Intelligence & National Security Discussion

skher
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby skher » 02 Dec 2008 23:28

http://www.hindu.com/2008/07/15/stories ... 210900.htm
Fighting Pakistan’s ‘informal war’

Praveen Swami

National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan calls for retaliation against the ISI.

Last week, infuriated by mounting evidence that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate organised the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan proposed a solution:. “I think we need to pay back in the same coin”. “Talk-talk is better than fight-fight,” Mr. Narayanan concluded, “but it hasn’t worked so far.”
Covert deterrence

No Indian official has ever used language that even approaches that deployed by the NSA — but more than a few in its covert services, including the former Intelligence Bureau chief, Ajit Doval, and his Research and Analysis Wing counterpart Vikram Sood, have long made a similar case.

Exactly what is it, though, that advocates of retaliation have in mind?
....
Put simply, they argue that India must have covert deterrent capabilities. If a Pakistan-based terrorist group carries out strikes against civilians in Mumbai, the argument goes, India must be able to assassinate its leaders and their financiers. While it makes no economic or strategic sense to start a potentially-catastrophic war to deter terrorism, covert tools can still be used to punish its sponsors.
ts politicians.
....
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s regime did not, however, restrict itself to sending verbal signals to Islamabad. In the mid-1980s, RAW unleashed two covert groups, CIT-X and CIT-J, the first targeting Pakistan in general and the second directed at Khalistani groups. A low-grade but steady campaign of bombings in major Pakistani cities, notably Karachi and Lahore, followed. According to former RAW official and security analyst B. Raman, India’s counter-campaign yielded results by making Pakistan’s terror campaign “prohibitively costly.”

For a variety of reasons, these operations proved short-lived. Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, who took over in 1997, shut down RAW’s offensive operations on moral grounds, pointing to the end of the terrorist campaign in Punjab and the improved situation in Jammu and Kashmir. Earlier, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao ended RAW’s eastern operations earlier as part of his efforts to build bridges with China and Myanmar.

Indian politicians need to debate Mr. Narayanan’s suggestions seriously, whether or not they see reason to eventually endorse them. So, too, do Pakistanis. If nothing else, the NSA’s comments show just how deep frustration with the ISI’s informal war runs in New Delhi. Pakistan has long feared a nightmarish future where a hostile India dams its water resources in Jammu and Kashmir and throws its weight behind irredentist forces. Each terror bombing against Indians, paradoxically, is bringing that nightmare one step closer to realisation.


Is this shutdown the reason why we have become a soft state over the last decade?

http://www.cfr.org/publication/17707/ra ... chlesinger

Weaknesses in RAW

The intrusion of Pakistan-backed armed forces into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (GlobalSecurity) in 1999 prompted questions about RAW's efficacy. Some analysts saw the conflict as an intelligence failure. However, RAW officials argued they had provided the intelligence but political leadership had failed to act upon it. The Indian government constituted a committee to look into the reasons for the failure and recommend remedial measures. The report of the Kargil review committee was then examined by a group of ministers, established in 2000. The group recommended a formal written charter and pointed out lack of coordination and communication within various intelligence agencies.

Following the review, a new organization was set up-the National Technical Research Organization (NTRO)-modeled on the U.S. National Security Agency-which would be the repository of the nation's technical intelligence-spy satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and spy planes. The government also decided to create a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), whose head would be the adviser to the Chief of Staffs Committee and the defense minister. The DIA was empowered to conduct transborder operations.

However, the shakeup of the intelligence apparatus has not removed the problems that persisted, especially relating to the overlap of agency activities, say experts. Earlier, RAW was the only organization permitted to conduct espionage operations abroad. Now both the IB and DIA have also been given the authority to conduct such operations, writes Singh.

There have also been occasional media reports of penetration inside RAW by other agencies, in particular the CIA. Swami writes that RAW is exceptional amongst major spy agencies in maintaining no permanent distinction (Hindu) between covert operatives who execute secret tasks, and personnel who must liaise with services such as the CIA or public bodies, such as analysts and area specialists. "As a result, personnel with sensitive operational information are exposed to potentially compromising contacts," he writes.



Garus,a few questions based on above.

- Are the IB's and DIA's foreign ops are subordinated to RAW? Isn't there a Jt.Directorate for foreign op to prevent turf war b/w the three agencies,clearly delineate roles and put in place a C & C structure?

- If not,then what stops DIA from liquidating the terror camps-since it is authorized to conduct trans-border raids (the 5-km International Border limitation imposed on DGMI doesn't apply)?
Is this agency still underdeveloped and understaffed?

-Considering Hon'ble Verappa oily has already slipped in to the media [appeared on Headlines today scroll] about our proposals for covert ops (shh...don't tell anyone!), do we currently have the capacity to get/nail the 20 musharrafs, for whom we have humbly requested in writing the powerless TSP government to "kindly hand them to us"?

-Has parliamentary oversight become necessary?What are the negatives associated with such a move?Also,how the productivity of such a move going to be ensured?

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby harik » 03 Dec 2008 00:03

Who was in Charge? By Wilson John

http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/dec/02m ... charge.htm

A critical question which remains unanswered about the Mumbai attacks and the Indian's state response during the 60-hour siege of India's economic soul is who was in charge of the operations?

No one. This brief answer sums up India's efforts to counter terrorism which has been growing in both size and dimension over the years.
............

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Mandeep » 03 Dec 2008 00:25

The DIA is authorised to conduct cross-border operations which means that they can send operatives to get information from other countries and to run sources in these countries. That does not include cross-border raids, military activities or special operations in foreign countries.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby skher » 03 Dec 2008 01:01

Mandeep wrote:That does not include cross-border raids, military activities or special operations in foreign countries.


Then who puts the feet on the ground?understaffed IB? DGMI (why the need to follow the 5km boundary-that's for western media onlee)?

Is RAW in a shape to such things after CIT X & CIT J shutdown?
Or has it become a cheque dispenser like CIA or is it even bad at that?

Successive PMs after IK Gujral have "not said yes nor said no".

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Mark Schwartzbard » 03 Dec 2008 01:28

The US and UK (of course Nato) are thinking of winding down their operations in A-stan. (with the credit crunch hitting even the most wealthiest nations). What if the mumbai blasts was a pre-cursor to bringing India into the mainstream on WOT, to do some policing in A-stan, so that Nato can call it a day. If India does send a troop deployment of few couple of brigades. (or what ever they are called by the IA)
How does this help India?. Does that put pressure on Pakistan as it sees the tri-colour flag on both sides of it's border?.

How will paks and it's regional allies react (or for that matter adversaries of India, in shot I mean the dragon)

Anyone thought about thinking on those lines ?.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby babbupandey » 03 Dec 2008 02:15

Ahh
I don't America would stoop to such a low tactics. Remember, Americans hate it when their citizens are hurt, they wouldn't have wanted their own citizens to be killed.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby ramana » 03 Dec 2008 02:49

I wish someone writes about the consequences from Indian point of view and not the stratfor spin.

cbelwal

Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby cbelwal » 03 Dec 2008 02:57

http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage ... s+purposes

"....
said one serving IB officer, “that just 20 per cent of the organisation’s focus was on hard intelligence like infiltrating insurgencies and terrorist groups and organised gangs like D-company.”

