Why India must be patient with its former ‘best enemy’ Pakistan
From The Times
January 9, 2009
Why India must be patient with its former ‘best enemy’ Pakistan
Bronwen Maddox, Chief Foreign Commentator
Unfortunately, the sudden dismissal of Pakistan’s national security chief is not a sign of progress in the tense talks with India over the Mumbai terror attacks. It is more a sign of the disarray of Pakistan’s Government.
That goes beyond personalities (although they are huge, and all too relevant). It goes to the heart of Pakistan’s Constitution, which never made clear enough whether the President or Prime Minister was in charge, and which has not recovered from its remodelling by former President Musharraf.
The Indian Government, now with apparently firm proof that the one captured gunman was Pakistani, can be excused fury and frustration at its counterpart’s slow-moving vagueness in response. India is entirely justified in calling on Pakistan to do more to crack down on Islamic militants and their sympathisers inside the security services, and to urge the US and others to pile on the pressure too.
But Islamabad’s lack of coherent response is better interpreted as deep dysfunction, not malice. It is easy (and right) for India to criticise; the harder question is how to help its neighbour, in the next few crucial years, to shut the door on the radicalism that is eroding the few solid pillars of the country.
Pakistan is not a failed state, but it is an unfinished country, with two long borders in dispute, an economy undeveloped because of the block on trade with its giant neighbour, and a Constitution tugged into tatters by the rival claims of presidents, prime ministers, army chiefs and judges.
Those points – the Afghan and Kashmir borders, trade and the most basic institutions – need urgent international attention. The US will play the most important role, and behind that, Britain. It would help if India threw its weight into the search for solutions too.
The best development since the attacks of November 26 has been the tacit determination of the Indian and Pakistani governments not to turn this into war. There has been restraint on the Indian side, and realism, not demanding that Islamabad guarantees an end to all terrorism when it obviously can’t. There have been professions of willingness to help from Pakistan’s President Zardari.
But clear signs point to the hand of Pakistani terror groups, particularly Lashkar-e-Taiba. After Islamabad admitted this week that Mohammed Ajmal Kasab, the captured gunman, had Pakistani nationality, Yousaf Gilani, the Prime Minister, dismissed Mehmood Ali Durrani as National Security Adviser. A rapid response, indicating that Pakistan was treating the matter seriously, you might think. But it is more indicative of Gilani’s desire to flex his muscles, in the scrappy battle with Zardari over who runs Pakistan. Durrani was a Zardari appointment, favoured because he had helped him and his late wife, Benazir Bhutto, to make contacts in the US. Gilani, it is said, felt that Durrani was not treating him with respect, not even going through the motions of keeping him informed.
Under Pakistan’s constitution, the Prime Minister is the executive. But the huge powers that Musharraf seized and bolted on to the presidency muddied a division of powers that was already much less clear cut than in countries that work well.
Zardari’s weakness, as an accidental President, stumbling into the role after the assassination of Bhutto in December 2007, has only fuelled the tussle. Ministerial meetings now happen only in response to one crisis after another; the rhythm of regular government has vanished.
The vacuum in Islamabad has led to incoherent responses to the Mumbai crisis, the President and Prime Minister apparently unaware or indifferent to the impact of a delay in responding. India should be credited for its patience. But the muddled, occasionally offensive signals from Islamabad are a symptom of the same problem as the attacks themselves: Pakistan’s own frozen development.
India wins against its rival on any competition you can devise, from wealth to health to military strength. India’s rise, and Pakistan’s slide, means that they have outgrown their old symmetrical stand-off, once dubbed “the best of enemies”. India needs to decide whether it will reconsider concessions it once found unthinkable, on trade, and even on international mediation on Kashmir.