1 The Chinese government uses a Stalinist formula to determine which groups constitute unique minzu, variously translated as "nationalities" or "ethnic groups." Accordingly, to be considered a nationality, a group must have a common language, territory, economic life, and culture. Stalin, J.V. "Marxism and the National Question," in Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages University Publishing House, 1953), 302. More than 400 groups registered as separate nationalities in the 1953 census, with more than 240 requesting recognition in Yunnan Province alone. The government was only able to winnow the number to 55 after awkwardly gerrymandering ethnic boundaries by sending work teams of anthropologists and government officials to the countryside to determine which groups "objectively" constituted unique nationalities. Many groups continue to contest the government's classification system. For details on the classification process, see Katherine Palmer Kaup, Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 2000); Katherine Palmer Kaup "Regionalism and Ethnicnationalism in the People's Republic of China," 172 China Quarterly, 863–884 (2002); and Fei Xiaotong, Collected Works of Fei Xiaotong [Fei Xiaotong xuanji] (Fuzhou: Haixian Wenyi Chubanshe, 1996), 285.
2 S. Robert Ramsey, The Languages of China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 157–292. Many of the minority languages are further divided into mutually unintelligible dialects.
3 The Uighurs, Kyrgiz, Kazahks, Uzbeks, and Tajiks in Xinjiang, for example, all have ethnic counterparts in neighboring countries, as do the Zhuang, Miao, Dai, and Shui in Yunnan and Guangxi.
4 The Chinese government and the other five members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) signed an agreement on June 2, 2005, to take "specific steps to step up the efficiency of cooperation in ensuring stability and security, including holding joint antiterrorist training exercises, training personnel and exchange of experience in fighting terrorism, separatism, and extremism." "Kazakhstan: SCO Officials Express Concern Over Terrorist Levels in Central Asia," Almaty Interfax-Kazakhstan, 2 June 05 (FBIS, 2 June 05).
5 Chinese President Hu Jintao noted in May 2005 that the per capita GDP in minority areas is only 67.4 percent of the national average and rural per capita income only 71.4 percent of the national average. Hu Jintao, "Opening Speech to the Ethnic Affairs Work National Conference" [Hu Jintao zai zhongyang minzu gongzuo huiyishang de jianghua], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 27 May 05. This figure, however, does not indicate the severity of economic discrepancies, as Han Chinese within minority areas typically have higher incomes than the minorities. The government tightly controls statistics on Han-minority economic discrepancies, and published statistics report figures based on regional differences rather than providing breakdowns by ethnic groups. Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 149–53. Numerous factors contribute to minority poverty. Minorities are concentrated in harsh geographical terrains on China's periphery and lack the capital needed to extract natural resources in their territories. Poor infrastructure and low educational levels also contribute to their poverty. Government policies have exacerbated discrepancies in wealth between the minorities and Han. See Katherine Palmer, "Nationalities and Nationality Areas," in China Handbook, ed. Chris Hudson (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1997), 276–85. Several Western analysts report that central development strategies in Xinjiang since the launching of the Great Western Development campaign in 2000 have disproportionately favored Han Chinese. Nicholas Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," 44 The China Journal 65, 82–3, 85 (2000); Gardner Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent (Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2004), 39. Uighur human rights advocate Rebiya Kadeer testified that the Great Western Development policies have had a deleterious impact on the Uighurs and resulted in the "bleakest period in Uighur history." Congressional Human Rights Caucus Members Briefing, The Human Rights Situation of the Uighurs in the People's Republic of China, 28 April 05.
6 Hu Jintao, "Opening Speech to the Ethnic Affairs Work National Conference."
7 Tibetans Lose Ground in Public Sector Employment, Tibet Information Network (Online), 20 January 05; "China's Influence in Central Asia (Part 5): Uighurs Count the Cost of China's Quest for Stability," Radio Free Asia (Online), 24 November 04.
8 A Ningxia government report notes that only 5 percent of the minority populations in Ningxia and the Tibetan Autonomous Region were literate in 1949. By 1998, that figure had risen to 89.5 percent and 48 percent respectively, though these rates remained below the national average. "Implementing the Regional Autonomy System" [Shixing minzu quyu zizhifa zhidu], Ningxia Government Web site.
9 Wen Jun, "Assessment of the Stability of China's Minority Economic Policy 1949–2002" [Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jingji zhengce wendingxing pinggu], Development Research, No. 3, 2004, 40–45. Han-minorities discrepancies in per capita income more than tripled in the first decade of reforms. Yang Zuolin, A General Discussion of Minority Economics [Minzu diqu jingji fazhan tongsu jianghua] (Kunming: Yunnan People's Press, 1993), 12. Minorities have had difficulty attracting foreign capital given their poor infrastructure, poorly trained labor force, and low levels of trade and private enterprise. 1994 tax revisions further exacerbated discrepancies in wealth.
10 The Tibetan illiteracy rate (47.55 percent), for example, is five times the national average (9.08 percent). Tabulation drawn from 2000 Population Census of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: China Statistics Press, August 2002), Table 2–3.
11 "Implementing 'China's Minority Education Regulations' Placed on Agenda," ["Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jiaoyu tiaoli" de zhiding lierule yishi richeng], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 16 June 05.
12 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [hereinafter REAL], enacted 31 May 84, amended 28 February 01.
13 The relationship between minority areas and the central government is reflected in an official news report, "The Central Party Puts Forth A Strategy for Xinjiang's Development and Stability" [Zhonggong zhongyang zuochu Xinjiang fazhan yu wending zhongda zhanlüe bushu], Xinhua (Online), 18 May 04. The report describes a meeting of the top-ranking government officials in Xinjiang called "to transmit the Central Party's Comprehensive Work Plan Regarding Xinjiang's Economic Development and Social Stability, and to develop plans for implementing it." At the meeting, Wang Lequan, Politburo member and Party General Secretary of Xinjiang, urged "all party and government officials from all levels within the autonomous region to earnestly study and adopt the spirit of the Center's comprehensive plan. We must focus all of our thinking on the spirit of the Center's directive, and, with a strong sense of enthusiasm and duty, quickly develop concrete implementation measures that blend each localities' and departments' concrete circumstances in order to rigorously promote all of these Xinjiang projects." Xinjiang's autonomy rests in how best to implement central directives according to local circumstances. In many cases, this results in policies more restrictive of individual liberties than those promoted by the central government. The report cited here, for example, advocates strengthening the role of the predominately Han, paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in order to promote regional stability.
14 REAL, art. 7.
15 Ibid., arts. 4–7, 19.
16 Ibid., arts. 4–7, 20.
17 The Chinese government has imposed the fewest controls on minorities that accept central authority, which in turn have made these groups more willing to cooperate with Han Chinese. Mutual distrust between Han authorities and several minority groups has led to tighter government controls in some areas, however, exacerbating ethnic tensions according to both Chinese and Western analysts. See, for example, Ma Mingliang, "Muslims and Non-Muslims Can Coexist in Harmony in China, as They Do in Malaysia, If They Understand Each Other's Culture Better," Islam in China, 31 Jul 05 (FBIS, 6 September 05); Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent.
18 REAL, art. 9. Authorities sentenced four Uighur boys to three and a half years in prison after a schoolhouse brawl in April 2005, on the charge of "undermining the friendship of the nationalities." "Uighur Youths, Teacher Detained After School Brawl, Residents Say," Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 June 05.
19 Minorities in southwestern China live in closer proximity to Han Chinese than do Tibetans and Uighurs, who are separated from predominately Han-populated regions in central China by mountain ranges and deserts. Although many of the minorities in southwestern China live in single-ethnicity villages, often these villages will be interspersed in close proximity to those of other minority groups. Southwestern minorities tend to be segregated by villages rather than by larger administrative areas, whereas distances between communities of different ethnic groups tend to be greater in the Northwest. Many of the southwestern minority groups are also internally divided and have little interest in mobilizing against Han Chinese authority. For further detail see Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 171–81; and Thomas Heberer, "Nationalities Conflict and Ethnicity in the People's Republic of China, With Special Reference to the Yi in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture," in Perspectives on the Yi of Southwest China, ed. Steven Harrel (Berkeley: University of California, 2001), 232–7.
20 State Council Regulations on the Implementation of the REAL, issued 11 May 05, art. 8.
21 Ibid., arts. 30 and 34.
22 Ibid., arts. 31 and 32.
23 Ibid., art. 2.
24 "South-Central Nationalities University Opens Legal Aid Clinic" [Zhongnan minzu daxue chengli falü huanzhu zhongxin], Tianshan Net (Online), 21 March 05; "Suzhou Wujiang City Establishes New Social Services System for Migrant Minority Workers" [Suzhou Wujiang shi chuang xin wailai liudong shaoshu minzu fuwu tizhi], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 18 August 05; "Jiangsu's Qiansu City Aggressively Expands New Approaches to Help Minority Migrants" [Jiangsu Qiansu shi jiji shensu xinshi xia fuwu "wailai" yu "waichu" shaoshu minzu de youxiao tujin], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 18 August 05.
25 "Open Letter from the Darhad Mongols," Southern Mongolia Human Rights Watch (Online), March 2005.
26 For example, Articles 15, 17, 18, and 22 of the State Council Regulations for the Implementation of the REAL require autonomous regions to give priority to border regions and minorities with small populations when making investment decisions. Bilingual education must be promoted, and autonomous governments are required to "guide and organize" local populations to seek jobs outside of their localities. Although the central government often encroaches on the autonomous governments' authority to determine their development strategies independently, the REAL in theory gave the autonomous regions the authority to control these policy decisions which are now determined by the central government.
27 The Party monitors and imposes strict controls on how minority cultures are represented in popular, official, and scholarly discourse. Controls over minority representation have been imposed on all minority groups, not simply on those who have strained relations with Han Chinese and the predominately Han government. For example, though authorities regularly arrest Uighurs who display overt signs of ethnic pride, government authorities in Guangxi have criticized Zhuang authors who display too little ethnic pride. Kaup, Creating the Zhuang, 118–9.
28 Article 7 of the REAL requires autonomous governments to "place the interests of the state as a whole above anything else."
29 The Constitution provides for the establishment of provincial-level autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures, and autonomous counties. The government began creating autonomous townships and villages in 1993 with the State Council's passage of the Regulation on the Administrative Work on Ethnic Villages [Minzu xiang xingzheng gongzuo tiaoli], issued 29 August 93.By 2003 the government had established five provincial-level autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures, 120 autonomous counties, and 1,173 autonomous villages. The government decided which areas would be granted autonomous status "through consultation between the government of the next higher level and the representatives of the minority or minorities concerned." General Program for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Minorities [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhi shishi gangyao], issued 8 August 52, art. 9.Some members of the larger minority groups express concerns privately that the regional autonomy policy disproportionately favors smaller groups. Commission Staff Interviews. Many Uighurs and Zhuang note that within the provincial-level Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, several minority groups have their own autonomous prefectures or counties. Once established, these smaller autonomous areas are eligible for special development assistance funds that the central and provincial governments earmark for county-level autonomous governments. The Bayinguoleng Mongol Autonomous Prefecture in Xinjiang contains one-quarter of Xinjiang's total land. Although only 4.46 percent of the Bayinguoleng population is Mongol and 34.25 percent is Uighur, the Chinese Constitution and the REAL require that the head of the prefectural government be Mongol. In another example, a portion of Guangxi's poverty alleviation funds is earmarked for minority counties, which means that Bama Yao Autonomous County (17.24 percent Yao and 69.46 percent Zhuang) is eligible for certain development assistance programs not available to nearby Jingxi County, which does not have autonomous standing despite the fact that over 99 percent of its population is ethnically Zhuang. Article 16 of the Election Law also allows minorities with small populations a greater number of People's Congress delegates. PRC Election Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses, enacted 1 July 79, amended 10 December 82, 2 December 86, 28 February 95, 27 October 04. Some Western experts believe the government consciously pitted minorities against one another when establishing regional autonomous areas in order to weaken their ability to confront the state. Gardner Bovingdon, "Heteronomy and Its Discontents 'Minzu Regional Autonomy' in Xinjiang," in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington, 2004), 117–154; Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," 86. Since 2000, the central government has explicitly stated that nationality development work will place a priority on the 22 smallest minority populations. Tang Ren, "Ethnic Minorities Need Help: Government Pledges Another Round of Poverty Alleviation Reforms to Save the Country's 22 Small Ethnic Groups," Beijing Review (Online), 26 July 05. The May 2005 REAL Implementing Regulations require provincial-level governments to give priority to smaller minorities in their economic development and investment plans.
30 Non-autonomous governments may also pass local legislation on issues not addressed by national law, but the autonomous areas have the power to pass local legislation expounding upon, or altering, national laws to suit minority customs.
31 PRC Legislation Law, enacted 15 March 00, art. 66.
32 Xinjiang has gone through eight drafts of its self-governing regulation since 1981. The Xinjiang People's Congress announced in January 2005 that it would restart the drafting process after the passage of the REAL Implementing Regulations, noting that "many issues [in the self-governing regulation] require reaching a compromise between national and local interests so the process has been slow." "Ten Issues Handled" [Shi jian yianjian jiande dao chuli], Xinjiang Capital Daily (Online), 20 January 05.
33 Article 19 of the REAL states that the self-governing regulations of autonomous regions must be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for approval before they go into effect. Self-governing regulations of autonomous prefectures and counties must receive the approval of the Standing Committees of the People's Congresses at the provincial or directly administered municipal level before becoming effective and then be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.
34 Governments in many autonomous areas have been revising their self-governing regulations over the last few years. Yunnan Province announced in October 2004 that all 29 of its autonomous counties and 8 autonomous prefectures would revise their self-governing regulations. "Yunnan Province Comprehensively Pushes Revisions of Autonomous Prefectures and Counties Self-Governing Regulations," State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 12 April 05.
35 These alterations predominately deal with marriage, inheritance, elections, and grasslands legislation according to the State Council Information Office White Paper. "Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities," State Council Information Office Web Site, 28 February 05; Cheng Jian, "Autonomous Statutes and Thoughts on Their Legislation in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region" [Lun danxing tiaoli: Neimenggu zizhiqu danzing tiaolifa xiancun wenti tanqi], Journal of Inner Mongolia University Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 34, No. 6, November 2002, 49–52; Chao Li, "Thoughts on Autonomous Areas' Autonomous Legislative Powers" [Dui minzu zizhi difang zizhi jiguan lifa quan de sikao], Journal of Southwest University for Nationalities, Vol. 23, No. 7, July 2002, 137–141; Ma Linlin, "Construction of Our Nation's Minority Economics Law" [Woguo shaoshu minzu diqu minzu jingji de fazhi jianshe], Academic Forum, No. 7, 2004, 57–9.
36 Chen Wenxing, Legislation Must Appropriately Reflect Changing Circumstances: On the Promotion of Yunnan's Autonomous Areas' Legislation" [Lifa gongzuo bixu shishi huiying qingshi bianqian: lun yunnan minzu sizhidifang lifa de tuijin"], Academic Exploration, No. 12, December 2004, 60–3; Li Baoqi, "On the Theory and Practice of the Financial Transfer Payment System in National Autonomous Areas" [Caizheng zhuanyi zhifu zhidu zai minzu zizhi difang de lilun yu shixian], Journal of Yanbian University, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 2004, 51.
37 Zeng Xianyi, "The Legislative Base of the Autonomous Government Regulations" [Lun zizhi tiaoli de lifa jichu], Journal of South-Central University for Nationalities—Humanities and Social Sciences, Vol. 24, No. 4, July 2004, 7. Chinese scholars regularly call for autonomous governments to exercise their right to formulate meaningful self-governing regulations, though these discussions do not appear in the popular press.
