Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stability

[RajeshA]

Ramana Ji,

When these so called 'experts' join up, and start thinking strategy, do they somehow de-link themselves from reality?

Persuading TSP to accept 'India's' benevolence and accept India's presence in Afghanistan, is indeed a program in futility. TSP is a Hydra with the same Islamic Heart, and even if one keeps one head busy with a bone, there will be several others willing to snap at you. There is no one single party to convince.

Just like USA has its soldiers tied down there and is to some extent dependent on Pakistani cooperation to keep its supply lines open, India would be in even more dire straits if we were to willingly walk into Afghanistan.

There is only one solution, USA has to accept that India needs an eight-lane Autobahn all the way to Central Asia Stans. That would give not only India access to Central Asia, but just might solve the American problem of access to this region. That India can plow on its own. America only needs to make sure that the bums do not go off, Dragon keeps quite and the Europeans keep on clapping.

[RajeshA]

Pakistan has been hammering Bajaur and more than a quarter million refugees are on the move. Has West said a word on it? Nobody cares!

It is not as if Chitral, Kohistan, ... were never a part of historic India. They were! It is not as if India is going to march into totally unknown lands.

The region offers sufficient tribal mix and hunger for development, that these people would be willing to look at new developmental models and political solutions to their underdevelopment. The way to pacify these regions is to tell the Taliban, that as long as they stay in their areas, India would let them live, if they start doing something against Indian lands, they will be hit hard. NATO/ISAF/Americans have not given the Taliban any place, where they could just live in peace and in power and hit the women with their sticks, so Taliban are hitting back.

India should accept Taliban over the Pushtoon lands, have controlled trade with them, and ask them to stay away. Fear of loss of power is sufficient motivation for them to keep their heads low. Humint, influence with local warlords, control over borders, carrots and big sticks, is the strategy to go after. Taliban have enough to do in Pakjab.

At the same time, building up the Northern Alliance's security would also help.

[svinayak]

There is only one solution, USA has to accept that India needs an eight-lane Autobahn all the way to Central Asia Stans. That would give not only India access to Central Asia, but just might solve the American problem of access to this region. That India can plow on its own. America only needs to make sure that the bums do not go off, Dragon keeps quite and the Europeans keep on clapping.

America may not be able to have this kind of influence in the future. India has to build a contingency plan for any eventuality.

[Rye]

RajeshA wrote:

India should accept Taliban over the Pushtoon lands, have controlled trade with them, and ask them to stay away. Fear of loss of power is sufficient motivation for them to keep their heads low. Humint, influence with local warlords, control over borders, carrots and big sticks, is the strategy to go after. Taliban have enough to do in Pakjab.

That is a good idea to hook up with the Taliban controlling pushtoon lands and becoming their bestest buddies (in the moral and diplomatic sense).

American control of Pakistan and Afghanisthan are both overrated.

[harik]

Ramana Ji,

When these so called 'experts' join up, and start thinking strategy, do they somehow de-link themselves from reality?

Persuading TSP to accept 'India's' benevolence and accept India's presence in Afghanistan, is indeed a program in futility. TSP is a Hydra with the same Islamic Heart, and even if one keeps one head busy with a bone, there will be several others willing to snap at you. There is no one single party to convince.

Just like USA has its soldiers tied down there and is to some extent dependent on Pakistani cooperation to keep its supply lines open, India would be in even more dire straits if we were to willingly walk into Afghanistan.

There is only one solution, USA has to accept that India needs an eight-lane Autobahn all the way to Central Asia Stans. That would give not only India access to Central Asia, but just might solve the American problem of access to this region. That India can plow on its own. America only needs to make sure that the bums do not go off, Dragon keeps quite and the Europeans keep on clapping.

> USA has to accept that India needs an eight-lane Autobahn all the way to Central Asia Stans. That would give not only India access to Central Asia, but just might solve the American problem of access to this region.

Haan Haan Baap kaa raaj hai.

[ramana]

I know Iran is the gateway for India to Afghanistan and Central Asia. And many Indian govts starting from PVNR have made investments on these road and rail links. The other link is thru Tajikistan. The POK area is to be recovered as its an Indian land. Nothing more.

RajeshA, Rasgotra is suggesting Indian troops in Afghanistan after a lot of conditions have been met. He is also suggesting many things most of which are unacceptable to TSP.

Pullikeshi, Yes stable Afghanistan is an Indian interest however Afghan instability is from the unstability in TSP border areas. As Pakiban grow stronger more chances of Afghanistan centrifugal forces to get stronger. The NA doesnt want Taleban redux. However US wants to preserve Pashtun primacy in Afghanistan. And Pashtun are Talibanizing at feverish pace on both sides of the Durand line. A De-Talibanized Pashtuns are an Indian interest however US is doing its darndest to ensure the opposite. Karzai has turned out to be a joke The NA should have been allowed to form the govt post 911.

The Indian MEA has to see the Great Game thru Indian eyes and not just thru received wisdom from West.

[Rye]

harik wrote:

Haan Haan Baap kaa raaj hai.

What is being said is that the price for cooperation has to be much higher than what the US/west are offering currently, where they seek to preserve Pakistan for their own interests, while asking India to clean up their mess in Afghanisthan and Pakistan. What does your stupid comment really explain or illuminate?

[harik]

harik wrote:

Haan Haan Baap kaa raaj hai.

What is being said is that the price for cooperation has to be much higher than what the US/west are offering currently, where they seek to preserve Pakistan for their own interests, while asking India to clean up their mess in Afghanisthan and Pakistan. What does your stupid comment really explain or illuminate?

Rajesh can talk for himself.

Btw what how can that be reconciled " to preserve Pakistan for their own interests, while asking India to clean up their mess in Afghanisthan and Pakistan."

Illuminate your acquired intteligence

[Rye]

Why is this troll harik being allowed to post here?

harik, can you please stop posting here. Yes, I know RajeshA can speak for himself -- your worthless comment on his post has ZERO additional value. If you cannot write something that makes sense, please do not post.

Btw what how can that be reconciled " to preserve Pakistan for their own interests, while asking India to clean up their mess in Afghanisthan and Pakistan"

Indian and US interests do not coincide when it comes to Pak. and Afghanisthan, which is the basis for that statement.

[Johann]

Ramana,

How would the Northern Alliance govern the Pashtun areas?

Its impossible, no more viable than the Pashtun Taliban ruling Tajik and Uzbek areas.

'Talibanisation', i.e. bouts of expansionist radical Islam is not a new phenomenon in Pashtun areas, but a recurring phenomenon that the Dari speaking Pashtuns on the Afghan side, and 'Sarkari' Pashtuns on the Subcontinental side hedge against.

