India nuclear news and discussion

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 13 Oct 2008 17:22

Philip, the NoKo dance is very predictable, and follows moi's paper precisely. They operate on the same wavelength (meaning repetition cycle) as the US Presidential Election cycle.

One has to recognize a few things:

1. There is no such thing as a North Korean nuclear weapon. IMO what showed up in NoKo was what was removed from TSP in 2002. Totally under Chinese control. The NoKos are allowed to display these from time to time, and that's it.

2. So now NoKo claims to be all peaceful and de-nuclearized - they want Dubya to go out with a major success, and they don't want McCain to come in, because he may react unpredictably to another nuke brandishment.

After the next President comes in, suddenly NoKo will discover that the US/UN have not been keeping their side of the bargain (which they won't, per NPR) and suddenly new nuke programs will be discovered. There will be again frantic calls for Six-Party Talks, and Unkil will go hat in hand to Beijing to ask for Chinese "good offices".

And so on.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 13 Oct 2008 17:59

Rye wrote:Sanku wrote:
Absolutely no data to back up that central assumption.
Umm..the claim is about something 10 years from now? What kind of data do you want from the future that would satisfy you?

One makes future predictions based on current event and past history and understanding trends. Otherwise any statement can be made about the future. After all its 10 years away

Just randomly yelling, "where is your logic? I don't see it in your hand, you suck" explains nothing and reveals nothing.

It would be nice if you would not use that sort of a language to describe what is essentially a polite post -- lets maintain some decorum please -- my point is simple; while trying to see whats the future going to be; lets not put to much weight to assumptions whose validity is not solid.

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 13 Oct 2008 18:07

Sanku wrote:

It would be nice if you would not use that sort of a language to describe what is essentially a polite post -- lets maintain some decorum please -- my point is simple; while trying to see whats the future going to be; lets not put to much weight to assumptions whose validity is not solid.

Yes, the 'I am so offended" line that is usually pulled out when hyperbole/rhetoric is exposed. The validity of assumptions can only be determined as valid or invalid after the outcome is known 10 years down the road. Some assumptions have to be made without wearing ideological blinders, and the strongest statements that can be made are conditional. If we do X, we will mostly likely end up in scenario A. If we do Y, we end up in scenario B. Just because one of those scenarios gives you ideological heartburn is no reason to dismiss it out of hand.

If India fails to get its act together, then all this gloom and doom would turn out to be true -- otherwise, not. What is the need for all this pretense of extreme-400%-logical thinking in a domain where information is partial or incorrect almost all the time?

harbans · Post by **harbans** » 13 Oct 2008 18:33

Energy additional requirement for any nation has a direct corelation with it's GDP growth. However it is different for a 1% growth in a developed country like say US and 1% GDP growth for a country like Botswana. The additional energy requirement for a country like Botswana would be 2.5 times while the additional requirement for US around .7 times. So for a country like India somewhere in the middle and more to Botswana in the development index for 1% growth in GDP the energy growth requirement would be 2% of which 75% would be in power generation. If we consider we want to grow a modest 7% and our present power gen capacity is 130GW, then we would require by 2030 around 750 GW of installed capacity. That means we will have to install around 27GW every year till 2030 atleast.

However even after managing to do so we will be lower in per capita consumption than most moderate developing countries like Malaysia or Brazil.

Today we know how badly oil prices effect us. World demand for oil is 80 odd Million barrels per day. By 2030 it would be around 130 mbd. We would'nt be able to get enough oil even at 200 USD/ Barrel. We will parellely have to encourage electric vehicles, hybrid cars etc to keep growing transportation fuel imports in check.

Coal is an option but with the very high ash content we have in our coal, it's not viable on such scale apart from the tremendous damage which our environment will sustain as a result.

From the energy angle we need available as ot today as many options available to us. The Nuclear deal provides us a major option, without affecting our military part.

Hence we need to keep installing a 1GW power generation plant almost every 2 weeks in the country to just sustain a 7% growth, starting today.

Please figure out options without the nuclear one. You don't have many ways of doing that. Thanks.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 13 Oct 2008 19:29

It is said that at the current growth for nuke reactors, in 2030 ANY reactor built will NOT have fuel to last its life time - IF the reactor is Uranium based. I believe that the current "life time" for a reactor is 40 years.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 13 Oct 2008 22:01

The key is to pry Japan loose from that grouping and see India in its own eyes and not thru distorting visions. IOW Japan has to see India as contributing to the stability of East Asia which is what Japan needs.

Sanjay M · Post by **Sanjay M** » 13 Oct 2008 22:16

RajeshA wrote:Civilian nuclear cooperation between India and the 'international community' can have its downsides in the Indian politics too.

Once LWRs are set up by the nuclear reactor suppliers in the West in the various states, e.g. West Bengal, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, etc., and industrial parks, etc are set up around those reactors, the govts. of these states come under huge amount of pressure to see to it, that these reactors keep on working without any disruption.

Knowing that today politics in India has become fragmented and coalition politics is the rule of the day, and even marginal regional groups in India can exert disproportionally high pressure on Central politics, one could assume, the regional groupings would not allow the Central Govt. to do anything, which could rock the boat, i.e. stop the reactors from producing power.

As such, whichever Govt. comes in the Center may find it a difficult proposition to really make use of that Right to Test.

I am not saying TEST, TEST, TEST. I merely want to point out, that there exist certain pressure points in India, as far as testing celibacy is concerned.

Actually, putting such foreign nuclear reactors in states like W.Bengal could make the local state govts into stakeholders whose own success is then tied to the reactors' successful operation. Shutting down those reactors as part of a bandh would be like cutting off your nose to spite your face. If Commies are trying to save their own future by emulating Chinese industrialization on the one hand, and yet on the other hand they are shutting down the energy for their industrialization, then they'll be undercutting their own existence very quickly.

Personally though, I would prefer to see W.Bengal bled into submission through their own self-inflicted wounds. Any reactors built in other parts of the country would be beyond the reach of such regionally-bound parties.

In an era of coalition politics, then it's good to advertise the pitfalls of coalitionism, by showing any odd-man-out that if he's not part of the coalition then he may lose everything. Congress seemed to turn a blind eye to Tata Nano's departure from W.Bengal, but perhaps they might not have done this if Commies hadn't withdrawn their support.

So the lesson of coalitionism should be -- Don't take the nation for granted, otherwise it might not be there for you when you need it.

Use the power of the central govt to reward loyal coalition members, while actively penalizing those who aren't loyal. Certainly, the stick can be as much of a teacher as the carrot.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 14 Oct 2008 02:09

NPCIL to raise capacity 5-fold in five years

The Nuclear Power Corp of India (NPCIL), which had so far managed to install 4120 mw of capacity, has set its eyes on an ambitious target of 22,000 mw in the next five years.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 14 Oct 2008 05:13

NPCIL eyes 80% localisation in nuclear tech

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 14 Oct 2008 05:40

I wonder if Dr. Tim is deeply disturbed at the turn of events ending in the signing of Indo US nuclear deal. He being a great admirer of Uneven Cohen, must be really lamenting every moment in the lsat six months!