38 Zhou Li, et al, "Autonomous Legislation in the Course of Modernization" [Xiandai huajin chengzhong de zizhi lifa], Yunnan University Journal- Legal Studies Edition, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2004, 88; Li Zhanrong, "On the Application of Minority Economic Law" [Lun minzu jingjifashiyong], Journal of the Guangxi Cadre Institute of Politics and Law, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 2005, 18; Li Chaokai, "Brief Analysis of Yunnan's Legal Personnel Training and Law School Reforms" [Yunnan falü rencai peiyang yu faxue jiaoyu gaige qianxi], Seeking Truth, Vol. 6, 2003, 58.
39 Li Chaokai, "Brief Analysis of Yunnan's Legal Personnel Training and Law School Reforms," 57; Chen Wenxing, "Legislation Must Appropriately Reflect Changing Circumstances,"60–3; Li Zhanrong, "On the Application of Minority Economic Law," 15–20.
40 Li Zhanrong, "On the Application of Minority Economic Law," 15–20.
41 Article 32 of the Inheritance Law mandates that the property of a deceased person with no survivors reverts to the state. PRC Inheritance Law, enacted 10 April 85. The customary practice of many Islamic groups, however, requires that such property be donated to the local mosque. No alterations or supplements to the National Inheritance Law have yet been passed. Li Zhanrong, "On the Application of Minority Economic Law," 19.
42 6.9 percent of government workers are minorities though minorities account for almost 9percent of China's total population. Ling Yun, "Analysis of Major Issues and Theories in Our Nation's Minority Nationality Cadre Education" [Woguo minzu ganbu jiaoyu cunzai de zhuyaowenti ji lilun fenxi], Journal of South-Central University for Nationalities, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2004, 17; Wang Xiubo, "Research and Thoughts Regarding The Current Situation Of Minority Nationality Cadres Corps Talent" [Guanyu shaoshu minzu diqu ganbu rencai duiwu xianzhuang de diaocha yu sikao], Progressive Forum, March 2004, 24–5; Yang Guocai, "Building a Minority Nationality Cadres Corps Is the Crux to Developing Minority Nationality Areas" [Shaoshu minzu ganbu duiwu jianshe shi minzu diqu fazhan de guanjian], Yunnan Nationalities University Journal, Vol. 21, No. 4, July 2004, 84–6. The proportion of technically trained minorities placed in high- or mid-level positions is 19 and 45 percentage points below the Han average according to Na Canhui, "In- Depth Analysis of Our Nation's Minority Nationality Cadres' Training" [Woguo shaoshu minzu ganbu peiyu jizhi shenxi], South-Central Nationalities University Journal, Vol. 24, April 2004, 183–4. The absolute number of technically trained minorities has increased substantially. One Chinese scholar reports that the number rose from 238,000 in 1979to over 1.7 million in 2002. Zhang Linchun, "Policy Decisions and Successful Experience Regarding Minority Cadre Training and Use" [Woguo shaoshu minzu ganbu peiyang he xuanbo shiyongde zhengce guiding he chenggong jingyan], Tianshui Government Administration Academy, Vol. 2, 2002, 18.
43 Zhang Linchun, "Policy Decisions and Successful Experience Regarding Minority Cadre Training and Use," 15–8. In July 2002, the State Council approved the joint appointment of State Ethnic Affairs Commission officials to 20 government ministries and bureaus. Though these officials are not necessarily ethnic minorities, the majority of SEAC cadres are. The decision also helps assure that minority issues will be raised in each of these government offices. "State Ethnic Affairs Commissioners Joint Appointment to Other Commissions and Their Responsibilities" [Guojia minzu shiwu weiyuanhui bingzhi weiyuan danwei ji zhize], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 8 February 05.
44 Ling Yun, "Analysis of Major Issues and Theories in Our Nation's Minority Nationality Cadre Education," 171–3. Government investment in education in Xinjiang in 2000 was only 45.45 percent of the national average, according to Gu Huayang, "Research on the Current Situation and Policy of Xinjiang's Educational Development" [Xinjiang jiaoyu fazhan de xianzhuangji duice yanjiu], Seeking Truth, No. 2, 2004, 74–7. The same article notes that although a higher percentage of people in Xinjiang have college degrees than the national average, the percentage of people receiving high school and middle school degrees is only 58.43 and 38.15 percent of the national average respectively.
45 Wang Xiubo, "Research and Thoughts Regarding the Current Situation of Minority Nationality Cadres Corps Talent," 24–5. Wang Xiubo also notes that many autonomous governments are having difficulty recruiting government employees under the age of 35. The State Council Implementation Decision calls for "vigorous training" of younger minority cadres to ensure that a corps of minorities is being trained to assume mid- and upper-level positions in the years ahead.
46 In the 10th People's Congress, for example, 13.91 percent of the deputies were minorities, well above the 8.9 percent they represent of the total population. State Council White Paper on Regional Autonomy, issued 28 February 05. The Election Law also allows ethnic groups not residing in autonomous areas to hold separate elections for congressional delegates "based on the local circumstances," though how these should be carried out remains unclear. Article 9 of the Election Law says that the State Council may allow autonomous people's congresses 5 percent more seats than they would normally be allowed on the basis of their population size. PRC Election Law for the National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses.
47 "Number of CPC Members Reaches 69.6 Million," China Daily, 24 May 05 (FBIS, 24 May 05). Because the party represents the interests of the entire nation without bias, it would be "unscientific" to require specific minority representation within the party ranks, according to the official party position. Guo Zhengli, The Theory and Practice of Regional Ethnic Autonomy with Chinese Characteristics [Zhongguo tese de minzu quyu sishi lilun yu shijian] (Urumqi: Xinjiang University Press, 1992), 92.
48 Nicholas Becquelin, "Staged Development in Xinjiang," 178 China Quarterly 358, 363 (2004).
49 In a widely studied speech in May 2005, Hu Jintao stressed the need to increase party control over nationality work. He highlighted the need to "increase the contingent of nationality work cadres" while avoiding any mention of increasing the number of ethnic minority Party members. Hu Jintao, "Opening Speech to the Ethnic Affairs Work National Conference."
50 Central Personnel Office Notice on the Correct Handling of Party Members' Believing in Religion [Guanyu tuoshan jiejue gongchan dangyuan xinyang zongjiao wenti de tongzhi], issued20 March 93; Chinese Communist Party Notice on "Our Nation's Basic Understanding and Policies Toward Religion in the Current Stage of Socialism" [Zhonggong zhongyang yinfa "guanyuwoguo shehuizhuyi shiqi he jiben zhengce de tongzhi"], issued March 1982. Religion is a central marker of ethnic identity for many in China, including the Tibetans and the country's ten Muslim minorities.
51 The Chinese government distinguishes between those from "the interior, advanced regions" and those from the "borderland, autonomous areas."
52 "Assist Tibet, Xinjiang, and Border Areas Cadre Policy" [Yuan zang, yuanjiang zhibianganbu], State Ethnic Affairs Web site.
53 Louisa Lim, "Uighurs Lost Out in Development," BBC (Online), 19 December 03.
54 The Xinjiang Propaganda Department praised a local technical college for placing 60 minority graduates in the coastal city of Shenzhen. The school plans to send another 180 by year's end. "60 Xinjiang Minority Technical School Graduates Take Jobs in Shenzhen" [Xinjiang 60 ming shaoshu minzu zhongzhuansheng Shenzhen jiuye], Tianshan Net (Online), 14 April 05.
55 State Council Regulation on the Implementation of the REAL, art. 18.
56 "Assist Tibet, Xinjiang, and Border Areas Cadre Policy," State Ethnic Affairs Web site.
57 Wen Jun, "Assessment of the Stability of China's Minority Economic Policy 1949–2002" [Zhongguo shaoshu minzu jingji zhengce wendingxing pinggu], Development Research, No. 3,2004, 40–45.
58 Calla Weimer, "The Economy of Xinjiang," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004), 163–189; Nicholas Becquelin, "Staged Development in Xinjiang," 362; David Bachman, "Making Xinjiang Safe for the Han? Contradictions and Ironies of Chinese Governance in China's Northwest," in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 165–168.
59 Uighurs also regularly report that they are discriminated against in the broader job market, with offices publicly posting help wanted signs stipulating "Uighurs need not apply." "China's Influence in Central Asia (Part 5)," Radio Free Asia. Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman state that "members of the Han majority appear to advance more rapidly than similarly qualified Uighurs, while even in Kashgar many specialized occupations are reserved for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps and other Han-dominated work units." Graham E. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, "Islam in Xinjiang," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004), 325. Economist Calla Weimer demonstrates statistically that Uighurs have less earning power than Han living in the same area. Calla Weimer, "The Economy of Xinjiang," 188.
60 REAL, art. 20.
61 Ibid., arts. 27 and 65; PRC Constitution, art. 9.
62 "Complaint Against the Chinese Government's Forced Eviction of Ethnic Mongolian Herders," Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online); Hong Jiang, Fences, Ecologies, and Changes in Pastoral Life: Society and Reclamation in Uxin Ju, Inner Mongolia, China, paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference in Chicago, IL, 3 April 05; Enhebatu Togochog, Ecological Immigration and Human Rights in Inner Mongolia, paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference, Chicago, IL, 3 April 05.
63 Stanley Toops, "The Ecology of Xinjiang: A Focus on Water," in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Washington, DC: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004),271; Becquelin, "Xinjiang in the Nineties," 84.
64 State Council Regulation on Implementation of the REAL, arts. 30 and 32. Article 8 requires the central government to compensate autonomous governments who have suffered financially after implementing ecological development projects. Many of the central government's largest ecological protection programs are in minority regions, which must share the financial burden of implementing the center's plans. The "three returns" plan of 2000 (returning farmland to forest, farmland to grasslands, and pasturelands to fallow) cost each of the affected banners in Inner Mongolia an average of 200,000 yuan annually, for example. Zhuang Wanlü , "Discussion of Minority Areas' Various Types of Poverty: The Problem of Local Government Financial Resources Poverty" [Lun minzu diqu de linglei pinkun—difang zhengfu caizheng pinkun wenti], Journal of Southwest University for Nationalities, Vol. 24 No. 6, June 2003, 23.
65 REAL, art. 36. Minority governments have established a number of special schools to increase literacy among adult minorities. In these short courses, local education departments within the autonomous areas tailor textbooks to student needs. Some courses use local minority scripts to teach farming techniques and personal hygiene, for example. The government carefully monitors the depiction of minority history in all fields of publication, however, including textbooks. All textbooks must reflect official historiography showing "family ties and deep affection among the nationalities" and "common struggle towards prosperity of all the minorities within a multinational unitary state." Teachers are not allowed to include course segments on a particular minority group's distinct history. Commission Staff Interview.
66 "Education for Ethnic Minorities," China's Education and Research Network Web site.
67 Minorities Statistical Yearbook 2000 [Minzu tongji nianjian 2000], Ethnic Publishing House Web site. The percentage of minorities in the total student population in secondary technical schools rose for that same period from 0.4 percent to 6.6 percent, in teaching institutes from 2.1 percent to 10.7 percent, in middle schools from 2.6 percent to 6.8 percent, and primary schools from 2.2 percent to 9 percent.
68 More than 10,000 attended similar classes in preparation for secondary school. "Education for Ethnic Minorities II," China's Education and Research Network Web site.
69 Wang Lequan, "Maintain the Dominant Position of Marxism in Ideological Work and Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principals," Seeking Truth, 16 January 05, No. 2, (FBIS, 1 February05).
70 Commission Staff Interview.
71 Steven Harrell and Ma Erzi (Mgebbu Lunze), "Folk Theories of Success Where Han Aren't Always Best," in China's National Minority Education: Culture, Schooling, and Development, ed. Gerard A. Postiglione (New York: Falmer Press, 1999), 220–1.
72 These are terms the government uses to deride those it believes promote the interests of their own ethnic group over the interests of the state as a whole or who favor the creation of a separate state for their minority group.
73 Chinese Communist Party Notice on "Our Nation's Basic Understanding and Policies Toward Religion in the Current Stage of Socialism."
74 Central Personnel Office Notice on the Correct Handling of Party Members' Believing in Religion.
74 Hu Jintao stressed the importance of "conducting nationality solidarity propaganda and education campaigns on an extensive scale" in his May address to the National Conference on Ethnic Minority Work, while Xinjiang's Party secretary announced that the region would "vigorously step up propaganda to reveal that the fallacies spread by national separatists are outrageous lies." Wang Lequan, "Maintain the Dominant Position of Marxism in Ideological
75 Work and Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principals." On June 29, 2005, the central State Ethnic Affairs Commission met with more than 20 media organizations, including the Party's main theoretical journal and the national People's Daily, to discuss increasing propaganda work. "State Ethnic Affairs Commission Holds Meeting with Media Representatives"[Guojia minwei juban xinwen meiti zuotanhui], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, 28 June 05.
76 "The Teahorse Road" [Chama gudao], State Ethnic Affairs Commission Web site, May 2005.
77 One scholar argues that the Party in essence "created" certain ethnic groups through careful manipulation of ethnic cultural markers, widespread Party propaganda about the groups' histories and cultures, and banning of unofficial critiques of minorities' cultures. Kaup, Creating the Zhuang.
78 Michael Dillon, "Uyghur Language and Culture Under Threat in Xinjiang," Diplomatic Observer (Online), 14 August 02.
79 Members of some minority groups report that they are pleased to highlight their ethnic heritage in these and other state-sponsored forums. Numerous Zhuang scholars, peasants, and government workers, for example, participated with enthusiasm in the construction of a "Zhuang Village" display near the capital of Yunnan in 2001. Commission Staff Interviews.
80 The White Paper notes that over 50 million copies of 4,800 separate book titles have been published in minority languages, and more than 200 magazines and 88 newspapers.
81 The Paper notes, for example, that it was the central authorities who "organized" 3,000 experts and scholars to compile a five-part series of books on each of China's ethnic minorities. The White Paper also reports that "the state has set up institutions to collect, assort, translate and study in an organized and programmed manner the three major heroic epics of China's ethnic minorities."
82 REAL, art.10.
83 Minglang Zhou, Multilingualism in China: The Politics of Writing Reforms for Minority Languages 1949–2002 (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2003). Not all of the minorities had unified written scripts when the Communist Party came to power in 1949. Practical challenges, such as determining which dialect should form the foundation for new phonetic scripts, limited many minorities' ability to utilize their own scripts rather than any concerted efforts by the central government to limit their use.
84 Select universities in the TAR, Inner Mongolia, and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture offer coursework in minority languages, though generally minority language use is limited to primary and middle schools. In many areas, minority languages are used only in the lower levels of primary school until students master Chinese and are able to take all of their classes in Mandarin.
85 The REAL Implementing Regulations instruct autonomous areas to promote "bilingual teaching." Whereas Article 37 of the REAL previously only stipulated that "Han language and literature courses" should be offered in the senior grades of primary school or secondary school, the new Regulations encourage the use of Mandarin with minority languages in all courses. Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer reports that the Uighur language has been banned in schools throughout Xinjiang. Commission Staff Interview, 22 August 05.
86 Mette Halskov Hansen, "The Challenge of Sipsong Panna in the Southwest," in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 69.
87 Regulation on Spoken and Written Language Work in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region [Neimenggu zizhiqu menggu yuyan wenzi gongzuo tiaoli], enacted 26 November 04.
88 Ibid. Article 18, for example, increases the number of translators in each government office and assures that they receive the same rank and compensation as others in their office. Article 14 states that offices and businesses should give priority in hiring to students who received their education in Mongol technical schools.
