FWIW. before we find a conspiracy or predict our own doomsday onlee.

know your enemies. pakistan or UPA. cast your vote.http://deccanherald.com/Content/Jan2120 ... 113738.asp The tough stand adopted by Union Home Minister P Chidambaram on Bangladeshi immigrants and his plain speaking against Pakistan have unsettled part of the ruling UPA dispensation.
Thanks Ramanaji.ramana wrote:JwalaMukhi, I ask you a question in return? What state do the vocal supporters of TSP belong to?
Let's maintain enough access so that our HUMINT doesn't dry up like in the 90s.
What should we do today? Look at what we did yesterday and do the same because we don't know any better today than we did yesterday
Senator/ President/ VP XYZ wants this sale to go through, because it means many jobs (meaning campaign funds) in his/her constituency
Let's do this, though it is crazy and stupid, so we sink this damn political appointee well and good.
because there is really no penalty for doing things that results in the death/dismemberment/rape/ other trauma of foreigners, esp. Third-Worlders. "Their" OWN governments (see GOI if u don't believe) don't care 2 hoots for those, so why should the US?Is this consistent with the Vision of the Founding Fathers and the Bill of Rights?
IndraD wrote:Pak warns US, says will review options if Obama not patient
"Pakistan hopes that Obama will be more patient while dealing with Pakistan. We will review all options, if Obama does not adopt a positive policy towards us," Pakistan's ambassador to the US Hussain Huqqani told Geo TV in Islamabad.
In lieu of $1.5 billion of non-military aid to Pakistan, Islamabad would be required to making concerted efforts to prevent al-Qaeda and associated terrorist groups from operating in its territory and make concerted efforts to prevent the Taliban from using its territory as a sanctuary to launch attacks within Afghanistan
Rahul admits to system failure on 26/11
21 Jan 2009, 0000 hrs IST, TNN
JAIPUR: In a frank remark that could churn a new controversy, Rahul Gandhi on Wednesday voiced what many in Mumbai had felt and said soon after the
terror attack on 26/11 began: That the system had failed.
Even as the nation prepares to honour on Republic Day with Ashok Chakras the fallen police officers in Mumbai who are hailed as heroes, the young Gandhi said, "A hero is only necessary when systems fail.''
At a meeting of top IPS officers from across the country, Rahul referred to sub-inspector Tukaram Ombale who took about half a a dozen bullets during the Mumbai massacre but managed to capture Ajmal Kasab alive.
"In my eyes, Mr Ombale is the hero. We gave him salary and a lathi but probably no training,'' Rahul said. Then elaborating with candour, uncharactersitic of politicians, he added, "We have given him practically nothing. But when he comes face to face with enemies of our country, he grabbed their gun and allowed us to capture one of them. He gets seven bullets in his stomach and he is gone.''
And ending on a poignant note, he said, "Now, after Ombale is dead, his grandson asks: 'Why did they shoot my dada?''
"We found Ombale because of circumstances but there are lots of other heroes, too, who also did a lot of things but we don't know them,'' Rahul added. "My concern is that our heroes should not die for no reason. These people need to be valued,'' he added.
The young Gandhi's comments at the conclave 'Police Performance and Public Perception' could act as a trigger to introduce overdue reforms in the system to better equip the forces against terror attacks.
But Rahul felt that the solution did not lie in just weapons or bullet-proof vests. The real problem, he said, lay in the fact that neither the government nor the citizenry value police. "We have to listen to what they have to say,'' he said.
Rahul also set the stage for ticket distribution in the forthcoming Lok Sabha polls, saying the party should take action against potential rebels who could harm the prospects of Congress right before the ticket distribution process.
He said one of the biggest drawbacks of Congress was that it treated the same way those who work for the party and those who harm its prospects. He was speaking at the first meeting of PCC functionaries, MLAs and MPs after Ashok Gehlot took over as chief minister of Rajasthan.
