Discussion on Indian Special Forces

K Mehta · Post by **K Mehta** » 30 Dec 2008 13:10

to the above discussion,
kudos to the people involved for keeping the discussion quality high, please carry on. I atleast have learnt a few things from this discussion.

KiranM · Post by **KiranM** » 30 Dec 2008 15:05

RayC Sir, it has been a pleasure engaging in discussion with you.
I would like to know your opinion on the current Special Forces structure and their command & control, in all the 3 branches and where things can be better.

To the wider audience, personally I do favour a Joint Special Operations Command. However, India is not doing bad without one either. Case in point being Navy MARCOs operating around Wular lake along with Army. Also many people favouring the US model of forces integration, theirs' is a top down approach - starting from Chiefs of Staff. In India I see a bottoms up approach, more effective though very slow I might add. Hence, we have to be patient for a CDS, JSOC, etc. Like the point I highlighted above, more than any executive order to integrate, I think it is the old boys' network that can and will sustain true integration between forces.

On a side note, I think SF, especially Army Para Cdos and Navy MARCOs, need to work under operational control of their respective service intelligence. I think an MI officer will better know how to effectively utilize SF in the cloak and dagger style operations. Similarly, interface NSG hit teams directly with IB counter terror cells. Would like to know your esteemed opinions.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 30 Dec 2008 15:47

RayC wrote:Somnath,

My apologies again.

This edit and quote buttons are too close.

I am going to appeal to the Mods to distance them!

again ?

vintage RayC !

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 30 Dec 2008 16:09

RayC Sir, you are a goldmine of useful info!

The School of Languages you are referring to is the one in JNU, right? RAW uses (or rather used to) extensively recruit from that school. Of late, there have been an big erosion in the availablity of launguage trained specialits, especially "translator quality" out there. Symptomatic of the general malaise in the system I guess. But even the CIA found out after 9/11 the same type of deficincies, they didnt have enough people with "relevant" language skills - arabic, dari etc..

I agree with you on our successes. I think in managing counter insurgency, we have a pretty good track record. Punjab, NE, Kashmir..But its about the taking the next level jump...the measuresthat are EXPECTED out of an emerging power..one which is aspiring for the next level..Needs doctrinal changes, more than jumping straight on to equipment discussions - I agree too much of the discussion in the media as well as in BRF are equipment related - but doctrinal changes requires thought processes that are different.

As an unrelated example, nuclear weapons and its doctrines are a widely studied area - with tons of literature over the years. But after Pok II, it took many years for us to evolve a functional doctrine, and the "tooling and staffing" of thatis still work in progress. This after the nation for once deployed the right architecture to evolve a doctrine and political will to back it up. If we dont do the same for special ops, which is a here and now requirement, we would be too late! and keep bleeding..

KiranM, most intel agencies have "in house" special ops forces - KGB used the run the dreaded Alpha troops, CIA has its own special ops paramilitary, RAW has SFF. But no countryu leaves its full complement of SFs under an intel org - the risks of creating a huge frankenstein is too great!

vishal · Post by **vishal** » 30 Dec 2008 18:37

I didn't know this unit existed. Today's Mumbai Mirror has an article about them but I am unable to find the URL. Am posting a summary.

* Maharashtra Govt. plans to raise a commando unit on the lines of C-60.
* C-60 is a specialized anti-Naxal force and was raised 18 years ago.
* Operates in Gadchiroli district in Maharashtra.
* Strength is 350
* Trained by NSG, Greyhounds and experts from Central School for Weapons & Tactics.
* Trained at CIJWS, Mizoram.
* Drawn from tribal areas of the district which is Naxal infested.
* Trained to be jungle warriors.
* Name is drawn from first batch of 60 commandos.
* Said to be primarily responsible for low Naxal activity in the area.
* Photo shows the men carrying AK-47s and SLRs.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 30 Dec 2008 18:49

* Maharashtra Govt. plans to raise a commando unit on the lines of C-60.
* C-60 is a specialized anti-Naxal force and was raised 18 years ago.
* Operates in Gadchiroli district in Maharashtra.
* Strength is 350
* Trained by NSG, Greyhounds and experts from Central School for Weapons & Tactics.
* Trained at CIJWS, Mizoram.
* Drawn from tribal areas of the district which is Naxal infested.
* Trained to be jungle warriors.
* Name is drawn from first batch of 60 commandos.
* Said to be primarily responsible for low Naxal activity in the area.
* Photo shows the men carrying AK-47s and SLRs.