The PA has stood aside and let the Taliban hammer the Dari speakers and the Sarkari types, creating a leadership vacuum that only the Taliban can fill. The Americans have come to recognise this, but are still groping around for the best way to change PA behaviour.

Their problem too remains access - America is forced to rely at present on Pakistan for access to Afghanistan, given the on and off problems with Russia and mutual hostility with Iran, and the alternative route (Georgia-Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan) is unsuitable for high volume surface traffic.

[RamaY]

Mr Krishna Rasgotra is doing India a big disservice, if he is trying to drag India into the quicksands of Afghanistan, just so that USA can call victory and run away.

As I have often said earlier, there should be no large scale deployment of Indian troops in Afghanistan unless and until there is a secured, internationally acknowledged land corridor between India and Afghanistan to ensure our supply lines. That means Northern Areas and PoK should become part of India. Moreover Chitral, Kohistan, and few northern divisions of NWFP should be allowed to be used as a buffer area for Indian operations and deployment.

Anything less than a secure land corridor, should not even be entertained by Indian strategic planners, as sufficient conditions for any large-scale Indian deployment. If it has to be a long term pledge, than we should be prepared. It is for US to see to it, that such an Indian intrusion into Northern Areas and PoK gets the international diplomatic and political support and Chinese acquiescence.

Otherwise we will be sending our soldiers in harm's way unprepared and unsecured.

Very True!
Instead of standing out, India must actively seek this commitment and acceptance from international community on POK and NA, so it can contribute to regional stability.

In order to set Pakistani/Kashmiri public mood on right note, India can:

1. Actively highlight the plight of Kashmiris and NA tribes under Pakistan rule in POK and NA. The basic human rights are denied to these natives and Pakistan is forcing demographic alterations in this area. There is a nice serial going on in a Telugu news paper “Andhrabhoomi” (Sunday special) on this topic. I will try to get the key points translated for our records…

2. Address Pakistani concerns on national security by offering security guarantees, provided Pakistan denounces terrorism, POK/NA, and its policy of strategic depth in Afghanistan.

3. Offer economic incentives to Pakistan such as participation in IPI gas pipeline and building goods corridor between India and Middle East.

4. Initiate and arrange a six party talk involving Afghanistan, USA, Pakistan, Iran, Russia and India to discuss the Taliban (as an ideology and political entity) menace and Afghanistan stabilization.

[RajeshA]

Haan Haan Baap kaa raaj hai.

Harik, if you are a Pakistani (as I am quite sure, you are), you should do some introspection, (i.e. right after your school education is finished. That takes precedence you know). You should give it some serious thought, that under changed political scenario in your country, you and your family would indeed be better off. Pakistan is a failed project, and it has not failed because of India, but rather because it was doomed to fail. I wish you moderated enlightenment!

[RajeshA]

I know Iran is the gateway for India to Afghanistan and Central Asia. And many Indian govts starting from PVNR have made investments on these road and rail links. The other link is thru Tajikistan. The POK area is to be recovered as its an Indian land. Nothing more.

RajeshA, Rasgotra is not suggesting Indian troops in Afghanistan. The problem is you have highligted whats not acceptable to you with out looking at what he is saying. He is also suggesting many things most of which are unacceptable to TSP.

Pullikeshi, Yes stable Afghanistan is an Indian interest however Afghan instability is from the unstability in TSP border areas. As Pakiban grow stronger more chances of Afghanistan centrifugal forces to get stronger. The NA doesnt want Taleban redux. However US wants to preserve Pashtun primacy in Afghanistan. And Pashtun are Talibanizing at feverish pace on both sides of the Durand line. A De-Talibanized Pashtuns are an Indian interest however US is doing its darndest to ensure the opposite. Karzai has turned out to be a joke The NA should have been allowed to form the govt post 911.

The Indian MEA has to see the Great Game thru Indian eyes and not just thru received wisdom from West.

I would argue, that the Talibanized Pushtoons are in fact in medium term a definite asset to India, as they can really shake up the region and speed up the demise of TSP. Without the Talibanization, the Pushtoons would not be so potent. I cannot prove it, but something tells me, that Taliban is only a label, that the Pushtoons are using to further their ends, i.e. get rid of the Durand Line, get rid of Pakistan, get rid of the Americans and get rid of any other Afghans, who think they have a say in what goes on in Pushtoon lands.

In the long term, when the Talibanized Pushtoon Nation crumbles of its own weight and poverty, then India can look at the Khidmatgars and others.

[SSridhar]

I cannot prove it, but something tells me, that Taliban is only a label, that the Pushtoons are using to further their ends, i.e. get rid of the Durand Line, get rid of Pakistan, get rid of the Americans and get rid of any other Afghans, who think they have a say in what goes on in Pushtoon lands.

In the long term, when the Talibanized Pushtoon Nation crumbles of its own weight and poverty, then India can look at the Khidmatgars and others.

Rajesh, there are three types of players in the Pashtun badlands across either side of the Durand Line. One is the Taliban owing allegiance to (or in the mould of) Omar, the other are normal Pashtuns for whom the traditional Pakhtun rivaaj is still the only way of life, and the third are unprincipled warlords/drug lords etc.

The Taliban have coalesced with AlQaeda and the Punjabi Taliban (which are essentially all the jihadi outfits). They have an all encompassing worldview that goes well beyond Afghanistan. Earlier on, the Taliban had a limited Afghan blinkers but it is my feeling that they have outgrown that in alliance with the AlQaeda in recent years. The Taliban/AlQaeda may have the same worldview today. The normal Pashtuns see the Americans as an evil occupying force and are from that point of view, willing to join hands with the Taliban. These are people like Gul Bahadur et al. The warlords/drug lords are in it for exploiting the situation and the Taliban are smart enough to make effective use of them to expand their emirate.

There is therefore no unified political aspiration across the entire Pashtun spectrum.

I would argue, that the Talibanized Pushtoons are in fact in medium term a definite asset to India, as they can really shake up the region and speed up the demise of TSP.

No doubt as the Talibanized Pashtun have the strength of a radicalized Islam to give them strength and cover. But, this could be dangerous to India even in medium term. If India is working for the demise of TSP, which I doubt it is, it should think in terms of the ethno-linguistic faultlines within Pakistan accentuated by water and economic woes.

[ramana]

RajeshA

I would argue, that the Talibanized Pushtoons are in fact in medium term a definite asset to India, as they can really shake up the region and speed up the demise of TSP. Without the Talibanization, the Pushtoons would not be so potent. I cannot prove it, but something tells me, that Taliban is only a label, that the Pushtoons are using to further their ends, i.e. get rid of the Durand Line, get rid of Pakistan, get rid of the Americans and get rid of any other Afghans, who think they have a say in what goes on in Pushtoon lands.

I agree only way to dismantle the TSP is for Talibanization of Pashtuns.

Bade me dekha jaayega about the aftermath.