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 14 Oct 2008 05:56

NPA's are moving to greener pastures . They have bright carrier wating for them in EGYPT.
http://www.awate.com/portal/content/view/4863/5/

In Egypt it is customary that people hire professional wailers for funerals. The NPA, a professional wailer, is briefed and advised by the relatives of the deceased on how they would like their beloved to be remembered. The costlier wailer is the one with the necessary experience and devices for drawing tears from the eyes of the majority using rhythmic wails of quasi poems. The same, or a variation of the same phenomenon, is observed in parts of Ethiopia,Sudan and Tubelightbad,Peking and Isloobad.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 14 Oct 2008 14:27

Rye wrote:
Yes, the 'I am so offended" line that is usually pulled out when hyperbole/rhetoric is exposed.

Why are you trolling? I had a simple point there is no proof for the economic predictions made -- instead of providing some you have chosen to make a personal attack ! But rest easy -- you do not offend me; only my sensibilities; and I have to learn to live with that.

Ramana -- thanks -- you are a Guru because you look at the problem squarely but not worry and try for a solution and not wish it away on ideological grounds or get into a whine fest like some of us (me included). Also hats off for the Chakravhuya analogy.

NRao -- the point about limited N fuel has been made time and again on the board here -- but I wonder why that elephant in the room is missed out in the non BRF discussion on the deal in the media?

amit · Post by **amit** » 14 Oct 2008 15:19

Sanku wrote:
amit wrote:not sufficiently large enough to give as much pain to the sanction givers as it gets itself.
Thank you makes it easy for me--

Absolutely no data to back up that central assumption.

And no comparison with China does not count --
1. China was not sanctioned when it could have been purely from economic perspective.
2. China is far more willing to suffer sanctions (under a different banner) to do what it needs to do -- yesterday today and tomorrow
3. China always had other geopolitical irons in the fire (N K for one) the threat to Japan Taiwan other. It has a hostile position to Western block allies and a power project and demonstrated will to back that position.

In all ZERO GROUNDS FOR INDIA === CHINA.

This economic theory is just a article of faith without any logic or prior examples to justify it!!

You know boss you're so predictable!

I put in the China bit just for fun to see your reaction and even warned you that it is peripheral to my argument and bingo just like in your last post you latched on the minor point and the major portion of your response was devoted to it.

This time there's not going to be any peripheral issues and i'll get right to the point in a minute.

But before that I see you've kindly decided to charged Rye, who's a very respected poster, of trolling. That's interesting because you're the one who barged in into a discussion I was having with Rajesh and moved into a tangent so that you could sprout your pet theories. Isn't that a case of the pot calling the kettle black?

Rajesh made a very valid observation that as large Nuclear Power Plants of the 1,000 MW range are set up across the country on its periphery there's going to be a large number of industrial parks coming up all contributing significantly the the area's GDP and per capita. Now given the nature of India's fragile coalition politics there could be local interest groups which would put pressure on the central govt to defer any possible decision to test for fear of economic sanctions.

To that I said that if economic growth goes on the way it has been (please note I did discount the current financial crisis in this simple model) then power plants in the 1,000 MW category will come up anyway - but instead of nuclear it would be coal fired - and the industrial parks would still come up and the GDP/per capita scenario would be the same.

And any sanctions that India would face due to a test would hurt just as much because it would hit things like FDI and FII inflows, exports, foreign collaborations, backoffice operations and the availability of cheap credit etc. This would be a far greater financial blow to the Indian economy than the actual financial loss that would possibly be suffered from a disruption of fuel for the nuclear plants.

This is more so because we are talking about a relatively short period of time, that is 20 years - a period in which at the max two or three (optimistically) nuclear plants would come up. My final point was that after 20 years the economy would be too big for sanctions to hurt us.

Instead of commenting on that argument you took it off in your familiar tangent of nuclear deal bad blah, blah.

Now coming to you point that this economic logic is an article of faith and your demand for empirical evidence, I would like to ask you what empirical evidence have you put forward to show that my point is an article of faith and your point is not just simple kite flying?

In fact what exactly is your point? That now we have the nuclear deal, if we test it will doom and gloom for the economy. But if we hadn't signed the deal then everything would be hunky dory after a nuclear test?

You must remember that you can only dish an economic model with an alternative economic model. That's the interesting point about "this inexact science" of economics. No amount of mambo jumbo would do the job.

Now I know you'll immediately come up with "Oh nothing much happened to the Indian economy in 1998 so nothing much would happen to the economy if we test in either 2009, 2015, 2018 or 2020" argument. I've heard that before.

I'm afraid if you put forth that kind of reasoning then even school kids who read economics would laugh at you. Even today the Indian economy is about three times the size of the economy in 1998, we get more than 10-15 times of FDI per year than we used to get in 1998, I don't have the figures on the tip of my figures but our exports are at least five-10 times more. Our firms have far more foreign credit exposure than in 1998. Imagine what those numbers will be in say 2018? In short the Indian economy is much more dependent on the global economy and that's the pressure points which the sanctioning nations have got on us in the medium term.

Plus there was another factor which mitigated the 1998 crisis and that is 9/11 which brought down the sanctions regime very fast.

The point is that if we test, there will sanctions and the Indian economy will be hit badly but it will survive, the economy despite everything is very robust, IMO.

But and here's my central point I think there would not have been any substantial mitigation in the severity of the potential damage that a sanctions regime would cause if we did not sign the nuclear deal and tested.

And that's because the major damage to the economy would come not from the cost of the nuclear reactors themselves or from the fuel supply disruptions but due to loss of business confidence and drying up of funding and FDI and a hit on our exports plus a fall in the rupee, stock exchange etc. Remember it's been discussed how despite the most optimistic scenarios, foreign fueled nuclear power plants would form a very small percentage of our total power output.

The important caveat here is the 20 years horizon I'm talking about. In that period there'll be very few nuclear plants set up and after that period the Indian economy will become sanction proof by become too big.

Now let's see which tangent you take now...

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 14 Oct 2008 18:12

Compare MMS and Dear Leader Kim's methods of dealing and negotiating with Bush & Co.!

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 60267.html

World Focus: Game, set and match to North Korea

By Anne Penketh, Diplomatic Editor
Tuesday, 14 October 2008

The pictures alleged to be of Kim Jong-Il after his reported brain surgery

If you were keeping a scorecard of the nuclear brinkmanship between North Korea and the United States, today it would show game, set and match for Pyongyang over the world's only remaining superpower.

The totalitarian state secured a major strategic victory at the weekend over the US, which finally removed North Korea from its terrorism blacklist, consigning to history President George Bush's description of Pyongyang as a member of the "Axis of Evil".

The decision goes far beyond the realm of symbolism, however. The delisting, which had long been a prize sought by the reclusive and isolated North Korean regime, opens up trade and financial prospects that had been denied under US sanctions. it also comes after the North Koreans threatened to sabotage a hard-fought agreement secured through six-party talks with the US and its neighbours. it warned it would bar UN weapons inspectors from its partially disabled Yongbyon plant and move to restart its weapons programme, accusing the Americans of reneging on a pledge to delist it as a state sponsor of terror.