Hope this is not a usual knee jerk reaction, liable to dissipate itself in course of time. I remember a few years ago Mumbai Police had raised a "commando unit" - the guys were clad in black outfits, and used to move about in 125 cc Hero Honda bikes. But no one knew what their role was, there were complaints of misuse by senior officers, and the unit was disbanded. The city police needs to know how to use a SWAT team, train and "preserve" it. Not let it become a VIP security unit.

sum · Post by **sum** » 30 Dec 2008 18:56

The force is(to be) apparently called Force-one...

Rishi · Post by **Rishi** » 30 Dec 2008 19:05

vishal wrote:I didn't know this unit existed. Today's Mumbai Mirror has an article about them but I am unable to find the URL. Am posting a summary.

* Maharashtra Govt. plans to raise a commando unit on the lines of C-60.
* C-60 is a specialized anti-Naxal force and was raised 18 years ago.
* Operates in Gadchiroli district in Maharashtra.
* Strength is 350
* Trained by NSG, Greyhounds and experts from Central School for Weapons & Tactics.
* Trained at CIJWS, Mizoram.
* Drawn from tribal areas of the district which is Naxal infested.
* Trained to be jungle warriors.
* Name is drawn from first batch of 60 commandos.
* Said to be primarily responsible for low Naxal activity in the area.
* Photo shows the men carrying AK-47s and SLRs.

The C-60 is a commando force drawn from the tribal hinterland to combat Naxalites. It is an elite group, tough, skilled, trained and fearless. It was formed in Gadchiroli by K P Raghuvanshi - now ATS chief in Mumbai - in 1991. It was later withdrawn. Started again in 1999, this force of tribal young men inspired as much by a sense of mission or - as in the case of the Arka brothers personal loss and vendetta.

http://www.hvk.org/articles/0907/46.html

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 30 Dec 2008 19:28

The requirements of an anti naxal force is very different from a SWAT team. The main adversaries for an anti-Naxal force are local knowldege, intel, sypathetic local populace. Therefore the idea would be to create substantial "assets" within the affected districts and gain confidence of the populace, set up a large HUMINT network etc. While a measure of jungle survival training is required, the opposing Naxals are not a highly trained force set upon martyrdom. Intel and basic police capacity are the two big factors in naxal ops.

HRT on the other hand would be more techinical, requiring a much higher level of training sophisticaction, trained hostage negotiators, and generally superior equipment.

Most of the times our netas and police honchos think that creating a "commando" force is the answer to an insurgency problem. Unfortunately it is not. Insurgencies are tackled by creating basic policing capacities. The big example is Punjab. The insurgency was won when the Punjab Police drastically increased its capacities, both in terms of quality and quantity - put boots on the ground in the villages and dominated the areas day and night, and created enough confidence to generate intel about the terrorists from the locals. Supplemented by a superb HUMINT operation that should be a textbook case for intel against insurgencies - much underappreciated. Punjab did not get over the insurgency by creating a Rambo squad.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 30 Dec 2008 20:22

Rishi, some of these paramil/police commando type forces are pretty interesting and competent in what they do.
could you rustle up something to fit a page or a two for BR mainsite ? I'm sure jagan/big boss will be more than happy to host it. btw, is there enough information available for such a report ?
thanks.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 30 Dec 2008 21:17

KiranM wrote:RayC Sir, it has been a pleasure engaging in discussion with you.
I would like to know your opinion on the current Special Forces structure and their command & control, in all the 3 branches and where things can be better.

To the wider audience, personally I do favour a Joint Special Operations Command. However, India is not doing bad without one either. Case in point being Navy MARCOs operating around Wular lake along with Army. Also many people favouring the US model of forces integration, theirs' is a top down approach - starting from Chiefs of Staff. In India I see a bottoms up approach, more effective though very slow I might add. Hence, we have to be patient for a CDS, JSOC, etc. Like the point I highlighted above, more than any executive order to integrate, I think it is the old boys' network that can and will sustain true integration between forces.

On a side note, I think SF, especially Army Para Cdos and Navy MARCOs, need to work under operational control of their respective service intelligence. I think an MI officer will better know how to effectively utilize SF in the cloak and dagger style operations. Similarly, interface NSG hit teams directly with IB counter terror cells. Would like to know your esteemed opinions.