[Rye]

The election of Obama as President may bring better relations with Iran, there by reducing pakistan's value and increasing India's pain -- this is a very real possiblity. Maybe pushing the IPI now would keep India in the game in such a circumstance.

[RajeshA]

I cannot prove it, but something tells me, that Taliban is only a label, that the Pushtoons are using to further their ends, i.e. get rid of the Durand Line, get rid of Pakistan, get rid of the Americans and get rid of any other Afghans, who think they have a say in what goes on in Pushtoon lands.

In the long term, when the Talibanized Pushtoon Nation crumbles of its own weight and poverty, then India can look at the Khidmatgars and others.

Rajesh, there are three types of players in the Pashtun badlands across either side of the Durand Line. One is the Taliban owing allegiance to (or in the mould of) Omar, the other are normal Pashtuns for whom the traditional Pakhtun rivaaj is still the only way of life, and the third are unprincipled warlords/drug lords etc.

The Taliban have coalesced with AlQaeda and the Punjabi Taliban (which are essentially all the jihadi outfits). They have an all encompassing worldview that goes well beyond Afghanistan. Earlier on, the Taliban had a limited Afghan blinkers but it is my feeling that they have outgrown that in alliance with the AlQaeda in recent years. The Taliban/AlQaeda may have the same worldview today. The normal Pashtuns see the Americans as an evil occupying force and are from that point of view, willing to join hands with the Taliban. These are people like Gul Bahadur et al. The warlords/drug lords are in it for exploiting the situation and the Taliban are smart enough to make effective use of them to expand their emirate.

There is therefore no unified political aspiration across the entire Pashtun spectrum.

Expanding on your classification, I'll say there are a myriad of stakeholders and active participants in the Pushtoon Lands and Jihadist Movement:
1. Afghan Northern Alliance, Afghan Govt.
2. Afghan Pushtoon Taliban
3. Afghan Pushtoon Warlords
4. Independent Pakiban in Pushtoon lands like Fazlullah, Baitullah Mehsud, ...
5. Foreign Militants (Uzbeks, Uighurs, Chechens, ...)
6. Dispersed Independent Pakiban like Lal Masjid, Karachi Taliban, ...
7. Sarkari Pakiban, who go and fight in Afghanistan like Haqqani, etc.
8. Sarkari Sectarian, Pakjabi, Kashmiri Jihadist outfits like Sipah-e-Sahiba, LeT, JeM, etc. (not focused on Pushtoon lands)
9. Al Qaida (Arabs)
10. ISI
11. relatively secularized Pushtoons (ANP, civilians both in Pakistan and Afghanistan ..)
12. Political Islamists like Qazi Ahmed, Fazl-ur-Rehman, etc.

Other parties:
13. RAPE, common Pakjabi Abdul, part-PML
14. Baluchi Tribals
15. Sindhis, PPP
16. Mohajirs, MQM
17. Pakistani Diaspora

External stakeholders:
18. NATO/ISAF/USA
19. Saudis
20. Iranians
21. Russians
22. Chinese
23. Central Asians
24. Indians

As has become quite clear over the last seven years, one cannot win a war against the Taliban, so the only alternative is containment. Containment however is also not a stable proposition, as long as Pushtoon lands remain under non-Pushtoon non-Taliban control. So there is something here to trade, land for peace. Not just Afghan Pushtoon lands, as being proposed by the British, Saudis and others, but also Pakistani Pushtoon areas will have to be sacrificed. In return Taliban gives the rest of the world peace. However Taliban promises of peace mean little, unless their fulfillment is not monitored and a potential Taliban break out is not defended against.

So containment means there are strong defenses around Taliban's Pushtunistan's periphery:
1. In the East: India
2. In the North and West: Northern Alliance bolstered by NATO presence, India, Iran, Central Asian States, Russia
3. In the South-East: RAPE Pakjab (somewhat bolstered by US, India )
4. In the South-West: Baluchistan bolstered by India and USA
5. In Karachi: MQM, PPP bolstered by India

Containment also means that Taliban does not support either the anti-Indian jihadist groups (8) or Al Qaida (9) or ISI (10). That may be achieved by good monitoring of the periphery by the International Afghan Security Coalition, humint inside the Taliban Areas, Saudi involvement and pacification, constant chai-biscuit sessions with the Taliban powerbrokers, control over all external trade and strong policy of retaliation upon violations (if they give support to unsavory groups).

A strong periphery would mean, that any remaining expansionist tendencies and energy of Taliban would naturally be channelized into constant tension between them and Pakjabis.

The Pakjabis may also accept the plan if their pain is severe enough, from creeping Talibanization, Taliban-inspired terrorism, economic woes, hyperinflation, crumbling infrastructure, lack of government, etc.

The Chinese may agree, if assurances are made that the Uighurs would not be allowed to train and operate inside the Talibanistan, and Indian presence in Northern Areas, Chitral, Kohistan, Badakhshan, and Nurestan would cut off any transit routes for them to and from China.

The secular Pushtoons who will bear the real brunt would have to be given asylum in Sindh, Baluchistan, India, Northern Afghanistan, West, etc. and these groups and people would have to be supported financially too. They need to be nurtured for later when the time is ripe for Taliban to also move into the sunset after a couple of decades. Besides these groups can be a source of vital information from inside the Taliban areas.

A side effect of all this would be that USA and other Western nations could have assured supply routes to their bases in Northern Afghanistan over Indian held areas and Baluchistan and they would gain important routes for oil, gas and trade into Central Asia too.

This has been a big day-dreaming ramble here, but I just wanted to put down how a Utopian solution might look like, and stress that the Taliban do not necessarily mean the plague for India. Sorry if realism has been a casualty!

[RajeshA]

When I speak of Peripheral Containment of Talibanistan, I think of Gaza, but without the accompanying pressure cooker pressure or the international outcry!

Gaza is cordoned off by Israel on the North, West and East any by the Egyptians to the South, and more or less, the Hamasism remains inside caged.

[Rye]

Rajesh, thanks for the breakdown of the power interest groups, but the NWFP kinda of nightmare does not look like anyone can have any sort of control over any subgroup to any extent. I think the USA should clean up its own mess in Pakistan for now -- very likeklythey are most likely going to throw Karzai and everyone there to the wolves ("good taliban" in US terminology) in order to get co-operation from Pakistan, which is not a good thing for India.

[ramana]

RajeshA, Excellent summation. Can you put those ideas in a graphical diagram using say Mindmap software or ppt. It will enable folks to understand the complexity of the problem.

[RajeshA]

Rye, if Pakistan had not been in such a sorry state it is right now, USA could well have considered Pakistan to be qualified enough to look after Afghanistan, but this would be a leap of faith right now, especially as Obama is aggressive towards Pakistan and getting Al Qaida.