The increasing number of terrorist attacks on India, culminating in last week’s Mumbai carnage, helped reverse the trend. “But there is almost a generation of men at the ground-level who have only done political intelligence,” the officer said.
...
Indian foreign and home ministry officials are scathing about R&AW and IB’s tendency to flood the system with dozens of vague and contradictory threat alerts. “After an attack they then pick one of the reports and say, ‘Look we predicted it,’” said one. "

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Kati » 03 Dec 2008 04:10

Can we have a discussion on possible modus operandi of the piglets for future actions, and how to tackle those (hypothetical) scenarios? For example, three to five terrorists dressing up like CRPF/CISF/police with light arms and ammo can walk up to a railway station, temple, shopping mall, and create havoc.

In the past, my discussion with some knowledgeable people from Bangladesh (one of them worked for DGFI) pointed toward the soft targets repeatedly - mushrooming snazzy shopping malls frequented by upper-middle class people. My contacts repeatedly mentioned the malls coming up at and near Kolkata (since they themselves, like many other 'paisawala' Bangladeshis have visited them while in Kolkata for medical treatments) with light or no security at all. What's the point of having a metal detector at the entrance of INOX deep inside the mall? Think of it. Lobbing a couple of grenades will do the maximum damage. The few so called 'security guards' on the footpath armed with 'lathis' and whistles are busy managing the traffic. Probably Kolkata is at the bottom of the list of major targets since the piglets are using as a transit point, but we never know.

Same goes true with major places of worship. Random checks at a distance of 50 to 100 meters from the place is one partial measure one can think of.

Other possibilities, and their partial remedies?????????

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby shyamd » 03 Dec 2008 06:23

I think CCTV's will be of great help. More CCTV's and vehicle registration number recognition will help a great deal. In London, every vehicle that has entered the city will be recorded, which means, if the owner of the vehicle is wanted for a certain crime, police can immediately pass on the info to local law enforcement and get the driver pulled over.

Tharakan recommended an increase in beat policing. I think beat policing along with CCTV's will work well in a city. This allows quicker response etc.

I think in London, they have facial recognition in their CCTV camera's.

--------------
Kati, I think there is no substitute for greater intelligence, HUMINT especially, penetrating the bangla intel and any groups intent on starting trouble. Today even Mumbai ATS is running HUMINT operations accross the border.

BTW, just out of interest, why would the DGFI want to target these kind of places? Who funds them to carry out these operations and what do they gain from doing so?

TIA
----------------------
'Rot' at heart of Indian intelligence

By Soutik Biswas
BBC News, Mumbai
The blame game over who was responsible for bloody terror attacks in the western Indian city of Mumbai (Bombay) has a sense of déjà vu about it.

Security experts have criticised the response to the attacks, which left nearly 200 people dead, as "amateurish, sluggish and feeble".

Indian intelligence agencies are leaking information that they gave about half a dozen warnings to the government in Maharashtra state - of which Mumbai is the capital.

The reports say Maharashtra was warned that strikes were being planned on city landmarks, including, possibly, the Taj Mahal hotel at the historic Gateway of India.

Authorities in Mumbai flatly deny that they received any tip-offs. "It is unimaginable that we would have got this sensitive information and not react," says state Interior Secretary Chitkala Zutshi.

Knee-jerk responses

But security experts confirm that information extracted from a group of Indian and Pakistani men arrested in northern India earlier this year revealed that some men belonging to Pakistan-based groups had done a reconnaissance of major landmarks in Mumbai. The agencies had also been picking up militant chatter on attacks in the city.

The police in India are working on manpower and equipment assessments last made in the 1970s

Security analyst Praveen Swami

Yet the local police and intelligence agencies appeared to have failed to act on any of the information - despite doubts as to whether the information was shared promptly enough between the Mumbai authorities.

This is a story which keeps repeating itself in a country which has been hit by over half a dozen big "terror attacks" this year - the central and local security authorities trade charges over the sharing and quality of intelligence, followed by knee-jerk responses and investigations which fizzle out in a couple of years.

The attacks and their aftermath again point to the rot that has set into the country's internal security system and a lack of cohesion between civilian and security wings of the government.

One telling example: six days after the attack, even the number of dead and injured keeps going up and down, due to poor co-ordination between the police and hospitals.


More seriously, the Indian police appear to be incapacitated by a lack of money and training. Poor working conditions, rudimentary surveillance and communications equipment, inadequate forensic science laboratories and outdated weaponry are making matters worse.

"The Mumbai attacks prove that the whole system is falling apart. The police in India are working on manpower and equipment assessments last made in the 1970s," says security analyst Praveen Swami.

The fact that the gunmen came by sea - and sneaked into the city through a crowded fishing colony - points to almost non-existent coastal police patrols, as a local officer admits.

All that the police have is a couple of launches. They have no radar.

The Mumbai police - like most police in India - remain in a time warp: they are equipped with World War II vintage rifles and carbines handed down by the army. In most states, an average policeman's salary and status is equivalent to that of an unskilled municipal worker, encouraging corruption.

Inadequate protection

Budgets do not extend to supplying food to police personnel on shift, so many end up extorting food from street hawkers. They also routinely hitch free rides because they don't have enough vehicles.


Training and faster response times are urgently needed, critics say

Bullet proof vests are of inferior quality and phone interception equipment remains largely rudimentary.

And three years after the central government announced the setting up an ambitious National Police Mission to set out the future needs and requirements of the force, nothing has happened.

India's commando forces are also not exactly in good shape.

A group of the elite 7,400-strong National Security Guards (NSG) - who were flown in to Mumbai eight hours after the attacks - is based near the capital, Delhi. Many of the commandos, say experts, are wasted in giving protection to politicians and other VIPs.

The country's best commando force does not have its own aircraft. As a result, it has become used to spending hours reaching crisis locations, with mixed results.

"On average, the commando force has taken six to seven hours to reach and begin their operations and get their act together every time they have been called for. There have been delays," says Praveen Swami.

He says the commandos have been trained to rescue small groups of people. "They have not been trained on multiple location operations of such scale."

'No way to fight terrorism'

Any deficiencies in their training may be explained by the fact that a Mumbai-type attack only happens very rarely.


Attackers arrived by sea, police say

That is why Indian security experts like Ajai Sahni say that the response to the attacks was so poor.

"This is no way to fight terrorism," he says.

After the Mumbai attacks, the local government announced it would set up a state commando force: to begin with, some 500 armed men would be ready in four months.

This, when the basic training for the NSG commandos takes six months. And Maharashtra, along with other states, has no commando training centres.

A number of states where there have been attacks by Maoist rebels plan to raise their own commando forces, but early results point to hasty, faulty planning.