The US would doubtless argue that impoverished North Korea needed this deal more than the Americans. But the administration, castigated by the Republican right for yielding to North Korean blackmail yet again, clearly needed a diplomatic success in the dying days of George Bush's presidency. The outgoing President hopes to be able to proclaim that he has left the world a safer place by dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons programme under a strict verification process.

UN monitors were back at work yesterday following the delisting announcement which came after crisis talks between North Korea and the chief US negotiator, Christopher Hill, in Pyongyang, to salvage the nuclear deal.

Now that the issue of North Korea's nuclear ambitions appears to have been sorted – at least until the next hiccup in the disarmament timetable – international attention will focus on the fate of the North Korean regime under Kim Jong-Il, its unpredictable dictator who has no clear successor in the Communist dynasty founded by his father, Kim Il Sung. The ruler, 66, disappeared from view in mid-August amid reports that he had undergone brain surgery after suffering a stroke. Yesterday South Korean officials, who obsessively follow developments in the North, were poring over pictures released at the weekend, just before the US announcement.

The first photos of the "Dear Leader" since August showed him inspecting a women's army unit. But experts were puzzled by the lush foliage on the trees on the hillside behind, which raised questions about the date of the pictures. Nor did Kim Jong-Il show any signs of having had his hair displaced by surgery.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 14 Oct 2008 19:24

35 pc power from n-plants by 2050: Kakodkar

Katare · Post by **Katare** » 15 Oct 2008 01:26

Philip wrote:Compare MMS and Dear Leader Kim's methods of dealing and negotiating with Bush & Co.!

Who is better negotiator in your opinion?

Other day you wanted a Putin in India now you like Kim next it would be Ahmadinejad and Chavez.

No thank you saar, Indians are happy with our SDRE head of the states.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 15 Oct 2008 02:06

GE gears up for civil nuclear play

While GE was silent on the issue of reprocessing of spent fuel, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has clearly spelt out its position that any new imported LWR capacity to be set up in India would have to be accompanied by access to fuel reprocessing technology.

“There is no question of getting into a situation where spent fuel is allowed to pile up. Not even a single mega watt of LWR capacity would be set up in the country without fuel reprocessing assurances… This is an absolute precondition for us engaging with any foreign reactor vendor,” a senior DAE official told Business Line. He said the DAE’s position has been clearly spelt out to all the reactor manufacturers in the fray for contracts in India.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 15 Oct 2008 04:17

India: 21 nuclear power projects planned

These include the setting up of six French reactors of 1,600 MW, four Russian reactors of 1,000 MW and four American reactors of 1,500 MW within the next five years. Senior sources in the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) point out that each of these reactors is likely to cost a minimum of 2 billion dollars and will collectively produce 30,000 MW of nuclear energy.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 15 Oct 2008 04:19

http://www.cfr.org/publication/17498/

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERVIEW

U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Accord: An ’Epochal’ Agreement

Interviewee: Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor

October 10, 2008

Ashley J. Tellis, an expert on South Asia, who served as a consultant to the State Department in negotiating the just signed U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement, says the pact was a "significant achievement" for President Bush. He foresees an improvement across the board in U.S.-India relations, although he warns that there has to be careful diplomacy in the future to ensure cooperation.

You were involved in planning and execution of this U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement from its earliest stages. It was finally signed into law by President Bush this week. How important is this agreement, do you think, for the Bush administration?

It is a very significant achievement. The president came into office hoping that he would be able to put in place a new relationship with India, an idea which has turned out to be elusive through the years. Administrations have tried, since the 1980s, beginning with President Reagan, to set the India relationship on a new footing. The most recent effort was led by President Clinton, just before he left office. That breakthrough eluded us for a variety of reasons, among the most important of which was of course the disagreement with India on its nuclear weapons. And Bush has, in a sense, managed to take this devil by the horns and exorcise it. Get rid of it entirely. And I think this is simply epochal. I mean, there’s no other way to describe it.

Epochal?

This is epochal. This is one of those moments, when we look back a couple of years or decades from now, it will prove to be one of the turning points in forging the U.S.-India relationship for the new century.

That’s interesting. It was signed almost without any Americans taking notice.

The bill was signed into law on Wednesday. The Senate actually voted on it last week.

Voted on it almost between votes on the rescue program. And as a result the American press virtually ignored it. But in India, this was a major, major story, wasn’t it?

Absolutely, because it’s a multilayered phenomenon in India. First, it was a symbol of the United States doing something that it did not have to do for India, but nonetheless did, in order to forge this new relationship. This went to the heart of the American commitment to assisting India in its growth toward the coming of great power. So there was a powerful symbolism that transcended the specifics of the agreement. That was the first item. Remember, this comes against a backdrop of an Indian complaint that goes back fifty years, which is that the United States has always seen India within the context of its relationship with Pakistan, that it has always given India short shrift because of the exigent necessities for Pakistan over the years. So, the civil nuclear agreement exorcises the demons that the Indians believed always put India within the context of Pakistan. This agreement has nothing to do with Pakistan. It was a pure bilateral U.S.-India initiative. And it was the best way the United States could convey its commitment to helping India’s development, to helping India’s growth and power. The symbolism here was extremely profound.

The second element is simply that this meets an important Indian need, which is the need for energy. India is in the takeoff stage of its economic development. It’s looking at a point where it has enormous energy requirements. The one thing they want to look at more closely is civilian nuclear energy, for all the environmental benefits and because it lessens dependency on foreign oil. These are pretty much the same kinds of concerns that we have in the United States. But they couldn’t get to this point because of this enormous set of rules that was constructed for the last thirty-five odd years that kept India out after 1974 [when India conducted its first nuclear test].

You mean the Nuclear Suppliers Group?

Yes, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, for one. There’ve been a whole series of things that the United States put in place since 1974 in an effort to isolate India and to get the Indians to roll back their weapons program. The Bush initiative basically brings the curtain down on those U.S. efforts of the last thirty-five years. It transforms India from the target to now the partner. This is, from the Indian point of view, extremely profound. It helps India meet its energy targets, but it also changes the character of the bilateral relationship. The Indians recognize that the one thing that the Chinese have had since the 1970s is access to American and European dual-use technologies, because those were not barred to China as they were to India.

Can you give me an example of such a technology.

A very simple technology, for example, is instrumentation. Sophisticated instrumentation that you can use, for example, in mining, in oil exploration. These are technologies that, in some conceivable circumstances, could be used to advance a nuclear program. The Indians didn’t want this for their nuclear program because they had enough technology for their weapons program indigenously. They, for example, are trying to do resources exploration in very difficult geographic terrain. They need access to this quality of instrumentation but it was simply denied to India on nonproliferation grounds. Now, this technology becomes available given the Bush initiative.