89 Mette Halskov Hansen, "The Challenge of Sipsong Panna in the Southwest," 62.
90 A survey conducted in Xinjiang in 2003 revealed that over 67 percent of those interviewed felt strong Mandarin language skills were the most important qualification for hiring minorities. Wang Jianjun, "Develop Social Surveys, Train Qualified Talent" [Kaizhan shehui diaocha peiyang shiyingxing hege rencai], Advanced Scientific Education, No. 6, 2003, 64–7. "China's Influence in Central Asia (Part 5): Uighurs Count the Cost of China's Quest for Stability," Radio Free Asia.
91 Tibetans Lose Ground in Public Sector Employment in the TAR, Tibet Information Network. For detailed analysis, see Section VI—Tibet.
92 Moreover, these new cadres would not be allowed to serve in their own hometowns, despite a 1993 central government decision specifically exempting minorities from a national ban on local officials being placed in their home locales. "Xinjiang Will Hold Open Civil Service Exams for 700 Civil Servants to Enrich Southern Xinjiang" [ Xinjiang jiang mianxiang shehui zhaokao700 ming gongwuyuan chongshi nanjiang ganbu duiwu], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted on Tianshan Net (Online), 7 April 05; Temporary Regulations on Public Officials [Guojia gongwuyuan zhanxing tiaoli], issued 19 August 93; Wang Lequan, "Those Who Master Minority Language Will Be Exempted From Civil Service Examination," [Wang Lequan: zhangwo minyu baokaogongwuyuan ke mianshi], Urumqi Evening News, reprinted on Tianshan Net (Online), 25 July 05.
93 "To Establish Scientific Development Views: Xinjiang Urgently Needs to Address the Challenge of Its Talent Loss" [Luoshi kexue fazhanguan Xinjiang jidei huajie rencai liushi kunju],Workers' Daily, reprinted on Tianshan Net, 1 May 05. The government has created some special programs to encourage minorities with doctoral degrees to conduct their research in autonomous areas. The government has set aside a million yuan each year since 2000, for example, to fund research projects by minority scholars. The applicant pool for these funds is a group of 516 minority scholars sent for one to two years of advanced scientific training outside of Xinjiang between 1992 and 2001. "The Clear Success Over the Last Five Years of The Scientific Research Program for Those in Xinjiang's Special Training Plan for Minority Technical Talent" [Xinjiang shaoshu minzu keji rencai teshu peiyang jihua keyan xiangmu shishi 5 nianlai chengxiaoxianzhu], Hami Information Outlet Web site, 12 June 05.
94 Official press coverage stressed that the flow of new workers would lead to "mutual prosperity" for both Xinjiang and Gansu. "Jointly Prosper: 4,000 Gansu Households Begin Work in Xinjiang's Construction and Production Corps," Gansu Daily, 21 April 05, reprinted on TianshanNet, 22 April 05.
95 Xinjiang is home to 8.2 million Uighurs, who are largely Sunni Muslims of Turkic descent. Several other minorities live in the region, including Tajiks, Kazahks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Mongols. Xinjiang supplies over 35 percent of China's oil and gas, and borders eight countries.
96 Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, April 2005; Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uighur Discontent.
97 He Ruixia, "Political Thought Work In the Course of Strengthening and Improving the Struggle Against Nationality Splittism" [Jiaqiang he gaijin fandui minzu fenliezhuyi douzhengzhong de sixiang zhengshi gongzuo], Seeking Truth, No. 2, 2004, 22–4.
98 Commission Staff Interview. "Press Conference on the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region" [Zizhiqu chengli 50 zhounian xinwen fabuhuizhaokai], Tianshan Net (Online), 25 August 05.
99 "In the Midst of Glory and Hope: Key Points in Propaganda for Xinjiang 50th Anniversary"[Xinjiang zai huihuan yu xiwang zhong fengyongqianjin: qingzhu Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu chengli 50 nianzhou xuanchuan jiaoyu yaodian], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted on Tianshan Net (Online), 19 May 05; "AFP: Xinjiang Ribao Carries 'Editorial' Against Separatism as Uzbek President To Visit," Agence France-Presse, 25 May 05 (FBIS, 25 May 05).
100 "Xinjiang Has Become the Main Battlefield For China's Antiterrorism Struggle," China Youth Daily, 6 September 05 (FBIS, 7 September 05).
101 Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang; Arienne M. Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uighur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse (Washington: East-West Center Washington, 2005); Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uighur Discontent.
102 "Police Patrolmen in China's Xinjiang Capital Get Sub-Machine-Guns," Urumqi News, 1 March 05 (FBIS, 1 March 05).
103 Gardner Bovingdon, "The Not-so-Silent Majority: Uighur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang," 28 Modern China 39, 39–78 (2002). For similar findings, see Jay Todd Dautcher, "Reading Out-of-Print: Popular Culture and Protest on China's Western Frontier," in China Beyond the Headlines, eds. T.B. Weston and L.M. Jensen (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000),273–295; Justin Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uighur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Joanne Smith, "Four Generations of Uighurs: The Shift towards Ethno-Political Ideologies Among Xinjiang's Youth," Vol. 2, No. 2 Inner Asia 195, 195–224 (2000).
104 Michael Dillon, "Uighur Language and Culture Under Threat in Xinjiang."
105 China's Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law: Does It Protect Minority Rights?, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 April 05, Testimony of Gardner Bovingdon, Assistant Professor, Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
106 Wang Lequan, "Maintain the Dominant Position of Marxism in Ideological Work and Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principals."
107 He Ruixia, "Political Thought Work In the Course of Strengthening and Improving the Struggle Against Nationality Splittism," 23.
108 Linguist Arienne Dwyer dates the beginning of a policy of forced linguistic assimilation to the mid-1980s. Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uighur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse.
109 "China Imposes Chinese Language on Uyghur Schools," Radio Free Asia (Online), 16 March 04. Xinjiang residents previously had the choice of attending minority schools, in which classes were conducted in minority languages, or Chinese schools, where Mandarin was used. Graduates with Mandarin Chinese language skills are more competitive in the job market, and some Uighurs may welcome the opportunity to study the language. The government is demanding a rapid transition to bilingual schools, however, and is placing higher emphasis on Mandarin language use than on local minority language use. Uighurs in exile report that the government has banned Uighur language use in schools and that Uighurs fear "cultural annihilation" through the weakening of their language. Commission Staff Interview with Rebiya Kadeer, 22 August 05.
110 Teacher-student ratios in Xinjiang's colleges are 1:333 compared to the national average of 1:144, according to an article in the party's main theoretical journal. While more than 800new teachers are needed to bring Xinjiang's teacher-student ratio in line with the national average, Xinjiang actually lost more than 530 higher education teachers between 2001–2004. Gu Huayang, "Research on the Current Situation and Policy of Xinjiang's Educational Development" [Xinjiang jiaoyu fazhan de xianzhuag ji duice yanjiu], Seeking Truth, No.2, 2004, 74–7.
111 Dwyer, The Xinjiang Conflict: Uighur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse, 40.
112 "Wang Lequan Stresses: Firmly Implement the Principle of Politicians Managing Education" [Wang Lequan qiangdiao: jianding luoshi zhengzhijia ban jiaoyu yuanze], Xinjiang Economic News, reprinted on Xinhua (Online), 26 April 05.
113 "Xinjiang Will Hold Open Civil Service Exams for 700 Civil Servants to Enrich Southern Xinjiang," Xinjiang Daily.
114 "Wang Lequan Stresses: Firmly Implement the Principle of Politicians Managing Education," Xinjiang Economic News.
115 "How to Handle the Issue of Religion Interfering in Education in Minority Areas with a Majority of Religious Believers" [Zai yixie duoshuren xinjiao de minzu diqu, rehe chuli zongjiao ganyu xuexiao jiaoyu wenti], State Minorities Bookstore Web site.
116 Wang Lequan, "Maintain the Dominant Position of Marxism in Ideological Work and Adhere to the Four Cardinal Principals."
117 Zhang Jian, "Speech at the All-County 20th Teachers' Day Award Ceremony" [Zai quanxian qingzhu di ershi ge jiaoshijie ji biaozhang dahuishang de jianghua], Buerjin County (Xinjiang) Communist Party Office Web site, 10 September 04.
118 He Ruixia, "Political Thought Work In the Course of Strengthening and Improving the Struggle Against Nationality Splittism," 22–4.
119 "Wang Lequan Stresses: Firmly Implement the Principle of Politicians Managing Education," Xinjiang Economic News.
120 He Ruixia, "Political Thought Work In the Course of Strengthening and Improving the Struggle Against Nationality Splittism," 22–4.
121Ibid.
122 Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Appendix III.
123 The story tells of a wild pigeon who commits suicide rather than submit to being caged by humans who feed him well, but deny him his freedom. "RFA Publishes First English Translation of Noted Uighur Story," Radio Free Asia (Online), 29 June 05.
124 Tohti Tunyaz's doctoral advisor in Japan denies any such publications exist. Tunyaz was arrested for obtaining state secrets, which according to the sentencing record were publicly available library materials he obtained from a state- employed librarian at Xinjiang University. "Honorary Members: Tohti Tunyaz," Pen American Center Web site.
125 The charges included "inciting to split China, organizing meetings, taking oaths, accepting membership and possessing illegal publications and counterrevolutionary videos for propaganda purposes." "Bingtuan Supreme Court Affirms Jail Terms for Uighur Youths," Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 December 03.
126 The names of the other defendants have not been disclosed. Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, 49.
127 Ibid., 6.
PRC Economy and Industry: News and Discussions
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Han culturism differentiates between the culture of the Han, the inner people (nei ren) and the barbarians, the outer people (wai ren). This concept is a hand me down from the time of the Shang Dynasty, who political centre was located North of the Yellow River.
The Chinese differentiate between raw barbarians (shengfan) or the unassimilated people and the “cooked barbarians” (shufan) or those who were assimilated and yet were not the Han people e.g. the Han Chinese separated the ‘cooked’ Li of the coast of Hainan from the ‘uncooked’ Li of the central forest.
Barbarians were given generic names in the Chinese classics and histories: the Yi barbarians to the East, the Man to the South, Rong to the West and Di to the North.
Until the 1930s, the names of the outgroups (wai ren) were commonly written in characters with the animal radical: the Di, a northern tribe were linked to the dog; the Man and Min of the South were characterised with reptiles; the Qiangs were written with a sheep radical. This reflected the Han Chinese conviction that civilisation and culture were linked with humanity; alien groups living outside the pale of Han society were regarded as inhuman savages.
The custom of sharply distinguishing between the inner and outer people went along with the calling China the Middle Kingdom (zhong guo) , which began by ruling the Central plain (zhongyang) in North China. Rather than using outright military conquest, the theory of ‘using the Chinese ways to transform the barbarians (yongxiabianyi)’ was promulgated. By cultural absorption or racial integration through intermarriage, a barbarian could become a Han Chinese (Hanhua).
Excerpted from:
An Ethnohistorical Dictionary of China
http://books.google.com/books?id=IOM8qF ... t#PPA95,M1
Sun Yat Sen, the founder of Chinese Republic overthrew the Qing Dynasty which ruled over all of China from 1644 to 1911 and proclaim when he launch his rebellion against the Qing Dynasty which was ruled by Manchus:
“ In order to restore our national independence, we must first restore the Chinese nation. In order to restore the Chinese nation, we must drive the barbarian Manchus back to the Changbai Mountains. In order to get rid of the barbarians, we must first overthrow the present tyrannical, dictatorial, ugly, and corrupt Qing government. Fellow countrymen, a revolution is the only means to overthrow the Qing government!
The Chinese differentiate between raw barbarians (shengfan) or the unassimilated people and the “cooked barbarians” (shufan) or those who were assimilated and yet were not the Han people e.g. the Han Chinese separated the ‘cooked’ Li of the coast of Hainan from the ‘uncooked’ Li of the central forest.
Barbarians were given generic names in the Chinese classics and histories: the Yi barbarians to the East, the Man to the South, Rong to the West and Di to the North.
Until the 1930s, the names of the outgroups (wai ren) were commonly written in characters with the animal radical: the Di, a northern tribe were linked to the dog; the Man and Min of the South were characterised with reptiles; the Qiangs were written with a sheep radical. This reflected the Han Chinese conviction that civilisation and culture were linked with humanity; alien groups living outside the pale of Han society were regarded as inhuman savages.
The custom of sharply distinguishing between the inner and outer people went along with the calling China the Middle Kingdom (zhong guo) , which began by ruling the Central plain (zhongyang) in North China. Rather than using outright military conquest, the theory of ‘using the Chinese ways to transform the barbarians (yongxiabianyi)’ was promulgated. By cultural absorption or racial integration through intermarriage, a barbarian could become a Han Chinese (Hanhua).
Excerpted from:
An Ethnohistorical Dictionary of China
http://books.google.com/books?id=IOM8qF ... t#PPA95,M1
Sun Yat Sen, the founder of Chinese Republic overthrew the Qing Dynasty which ruled over all of China from 1644 to 1911 and proclaim when he launch his rebellion against the Qing Dynasty which was ruled by Manchus:
“ In order to restore our national independence, we must first restore the Chinese nation. In order to restore the Chinese nation, we must drive the barbarian Manchus back to the Changbai Mountains. In order to get rid of the barbarians, we must first overthrow the present tyrannical, dictatorial, ugly, and corrupt Qing government. Fellow countrymen, a revolution is the only means to overthrow the Qing government!
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Amit,
If you have the patience to read the posts above and this one that I have made, you will realise the deceit that the Chinese Communist mouthpieces spew, frothing all the way!!
Try this and see what sheep they are:
In Chinese history, Legalism (Chinese: 法 家; pinyin: Fǎjiā; Wade-Giles: Fa-chia; literally "School of law") was one of the four main philosophic schools during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period (the other three being Confucianism, Daoism and Mohism). This period (from 770 to 221 BC) was an era of great cultural and intellectual ferment in China, and gave rise to the important Hundred Schools of Thought. In China under the political leadership of Li Si, his form of Legalism became the predominant ideology in China. Some scholars consider Li Si's form of Legalism to have been one of the earliest known totalitarian ideologies.
Legalism was a pragmatic political philosophy that does not address higher questions like the nature and purpose of life. It has maxims like "when the epoch changed, legalism is the act of following all laws", and its essential principle is one of jurisprudence. "Legalism" here has the meaning of "political philosophy that upholds the rule of law", and is thus distinguished from the Western meaning of the word. The school's most famous proponent and contributor Han Fei (韓非) believed that a ruler should govern his subjects by the following trinity:
1. Fa (Chinese: 法; pinyin: fǎ; literally "law or principle"): The law code must be clearly written and made public. All people under the ruler were equal before the law. Laws should reward those who obey them and punish accordingly those who dare to break them. Thus it is guaranteed that actions taken are systematically predictable. In addition, the system of law ran the state, not the ruler. If the law is successfully enforced, even a weak ruler will be strong.
2. Shu (Chinese: 術; pinyin: shù; literally "method, tactic or art"): Special tactics and "secrets" are to be employed by the ruler to make sure others don't take over control of the state. Especially important is that no one can fathom the ruler's motivations, and thus no one can know which behaviour might help them getting ahead; except for following the 法 or laws.
3. Shi (Chinese: 勢; pinyin: shì; literally "legitimacy, power or charisma"): It is the position of the ruler, not the ruler himself or herself, that holds the power. Therefore, analysis of the trends, the context, and the facts are essential for a real ruler.
