India nuclear news and discussion

[joshvajohn]

US House approves Indo-US nuke deal
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/US_H ... 535443.cms

[BSR Murthy]

House approves nuclear pact with India - AP

[BSR Murthy]

House Vote On Passage: H.R. 7081: To approve the United States-India Agreement for Cooperation

[Sean]

House passes India nuclear deal, senator upbeat.
http://www.reuters.com/article/politics ... D320080927

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. House of Representatives on Saturday approved an agreement to end the three-decade ban on U.S. nuclear trade with India and the top U.S. senator was upbeat about passage in the Senate.

The agreement passed the House by a margin of 298-117 and the Democrats who control the Senate hope to bring it to a vote there within days despite the opposition of some in their own party, congressional aides said.

In the Senate, a vote has been held up by the objections of some Democrats, said congressional aides who declined to name those blocking a vote.

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, a Nevada Democrat, urged his colleagues to drop their resistance, noting that under special rules for consideration of the nuclear deal it can ultimately be brought to a vote.

"For people who are concerned about the Indian nuclear agreement, and there are several senators that have concerns about that, all we would be doing is running out the time," he said.

"There's statutory time we have. ... We can run that out. At the end of that time, senators have 10 hours of debate time and then we vote. So there are very few hurdles we have to jump on that," he added.

[Sean]

In the house, not a single vote against the deal came from Florida and Virginia. Most of the Democrats from California against the deal, including my own representative. She has lost four votes from my household for the upcoming election. However, she is expected to win handily.

[BSR Murthy]

Same here in Texas
Here is my letter to my congressman:
Dear Congressman Hinojosa,
I am saddened by your vote against the India-US nuclear deal. As a constituent and supporter, I am very disappointed. What is your objection to the deal? Why would you not help a fellow democratic state deal with its energy crisis? Why would you not support ending the nuclear isolation of India, a country that has an impeccable record of non-proliferation - even after the nod from IAEA and the NSG? I fail to understand your stand, because, this nuclear deal has a great potential to reduce global environmental pollution, moderate oil prices and improve strategic relations between India and the US.

[BSR Murthy]

The traditional blue and red states are somewhat reversed here!

[sraj]

This analysis by Siddharth Varadarajan of the bill before the Senate (and just passed by the House) deserves to be posted in full and deserves a careful reading:
Congressional riders turn 123 Agreement into lame duck

India can no longer hide behind the claim that “internal processes” within the United States are of no concern.

Siddharth Varadarajan

New York: The speed at which Capitol Hill moved may have surprised many but Congressional approval of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with India – imminent at the time of going to press – comes laden with riders and conditions aimed at reinforcing a principal policy objective: how to ensure the Indian side doesn’t play the global nuclear field to the detriment of American economic and political interests.

Since the “internal communications” between different branches of the American government derogating from core provisions of the 123 are now embedded in the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, New Delhi will have to take a tough call about whether and how it will sign and implement the bilateral agreement.

Hoping to avoid or postpone the inevitable unpleasantness that any reluctance to sign would bring, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his advisers are hoping President George W. Bush will bail them out by issuing a “signing statement” dissociating himself from some of the more distasteful Congressional edicts. But this is easier said than done, even assuming Mr. Bush violently disagrees with the riders that have been attached to the 123 Agreement in the first place. For the fact is that all that Congress has done is to embed the “authoritative representations” the President and his representatives made in written submissions prior to the agreement being sent up the Hill. It would be remarkable, indeed, were Mr. Bush to now declare that he will not be bound by the very representations he authored less than a fortnight ago.

A careful consideration of the Bill to approve the 123 Agreement reveals no less than nine specific problems with the draft language of the benchmark Senate version. Much has been made of the version tabled in the House of Representatives by Congressman Howard Berman. But other than largely inconsequential changes in four separate places, his version is a carbon copy of the disastrous Senate Bill whose eventual passage will render the 123 Agreement a lame duck from India’s point of view.

First, the Manmohan Singh-led United Progressive Alliance government had said all along that it shared the Opposition’s reservations about the Hyde Act passed by the U.S. in December 2006. A fair attempt was made to recover some ground in the 123 Agreement by balancing the Indian legal commitment to safeguards with the American legal obligation to ensure fuel supplies. When a skeptical opposition doubted whether such an agreement could ever be implemented, the UPA maintained that the 123 would supersede Hyde once it was approved by Congress and entered into law. That tendentious claim is now being given a very public funeral. The new Bill establishes the explicit supremacy of the Hyde Act over the 123 Agreement in Section 101(b) and reinforces this in the rules of construction in 102(d) when it says nothing in the Agreement should be construed to supersede the legal requirements of the Hyde Act.

Second, section 102(a) of the Bill says the 123's provisions have the legal meanings contained in the "authoritative representations" made by the president and his representatives. By stating so, the U.S. is formally entering a reservation about, inter alia, the nature of the fuel supply assurances contained in the agreement as well as on the ‘non-permanent’ nature of reprocessing consent rights. Once the Bill is passed and India signs the 123 agreement, it will be tantamount to accepting these reservations in international law. It is futile to think legally binding fuel assurances can be built into a contractual arrangement with American reactor suppliers like Westinghouse and GE. Besides, by accepting these reservations now, India will be in a weaker position to negotiate fuel arrangements in the future.

Third, the Bill reiterates in section 102(b) a particularly obnoxious provision of the Hyde Act that it shall be American policy to seek to prevent nuclear supplies to India from other countries in the event of the U.S. terminating nuclear cooperation with India for any reason. This is further aimed at making it difficult for India to look elsewhere once the U.S. decides to shut the door.

Fourth, the same section makes another declaration of policy -- that any fuel reserve provided to India pursuant to the Hyde Act must be “commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements”. Of course, this declaration of policy is superfluous since the Hyde Act itself spells this out explicitly via the Obama amendment. Once again, the net effect is to try and deny India the ability to create space for itself by building the kind of strategic fuel reserve envisaged by the March 2006 separation plan as well as the 123 Agreement.

Fifth, as provided for in section 204, the Bill seeks to the tie the entry into force of the 123 Agreement to a certification by the President that it is U.S. policy to tighten restrictions on the supply of enrichment and reprocessing equipment (ENR) and technology at the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Though this requirement does not place a direct burden on India, it does further impel the administration to pursue the adoption of ENR restrictions at the international level to the detriment of the Indian side.