There are many reasons why the SF is not what it should be.

The CDS is still finding its niche, even though it is far better than before. If they are still shaky, I reckon the SF is going the same way. SF is not cloak and dagger. It is quite upfront and can get the nub of an issue if released. Now, the issue is who is going to release them?

I would rather have military organisation far away from the intelligence agencies.

I am totally against interpolating US ways to Indian situations. I can assure you that contrary to the popular opinion, the Indian brass is quite capable. Some, I will concede, were born under a lucky star!

kit · Post by **kit** » 30 Dec 2008 21:26

RAW has some 'special forces' assigned to it., i mean are they taken from IA commando groups or is it entirely a separate entity.Used to wonder where they get to kick a**. Any open source literature on their activities?

found it :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Frontier_Force
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/wo ... ia/raw.htm

hmmmmmm ...

Published reports allege that as many as 35,000 RAW agents have entered Pakistan between 1983-93, with 12,000 are working in Sindh, 10000 in Punjab 8000 in North West Frontier Province and 5000 in Balochistan. As many as 40 terrorist training camps at Rajasthan, East Punjab, Held Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh and other parts of India are run by the RAW's Special Service Bureau (SSB).

all this dated info i think.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 30 Dec 2008 21:34

R&AW controls some units of SFF.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 30 Dec 2008 21:41

somnath wrote:RayC Sir, you are a goldmine of useful info!

The School of Languages you are referring to is the one in JNU, right? RAW uses (or rather used to) extensively recruit from that school. Of late, there have been an big erosion in the availablity of launguage trained specialits, especially "translator quality" out there. Symptomatic of the general malaise in the system I guess. But even the CIA found out after 9/11 the same type of deficincies, they didnt have enough people with "relevant" language skills - arabic, dari etc..

I agree with you on our successes. I think in managing counter insurgency, we have a pretty good track record. Punjab, NE, Kashmir..But its about the taking the next level jump...the measuresthat are EXPECTED out of an emerging power..one which is aspiring for the next level..Needs doctrinal changes, more than jumping straight on to equipment discussions - I agree too much of the discussion in the media as well as in BRF are equipment related - but doctrinal changes requires thought processes that are different.

As an unrelated example, nuclear weapons and its doctrines are a widely studied area - with tons of literature over the years. But after Pok II, it took many years for us to evolve a functional doctrine, and the "tooling and staffing" of thatis still work in progress. This after the nation for once deployed the right architecture to evolve a doctrine and political will to back it up. If we dont do the same for special ops, which is a here and now requirement, we would be too late! and keep bleeding..

KiranM, most intel agencies have "in house" special ops forces - KGB used the run the dreaded Alpha troops, CIA has its own special ops paramilitary, RAW has SFF. But no countryu leaves its full complement of SFs under an intel org - the risks of creating a huge frankenstein is too great!

As Rahul says I am vintage. But then a vintage wine is rare!

If indeed the School of Foreign Language is foundering, then it is a sad commentary. I was selected for French but owing to exigencies I could not attend. I learnt German on my own. There is no doubt that we should learn languages, more so, the ones of our neighbourhood and the areas where we have insurgencies. The unfortunate part is with disuse, we forget the language. I was fluent in Marathi, my regimental language, but now though I understand, I struggle for words!

As far as equipment is concerned, like the excited enthusiasts of foreign military glossies, who feel that the western military glossies are the last word, the Arjun GSQR team I presume were replicating the BRF enthusiasts. Now, we have a white elephant!! To have a weapon system, one has to understand the current environment and the future of at least 20 years hence. There is no idea of 'time pass' and have something 'intelligent' and let the other poor man, who has no wherewithal in expertise or industrial infrastructure to deliver. We want to be a first class Army with a second class infrastructure!

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 31 Dec 2008 06:49

If indeed the School of Foreign Language is foundering, then it is a sad commentary

The school isnt, but its RAW that has fallen upon "worse" days, with internecine squabbles between the RAS and IPS lobbies. there was a time they used to recruit heavily from the school of foreign languages, also selectvely from IIT D - not so much anymore. Too busy fighting turf wars!

As far as equipment is concerned, like the excited enthusiasts of foreign military glossies, who feel that the western military glossies are the last word, the Arjun GSQR team I presume were replicating the BRF enthusiasts. Now, we have a white elephant!! To have a weapon system, one has to understand the current environment and the future of at least 20 years hence. There is no idea of 'time pass' and have something 'intelligent' and let the other poor man, who has no wherewithal in expertise or industrial infrastructure to deliver. We want to be a first class Army with a second class infrastructure!