When the new Administration comes into Washington, there is going to be a lot of intellectual churning there about what to do with Afghanistan and Pakistan. I am quite sure, that the Dems would be asking Indian advice on how to proceed in Afghanistan. When Obama was in Berlin and held a huge rally here, he kept on repeating how Europe and USA should shoulder the responsibility in Afghanistan. I am quite sure, he will get a cold shoulder from his NATO allies on this. With Pakistan on the brink, India remains as the only country Obama can turn to with some hope.

If India is willing to explain, I am sure Obama too would be willing to listen to innovative approaches. And if he can come up with some strategy, which means less European blood, they would pounce on it and declare Obama as the messiah.

The likes of Brzenzski and others may even be able to take Obama by the hand to really undertake some ambitious projects.

Indo-US relations are well poised for serious dialogue. I only hope the good Sardarji carries a kirpan at his side, as he should.

[RajeshA]

Ramana Ji,

will try to do it as soon as time allows me.

[surinder]

Surinder: Point taken. However consider the following.

Should PRC push into POK, they will come into open confrontation with the sunni islamist forces. This would be a dream come true for the AQ and the Uighur freedom fighters who would not have to trudge all the way to Kashghar and take on PLA forces forces from a position of weakness. They can do that in POK itself with the full moral, diplomatic and not to mention logistical support from their Pashtun, Uzbeg, and AQ brethren.

The results for PRC will nit be unlike the outcome of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The Israelis went there to eject the PLO out and ended up making the underdog Shiite population the defacto rulers of south Lebanon.

At the same time PRC may not mind India managing these troublesome territories and in the process outsource these headaches to India. This will ensure a buffer force between PRC and the Taliban and provide opportunities for collaboration between these two common adversaries of India.


Paul,

"Should PRC push into POK, they will come into open confrontation with the sunni islamist forces",

that is exactly why I emphasize that PRC will not take these lands and claim soveriegnty. It will merely become a guarenteer of the security of these areas *from* India. These areas are a minefield of extremisms and hotbead of religious/ethinc clashes. It is not PRC's desire to take these areas. PRC's interest in these areas is essentially India-specific. It would seek to deny India the ability to retake this lands.

If at all PLA or PLAF would go, it would be in very small numbers, very carefully incircled by PA.

In some ways, PRC has always tried to protect TSP from India. Protecting NA is merely an extension of that, in some sense. It has not had means to ensure an absolute guarantee, but that the will, desire, and strategic utility has always been there. In 1965 it might have raised the issue of Yak's gazing. It did actual incursions during Kargil & other operations, it has always tried to get itself in a situation where it could outright prevent India from any military action on TSP. During 1971, Sam Maneckshaw timed the war in December so that the passes in the himalayas are clogged with snow. The PRC calculation was very much on the mind of India. Gen. JFR Jacob moved some forces from Tibet border to the Banlgla theater and it enraged Sam.

PRC sees TSP and wants to cultivate it as USA cultivates Israel, or Japan+US have guarenteed the security of Taiwan. The spoiler in all this, and to India's great luck, is that TSP itself is teetering on collapse. If it was a sustainable nation, we would live to see a full scale protection of TSP announced. In the event that TSP collapses, PRC may not be able to prevent India to take over parts of Pakjab or Sindh, or take actons in Baloochistan, but NA it will protect with all its might. If at all a trade is to be made, it will trade NA for Pakjab or Sindh. That is, in my opinion, the thinking in Beijing.

[SSridhar]

The Pashtun situation is further complicated by the tribes, sub tribes and clans.

[pushkar.bhat]

Interesting podcast from the Council For Foreign Affairs

Podcast Link

Also check out the Foreign Affairs Essay From Great Game to Grand Bargain on on Stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan

[ramana]

X-posted...
Op-Ed, Pioneer, 30 Oct., 208

Uncertain future as Pakistan goes broke

G Parthasarathy

Think-tanks and bipartisan groups in the US have worked feverishly in recent months on how the new US President should deal with the "single greatest challenge the world faces" -- Pakistan -- as it confronts "its greatest crisis since partition in 1947". A bipartisan report, endorsed by Democratic Party Congressman and former co-chairman of the 9/11 Commission Lee Hamilton and the Bush Administration's former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, has been prepared by a 'Pakistan Policy Working Group' comprising experts from both sides of the political divide. The report notes: "The US cannot afford to see Pakistan fail, nor can it ignore the extremists operating in Pakistan's tribal areas," as American efforts in Afghanistan "cannot succeed without success in Pakistan and vice-versa".

The report defines US objectives and interests as requiring a "stable and responsive Government" in Pakistan enjoying public support. It advocates the need to transform Pakistan into a "state that lives at peace with its neighbours -- most notably India and Afghanistan". The report is critical of the ISI for being "engaged with groups that support the Taliban and are killing American, NATO and Afghan Government troops in Afghanistan". It also alludes to "well sourced reports" on the ISI's role in the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, while noting that Taliban leader Mullah Omar is believed to be living in Quetta. It realistically asserts: "Pakistan's ambiguous policy on support for militancy is unlikely to change as long as the military -- currently the only national institution -- remains beyond the scrutiny of elected representatives."

But, amid belated realism on the ISI-jihadi nexus, the international community -- including Pakistan's 'all-weather friends' China and Saudi Arabia -- is still groping for a strategy to prevent Pakistan from collapsing economically. With its foreign exchange reserves rapidly declining to a level which would enable it to meet its needs for six weeks of imports, Pakistan could well face a situation of defaulting on a sovereign debt, when a $ 500 million Euro bond matures in February 2009. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's finance adviser Shaukat Tareen acknowledged on October 22 that his country immediately needs $ 4.5 billion to stay afloat economically. While the US has put together a new consortium, including China and Saudi Arabia, named 'Friends of Pakistan', to bail out Islamabad, Washington is not going to pour money into Pakistan if the country remains a bottomless pit economically. Aid is largely going to be withheld till Pakistan agrees to painful economic restructuring.

Unable to pay for its oil imports, Pakistan approached Saudi Arabia for a $ 5.9-billion bailout for supply of oil on deferred payment terms. The Saudis have yet to decide how to respond. President Asif Ali Zardari went to China hoping that Pakistan's most trusted friend and ally with $ 1.9 trillion of foreign exchange reserves would immediately open its wallet. When Pakistan sought a relatively small bailout of $ 500 million in 1996 from China, its then Finance Minister Shahid Javed Burki received a sermon from Prime Minister Zhu Ronji on why Pakistan cannot recover economically unless it raises its abysmally low rate of savings. After much hesitation, the Chinese gave Pakistan $ 500 million. China, it appears, will not encourage Pakistani economic profligacy and will possibly join other 'Friends of Pakistan' when aid is coupled with economic restructuring.