Sixth, the Bill seeks to introduce a potentially dangerous sequencing requirement that will undermine the reciprocity India has built into the implementation of commitments by both sides. Under section 104(2), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will not be allowed to issue licenses for any transfers to India until the President determines and certifies that the declaration of facilities to be safeguarded by India pursuant to paragraph 13 of the India-specific safeguards agreement (ISSA) has already been filed. Moreoever, lest India exploit the space it has between the filing of its declaration under paragraph 13 and its notifications under paragraph 14 (following which the facilities in the declaration get listed in the ISSA annex and go under safeguards), the Senate and House Bills introduce a new reporting requirement under section 105(a)(2) to see if there are any "material inconsistencies between the content or timeliness" of the notifications and the March 2006 separation plan.

Under the July 18 2005 agreement, India was meant to separate its military and civilian facilities and file a declaration to the IAEA in that regard. This it did via the document, Infcirc/731, as has been acknowledged by the U.S. in its Presidential determinations of September 10. But the declaration and notifications to be filed under Paragraphs 13 and 14 are linked in the safeguards agreement to "the determination by India that all arrangements conducive to the accomplishment of the objectives of the [safeguards] agreement are in place", i.e. fuel supply arrangements, deals to import reactors etc. which cannot be finalized until the NRC issues a license.

Seventh, the irony is that India's commitments under the separation plan are being treated as sacrosanct (which they are) but the legal nature of the U.S. commitments on fuel supply assurances are not even referred to. Indeed, apart from the reference in Section 102(a) to the President's "authoritative representations" renouncing the fuel supply commitments contained in Para 5.6 of the 123 agreement, the Senate Bill restates more explicitly the “political” rather than legal nature of the fuel commitments in Section 105(b)(3)(ii)(V) by requiring the administration to provide Congress with the details of "any United States efforts to fulfill political commitments made in Article 5(6) of the Agreement".

Eighth, at India’s urging, the word "subsequent" before "arrangements and procedures" had been deliberately kept out of the 123 Agreement’s language on reprocessing consent rights because of the specific meaning it has under Section 131 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act. However, this term -- and the full Congressional oversight envisaged by Section 131 -- have been dragged back in to the equation by the Senate Bill. Ordinarily, this ought not matter. But given the way the U.S. has played the executive-legislature division to force India to accept conditions it might otherwise not have accepted , there is every likelihood of a repeat when India and the U.S. start negotiating over the circumstances under which the reprocessing consent rights will be "brought into effect". This is especially important given persistent US demands for safeguards above and beyond IAEA safeguards, and its insistence on the non-permanence of consent rights -- something India will surely have a tough time accepting.

Ninth, anticipating the possibility that France and Russia may grant India reprocessing rights on conditions more favourable than that given by the U.S., the Senate Bill in section 201(b)(1)(C) stipulates that America’s own arrangements cannot take effect unless the President certifies that the U.S. will pursue efforts with other countries giving India reprocessing rights to ensure they insist on "similar arrangements and procedures".

Some of these extraneous demands might well be waived aside by President Bush when he signs the Bill into law. But the core problem with the legislation cannot be so easily done away with. India can still bravely argue that it will be bound only by the language of an international agreement and not Hyde and that if the U.S. invokes Hyde to renege on the 123 Agreement, it will have recourse to international law. But in the absence of any arbitration clause, international law allows only for abrogation or an appeal to the International Court of Justice. Even if fuel supplies and the nuclear testing issue were overcome, the problem of “permanent” reprocessing consent rights would still remain. If India had no other alternatives and was desperate for nuclear commerce with the U.S., there might arguably be some merit in risking a future legal dispute with Washington. But given the alternatives now available thanks to the NSG, New Delhi needs to cut its losses and give serious thought to not operationalising the 123 Agreement at all.

There is, within the Indian establishment, a section which sees merit in kicking the can down the road and walking away two years later when it becomes apparent that the differences on fuel supply and reprocessing are indeed unbridgeable. The downside of that strategy is that the American expectations of a payoff by then will even greater than what they are now. While properly choreographing the endgame is important, it is impossible to paper over the cavalier manner in which the U.S. has negotiated with India. One only hopes that despite professing deep affection for Mr. Bush, Prime Minister Singh might have learnt a thing or two about delivering what the Americans call a message of “tough love”.

[NRao]

Manmohan pitches for UN reforms, backs global fight against terror

As the India-US nuclear deal headed for the finish, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Friday told the UN General Assembly that the opening of international nuclear trade with India will impact positively on global energy security.

He also made a vigorous pitch for UN reforms and for collectively fighting terrorism.

"The opening of international civilian nuclear cooperation with India will have a positive impact on global energy security and on efforts to combat climate change," Manmohan Singh told over 170 world leaders gathered for the 63rd session of the UN General Assembly.

Manmohan Singh, who turned 76 on Friday, underlined that the NSG waiver that cleared India's re-entry into global nuclear trade was "a vindication" of "its impeccable record on non-proliferation".

Arguing for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, he reiterated India's "long-standing commitment to global, universal and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament" and called for the elimination of nuclear weapons in a specified time frame.

Armed with the NSG nuclear passport and a growing economy that has raised India's global profile, Manmohan Singh made a renewed pitch for revitalizing the UN General Assembly and called for expansion of the UN Security Council "to reflect contemporary realities of the 21st century".

"It is only a truly representative and revitalized United Nations that can become the effective focal point for the cooperative efforts of the world community. We need to expeditiously hold negotiations towards this end," Manmohan Singh said.

Intergovernmental negotiations on the UN reforms are expected to begin in February next year.

Manmohan Singh's last address to the UNGA during his current prime ministerial tenure was all-embracing and emphasized the need for increased global efforts to addresses international issues ranging from terrorism, UN reforms and surveillance of multilateral financial institutions to food and energy security, climate change and universal nuclear disarmament.

Manmohan Singh rallied the world leaders "to strengthen international cooperation to combat terrorism and to bring the perpetrators, organizers, financers and sponsors of terrorism to justice."

"We should conclude expeditiously the Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism," the prime minister underlined against the backdrop of a spate of terrorist attacks in Indian cities and the surging militancy and suicide bombings in India's neighbourhood.

Alluding to the situation in Afghanistan which he stressed was a matter of deep concern, the prime minister asked the international community "to pool all its resources to ensure the success of Afghanistan's reconstruction efforts and its emergence as a moderate, pluralistic and democratic society". India has pledged $1.2 billion for socio-economic reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Lauding the return of democracy to Pakistan, Manmohan Singh underlined that India was "committed to resolving all outstanding issues with Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, through peaceful dialogue".

With the US financial meltdown raising the spectre of a global economic slowdown, the economist-turned-prime minister underlined the need for a new international initiative to bring structural reforms in the world's financial system.

This can be achieved through more effective regulation and stronger systems of multilateral consultations and surveillance, the prime minister stressed.