I agree with you completely, though your example (of Arjun) is a bit of a red herring I must say. A lot of army officers I have spoken to have spoken highly of the tank, including ex COAS Gen Roychoudhury, but somehow it kept getting mired in politics all the time!

As many as 40 terrorist training camps at Rajasthan, East Punjab, Held Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh and other parts of India are run by the RAW's Special Service Bureau (SSB).

Kit, SSB is a "border security forcec", underr the home ministry - tasked on the Nepal border. Its not a "special force" in that sense.

sum · Post by **sum** » 31 Dec 2008 08:03

Kit, SSB is a "border security forcec", underr the home ministry - tasked on the Nepal border. Its not a "special force" in that sense.

SSB was a "special force" (conceived as a behind enemy line saboteur force in case Chinese took over the NE). Its only recently that its been turned into a "normal" paramil...

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 31 Dec 2008 08:13

Kit, SSB is a "border security forcec", underr the home ministry - tasked on the Nepal border. Its not a "special force" in that sense.

You are right - it was called the Secret Service Bureau.. But dont think it was even then under the operational command of RAW...Now its called Sashastra Seema Bal! We are good with acronyms one must say

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 31 Dec 2008 08:16

It was Special Services Bureau - not secret service

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 31 Dec 2008 10:12

I have spoken to have spoken highly of the tank, including ex COAS Gen Roychoudhury

As the ex Chief what did you expect him to say?

I also say technological it is picture perfect.

Why did the Chiefs who have come not induct the tank?

Honestly, one really does not know the reason.

What politics has he told you is afoot?

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 31 Dec 2008 10:13

http://indiatoday.digitaltoday.in/index ... 6&Itemid=1

Not specific to special forces, more to the intel thread. But once piece of info that we were discussing - on language skills, the aarticle again mentions the dearth of language trained manpower in the intel setup. RayC, the Army should be stepping up to provide language trained personnel!

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 31 Dec 2008 10:19

As the ex Chief what did you expect him to say?

I also say technological it is picture perfect.

Why did the Chiefs who have come not induct the tank?

Honestly, one really does not know the reason.

What politics has he told you is afoot?

well, given what a number of other senior officers have been saying about the tank, dont think he was under any "obligation" to defend it! In fact the Army has been quite openly trashing the tank! I ws quite surprised by his appreciation of the tank! And I did ask him why he didnt push for wide scale acquisition. His answer was more in terms of "we are still working out the bugs"..this was 1999...seems the army is still working out the bugs!!

The point on politics was my input, not his.

Some of the methods being adopted to junk Arjun, while almost touchingly keeping faith in T90 seem quite strange sometimes.

But dont get me wrong, I think the debate on an MBT has been another of thoese misinformed ones. No one quite knows whether there was a GSQR, and when did the GSQRs change and so on - but I think a large part of the misinformation is also from the IA itself!

But the point is completely aside.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 31 Dec 2008 10:34

somnath wrote:http://indiatoday.digitaltoday.in/index ... 6&Itemid=1

Not specific to special forces, more to the intel thread. But once piece of info that we were discussing - on language skills, the aarticle again mentions the dearth of language trained manpower in the intel setup. RayC, the Army should be stepping up to provide language trained personnel!

It is not that easy as it appears.

With modernisation, new weapons systems and other reasons, there are too many courses that a unit has to subscribe to. This keeps a sizeable manpower on these courses.

While on one hand, honing of specific skills is done, under experts at schools of instruction, the problem is that with critical and sizeable manpower being away from the unit, the cohesiveness of a sub unit suffers, especially the training as a sub unit or a unit. A sub unit or a unit has to train as a single and cohesive entity (as far as feasible) so that each person fits into the team and all know each other’s capability and how each will support the other in performing a specific task.

Therefore, while it is good that the maximum manpower imbibes skills are taught at specialised schools of instruction, the raison d’etre of a unit i.e. fight as a unit suffers to some extent.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 31 Dec 2008 10:46

His answer was more in terms of "we are still working out the bugs"..this was 1999...seems the army is still working out the bugs!!

Copybook answer.

It reminds me of a student asking where should the Company Commander be in the Order of March.