"We all know that who works for the party, and who does not... the accountability should be fixed or assessed before the commencement of elections, not after that,'' the AICC general secretary said.
India Vows Boost of Defenses
By Steve Herman
New Delhi
21 January 2009
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-01-21-voa15.cfm
The defense and foreign ministers of India are speaking about boosting the country's military capabilities and the need for the international community to crack down on states not doing enough to fight terrorism within their own borders.
Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony (2008 file photo)<br />
Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony (2008 File)
India defense minister, A.K. Antony, is calling for the country's military to be modernized, arguing it is operating at less than 30 per cent of the capability the nation requires.
Antony says this needs to be done as quickly as possible because India is surrounded by "inimical elements."
The defense minister made the remarks Wednesday in the state of Goa during the commissioning of a new coast guard patrol vessel.
Meanwhile here in the capital, New Delhi, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee is calling for action by the international community against countries which sponsor terrorism or allow their soil to be used to carry out such acts. He tied the need for such resolve to the Mumbai terror attack in late November, which India blames on Pakistani elements.
Indian Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee, 02 Dec 2008
Indian Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee, 02 Dec 2008
"It is high time for the international community to recognize that such recalcitrant states must be brought to discipline by resorting to various international mechanisms," said Mukherjee.
New Delhi has been increasingly frustrated over what it sees as a lack of concrete movement by Islamabad to neutralize and bring to justice those responsible for the siege of Mumbai, in which more than 170 people died.
The Indian foreign minister also acknowledges disagreement with London over a recent statement by British Foreign Secretary David Milliband. London's top diplomat linked the regional terror problem to the unresolved Kashmir territorial issue between India and Pakistan.
Milliband observed, in a British newspaper article, the Kashmir dispute gives terrorist in the region "one of their main calls to arms."
Indian media have reacted furiously to the comment. The Asian Age newspaper calls it "an appeasement of terrorism" while the Hindu newspaper says the remark plays into the hands of those who justify violent extremism.
India and Pakistan have fought two wars over Kashmir since the violent partition of the subcontinent following the end of British rule in 1947. The banned Pakistani jihadist group India blames for the Mumbai terror attack, Lashkar-e-Taiba, has carried out numerous attacks on Indian soil as part of its quest to oust India from Jammu and Kashmir.
UPA has bought as much as NDA. If you check the SIPRI records - may be even more. In terms of helping local industries MoD has opened up more in UPA period than NDA. The 'downgrading' of service personnel was a result of the pay commisson not an intentional act, most certainly not an act with ulterior motives as it is made out to be. They shall have a seperate pay commisson henceforth anyway.When the UPA came to power they did their utmost to ensure that defence purchases are not made in all the five years they were in power
Employ other options
After British Foreign Secretary David Miliband’s jarring visit, India needs to fundamentally change tack in order to make Pakistan verifiably dismantle its military-nurtured terror complex
Brahma Chellaney
Asian Age, January 21, 2009
Ever since the Pakistani-scripted Mumbai terrorist assaults, it was clear that diplomacy alone would not make Pakistan sever its ties with terror groups, especially if it was not backed by forceful pressure. Yet New Delhi chose to fire only empty rhetoric. Now the external affairs minister admits that Pakistan remains “in a state of denial”, while the home minister says Islamabad’s response thus far is: “Zero. What have they provided? Nothing”. Almost eight weeks after the attacks, India’s options are rapidly shrinking, even as a Rand Corporation report warns of more Mumbai-style carnages. But it is still not too late to change tack.
Let’s be clear. First, it is naïve to contend that the only alternative to the present course — waging an almost-daily war of words with Pakistan and urging the international community to fight India’s battle against Pakistani-fomented terrorism — is war. Between these two extremes lie a hundred different political, economic and diplomatic options — none of which New Delhi has exercised. It has, for example, not recalled its high commissioner from Islamabad, or suspended the composite dialogue process, or disbanded the farcical joint anti-terror mechanism, or halted state-assisted cultural and sporting links, or invoked trade sanctions.