Underlining the need for inclusive globalization, the prime minister drew the world community's attention to "a possible food crisis, a global energy crisis and unprecedented upheavals in international financial markets". "There is, therefore, an urgent need for coordinated action by the global community on several fronts," he said.

Calling for a Second Green Revolution to address the problem of food security, he underscored the need for the "transfer of technology and innovation from developed to developing countries".

With the India-US nuclear deal heading on its final journey, the prime minister also made a vigorous pitch for "economically sustainable development" and backed negotiations for the UN Framework on Climate Change. Quoting Mahatma Gandhi, he said: "The Earth has enough resources to meet people's needs, but will never have enough to satisfy people's greed."

In a spirited defence of the UN, Manmohan Singh ended his speech by projecting the UN as "a living symbol of pluralism". "It has weathered many storms. It is the vehicle through which our combined will and efforts to address global challenges must be articulated and implemented," he said.

"Unless we rise to the task, we would bequeath to succeeding generations a world of diminishing prospects," he warned world leaders.

[Arun_S]

Same here in Texas
Here is my letter to my congressman:
Dear Congressman Hinojosa,
I am saddened by your vote against the India-US nuclear deal. As a constituent and supporter, I am very disappointed. What is your objection to the deal? Why would you not help a fellow democratic state deal with its energy crisis? Why would you not support ending the nuclear isolation of India, a country that has an impeccable record of non-proliferation - even after the nod from IAEA and the NSG? I fail to understand your stand, because, this nuclear deal has a great potential to reduce global environmental pollution, moderate oil prices and improve strategic relations between India and the US.

I am sorry but pleading for reason without showing the business end of the stick or using the stick on errant congressmen is IMHO of no consequence. If I were you I would end the letter with saying that unless he represent me and gives an acceptable answer to his action, "he" has just lost x number of votes and you will actively solicit your Indian origin friends to do the same and ask them to stop giving him and his party money in next forthcoming election and thereafter.

Please understand the "zoo social norms" these congressmen have grown up under, "change behavior or a slap on the wrist and worse will assuredly befall". IOW the operating regime they grew up is: "Laat Kay Bhoot Batoin Say Nahin Mantey", and now they onlee grown-up Yamri-Khan zoo animal.

[sraj]

GNEP cannot be pushed to the background - the US leading that effort, but it cannot work without France OR Russia and BOTH have publicly stated (even as the Georgian fiasco was going on) that they will support the US. GNEP is OPEC++ for the nuclear field. GNEP will have total control. Absolute control.

NRao: could you post links on the French and (especially) Russian statements on supporting US in nuclear matters. TIA.

Russia first walked out of the 6-nation Iran talks, and then forced the US to accept as a compromise a new resolution which ruled out the new sanctions sought by the US. Russia also just announced nuclear cooperation plans with Venezuela.

This does not bode well for US-Russia cooperation in nuclear matters. The US-Russia 123 has been put in deep freeze by the US Congress.

Let's wait and see what is included in the India Russia nuclear agreement (if and when it is made public, which it may not be), as well as whether there is indeed a bait and switch in Paris waiting for MMS over the next few days.

[BSR Murthy]

I understand. But, our congressman has been generally helpful to us with other issues - including our physician owned hospital. In South Texas, he will be elected almost unopposed. Additionally Indians here matter more in terms of money, but, not in number of votes. I admit it is generally our (local Indian) failure not to utilize the access to the congrssman to convass for the issue and educate him. The next fundraiser indeed is going to be different and we will make sure of that.

[sraj]

sraj,

AFAIK, France has already stated that all their reactors would come with assured fuel supplies and the right to reprocess fuel. On further inquiry, the French Ambassador had to admit, that it would not include any enrichment and reprocessing technology transfers until the NSG has clarified its position on this issue. ENR Transfer issues remains a matter of discussion in the NSG. Now Howard Berman has a promise from Condoleeza Rice to push for the ban on export of ENR from the US side. That means France will make its policy on that dependent on NSG clearance.

Our deal with Russia will be signed during Medvedew's visit to India in December. The next NSG Plenary meeting is in November if I am not mistaken. It is unclear if NSG arrives at a consensus by then.

If NSG does not arrive at a consensus, then it would probably mean because of resistance from the Russians, in which case the Russians would be willing to give us ENR and will put it into writing to strengthen their position. However during the backroom NSG deliberations on August 21-23 in Vienna, the Pipsqueak, USA and Russia arrived at some sort of understanding regarding the ENR issue, and it could be that Russia has already assured the others of its support to a ban on ENR export.

Basically I am very pessimistic about ENR access. We will have to develop our own enrichment technology.

JMTs

RajeshA:

1. I think Sarkozy will need to take a call on what strategic and commercial benefits France can get by not toeing the US line on this issue. Hopefully this becomes clear in a few days.

2. Same with Russia: please see my previous post on the current state of US-Russia nuclear cooperation. Also, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov is arriving in Delhi Oct 20.

3. There are at least three other NSG nations (best that they remain unnamed) which apparently have something to offer India on this front and also want some things that India can provide.

All I am saying is: there may be a finite window on this issue, and GoI needs to explicitly ink all relevant agreements ASAP so they can be grandfathered if and when NSG does decide to prohibit ENR to non-NPT signatories.

[Arun_S]

I understand. But, our congressman has been generally helpful to us with other issues - including our physician owned hospital. In South Texas, he will be elected almost unopposed. Additionally Indians here matter more in terms of money, but, not in number of votes. I admit it is generally our (local Indian) failure not to utilize the access to the congrssman to convass for the issue and educate him. The next fundraiser indeed is going to be different and we will make sure of that.

Murthy saab: Good luck. IMHO Money easily makes up for number in the west, in many ways, money talks louder than votes. Even if will he wins unopposed, nevertheless the message needs to drive home. No taxation(money) without representation, is the base US system is built on special interests and lobby. Also message need to go that next election after this he may not be unopposed. The fear of "Money Gwad" in the Gwad fearing Texas will do miracle.

[NRao]

sraj,

I have posted two links on the previous page.

Here is another link that is actually very current.

The Russian quote was on CNN TV, around the third week after the Georgian "war" started. I will try and find it for you.

I would not take the current tit-for-tat between the two seriously. Note that if Obama is elected he will certainly go back to the table. And, seriously BOTH need each other on this one topic.

And, finally, there are a few topics for which links are very few and far in between - just the nature of the topic - for example one such topic is US efforts to get India into GNEP. The US made it very evident and then the topic just vanished. And then the "print" button on BR is gone, perhaps the one that hurts the most.

[NRao]

Here is another link that is actually very current.