The copybook answer was - He should be as far forward as to be able to influence to the battle, but not to forward so as to get embroiled in battle!!!!

So, tell me where he should be?

Then there was this classic - 'spatio-temporal environment' for 'time and space'!

With MBA being the flavour of the time, a whole lot of management terms are creeping in to add to the confusion. Imagine Commanders are sometimes called Managers! Unfortunately, (and I am aware that this may raise a hornets nest) a Commander is a Leader and not a Manager. There is a great difference between a Leader and a Manager!

The main difference (as I see it) between managers and leaders is the way they motivate the people who work or follow them, and this sets the tone for most other aspects of what they do.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 31 Dec 2008 14:05

Unfortunately, (and I am aware that this may raise a hornets nest) a Commander is a Leader and not a Manager. There is a great difference between a Leader and a Manager

Agree 200% - very few managers become leaders...But then again, as a lot of people say, leader are not made, they are born! How do you get so many "leaders" for a million man army?!

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 31 Dec 2008 14:19

somnath wrote:
Unfortunately, (and I am aware that this may raise a hornets nest) a Commander is a Leader and not a Manager. There is a great difference between a Leader and a Manager
Agree 200% - very few managers become leaders...But then again, as a lot of people say, leader are not made, they are born! How do you get so many "leaders" for a million man army?!

People may say that leaders are born, I disagree.

Look at the Army wives. They, being married to Army officers, have to participate in the Welfare meets and help to lift the lot of the jawans' families. They are not paid for it. It is the ethos that encourages them to do so. That is how leadership operates - that we are ONE FAMILY! Obviously, if one cares for one's family, the man is grateful and will give that extra bit.

When my orderly was killed in a CI operation (and he was in an RR unit and not really connected with us as such), my wife sent his wife some financial assistance, even though the govt would recompense, which we could never equal. It is not the money. It is the feeling, as Marlon Brando said - We are the Family!! Powerful. I am retired but they still contact us to know how we are doing and our children as we also contact them with the same queries. We are the Family and proud of it too! That is what is Leadership all about!!

Not money, perquisites, ego, rank or whatever. What is important is that whatever be your status in the organisation, never forget that we are a FAMILY!!

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 02 Jan 2009 11:00

Interesting, the Isarelies are setting up a Special Ops command, slightly old news though:

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsf/a ... 70416.aspx

KiranM · Post by **KiranM** » 02 Jan 2009 15:36

RayC wrote:
KiranM wrote:RayC Sir, it has been a pleasure engaging in discussion with you.
I would like to know your opinion on the current Special Forces structure and their command & control, in all the 3 branches and where things can be better.

To the wider audience, personally I do favour a Joint Special Operations Command. However, India is not doing bad without one either. Case in point being Navy MARCOs operating around Wular lake along with Army. Also many people favouring the US model of forces integration, theirs' is a top down approach - starting from Chiefs of Staff. In India I see a bottoms up approach, more effective though very slow I might add. Hence, we have to be patient for a CDS, JSOC, etc. Like the point I highlighted above, more than any executive order to integrate, I think it is the old boys' network that can and will sustain true integration between forces.

On a side note, I think SF, especially Army Para Cdos and Navy MARCOs, need to work under operational control of their respective service intelligence. I think an MI officer will better know how to effectively utilize SF in the cloak and dagger style operations. Similarly, interface NSG hit teams directly with IB counter terror cells. Would like to know your esteemed opinions.
There are many reasons why the SF is not what it should be.

Sir, what are some of those reasons, if they can be discussed publicly?

RayC wrote: The CDS is still finding its niche, even though it is far better than before. If they are still shaky, I reckon the SF is going the same way. SF is not cloak and dagger. It is quite upfront and can get the nub of an issue if released. Now, the issue is who is going to release them?

I would rather have military organisation far away from the intelligence agencies.

I was referring to SF operating with service intelligence units. Para Cdos with Army Intelligence Corps, MARCOs with Naval Intelligence and NSG with IB. Any reasons you think to the contrary?

RayC wrote: I am totally against interpolating US ways to Indian situations. I can assure you that contrary to the popular opinion, the Indian brass is quite capable. Some, I will concede, were born under a lucky star!

And about the capable Indian Brass. Few nuggets of related info will be more inspiring to us than Hollywood movies or other assorted Western media about US command structure

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 03 Jan 2009 14:57

KiranM wrote:
RayC wrote: There are many reasons why the SF is not what it should be.
Sir, what are some of those reasons, if they can be discussed publicly?