India used to be a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and always kept running up against U.S. foreign policy because it was seen as tilting toward the Soviet bloc. Does this accord open up new vistas in cooperation on foreign policy issues?

It does, but one needs to be careful about what that will mean in practice. It will certainly change the India worldview about how it sees the United States. Throughout the Cold War and at the height of the Non-Aligned Movement, India always had a very suspicious view of the United States because the United States was seen as a country that was attempting to restrain India’s growth. The ties that the United States enjoyed first with Pakistan and then with China were seen as objective constraints on India’s freedom of action. And there was enough there in the relationship that allowed the Indians to look at the relationship with the United States through very jaundiced lenses. This deal puts all that behind us, because if nothing else, it communicates to the Indians that the United States is a friend. But, what does this mean for actual cooperation? We’ve got to remember even if the Indians change their view of the United States there are challenges that India is going to face because of the disparities in Indian and American power.

Our interests often diverge. And these interests can be reconciled through diplomacy and through a great deal of energy and investment on both sides. But, that convergence may not be automatic, or it may not exist a priori. So there is work that will have to be done. The deal takes away some of the preconditions that prevented cooperation. But this will not automatically assure cooperation unless both sides can bring to the table good diplomacy, deep engagement, and continued cooperation.

India’s very worried about terrorism right now, particularly Islamic terrorism. The United States has been fighting this now for some time. Is there any cooperation going on now in this field?

There is cooperation, but I must confess that we have not found the right level of cooperation. It is still in its infancy. And until a year ago, it was a very discordant cooperation because there were real differences about Pakistan. A year ago, that began to change because the U.S. expectation that Pakistan would deliver on terrorism slowly started dissipating. We began to become more realistic about what the Pakistanis could and could not do. And in the last year there has been a much better convergence on U.S. and Indian positions with respect to terrorism, especially the need to help Pakistan kick the cancer that consumes it from within.

I think we are on the cusp of a new relationship with respect to cooperation on terrorism. We can do much better than we have so far done in terms of intelligence cooperation. The Indians have very good local intelligence on what is happening in respect to terrorist movements in Pakistan. We need to be able to better share with the Indians our own intelligence. We started doing it, but we need to accelerate this. Second, we need to have at least a common view on what the challenges facing Pakistan are, and how we can both help Pakistan to defeat terrorism. This is not an issue to divide us anymore, because I think the United States has realistic expectations of Pakistan’s limitations today. The third area is in respect to Afghanistan. India, the United States, and Pakistan have a real interest in Afghanistan coming out right. We have not been able to coordinate our strategies with respect to Afghanistan. The next administration has a great opportunity to have that conversation. I hope now that we have opened the door to a new relationship with India, the stage is set for a cooperative engagement with respect to Afghanistan.

What is India’s relationship to Afghanistan?

The Indians have always wanted a close relationship with Afghanistan but they have never pushed for one because, other than the civilization ties, the relationship with Afghanistan has been driven more by what happens in Kabul than what happens in New Delhi. Afghanistan’s relationship with Pakistan has always been a very troubled one. And because it has been a troubled relationship, successive Afghan governments of every stripe, going back to the days of the monarchy in the 1950s, through the Communists in the 1980s, have looked to New Delhi for help in containing what they see as the Pakistani threat to Afghanistan.

There has been a good relationship, but it’s been a relationship with many limitations because India does not share the land frontier with Afghanistan. Access to Afghanistan has historically been very difficult because the relationship with Pakistan has been troubled. Even to this day, the Indians are unable to assist the Afghans in ways that they would want simply because they don’t have land transit rights to be able to move food, to move construction materials and things like that, which they need to support their humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan.

The United States looks upon China with sort of mixed feelings. How does India come out on this?

It comes out of it in exactly the same way as we do. There is a fundamental disquiet about China, about its growing power, about its military modernization, and about the many things that the Chinese have done over the last fifty years to undermine Indian security. But the Indians are extremely cagey about articulating that disquiet. And so, what you’ve got is essentially a situation that is analogous to that which confronts the United States, a desire to maintain a good working relationship with China and to have the economic dimensions expand to the maximum degree possible. But the Indians are going to continue to keep their powder dry, and there will be a certain distance which will not be bridged because Chinese power exists on Indian doorsteps. There is a certain degree of discomfort with China and the strategic directions it has pursued. In India, that is not going to disappear anytime soon. [This is] one of the things that drives the Indian strategy of improving its relations with third parties. Here the United States is critical; its relations with Russia become very important; Indian relations with Japan and Southeast Asia become very important. All these relations are driven in part by the calculation that because the Sino-Indian relationship will never be one of complete transparency and amity, the Indians feel compelled to build up these other relationships as insurance. The key thing though is it’s all going to be very polite, very Asian. Everyone is going to do this with a lot of smiles on their faces, but they’re not going to let down their guard.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 15 Oct 2008 04:51

India to seek n-energy support from Brazil, South Africa

renukb · Post by **renukb** » 15 Oct 2008 22:02

AnantD wrote:Glad to see BRF finally cheering about Rice and GWB. I was predicting this was inevitable as far back as 2 years ago with someone here calling me MUTU or some other wise ass acronym.

He's probably sitting on the floor crying on Karat's shoulder right now.

The next step would be to have the Ambani's or Tata's govern the Nuclear Trade with the US, as a partial stake-holder. Would do a lot better than GOI or State Mantri's; don't want a repeat of Enron.

However, there is really no looking back. Just need to act responsibly and there is no limit to anything India wants from the US, trust me.

Would be good if IN and IAF helped control/interdict/seize shipment of nuclear contraband from the usual suspects along with the US in the high seas. Probably a 40-50% chance of that happenning. Just wishful thinking.

What's it about the need to act responcibly? So you want India to be the next Munna state, begging for things to use against China or some other nation? This is height of US psychopancy...

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 16 Oct 2008 04:22

Nuclear pact with Kazakhstan likely during PM’s visit

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 16 Oct 2008 14:07

A mixed bag article by Raj Changappa, that is good, san some snake oil selling that gives the ting of sarkari salesmen selling the deal to aam janata.

India Today: The new nuclear future

Raj Chengappa
October 10, 2008
As George W. Bush stepped briskly into the White House for the signing ceremony in the afternoon of October 8, the gathering that included Ronen Sen, India's ambassador to the US, was aware that they were witnessing a rare and historic moment.

Bush looked much the cat that got the cream as he signed the hard-fought US Congress legislation enabling civilian nuclear trade with India after a hiatus of 34 long years. He had plenty of reason to look pleased.

Even as the walls of the US economy seemed to be crumbling around him, he was ending his two-term tenure as President with a signal foreign policy success-a bright ray of sunshine amid the gathering gloom.

In India it was just past the midnight hour and as the country slept, its giant nuclear establishment, to paraphrase Jawaharlal Nehru, was stepping out from the old to the new and waking up to new life and freedom. As a senior Indian diplomat observed, "We're out of the doghouse and on the high road again."

For years after India's 1974 nuclear test, the country was treated like a pariah, especially by the US. America had erected an entire architecture of laws and multinational groupings meant to isolate and punish India for being a rogue nuclear power.