Origin
Legalism was first created by Hanfeizi and Li Si as a realist reform oriented philosophy to turn the state of Qin from a backward state to a powerful state. It emerged in a critical point in ancient Chinese history as the region was on the brink of civil war during the Warring States Period. Many new religions were made to solve these problems including, Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. The Qin Dynasty would eventually conquer six other feudal states and create what is regarded as the first true Chinese Empire. Shang Yang's law theories advocate the belief that all people are fundamentally equal and that stringent laws and harsh punishments are required to keep them in order. In addition his theories thought all humanity was selfish and evil, which added towards the cause for Shang Yang becoming prime minister of the Qin under the rule of Duke Xiao of Qin and gradually transforming the state into a vigorously regulated machine, the sole purpose of which was the elimination of all rivals. Shang Yang swept away the aristocracy and implemented a meritocracy – only those who achieved could reach high places and birth privilege was reserved exclusively for the ruler of the state. Previously the army had been controlled by nobles and constituted of feudal levies. Now generals could come from any part of society, provided they had sufficient skill. In addition, troops were highly trained and disciplined. From then on, Qin was taking its shape to become the most powerful state in China before it eventually brought all of the six other states together (Qi, Chu, Han, Yan, Zhao, and Wei) under the First Emperor (Qin Shi Huang, literally the First Emperor - prior to ascending to the imperial throne he was known as Qin Ying Zheng).
Role of the ruler
Primarily members of the ruling class, the Legalists emphasized that the head of state was endowed with the "mystery of authority” (Chinese: 勢; pinyin: shì), and as such his decisions must always command the respect and obedience of the people. The state (country) comes first, not the individual. The emperor’s very figure brought legitimacy. In emphasizing the power of rulership, Legalists such as Shen Dao (ca. 350 - 275 BCE) and Shen Buhai sought to devalue the importance of the charismatic ruler. Skillful rulers hid their true intentions and feigned nonchalance. To ensure that all of his words were revered, the wise ruler kept a low profile. Thus, theoretically, by cloaking both his desires and his will, the Emperors checked sycophancy and forced his subject to heed his dictates. While Shang Yang (the Prime Minister of Duke Xiao of Qin) would allow rulers to listen to musical instruments rather than focus on foreign policy, Han Fei (the Legalist scholar most admired by the First Qin Emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi) demanded more of the wise ruler. A good leader, by Han Fei's standards, must not only accept the advice of loyal ministers when shown to be in error, but must also extend courtesy to those beneath him or her and not be too avaricious. The adept ruler also understood the importance of strictness over benevolence. Although the ruler was expected to be paternalistic, the Legalists emphasized that being too kind would spoil the populace and threaten the state's internal order. Interestingly, according to Han's Grand Historian Sima Qian (ca. 145-86 BCE), while the First Qin Emperor hid himself from the rest of the world (perhaps due to a desire to attain immortality) and thus maintained a low profile, he did not necessarily follow all of the Legalists’ advice on the role of the ruler.
Role of ministers in Legalist thought
To aid the ruler and help prevent misgovernance, Shen Buhai – a minister from the state of Han for fifteen years – formalized the concept of shu (Chinese: 術; pinyin: shù; literally "methods"), or the bureaucratic model of administration that served to advance the ideal Legalist ruler’s program. To the Legalists, the intelligent minister was the ruler's most important aide. Whereas the minister’s duty was to understand specific affairs, the ruler was responsible for correctly judging ministers’ performances. Stressing that ministers and other officials too often sought favours from foreign powers by abusing their positions, Han Fei urged rulers to control these individuals by the two handles of punishment and favour. Officials were required, through fear, to ensure that ministers' accomplishments were neither greater than nor inferior to the assigned undertaking. According to the eminent sinologist Robin Yates, newly discovered Qin Dynasty legal codes show that officials were required to correctly calculate the exact amount of labor expected of all artisans; if the artisan was ordered to perform either too much work or too little work, the official would be held accountable. Thus, in Legalist theory, ministers and other officials were prevented from performing some other official's duties and were punished if they attempted to blind the ruler with words or failed to warn the ruler of danger. One consequence of this situation was that the ministers could always be held accountable for royal misadventures while the ruler’s name was never to be tarnished. By emphasizing performance, however, over sophistry, the Legalists hoped to eliminate bureaucratic corruption and intrigues amongst the officialdom through fear.
Purpose of law
The whole system was set up to make model citizens behave and act how the dynasty wanted them to act against their will. The laws supported by the Legalists were meant to support the state, the emperor, and his military. They were also reform-oriented and innovative. In theory, the Legalists believed that if the punishments were heavy and the law equally applied, neither the powerful nor the weak would be able to escape state control. The Legalists especially emphasized pragmatism over precedence and custom as the basis of law. Guided by Legalist thought, the First Qin Emperor, Qin Shi Huang, would weaken the power of the feudal lords (although not completely as previously discussed), divide the unified empire into thirty-six administrative provinces, and standardize the writing system. Reflecting Legalist passion for order and structure, Qin soldiers were only mobilized when both halves of tiger-shaped tallies (one held by the ruler and the other by the commanding general) were brought together. Likewise, all documents in the empire had to have recorded the year they were written, the scribe who copied them, and up to the exact hour of delivery. Accepting Shang Yang’s earlier emphasis on the standardization of weights and measures, the Qin Shi Huang would also accept Shang Yang’s philosophy that no individual in the state should be above the law (by ensuring harsh punishments for all cases of dissent) and that families should be divided into smaller households. While there is reason to doubt Sima Qian’s claim that Qin Shi Huang did in fact divide households into groups of ten, certainly the other examples of standardization and administrative organization undertaken by the First Emperor reflect the importance of Legalist thought in Qin law. Based on promoting the interests of the state Qin, the law (Chinese: 法; pinyin: fǎ; literally "law, method, way, Buddhist teaching") served as a vehicle to both control the populace and eliminate dissent. People were forced to live as apart of the society or be removed (murdered).
Legalism and individual autonomy
The Legalist philosophers emphasized the primacy of the state over individual autonomy. The lone individual had no legitimate civil rights and any personal freedom had to strengthen the ruler. Han Fei , in particular, would be very caustic towards the concept of individual rights. Fundamentally, the Legalists viewed the plebeian (common people of lower class) and their actions as evil and foolish.
However, Legalism allowed the common people to gain in rank if they performed well. For example, soldiers would gain in rank according to the number of heads the soldiers collected. A soldier may even gain noble rank. In contrast, some other states allowed only the well-connected to gain higher ranks. An example of this would be Lü Buwei, who originally a merchant, was able to become Chancellor of China, an occurrence that would never happen in the other six states. However, it should be noted that he played a major role in King Zhuangxiang of Qin's rise to power.
According to Shang Yang's The Book of Lord Shang, the people themselves wanted a ruler to generate order. Social cohesion in the Legalist state mandated that the populace never escape punishment. The Qin dynasty used the people, for example, to maintain vigilant mutual surveillance over one another under threat of death.
This intrastate realpolitik would end up devouring the Legalist philosophers themselves. Shang Yang, in advocating the state’s right to punish even the heir-apparent’s tutor, would run afoul of the future King Huiwen of Qin (r. 338 -311 BCE). Whereas at one point, he had the power to exile his opponents (and, thus, eviscerate individual criticism) to border regions of the state, he died when torn into pieces by chariots. Similarly, Han Fei would end up being poisoned by his envious former classmate Li Si, who in turn would be killed (under the law he had introduced) by the violent Second Qin Emperor he had helped to take the throne.
Decline
In later dynasties, Legalism was discredited and ceased to be an independent school of thought. However, both ancient and modern Confucian observers of Chinese politics have argued that some Legalist ideas have merged with mainstream Confucianism and still play a major role in government. The philosophy of imperial China has been described as a Confucian exterior covering a core of Legalism (Chinese: 儒表法裏; pinyin: rú biăo fă cái; literally "Confucian scholar; external surface; Legalism; judgment"). In other words, Confucian values are used to sugarcoat the harsh Legalist ideas that underlie the Imperial system. During the Sui and Tang dynasty, Buddhist ideas were also part of the external face of the imperial system.
There was a brief revival of Legalism during the Sui dynasty's efforts to reunify China. After the Sui dynasty was replaced by the Tang dynasty, the Tang government still used the government structure left behind by the Sui dynasty, albeit with much reduced punishments.
More recently, Mao Zedong, who had some knowledge of ancient Chinese philosophy, compared himself with Qin Shi Huang and publicly approved of some Legalist methods. One such method approved in the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping administration is the reward and punishment, which has increased the size of the Beijing government in the process. However, since the 1990s the related concept of the rule of law has gained currency.
:
If you have the patience to read the posts above and this one that I have made, you will realise the deceit that the Chinese Communist mouthpieces spew, frothing all the way!!
Try this and see what sheep they are:
In Chinese history, Legalism (Chinese: 法 家; pinyin: Fǎjiā; Wade-Giles: Fa-chia; literally "School of law") was one of the four main philosophic schools during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period (the other three being Confucianism, Daoism and Mohism). This period (from 770 to 221 BC) was an era of great cultural and intellectual ferment in China, and gave rise to the important Hundred Schools of Thought. In China under the political leadership of Li Si, his form of Legalism became the predominant ideology in China. Some scholars consider Li Si's form of Legalism to have been one of the earliest known totalitarian ideologies.
Legalism was a pragmatic political philosophy that does not address higher questions like the nature and purpose of life. It has maxims like "when the epoch changed, legalism is the act of following all laws", and its essential principle is one of jurisprudence. "Legalism" here has the meaning of "political philosophy that upholds the rule of law", and is thus distinguished from the Western meaning of the word. The school's most famous proponent and contributor Han Fei (韓非) believed that a ruler should govern his subjects by the following trinity:
1. Fa (Chinese: 法; pinyin: fǎ; literally "law or principle"): The law code must be clearly written and made public. All people under the ruler were equal before the law. Laws should reward those who obey them and punish accordingly those who dare to break them. Thus it is guaranteed that actions taken are systematically predictable. In addition, the system of law ran the state, not the ruler. If the law is successfully enforced, even a weak ruler will be strong.
2. Shu (Chinese: 術; pinyin: shù; literally "method, tactic or art"): Special tactics and "secrets" are to be employed by the ruler to make sure others don't take over control of the state. Especially important is that no one can fathom the ruler's motivations, and thus no one can know which behaviour might help them getting ahead; except for following the 法 or laws.
3. Shi (Chinese: 勢; pinyin: shì; literally "legitimacy, power or charisma"): It is the position of the ruler, not the ruler himself or herself, that holds the power. Therefore, analysis of the trends, the context, and the facts are essential for a real ruler.
Origin
Legalism was first created by Hanfeizi and Li Si as a realist reform oriented philosophy to turn the state of Qin from a backward state to a powerful state. It emerged in a critical point in ancient Chinese history as the region was on the brink of civil war during the Warring States Period. Many new religions were made to solve these problems including, Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. The Qin Dynasty would eventually conquer six other feudal states and create what is regarded as the first true Chinese Empire. Shang Yang's law theories advocate the belief that all people are fundamentally equal and that stringent laws and harsh punishments are required to keep them in order. In addition his theories thought all humanity was selfish and evil, which added towards the cause for Shang Yang becoming prime minister of the Qin under the rule of Duke Xiao of Qin and gradually transforming the state into a vigorously regulated machine, the sole purpose of which was the elimination of all rivals. Shang Yang swept away the aristocracy and implemented a meritocracy – only those who achieved could reach high places and birth privilege was reserved exclusively for the ruler of the state. Previously the army had been controlled by nobles and constituted of feudal levies. Now generals could come from any part of society, provided they had sufficient skill. In addition, troops were highly trained and disciplined. From then on, Qin was taking its shape to become the most powerful state in China before it eventually brought all of the six other states together (Qi, Chu, Han, Yan, Zhao, and Wei) under the First Emperor (Qin Shi Huang, literally the First Emperor - prior to ascending to the imperial throne he was known as Qin Ying Zheng).
Role of the ruler
Primarily members of the ruling class, the Legalists emphasized that the head of state was endowed with the "mystery of authority” (Chinese: 勢; pinyin: shì), and as such his decisions must always command the respect and obedience of the people. The state (country) comes first, not the individual. The emperor’s very figure brought legitimacy. In emphasizing the power of rulership, Legalists such as Shen Dao (ca. 350 - 275 BCE) and Shen Buhai sought to devalue the importance of the charismatic ruler. Skillful rulers hid their true intentions and feigned nonchalance. To ensure that all of his words were revered, the wise ruler kept a low profile. Thus, theoretically, by cloaking both his desires and his will, the Emperors checked sycophancy and forced his subject to heed his dictates. While Shang Yang (the Prime Minister of Duke Xiao of Qin) would allow rulers to listen to musical instruments rather than focus on foreign policy, Han Fei (the Legalist scholar most admired by the First Qin Emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi) demanded more of the wise ruler. A good leader, by Han Fei's standards, must not only accept the advice of loyal ministers when shown to be in error, but must also extend courtesy to those beneath him or her and not be too avaricious. The adept ruler also understood the importance of strictness over benevolence. Although the ruler was expected to be paternalistic, the Legalists emphasized that being too kind would spoil the populace and threaten the state's internal order. Interestingly, according to Han's Grand Historian Sima Qian (ca. 145-86 BCE), while the First Qin Emperor hid himself from the rest of the world (perhaps due to a desire to attain immortality) and thus maintained a low profile, he did not necessarily follow all of the Legalists’ advice on the role of the ruler.
Role of ministers in Legalist thought
To aid the ruler and help prevent misgovernance, Shen Buhai – a minister from the state of Han for fifteen years – formalized the concept of shu (Chinese: 術; pinyin: shù; literally "methods"), or the bureaucratic model of administration that served to advance the ideal Legalist ruler’s program. To the Legalists, the intelligent minister was the ruler's most important aide. Whereas the minister’s duty was to understand specific affairs, the ruler was responsible for correctly judging ministers’ performances. Stressing that ministers and other officials too often sought favours from foreign powers by abusing their positions, Han Fei urged rulers to control these individuals by the two handles of punishment and favour. Officials were required, through fear, to ensure that ministers' accomplishments were neither greater than nor inferior to the assigned undertaking. According to the eminent sinologist Robin Yates, newly discovered Qin Dynasty legal codes show that officials were required to correctly calculate the exact amount of labor expected of all artisans; if the artisan was ordered to perform either too much work or too little work, the official would be held accountable. Thus, in Legalist theory, ministers and other officials were prevented from performing some other official's duties and were punished if they attempted to blind the ruler with words or failed to warn the ruler of danger. One consequence of this situation was that the ministers could always be held accountable for royal misadventures while the ruler’s name was never to be tarnished. By emphasizing performance, however, over sophistry, the Legalists hoped to eliminate bureaucratic corruption and intrigues amongst the officialdom through fear.
Purpose of law
The whole system was set up to make model citizens behave and act how the dynasty wanted them to act against their will. The laws supported by the Legalists were meant to support the state, the emperor, and his military. They were also reform-oriented and innovative. In theory, the Legalists believed that if the punishments were heavy and the law equally applied, neither the powerful nor the weak would be able to escape state control. The Legalists especially emphasized pragmatism over precedence and custom as the basis of law. Guided by Legalist thought, the First Qin Emperor, Qin Shi Huang, would weaken the power of the feudal lords (although not completely as previously discussed), divide the unified empire into thirty-six administrative provinces, and standardize the writing system. Reflecting Legalist passion for order and structure, Qin soldiers were only mobilized when both halves of tiger-shaped tallies (one held by the ruler and the other by the commanding general) were brought together. Likewise, all documents in the empire had to have recorded the year they were written, the scribe who copied them, and up to the exact hour of delivery. Accepting Shang Yang’s earlier emphasis on the standardization of weights and measures, the Qin Shi Huang would also accept Shang Yang’s philosophy that no individual in the state should be above the law (by ensuring harsh punishments for all cases of dissent) and that families should be divided into smaller households. While there is reason to doubt Sima Qian’s claim that Qin Shi Huang did in fact divide households into groups of ten, certainly the other examples of standardization and administrative organization undertaken by the First Emperor reflect the importance of Legalist thought in Qin law. Based on promoting the interests of the state Qin, the law (Chinese: 法; pinyin: fǎ; literally "law, method, way, Buddhist teaching") served as a vehicle to both control the populace and eliminate dissent. People were forced to live as apart of the society or be removed (murdered).