)July 31, 2008) what do you know:

The United States--and depending on upcoming developments, perhaps the NSG--offered India, which has neither signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nor made any meaningful nonproliferation commitments, the option to import sensitive nuclear technology as long as it was a member of GNEP or an international fuel bank.

[ramana]

Kicking the can down stream wont work. The problems are bigger becasue of this attitude. Every PM before ABV had the chance to exercise the testing option but chose for whatever reasons to kick the can downstream. What that has done is to make the costs go up for India. In 1983-84 the cost of going for nuke would ahve been much cheaper than it was later on. The mileu- was SU in Afghanisitan, height of Cold War, PRC proliferation to TSP, etc, etc. And that was kicked downstream. Repeatedly they want prasi for keeping the option alive but at great cost for not exercising it. This keeping the opiton alive has done more damage to India than the tests as ABV showed. The right thing is to not ink any agreeemtn with the US as they have not kept their part of the bargain. By inking it India agrees to all those clauses.

[NRao]

Ramana,

Too much to ask. India is already expecting Bush to make a statement to save Indian position. It would have been appropriate for India to reject it by now and let 123 die, but they prefer to take the more confusing route.

[NRao]

sraj,

Sept 9, 2008 :: Russia criticizes U.S. for pulling nuclear deal

Russia said on Tuesday it regretted a decision by U.S. President George W. Bush to freeze a major bilateral civilian nuclear pact but said Moscow wanted nuclear cooperation with the United States to continue.

But Russia's powerful first deputy prime minister, Igor Shuvalov, told reporters that Moscow still wanted cooperation to continue in the nuclear sector.

"We consider that the joint development of relations between the Russian Federation and the United States in the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear energy is very important," Shuvalov told reporters in the Siberian city of Irkutsk.

"Whatever the decisions at the current time, we consider that it is a promising area for mutual cooperation and Russia and America will definitely cooperate, if not now than in the future," Shuvalov said.

The nuclear agreement, signed in May by U.S. and Russian officials, would have allowed the world's two biggest atomic powers to boost their nuclear trade and work on new ways to prevent proliferation.

The Bush reaction is temporary and childish.

[Sanjay M]

What can we expect from the upcoming visits with France and Russia?

What does it look like they'll do?

I'm more concerned about the French than about the Russians. After all, the French are more vulnerable to American influence than the Russians are.

I wouldn't mind signing various other big-ticket non-nuclear deals with the French, and then using these as insurance to ensure the French uphold their supply commitments.

[BSR Murthy]

I understand. But, our congressman has been generally helpful to us with other issues - including our physician owned hospital. In South Texas, he will be elected almost unopposed. Additionally Indians here matter more in terms of money, but, not in number of votes. I admit it is generally our (local Indian) failure not to utilize the access to the congrssman to convass for the issue and educate him. The next fundraiser indeed is going to be different and we will make sure of that.

Murthy saab: Good luck. IMHO Money easily makes up for number in the west, in many ways, money talks louder than votes. Even if will he wins unopposed, nevertheless the message needs to drive home. No taxation(money) without representation, is the base US system is built on special interests and lobby. Also message need to go that next election after this he may not be unopposed. The fear of "Money Gwad" in the Gwad fearing Texas will do miracle.

Arun Ji, No disagreement with your view.

[Sai]

"Diplomacy is the art of letting someone have your way"

"A diplomat is a person who can tell you to go to hell in such a way that you actually look forward to the trip."

The nuclear deal as being consummated today is a pale shadow of what it was originally touted to be 3 years ago. Manmohan Singh's rosy pictures either hid or underplayed or outright lied about the numerous thorns. Yet here we are, holding breath at each step along way, and celebrating its passing as if a difficult hurdle has been surmounted and a great victory has been scored. American diplomacy deserves to be appreciated.

[Nitesh]

condy coming:

http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/sep/27ndeal6.htm

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice [Images] and Union External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee are expected to sign the Indo-US civil nuclear deal on October 4 in New Delhi [Images] in the presence of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh [Images] and Congress president Sonia Gandhi

[sraj]

NRao: thanks for all the links.

From the GNEP link you posted, it is clear that GNEP is only one of several proposals, others being:

GNEP isn't the only international proposal

Regardless of GNEP's fate, preventing the future spread of sensitive nuclear technologies will remain a complex task. Alternate schemes have been proposed. Most provide fuel-supply assurances to recipient countries, but don't address the fuel-cycle's back-end (the disposal or reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel) and still leave many questions unanswered.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has proposed placing all enrichment and reprocessing facilities under multinational control and for suppliers to ensure a steady supply of nuclear fuel for potential buyers.

The Nuclear Threat Initiative pledged $50 million as start-up money for the establishment of an international fuel reserve. The IAEA would control the reserve, which would only be used as a last resort in the event of international nuclear fuel market disruptions. The fuel would be intended for countries that don't have indigenous uranium enrichment facilities. Congress provided $50 million of the $100 million required matching funds for the project. A promising start, this proposal would likely require additional funds to provide an adequate fuel supply and storage location. Criteria for access to the fuel would also have to be agreed upon.

The "Six-Country Concept" for reliable access to nuclear fuel, proposed by the United States, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, and Britain--all nations with enrichment facilities, would require recipient states to forego sensitive indigenous nuclear facilities. In the event of a supply disruption, the recipient country could approach the IAEA to facilitate new arrangements with other suppliers if nonproliferation conditions such as Additional Protocol and safety and protection standards were satisfied.

Other international schemes include:

A new IAEA-controlled enrichment facility, run on a commercial basis and located in an extraterritorial/neutral location--proposed by Germany.

A uranium and enriched-uranium suppliers registry maintained by the IAEA--proposed by Japan.

International, commercially operated uranium enrichment centers, based on Russia's new enrichment center with Kazakhstan and Armenia located in Angarsk, Siberia--proposed by Moscow.

International reprocessing and storage facilities, with fuel supplied through commercial contracts and guaranteed by the IAEA and with stocks of fuel under IAEA authority--also proposed by Russia.

A strategic reserve of 17.5 tons of highly enriched uranium that would be downblended and used in cases of disruption of fuel supply--proposed by the United States.

Enrichment bonds which would guarantee uranium enrichment services (subject to nonproliferation conditions) between the supplier state, recipient state, and IAEA--proposed by Britain.

In light of the above, your statement below is not very clear:

* From a proliferation PoV, India will never get ENR from abroad, even under IAEA supervision, because that feeds into three-phase and thorium. IF India is allowed three phase the nonproliferation loop is incomplete

1. Isn't the issue from India's PoV whether it is a 'supplier' nation or a 'recipient' nation in any GNEP or GNEP like arrangement?