RayC wrote: The CDS is still finding its niche, even though it is far better than before. If they are still shaky, I reckon the SF is going the same way. SF is not cloak and dagger. It is quite upfront and can get the nub of an issue if released. Now, the issue is who is going to release them?

I would rather have military organisation far away from the intelligence agencies.
I was referring to SF operating with service intelligence units. Para Cdos with Army Intelligence Corps, MARCOs with Naval Intelligence and NSG with IB. Any reasons you think to the contrary?

RayC wrote: I am totally against interpolating US ways to Indian situations. I can assure you that contrary to the popular opinion, the Indian brass is quite capable. Some, I will concede, were born under a lucky star!
And about the capable Indian Brass. Few nuggets of related info will be more inspiring to us than Hollywood movies or other assorted Western media about US command structure

KiranM,

Everything in life could be better and of that there is no doubt.

SF too has a bureaucratic lethargy that is not letting it ‘loose’. But let us be frank, there has to be a political will to allow it role. But then, I am sure there serious impediments that with the political powers that be from letting them ‘loose’. It is easy for us to rave and rant, but then uneasy like the head that wears the Crown!

While quite a few are laudatory about the US way of functioning, I regretfully concede, I am not. They are over hyped, in my opinion. More bluster and hyperbole and drama that catches the eye!

I don’t think bottom up or top down is the problem. It is just that the NDA concept is on the backburner. With independent entry, that camaraderie is gone. Let’s be frank, if I have trained with a person and faced the rigours together even if we were from different services, it will surely whittle down the differences when approaching a joint task, without totally compromising our service’s interest?

People may like things to be antiseptic and egalitarian, just to appear PC, but in real life, old boy network works!

The SF is to work based on intelligence, but used by the Army, charged with a political mandate, to forward a military requirement.

The RAW is capable of executing political mandates without the involvement of the military and its organisations! And I daresay they are failing the Nation!

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 03 Jan 2009 15:12

KiranM,

No military special ops force is made a part of the intel setup. The chances of cockups are too great, and risks of "misadventures" are too great. Intel and special ops are strategic options to be taken by the political executive. Merging them can raise great problems. Take a simple case. If RAW detects an LET camp somewhere close to the LoC, and suppose the 9 Para (SF) is under its operational control. An "Aggressive" Joint Secretary (operations) may ask the SF to go in. The govt on the other hand might have other political objectives that preclude the option.

This is the reeason all intel agencies wordwide have very limited special forces capablities. The final call on operations lies with the political executive.

KiranM · Post by **KiranM** » 03 Jan 2009 19:36

RayC Sir and Somnath. You are still not getting what I am saying. I am not talking of putting SF under RAW's control. I am talking of SF working with Service intelligence. Please read my previous post carefully. And I am not talking about Army Intelligence controlling SF completely. I am talking of something like, say an SF team has a mandate to operate in Kashmir in a given area. An Army Intelligence Corps officer is assigned to that team so that there is faster flow of operational intelligence to the shooters than through the regular chain of command down to top the Army Intelligence hierarchy, hand over to operations and then top to down to the SF team. And Army Intelligence deals with tactical intelligence aint they?

Sandipan · Post by **Sandipan** » 03 Jan 2009 20:11

All this intelligence problems we seem to have due to lack of a single intelligence unit. We have multitude of different agencies working cross purposes. Isnt it the right time to bring all under a single umbrella reporting to one hierarchy. There is a feeling among the masses, that we have everything with defence forces who are well trained and professional, intelligence agencies who have decades of experience but when it comes to crunch, everything seems to fall apart. We see total chaos on the streets after a tragedy, nobody seems to be in charge.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 04 Jan 2009 11:50

kit wrote:Published reports allege that as many as 35,000 RAW agents have entered Pakistan between 1983-93, with 12,000 are working in Sindh, 10000 in Punjab 8000 in North West Frontier Province and 5000 in Balochistan. As many as 40 terrorist training camps at Rajasthan, East Punjab, Held Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh and other parts of India are run by the RAW's Special Service Bureau (SSB).

This is quoted from a Pakistani book on RAW. It is inaccurate or incorrect facts.

SSB used to be under RAW but is now an independent border management agency renamed to Sashastra Seema Bal.