The authorities in eastern Orissa state, for example, hired 8,000 new policemen for anti-Maoist operations, but found to their dismay that it took six months to train just 350 of them.

There are allegations that many of the candidates paid bribes to get into the force.



India is seen as a 'soft' target

Painfully slow and lazy bureaucracy means that the modernisation of the security forces often takes ages. Police in Uttar Pradesh state took four years to buy imported surveillance equipment.

By the time it arrived, it had become outdated and now lies disused. One police official even paid by his own credit card to pick up a piece of $60 equipment from a foreign website for his forces because it would have taken him months, if not years, to acquire it.

With their bureaucratic ways of working, the intelligence agencies are also struggling.

There is a dearth of language specialists. India's spy agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), is reported by insiders to have only two Arabic and two Chinese language specialists, hired from language schools.

But the best do not stay on because of poor wages, and one of the Chinese language specialists who was trained in cyber-technology quit to join one of India's top industrial groups.

"Things have to begin from scratch to boost internal security in India. Authorities should come clean to the people and tell them how bad the situation is and set time-bound targets to begin improving security infrastructure," says Praveen Swami.

Otherwise, he warns, India will continue to be one of the softest targets for terror strikes in the world.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 03 Dec 2008 08:47

shyamd wrote:I think NSA and PM/PMO know exactly what was going on in RAW. It is something else that has allowed Chaturvedi to keep his job. And no not the fact that the Cabinet Minister is his cousin or whatever. I think it is due to the CD which was delivered to the office, with all the hawala transactions of the businessmen and politicians etc. CD was delivered by the CIA. I think the article still exists on this thread.

Please do provide link fo the article, Shyamd..
Dammit, how do i miss such gems?? :(

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby ramana » 04 Dec 2008 03:25

sum, That was quite well known during the nuke deal halla. Even the Germans offered to MMS the results of their probe of Lichetenstein banks. MMS didnt do anything. Must have used them for blackmail for the vote. Do some googleing.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby K Mehta » 05 Dec 2008 19:00

Posting in full to discuss multiple points raised in the article
Pakistan: Thus far and no further-B Raman
You cannot convince somebody, who does not want to be convinced, who is not prepared to be convinced.

That has been our experience since 1981 when Pakistan started using terrorism as a weapon to keep India bleeding and to weaken it, in the hope that, by doing so, it will be able to force India to agree to a change in the status quo in Jammu & Kashmir.

The recovery by the Dubai authorities in 1983 of a revolver from a Khalistani hijacker which German authorities certified in writing was from a consignment sold to the Pakistan Army [Images]; the recovery from the perpetrators of the March, 1993, blasts of hand-grenades which Austrian experts certified in writing had been manufactured in Pakistan with technology and equipment sold by Austria to the Army-run Pakistan ordnance factories; the recovery from them of a chemical timer which the US certified in an unsigned note was part of a consignment supplied by the US to Pakistan in the 1980s and more and more and more.

The more the evidence we collected, the stronger the rejection -- particularly from the US. Not sufficient enough. Does not directly implicate the government of Pakistan. That was the stock reply we received repeatedly.

The US was interested only in protecting the lives and property of its citizens and in preventing another 9/11 in the US homeland from Pakistani territory. So long as Pakistan was co-operating with the US in action against al Qaeda, the US closed its eyes and continues to close its eyes to Pakistani support for acts of jihadi terrorism directed against India.

One would have expected that the US attitude after the Mumbai terrorist strikes would have been different because the terrorists of the Pakistan government-raised and backed Lashkar-e-Tayiba killed not only about 160 Indians, but also 25 foreigners -- six of them Israelis and another six Americans.

The Jewish civilians killed by the terrorists in the Nariman House were subjected to brutalities the like of which the world has not seen since the brutalities inflicted on the Jewish people by the Nazis during the Second World War.

And yet, the attitude of the US and other Western countries has been the same as it has always been. Where is the evidence, we are asked.

What evidence?

Evidence of the death of 160 Indians?

Evidence of the death of six Americans?

Evidence of the death of six Israelis?

Evidence of the brutalities inflicted by the terrorists on the Jewish people?

Is not the capture by the public of one of the perpetrators, a Pakistani national, who has confessed that he is from Pakistan and that he belonged to the Lashkar-e-Tayiba and that the entire operation was mounted by the LeT evidence enough?

Are not the intercepted telephone conversations between the perpetrators and their handlers in Pakistan evidence enough?

Are not the movement and activities of Professor Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the amir of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the political wing of the LET, in Pakistan as reported in the Pakistani media and in its own web site evidence enough?

Is not the continued existence of the training camps of the LET in Pakistani territory, including at Muridke, its headquarters near Lahore [Images], evidence enough?

Is not the refusal of the Pakistan government -- whether of Pervez Musharraf [Images] or Asif Ali Zardari [Images] -- to arrest the operatives of the LeT and close their camps despite an ostensible ban on it evidence enough?

What more evidence do the Americans want?

What evidence did they have when Ronald Reagan ordered the bombing of Libya in 1986 after an explosion in a West Berlin discotheque, which killed some Americans?

What evidence did they have before Bill Clinton [Images] ordered the Cruise missile attacks on jihadi training camps in Afghan territory in August, 1998?

What evidence did they have against al Qaeda and the Taliban [Images] before they bombed Afghanistan from October 7, 2001?

What evidence did they have against the Saddam Hussain government before they invaded and occupied Iraq in 2003?

In every case affecting American nationals and interests, they bombed and then collected evidence. They did not wait till they had collected all the evidence possible before they bombed.

They did not act on the basis of evidence accepted by the international community. They acted on the basis of their conviction as to where from the attacks on Americans came.

Their actions were motivated by the need to show that nobody can play with American lives and get away with it.

We should stop demeaning ourselves as a nation by going to the Americans and others with evidence. I am shocked by suggestions that we should produce the evidence before the UN Security Council. I cannot think of a more naive idea. It is as stupid as the advice given by the British to Jawaharlal Nehru to take the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council with a promise that it would do justice by India.

The time for action against Pakistan has come. Action based on our conviction that the terrorists came from a Pakistani terrorist organisation, which enjoys the patronage of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence.

The objective of the action should be to force Pakistan to act effectively against the LeT and its terrorist infrastructure. It should also be to mount a no-holds barred covert operation against the LeT through our own resources and methods.

Two steps the Government can take immediately:

� STEP No.1: Downgrade the diplomatic relations with Pakistan, terminate all economic relations including bilateral trade and communication links, suspend the confidence-building measures and the so-called peace process, terminate the talks on the gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan and withdraw from the so-called joint counter-terrorism mechanism, which has been a farce forced on Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh [Images] by the US. Announce that these actions will remain in force till Pakistan acts against the LeT and its terrorist leaders and infrastructure and hands over to India the terrorists wanted for trial in India.