Furthermore, despite the Inter-Services Intelligence agency’s direct involvement in the Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul last July and indirect role in the more-recent Mumbai attacks, New Delhi has neither declared nor urged the U.S. to designate the ISI as a terrorist organization. Yet by New Delhi’s own account, that rogue Pakistani agency has a long history of plotting and executing terrorist attacks in India, including the 1993 serial bombings in Mumbai which killed hundreds of people and the 2006 Mumbai train bombings that left more than 200 dead. India’s commercial capital has been repeatedly targeted to undermine the country’s rising economic power.
New Delhi actually has shied away from taking even the smallest of small steps as a symbolic expression of India’s outrage over Pakistan’s role as a staging ground for the Mumbai assaults. Such glaring inaction does not jibe with the prime minister’s thesis that “some Pakistani official agencies must have supported” those attacks. Nor does it square with the popular expectation that the attacks would serve as a tipping point in India’s forbearance with Pakistan’s use of cross-border terrorism as an instrument of state policy.
Second, even in the military realm, India has more than one option against Pakistan. Contrary to the simplistic belief, there isn’t just one military option — waging war. Mounting a military attack is at one end of the spectrum and, obviously, can be the option of only last resort. India ought to look at a military option that falls short of war.
Often in interstate relations, as history testifies, a credible threat to use force can achieve objectives that actual use of force may not help accomplish. But for a threat of force to deliver desired results, it has to be realistic, sustained and ceaseless until the adversary has demonstrably delivered on its promises to conform fully to international norms and rules. Mounting such a threat entails full-scale force mobilization so that the adversary realizes it will face a decisive military onslaught unless it complies with the demands being put. But there can be no credible threat if the adversary believes — as it did during India’s botched Operation Parakram in 2002 — that the threat is not backed by the requisite political will to carry it out.
Furthermore, given that a credible threat of force demands war-like simulation, the strategy brought into play has to replicate war scenarios. As modern history shows, the outcome of any war is crucially shaped by elements other than the sophistication and range of weaponry. The single most-important factor is strategy. War can be won by taking an enemy by surprise, or by punching through a front that the adversary didn’t expect to be the focal point of attack, or other flanking manoeuvres.
There will be little surprise element in the present circumstances, given that an all-out troop mobilization will become known. But the second element — keeping the enemy on tenterhooks as to which front may be chosen for the principal onslaught — can be ensured through offensive military deployments along the entire length of India’s border with Pakistan.
Such a strategy, if sustained and backed by political resolve to go the whole hog if necessary, will put unbearable pressure on Pakistan at a time when that state is in dire straits financially, with its political authority fragmented. Moreover, the snow-blocked Himalayan mountain-passes foreclose the possibility of China opening another front to relieve Indian military pressure on its “all-weather” ally.
Pakistan has never been more vulnerable to coercive pressure than today. The deployment of battle-ready Indian forces along the entire border will force the near-bankrupt Pakistan to follow suit. Such mobilization will cost it millions of dollars daily. It will bleed Pakistan at a time when it is already seeking international credit extending far beyond the $7.6 billion IMF bailout package. Bankrupting Pakistan, in any event, has to be part and parcel of the Indian strategy.
With full force mobilization in place and the armoured corps ready to punch through Pakistani defences at multiple points, India would be well-positioned to ratchet up political, economic and diplomatic pressures on Pakistan and get the U.S. and others to lean on Islamabad. For India to de-escalate, Pakistan would have to verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its military-run terror complex and hand over to India top-ranking terrorist figures. This would be an operation intended to compel Pakistan to come clean, no matter what it takes.
Make no mistake: Non-military pressures will not work because Pakistan is a militarized state, even if a failing one. British Foreign David Miliband’s visit was a jarring reminder to India to stop offshoring its Pakistan policy. Without a credible Indian threat of force, Pakistan, far from dismantling its terrorist infrastructure, will continue to prevaricate over the identity of the 10 Mumbai attackers and not bring to justice all the planners of those strikes. In fact, without the Pakistani military being targeted and cut to size, Pakistan will not cease to be a threat to the world.