SFF functions under ARC.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 04 Jan 2009 12:21

KiranM wrote:RayC Sir and Somnath. You are still not getting what I am saying. I am not talking of putting SF under RAW's control. I am talking of SF working with Service intelligence. Please read my previous post carefully. And I am not talking about Army Intelligence controlling SF completely. I am talking of something like, say an SF team has a mandate to operate in Kashmir in a given area. An Army Intelligence Corps officer is assigned to that team so that there is faster flow of operational intelligence to the shooters than through the regular chain of command down to top the Army Intelligence hierarchy, hand over to operations and then top to down to the SF team. And Army Intelligence deals with tactical intelligence aint they?

Kiran,

I hope I have understood your drift.

I am not privy to the govt policy for the employment of the SF and so I am going by international modes on the use of such Forces.

I presume by Kashmir, you mean POK.

As far the the psyche of the Indian govts so far one cannot give Carte Blanche to any unit.

Tasks that will be carried out by the SF have grave political and geopolitical ramifications and hence it will not only be a military decision, but more importantly, a political decision.

I reckon when the SF is used, it will be a deliberate decision and not in any 'free for all' mode. The task will be specific.

It must also be understood that the SF is not a one time use unit like the jihadis. Exfiltration and their security is also of paramount importance and therefore the highest form of coordination and monitoring is required.

KiranM · Post by **KiranM** » 04 Jan 2009 13:50

RayC sir.. I understand. What about when war is on and the SF are to be used for unconventional warfare in support of conventional forces? Then wont it be prudent to use SF with Defense intelligence? Say one of the missions is assassination of enemy military command hierarchy, or ISR of enemy nuclear assets and when required sabotage of the same. Since, such targets will be time variant, wont it make sense to have shorter path of information being acquired and acted upon? These are scenarios when the war has been declared. This will involve a political mandate as well. Just my 2 cents.

satya · Post by **satya** » 04 Jan 2009 15:59

There seems to be gross mis-understanding here about how Army units down to the lowest echelon say squad operates On ground they move & conduct their operation only after they are thoroughly briefed about the situation , about possible resistance to expect and type of buildings so on , point is this briefing is conducted by CC's staff having themselves received the info from Battalion HQ & they upwards , now pls tell me what these so called MI staff working say at Company level will help , can they produce a bunny rabbit out of their intelligence hat , no sir they can't so any of this. Talk of putting intelligence guys on ground is adding more manpower with absolute no increase in quality of intelligence that field units will be getting .Pls try to understand intelligence requires more of under-cover intel gathering and when u put these people in open with other army units, you are drying up their information sources ultimately leading to less flow of information . Another thing , KS led committee after Kargil War suggested battalion strength MI at Div. level echelon & for a moment do think why it was suggested & implemented and not for lower echelons before another bulb goes in one's brain and he says let's put MI guys with SF guys and create havoc with their organizational set up ( again do think why no SF unit on ground operates at more than 12 man squad ) .

SF is another defense unit whose purpose is to serve nation's interests except its specific for tailor made situations and tailor-made solutions implemented for same nothing else is special about them pls don't start about their training do check how many Officers make it to DSC , Wellington , they are not super humans nor their increase in nos will tilt the balance in one's favor .

Again as some suggest put MI/DIA in touch with SF units on ground , my point when SF unit is already on ground that means they have been sent for a specific target and they have been provided all the necessary information required & available from all sources to make this operation a success so what in the hell will this direct calling to MI section will make except create enough radio signals to make enemy suspicious ? And yes if SF unit on ground comes across resistance beyond what they been briefed about then they are trained to handle such situations( and do remember so are all other footsoldier units trained for such unexpected situations ) & in tht case our Intel guys can't do much , or should MI guys will act as complaint center to hear complaint from SF unit leader on not been told about this higher level of enemy resistance , will tht actually help the unit on ground in completing their mission & returning back safely ? Answer is big NO . All these issues are regularly taken up even by so called 'footsoldier' units who regularly debrief after an operation and lessons are learned and changes are made ( RR is one such shining example of such a process ) .

As for real time communication , there is signal unit operational and u don't again need MI guy to sit whole day to listen to all the talk .

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 04 Jan 2009 16:45

As a matter of fact most regular Army units hate to have intel guys around!