Legalism and individual autonomy
The Legalist philosophers emphasized the primacy of the state over individual autonomy. The lone individual had no legitimate civil rights and any personal freedom had to strengthen the ruler. Han Fei , in particular, would be very caustic towards the concept of individual rights. Fundamentally, the Legalists viewed the plebeian (common people of lower class) and their actions as evil and foolish.
However, Legalism allowed the common people to gain in rank if they performed well. For example, soldiers would gain in rank according to the number of heads the soldiers collected. A soldier may even gain noble rank. In contrast, some other states allowed only the well-connected to gain higher ranks. An example of this would be Lü Buwei, who originally a merchant, was able to become Chancellor of China, an occurrence that would never happen in the other six states. However, it should be noted that he played a major role in King Zhuangxiang of Qin's rise to power.
According to Shang Yang's The Book of Lord Shang, the people themselves wanted a ruler to generate order. Social cohesion in the Legalist state mandated that the populace never escape punishment. The Qin dynasty used the people, for example, to maintain vigilant mutual surveillance over one another under threat of death.
This intrastate realpolitik would end up devouring the Legalist philosophers themselves. Shang Yang, in advocating the state’s right to punish even the heir-apparent’s tutor, would run afoul of the future King Huiwen of Qin (r. 338 -311 BCE). Whereas at one point, he had the power to exile his opponents (and, thus, eviscerate individual criticism) to border regions of the state, he died when torn into pieces by chariots. Similarly, Han Fei would end up being poisoned by his envious former classmate Li Si, who in turn would be killed (under the law he had introduced) by the violent Second Qin Emperor he had helped to take the throne.
Decline
In later dynasties, Legalism was discredited and ceased to be an independent school of thought. However, both ancient and modern Confucian observers of Chinese politics have argued that some Legalist ideas have merged with mainstream Confucianism and still play a major role in government. The philosophy of imperial China has been described as a Confucian exterior covering a core of Legalism (Chinese: 儒表法裏; pinyin: rú biăo fă cái; literally "Confucian scholar; external surface; Legalism; judgment"). In other words, Confucian values are used to sugarcoat the harsh Legalist ideas that underlie the Imperial system. During the Sui and Tang dynasty, Buddhist ideas were also part of the external face of the imperial system.
There was a brief revival of Legalism during the Sui dynasty's efforts to reunify China. After the Sui dynasty was replaced by the Tang dynasty, the Tang government still used the government structure left behind by the Sui dynasty, albeit with much reduced punishments.
More recently, Mao Zedong, who had some knowledge of ancient Chinese philosophy, compared himself with Qin Shi Huang and publicly approved of some Legalist methods. One such method approved in the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping administration is the reward and punishment, which has increased the size of the Beijing government in the process. However, since the 1990s the related concept of the rule of law has gained currency.
:
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
The Han call others barbarians. Actually, they are the barbarians.
Here is an example:
1
Migration, Hukou, and the Chinese City1
C. Cindy Fan
China has experienced more than two decades of rapid urbanization. The level of
urbanization increased from 21% in 1982 to 40% in 2003 and is expected to exceed 50% by
2015 (Duan 2003; Zhou and Ma 2005). Migration from the countryside to the city has been the
main source of urban growth (Duan 2003; Lu and Wang 2006).2 Rural-urban migration is also
playing an increasingly important role in shaping the economic and demographic landscape of
Chinese cities. Over the past two decades, China has transformed itself from a relatively
immobile society to one where more than 10% of the population is on the move. Although
China’s mobility rate is still low compared to that of advanced industrialized economies, the
sheer size of migrants and their dramatic economic and social impacts have attracted great
attention from researchers and given rise to a large body of literature. Migration issues are, at
the same time, controversial and hotly debated among scholars, observers and Chinese
policymakers.
This chapter reviews major issues and findings in the recent literature on migration in
China, focusing on the hukou system and reform, migration patterns and changes since the 1980s,
and the impacts of migration on China’s urban and rural areas. The review is not intended to be
exhaustive. Rather, it aims at highlighting the salient facets of migration that have direct
implications for China’s urbanization process.
1 Chapter in China Urbanizes, under review and edited by Shahid Yusuf. Funding from the
World Bank, the National Science Foundation (BCS-0455107 and SBR-9618500), the Luce
Foundation and the UCLA Academic Senate that supported this research is gratefully
acknowledged. I also wish to thank Mingjie Sun and Wenfei Winnie Wang for their research
assistance.
2 Lu and Wang (2006) estimate that rural-urban migration accounted for 79% of China’s urban
growth from 1979 to 2003.
2
The Hukou (Household Registration) System and Reform
The Chinese government implemented the hukou system in the late 1950s and since then
has used it as an instrument of migration control. Every Chinese citizen is associated with a
hukou location (hukou suozaidi) and an “agricultural” (rural) or “nonagricultural” (urban) hukou
classification (hukou leibie). For the most part, both are inherited from the parents. Agricultural
hukou provides access to farmland, whereas nonagricultural hukou gives urban citizens access to
jobs, housing, food and state-sponsored benefits. Hukou location specifies where one is entitled
to the above resources and is, in essence, where one belongs. Details of how the hukou system
operates have been extensively reviewed elsewhere (Yu 2002; Wang, Fei-Ling 2005) and are not
repeated here. Suffice it to say, until the mid-1980s it was extremely difficult for rural Chinese
to survive in cities, because without urban hukou they did not have access to the necessities of
life such as food and housing, much of which was centrally controlled and allocated. The hukou
system, therefore, kept rural-urban migration to a minimum.
During the past two decades, expanded options for rural Chinese to work in urban areas
have unleashed large waves of migration. Below I highlight the major changes in the hukou
system since the 1980s.
a. Temporary migration. In October 1984, the State Council announced that peasants working in
towns would be granted the “self-supplied food grain” hukou, marking the first opening in the
rigid border between city and countryside.3 In 1985, the Ministry of Public Security issued
regulations for rural migrants to obtain the “temporary residence permit.” In the same year, the
National Congress approved the citizen's identity card as an alternative proof of identification to
3 By the late 1980s, the “self-supplied food grain” hukou had gradually disappeared (Zhong 2000:
3
hukou (Yu 2002: 35). All of this, plus increased marketization of food, housing and other daily
necessities, has made it easier for rural Chinese to work and live in urban areas. Although some
rural migrants may stay in the city for an extended period of time, their lack of an urban hukou
means that they are considered, at least in an institutional sense, “temporary migrants” (see also
qianyi renkou).
b. “Selling” of hukou. A wave of local governments charging migrants high fees4 – ranging from
several thousand yuan to tens of thousands of yuan – in exchange of hukou in small towns and
cities began in the late 1980s. City governments justified this practice on the ground that they
should be compensated for extending urban benefits to migrants.5 Beginning in the mid-1990s,
large cities such as Shanghai and Shenzhen began to offer “blue stamp” hukou, with monetary
and skill requirements only few could satisfy (Wong and Huen 1998). In reality, these practices
commodified hukou and channeled resources from the very small minority of highly successful
migrants to the coffer of urban governments (Cai 2001; Cao 2001).6
c. Hukou reform in small cities and towns. In 1997, the State Council approved a pilot scheme to
grant urban hukou to rural migrants who had a stable urban job and who had resided in selected
towns and cities for more than two years (Yu 2002: 379). Unlike earlier practices, qualified
194).
4 A variety of terms have been used to describe these fees, the most popular being jiangshe fei
(development fee), chengshi jiangshe fei (urban development fee), jiangzhen fei (town
development fee), jiangshe peitao fei (development and accessory fee) and zengrong fei
(accommodation fee). The fees may be higher in large cities than in small cities and higher in
the city proper of large cities than in their outskirts (Cao 2001).
5 Yu (2002: 374) estimates that by the end of 1993 three million rural migrants had purchased
hukou in a city or town and through which local governments had collected a total of 25 billion
yuan.
6 Since the late 1990s, the “selling” of hukou has become increasingly unpopular (Cai 2002;
Zhang and Lin 2000; Zhong 2000: 195).
4
migrants were not required to pay a hefty sum. The scheme was tested in 450 towns and small
cities, based on which the State Council approved in 2001 plans to further expand hukou reform
(Yu 2002: 382). Since then, the principal criteria for obtaining hukou in small cities and towns
have been a fixed and legal residence and a stable source of income (Cai 2003: 210). In 1998,
the State Council approved four guidelines that aimed at further relaxing urban hukou.7 In 2003,
the State Council issued a directive affirming the rights of rural migrants to work in cities (Cai
2003: 212). Adherence to these guidelines and directives is, however, up to city governments.
d. Hukou reform in large cities. The extent and specifics of hukou reform vary greatly. In
general, the larger the city, the more difficult it is to obtain a local hukou. A number of large and
medium size cities such as Zhuhai, Nanjing and Xi’an have indeed relaxed their criteria for
granting hukou (Cai 2002: 227). Shijiazhuang in Hebei is among the most adventurous cities and
granted 450,000 new hukou between August 2001 and June 2003 (Wang 2003). Yet, in most
large cities, hukou reform is minimal; only an extremely small minority of rural migrants, who
satisfy stringent criteria such as educational attainment, skills, financial ability, health, and a
clean criminal record, are awarded local hukou and given access to urban benefits (Cai 2003:
210-211; Qiu 2001; Wang 2003; Zhang and Lin 2000; Zhong and Gu 2000). “Super-large” cities
such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, where hukou is still a primary gatekeeper, are
especially resistant to hukou reform. 8 Beijing city proper hukou, for example, is required of
7 First, children can now choose to inherit hukou from the father or the mother (previously,
hukou was inherited from the mother). Second, rural persons who have lived in the city for more
than one year and whose spouses hold urban hukou may be granted urban hukou. Third, elderly
parents whose only children live in cities may be granted urban hukou. Fourth, persons who
have made investment, established enterprises or purchased apartments, who have stable jobs
and accommodation, and who have lived more than one year in a city are eligible for local hukou
(Yu 2002: 381).
8 In 2001, Beijing government began to issue three types (A, B and C) of temporary permits,
which determine the services migrants have access to and the extent of government control and
5
university graduates who wish to apply for government jobs (Beijing chenbao 2006). Many
enterprises in Beijing restrict hiring to individuals who have Beijing hukou (Fazhi wanbao 2006).
In addition, city governments can tighten the policy at its discretion. In August 2004, for
example, Zhengzhou reversed its hukou reform because the large number of new migrants
overloaded the city's transportation system and schools (China Daily 2004).
e. Hukou classification and hukou location. The distinction between nonagricultural hukou and
agricultural hukou is no longer as important and has in fact been eliminated in some provinces
(e.g., Anhui, Gansu, Hunan, and Hubei) and some large cities (e.g., Guangzhou and Nanjing)
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2005). Hukou location, however, continues to
define one’s life chances and access to resources. The difference in status between a hukou in
small cities and towns and a hukou in the city proper of large cities persists and is substantial.
In addition to the new measures and guidelines described above, the Chinese government
established the goal that by 2005, hukou reform in large and medium-sized cities would be
completed and the dualistic registration system would be replaced by a unified registration
system (Cai 2002: 229). To date, neither of the above has been fully implemented. Still, these
official endorsements indicate that the central government is increasingly concerned with
reforming the hukou system and tackling hukou-based barriers to migration.
Migration Patterns and Changes
Volume and spatial patterns
Despite the recent proliferation of research on migration in China, there is still much
confusion about the magnitude of migration. This is due in part to the existence of many
monitoring (Cai 2002: 238).
6
different concepts and terms related to migration and the frequent changes of definition in census
and census-type surveys in China (Duan and Sun 2006).9 In the following, I shall focus on
liudong renkou and qianyi renkou – by far the two most commonly used measures of migration
in China.
Liudong renkou (floating population)
Liudong renkou, generally translated as the “floating population,” is a unique concept in
China and is tied to the hukou system (Goodkind and West 2002). When an individual is not
living at his/her hukou location then s/he is considered “floating.” This concept is based on the
notion that the hukou location is where one belongs and that any migration is not considered
official and permanent until the migrant’s hukou location is also moved to his/her destination.
Floating population is a stock measure. Regardless of when actual migration occurred, a person
is counted as part of the floating population so long as his/her usual place of residence is
different from the hukou location.
In practice, a temporal criterion usually qualifies the definition of floating population, and
the criterion varies from one source to another.10 The 1990 census specified that a person must
have left the hukou location for at least a year before s/he would be considered as part of the
floating population. In the 2000 census, the criterion was shortened to six months. The spatial
criterion also changed. In the 1990 census, the floating population included persons who had
moved from one county (or county-level city or urban district) to another county; whereas in the
2000 census, the spatial criterion changed to subcounty units, i.e., townships, towns and streets.
9 Yunyan Yang notes that there are at least 20 different and related concepts for describing
population movements and floating population in China (Zhou 2002). Jiao (2002) comments
that the definitions of migrants in China are the most complex in the world.
10 The temporal criterion varies greatly between sources and can range from 24 hours to one year
(Goodkind and West 2002). Obviously, these variations result in widely varied estimates.
7
In other words, the 1990 census counted intercounty floating population only while the 2000
census counted both intercounty and intracounty floating population. Intercounty floating
population increased from 22.62 million, or 1.97% of the population in 1990 to 78.75 million, or
6.34% of the population in 2000 (Table 1).11 Clearly, mobility had increased considerably
between 1990 and 2000.
Table 1. Floating population and migrants.
1990 census 2000 census
Volume
(million)
Percent
population*
Volume
(million)
Percent
population*
Floating population (liudong renkou)
Intercounty 22.62 1.97 78.75 6.34
Intercounty + intracounty - - 144.39 11.62
Migrants (qianyi renkou)
Intercounty 35.33 3.39 79.05 6.74
Intercounty + intracounty - - 121.21 10.33
Intercounty migrants
Permanent migrants 19.13 1.84 20.22 1.72
(Percent) (54.1) (25.6)
Temporary migrants 16.20 1.56 58.84 5.01
(Percent) (45.9) (74.4)
Interprovincial 11.53 1.11 32.30 2.75
(Percent) (32.6) (40.9)
Intraprovincial 23.80 2.29 46.75 3.98
(Percent) (67.4) (59.1)
* For migrants, proportion of population aged 5+.
Sources: 1990 census 1% sample; Liang and Ma (2004); Population Census Office (2002).
Combining intercounty and intracounty counts, the 2000 census reported a total of 144.39
million floating population, accounting for 11.62% of the nation’s population (Population
Census Office 2002). This number is consistent with most published sources, which estimate
that the floating population was about 30 million in the early 1980s, 70-80 million in the early
and mid-1990s, and between 100 million and 140 million in the late 1990s (Bai and Song 2002:
Definitions using a short temporal criterion may include transients and travelers (Shen 2002).
11 The effect of the change of the temporal criterion – from one year to six months – is difficult
to determine. However, it is reasonable to assume that the surge in the floating population was
primarily due to mobility increase in the 1990s, which is consistent with the literature’s findings
(Liang 2001), rather than to definitional changes.