STEP No. 2: Revive immediately the covert action capability of the Research and Analysis Wing, which was wound up by Inder Gujral, when he was the prime minister in 1997, and empower it to impose prohibitive costs on Pakistan till it stops using jihadi terrorism against India. The RAW imposed heavy costs on Pakistan for supporting the Khalistanis and should be able to do so now for its support to the LET and other jihadi terrorist organisations.

If step 2 has to be effective, there is an urgent need for a revamping of RAW. The organisation has been in a bad state of affairs with low staff morale, factionalism and internal bickering. Unfortunately, at this critical time in the nation's history, the RAW has no covert action specialists at the top of its pyramid. Get a suitable officer from the IB or the army. If necessary, make him the head of the organisation.


This is not the time for a direct military confrontation with Pakistan. It could prove counter-productive. It would enable the Pakistan Army to divert its troops from the Pashtun tribal belt to the Indian border and could unite the various jihadi organisations against India.

A divided Pakistan, a bleeding Pakistan, a Pakistan ever on the verge of collapse without actually collapsing -- that should be our objective till it stops using terrorism against India.

We should be realistic enough to anticipate that Pakistan will step up terrorism in Indian territory if we adopt such a policy. This should not deter us from embarking on this policy. The policy of active defence against Pakistan should be accompanied by time-bound action to strengthen our counter-terrorism capability at home.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Katare » 05 Dec 2008 20:37

UPA is hopeless but i wonder why didn't NDA reverse Gujral doctrine? Even after Kargil and Op Parakram they didn't empower RAW to take covert actions against Pakistan!?!

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 05 Dec 2008 20:58

They must have been overcome by the Bhai-bhai syndrome of ABV...

Hell, we even became the first country to officially recognize Mushy as el-presidante after the Kargil gift he gave us.

On the bright side, i have no doubt that the covert squads will be back in action(after the Mumbai attack) very soon after the initial delay in getting all the withered infrastructure, assets etc in paki-land back to shape.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby neerajb » 05 Dec 2008 22:08

sum wrote:On the bright side, i have no doubt that the covert squads will be back in action(after the Mumbai attack) very soon after the initial delay in getting all the withered infrastructure, assets etc in paki-land back to shape.


I can only say that you are one hell of an optimist. Not only UPA or NDA, I doubt whether India is left with any leader who has even a bit of wisdom to do what you are expecting. Our parliament is full of impotent chatterboxes.

Cheers....

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby ramana » 05 Dec 2008 22:23

katare I see you are learning fast from master spinners and introducing politics into a technical thread. Good job.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby shyamd » 05 Dec 2008 22:51

Bitter enemies in the past, Chinese and Vietnamese intelligence agencies have joined ranks against Chinese criminals in Indochina who are often of Taiwanese origin and considered to act as an unofficial foreign intelligence-gathering arm of Taipei. Beijing and Hanoi are also jointly manning a string of old Soviet signals intelligence centers, among them the SIGINT station at Hop Sau in Laos which covers the South China Sea, the straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Ananth » 05 Dec 2008 22:54

Ramana, Katare has a very valid point. During NDA's tenure B. Raman was crying hoarse repeatedly why Vajpayaee and company did not invoke covert op capabilities. I also noticed that he stopped saying that after UPA took it over. This is a vague data point. My hypothesis is that NDA was more focussed in Durand line instead of reviving 80s black ops inside TSP, since the action was in FATA belt. News items about "Sasha, Misha and other KDB agents" aiding Balochistan insurgency starting coming in TSP press around 2 years after Kunduz airlift. By time India was very much involved in civilian development inside Afghanistan. My impression based on articles of B. Raman and other people is that security establishment would have been more happy if they showed the same zeal in setting up covert ops inside TSP as the urgency they showed in re-establishing India's contacts with NA and Afghan government.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby shyamd » 05 Dec 2008 22:59

BTW, eorge Tenet, John Brennan, could well take over as head of the agency or become Director of National Intelligence under Obama.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby ramana » 05 Dec 2008 23:38

Ananth, Sorry the Mil forum is purely a technical forum where politics is not brought in. In Strat forum its tolerated. I hope you understand that. I f one more post comes in same vein I will be forced to warn you to keep the apolitical nature of this forum. Any discussion can go on in the Strat Forum in an appropriate thread.

Its with great difficulty the admins keep this Forum pristine. Its off limits for bringing partisan politics.


Thanks for future understanding, ramana

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 06 Dec 2008 11:15

neerajbhandari wrote:
sum wrote:On the bright side, i have no doubt that the covert squads will be back in action(after the Mumbai attack) very soon after the initial delay in getting all the withered infrastructure, assets etc in paki-land back to shape.


I can only say that you are one hell of an optimist. Not only UPA or NDA, I doubt whether India is left with any leader who has even a bit of wisdom to do what you are expecting. Our parliament is full of impotent chatterboxes.

Cheers....

What i meant by covert ops was that we wont need to send in our men into Pukiland for some IED-mubaraks...we just aggressively start playing off the cut throat rivals within Pak against each other which we were avoiding till now citing "moral high ground". Using RAW operatives might take a lot of time to happen since i'm assuming that we have next to nothing infrastructure left in pak for such ops, all thanks in no small measure to IKG and successors.

Shouldn't be very tough in the Pak of today with its king size fissures,IMHO. Of course, it all boils down to whether our netas are able to grow a pair to sign on the authorization letter and are evn thinking in such terms like the jingoes of BR.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby shyamd » 07 Dec 2008 04:40

Why M Sounds Better Than MK
The NSA's penchant for keeping all the eggs in his own basket has been his undoing ...
On November 26, when terrorists struck Mumbai, national security advisor (NSA) M.K. Narayanan was at a party thrown by Congress MP from Aurangabad, Bihar, Nikhil Kumar, an ex-police officer himself. Kumar confirmed to Outlook that the NSA attended the party at his residence. Sources say he left around 11.20 pm, a full two hours after the attack had begun.

The fact that Narayanan, the key pointsman for national security, stayed on late, delaying a meeting of the Crisis Management Group at the PM’s residence, is prime indication that government assessment of the crisis was completely inadequate. But what has appalled officials in the PMO is the fact that the NSA was partying even after he came to know Mumbai was under attack.


Experts say Narayanan’s slow response is reflective of the rot that has set in the security apparatus (which he personally oversees). In fact, all intelligence inputs are first sent to the NSC secretariat and the Joint Intelligence Committee, which come under him. Also, after taking over as NSA, Narayanan virtually took over the reins of two key intelligence agencies—IB and RAW.

The UPA government had initially appointed him advisor on internal security. But Narayanan switched to a new role as the NSA after the sudden demise of J.N. Dixit. Since then, Narayanan has had to wear several hats: he was a key behind-the-scenes interlocutor in the Indo-US nuclear deal. He used IB safehouses in Delhi and worked overtime to garner support for the UPA during the no-confidence motion over the N-deal. The Sino-Indian border talks and liaisoning with foreign dignitaries is also in the NSA’s purview. Did it happen that with so many responsibilities he had little time to deal with our diverse intelligence challenges?