Sanctions were heaped on India and US firms were prevented from selling hi-tech that was even remotedly connected to the word nuclear. America put pressure on the world to ostracise India and formed the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to prevent other countries from conducting nuclear trade with India. Indian nuclear scientists were made unwelcome at international seminars in their field.

Now with the Indo-US nuclear deal, the huge boulder that was blocking India's nuclear path had been lifted. For excited Indian nuclear scientists, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Bush had made the impossible happen.

Not only had India ended the apartheid it faced with regard to civilian nuclear trade, but the country was also incredibly allowed to carry on with its nuclear weapons programme unhindered. It was a privilege only the so-called P5 nations-the US, Russia, France, UK and China-enjoyed.

India has now joined the exclusive club of the nuclear haves. As M.R. Srinivasan, a former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, put it: "For all practical purposes we are now recognised by the world as a nuclear weapons state."

To achieve that, the US had to expend voluminous political capital that began on July 18, 2005 with Bush and Manmohan signing a landmark agreement to remove the nuclear obstacle from bilateral relations.

The Bush administration got the US Congress to pass the Hyde Act, amending the Atomic Energy Act that had prohibited American entities from trading with countries that didn't sign the NPT or had done a nuclear test-India fitted into both categories.

Meanwhile, the US negotiated a bilateral 123 Agreement with India that laid the framework for their civilian trade. It was agreed that India would place in phases 14 of its 22 power reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Delhi then negotiated an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA, after Manmohan won a trust vote in July this year.

The biggest breakthrough came last month when the US got the NSG countries to make an exception to trade with India. It meant that India could conduct civilian trade with not just the US but with the entire world.

Last month's battle in the US Congress to get the 123 ratified was Bush's final salvo to push the deal through that culminated with him signing it into law. It was to be followed by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice inking the 123 Agreement in Washington DC.

Typically, the opposition to the deal from the BJP and the Left came thick and fast. Both parties had bitterly opposed it and denounced the signing as a sellout of India's nuclear sovereignty. In Parliament later this month they would once again haul Manmohan over the coals by going over the fine print of the deal.

But nothing they would say or do would rob Manmohan of his moment of glory. Like Bush, he too is credited with pulling off a foreign policy coup that has not only defined his prime ministerial tenure but has also set the agenda for the nation and possibly for the next election.

So why is it such a big deal for India and for its nuclear establishment? Few know that India's nuclear power reactors are running at 50 per cent of their capacity because of a crippling shortage of uranium fuel. Four of its new reactors cannot be commissioned because there is no fuel available to start them up. {Arun_S: I am disappointed at such wanton snake oil selling by Raj Changappa, executive officers in DAE and PMO need to be dismissed for this "arson by fire fighter; Viz. govt officials wolves who are paid to watch the hen house"}

Fewer know that the main reason for India's nuclear power sector stagnating at 4,100 MW-when it should have been 10,000 MW eight years ago-was because of the ring of sanctions against the industry. And that India has only fuel enough to support 10,000 MW of nuclear generated power when it has plans for over 60,000 MW{Arun_S: Some more snake oil selling by Raj Changappa, cover-up of non-performing DAE officials, in delivering FBR and AHWR till date.} .

There were far more important reasons than just bailing out India's flailing nuclear industry. India had become chronically short of energy-the power cuts that most cities experience is testimony to that. With an energy shortage of 10 per cent, India needs to add 10 power plants of 1,000 MW capacity this year alone to meet its current demand.
It is still heavily dependent on thermal power fired mainly by coal to help ease the energy shortage. Thermal power now accounts for 51 per cent of the electricity generating capacity of 1,45,000 MW.

But apart from dwindling coal reserves it comes with the disadvantage of high carbon emissions that will put India on the mat for global warming. {Arun_S: Salesmen scoring a self goal.}

Hydro-electric generation is credited with another 25 per cent but with environmental activism and the damage to forest resources being enormous, they are not seen as the best alternative.

In renewable energy, like solar and winds, efforts haven't met with the kind of success they should have and they now contribute barely 8 per cent of the share. Enter nuclear power.

Nuclear power is enjoying a remarkable comeback across the world-after major improvements in safety of reactors following Chernobyl and Three Mile Island-and is once again being touted as the clean fuel of the future.

France is the leader with nuclear power accounting for 75 per cent of its electricity generation. Japan is at around 30 per cent. Even European countries like Germany, who are rethinking their opposition to nuclear plants, have begun making enquiries.

In the US, there has been a surge of interest-John McCain promised that if he became President he would sanction a hundred new nuclear plants. Nuclear energy now accounts for 23 per cent of the total world electricity production while in India it contributes only a paltry 3 per cent.

The deal is certain to change that. Soon after his New York and Washington visit, Manmohan flew into Paris for a bilateral summit with French President Nicolas Sarkozy. As they looked on, Anil Kakodkar, Atomic Energy Commission chairman and Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister, signed an umbrella Indo-French nuclear cooperation agreement.

Details of it have still not been made public but from the look on Kakodkar's face it was apparent that India had got what it wanted from France-nuclear fuel, reactors, reprocessing rights for spent fuel and possibly enrichment technology as well. Later he told India Today, "It's a perfect agreement."

Meanwhile, the French nuclear power giant, Areva, has already been having meetings with the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL). The two have homed in on a site in Jaitapur in Maharashtra to set up a nuclear park that would have possibly six top-of-the-line French reactors of 1,600 MW each in the first phase.

Costing close to $2 billion each, it could add 9,600 MW of power in the next five years alone and bring into India some of the latest nuclear technology. For the French, the business would be worth close to $12 billion. But Indian firms would benefit too.

S.K. Jain, NPCIL chairman and managing director, points out that there is a huge capacity constraint across the globe for nuclear power. That would mean that companies like Areva would outsource manufacturing of equipment to Indian companies like Larsen & Toubro and Bharat Forge. Jain says India is pushing for a steady indigenisation of imported plants with the vendors and it could go up to as much as 80 per cent for future plants.

By December, when the new Russian President Dmitry Medvedev makes his maiden visit to India, the NPCIL would be signing a similar agreement with its counterpart Rosatom for the supply of four reactors of 1,000 MW each to be set up in Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu.

Under an earlier agreement, the Russians are building two giant 1,000 MW reactors at a cost of Rs 14,000 crore, expected to be commissioned by 2010. An agreement with Russia will bring in fuel as well as reactor and reprocessing technology.

American companies who believe they have first right over India's imported nuclear pie are already champing at the bit. Both GE and Westinghouse, the big two of the US nuclear industry, are making major bids for nuclear reactors and could win as many as four reactors in the next couple of years.

GE is promising an astonishing 40-month completion if India chooses its 1,500 MW plants. Says Ron Somers, president of the US India Business Council, "We are looking at $150 billion of business in the nuclear industry alone."

Canada, which angrily cut off its nuclear agreement with India after the 1974 test, is talking about restarting trade. "It's a good feeling," says an Indian negotiator.