In these circumstances, the 'Friends of Pakistan' will use their economic leverage to see that Pakistan moves in the direction of ending support for terrorist groups and dealing with pro-Taliban groups operating across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. It is in this background that one has to assess the rather shady role being played by America's British allies, who are preaching virtual defeatism and surrender in Afghanistan through both their military commander and Ambassador. The British quite evidently have no stomach for further casualties. Over the past two years they have played a duplicitous role in establishing secret contacts with the Taliban behind the back of President Hamid Karzai, who has reacted with rage, expelling a British national who was involved in clandestinely transferring money to the Taliban and by pre-empting a British ploy to get Lord Paddy Ashdown, who had earned notoriety in Bosnia and is said to have had MI 6 links in his short career as a diplomat, as a UN High Representative to Afghanistan.

There can obviously be no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. But this does not mean that the Taliban and its ISI mentors should be led to believe that the Taliban could return to power. Mr Karzai does have members of the Hizb-e-Islami led by ISI-backed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar holding high positions in the Afghan Government. But they have to function within the framework of Afghanistan's democratic Constitution. But a return of the exclusively Pashtun Taliban would be a recipe for not only an ethnic division of a country where 56 per cent of the population is not Pashtun, but also return to an era where the terrorist groups across the world found haven in Afghanistan.

The talks that Mr Karzai has initiated with Taliban representatives with Saudi Arabian facilitation are evidently an effort to set out the terms under which the Taliban could be accommodated in the political mainstream in Afghanistan. The Afghan Foreign Minister clarified in Islamabad on October 21: "Talks will be held with only those who are willing to lay down arms and those willing to function within the Constitution" -- akin to terms that Pakistan's National Assembly has set down for talks with those who have taken to arms in that country.

Pakistan is evidently seeking to link progress on Afghanistan with the international community 'facilitating' dialogue on Jammu & Kashmir with India and a reduction in Indian influence and profile in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis, using noted scholars like Ahmed Rashid, are also attempting to peddle the view that Taliban sincerity should be accepted if the Taliban merely 'disavows' ties with Al Qaeda. There is also an effort to tell the Americans that "Islamist movements with local or national objectives" (read Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and Jaish-e-Mohammed) are quite different from an international terrorist group like Al Qaeda and should be dealt with differently. India will have to evolve a comprehensive diplomatic strategy, including consultations with Russia, Iran and with the incoming US Administration to counter such moves designed to perpetuate terrorism from Pakistani and Afghan soil.

So I was right. there is a seminar fest going on about how to bail out TSP and Rasgotra article is part of the spin. How different is thei from the task force setup before Bill Clinton cam e to power in 1992 with Oakley and Geoff Kemp?

[ramana]

Uneven Cohen is at the center of it!

Brookings Report on Next chapter : US -Pakistan

IIRC the previous one was also from this group.

[Paul]

It is akin to rearranging the chairs on the deck of the Titanic.

[SSridhar]

Uneven Cohen is at the center of it!

Brookings Report on Next chapter : US -Pakistan

One of the strategies being advised pi$$esd me off:

Develop a strategy based on the NIE findings that seeks to adjust Pakistan’s cost–benefit calculus of using militants in its foreign policy through close cooperation and by calibrating U.S. military assistance

What is meant by 'adjust' ? It is not 'eliminate', it is 'adjust'. What it means is that this 'Working Group on Pakistan' is willing to let Pakistan retain its militants as an instrument of its foreign policy while all it seeks to achieve is 'adjust' its widespread usage. It means that ensuring that terrorists are curbed against the US forces while turning a blind eye to their usage against India. While it is certainly a perfect policy for the US to follow, India must be aware of this.

[ramana]

I dont know how may be its due to members indulging in cat fights and Pingrezi jousts that we have missed the Western repackaging of the Taliban.

X-posted with my highlights....

The Dawn's India correspondent,Javed Naqvi,on India's Afghan dilemna,quoting our former envoy,Mr.Bhadrakumar extensively.It brings into focus the quagmire that Afghanistan has become and the the price that the countries involved are paying,including India.On one point,Naqvi is spot on.There are NO "good or bad" Taliban! Any attempt to label tham as such is an exercise in self-delusion.

http://www.dawn.com/weekly/jawed/jawed.htm

The insult and the injury: India’s Afghan policy faces a severe test
By Jawed Naqvi

WHEN a couple of years ago the king of Saudi Arabia visited New Delhi for the first time in half a century, he did something so horrific that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s establishment is understandably keen to cover it up. The king insulted his hosts by refusing to pay a customary visit to the shrine of Mahatma Gandhi, which no other leader had yet dared to do to the revered icon of peace.

He apparently used the fiction that his religion forbade him from visiting non-Muslim shrines. Not even President Pervez Musharraf was so discourteous. When he first came to Delhi for the 2001 Agra summit, he offered flowers at the Rajghat to the man with whom his country’s founding fathers had major ideological differences.

Not by symbolism alone, the king’s visit to New Delhi preceded by a few weeks another by a better-camouflaged obscurantist President George W. Bush. And the two are now engaged in divining a vague, alleged difference between good and bad Taliban, presumably in the belief that there are good and bad zealots.

If they succeed in their mission, a project assiduously pursued by a dominant section of the Pakistani establishment, India would be willy-nilly offered to choose between a rock and a hard place. There are strong suggestions that this may have been one of the facets of the meeting that Indian and Pakistani national security advisers held in Delhi last week.

After a long time both governments in Islamabad and New Delhi are on the same wavelength with the Americans and the Saudis alike. It has required India to eject its non-aligned worldview, or whatever was left of it since the end of the Soviet Union, in the process abandoning its traditionally close ties with Iran and other third world comrades.

The two anti-Iran votes at the IAEA and recent comments by the Indian prime minister that he would not want Iran to become another nuclear power in the region (while maintaining a farcical smile over Israel’s undeclared but widely acknowledged arsenal) were part of a calculated manoeuvre. It amounted to a de facto policy U-turn in order to shape a new one in which the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel and US-administered Afghanistan are ranged against Iran and whoever else happens to stand in Washington’s way of the hydrocarbons-rich Caspian region.

The bouquet of grovelling compliments that President Bush got from Prime Minister Singh in Washington was of a piece with the new willingness of the current Indian establishment to pay any price to endear itself to the group of countries Delhi regarded with suspicion not too long ago. Is India bracing to change its Afghan policy in accordance with the new mantra that anoints the existence of good Taliban? It could be early to say but the omens are numerous.

For a long time it was the practice with the Indian establishment to look for links for its woes in Kashmir and elsewhere in the country to the gaggle of Islamic fanatics straddling the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, usually sweeping the ISI too into the frame. The last time this formula came into play was with the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul. Pakistan’s NSA Ali Mahmud Ali Durrani vehemently denied this assertion when he visited Delhi recently. And his Indian counterpart M.K. Narayanan paid him rich tributes at a dinner speech without any mention of the Kabul attack.