2. While Russia may wish to cooperate with the US for mutual benefit in this area, there is no reason for it to follow its lead blindly. The proposals above suggest it has the ability and desire to come up with alternatives to GNEP which it will lead and might be willing to include India in on equitable terms acceptable to India.

3. Could you elaborate on "IF India is allowed three phase......". What is the issue with three phase plants under IAEA safeguards fed by fuel from India-based ENR facilities under IAEA safeguards? Thanks.

Obviously three phase plants (such as the first 4 FBRs) not under IAEA safeguards will need to be fed with fuel produced by indigenous Indian ENR facilities outside safeguards.

[RajeshA]

RajeshA:

1. I think Sarkozy will need to take a call on what strategic and commercial benefits France can get by not toeing the US line on this issue. Hopefully this becomes clear in a few days.

2. Same with Russia: please see my previous post on the current state of US-Russia nuclear cooperation. Also, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov is arriving in Delhi Oct 20.

3. There are at least three other NSG nations (best that they remain unnamed) which apparently have something to offer India on this front and also want some things that India can provide.

All I am saying is: there may be a finite window on this issue, and GoI needs to explicitly ink all relevant agreements ASAP so they can be grandfathered if and when NSG does decide to prohibit ENR to non-NPT signatories.

The one window of opportunity, that I see is that Bush remains Bush, the destroyer of treaties and agreements, including those made with the US Congress. Even though some Congressmen with strong NPT credentials have given their inputs into the Legislation, in the end, should it come to Bush not following up on his assurances to the Congress wrt tightening the international NP noose around India, I don't think there will be too big brouhaha about it. The general sentiment is that this deal is being offered to a friendly country, especially to a friendly ally, PM Manmohan Singh. Bush is on his way out, and there are few things for which he requires Congressional cooperation, so he can afford to depart showing his middle finger on his way out. I know, this is an optimistic reading of the situation but let's humor the thought.

So if the US executive gives France the green light to indulge and live in sin and not by the holy book as laid down by US Congress, that would suffice. Russia's room for maneuvering is a lot more. Russia is not really bound to all the promises made to the Pipsqueak, unless for course, these are being held to them by US. Here, Bush being Bush, he can again look away.

So France and Russia, now that the NSG approval is out of the way, and US Congressional process is also out the way, leaving US Administration more room, France and Russia just may have some more space to commit themselves to ENR transfer to India in bilateral agreements.

The question is, will they?

For France, it is perhaps more a question of economic benefits rather than strategic relations.

For Russia ENR transfer to India, would have an extremely high symbolic value. It would tell Indian policy makers, how Russia sees India in their scheme of things. Does Russia want to be the major power more friendly to India than all other powers, or is Russia willing to cede this space to USA?

[rajrang]

This analysis by Siddharth Varadarajan of the bill before the Senate (and just passed by the House) deserves to be posted in full and deserves a careful reading:
Congressional riders turn 123 Agreement into lame duck

India can no longer hide behind the claim that “internal processes” within the United States are of no concern.

Siddharth Varadarajan

New York: The speed at which Capitol Hill moved may have surprised many but Congressional approval of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with India – imminent at the time of going to press – comes laden with riders and conditions aimed at reinforcing a principal policy objective: how to ensure the Indian side doesn’t play the global nuclear field to the detriment of American economic and political interests.

Since the “internal communications” between different branches of the American government derogating from core provisions of the 123 are now embedded in the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act, New Delhi will have to take a tough call about whether and how it will sign and implement the bilateral agreement.

Hoping to avoid or postpone the inevitable unpleasantness that any reluctance to sign would bring, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his advisers are hoping President George W. Bush will bail them out by issuing a “signing statement” dissociating himself from some of the more distasteful Congressional edicts. But this is easier said than done, even assuming Mr. Bush violently disagrees with the riders that have been attached to the 123 Agreement in the first place. For the fact is that all that Congress has done is to embed the “authoritative representations” the President and his representatives made in written submissions prior to the agreement being sent up the Hill. It would be remarkable, indeed, were Mr. Bush to now declare that he will not be bound by the very representations he authored less than a fortnight ago.

A careful consideration of the Bill to approve the 123 Agreement reveals no less than nine specific problems with the draft language of the benchmark Senate version. Much has been made of the version tabled in the House of Representatives by Congressman Howard Berman. But other than largely inconsequential changes in four separate places, his version is a carbon copy of the disastrous Senate Bill whose eventual passage will render the 123 Agreement a lame duck from India’s point of view.

First, the Manmohan Singh-led United Progressive Alliance government had said all along that it shared the Opposition’s reservations about the Hyde Act passed by the U.S. in December 2006. A fair attempt was made to recover some ground in the 123 Agreement by balancing the Indian legal commitment to safeguards with the American legal obligation to ensure fuel supplies. When a skeptical opposition doubted whether such an agreement could ever be implemented, the UPA maintained that the 123 would supersede Hyde once it was approved by Congress and entered into law. That tendentious claim is now being given a very public funeral. The new Bill establishes the explicit supremacy of the Hyde Act over the 123 Agreement in Section 101(b) and reinforces this in the rules of construction in 102(d) when it says nothing in the Agreement should be construed to supersede the legal requirements of the Hyde Act.

Second, section 102(a) of the Bill says the 123's provisions have the legal meanings contained in the "authoritative representations" made by the president and his representatives. By stating so, the U.S. is formally entering a reservation about, inter alia, the nature of the fuel supply assurances contained in the agreement as well as on the ‘non-permanent’ nature of reprocessing consent rights. Once the Bill is passed and India signs the 123 agreement, it will be tantamount to accepting these reservations in international law. It is futile to think legally binding fuel assurances can be built into a contractual arrangement with American reactor suppliers like Westinghouse and GE. Besides, by accepting these reservations now, India will be in a weaker position to negotiate fuel arrangements in the future.

Third, the Bill reiterates in section 102(b) a particularly obnoxious provision of the Hyde Act that it shall be American policy to seek to prevent nuclear supplies to India from other countries in the event of the U.S. terminating nuclear cooperation with India for any reason. This is further aimed at making it difficult for India to look elsewhere once the U.S. decides to shut the door.

Fourth, the same section makes another declaration of policy -- that any fuel reserve provided to India pursuant to the Hyde Act must be “commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements”. Of course, this declaration of policy is superfluous since the Hyde Act itself spells this out explicitly via the Obama amendment. Once again, the net effect is to try and deny India the ability to create space for itself by building the kind of strategic fuel reserve envisaged by the March 2006 separation plan as well as the 123 Agreement.