Meanwhile, with fuel now expected, India is expanding its own indigenous capacity. It has just mastered the 700 MW type of reactors and is building four of them within the next five years. It is also perfecting its Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRS), so called because they generate as much plutonium as they consume.

This, if successful, will give a major boost to power generation plans. Under the deal, India is creating a National Technical Facility to store spent fuel from its reactors it designates as civilian. With permission to reprocess such fuel, the spent plutonium could be used as fuel in FBRS. That would put India streets ahead in the business.

Its also on its way to using abundant thorium reserves as a fuel. Most importantly, India will be allowed to export its own reactors, especially in the market for smaller reactors of 220 MW and 540 MW.

The downsides: Issues like the safety of reactors are a major concern. The world nuclear industry has strived hard to make their plants almost error free and in the event of an accident to ensure that all leaks would be contained and there would be no need for evacuation.

With so many reactors being built and run at a short time, India needs to beef up its regulatory board and safety standards.

On the strategic side, the big question is what happens if India tests a nuclear weapon? Under its deal with India, the US would terminate the agreement and could even demand the return of reactors and fuel supplied by it.

But while negotiating the agreement, the Indian side pushed the Americans to soften the whole breakaway clause by ensuring no sudden deaths or withdrawals. There would be a protracted negotiation and the circumstances that led India to test would become a factor.

This would mean that if say China and Pakistan tested, India would have good enough reasons to test. The US President would then have waiver power to prevent the provisions of the Act from being enforced.

Learning from the Tarapur experience, where the US reneged from the agreement to supply fuel to it after the 1974 tests, India will insist that all the vendors give cast-iron guarantees of fuel supply and the country would maintain a strategic reserve of fuel to meet such exigencies.

So the right to test remains with India but as Mukherjee told India Today, "Other nations have the right to react." Exasperated by the constant nagging over whether we can test or not, a senior official said, "Look, it's like asking a woman to prove her virginity. She can only do it by losing it."

And if Barack Obama comes to power and he gets the US to ratify the CTBT, India could be pressured into signing the document. Right now India and Pakistan are the main holdouts.

So would it crimp India's weapons programme as the Opposition has been charging? Under the deal, India has so far identified eight reactors that it would designate as military-four at Kalpakkam near Chennai, two at Kaiga in Karnataka and two at Tarapur.

It also has two research reactors Dhruva and Cirrus. (Cirrus is to be decommissioned in 2010). These would provide as much fissile material as India needs for its credible minimum deterrent.

Since India would be allowed to import fuel, it can conserve its domestic mines to build bombs. {Arun_S: If only Raj Changappa can also tell the nation what fraction of the domestic Uranium reserves are needed to build even 1000 bombs, and his jaws will drop.}[/color][/b] While India has agreed to join negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, it is unlikely to sign till it is satisfied that it has a large enough stockpile.

India is pressing ahead with its triad of missiles, aircraft and nuclear power submarines to deliver its weapons (see chart). Those programmes are proceeding at full speed. Agni, with its many variants, can now threaten most of China's major cities apart from the whole of Pakistan.

India's top secret nuclear submarine is on its way to completion, giving it the ability to strike from the sea. And it is building a state-of-the-art antiballistic missiles system. On all these programmes, the deal allows India to proceed at a fair trot without hindrance. In some areas like missiles, it could even collaborate and get the much-needed high technology for them.

More importantly is the deal's impact on India's self-confidence and its image abroad. India is clearly recognised as a power that has arrived on the world stage. It can shed its baggage of nonalignment and go for what Lalit Mansingh, former foreign secretary, calls co-alignments with all the major countries whether the US, Russia, France, China, South Africa, Brazil, the UK, Australia.

India has already entered into strategic partnerships with all of them. It can push for a seat in the UN Security Council now with greater vigour. A new world has opened for India. It's up to us to go out and make the best use of the opportunity.

Nuke numbers

* 4,100MW is the current nuclear power capacity.
* 22 reactors India has right now.
* 10,000MW reactor capacity to be imported in five years.
* 30,000MW is the target to be achieved by 2020.

Nuclear arsenal

India is developing a range of nuke weapons and delivery systems.

* Fissile stock: India has retained 8 reactors for military use to add to its fissile material stock for bombs.
* Missiles: Agni variants are the workhorse for the country’s nuclear missile delivery systems.
* Nuke sub: India is in the process of building an indigenously designed nuclear submarine.
* Fighters: The Sukhois are India’s main nuclear strike aircraft apart from the Mirages.

What the deal means to India

* The deal allows India to conduct civilian nuclear trade with the world.
* India can import much needed fuel for its plants.
* 8 reactors to be imported in five years.
* $100 billion worth of nuclear commerce in the next 20 years.
* India's weapons programme can develop unhindered.
* Sensitive technology for reprocessing and enrichment of fuel can now be imported.
* India can now export its indigenously designed nuclear reactors to other countries.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 16 Oct 2008 15:36

Read this by Brahma Chellaney ,"Parliament Ambushed",in the Deccan Chronicle,how MMS has lied to Parliament and the Indian people from his own words.

http://209.85.175.104/search?q=cache:dm ... cd=2&gl=in

Parliament ambushed
By Brahma Chellaney

Do promises made to Parliament have no sanctity? With the government hastily signing the flawed 123 Agreement with the US last weekend, it is important to recall Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s assurances that after having completed the negotiation process, he would bring the nuclear deal to Parliament and "abide" by its decision. But no sooner had the process been over than Dr Singh proceeded to sign the 123 Agreement while sidelining Parliament.

This is what Dr Singh had pledged in the Lok Sabha during the brief July session marred by the cash-for-votes scandal: "All I had asked our Left colleagues was: please allow us to go through the negotiation process and I will come to Parliament before operationalising the nuclear agreement. This simple courtesy which is essential for orderly functioning of any government worth the name, particularly with regard to the conduct of foreign policy, they were not willing to grant me".

Earlier, at a June 30 book-release function at his official residence, Dr Singh had elaborated on his pledge: "I have said it before, I will repeat it again, that you allow us to complete the process. Once the process is over, I will bring it before Parliament and abide by the House".

Lest there be any ambiguity, he expanded: "I am not asking for something that the government should not be doing. I am only saying you allow me to complete the negotiations. I agree to come to Parliament before I proceed to operationalise. What can be more reasonable than this?" He then added: "All that I want is the authority to proceed with the process of negotiations through all the stages… If Parliament feels you have done some wrong, so be it".

Dr Singh had repeatedly promised to take Parliament into confidence before formalising the deal. For instance, way back on March 10, 2006, he said in the Lok Sabha: "There should be no reason for anyone to doubt that anything will be done at the back of Parliament, or that we will do anything which would hurt the interests of the country as a whole".

But that is precisely what he did — sign the 123 Agreement behind Parliament’s back, to the extent that he skipped its traditional monsoon session, setting a precedent that could be detrimental to the future of Indian democracy. Now any future government can skip a session of Parliament — or two — besides turning its back on the solemn promises it made to the legislative body.