But Narayanan went out of his way to herald quite possibly a brand new stance between the two countries. He said, as far as one could discern, that the fulcrum of terror was now located in the domestic fautlines of both countries. This would seem to justify the several coercive, if dubious, actions taken by many Indian states almost always targeting alleged Muslim terrorists the homegrown variety. No longer the hunt for them in the neighbourhood. It was also a nudge to Pakistan to tackle its domestic war with fanatics.

But what if Pakistan, the UK and the United States, with Saudi encouragement, revived the thesis that the war in Afghanistan was unwinnable without involving some of the Taliban groups currently battling governments on both sides of the Durand Line being wooed? How would New Delhi ever come to accept that?

M.K. Bhadrakumar, former point man for Indian foreign ministry’s Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan desk, and now an avowed critic of its evident drift, believes that the choices before India are difficult. As the US Defence Secretary Robert Gates too indicated earlier this month: “There has to be ultimately, and I’ll underscore ultimately, reconciliation as part of the political outcome to this (war). That’s ultimately the exit strategy for all of us.” It may not be far-fetched to imagine that India’s new proximity with Saudi Arabia had factored in the kingdom’s importance in the resolution of the Afghan tangle if indeed there can be one.

If there were reconciliation with the Taliban, says Bhadrakumar, it “would essentially be in the nature of picking up the threads from October 2001 when the US invaded Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban regime”. That was when Taliban leader Mullah Omar promised at the eleventh hour from his hideout in Kandahar that he would verifiably sequester his movement from Al Qaeda and ask Osama bin Laden to leave Afghan soil, provided the US acceded to his longstanding request to accord recognition to his regime in Kabul rather than engage it selectively. According to this analyst the US administration ignored the cleric’s offer and instead pressed ahead with the plan to launch a “war on terror”.

The “unaffordability” of an open-ended war in Afghanistan is projected to influence thinking in Washington if the crisis in the US economy deepens, though that threshold is not nigh. The war should be “affordable”, according to Bhadrakumar, if the new head of US Central Command, General David Petraeus, can somehow make it more “efficient”, which is what he did in Iraq.

But that would not get the regime in Kabul any respect among the Afghans. Other regional powers, including Russia and Iran, do not see the US or Nato getting out of Afghanistan any time soon. Tehran has been alleging that the US strategy in Afghanistan is essentially to perpetuate its military presence and has raised the ante there. After having supported the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 Tehran has reheated an old relationship.

It invited former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani, who led the anti-Taliban coalition of the Northern Alliance in the 1990s to visit Iran. Receiving him in Tehran this month, the speaker of the Iranian Majlis Ali Larijani told Rabbani that the presence of foreign forces was creating “insecurity” and is causing rampant drug trafficking.

Russian statements regarding the US role in Afghanistan too have become critical by the day. Moscow seems to have assessed that the US-led war is getting nowhere and blame-game had begun. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov utilised the annual UN General Assembly forum to launch a broadside against Washington.

He said: More and more questions are being raised as to what is going on in Afghanistan. First and foremost, what is the acceptable price for losses among civilians in the ongoing anti-terrorist operation? Who decides on criteria for determining the proportionality of the use of force?

In the changing equations in Afghanistan, India will need the trust of all key players, which include Saudi Arabia and Iran even as they represent opposite ends of the ethnic divide. We all know how everyone who has waded into the territory has come out severely bruised. To turn the saying on its head, the Saudi-led search for good Taliban may add a smarting bruise to the insult India has endured at the hands of the monarch.

Is this another Great Game sellout? Did the Kabul Embassy bombing scare Indian elite?

[ramana]

Drum Roll for talking to Taliban increases.

Op-Ed Pioneer, 31 oct., 2008

Afghanistan in a mess

Vanda Felbab-Brown

The weak, the bad, and the ugly: US policy options

After years of systematic underprovision of security in an intervention carried out on a shoestring, the Bush Administration has finally woken up to the dire situation in Afghanistan. Washington is now in a frantic scramble to come up with a new strategy. Unfortunately, the options batted around have a slim chance to fundamentally reverse the worsening trends.

Violence has increased dramatically and now paralyses much of the country in the south and east. Not only are the numbers of casualties and attacks the highest since 2002, but the psychological effect of violence has been profound. Spectacular operations like the Taliban's attacks on Kabul's Serena Hotel and on Kandahar's prison have sent a powerful message that the momentum is on its side. The Taliban has opened an eastern front and there may not be a winter lull in the violence this year.

International advisers, NGOs, and even Afghan Government officials have been locked in to the provincial capitals, with minimal capacity to travel outside of the city gates. Few dare travel on the Ring Road. Even the north is not completely stable, with many commanders there rearming. {Shoudln't they as a hedge against return of Taliban?}

The lack of security has paralysed reconstruction efforts while public impatience has grown. A lot of money has been sunk into large projects, like the Kajaki Dam, which have failed to provide any immediate benefits to the population. And the entire Kajaki project will be jeopardised when the Taliban blows up the pylons.

Governance has collapsed. Kabul is isolated and unresponsive. Throughout the country, much of the political leadership is corrupt, incompetent, and focussed on tribal parochial and personal gains. The corruption is endemic, affecting critical institutions, like the Afghan National Police, who are uniformly seen as thieves in state-issued uniforms. Personal insecurity from ordinary crime is great and even rudimentary justice is not being delivered.

US military actions in FATA have failed to reduce Taliban's safe havens. The air strikes have alienated the local population from the US and the fight against terrorism. However, the violence in Afghanistan has become self-sustaining and even if the safe havens were removed, the Taliban would carry on.

Three policy options have lately received attention: A military surge combined with an enlargement of the Afghan National Army; a tribal option; and negotiations with the Taliban.

An infusion of sustainable security is absolutely critical for any progress. Increasing the number of troops is one way: It is the insufficient density of Nato forces that results in overreliance on air power and civilian casualties. Unfortunately, the planned surge of three American brigades is not enough. The real, though unspoken, number of troops necessary is around three divisions. Such troop numbers are of course not available, and the rise of Pashtun nationalism stoked by the Taliban may have already precluded the Afghan tolerance for increases in foreign troops. The default strategy is therefore one of relying on increasing the ANA. But the ANA is currently not ready to take on the Taliban. In many areas, it cannot even hold the territory after the Taliban are pushed out, with critical districts like Panjwayi, Maywand, Musa Qala, caught in cycles of clear and failure to hold, never progressing to build.