8
4; Jiao 2002; Solinger 1999: 18; Wan 2001; Zhong 2000).12 The 2005 One-Percent Population
Sample Survey reported further increase of the floating population to 147.35 million (National
Bureau of Statistics 2006).
Qianyi renkou (migrants)
The closest equivalents to the terms migration and migrants in the Chinese language are,
respectively, qianyi and qianyi renkou. Unlike floating population, qianyi renkou is a measure of
flow. In the 1990 census, qianyi renkou was defined as individuals five years or older (1) who
had moved from one county to another within the past five years, and (2) (a) whose hukou
location had moved to the 1990 place of residence or (b) who had left the hukou location for
more than one year. Those in group (a) constituted permanent migrants because their hukou
location had moved to the migration destination; while those in group (b) are referred to as
temporary migrants because their hukou location differed from the migration destination. In the
2000 census, the spatial and temporal criteria were changed respectively to subcounty-level units
and six months.
It should be noted that the terms liudong and qianyi are often used interchangeably in the
Chinese literature and media. At the same time, some scholars consider the two terms mutually
exclusive. To make it even more confusing, the terms floating population and temporary
migrants are also often used interchangeably. Understanding the floating population as a stock
measure and qianyi renkou as a flow measure is key to distinguishing between these terms.
Using the qianyi renkou criteria described above, the 1990 and 2000 censuses
12 Note that figures reported by the Public Security Bureau (PSB) may be considerably lower
because they include only the portion of the floating population that registers with local PSB.
For example, based on PSB data the floating population in the mid-1990s was only 44 million
(Jiao 2002). The Ministry of Public Security estimates that the floating population in 1997 was
100 million but its data shows that only about 38 million were registered (Gongan bu 1997;
9
documented a total of 35.33 million and 79.05 intercounty migrants respectively, accounting for
3.39% and 6.74% of the population aged five and above (see also footnote #11) (Table 1). These
results again support the observation that mobility had increased significantly between the 1985-
1990 and 1995-2000 periods (Fan 2005a; Liang 2001). The sum of intercounty and intracounty
migrants, according to the 2000 census, was 121.21 million, accounting for 10.33% of the 5+
population.
Among intercounty migrants, respectively 45.9% and 74.4% were temporary migrants
according to the 1990 and 2000 censuses. The volume of permanent migrants hovered near 20
million but the number of temporary migrants increased by 3.6 times from 16.20 million to 58.84
million. The dramatic surge of temporary migrants reflects not only hukou reform but also
increased prominence of market forces in determining population movements in China. In
addition, this result indicates that rural migrants, who constitute the bulk of temporary migrants,
are playing an increasingly important role in shaping Chinese cities.
Breaking intercounty migrants down into interprovincial and intraprovincial components
sheds further light into mobility changes. Interprovincial migration, which is typically of longer
distances, accounted for 32.6% and 40.9% respectively of total intercounty migration in the 1990
and 2000 censuses. Thus, not only had mobility increased, but greater proportions of migrants
moved long distances in the 1990s than in the 1980s (Du and Gao 2004; Fan 2005b).
Table 2 shows the proportions of interprovincial migration attributable to intraregional
and interregional flows, represented respectively by diagonal and off-diagonal cells. Between
the two censuses, intraregional flows declined in relative importance while interregional
proportions increased. Specifically, the sum of off-diagonal proportions increased from 57.3%
to 71.8%. This again supports the observation that more migrants traveled long distances in the
Goodkind and West 2002; Shen 2002).
10
1990s than in the 1980s. Of the six off-diagonal cells, only two – central-to-eastern and westernto-
eastern – increased between the two censuses, indicating an acceleration of migration flows
from the two non-coastal regions to the eastern region. The flow from the central region to the
eastern region is especially noteworthy, increasing from 21.0% to 41.8% between the two
censuses. All of this indicates that interprovincial migration is overwhelmingly from inland to
coastal areas and that the concentration of migrants in the eastern region, which is the most
urbanized of the three regions, is high and increasing. The province of Guangdong alone
received 36.15% of all interprovincial migrants during the 1995-2000 period. Recent studies
also confirm that provincial net migration volumes and rates increased between the two censuses;
that is, sending provinces lost more migrants and receiving provinces gained more migrants in
the 1990s than in the 1980s (Fan 2005a).
Table 2. Interprovincial migration within and between regions.
Proportion of total flows (%) Origin
Destination Eastern Central Western Sum
1990 census
Eastern 24.4 21.0 11.5 57.0
Central 10.7 9.2 6.3 26.1
Western 3.7 4.1 9.1 16.9
Sum 38.8 34.3 26.9 100.0
2000 census
Eastern 18.4 41.8 18.2 78.4
Central 3.8 4.0 2.4 10.2
Western 2.4 3.2 5.8 11.4
Sum 24.5 49.0 26.5 100.0
Note: Because of data limitations, Tibet is excluded from the computation. Because Chongqing did not
become a separate provincial-level unit until 1996, in the analysis it is combined with Sichuan.
Sources: State Statistical Bureau (1992); National Bureau of Statistics (2002).
Migration reasons
Both the 1990 and 2000 censuses asked migrants to choose from nine options their
primary reason for migration. These reasons depict not only the motives, but also the means of
migration, circumstances under which migration takes place, what migrants plan to do at the
11
destination, and above all the degree of state involvement (Fan 1999). The options in the two
censuses were the same except that the 2000 census omitted “retirement” and included a new
option “housing change” (Table 3).
Table 3. Migration reasons for intercounty migrants (%).
1990 census 2000 census
All
Permanent
migrants
Temporary
migrants All
Permanent
migrants
Temporary
migrants
Job transfer 12.0 18.1 4.8 3.1 5.1 2.4
Job assignment 6.8 10.2 2.7 2.6 7.8 0.8
Industry/business 23.6 1.8 49.3 46.4 3.9 65.0
Study/training 12.9 21.4 2.7 13.7 39.9 4.7
Friends/relatives 9.7 6.6 13.4 5.0 3.4 5.6
Retirement 1.6 2.1 1.0 - - -
Joining family 11.0 13.7 7.8 10.0 7.9 10.7
Marriage 13.8 15.6 11.6 7.3 17.2 3.9
Housing change - - - 4.5 10.4 2.5
Other 8.7 10.4 6.7 4.4 4.2 4.4
Sources: 1990 census 1% sample; Liang and Ma (2004).
These migration reasons can be represented by two intersecting sets of dichotomy. The
first set distinguishes economic reasons from social (including family and life-cycle) reasons
(Rowland 1994). “Job transfer” and “job assignment,” which refer to the state’s allocation of
human resources by, respectively, transferring workers to specific jobs and regions and assigning
jobs to school graduates, are economic reasons. So is “industry/business,” which is defined as
self-initiated moves for engaging in industrial, commercial or trade sectors. Research has shown
that most “industry/business” migrants are of rural origin and do not have urban hukou (Fan
1999). Social reasons include “friends/relatives,” which refers to migration to seek the help of
friends and relatives, “joining family,” and “marriage.” “Retirement” and “study/training,”
however, are not as readily categorized as economic or social reasons.
The second set of dichotomy involves “state-sponsored,” “planned” or “official”
migration versus migration that is “self-initiated,” “unofficial” or driven by “market.” The
12
former is most likely associated with permanent migrants (with hukou change) and the latter
temporary migrants (without hukou change). Generally, "job transfer" and "job assignment" are
part of state planning and are thus usually accompanied by hukou change. Because admission to
universities is highly competitive, “study/training” migrants who enter universities are awarded
urban hukou at the city where the university is located. "Industry/business" and
"friends/relatives" constitute self-initiated migration and are usually not accompanied by hukou
change. “Retirement,” “joining family” and “marriage” may or may not involve hukou change.
Generally, marriage migrants moving from one rural area to another can obtain hukou at the
destination (and will have access to farmland), but the same is not true for rural-urban marriage
migrants. Since the vast majority of marriage migrants are rural-rural migrants, marriage as a
migration reason tends to describe permanent migrants whose moves are accompanied by hukou
change (Fan and Huang 1998).
A new category “housing change” was included in the 2000 census, in part because of
rapid increase in housing construction in many cities since the 1990s. It primarily describes
intracounty moves and migration of short distance.
As expected, according to the 1990 census, “study/training,” “job transfer” and “job
assignment” were prominent reasons for permanent migrants (Table 3). The proportions of “job
transfer” and “job assignment” migrants dropped sharply between the two censuses, however,
further supporting the observation that market mechanisms are increasingly overtaking statesponsored
channels in job-related moves. Marriage continued to be a prominent reason for
permanent migration in the 2000 census. “Industry/business” was an important and leading
reason for temporary migration in the 1990 census but its dominance increased further so that in
the 2000 census it accounted for 65.0% of all temporary migrants. It is well known that the
overwhelming objective of rural migrants is economic – to increase income and diversify sources
13
of household income (Croll and Huang 1997; Fan 2002) – and that they have little access to
state-sponsored channels of migration (Solinger 1999). The 2000 census results show that the
economic explanation, vis-à-vis social reasons, is increasingly prominent (Yang 2004). At the
same time, the increased proportion of temporary migrants in the “joining family” category
suggests that more rural-urban migrants are bringing their families to cities (Zhou 2004).
The above has illustrated the continued centrality of the hukou system to understanding
migration in China. Specifically, state-sponsored migrants are mostly permanent migrants that
are awarded hukou at the destination, while self-initiated migrants to cities are mostly temporary
migrants denied hukou at the destination. Studies have shown that permanent migrants are
correlated with high education, urban origins, and urban destinations; while temporary migrants
are associated with low education and rural origins (Fan 2002). Thus, the state is selectively
awarding skilled and urban migrants permanent residence in the city while relegating the less
qualified and rural migrants to unofficial and temporary statuses. The hukou system, therefore,
has played an important stratification role by engineering a two-track migration system, whereby
a superior track is set aside for the qualified and urbanites and an inferior track is designated for
the less-skilled and those from rural areas (Chan et al. 1999; Fan 1999; Gu 1992). In the last
section of the chapter, I shall review the criticisms toward this policy and recommendations for
change.
Migrants’ characteristics
Research has consistently found that migrants in China are young, that they are more
likely to be single than married, and that male migrants outnumber female migrants (Cai 2003:
182; Cao 1995; Chan et al. 1999). The characteristics of rural-urban migrants are, likewise, well
documented. First, they are young, with mean age near the mid-20s (Wang et al. 2002). Second,
14
there are more male migrants than female migrants but the sex ratio varies considerably from
place to place (Wang et al. 2002). Third, female migrants are younger than male migrants and
larger proportions of female migrants than male migrants are single (Fan 2004a; Wang et al.
2002). Fourth, rural-urban migrants’ modal educational attainment is junior secondary; they are
more highly educated than rural non-migrants but less highly educated than urban residents (Cai
2003: 183). The effect of education is likely quadratic, namely, the most and least highly
educated are less likely to migrate than those in the middle, because the latter have the desire to
economically better themselves as well as the means to pursue migrant work (Li and Zahniser
2002).
Recent studies have highlighted a new generation of rural-urban migrants, who unlike
earlier migrants are more highly educated and have little farming experience (Qiu et al. 2004).
These recent migrants may be less concerned with augmenting family income than with the
prospect of obtaining urban hukou and staying in urban areas. They are also likely to be more
selective in urban work (Jian and Zhang 2005).
Impacts of Rural-Urban Migration
Impacts on urban areas
The notion that rural-urban migration is a key component of China's economic
development is widely accepted (Cai 2001: 326). Migrants’ impacts on urban areas are, however,
hotly debated (Jiao 2002). Migrant labor is seen as important for stimulating urban economy and
boosting the expansion of urban industries and services (Cao 1995; Zhong and Gu 2000). Since
the bulk of rural-urban migrants engage in low-paid, manual and services types of work, they fill
jobs that are shunned by most urbanites who can then specialize in more prestigious jobs.
Migrants in cities also generate consumption, which in turn creates employment for others
15
(Zhong and Gu 2000).13 Thus, rural-urban migrants are a major force in shaping the urban
economy.
By augmenting labor in urban areas, rural migrants are indirectly suppressing wage
increase in cities (Qiu et al. 2004). Cai (2002: 218) argues that since rural migrants’ labor cost is
low, their productivity is in fact higher than that of local urban labor.14 Moreover, the large
agricultural labor surplus supports a continued supply of new, young and cheap migrants for
cities (Yang and Ding 2005). Rural migrants are, therefore, a source of “perpetually young”
labor for urban development and are especially relevant for cities experiencing or anticipated to
experience population aging (Wang et al. 2002). Recent labor shortage in the Pearl River Delta
and other areas specialized in labor-intensive manufacturing, however, suggests that rural
migrants are increasingly selective in urban work and that their supply may dwindle in the future
(Jian and Zhang 2005).
Despite migrants’ contributions to the urban economy, public and official evaluations of
rural-urban migration are mixed. Rural migrants are criticized for overloading urban
infrastructure such as transportation and housing, engaging in criminal activities, violating the
birth-control policy, and creating chaos in urban management (Cao 1995; Solinger 1999; Zhong
and Gu 2000). Migrants are also blamed for exacerbating urban employment, especially given
the increase of laid-off urban employees from state-owned enterprises (Jiao 2002; Yang and
Ding 2005). This criticism prompted many cities to tighten migration control in the mid-1990s
(Cai 2002: 236), although scholars have shown that migrant labor and urban local labor are
complementary rather than competitive (Wang et al. 2002; Zhong 2000: 208). Workers laid off
from state-owned enterprises are more experienced and skilled than the average rural-urban
13 Based on a survey in the mid-1990s, Zhong and Gu (2000) reports that migrants’ consumption
accounts for more than half of the total retail consumption in Wuhan.
14 Cai (2002: 218) cities reports that estimate that the cost ratio between local labor and migrant
16
migrant.15 Some studies, nevertheless, warn that the competition between migrants and laid-off
workers in cities may have increased (Cai 2002: 218). In general, a consensus among
researchers is that the positive impacts of rural-urban migrants on urban areas outweigh their
negative impacts (Jiao 2002).
Rural migrants in cities are institutionally inferior and socially marginalized. Numerous
studies have shown that the dualistic structure embodied by the hukou system has reinforced the
social and economic segregation of rural migrants, fixated hierarchical statuses based on
geographic origin, and segmented the urban labor market (Cai 2002; Cao 1995; Chan et al. 1999;
Fan 2002; Gu 1992; Solinger 1999; Yu 2002: 40-41). The bulk of rural migrants occupy the
lowest social and occupational rungs of urban society, are treated as outsiders and have poor
prospect of assimilation in cities (Fan 2002; Solinger 1995). Under the dualistic structure, rural
Chinese are shut out of a system of entitlements designed only for urbanites. Thus, rural
migrants do not have access to retirement, health and unemployment benefits, governmentsponsored
housing schemes, jobs that prioritize urban residents, and the urban education system
(Lu 2005). The education of migrant children, who amounted to more than 14 million in 2000, is
rapidly becoming a burning question in Chinese cities (Wang, Fang 2005).
Impacts on rural areas and rural-urban inequality
It is widely acknowledged that labor migration contributes to raising income and
diversifying income sources for rural households and alleviating poverty in rural areas (Cai 2001:
329; CASS 2003: 54). Estimates of remittances vary, but most studies find that they account for
20% or more of the total income of migrant households (Du and Bai 1997: 131; Li 1999).
labor is 5:1 in Shanghai and 1.8:1 in Nanjing.
15 Jiao (2002) cites a work by Cai and Wang which concludes that the replacement ratio between
the two types of labor is only 0.1.
