consider a joint use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,” he said.

On a more general plane, he pointed out to the prospects for economic cooperation opening up before Russia and Venezuela, “I’m glad to point out that Gazprom is due to launch the first drilling rig in the Gulf of Venezuela at end-October,” Putin said. “The new prospects opening before us embrace power engineering, high technologies, machine-building, and petrochemical industry.”

He also underlined fair prospects that cooperation between Russian corporations and the Venezuelan State Oil Company has inside Venezuela and on the markets of third countries.

“I’d like to note the progress of our relations in all areas, and our agreements are translated into life step by step,” Putin said.

Russia plans full-scale implementation of agreements on cooperation between Russian and Venezuelan naval forces, he said.

“We hope to fully implement agreements on cooperation between our naval forces,” Putin said. “A detachment of Russian ships is currently on its way to the Atlantic, and we’re ready to discuss further cooperation in defense-related technologies.”

“We couldn’t help thanking you for the warm reception that Venezuela gave to the crews of our strategic missile-carrying jets that stayed for several days in your country,” he said.

Chavez gave regards to Putin from the Cuban leader Fidel Castro.

He said the was writing a letter to Fidel, his political friend, right when his jet was about to land in Moscow, and Fidel and his brother Raul asked him in return to give warm regards to Putin.

Chavez thanked his interlocutor for the warm reception he had received in Moscow and for the invitation to visit Russia.

“Thank you dear friend for doing this,” Chavez said adding jokingly he was glad this trip fell on a time different from Russia’s frosty winter.

“I’m very glad you’ve found it possible to come to Russia again,” Putin said. “You have an extensive trip with an itinerary that includes several countries. And it’s especially good to know that you decided to draft your routes across Russia.”

Chavez said he was generally satisfied with the rates at which bilateral cooperation is developing.

He recalled the warning by Latin America’s hero Simon Bolivar who said once that the world would be moving forward at a fast pace.

“And if our two countries don’t move ahead at the same pace, they’ll simply sink,” Chavez said. “But contrary to that, our dynamics enables us to keep afloat.”

Putin said on his part that Latin America is turning into a notable element in the rising multipolar world. “We’ll continue increasing our attention to this vector of Russia’s foreign policy,” he said.