Hence option 2: Arming tribal militias. While informed by "the tribal awakening" in Anbar, Iraq, this policy is not wholly a foreign import. Many frustrated foreign forces in the Afghan-Pakistan region, be they British or Soviet, sought to rely on tribes. But, the tribal complexity is far greater than in Iraq. The tribal leadership in Afghanistan is frequently critically weak. Both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban has further weakened the tribal structures by assassinations and discrediting of tribal leaders, such as those who agree to drug eradication, while replacing them with its own mullahs. Moreover, the tribal option is equally open to the Taliban: They have a long history of playing the tribes and are already coopting them through protection against poppy eradication. Even if successful in halting the progress of the Taliban, it is hard to see how a tribal option could be made consistent with the dream of a strong central state. More likely, it would speed up the fracturing of the country into fiefdoms.

If you cannot beat them, then negotiate with them, as many Europeans are urging. Strategic negotiations with the Taliban need to be distinguished from a reconciliation process for those who lay down their weapons. Such an amnesty process has brought hundreds of fighters out, though not enough to make a strategic difference. Such a minimalist scenario could hardly be appealing to the Taliban leadership which feels that the trends are going their way. Rather, in any strategic negotiations, such as the recent feelers in Mecca, the Taliban would likely not be satisfied with less than full participation in the political process -- which could result in their takeover of the south and east. In fact, Mullah Omar recently stated that the only matter for negotiations is the terms of Nato withdrawal. But this Taliban central goal of all foreign troops out needs to remain unacceptable: To avoid further feeding the global Salafist ego of running the infidels out and at minimum, to preserve the necessary means to disrupt the extremely dangerous Al Qaeda safe havens in the region.

-- The writer is Fellow, Foreign Policy, at The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. On the Web: http://www.brookings.edu

So she does understand and is willing to give the south and east Afghanistan to the Taliban. In other words the lands west of the Durand. The FATA is on its way to Talibanization any way(Baitullah Mehdsud and Mullah Fadullah). Also note she recognizes that Pashtun nationalism is being channeled by Taliban. Hats off Paul.

So my take is if talks with Taliban are taken to logical conclusions, the West is prepared to see a new hardcore Salafist Pashtun state emerge between the borders of Afghanistan and current TSP. With NATO troops in the other areas as trip wire.

Taliban will be in defacto control on both sides but dont know yet about dejure as that means breaking up Afghanistan and TSP.


So atleast on BRF we are upto speed on whats happening.

[renukb]

India should join Russia, Qatar, Azerbaijan, Iran in the OIL pipeline project.
With so many stake holders and $$ involved like this, TSP can not be a big PIA (Pain In the A$$) and hurt India with the IPI project. I believe IPI can be managed well to help India, if executed the right way.

Putin Invites Azerbaijan, Qatar to Take Part in Russia-Iran Projects
30.10.08 18:52
http://news.trendaz.com/index.shtml?sho ... 73&lang=EN

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin believes other countries could join implementation of a range of Russia-Iran projects, ITAR-TASS quoted. “We have a plenty of bilateral and multilateral prospective projects,” Putin said at his meeting with Iranian First Vice-President Parviz Davoodi in Astana on 30 October. According to Putin, besides Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan also can take part in the development of transport infrastructure and Qatar in the power engineering field.

“Cooperation on the Caspian Sea is very important and prospective both for Iran and Russia,” said Prime Minister, adding that the two countries maintain friendly relations which have been intensively developing in recent years. The trade turnover between Russia and Iran achieved almost $3.5bln. “The relations between Russia and Iran are comprehensively developing,” Putin stressed. Putin and Davoodi took part in the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries’ Prime Ministers in Astana on 30 October. Iran was represented as an observer. “From the very beginning we welcomed Iran’s participation in the activity of this international organization as an observer,” Putin said.

Davoodi said the relations between the two countries took a fast pace after the summit of the Caspian Sea countries’ Presidents in Tehran. “Then you uttered a remarkable phrase that the cooperation between Russia and Iran does not contradict to the security in the region and meets the interests of all neighbouring countries. We would like to assure that the strong Russia meets the interests and expectations of the region and the entire world,” he Davoodi.

“Despite rather good economic relations between the two countries, today’s situation in the world and the general economic situation push Russia and Iran to more efficient and active cooperation,” said Davoodi.

[NRao]

As has become quite clear over the last seven years, one cannot win a war against the Taliban, so the only alternative is containment. Containment however is also not a stable proposition, as long as Pushtoon lands remain under non-Pushtoon non-Taliban control. So there is something here to trade, land for peace. Not just Afghan Pushtoon lands, as being proposed by the British, Saudis and others, but also Pakistani Pushtoon areas will have to be sacrificed. In return Taliban gives the rest of the world peace. However Taliban promises of peace mean little, unless their fulfillment is not monitored and a potential Taliban break out is not defended against.

So containment means there are strong defenses around Taliban's Pushtunistan's periphery:
1. In the East: India
2. In the North and West: Northern Alliance bolstered by NATO presence, India, Iran, Central Asian States, Russia
3. In the South-East: RAPE Pakjab (somewhat bolstered by US, India )
4. In the South-West: Baluchistan bolstered by India and USA
5. In Karachi: MQM, PPP bolstered by India

Containment also means that Taliban does not support either the anti-Indian jihadist groups (8) or Al Qaida (9) or ISI (10). That may be achieved by good monitoring of the periphery by the International Afghan Security Coalition, humint inside the Taliban Areas, Saudi involvement and pacification, constant chai-biscuit sessions with the Taliban powerbrokers, control over all external trade and strong policy of retaliation upon violations (if they give support to unsavory groups).

Two comments:
1) Taliban is a creation of Pakistan and have their TM on it. Their existence is nearly entirely on the ISI, outside of which I doubt they can exist. Taliban "support" of ISI cannot happen IMHO, it is the other way around. Comments?
2) No Chicom? Did China get washed out to sea or is it deliberate?

I think the key to the dismantling of the Great Game is to get rid of the play-maker - ISI.

[svinayak]

I think the key to the dismantling of the Great Game is to get rid of the play-maker - ISI.

That means a war

[Prem]

http://www.afghanland.com/history/durrand.html


Afghanistan and Balochistan should form a legal team to challenge the illegal occupation of Afghan territories and Balochistan by Pakistan in the International Court of Justice. Once the Durand Line Agreement is declared illegal, it will result in the return of Pakistan-occupied territories back to Afghanistan. Also, Balochistan will be declared a country that was forcibly invaded through use of force by the Pakistanis; and with international assistance, Balochistan can regain its independence. It is the right time to act now because the US and Allied forces in Afghanistan are positioned to facilitate the enforcement of the Court’s judgment.

After Pakistan vacates territories belonging to Afghanistan and Balochistan, a new boarder should be demarked amicably to determine Baloch dominated areas to become the new Balochistan, and Pashtun dominated areas to be merged into Afghanistan. And, with the help of the US and Allied forces, the Afghans and the Baloch forces can flush out members of Al-Qaeda and Talebans from their respective countries.