A senior government official told Outlook, "You can either micro-manage a few key areas and delegate authority, or you can oversee everything and be inputs provider at the policy level. You can’t do both. The current NSA is micro-managing as well as refusing to delegate authority.... A number of key policy issues are pending on his desk. Can any man do justice to such a vast canvas?"

Narayanan also dabbled in the manoeuvring over key appointments. In ’05, he allowed then IB director Ajit Doval to retire and brought in E.S.L. Narasimhan. The latter was also due for retirement in a couple of months but the government approved a fixed two-year tenure for the IB director. This worked to Narasimhan’s advantage who, incidentally, was Narayanan’s staff officer when he headed the IB in the early ’90s. Surprisingly, Narasimhan had never headed a subsidiary intelligence bureau during his tenure (considered mandatory for a director, IB appointment.)

Another NSA appointments which raised eyebrows was the elevation of P.K. Hormese Tharakan as secretary, RAW. The former was serving as DGP, Kerala, and was a few months away from retirement when Narayanan asked him to head the external intelligence agency. Tharakan did have a brief stint with RAW early on but was considered an outsider since he had gone back to his parent cadre. By playing one agency against the other and favouring a few officers, the NSA is currently running a faction-ridden security apparatus. Which perhaps explains why the internal security apparatus failed miserably during the Mumbai attack.


Yawn! Good night!

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Nikhil T » 07 Dec 2008 07:16

Probably first time a specific instance of infiltration into a TSP Kashmir terrorist group has come to light so publicly. I wonder if he's a J&K cop on records or a quasi-govermental 'follower' ??

Arrested cop was deputed to sneak into Lashkar

Srinagar: The trail of the SIM cards recovered from terrorists in Mumbai has led to a J&K policeman who was arrested by police in New Delhi, taking the lid off an undercover operation that had successfully sneaked deep inside Lashkar ranks. Mukhtar Ahmed—a ‘follower’ in District Special Branch of J-K police in Srinagar district—had been deputed for an undercover operation.

Sources reveal that the modus operandi was simple: he had managed to sneak inside the Lashkar ranks and become one of their trust-worthy aides. It is learnt that a Lashkar operative needed SIM cards for their men and sought Ahmed’s help, who contacted Tausif Rehman based in Kolkata. And when the police found out that a SIM card recovered from a Mumbai attack site was one of the 22 Rehman sold to Ahmed, they immediately arrested both.

A sub-inspector of J&K Police, sources say, was also with Ahmed when he was arrested. The sub-inspector, however, was released later last evening. Ahmed—a resident of Rang Parestan, Rainawari in Srinagar—had been appointed a follower in the police after his brother was killed by the militants. He was later promoted as a constable after he did “exemplary work” in counter-insurgency. It is not known how and where Ahmed handed over the SIM card to the Lashkar men.

The J&K Police are tightlipped about the entire issue because there is apprehension of “compromising” other similar operations. It is not known whether any Government agency actually managed to get active intelligence inputs based on the surveillance of these SIM cards. Sources reveal that the J&K police had communicated the details of the SIM cards to “concerned people” for keeping a watch too.

Such operations are, in fact, the backbone of J&K Police’s counter-insurgency effort where the human intelligence and the technical intelligence—generated through phone interceptions etc—are put together to foil militant attacks through pre-emptive action.

In fact, the sea route infiltration of militants was not a surprise in J&K. In March last year, seven militants had sneaked in from Karachi through sea and bribed Coast Guard officials after being intercepted well within Indian waters near Mumbai. The group of five Pakistani militants who were finally nabbed while entering Kashmir Valley are still lodged in a police station in South Kashmir. “These men were intercepted as they were on their way to Kashmir,” a source told The Indian Express.

Sources reveal that their movement had been under a strict watch right all across their journey from Karachi but J&K police arrested them only after they entered the state. The reason for the delay in the interception, sources reveal, was to avoid compromising the undercover police handler here. Sources reveal that the entire modus operandi used by the militants to infiltrate through the sea was communicated to the government and even Maharashtra was informed.

In a similar incident, two Pakistani militants were arrested by J&K Police at Patrari Bridge in Manjakote, Rajouri on March 10, 2007, who too had infiltrated through the sea route. Identified as Abdul Majeed of Nawabshah, Sindh and Mohammad Jameel of Mansera, Pakistan, these two militants had told the J&K police investigators that they had taken a private boat from Karachi in the last week of February, 2008 for Mumbai and were intercepted by the sleuths of the Coast Guard inside the Indian waters but managed to escape an arrest after paying a “hefty sum as bribe”. The group stayed in Mumbai for several days, then travelled to New Delhi on a train and finally took a bus to Chandigarh where they stayed in a hotel.

The two Pakistani militants, Majeed and Jameel had been accompanied by local handlers from Mumbai till they had reached Chandigarh where two militants from J&K finally came to pick them up. The police had also arrested their two local contacts, who belonged to Sangiot, Mendhar in J&K. The locals were identified as Feroz Mohammad, a former Army jawan of 2 JAK Li and Mohammad Taj, both residents of Sangiot, Mendhar. In fact, sources reveal that the J&K police had immediately informed the Centre and also their counterparts in Maharashtra regarding these serious incidents.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 07 Dec 2008 09:35

Srinagar: The trail of the SIM cards recovered from terrorists in Mumbai has led to a J&K policeman who was arrested by police in New Delhi, taking the lid off an undercover operation that had successfully sneaked deep inside Lashkar ranks. Mukhtar Ahmed—a ‘follower’ in District Special Branch of J-K police in Srinagar district—had been deputed for an undercover operation.

WTF?
A repeat of the infamous Delhi Police busting of a Chotta Rajan operative being readied by the IB for a trip to Pak to "meet up" with Dawood?
The absolute lack of coordination among the agencies is shocking!!!

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby putnanja » 08 Dec 2008 05:51

Behind 26/11: Snoop network is fine, but not data-sharing

Image

Behind 26/11: Snoop network is fine, but not data-sharing
NISHIT DHOLABHAI

New Delhi, Dec. 7: The Mumbai terror attacks have unleashed a fresh round of sniping between our many defence and security agencies over alleged intelligence lapses — information that was either not picked up in the first place or information that was available but was not interpreted or acted upon.

Intelligence comes off a complex and elaborate network that extends down from the chiefs of various wings, mostly headquartered in New Delhi, down to faceless — and mostly plainclothed — operatives at the grassroots.

What goes under the omnibus and often loosely-used term “intelligence network” is a vast and variegated workforce that is meant to shore up information from a variety of fields ranging from drugs to markets and revenues and industry to diplomacy to defence preparedness to internal security and the activities of politicians and political parties themselves.

Very often — as the Mumbai terror attacks have brought home to us again — intelligence gathering not only needs to cut across various wings, the inputs also need to be pooled and processed in order to give the consumer — in this case the government — the ability to locate and neutralise possible threats.