More than six decades after its creation, Pakistan has not only failed to emerge as a normal nation, but actually lapsed into a de facto failed state by Westphalian standards, with the line between state and non-state actors blurred and the tail (the military establishment) wagging the dog (the state). It has become what its founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, had feared: A truly “moth-eaten” state. It is the world’s Terroristan rolled into an Anarchistan. Keeping such a state intact will pose very serious challenges to regional and international security.
Rather than leave an ungovernable Pakistan and a wild Afghanistan as festering threats to global security, the time has come to think bold about a new political order in the Hindu Kush region. To fix Afghanistan, as outgoing U.S. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley said last week, we need to first “solve Pakistan”. To help Pakistan self-destruct, it has become imperative to do what Ronald Reagan did to the Soviet Union — make it broke — while cashing in on its deep internal fault-lines.
Bharat Karnad
In the period since 26/11, the overly bureaucratized Indian state has reacted characteristically. Not by initiating programmes to enlarge and improve the skill sets of the Special Action Group—the commando element of the National Security Guard—and to equip it with sophisticated wherewithal such as thermal imaging goggles, helmet-mounted communications paraphernalia and super sniper scope rifles with infra-red sights for distant kills to surgically disable the urban guerilla terrorist in the dark and in confined spaces, but by creating new organizations. Instead, it has created new posts, and new establishments. This has added to the layer of bureaucracy, multiplied the potential for failure, and ensured that future crises will end in the usual manner.
The government has been found wanting in other respects as well. It squandered the opportunity of limited but immediate reprisal by swift aerial attack on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) camps and supply depots in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Such action was eminently doable, would have been perceived as legitimate, met the standard of “proportionality”, reassured the people that New Delhi is on the ball, and signalled to Pakistan that the days of terrorism as a no-cost instrument of state policy are over.
Instead, New Delhi has chosen to talk tough (“all options are open”) but leave it to the US to investigate and put the squeeze on Pakistan. The policy of relying on Washington for decisive action is incredibly naïve, based on the mistaken belief that (1) India now rates higher in the US’s scale of geostrategic utility and political-military value than Pakistan—the proven Cold War pivot of the US Central Asia policy and the prime enabler of the current proactive American strategy in Afghanistan, and (2) general headquarters, Rawalpindi, can be pressured by the withdrawal of trade and touring dance troupes to voluntarily surrender the leverage of asymmetric warfare that is seen to have, if not levelled the strategic playing field, then kept India, the larger, immensely stronger, neighbour, unsettled. Worse, approaching outside powers has legitimized the US’ role as mediator (prepare for Richard Holbrooke’s New Delhi-Islamabad shuttle diplomacy with a bit of arm-twisting of both sides on the cards), adjudicator and balancer and China’s desire to be a seminal player in the subcontinent. One thing aspiring great powers never do is outsource security for any reason and in any way.
One thing aspiring great powers never do is outsource security for any reason and in any manner
It is easy to infer from New Delhi’s tip-toeing around the military option that it fears the situation spiralling out of control and into a nuclear exchange, whence Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s categorical assertion that there would be no war. This reading of the situation that Islamabad encourages ignores the cost of nuclear war for Pakistan. Should nuclear weapons use ever be initiated, the one certainty is that Pakistan cannot survive repeated Indian nuclear strikes. In the event, Islamabad has every incentive to avoid hostilities. It confers an advantage India has been loath to capitalize on. Islamabad has cannily used the overblown threat of nuclear conflagration, which is pumped up by the Western propaganda about “nuclear flashpoint”, to keep New Delhi in the throes of indecision and on the defensive.