The contrast between Dr Singh and President George W. Bush in the way they handled the deal could not have been starker. From the time he introduced a legislative-waiver bill in March 2006 to last week’s signing ceremony, Mr Bush worked in a spirit of bipartisanship, forging an impressive political consensus at home.

The Hyde Act was the product of such consensus-building and political co-option, with the administration holding closed-door briefings for lawmakers and allowing its three-and-a-half-page bill to be expanded to a 41-page litany of India-specific conditions. Bipartisan support also was the key to the recent passage of the ratification legislation, the "US-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-Proliferation Enhancement Act", which imposes Hyde Act-plus obligations on India.

After the Senate approved this Hyde Act-plus legislation on October 1, Mr Bush said: "I commend the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for their leadership in crafting this important bipartisan legislation".

By contrast, Dr Singh’s approach was blatantly partisan, subordinating national interest to personal agenda. Although the deal has divided India like no other strategic issue since Independence, Dr Singh did not hold a single all-party meeting on the subject ever since he sprung the accord as a surprise on the nation in 2005. However, he was quick to hold more than one all-party meeting on the parallel summertime agitations that wracked Jammu and the Kashmir Valley.

Just two days after signing the agreement-in-principle on July 18, 2005, he said: "It goes without saying that we can move forward only on the basis of a broad national consensus". On August 17, 2006, he told the Rajya Sabha: "Broad-based domestic consensus cutting across all sections in Parliament and outside will be necessary". Subsequently, he reassured Parliament that he will "seek the broadest possible consensus within the country to enable the next steps to be taken".

Instead of any attempt at consensus-building, the nation witnessed a polarising single-mindedness. The zealous partisanship only helped undermine India’s negotiating leverage.

The upshot was the progressive US attachment of tougher conditions at every stage. That partly resulted from US bipartisan efforts to make the deal more palatable to the non-proliferation constituency. But the gradual attachment of more and more conditions also flowed from the belief in Washington that a deal-desperate Dr Singh would accept such a final product, especially if its mortifying terms were cosmetically couched.

The US was so right. Just as Dr Singh’s government had blithely picked on Mr Bush’s December 2006 Hyde Act signing statement to claim relief from that Act’s grating conditions, it has now cited Mr Bush’s statement signing the Hyde Act-plus legislation into law to assert an illusory reprieve.

But Mr Bush’s statement last week could not have been clearer in underpinning the primacy of US law: "The bill I sign today approves the 123 Agreement I submitted to Congress — and establishes the legal framework for that agreement to come into effect. The bill makes clear that our agreement with India is consistent with the Atomic Energy Act and other elements of US law".

It also makes plain that New Delhi has only a theoretical right to reprocess spent fuel and that the actual right "will be brought into effect upon conclusion of arrangements and procedures", to be negotiated in the years ahead. And to help Dr Singh spin reality at home, Mr Bush said the new legislation "does not change the fuel assurance" as "recorded in the 123 Agreement" — without citing either his earlier statement that such a commitment is political, not legally binding, or the new legislation’s fuel-restrictive provisions, including Section 102(b)(2) that mandates limiting supply to "reasonable reactor operating requirements" and Section 102(b)(1) that requires that if the US terminates cooperation with India, it will ensure New Delhi does not secure supplies from "any other source".

Put simply, India has no legally binding fuel-supply assurance; no operational reprocessing right; no permission to build strategic fuel reserves; no entitlement to take corrective measures, whatever the circumstance; and no escape hatch from the legal obligations it is assuming. All the key assurances Dr Singh made in Parliament on August 17, 2006, thus stand jettisoned. Yet today he celebrates a deal that cannot survive the light of parliamentary scrutiny and sets a treacherous legacy.

History has a way of catching up with the truth. As a well-known proverb goes, "The mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small".

PS: Katare,I truly prefer Bhagat Singh to MMSingh!

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 16 Oct 2008 18:20

IMHO, considering that India is now in a new phase of nuclear diplomacy and power industry expansion, after the Nuclear Deal is clinched, perhaps it would be best if this Thread is sent to the Trash Can, and its new Avatar is created.

JMTs

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 16 Oct 2008 18:28

I agree. A fresh start may lead to new directions (other than (hopefully) testing).

Just my two annas.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 16 Oct 2008 18:30

Call it SLOW PROGRESS OF INDIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

THREAD.

Or better yet, something useful:

Boondoggle trips and baksheesh of desi babus and mantris for nuclear program

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 16 Oct 2008 20:22

I would wish the MMS Govt. would move quickly a clinch a nuclear deal with Canada, before the Democrats get into the White House.

It may be possible to have a deal with the Canadians now, which does not have any 'return of nuclear material' or 'termination of agreement' upon nuclear testing clauses. After the Democrats enter the White House, and perhaps stay put for the next 8 years, I can't see Canada going against the Non-Proliferation Ayatollahs of the incoming Administration. It would be a loss to India, as Canada is the biggest uranium producer of the world.

As far as Australia is concerned, the in-love-with-China Australian Labour Party is not going to change its policy of exporting uranium to a non-NPT country. When the Democrats enter White House, it is going to be all the harder for India to convince Australia, even with 'conditions' to export to India. So India might as well, not spend too much diplomatic capital on worthless causes.

Australia has been trying to get an FTA with India, and Kamal Nath is making his rounds Down Under. If the Australians do not want to give us Uranium, then any FTA with Australia should be heavily loaded in favor of India, including hassle-free visas for service workers from India. They should also allow more legal immigration from India, I mean, after all, they are the Labour Party, and not some conservatives like Liberal Party of Australia. If Australia wants to do business with us, they need to acknowledge India's presence.

vsudhir · Post by **vsudhir** » 16 Oct 2008 20:28

IMHO the best scenario now going fwd would be for a one-term Dem administration to come into the White-House. Another 8 yrs of Dem-agogory would be less than comfy from the yindian POV.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 16 Oct 2008 20:39

India would have to tell Obama early on, that should Obama's NPA dogs again start targeting India, it would undo all good in form of mutual trust that has been done, during GWB's tenure.

Obama's suggestions of helping India and Pakistan reach some sort of peace deal on Kashmir solution, should not intrude upon India's sovereignty or make too much fuss of human rights allegations there, as that is an internal Indian cause to ensure the human rights of all, and external actors should not intervene. Of course, if US wants to talk about reforging the political geography with PoK on the table, then we are game. The Democrats have to do a lot still to win India's trust on Kashmir as well.

p_saggu · Post by **p_saggu** » 16 Oct 2008 21:43

wrt Kashmir, there is this stupid problem we keep on facing again and again.

Every new incumbent that arrives in Islamabad wants to go to war with India to prove his credentials.
Every new incumbent that arrives in Washington want to solve the cashmere issue to boost his Mai-baap status on the world stage.

Barak Obama is on record in the letter written to MMS which outlines his NPA intentions very clearly. These will surely be to India's detriment, more so currently with an incomplete Nuclear weapons programme.