The set-up

At the apex of the intelligence network is the Prime Minister himself, but in a day-to-day sense, the hands-on intelligence boss is meant to be the national security adviser (NSA), an office institutionalised during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s premiership and currently occupied by M.K. Narayanan.

The chief internal security snoop network is the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Beyond its official ranks, the IB works with what is known as “human intelligence”, an informal and paid network of informers. These informers or “assets” are cultivated by intelligence officers in the subsidiary intelligence bureaux (SIB) spread across the country.

Intelligence officers in touch with the ground give their inputs to assistant chief intelligence officers and chief intelligence officers. They, in turn, pass inputs to assistant directors and the flow terminates, at the state level, with the joint director of the SIB.

The flow goes up from various states to the IB director, whose office, in turn, is meant to redirect or distribute information wherever it is relevant — state governments, other government wings etc.

Information on the Mumbai strike, or its preparations, for instance, should ideally have reached one or more of the two dozen joint directors at the IB headquarters, before being passed on or shared.

The IB has dedicated desks to keep watch on activities related to Pakistan, Kashmir, the Northeast, Naxalites, Punjab and minority affairs.

A similar set-up exists in the country’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which is headed by a secretary-level officer assisted by four special secretaries, two additional secretaries and several joint secretaries. There is also the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) that provides air intelligence, reconnaissance and transport inputs required for internal and external purposes.

Both RAW and ARC report through the cabinet secretariat to the NSA and the Prime Minister. There is also the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) that receives inputs from the defence forces, primarily through the office of the director-general of military intelligence (DGMI).

Technically, the IB and RAW chiefs can brief the Prime Minister directly but since the NSA’s post was institutionalised, he is the key information/intelligence gateway to the Prime Minister.

Two years ago, a new body called the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) was set up with a view to enhancing India’s technical intelligence. The NTRO has remained an unevolved entity.

We also have financial intelligence reaching the finance, home and external affairs ministries through the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the ministry of economic affairs, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) and the Customs. Even as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh vowed that the government would snap fund flow to terror groups, there is said to be little co-ordination or information-sharing among the financial intelligence agencies and the other ministries.

Then we have intelligence flowing in from the Narcotics Control Board (NCB) on the narcotics trade and its overlap with terror networks. Paramilitary forces like the BSF and the ITBP have their intelligence wings. There are also the state intelligence cells or special branches in each state police force.

There exist, therefore, many streams overflowing with material and information that need to be co-ordinated and processed — either to be kept at the background or to be acted upon.

Analysts & analysis

Two major bodies exist to collate and analyse this huge data bank — the NSA backed by its secretariat and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).

The JIC comprises officers from various intelligence agencies and so does the secretariat, headed by the NSA who is assisted by three deputy NSAs.

There is also a third body called the Multi-Agency Centre or MAC, which has representatives from all the agencies and is headed by the NSA.

After the terror attacks in Assam recently, a joint task force has been formed in the Northeast on the lines of a state-level multi-agency centre where all states in the region can co-ordinate among themselves.

There are two main kinds of intelligence inputs too — specific and actionable. These categorisations are made depending upon interpretation of information. But action on information also depends on speedy analysis and decision-making. It is here that both informers and action-taking bodies can be held accountable for failure to protect lives across the country, including Mumbai.

Information on a Pakistani threat through the sea route was available, as sources say, through September, October and November before the attacks shook Mumbai and the nation. Intelligence experts insist that if an intelligence input is received repeatedly, it needs to be treated as knowledge. “Even if it does not describe the colour of a terrorist’s clothes and the number of guns he is carrying,” says a retired IB chief. India does not have a “yellow, amber, red” rating in intelligence like the Americans and, as an IB operative said sarcastically: “Nor do we create incidents and information like the ISI.”

Whether the knowledge of a threat reached the Indian Navy brass is still a raging debate. The armed forces have argued that if the information was so critical and urgent, why did the agencies not go to the Prime Minister’s Office and complain? That, however, is part of the debate.

The fact that information existed is certain. It is also a fact that it was not considered knowledge despite repeated receipts of similar or identical inputs.

Chinks in armour

At the lowest level, the strength of assets is considered to be the major strength of any intelligence set-up. For India, which doesn’t have the luxury of huge budgets — the US spends $40 billion a year, for instance — the task is getting tougher every passing day. Besides, there are other drawbacks.

A major one is the low representation of minorities in intelligence units, something that hampers information gathering at the grassroots level. One of the reasons the terror attack in Ahmedabad was possible was that over the years Muslims had been weeded out of police special cells. This anomaly exists in varying degrees elsewhere too.

Co-ordination block

Fast processing of information and moving on it remain a huge problem. For instance, an input on a threat to Manipur will be sent by the IB to the RAW, JIC, NSA, home ministry, DG Assam Rifles, local police and home officials, perhaps even the foreign ministry since Myanmar is in the neighbourhood.

However, failures occur when decision-makers and analysts miss the point where information has translated into knowledge. That is when action is not taken and we hear accusations of lack of “specific intelligence”. Tragedy often follows.


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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby putnanja » 08 Dec 2008 06:39

RAW or half-done?

RAW or half-done?
Soumyajit Pattnaik, Hindustan Times
Email Author
Bhubaneswar, December 07, 2008
First Published: 23:02 IST(7/12/2008)
Last Updated: 23:29 IST(7/12/2008)

In the aftermath of 26/11, deputation rules for Indian Police Service (IPS) officers to serve in the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) have come under the scanner. RAW has its own Group A officers’ cadre, known as the Research & Analysis Service (RAS).

Officers directly recruited to RAS during the probation period learn at least one foreign language and undergo rigorous training in intelligence gathering techniques. They are also taught how to carry out operations in hostile conditions. More importantly, they learn how to lead a life in complete anonymity.

As intelligence agencies came under the scanner after 26/11, some RAS officers told Hindustan Times the agency ought to revert back to the old deputation rules prevalent till January 2007.

According to those rules, IPS officers serving in RAW after completing a deputation period of eight years had to leave their parent service and get absorbed into RAS if they wanted to continue with the intelligence agency. But in 2007, the MHA introduced a system of “permanent secondment” under which the IPS officers did not have to get absorbed into RAS any more. “Permanent secondment” refers to long-term deputation. RAS officers complained they got a raw deal with the introduction of the new system as the IPS officers “had the best of both worlds”.

The deputation policy notified by the MHA in 2000 said: “IPS officers will join the RAW, as per normal tenure of deputation. Before expiry of the normal tenure of deputation, the proposal for extension in deputation tenure for a period of 4 years will be moved by Secretary (Research) for approval of the government…. One year before the expiry of the second extension or when the officer becomes eligible for promotion to the rank of Director or Joint Secretary, whichever is earlier, subject to a minimum tenure of 8 years in RAW, he will be considered for absorption in RAS. If he is not recommended for absorption in RAS, he will be reverted back to his parent cadre after the extended tenure comes to an end.”

In January 2007, the absorption requirement was ended. The new policy said: “One year before expiry of the extension, the officer will be considered for induction on permanent secondment basis by a committee comprising of Cabinet Secretary, Home Secretary, Secretary (Personnel) and Secretary (Research).”