Most political leaders and their advisers in the highest reaches of the government having bought into such alarmist nonsense have urged caution, leading the 1999 Kargil conflict onwards to India’s passivity and inaction in the face of even extreme provocation. What has been swallowed whole is US thesis that because India and Pakistan are both nuclear-armed states, Pakistan can safely fuel the insurgency in Kashmir and facilitate terrorism in India because its nuclear arsenal will deter India from retaliating with its superior conventional military forces. But this argument holds only if India does not respond in kind.
Terrorism cannot any longer be permitted to remain a cost-free option for Islamabad. Paying the Pakistani army and its creature, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), back in their own coin is the answer. This will require targeted intelligence operations to destabilize the brittle Pakistani polity. Support for sub-nationalist movements in Baluchistan, Baltistan and Sindh, stoking the anti-Punjab sentiment, and exacerbating the Sunni-Shia rift and, in parallel, for Indian special forces and the military to render live the Line of Control and the international border. In a short time, fissiparous forces will begin to tear that country apart and the sustained low-key military tension with India will sap the energy of the army and convince it that terrorism against India is not worth the consequences to Pakistan.
But here’s the rub. Such a strategy demands that the Indian government show guts, an attribute the ISI, LeT, and Washington know it cannot boast of. On the contrary, as the record shows, in a crisis the first casualty is the political will to take hard decisions. It is a debilitating weakness that inclines the Indian government to always play the victim, bleat incessantly about Pakistan doing this and that, grab at straws of supportive statements emanating from Washington, but otherwise to do nothing. The US, alas, is in a different game, one of doggedly shielding the ISI and the Pakistani army, whose culpability is sought to be minimized by inventing degrees of separation between them and their terrorist sword arm, the LeT.
Bharat Karnad is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research. Comments are welcome at [email protected]
Geopolitical Diary: India's Afghanistan Option
January 22, 2009
Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said at a conference in New Delhi on Wednesday that Pakistan is still sponsoring international terrorism and must be disciplined. India has reiterated this message on a near daily basis ever since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, yet the only disciplinary action it has taken has been limited to mere rhetoric.
There is no question that the Mumbai attacks outraged India’s decision-makers, the vast majority of whom maintain that there are clear and identifiable links between the perpetrators of the attack and the Pakistani military establishment. As far as New Delhi is concerned, the Islamist militant proxies that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency has long supported are still well within the military’s reach, and could be reined in if Islamabad actually had the will to do so.
With the blame cast on Pakistan, in the wake of the attacks, India prepared for military action, ranging from surgical strikes and hot-pursuit operations in Pakistani-administered Kashmir to a full-scale war. Pakistan soon grew nervous and started redeploying its troops from the Afghan border in the west to the eastern border with India. At that point, Pakistan’s best hope was to pressure the United States into holding India back, which it did by reminding Washington of the risk it would incur to its supply lines in Pakistan – which are critical to fighting the war in Afghanistan — if the Pakistanis were faced with the need to confront a military threat from India.
But it wasn’t just U.S. pressure that could restrain India. The Indians knew themselves that they lacked any good options for responding forcefully against Pakistan. Limited strikes in Pakistani-administered Kashmir would be mainly of symbolic value, given that many of the militant assets there had already had time to relocate. And any such strike likely would end up working in Pakistan’s favor; the local population, united by an Indian threat, would have good reason to rally behind the Pakistani military and government.
Any plans India might have had to go beyond a limited war in Kashmir did not have the full support of the military — particularly the army, which lacked confidence in its capabilities and felt that stalemate was a far more likely outcome than victory. Indian policymakers also had to deal with the uncomfortable possibility that the militants who carried out the Mumbai attacks likely had the intent of pulling India into a military confrontation with Pakistan. The more Pakistan destabilized, the more room jihadists in the region would have to maneuver. Any large-scale military action by India could be seen as playing into the militants’ hands –- and could intensify the jihadist focus on India for further attacks.