There will be a lot of pressure that will be brought upon New Delhi to accede, and it will be used as a bargaining chip from time to time.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 16 Oct 2008 21:55

CTBT does have a supreme national interest clause, citing which one can leave the treaty, so whether we have a voluntary unilateral moratorium for the next 20 years or a CTBT accession, which we suspend in 2030, is more or less the same thing. But concessions on CTBT is not something, India should give USA lightly. There should be at least UNSC permanent membership with veto rights in it, and the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to India should be reconsidered.

How about reformulating India's national policies as one of retaining the right to test and improve our nuclear arsenal, as long as the Kashmir question is not settled in India's favor, i.e. the transfer of Northern Areas of J&K to India. As long this question remains, India can say, India is under strategic pressure not to part with our right to test.

Or one can say, that until USA has not stripped Pakistan naked off its atom bombs, India is not about to sign off our right to test.

harbans · Post by **harbans** » 16 Oct 2008 22:28

^^^ Rajesh ji excellent post! This is the strategy our politicians must now adopt. Any 4 letter treaties should not be signed without extracting the maximum due. We have to get leaders in India that think strategically. You have outlined this very well. Very few in our polity realize the deadly danger we are in wrt Paki nukes.

10 years down the line India should have trade with the US to the tune of 200-300 Billion USD a year at least. India's economy will be in the top 5 around 3 trillion US at the minimum. Thats much larger than Chna's economy today. We'd have sent a man to space creating psy ops if not to the moon by then, I doubt any nation then could even think of sanctioning India even if we test. I think US / GWB/ CR figured this bit out. These statements emanating from CR was more for the US NPAs and cold war pipsqueaks. Also it was a bit to keep India from testing in the short term.

Looking at the deal this is ONLY what India could have got. And it is the best option. There's nothing better that could have been negotiated under the circumstances.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 16 Oct 2008 22:50

Rye wrote:I agree. A fresh start may lead to new directions (other than (hopefully) testing).

Just my two annas.

I disagree. This thread is a living entity, the collective consciousness of participants (and reader) learns and evolves. IMV one cant wish away issues and thoughts captured in the thread. Not learning from historical discussion will certainly force the thread to repeat the history again and re-learn (the same issues and thoughts). IMO that will keep the discussion at ab-inito and not grow up. {Some will recall that previous LCA threads were frozen in context with the same basic question & issues; and once it arrives at some maturity the old forum software will force canning of the thread. And the discussion stays at Kindergartner's level}.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 16 Oct 2008 23:13

Harban Ji, your optimism is indeed infectious.

The point is, that when others tell India, India must do this and that, and then do a double somersault, India always look for principled stands. However principled arguments only fly as long as others believe in your principles, so basically we are appealing always to the sense of fairness of other countries. We are inviting other countries to sit as jury over us. We need to change that style of argumentation.

Other countries venture out on a plan, say NPT or CTBT or whatever. They have a mission. How can we then expect them to be impartial, when they sit as jury over our principled stands. They are going to be partial and always against India. One of the problems is, one cannot bargain with principles, so nobody tries. When one puts up principled stands, one is directly challenging the principles of all others, and at the same time inviting them to judge us.

First and foremost, we should stop just putting forth principled stands. Instead we should always put forth the conditions under which we will be willing to accede to some principle, lay out our strategic interests. The language of bargaining is something everybody understands.

Principled stand belongs to the Nehruvian age. Even after 1974, when we conducted our first nuclear explosions, if we had stated in black and white, that we agree with the general direction of nuclear non-proliferation, but that the NPT signatories ought to agree with our inclusion in the NWS, things could have turned differently. But because of our principled stand we scared away most of the countries up a tree, and they decided that we belong in a nuclear cage. Principled stands is the pride of the poor and weak and a red rag to all the mighty and their followers.

So when it comes to CTBT lets tell others what our conditions are, have them fulfilled and sign the agreement.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 16 Oct 2008 23:44

RajeshA wrote:CTBT does have a supreme national interest clause, citing which one can leave the treaty, so whether we have a voluntary unilateral moratorium for the next 20 years or a CTBT accession, which we suspend in 2030, is more or less the same thing. But concessions on CTBT is not something, India should give USA lightly. There should be at least UNSC permanent membership with veto rights in it, and the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to India should be reconsidered.

How about reformulating India's national policies as one of retaining the right to test and improve our nuclear arsenal, as long as the Kashmir question is not settled in India's favor, i.e. the transfer of Northern Areas of J&K to India. As long this question remains, India can say, India is under strategic pressure not to part with our right to test.

Or one can say, that until USA has not stripped Pakistan naked off its atom bombs, India is not about to sign off our right to test.

I would suggest change
"as long as the Kashmir question is not settled in India's favor"
to
"as long as Tibet border and Kashmir question is not settled per Indian terms and constitution"

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 17 Oct 2008 00:09

Or one can say, that until USA has not stripped Pakistan naked off its atom bombs, India is not about to sign off our right to test.

Time to lock this thread - even the rational postors are "losing it".
Helllooooooo!!!!!!! Pakistan can get nukes from CHINA!!!!!

As long as CHINA HAS NUKES, why would India sign off on "right to test"??
In fact, as long as nuclear weapons are not completely eliminated from the planet, India as home to 1/6 of the world's population, needs to do whatever is necessary to ensure their security.

Rye · Post by **Rye** » 17 Oct 2008 00:15

Arun_S wrote:

I disagree. This thread is a living entity, the collective consciousness of participants (and reader) learns and evolves. IMV one cant wish away issues and thoughts captured in the thread. Not learning from historical discussion will certainly force the thread to repeat the history again and re-learn (the same issues and thoughts). IMO that will keep the discussion at ab-inito and not grow up.

If that is the sentiment, then the thread can be archived and the discussion can try to cover grounds not covered before. Not to mention, calling some of these discussions on this thread and earlier versions of it "grown up" would be a stretch. The thread will only repeat history if the same "problems" are broached, but that seems to be the intent in any case.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 17 Oct 2008 00:23

narayanan wrote:
Or one can say, that until USA has not stripped Pakistan naked off its atom bombs, India is not about to sign off our right to test.

Time to lock this thread - even the rational postors are "losing it".
Helllooooooo!!!!!!! Pakistan can get nukes from CHINA!!!!!

As long as CHINA HAS NUKES, why would India sign off on "right to test"??
In fact, as long as nuclear weapons are not completely eliminated from the planet, India as home to 1/6 of the world's population, needs to do whatever is necessary to ensure their security.

Narayanan Ji,

I acknowledge my losing it. Thank you for your corrections.

It may sound optimistic, but Pakistan is simply a short-duration guest on this hotel called Earth. My comment, referred to doing some house-keeping after the guest has left. Making sure that the guest has not left some nukes lying around in the room, etc.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 17 Oct 2008 00:59

I believe the TSP, NoKo and soon-2-b-seen Eyeranian nukes are all Chinese, just moved around in a shell game to drive the US crazy. At some point a joint YYY mission will have to go seize these and prove the point to the world. Of course the world at that point will say:
"Huh?" in Chinese.