This policy further said: “An officer once inducted in the permanent secondment would continue in RAW and would not be repatriated to his/her parent cadre/state.”

It also said the “permanently seconded officers” can occupy 50 per cent of the posts in the rank of under secretary, deputy secretary and director in the deputation quota.

RAS officers complain this change has created two parallel cadres within RAW.

A senior IPS officer, who served in RAW and has returned to the state cadre, however told HT: “Getting absorbed into RAS was a deterrent for many to continue in RAW for long. But the new rules still provide many safeguards to repatriate officers to parent cadre/state in case their professional utilities decline. Thus the apprehensions of RAS officers are not correct.”


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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 08 Dec 2008 09:15

More on the SIM card fiasco:
[url]Link[/url]
J&K cops had told central agencies of SIM card operation 3 months ago
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Srinagar: Jammu and Kashmir Police had informed central agencies about their operation of planting 22 SIM cards in Lashkar-e-Toiba ranks three months ago. They had also passed on the numbers of the mobile phones and information on the Lashkar’s plan to carry out a major strike outside Jammu and Kashmir.

The startling revelation adds another example to the many instances of specific alerts leading up to the attack on Mumbai last month not having been acted upon. The Sunday Express had reported that Mukhtar Ahmad, a Jammu and Kashmir Police constable arrested by the Kolkata Police in New Delhi in connection with the attacks, was actually on an undercover mission to infiltrate the Lashkar.

Ahmad’s arrest has reduced the country’s most experienced counter-terrorism police force to a state of shock. “This arrest has compromised all our undercover work,” a senior officer told The Indian Express. “Ahmad was staying with Sub-Inspector Latief Ahmad, and both were arrested,” a J&K police officer privy to the operation said. “They showed their movement orders and begged to be allowed to speak to the superiors of the raiding party, but the raiding party didn’t agree. Ahmad was handcuffed and paraded like a criminal. The proper procedure would have been to enquire from our superiors and check the antecedents of our man before arresting him.” :x :x


J&K Police officers complain other states are not keen to utilise the former’s anti-terrorism expertise in their investigations. “We have been trying to create trans-state linkages to help prevent attacks like the one in Mumbai. We know Lashkar and other militant groups better than anyone else, and we have been saying we are ready to chip in. But other states prefer to go solo,” the officer said.

There is a feeling that steps like setting up new NSG hubs aim only to cure, not prevent. “The need is to stop terrorists in their tracks. Better intelligence alone can help. The priority should be to put in place mechanisms so that we pe-empt a Terror strike and not prepare for combat once they have already attacked,” the officer said.

Absolutely shocking stuff!!!

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Manas » 08 Dec 2008 09:59

Exploits of some top chefs from the Culinary Institute of America in India's neighborhood.

From the The Shadow Factory, James Bamford, Pg 155

The DO's chunk of the budget inside the CIA is now bigger than the entire CIA budget was when Bush came to office. :shock: Nobody can tell you [whether] what youre getting is any good or not. They are paying so much money to third-party countries for stuff, its incredible. I dont think anybody even knows, really, how much money we are giving Pakistan. :evil:


Pg 157
Their job was to collect intelligence. But this is what was happening - you would go into this village and you would have ten or fifteen people come up to you and go, "I know where bin Laden is.". So you give them a hundred bucks and you never see them again. The informants were also given a handheld GPS to pinpoint exact locations. The GPS was to be taken to wherever bin Laden was, and they would write down the latitude and longitude. And so a lot of cable traffic has come and gone based on all of this information, from all of these people who come in and say they know where bin Laden is. :eek:

And of course, they dont - they want the money. Or if someone does in all good faith, they only heard it through a cousin who heard it from their cousin who heard it from a cousin who heard it from a cousin. :rotfl: It is so inffective, I am not saying that that's not the right way to go about it, but what I am saying is it is not working....


Wonder how many of these GPS units have trickled down to terrorits groups attacking India. Perhaps some may have been used in the recent attacks against Mumbai.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Arya Sumantra » 08 Dec 2008 15:00

PMO uses Googlemail :shock: Image

http://infotech.indiatimes.com/News/Chi ... 808513.cms

Chinese hack PMO’s mail
8 Dec, 2008, 1434 hrs IST,TNN

NEW DELHI: Officials in the PMO have been asked not to use Google mail for official communication in view of Chinese hackers having broken into the PMO’s internal networking systems recently. which country's PMO relies on gmail for official communications?

The news of cyber spying on PMO communications by the Chinese comes close on the heels of hackers, also from China, having gained access to the ministry of external affairs’ internal communications network. Similar cyber attacks were also reported at National Informatics Centre (NIC) suspectedly aimed at the National Security Council.

The hackers, by breaking into the communication networks of officialdom, gain access to emails through which officials communicate policy and decisions to other ministries and arms of the government. Mostly found to be mounted from dial-up internet connections in China, at least 3-4 attacks are reported everyday on Indian servers.

The NIC is said to have also traced the IP addresses used to hack into PMO communication networks to China. The hackers had basically targeted email communications using Google mail, or Gmail.

Based on the findings, the PMO has sent across instructions to all its officers and staff to desist from using Google mail for sending of receiving official communication. The exposure of official communications within the PMO to hackers has raised a question mark on security of cyber systems used by the government for internal confabulations and policy making.

Though key communications within the government are encrypted and secure, the Chinese hackers appeared to have exploited the alleged security loopholes and are using programmes and designing software that can decrypt the system and bypass the security systems installed.

The cyber assault has the Indian security agencies worried, as it exposes India’s official networks to constant scanning and mapping by the Chinese.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby svinayak » 08 Dec 2008 15:18

India has a incompetent govt

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby shyamd » 08 Dec 2008 18:03

Arya Sumantra wrote:PMO uses Googlemail :shock: Image

http://infotech.indiatimes.com/News/Chi ... 808513.cms

Chinese hack PMO’s mail
8 Dec, 2008, 1434 hrs IST,TNN


shyamd wrote:Folks, there is a possibility of another cyber intelligence organisation will be created in India. This time to protect's critical national infrastructure. This is due to frequent hacking attacks from the 3rd dept of PLA. In april, hackers got into the MEA databases and the comms(possibility the PM comms system or system where instructions are given to consulates abroad, it is definetly comms system related to the national security system though) system. Following the attacks, NTRO conducted an audit on vulnerabilities of the system. The audit will be public soon, and will recommend that the new service, will be staffed from various agencies. NTRO, Army cyber command and Economic intelligece department.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 08 Dec 2008 20:58

Hi shyamd,
Despite all the negative press about the agencies, RAW does seem to have a decent TECHINT capability(reports of multiple intercepts seem to indicate so). You had mentioned some time back that RAW is almost kaput and depends on openource for most info and has outdated TECHINT gadgets with new ones being denied by western countries. If this is the case, how did RAW perform decent job on the TECHINT front atleast (HUMINT seems to be a definite problem since no report mentions anything about human agents reporting leads)? Is it that we have managed to procure the required gadgets or is it that US agencies helped us out and RAW is taking credit for all the taps, intercepts etc?