In short, India’s hands were tied post-Mumbai, and as New Delhi spent time debating among bad options and more bad options, the window of opportunity to strike in the wake of the attacks (when international outrage against Pakistan was highest) had soon passed.
But this is not to say that India is left without any options. On the contrary, India is keeping open the option of hot-pursuit strikes in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, and is moving forward with plans for covert operations inside Pakistan to target militant networks. The Indians also are cognizant of the fact that a follow-on attack would require them to take some level of military action. But there is another pressure tactic the Indians are throwing around, one that involves India stretching beyond Pakistan into the war-torn territory of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is essentially the extension of Pakistan’s western buffer against foreign threats. Without a foothold in Kabul, Pakistan runs the risk of being sandwiched between a hostile power to its west and its main rival, India, to the east — a position it remembers well from the Cold War days when the Soviet Union, then allied with India, invaded Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan has to rely heavily on its Pashtun ties to Afghanistan to secure its western frontier.
India knows what makes the Pakistanis jumpy, and has spent recent years steadily upping its involvement in reconstruction work in Afghanistan to make good with Kabul, which currently has a very shaky relationship with the Pakistanis over the insurgency plaguing the country. So far, India has not ventured beyond its $86 million reconstruction commitment to Afghanistan, but has been throwing around the rather contentious idea of sending troops to the country to help with fighting the insurgency.
This would be a gigantic step for India to take, and one that would make the Pakistanis jump through the roof. India is extremely wary of deploying forces beyond its border. (It learned the pains of counterinsurgency the hard way when it got pulled into a bloody war of attrition with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the late 1980s.) New Delhi prefers to keep to itself in most foreign policy matters, particularly when it comes to fighting other nations’ wars. But sources in Indian defense circles say there are serious discussions going on among the political and military leadership over the Afghan option. Even Indian army chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor publicly raised the possibility Jan. 14 when he said in a conference, “Changing our strategic policy towards Kabul in terms of raising military stakes is one of the factors that is to be determined politically.”
Kapoor was being careful in wording his statement, essentially saying it is up to the politicians to give the military orders to deploy. But he was also deliberate in his message to Pakistan: If Islamabad continues to push India through its array of Islamist militant proxies, India could end up making a strategic decision to break through a few foreign policy barriers and shoulder some of the security burden on Pakistan’s western frontier. At a time when U.S. tolerance for Pakistan is wearing dangerously thin, and when the United States and India are exploring deeper, long-term and more strategic ties, this type of adversarial encirclement is a threat that potentially could shake Pakistan to its core.
That is, if India actually follows through. As mentioned earlier, this would require a major leap in Indian foreign policy — not to mention arrangements to coordinate and integrate Indian military efforts in Afghanistan with U.S. and NATO operations. And there is currently no indication that the discussions are anywhere near an implementation stage.
Also, the United States would probably prefer that India keep things as they are for now. An Indian military presence in Afghanistan would make a juicy target for jihadists in the region, and it would give Pakistan all the more incentive to redirect and intensify the insurgency in Afghanistan, putting both the United States and India in an even stickier situation.
However, the threat of sending Indian troops to Afghanistan does a decent job in keeping Pakistan off balance. And, at least for the moment, that is what New Delhi and Washington want to intimidate Pakistan into giving up its militant proxy activities. Time will only tell if the Indians actually put the Afghan option into practice, but the Pakistanis are certainly keeping watch.
If you don't know the facts shouldn't you try to find them before writing stuff? as soon as they came to power UPA stopped many modernization procurements claiming potential corruption and haven't done anything else. They haven't proven the corruption nor bouht the stuff. This way the forces don't get any weapons.nashm wrote:ramana wrote:We have reams of stuff in the mil forum sonce 2004 which shows how by ineptitude or activiely the UPA has degraded Indian military capability and finds itself in a fix and worse tries to fix the blame now on the military by leaks to selective SLIME. If they are so sure about it why dont they dismiss those responsible for the mess.
but you are welcome to your views.