Fifth, as provided for in section 204, the Bill seeks to the tie the entry into force of the 123 Agreement to a certification by the President that it is U.S. policy to tighten restrictions on the supply of enrichment and reprocessing equipment (ENR) and technology at the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Though this requirement does not place a direct burden on India, it does further impel the administration to pursue the adoption of ENR restrictions at the international level to the detriment of the Indian side.

Sixth, the Bill seeks to introduce a potentially dangerous sequencing requirement that will undermine the reciprocity India has built into the implementation of commitments by both sides. Under section 104(2), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will not be allowed to issue licenses for any transfers to India until the President determines and certifies that the declaration of facilities to be safeguarded by India pursuant to paragraph 13 of the India-specific safeguards agreement (ISSA) has already been filed. Moreoever, lest India exploit the space it has between the filing of its declaration under paragraph 13 and its notifications under paragraph 14 (following which the facilities in the declaration get listed in the ISSA annex and go under safeguards), the Senate and House Bills introduce a new reporting requirement under section 105(a)(2) to see if there are any "material inconsistencies between the content or timeliness" of the notifications and the March 2006 separation plan.

Under the July 18 2005 agreement, India was meant to separate its military and civilian facilities and file a declaration to the IAEA in that regard. This it did via the document, Infcirc/731, as has been acknowledged by the U.S. in its Presidential determinations of September 10. But the declaration and notifications to be filed under Paragraphs 13 and 14 are linked in the safeguards agreement to "the determination by India that all arrangements conducive to the accomplishment of the objectives of the [safeguards] agreement are in place", i.e. fuel supply arrangements, deals to import reactors etc. which cannot be finalized until the NRC issues a license.

Seventh, the irony is that India's commitments under the separation plan are being treated as sacrosanct (which they are) but the legal nature of the U.S. commitments on fuel supply assurances are not even referred to. Indeed, apart from the reference in Section 102(a) to the President's "authoritative representations" renouncing the fuel supply commitments contained in Para 5.6 of the 123 agreement, the Senate Bill restates more explicitly the “political” rather than legal nature of the fuel commitments in Section 105(b)(3)(ii)(V) by requiring the administration to provide Congress with the details of "any United States efforts to fulfill political commitments made in Article 5(6) of the Agreement".

Eighth, at India’s urging, the word "subsequent" before "arrangements and procedures" had been deliberately kept out of the 123 Agreement’s language on reprocessing consent rights because of the specific meaning it has under Section 131 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act. However, this term -- and the full Congressional oversight envisaged by Section 131 -- have been dragged back in to the equation by the Senate Bill. Ordinarily, this ought not matter. But given the way the U.S. has played the executive-legislature division to force India to accept conditions it might otherwise not have accepted , there is every likelihood of a repeat when India and the U.S. start negotiating over the circumstances under which the reprocessing consent rights will be "brought into effect". This is especially important given persistent US demands for safeguards above and beyond IAEA safeguards, and its insistence on the non-permanence of consent rights -- something India will surely have a tough time accepting.

Ninth, anticipating the possibility that France and Russia may grant India reprocessing rights on conditions more favourable than that given by the U.S., the Senate Bill in section 201(b)(1)(C) stipulates that America’s own arrangements cannot take effect unless the President certifies that the U.S. will pursue efforts with other countries giving India reprocessing rights to ensure they insist on "similar arrangements and procedures".

Some of these extraneous demands might well be waived aside by President Bush when he signs the Bill into law. But the core problem with the legislation cannot be so easily done away with. India can still bravely argue that it will be bound only by the language of an international agreement and not Hyde and that if the U.S. invokes Hyde to renege on the 123 Agreement, it will have recourse to international law. But in the absence of any arbitration clause, international law allows only for abrogation or an appeal to the International Court of Justice. Even if fuel supplies and the nuclear testing issue were overcome, the problem of “permanent” reprocessing consent rights would still remain. If India had no other alternatives and was desperate for nuclear commerce with the U.S., there might arguably be some merit in risking a future legal dispute with Washington. But given the alternatives now available thanks to the NSG, New Delhi needs to cut its losses and give serious thought to not operationalising the 123 Agreement at all.

There is, within the Indian establishment, a section which sees merit in kicking the can down the road and walking away two years later when it becomes apparent that the differences on fuel supply and reprocessing are indeed unbridgeable. The downside of that strategy is that the American expectations of a payoff by then will even greater than what they are now. While properly choreographing the endgame is important, it is impossible to paper over the cavalier manner in which the U.S. has negotiated with India. One only hopes that despite professing deep affection for Mr. Bush, Prime Minister Singh might have learnt a thing or two about delivering what the Americans call a message of “tough love”.

Most troubling is - "Third, the Bill reiterates in section 102(b) a particularly obnoxious provision of the Hyde Act that it shall be American policy to seek to prevent nuclear supplies to India from other countries in the event of the U.S. terminating nuclear cooperation with India for any reason. This is further aimed at making it difficult for India to look elsewhere once the U.S. decides to shut the door."


The US has always been run by brilliant lawyers - they will make 200% sure that India will have no wriggle room or escape cracks of any kind. Indian PM MMS (and his emotional disposition toward Pres Bush - per above link) is no match for them in legal intellect. I wonder how many Indian PMs were lawyers. Just as soldiers are trained to kill, lawyers are trained to maximize their legal position.

If India ever tests - the US could ally itself with China to punish India - especially if for whatever reason China is back in US favor again. India should not forget that from 1972 till Tianamen Square in the late eighties (and for some years beyond that incident) Americans had a love affair with everything Chinese - they way India has come into favor of late.

(The drawing to a close of the Cold War at the end of the eighties and the Tianamen incident about the same time gave the West a reason (end of cold war) and an opportunity (Tianamen) to draw away from China, especially with regard to supplying military equipment and technology - after all nobody trusts China. It took the US many more years to overcome their prejudices to begin culitvating India seriously (after the set back during India's nuclear tests of the late nineties).

[vsudhir]

In the worst case scenario where, suppose, Delhi actually ended up signing onto a bill that we later found was backdoor CRE, yet, doesn't mean we have to continue on that path.

We could do *no* business at all with any outside countries at all and still continue the original (pre-J18) plan, no? Declare the 14 (and thats it!) under IAEA and move on. Thats the worst case scenario, admittedly. Chances are we'll be at least marginally better off in terms of trading on items that may be uneconomical to make in yindia. And U import is always nice whilst the domestic U is used for other purposes.

[Nitesh]

http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news ... zy/366937/

September 28: Even as the Indo-US nuclear deal is making its passage in the US Congress, French President Nicolas Sarkozy made clear his country's intention to forge ahead with the civil nuclear cooperation with India which will be sealed in an agreement he is signing with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Paris on Tuesday.
France, the world's leading country in nuclear power which produces 80 per cent of electricity from atomic energy, is ready to offer its latest EPR technology to India under the agreement.