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby shyamd » 08 Dec 2008 21:24

sum wrote:Hi shyamd,
Despite all the negative press about the agencies, RAW does seem to have a decent TECHINT capability(reports of multiple intercepts seem to indicate so). You had mentioned some time back that RAW is almost kaput and depends on openource for most info and has outdated TECHINT gadgets with new ones being denied by western countries. If this is the case, how did RAW perform decent job on the TECHINT front atleast (HUMINT seems to be a definite problem since no report mentions anything about human agents reporting leads)? Is it that we have managed to procure the required gadgets or is it that US agencies helped us out and RAW is taking credit for all the taps, intercepts etc?

Hi Sum, I think after 2007 period, there was a big step up in the interception capability, I did mention that before. It contributed to numerous arrests within the Lashkar network in J&K. However, India records every call that is made from India across the border. Most of the calls are using ordinary sim cards and satellite phones, Ordinary mobile calls could be monitored before. SAT call interception eqpt came late 2006/7, which improved capabilities. Some of the TECHINT that India had was complemented with inputs from the US. India has code breaking eqpt but they are old. They may have been updated in the last 2 - 3 years. India is not monitoring all the Thuraya satellites, but the US is monitoring all of it.

India's weak link was VoIP (incidentally the terrorists were using this in the Mumbai attack I believe, it was this intel that was given to India I think by the US). VoIP interception is something that is relatively new, there was a seminar earlier this year or late last year with Ruskies and frenchies comparing their voip interception techniques.

The problem now is that India relies mainly on TECHINT and next to no HUMINT. If India ever needed to get some information they will write cheques (Very similar to Saudi intel) and bring whoever to Dubai or whereever. India is also reliant on foreign liaison.

The problem with TECHINT is that most of the others(people with SIGINT stations and the ECHELON network) are probably receiving the same info anyway. So, the info India reports is probably already known.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 08 Dec 2008 21:31

Hi Sum, I think after 2007 period, there was a big step up in the interception capability, I did mention that before. It contributed to numerous arrests within the Lashkar network in J&K. However, India records every call that is made from India across the border. Most of the calls are using ordinary sim cards and satellite phones, Ordinary mobile calls could be monitored before. SAT call interception eqpt came late 2006/7, which improved capabilities. Some of the TECHINT that India had was complemented with inputs from the US. India has code breaking eqpt but they are old. They may have been updated in the last 2 - 3 years. India is not monitoring all the Thuraya satellites, but the US is monitoring all of it.

Reassuring stuff..

So, there has been no local technological inputs(DRDO etc) and all the improvements are only because of the goodness of the western agencies? Thats a worrying situation. Also, do we have the capability to break codes which we intercept or is even that outsourced to the great Amir-khans?

The problem now is that India relies mainly on TECHINT and next to no HUMINT.

Shocking would an understatement.We should have expected better given the massive diaspora all over the globe and the massive IM population living in the gulf should have meant no shortage of HUMINT. It would be every intel agencies dream to have a diaspora as vast as the Indian one and its a shame that we are unable to exploit even 0.01% of it. Is it because of the distrust of IMs towards their own agency or is it that the RAW doesnt trust the IMs(esp in the gulf)?
Last edited by sum on 08 Dec 2008 21:35, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby anupmisra » 08 Dec 2008 21:35

Image

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby ramana » 08 Dec 2008 21:40

Teh graphic in the Telegraph article is simplistic and does not convey the true picture. The text fillsin the blanks. Can some one use the text and create a better network graphic. One obvious thing is the NSA being single point of contact to may agencies and thus cause for failure.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby anupmisra » 08 Dec 2008 22:01

shyamd wrote:
Arya Sumantra wrote:PMO uses Googlemail :shock: Image


The horror stories dont end here. The Private Secretay to the CM of Assam gave me his business card which had a Yahoo email address. A PS to the CM of a ultra-sensitive state like Assam!! An MP from Andhra gave me his business card with an email address of a private server. Listed on his official businss card!! Think of all the security violations that could take place if not already taking place. Go figure.

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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby Nikhil T » 08 Dec 2008 23:27

anupmisra wrote:
shyamd wrote:
Arya Sumantra wrote:PMO uses Googlemail :shock: Image


The horror stories dont end here. The Private Secretay to the CM of Assam gave me his business card which had a Yahoo email address. A PS to the CM of a ultra-sensitive state like Assam!! An MP from Andhra gave me his business card with an email address of a private server. Listed on his official businss card!! Think of all the security violations that could take place if not already taking place. Go figure.


God help this country. The more info we get out of these Intelligence discussions, the more skeletons tumble out of the closet. Its appalling to find the country's highest offices using Gmail to send policy papers to each other. How worse could it get? SPG might have a 100 crore budget to protect MMS but they cant spend a fraction of that to get TCS/Infy work on a dedicated encrypted Email server. The lack of concern, indifference and "yeh chalta hai" attitute is disgusting. I'm sure the Chinese hackers must be wondering if this country's policy papers/decisions are even worth all the effort they put in to hack the systems.

shyamd
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Postby shyamd » 08 Dec 2008 23:54

sum wrote:Reassuring stuff..

So, there has been no local technological inputs(DRDO etc) and all the improvements are only because of the goodness of the western agencies? Thats a worrying situation. Also, do we have the capability to break codes which we intercept or is even that outsourced to the great Amir-khans?

Unfortunately, I am not aware of any DRDO or indigenous efforts to create code breakers etc. Maybe Shri Abdul Kalam can help launch an effort, if someone wants to email him. RAW doesn't work that closely with Amir Khans.

Shocking would an understatement.We should have expected better given the massive diaspora all over the globe and the massive IM population living in the gulf should have meant no shortage of HUMINT. It would be every intel agencies dream to have a diaspora as vast as the Indian one and its a shame that we are unable to exploit even 0.01% of it. Is it because of the distrust of IMs towards their own agency or is it that the RAW doesnt trust the IMs(esp in the gulf)?

We should really be having tremendous influence in the Gulf region, but sadly, our intel or policy makers probably don't want to command influence in that region (Maybe they haven't thought about it). But such policy needs to come from the govt of the day, more than the intel officers themselves.

There is noo shortage of people in the ME that are well disposed to the GOI. Hell, IM's and Indians in general have soo much respect/power within certain ME nations. I have raised this before. In my last visit to the UAE, I heard about numerous hyderabadi and keralite IM's and their huge influence within the sheikhdoms.

I have heard the same from friends from Jeddah and places. Oman - posted info about the level of influence indians have there.

In short, there is a massive opportunity and a large number of individuals in the ME who could be utilised for HUMINT and info in general. The govt of the day has to set the policy, and intel officers would implement it. With an absence of policy, we can't blame the intel agencies themselves.


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