I don’t know the facts but I think UPA is no different than NDA in terms of supporting army modernization. The bigger problem is that there is nobody in site; I mean no good leader, who can overcome petty politics and lead the nation.
ramana wrote:nashm wrote:
And why is RG addressing a meeting of top IPS officers? Is he heading the police force or does he have extensive policing experience?Pranay wrote: Candid admission of current state of affairs by Rahul Gandhi...Let's see what comes out of it.
At a meeting of top IPS officers from across the country, Rahul referred
nashm wrote:ramana wrote:We have reams of stuff in the mil forum sonce 2004 which shows how by ineptitude or activiely the UPA has degraded Indian military capability and finds itself in a fix and worse tries to fix the blame now on the military by leaks to selective SLIME. If they are so sure about it why dont they dismiss those responsible for the mess.
but you are welcome to your views.
I don’t know the facts but I think UPA is no different than NDA in terms of supporting army modernization. The bigger problem is that there is nobody in site; I mean no good leader, who can overcome petty politics and lead the nation.
This is a shame. If this is true then we have no option but to throw these guys out. I was not justifying one gov over another I merely pointed out the fact that there was no real progress for a long time due to lack of political will in both parties... We need a leader who is strategic thinker and take bold decisions beyond party’s will... I read in this forum that when PC brought up the issue of illegal Bangladeshi, some people from his own party worried about their vote bank... common guys think about country at least once...raviscorp wrote:nashm wrote:
Yes the babus inertia is there. But George Fernandes of NDA made them move their asses by sending the same babus up the slopes to Siachen & things started moving.Nihat wrote: Aldo I don't understand the constant blaming of UPA for the apathy of the military - UPA and NDA bring only top leadership to the country and both have been equally competent or pathetic (whichever line you may choose) , it can only do so much till the MoS level , below that comes the famed bureaucracy , babus , file passers and below that are the heads of the armed forces who are in desperate need of equipment.
A 100 CISF men guarding the Nepal embassy?Mission in Pak among first to seek CISF cover
New Delhi: In view of the heightened security threat to Indian installations in Pakistan, especially in the wake of the Mumbai Terror attacks, the Indian High Commission in Islamabad has sought deployment of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) to guard its premises.
Sources said the High Commission in Islamabad is among the first Indian missions abroad to seek CISF cover — the request coming within days of the Government promulgating an ordinance to amend the CISF Act, enabling its personnel to be deployed abroad at Indian missions and on UN peacekeeping duties. The security of the Islamabad mission is currently the sole responsibility of the host government.
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As of now, the embassy in Kathmandu is the only Indian mission to have CISF security, granted to it more than five years ago. More than 100 CISF personnel are deployed there. In addition, the embassy in Kabul is guarded by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. Sources said a proposal to replace the ITBP in Kabul with CISF is also under consideration.
It was the attack last July on the Indian embassy in Kabul that prompted the government to think on ways to strengthen the security at missions abroad. Accordingly, the government moved a CISF amendment Bill in the last session of Parliament. Since the Bill could not be passed for want of time, the government promulgated an ordinance on January 12 to make necessary changes in law.
Ramanajiramana wrote:We have reams of stuff in the mil forum sonce 2004 which shows how by ineptitude or activiely the UPA has degraded Indian military capability and finds itself in a fix and worse tries to fix the blame now on the military by leaks to selective SLIME. If they are so sure about it why dont they dismiss those responsible for the mess.
but you are welcome to your views.
Prabu, why are you so surprised. This is India my friend, remember the ethos that are taught to us, "Divided we Stand, United we Fall" or as succintly said by Russell Peters, "We are Indians, we hate eachother, we don't have time to hate anyone else". BTW Russell peters is a canadian comedian of Indian Descent. Google him up or look for him on youtube.Prabu wrote:This is just a Bull S**t ![url=http://www.dawn.com/2009/01/22/top7.htm wrote:Magazine endorses Antulay’s stance on Karkare[/url]
.”