In an e-mail interview to PTI ahead of his talks with Singh, Sarkozy said the prospects of cooperation between France and India in the civil nuclear field are ‘very promising’ considering his country's expertise, long tradition of cooperation with New Delhi and an atmosphere of trust.

"This visit holds a special meaning for me... We will launch our civil nuclear cooperation which will become a cornerstone of our partnership," the French President said while talking about the agenda of his bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister in Paris on Tuesday.

India and France initialed the Framework Agreement for Civil Nuclear Cooperation in January but could not sign it pending a waiver from the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group.

With the NSG giving its nod, the two leaders will sign the agreement during Singh's visit to Paris.

Prior to their bilateral talks, the two leaders will meet tomorrow in Marseille for India-EU Summit as France is the current chair of the 27-nation European body

[NRao]

Not much time, but here goes:

1. Isn't the issue from India's PoV whether it is a 'supplier' nation or a 'recipient' nation in any GNEP or GNEP like arrangement?

Yes. From what is out there India is NOT a supplier country. However, I have come across very, very few comments that state that India MAY be able to add value from her Thorium experiments. The comments are from techies, I am sure that politicoes and NPAs would oppose that - more on this down below.

2. While Russia may wish to cooperate with the US for mutual benefit in this area, there is no reason for it to follow its lead blindly. The proposals above suggest it has the ability and desire to come up with alternatives to GNEP which it will lead and might be willing to include India in on equitable terms acceptable to India.

Two items of interest: funds and political pull. Both are with the US CURRENTLY. The US has conducted much research on how to implement GNEP - in Billions of $, I doubt if that is true of the other "alternatives" (I have not followed any of them). But, more on that in another post.

3. Could you elaborate on "IF India is allowed three phase......". What is the issue with three phase plants under IAEA safeguards fed by fuel from India-based ENR facilities under IAEA safeguards? Thanks.

GNEP supposedly is an answer to proliferation. They are looking for making nuclear energy cheap and very available without the risks associated with it - the one risk that is highest is proliferation. Note that risk means diff things to diff groups: politicians are scared of proliferation (scicom has diff risks). GNEP answers ONLY the political angle AND HAS TO BE discussed in that realm.

This essentially translates to counting atoms. GNEP based on supplier/recipient countries allows for counting for atoms - supposedly.

India,as we know, has trudged off and built her own reactors. (There is enough open source lit to support this from US Scicom - US politicoes waffle between responsible nation to growing, depending on politics.) Thus the potential of a GNEP not being able to count atoms in an Indian reactor is rather high (rightfully so). Which makes most Indian designed reactors unsuitable for GNEP UNLESS India parts with the design and tech details. From Scicom it means IAEA supervision at the very least, from political PoV it means shut down Indian efforts because they constitute additional nuke accountants, who need to be trained by a foriegn entity, to count atoms. Not worth the cost and potential lack of control in future (IF there are any diff that arise at a political levels).



Now WRT current situation, GNEP (or an alternative) will take years to materialise. So, it is my read that India has been offered a substitute with total controls to implement GNEP. India has access to reactors and fuel and NO ENR. IMHO even IF India signs NPT?CTBT/whatever, this will stand. For two reasosn: I doubt the wetsern political wing wants India to be a supplier nation and India has a competing tech in thorium reactors. Both these situations have the potential to sink the current civilian nuclear know how.

I have no time to review what I have posted here, but, hope this helps.

[ramana]

I also welcome Obama's responses on Pakistan, besides his point that the original judgement of going into Iraq needed to be questioned, not quibbling about the success of the surge.

Why are we so fond of the Republicans -besides the 10b giveaway and the active support to its N proliferation and terror activities in all their tenures starting with Nixon & Ronnie - the N deal is deeply flawed now, no right to test, no right to reprocess (what on earth are we going to do with fuel being piled up infinitely), no right to get it from others if US stops supplies, no right to get enr, what is left of the 123?

What was achieved by the US is Indian adherence to defacto NPT, virtual CTBT and potential FMCO. So its a triple win for them and GOI went along willingly that should not be forgotten. Its bi-lateral CRE. This way India keeps H&D of not being part of NPT etc. Arundhati Ghose topyes can write eloquent articles about how India squared the circle and its civlian deal etc but at the bootomline this effectively makes India a part of the NPT and the consequent treaties. The only people Indian elite (diplomats and polticians) fool are Indians. This has happened throughout the centuries.

[Sanjay M]

What was achieved by the US is Indian adherence to defacto NPT, virtual CTBT and potential FMCO. So its a triple win for them and GOI went along willingly that should not be forgotten. Its bi-lateral CRE. This way India keeps H&D of not being part of NPT etc. Arundhati Ghose topyes can write eloquent articles about how India squared the circle and its civlian deal etc but at the bootomline this effectively makes India a part of the NPT and the consequent treaties. The only people Indian elite (diplomats and polticians) fool are Indians. This has happened throughout the centuries.

I thought you were in favour of the 123 deal! You're now saying that the deal is a total debacle for India, and that we're now stuck under NPT-like and CTBT-like restrictions?

Well, then the answer to this is simple -- we don't proceed with the deal.
We haven't submitted any list of facilities to IAEA, so in reality we haven't done anything that we can't pull back from.

If they've reneged on their side of things, then we pull back on our side.

And, just as importantly, the UPA govt would be dumped from power, having wrecked its relations with its various allies and vote banks, and gained nothing for it.
So if there's any silver lining to all of this, it would be that.

So what are the pro-123 commentators/columnists/etc now saying? Are they just keeping mum?
What is Anil Kakodkar saying? All that stuff about "this is nothing new" now seems to be hogwash, doesn't it?

[kshirin]

Ramana I agree with you now. I liked the 123 and backed it but they have succeeded in substituting it with Hyde Act, please see Siddharth Varadarajan's article, he has asked for feedback...


http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com/
28 September 2008
Nuclear update: 123 @ House of Representatives

The House of Representatives on Saturday passed HR 7081 -- the ‘United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act’ -- granting legislative approval to the US-India 123 Agreement.

The vote was 298 in favour to 117 against.

Among Republican Congressmen, the split was 178-10.

For Democrats, however, the vote was more even: 120 in favour to 107 against. A total of 17 Congressmen did not vote. Under House rules, a two-thirds majority of those present and voting was required for the Bill to pass, i.e. 278 votes. The final roll call can be found here.

Congressman Howard Berman sponsored the Bill, after he said Condoleezza Rice assured him the U.S. would make the achievement of a decision to prohibit the export of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology to states that are not signatories” to the NPT its highest priority at the November meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Dr. Rice later clarified what she meant:

Asked to comment on Mr. Berman’s use of the word “prohibit” she said, “I think the wording actually is to seek strict limits on,” according to the transcript.