A wise observer once said, “Pakistan is a completely superfluous and artificially created spot on the world map that has become a breeding ground for extremism, and trouble that would be best done away with.”

[RajeshA]

Prem,

I think, Afghanistan's and Balochistan's have good cases. Right now, USA and NATO are sitting right in the middle of the whole crime scene and may be willing to be more active in looking for some solution. Once their forces move out, the whole movement may peter out as well.

With the Democrats moving in the White House, when the whole premise of Pakistan and Afghanistan is going to be thought over anew, now is the time to move.

[NRao]

RA,

Barak Obama has already brought Kashmir to the table - because TSP has mentioned it as a thorn in its side. Obama is going to "resolve" it - without a "fight". I think/feel that Indian efforts to make a case to defang ISI is a must. ISI hurts everyone but the ISI - even Pakistan. A country has a need to have an entity such as the ISI, but Pakistan has no ISI, ISI has a Pakistan, ISI is an independent entity unto itself. Indian argument has to be that Pakistan needs build a "ISI" under civilian power.

Acharya,

What else is new? It has always existed - in Kashmir since 1990!!!!! Let us formalise it under a democratic banner.

[NRao]

Just BTW, did anyone listen to Md. Halfbright - on CNN this AM? Hard to believe that she SEEMS to be edging towards full brightness......... hard to imagine it in my life time. BUT, we need to give full credit to PakiLand for their self destructing behaviour and also to Paki supporters in the US. Paki single handedly has done what most other nations could not think of.

:clap_emiticon:

[RajeshA]

RA,

Barak Obama has already brought Kashmir to the table - because TSP has mentioned it as a thorn in its side. Obama is going to "resolve" it - without a "fight". I think/feel that Indian efforts to make a case to defang ISI is a must. ISI hurts everyone but the ISI - even Pakistan. A country has a need to have an entity such as the ISI, but Pakistan has no ISI, ISI has a Pakistan, ISI is an independent entity unto itself. Indian argument has to be that Pakistan needs build a "ISI" under civilian power.

If Obama brings Kashmir onto the table, we should probably just tell him, he should start with Palestine first, and then go on to Tibet, because the suffering and culturocide there is far more acute, and when he has healed the world after that, we are willing to listen to him. Now the Dems may feel they can frack India on Kashmir to get brownie points from the Muslims, and get TSP to do its bidding, but that thought ought to be given a quick burial. India has been able to form a good relationship with the GoP, especially George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice, but the Dems still have to show the pedigree of their support for a strategic relationship with India, and if they don't watch out they may piss off India so much, that all the gain of the past decade would go down the drain. There is still a big trust deficit between India and the Dems, and it will take time before that is built up.

The only way to defang the ISI is to take away that what feeds the ISI. If a proper political reorganization of Pakistan and Afghanistan is carried out, which I mentioned earlier (Just MHO), then ISI loses the State of Pakistan and the Pakistani Ideology, which nurtures from the existence of such a state. Secondly ISI loses all the resources.

Of course, they can still find employment in the ranks of the Saudis or Al Qaida, but their institutional strength would be broken, and they may end up as mere caddies to other intelligence agencies or even jihadist organizations.

As long as Pakistan exists, ISI will exist. A few changes in the leadership, etc. or supposedly bringing it under civilian oversight would remain just cosmetic changes, which would give ISI a more benign image, but that way it will become even more dangerous.

The next big project for Indian diplomacy is to help mold the US strategy towards Pakistan. We could start by influencing the discourse in the think-tanks, Democratic policy makers, Congress Foreign Affairs Committees, influential American journalists, but also amongst the politicians in Great Britain, like Foreign Minister David Miliband, and the Tories. As mentioned earlier, giving some support to Afghanistan and Baluchistan to get their cases on Durand Line and Independence before the International Court of Justice, would also give the Great Gamers in the West more options.

[renukb]

India working with Pak to resolve issues on IPI gas pipeline
Tehran, PTI:

"We have reiterated to the Iranian government at all levels that India remains committed to the IPI project. We are working with Pakistan to resolve outstanding issues pertaining to transit and transportation tariff," External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said.


http://www.deccanherald.com/Content/Nov ... updatenews

Affirming its commitment to the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline, New Delhi on Saturday said it is working with Islamabad to resolve outstanding issues and insisted that the USD 7.4-billion project can be finalised through cooperation of all the three countries.

Inaugurating the India-Iran Joint Commission Meeting here, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee also expressed hope that Iran would implement the Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) deal of 2005 for supply of five million mtpa of LNG.

He said India also expected that 20 per cent stake for ONGC Videsh Ltd in Yadavaran gas field as part of the LNG agreement would be honoured by Iran.

"We have reiterated to the Iranian government at all levels that India remains committed to the IPI project. We are working with Pakistan to resolve outstanding issues pertaining to transit and transportation tariff," the Minister said.

"With the cooperation of all three sides, it should be possible to finalise the project," he said.

The two-day Joint Commission meeting, co-chaired by Mukherjee and Iran's Economic Minister Shamseddin Hossein, is discussing new initiatives in various sectors including trade and investment, energy, mining, railways and banking.

Noting that India was looking for a more balanced trade profile, Mukherjee invited Iranian participation in India's growth.

He said the two countries have finalised negotiations on Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) and Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) and are agreeable on commencing discussions on a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) to strengthen bilateral trade.

India and Iran have already sorted out banking issues and sought to create a suitable ambience for investments, joint ventures and collaborations, Mukherjee said.

"India is globally acknowledged as an investment destination. We would invite Iranian friends to also benefit from India's growth," he said.

Observing that the two countries have already demonstrated in the past that they can successfully collaborate in major economic projects, he said, "our strong bilateral relationship in the oil and gas sector can be a stepping stone for Iranian investments in that sector."

Mukherjee expressed happiness over the discovery of oil and gas by OVL in the Farsi block after exploration work at four sites at an estimated cost of USD 90 million.

"OVL is hopeful of being awarded the development contract under a mutually acceptable arrangement," Mukherjee said while noting that OVL is also involved in negotiations on the development of South Parl Phase 12 and Azadegan fields.

"We hope bilateral cooperation in this sector would be further strengthened by the implementation by Iran of the LNG deal concluded in 2005 for the supply of five million mtpa of LNG to India by Iran," Mukherjee said.

He said that trade in oil sector has been adversely impacted by banking problems which has since been resolved to the satisfaction of both sides.

The Exim Bank of India has renewed until 2009 a medium term Government of India-supported Line of Credit of USD 200 million to seven Iranian banks to support bilateral trade.

India would like the unutilised amount of around USD 115 million to be optimally harnessed for enduring projects symbolising close bilateral ties.