17
Moreover, rural households exhibit a high degree of consistency in the use of remittances.
Overwhelmingly, remittances are used to fund household projects (such as building or
renovating a house), support household members (such as education), maintain regular
household activities (such as living expenses and agricultural input), and lift the household out of
financial difficulties (replaying debts), rather than engage in new investing activities (Fan 2004b;
Murphy 2002: 91; Wang and Fan 2006).
When rural Chinese migrate to the city, their direct economic contribution to the
countryside is lost, except when they return during planting and harvesting seasons. Even after
factoring in this opportunity cost, labor migration is still desirable. Li (1999) shows that the
marginal contribution of migrant workers to household income is higher than that of non-migrant
workers. Hare and Zhao (2000) find that marginal returns to labor input to migration are higher
than that to agriculture. In addition, Li (1999) argues that migration raises also the productivity
of non-migrants, as the departure of migrants results in reallocation of resources within the
household and increased efficiency of the remaining labor.
It is widely documented that rural-urban inequality in China is very high (Knight and
Song 1999: 338). Li (2003) shows that if urban non-monetary income is taken into account then
in 2000 the ratio of urban income to rural income in China was 3.62:1 and was the largest in the
world. The Chinese government reports that urban income is 5 to 6 times that of rural income
(Guomin jingji 2005: 9). Former President Jiang Zemin stated in the 16th National People’s
Congress (November 2002) that a widening rural-urban gap impedes the progress toward a
xiaokang16 society and that this trend should be reversed (CCP 2002: 19). This point is further
16 Xiaokang society is a society in which most of the population are of modest means or middleclass
(see entry in http://www.yourencyclopia.net). Though of classical literature roots, the
concept has been widely used by China’s national leaders as a goal to reach in the next two
decades. Its newfound popularity is probably a response to increased criticisms on widening
gaps in Chinese society.
18
emphasized in the current 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010) (Guomin jingji 2005:
. In this light,
the economic benefits of rural-urban migration to the countryside have national importance as
they are expected to alleviate, if not narrow, rural-urban inequality.
Skeptics, however, question the equilibrating effect of migration. Croll and Huang (1997)
point out that remittances are an unstable source of income. Migration is also seen as
accelerating brain drain from the already deprived rural areas (Cao 1995). Others warn that labor
migration discourages profitable sectors to move inland and accelerate industrial agglomeration
in coastal areas, thus enlarging further the coastal-inland gap (Hu 2002). Despite the above,
most researchers conclude that rural-urban migration has positive effects on rural areas and that
its negative effects are small. Moreover, many studies have shown that migrants bring back not
only remittances but also new skills, information and ideas that are beneficial to the origin’s
economic development (Fan 2004b; Zhong 2000: 162).
A small body of work since the late 1990s has focused on urban-rural return migration.
While little systematic data about return migration exists, research based on surveys suggests that
significant proportions of rural-urban migrants have returned to their places of origin (Bai and
Song 2002: 8-27; Murphy 2002: 125). Most studies on return migrants highlight their positive
contributions, including their skills, capital, experience, demonstration effect, information
transfer and entrepreneurial activities (Ma 2002; Murphy 2002; Qiu et al. 2004). Wang and Fan
(2006), however, argue that return migrants are negatively selected and they question the extent
of the returnees’ economic contributions to the origin communities.
In short, the literature’s main findings indicate that rural-urban migration has positive
impacts on the countryside but its impacts on overall rural-urban inequality are mixed.
Policy Implications
19
The Chinese society is increasingly mobile. Both the volume and geographic extent of
migration have expanded since the 1980s and this trend is expected to continue (Zhang and Lin
2000). As described earlier, the roles of economic and market forces in shaping migration have
increased. Migration is considered as the engine of urbanization and economic development of
China, and it is generally acknowledged that the overall impacts of migration on both rural and
urban areas are positive. At the same time, the hukou system is increasingly criticized for
impeding labor flows, efficient allocation of human resources and establishment of a nationally
integrated labor market (Cai 2001: 342; Cao 1995; Liu et al. 2004; Qiu 2001; Yu 2002: 5; Zhang
and Lin 2000; Zhong 2000: 200). It is also seen as the main source of persistent inequality
between rural and urban Chinese, which threatens social stability and undermines the
government’s new goal of “getting rich together” (gongtong fuyu), as embodied in the 11th Five
Year Plan (Guomin jingji 2005:. In addition, the difficulties and problems in accurately
documenting urban statistics are also attributable to the hukou system (Chan 2003; Wan 2001).
Despite the criticisms toward the hukou system, most researchers favor an “orderly”
reform rather than a wholesale abolition of the system. 17 This in part reflects the resistance of
urban residents who desire to protect their interests and entitlements (Cai 2001: 330-331), but it
is also due to the concern over exploitive growth of cities. In addition, complete abolition of
hukou cannot be achieved without also reforming housing, health insurance, social security,
labor and employment policies (Liu et al. 2004; Qiu 2001). Instead, a two-pronged approach
toward incrementally reducing the prominence of the hukou system summarizes most scholars’
recommendations. First, they suggest that urban entitlements should be reduced so that urban
residents are encouraged to compete in the labor market rather than relying on state protection
17 These views are quite consistent with the incremental, gradualist approach that characterizes
China’s economic reforms since the late 1970s. This approach is sometimes described as
“crossing the river by touching the stones.”
20
(Cai 2001: 342; Zhong 2000: 200). And second, scholars argue that certain conditions –
including freer capital flows, increased educational attainment of migrants, and reduced ruralurban
income gap – are necessary before hukou reform can be thoroughly implemented, to
ensure that migrants will not flood cities and cripple the urban infrastructure (Cai 2001: 335-336;
Zhang and Lin 2000).
Given the likelihood that the hukou system will remain relatively intact in the foreseeable
future, researchers have highlighted several issues that require policymakers’ attention. The first
issue has to do with the criteria for awarding urban hukou to rural migrants. Most favor meritbased
criteria, which are seen to be useful for monitoring the amount, quality and composition of
migrants (Zhang and Lin 2000). This is, in essence, an “elite” migrants approach, which has
indeed characterized migration policies in Shenzhen, Beijing, Shanghai and other large cities.
Related to this is a popular view that the extent of hukou reform should decrease with increasing
rank of the urban hierarchy, namely, urban hukou should be most accessible in small towns and
most strictly controlled in large and super-large cities (Cai 2003: 210-211; Wan 2001).
Another issue concerns the functions of hukou. An increasingly popular view is that
hukou should serve the purpose of population registration rather than migration control (Zhong
2000: 200). Scholars argue for a single identity card as an alternative, as it is individual rather
than household and location based, it can replace the multiplicity of permits required of rural
migrants, and it can enable better and more standardized data collection (Qiu 2001).
Finally, numerous researchers have urged for greater attention on the rights and well
being of rural migrants in cities (e.g., Jiao 2002), especially since their voices are often hidden
and they have few resources for collective activities such as bargaining. In particular, there has
been increased attention on the education of migrants’ children, including recommendations to
legalize selected “floating children’s schools” and integrate them into the urban education system
21
(Wang, Fang 2005; Zhong and Gu 2000; Zhou and Chen 2004).18 Cai (2003: 205) warns that
without a systematic plan to educate migrants’ children they will repeat their parents’
marginality and thus a vicious cycle will be passed down from one generation to the next.
Furthermore, policies that aim at serving migrants on a long-term basis can help foster their
sense of belonging and contribution to the cities. These recommendations are, above all, rooted
in concerns over equity and a dualistic social and opportunity structure, which are at the heart of
the debate on migration policy and which will be the driver for hukou reform.
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Wang, Guixin, Hui Gao, Wei Xu, and Guoxiang Chen. 2002. Xiao chengzhen wailai laodongli
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Wang, Wenfei Winnie, and C Cindy Fan. 2006. Success or failure: selectivity and reasons of
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8-13.
26
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preliminary glimpse of the blue chop household registration system in Shanghai and
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hujifa yanjiu (City and Countryside Societies: From Segregation to Opening -- Research
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Zhong, Shuiyang. 2000. Renkou liudong yu shehui jingji fazhan (Migration and Social Economic
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Here is an example:
1
Migration, Hukou, and the Chinese City1
C. Cindy Fan
China has experienced more than two decades of rapid urbanization. The level of
urbanization increased from 21% in 1982 to 40% in 2003 and is expected to exceed 50% by
2015 (Duan 2003; Zhou and Ma 2005). Migration from the countryside to the city has been the
main source of urban growth (Duan 2003; Lu and Wang 2006).2 Rural-urban migration is also
playing an increasingly important role in shaping the economic and demographic landscape of
Chinese cities. Over the past two decades, China has transformed itself from a relatively
immobile society to one where more than 10% of the population is on the move. Although
China’s mobility rate is still low compared to that of advanced industrialized economies, the
sheer size of migrants and their dramatic economic and social impacts have attracted great
attention from researchers and given rise to a large body of literature. Migration issues are, at
the same time, controversial and hotly debated among scholars, observers and Chinese
policymakers.
This chapter reviews major issues and findings in the recent literature on migration in
China, focusing on the hukou system and reform, migration patterns and changes since the 1980s,
and the impacts of migration on China’s urban and rural areas. The review is not intended to be
exhaustive. Rather, it aims at highlighting the salient facets of migration that have direct
implications for China’s urbanization process.
1 Chapter in China Urbanizes, under review and edited by Shahid Yusuf. Funding from the
World Bank, the National Science Foundation (BCS-0455107 and SBR-9618500), the Luce
Foundation and the UCLA Academic Senate that supported this research is gratefully
acknowledged. I also wish to thank Mingjie Sun and Wenfei Winnie Wang for their research
assistance.
2 Lu and Wang (2006) estimate that rural-urban migration accounted for 79% of China’s urban
growth from 1979 to 2003.
2
The Hukou (Household Registration) System and Reform
The Chinese government implemented the hukou system in the late 1950s and since then
has used it as an instrument of migration control. Every Chinese citizen is associated with a
hukou location (hukou suozaidi) and an “agricultural” (rural) or “nonagricultural” (urban) hukou
classification (hukou leibie). For the most part, both are inherited from the parents. Agricultural
hukou provides access to farmland, whereas nonagricultural hukou gives urban citizens access to
jobs, housing, food and state-sponsored benefits. Hukou location specifies where one is entitled
to the above resources and is, in essence, where one belongs. Details of how the hukou system
operates have been extensively reviewed elsewhere (Yu 2002; Wang, Fei-Ling 2005) and are not
repeated here. Suffice it to say, until the mid-1980s it was extremely difficult for rural Chinese
to survive in cities, because without urban hukou they did not have access to the necessities of
life such as food and housing, much of which was centrally controlled and allocated. The hukou
system, therefore, kept rural-urban migration to a minimum.
During the past two decades, expanded options for rural Chinese to work in urban areas
have unleashed large waves of migration. Below I highlight the major changes in the hukou
system since the 1980s.
a. Temporary migration. In October 1984, the State Council announced that peasants working in
towns would be granted the “self-supplied food grain” hukou, marking the first opening in the
rigid border between city and countryside.3 In 1985, the Ministry of Public Security issued
regulations for rural migrants to obtain the “temporary residence permit.” In the same year, the
National Congress approved the citizen's identity card as an alternative proof of identification to
3 By the late 1980s, the “self-supplied food grain” hukou had gradually disappeared (Zhong 2000:
3
hukou (Yu 2002: 35). All of this, plus increased marketization of food, housing and other daily
necessities, has made it easier for rural Chinese to work and live in urban areas. Although some
rural migrants may stay in the city for an extended period of time, their lack of an urban hukou
means that they are considered, at least in an institutional sense, “temporary migrants” (see also
qianyi renkou).
b. “Selling” of hukou. A wave of local governments charging migrants high fees4 – ranging from
several thousand yuan to tens of thousands of yuan – in exchange of hukou in small towns and
cities began in the late 1980s. City governments justified this practice on the ground that they
should be compensated for extending urban benefits to migrants.5 Beginning in the mid-1990s,
large cities such as Shanghai and Shenzhen began to offer “blue stamp” hukou, with monetary
and skill requirements only few could satisfy (Wong and Huen 1998). In reality, these practices
commodified hukou and channeled resources from the very small minority of highly successful
migrants to the coffer of urban governments (Cai 2001; Cao 2001).6
c. Hukou reform in small cities and towns. In 1997, the State Council approved a pilot scheme to
grant urban hukou to rural migrants who had a stable urban job and who had resided in selected
towns and cities for more than two years (Yu 2002: 379). Unlike earlier practices, qualified
194).
4 A variety of terms have been used to describe these fees, the most popular being jiangshe fei
(development fee), chengshi jiangshe fei (urban development fee), jiangzhen fei (town
development fee), jiangshe peitao fei (development and accessory fee) and zengrong fei
(accommodation fee). The fees may be higher in large cities than in small cities and higher in
the city proper of large cities than in their outskirts (Cao 2001).
5 Yu (2002: 374) estimates that by the end of 1993 three million rural migrants had purchased
hukou in a city or town and through which local governments had collected a total of 25 billion
yuan.
6 Since the late 1990s, the “selling” of hukou has become increasingly unpopular (Cai 2002;
Zhang and Lin 2000; Zhong 2000: 195).
4
migrants were not required to pay a hefty sum. The scheme was tested in 450 towns and small
cities, based on which the State Council approved in 2001 plans to further expand hukou reform
(Yu 2002: 382). Since then, the principal criteria for obtaining hukou in small cities and towns
have been a fixed and legal residence and a stable source of income (Cai 2003: 210). In 1998,
the State Council approved four guidelines that aimed at further relaxing urban hukou.7 In 2003,
the State Council issued a directive affirming the rights of rural migrants to work in cities (Cai
2003: 212). Adherence to these guidelines and directives is, however, up to city governments.
d. Hukou reform in large cities. The extent and specifics of hukou reform vary greatly. In
general, the larger the city, the more difficult it is to obtain a local hukou. A number of large and
medium size cities such as Zhuhai, Nanjing and Xi’an have indeed relaxed their criteria for
granting hukou (Cai 2002: 227). Shijiazhuang in Hebei is among the most adventurous cities and
granted 450,000 new hukou between August 2001 and June 2003 (Wang 2003). Yet, in most
large cities, hukou reform is minimal; only an extremely small minority of rural migrants, who
satisfy stringent criteria such as educational attainment, skills, financial ability, health, and a
clean criminal record, are awarded local hukou and given access to urban benefits (Cai 2003:
210-211; Qiu 2001; Wang 2003; Zhang and Lin 2000; Zhong and Gu 2000). “Super-large” cities
such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, where hukou is still a primary gatekeeper, are
especially resistant to hukou reform. 8 Beijing city proper hukou, for example, is required of
7 First, children can now choose to inherit hukou from the father or the mother (previously,
hukou was inherited from the mother). Second, rural persons who have lived in the city for more
than one year and whose spouses hold urban hukou may be granted urban hukou. Third, elderly
parents whose only children live in cities may be granted urban hukou. Fourth, persons who
have made investment, established enterprises or purchased apartments, who have stable jobs
and accommodation, and who have lived more than one year in a city are eligible for local hukou
(Yu 2002: 381).
8 In 2001, Beijing government began to issue three types (A, B and C) of temporary permits,
which determine the services migrants have access to and the extent of government control and
5
university graduates who wish to apply for government jobs (Beijing chenbao 2006). Many
enterprises in Beijing restrict hiring to individuals who have Beijing hukou (Fazhi wanbao 2006).