Satya is absolutely right, the fact that the SF has been sent in presupposes that there is "specific" intel already. Though I will take one issue out of this:

SF is another defense unit whose purpose is to serve nation's interests except its specific for tailor made situations and tailor-made solutions implemented for same nothing else is special about them pls don't start about their training do check how many Officers make it to DSC , Wellington , they are not super humans nor their increase in nos will tilt the balance in one's favor .

It is actually one of the problems with the entire SF organisation itself. No of officers getting into DSC is a function of how many "staff quality" officers are volunteering to the special forces in the first place. While I have no idea on the actual numbers, I reckon from your statement that they are low. Thats a problem with the way its strucctured today in my view. It probably doesnt get enough volunteers from the officer corps. In the US, members of the Special Ops command have gone on to be Chief of Army staff as well as Chairman, Joints Chiefs.

They are not super humans, far from it. But they are, in the "ideal" case scenario, they ought to be trained and equipped "specially". Especially in our strategic scenario.

And I agree with you, the solution is not increasing their numbers. Thats another of the really strange developments that have happened. We havent got a proper SF doctrine, havent really equipped any of the exising units well enough, but we are talking about having more numbers!

KiranM · Post by **KiranM** » 04 Jan 2009 17:59

Satya, please read my posts in the whole context. Nowhere did I say an MI officer should be assigned to each SF unit of 12 men. I am not saying any numbers. I just want to discuss if greater interface can yield dividends.

What I propose has precedents. The example that comes foremost to mind are the operations of Navy SEALs in mekong delta during the vietnam war. Each SEAL unit was assigned an officer from Naval Intelligence.
An SF unit might operate in an area for a long period of time. During that duration it will need specific details which may not stand the time taken for the information to flow from intel source -> up the MI hierarchy -> hand over to operations -> down the ops hierarchy. Again what I am saying applies only to SF who engage in high tempo operations. The best example of what I am trying to say is Israeli Sayeret Matkal. They organizationally report to Amman. Please refer wikipedia. I am not saying Israeli model will work for India. But their model does warrant a study if nothing else.

All the people working in MI need not be generating info from the ground. I am sure there are many people involved even in administrative and liaison work. All I am talking about is expanding the liaison in quantity. Not at the cost of generating intel.

@ somnath, There is always this wall between Intel and the shooters. I am very well aware of that. Regular Army units complain intel does not give required info at the right time. MI complains Regular units do not understand how info is got, and its something similar to playing chess in the dark (quoting this for lack of better metaphor) But in the kind of assymetric warfare that prevails world over, this very wall can cause impediments.

I am here only for meaningful discussion. And I am not catching at straws in the air. So please leave out snipes like

satya wrote:before another bulb goes in one's brain and he says let's put MI guys with SF guys and create havoc with their organizational set up

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 04 Jan 2009 19:13

kiranM,

I must say that operational approaches and doctrines drive what structure military units follow. There is never a "one solution". Therefore questions like whether an intel officer needs to be embedded with a Special Ops unit is very very operation/theatre specific.

As a general rule, intel outfits have a very small "spec forces" setup under them. No one would like to create a monolithic organisation that runs outside that of the political executive. Sayaret Matkal is one of the many special ops units Isarel operates, and its main mandate is actually intel gathering behind enemy lines. But Israel has MANY other special ops units, and now all of them, including Sayaret, is being consolidated under a special ops command.

In that fashion, even RAW has SFF, a "limited" special ops capability.

The Indian special forces are currently being sought to be utlised for largley very specific, "short duration" operations (like taking out militants from a hideout in Kashmir, or taking out a base in PoK etc). These types of ops necessitates a) precise intel, b) typically short duration and c) great deal of security and exfiltration.

The US Special Forces ops in Vietnam were much more open ended, requiring the forces to carry out intel gathering about the VC, psyops on villagers/villages, set up "show of strength bases" etc etc. And the special forces were in the "field" for long periods, years...That sort of approach maybe asked for presence of intel resources. But the US Special Ops Command reports directly to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs and are not under any intel setup.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 04 Jan 2009 19:45

somnath wrote:RahulM,
..........

somnath, you are sparring with the good kiranM and not my humble self !

please, no collateral damage in the course of your sniping activities,
regards.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 04 Jan 2009 21:16

Rahul M wrote:
somnath wrote:RahulM,
..........
somnath, you are sparring with the good kiranM and not my humble self !
please, no collateral damage in the course of your sniping activities,
regards.

Sorry, apologies..though I wasnt sniping at all...look to retain a more "strategic" approach!