“...at the NSG, the United States has pursued this policy in the past, but we have pursued several other initiatives at the same time.

“And what I said to Chairman Berman, given that the Administration is coming to an end, this is something that we hope is doable. I couldn’t make any promises about delivery, but we would seek to do this,” she clarified.

“You know that the President has spoken about the need to do something about enrichment and reprocessing. And I think a global approach to this issue of the technologies is an appropriate one. But this has been our policy. But I think what Chairman Berman is speaking to is that we had also paired it with several other initiatives, and we’ll seek this one as the highest priority now,” she said.The Senate is likely to approve an identically worded Bill on Monday, President Bush will then sign it into law, and Dr. Rice is slated to travel to Delhi on October 3 to get the 123 Agreement signed by the Indians.
So what should India do?
1. Simply roll over and sign
2. Sign it with a strong reiteration of its national understanding, repudiating the riders that have been inserted by President Bush and Congress?
3. Tell Condi, thanks but no thanks.

Comments and suggestions welcome....

Trouble is, if we walk out now, there will be hell to pay, and even if TSP unleashes WMD, the US will look away. Come to think of it, they may look away even now.

[svinayak]

What was achieved by the US is Indian adherence to defacto NPT, virtual CTBT and potential FMCO. So its a triple win for them and GOI went along willingly that should not be forgotten. Its bi-lateral CRE. This way India keeps H&D of not being part of NPT etc. Arundhati Ghose topyes can write eloquent articles about how India squared the circle and its civlian deal etc but at the bootomline this effectively makes India a part of the NPT and the consequent treaties. The only people Indian elite (diplomats and polticians) fool are Indians. This has happened throughout the centuries.

I thought you were in favour of the 123 deal! You're now saying that the deal is a total debacle for India, and that we're now stuck under NPT-like and CTBT-like restrictions?

People think that it is the 123 agreement. It is actually he Hyde Act and additional laws attached to this act which is applicable on India. No country has this kind of things accepted

[Sanjay M]

Trouble is, if we walk out now, there will be hell to pay, and even if TSP unleashes WMD, the US will look away. Come to think of it, they may look away even now.

What do you mean, "hell to pay"?? If they're imposing an NPT+CTBT prescription upon us, then that is the "hell", not the walking away from it.

What could they do to us that they haven't already done?
By your logic, they could have forced us to directly sign NPT and CTBT all these years.

Nonsense. If we want to back out of a bargain they haven't lived upto on their side, then there's no penalty for us in doing that.
The penalty here is if we accept NPT + CTBT

[RajeshA]

What was achieved by the US is Indian adherence to defacto NPT, virtual CTBT and potential FMCO. So its a triple win for them and GOI went along willingly that should not be forgotten. Its bi-lateral CRE. This way India keeps H&D of not being part of NPT etc. Arundhati Ghose topyes can write eloquent articles about how India squared the circle and its civlian deal etc but at the bootomline this effectively makes India a part of the NPT and the consequent treaties. The only people Indian elite (diplomats and polticians) fool are Indians. This has happened throughout the centuries.

De-facto NPT? Yes. The question is: adherence to as de-factor NPT as a NWS or a NNWS? I would say, that the similarities to NWS are still higher, than with NNWS.

Potential FMCO is all Zukunftsmusik (future music), as the Germans say it.

There was some price to be paid.

What rankles me is the virtual CTBT bag over our heads. There was no willingness in India for such a concession. The concession was not made willingly but rather forced from us, by trapping India through duplicitous negotiations and bargaining in bad faith. Of course, MMS allowed that concession.

[kshirin]

Sanjay, Ok, maybe I can rephrase it, there will be MORE hell to pay, except if Bush/Mc Cain lose, the Democrats don't have much riding on this deal, so they may not take it "personally" as the Republicans will.

I am not for a minute advocating doing nothing and meekly signing, but we have to find a way out of this mess without hurting ourselves. Delay, procrastinate, add riders, whatever, defintiely signing it on October 3 should be OUT unless the US declares 123 prevails over everything else.

[kshirin]

Rajesh it is not just CTBT, we are taking on too much and seem to be getting zilch in return.

[Sanjay M]

People think that it is the 123 agreement. It is actually he Hyde Act and additional laws attached to this act which is applicable on India. No country has this kind of things accepted

My point is that whatever was just now passed by the US Congress bears no resemblance to what we were previously told was to be submitted to the US Congress. Therefore, we aren't walking away from the deal -- we simply found no deal there for us on the table.

The Americans have ripped up the deal themselves.

2 things have to happen:

1) There has to be a domestic backlash in India, to remove the UPA govt from power.
2) The Indian parliament has to pass its own counter-legislation to the Hyde Act, requiring the Indian govt to maintain the viability of India's nuclear deterrent as part of national policy, as well as India's energy independence. These things should take primacy over any international treaty.

[Sanjay M]

Sanjay, Ok, maybe I can rephrase it, there will be MORE hell to pay, except if Bush/Mc Cain lose, the Democrats don't have much riding on this deal, so they may not take it "personally" as the Republicans will.

I am not for a minute advocating doing nothing and meekly signing, but we have to find a way out of this mess without hurting ourselves. Delay, procrastinate, add riders, whatever, defintiely signing it on October 3 should be OUT unless the US declares 123 prevails over everything else.

Republicans are heading for electoral defeat anyway. Obama was never a strong cheerleader for this deal, so he won't make too much noise about this Bush admin centrepiece.

They only have one bullet to use -- the supply-cutoff threat. They can't use that lone bullet twice. They either use it to compel us to buy their reactors, or else they use it to compel us not to test. They can't get a 2-for-1 deal.


I still want to know what the main Indian pro-123 commentators/analysts are now saying.
And what about Anil Kakodkar? We were hanging on his every word, before. What is he saying now? Is he still saying that these additional riders are "nothing new"?

[ramdas]

So, the MMS clique's treason is there for all to see. Any entity - even a commie led third front is better than the UPA . In the event of the UPA losing power this will be one giant enron scandal.

As for the nuclear issue. A test is a must in the next five years to undo this damage. The maximum price that we will have to pay is that the 14 PHWRs we have committed to safeguarding will be put for IAEA safeguards. If a test is done within the next five to six years, fuel supplies may stop for a few 1000 MW worth of reactors. That deficit can be made up through coal fired plants in a year or so - not a big price to pay overall.

As an extra precaution, despite 123 or whatsoever, no deals should go to the US. Only to Russia, as even Fracnce might toe the US line.