In addition, city governments can tighten the policy at its discretion. In August 2004, for
example, Zhengzhou reversed its hukou reform because the large number of new migrants
overloaded the city's transportation system and schools (China Daily 2004).
e. Hukou classification and hukou location. The distinction between nonagricultural hukou and
agricultural hukou is no longer as important and has in fact been eliminated in some provinces
(e.g., Anhui, Gansu, Hunan, and Hubei) and some large cities (e.g., Guangzhou and Nanjing)
(Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2005). Hukou location, however, continues to
define one’s life chances and access to resources. The difference in status between a hukou in
small cities and towns and a hukou in the city proper of large cities persists and is substantial.
In addition to the new measures and guidelines described above, the Chinese government
established the goal that by 2005, hukou reform in large and medium-sized cities would be
completed and the dualistic registration system would be replaced by a unified registration
system (Cai 2002: 229). To date, neither of the above has been fully implemented. Still, these
official endorsements indicate that the central government is increasingly concerned with
reforming the hukou system and tackling hukou-based barriers to migration.
Migration Patterns and Changes
Volume and spatial patterns
Despite the recent proliferation of research on migration in China, there is still much
confusion about the magnitude of migration. This is due in part to the existence of many
monitoring (Cai 2002: 238).
6
different concepts and terms related to migration and the frequent changes of definition in census
and census-type surveys in China (Duan and Sun 2006).9 In the following, I shall focus on
liudong renkou and qianyi renkou – by far the two most commonly used measures of migration
in China.
Liudong renkou (floating population)
Liudong renkou, generally translated as the “floating population,” is a unique concept in
China and is tied to the hukou system (Goodkind and West 2002). When an individual is not
living at his/her hukou location then s/he is considered “floating.” This concept is based on the
notion that the hukou location is where one belongs and that any migration is not considered
official and permanent until the migrant’s hukou location is also moved to his/her destination.
Floating population is a stock measure. Regardless of when actual migration occurred, a person
is counted as part of the floating population so long as his/her usual place of residence is
different from the hukou location.
In practice, a temporal criterion usually qualifies the definition of floating population, and
the criterion varies from one source to another.10 The 1990 census specified that a person must
have left the hukou location for at least a year before s/he would be considered as part of the
floating population. In the 2000 census, the criterion was shortened to six months. The spatial
criterion also changed. In the 1990 census, the floating population included persons who had
moved from one county (or county-level city or urban district) to another county; whereas in the
2000 census, the spatial criterion changed to subcounty units, i.e., townships, towns and streets.
9 Yunyan Yang notes that there are at least 20 different and related concepts for describing
population movements and floating population in China (Zhou 2002). Jiao (2002) comments
that the definitions of migrants in China are the most complex in the world.
10 The temporal criterion varies greatly between sources and can range from 24 hours to one year
(Goodkind and West 2002). Obviously, these variations result in widely varied estimates.
7
In other words, the 1990 census counted intercounty floating population only while the 2000
census counted both intercounty and intracounty floating population. Intercounty floating
population increased from 22.62 million, or 1.97% of the population in 1990 to 78.75 million, or
6.34% of the population in 2000 (Table 1).11 Clearly, mobility had increased considerably
between 1990 and 2000.
Table 1. Floating population and migrants.
1990 census 2000 census
Volume
(million)
Percent
population*
Volume
(million)
Percent
population*
Floating population (liudong renkou)
Intercounty 22.62 1.97 78.75 6.34
Intercounty + intracounty - - 144.39 11.62
Migrants (qianyi renkou)
Intercounty 35.33 3.39 79.05 6.74
Intercounty + intracounty - - 121.21 10.33
Intercounty migrants
Permanent migrants 19.13 1.84 20.22 1.72
(Percent) (54.1) (25.6)
Temporary migrants 16.20 1.56 58.84 5.01
(Percent) (45.9) (74.4)
Interprovincial 11.53 1.11 32.30 2.75
(Percent) (32.6) (40.9)
Intraprovincial 23.80 2.29 46.75 3.98
(Percent) (67.4) (59.1)
* For migrants, proportion of population aged 5+.
Sources: 1990 census 1% sample; Liang and Ma (2004); Population Census Office (2002).
Combining intercounty and intracounty counts, the 2000 census reported a total of 144.39
million floating population, accounting for 11.62% of the nation’s population (Population
Census Office 2002). This number is consistent with most published sources, which estimate
that the floating population was about 30 million in the early 1980s, 70-80 million in the early
and mid-1990s, and between 100 million and 140 million in the late 1990s (Bai and Song 2002:
Definitions using a short temporal criterion may include transients and travelers (Shen 2002).
11 The effect of the change of the temporal criterion – from one year to six months – is difficult
to determine. However, it is reasonable to assume that the surge in the floating population was
primarily due to mobility increase in the 1990s, which is consistent with the literature’s findings
(Liang 2001), rather than to definitional changes.
8
4; Jiao 2002; Solinger 1999: 18; Wan 2001; Zhong 2000).12 The 2005 One-Percent Population
Sample Survey reported further increase of the floating population to 147.35 million (National
Bureau of Statistics 2006).
Qianyi renkou (migrants)
The closest equivalents to the terms migration and migrants in the Chinese language are,
respectively, qianyi and qianyi renkou. Unlike floating population, qianyi renkou is a measure of
flow. In the 1990 census, qianyi renkou was defined as individuals five years or older (1) who
had moved from one county to another within the past five years, and (2) (a) whose hukou
location had moved to the 1990 place of residence or (b) who had left the hukou location for
more than one year. Those in group (a) constituted permanent migrants because their hukou
location had moved to the migration destination; while those in group (b) are referred to as
temporary migrants because their hukou location differed from the migration destination. In the
2000 census, the spatial and temporal criteria were changed respectively to subcounty-level units
and six months.
It should be noted that the terms liudong and qianyi are often used interchangeably in the
Chinese literature and media. At the same time, some scholars consider the two terms mutually
exclusive. To make it even more confusing, the terms floating population and temporary
migrants are also often used interchangeably. Understanding the floating population as a stock
measure and qianyi renkou as a flow measure is key to distinguishing between these terms.
Using the qianyi renkou criteria described above, the 1990 and 2000 censuses
12 Note that figures reported by the Public Security Bureau (PSB) may be considerably lower
because they include only the portion of the floating population that registers with local PSB.
For example, based on PSB data the floating population in the mid-1990s was only 44 million
(Jiao 2002). The Ministry of Public Security estimates that the floating population in 1997 was
100 million but its data shows that only about 38 million were registered (Gongan bu 1997;
9
documented a total of 35.33 million and 79.05 intercounty migrants respectively, accounting for
3.39% and 6.74% of the population aged five and above (see also footnote #11) (Table 1). These
results again support the observation that mobility had increased significantly between the 1985-
1990 and 1995-2000 periods (Fan 2005a; Liang 2001). The sum of intercounty and intracounty
migrants, according to the 2000 census, was 121.21 million, accounting for 10.33% of the 5+
population.
Among intercounty migrants, respectively 45.9% and 74.4% were temporary migrants
according to the 1990 and 2000 censuses. The volume of permanent migrants hovered near 20
million but the number of temporary migrants increased by 3.6 times from 16.20 million to 58.84
million. The dramatic surge of temporary migrants reflects not only hukou reform but also
increased prominence of market forces in determining population movements in China. In
addition, this result indicates that rural migrants, who constitute the bulk of temporary migrants,
are playing an increasingly important role in shaping Chinese cities.
Breaking intercounty migrants down into interprovincial and intraprovincial components
sheds further light into mobility changes. Interprovincial migration, which is typically of longer
distances, accounted for 32.6% and 40.9% respectively of total intercounty migration in the 1990
and 2000 censuses. Thus, not only had mobility increased, but greater proportions of migrants
moved long distances in the 1990s than in the 1980s (Du and Gao 2004; Fan 2005b).
Table 2 shows the proportions of interprovincial migration attributable to intraregional
and interregional flows, represented respectively by diagonal and off-diagonal cells. Between
the two censuses, intraregional flows declined in relative importance while interregional
proportions increased. Specifically, the sum of off-diagonal proportions increased from 57.3%
to 71.8%. This again supports the observation that more migrants traveled long distances in the
Goodkind and West 2002; Shen 2002).
10
1990s than in the 1980s. Of the six off-diagonal cells, only two – central-to-eastern and westernto-
eastern – increased between the two censuses, indicating an acceleration of migration flows
from the two non-coastal regions to the eastern region. The flow from the central region to the
eastern region is especially noteworthy, increasing from 21.0% to 41.8% between the two
censuses. All of this indicates that interprovincial migration is overwhelmingly from inland to
coastal areas and that the concentration of migrants in the eastern region, which is the most
urbanized of the three regions, is high and increasing. The province of Guangdong alone
received 36.15% of all interprovincial migrants during the 1995-2000 period. Recent studies
also confirm that provincial net migration volumes and rates increased between the two censuses;
that is, sending provinces lost more migrants and receiving provinces gained more migrants in
the 1990s than in the 1980s (Fan 2005a).
Table 2. Interprovincial migration within and between regions.
Proportion of total flows (%) Origin
Destination Eastern Central Western Sum
1990 census
Eastern 24.4 21.0 11.5 57.0
Central 10.7 9.2 6.3 26.1
Western 3.7 4.1 9.1 16.9
Sum 38.8 34.3 26.9 100.0
2000 census
Eastern 18.4 41.8 18.2 78.4
Central 3.8 4.0 2.4 10.2
Western 2.4 3.2 5.8 11.4
Sum 24.5 49.0 26.5 100.0
Note: Because of data limitations, Tibet is excluded from the computation. Because Chongqing did not
become a separate provincial-level unit until 1996, in the analysis it is combined with Sichuan.
Sources: State Statistical Bureau (1992); National Bureau of Statistics (2002).
Migration reasons
Both the 1990 and 2000 censuses asked migrants to choose from nine options their
primary reason for migration. These reasons depict not only the motives, but also the means of
migration, circumstances under which migration takes place, what migrants plan to do at the
11
destination, and above all the degree of state involvement (Fan 1999). The options in the two
censuses were the same except that the 2000 census omitted “retirement” and included a new
option “housing change” (Table 3).
Table 3. Migration reasons for intercounty migrants (%).
1990 census 2000 census
All
Permanent
migrants
Temporary
migrants All
Permanent
migrants
Temporary
migrants
Job transfer 12.0 18.1 4.8 3.1 5.1 2.4
Job assignment 6.8 10.2 2.7 2.6 7.8 0.8
Industry/business 23.6 1.8 49.3 46.4 3.9 65.0
Study/training 12.9 21.4 2.7 13.7 39.9 4.7
Friends/relatives 9.7 6.6 13.4 5.0 3.4 5.6
Retirement 1.6 2.1 1.0 - - -
Joining family 11.0 13.7 7.8 10.0 7.9 10.7
Marriage 13.8 15.6 11.6 7.3 17.2 3.9
Housing change - - - 4.5 10.4 2.5
Other 8.7 10.4 6.7 4.4 4.2 4.4
Sources: 1990 census 1% sample; Liang and Ma (2004).
These migration reasons can be represented by two intersecting sets of dichotomy. The
first set distinguishes economic reasons from social (including family and life-cycle) reasons
(Rowland 1994). “Job transfer” and “job assignment,” which refer to the state’s allocation of
human resources by, respectively, transferring workers to specific jobs and regions and assigning
jobs to school graduates, are economic reasons. So is “industry/business,” which is defined as
self-initiated moves for engaging in industrial, commercial or trade sectors. Research has shown
that most “industry/business” migrants are of rural origin and do not have urban hukou (Fan
1999). Social reasons include “friends/relatives,” which refers to migration to seek the help of
friends and relatives, “joining family,” and “marriage.” “Retirement” and “study/training,”
however, are not as readily categorized as economic or social reasons.
The second set of dichotomy involves “state-sponsored,” “planned” or “official”
migration versus migration that is “self-initiated,” “unofficial” or driven by “market.” The
12
former is most likely associated with permanent migrants (with hukou change) and the latter
temporary migrants (without hukou change). Generally, "job transfer" and "job assignment" are
part of state planning and are thus usually accompanied by hukou change. Because admission to
universities is highly competitive, “study/training” migrants who enter universities are awarded
urban hukou at the city where the university is located. "Industry/business" and
"friends/relatives" constitute self-initiated migration and are usually not accompanied by hukou
change. “Retirement,” “joining family” and “marriage” may or may not involve hukou change.
Generally, marriage migrants moving from one rural area to another can obtain hukou at the
destination (and will have access to farmland), but the same is not true for rural-urban marriage
migrants. Since the vast majority of marriage migrants are rural-rural migrants, marriage as a
migration reason tends to describe permanent migrants whose moves are accompanied by hukou
change (Fan and Huang 1998).
A new category “housing change” was included in the 2000 census, in part because of
rapid increase in housing construction in many cities since the 1990s. It primarily describes
intracounty moves and migration of short distance.
As expected, according to the 1990 census, “study/training,” “job transfer” and “job
assignment” were prominent reasons for permanent migrants (Table 3). The proportions of “job
transfer” and “job assignment” migrants dropped sharply between the two censuses, however,
further supporting the observation that market mechanisms are increasingly overtaking statesponsored
channels in job-related moves. Marriage continued to be a prominent reason for
permanent migration in the 2000 census. “Industry/business” was an important and leading
reason for temporary migration in the 1990 census but its dominance increased further so that in
the 2000 census it accounted for 65.0% of all temporary migrants. It is well known that the
overwhelming objective of rural migrants is economic – to increase income and diversify sources
13
of household income (Croll and Huang 1997; Fan 2002) – and that they have little access to
state-sponsored channels of migration (Solinger 1999). The 2000 census results show that the
economic explanation, vis-à-vis social reasons, is increasingly prominent (Yang 2004). At the
same time, the increased proportion of temporary migrants in the “joining family” category
suggests that more rural-urban migrants are bringing their families to cities (Zhou 2004).
The above has illustrated the continued centrality of the hukou system to understanding
migration in China. Specifically, state-sponsored migrants are mostly permanent migrants that
are awarded hukou at the destination, while self-initiated migrants to cities are mostly temporary
migrants denied hukou at the destination. Studies have shown that permanent migrants are
correlated with high education, urban origins, and urban destinations; while temporary migrants
are associated with low education and rural origins (Fan 2002). Thus, the state is selectively
awarding skilled and urban migrants permanent residence in the city while relegating the less
qualified and rural migrants to unofficial and temporary statuses. The hukou system, therefore,
has played an important stratification role by engineering a two-track migration system, whereby
a superior track is set aside for the qualified and urbanites and an inferior track is designated for
the less-skilled and those from rural areas (Chan et al. 1999; Fan 1999; Gu 1992). In the last
section of the chapter, I shall review the criticisms toward this policy and recommendations for
change.
Migrants’ characteristics
Research has consistently found that migrants in China are young, that they are more
likely to be single than married, and that male migrants outnumber female migrants (Cai 2003:
182; Cao 1995; Chan et al. 1999). The characteristics of rural-urban migrants are, likewise, well
documented. First, they are young, with mean age near the mid-20s (Wang et al. 2002). Second,
14
there are more male migrants than female migrants but the sex ratio varies considerably from
place to place (Wang et al. 2002). Third, female migrants are younger than male migrants and
larger proportions of female migrants than male migrants are single (Fan 2004a; Wang et al.
2002). Fourth, rural-urban migrants’ modal educational attainment is junior secondary; they are
more highly educated than rural non-migrants but less highly educated than urban residents (Cai
2003: 183). The effect of education is likely quadratic, namely, the most and least highly
educated are less likely to migrate than those in the middle, because the latter have the desire to
economically better themselves as well as the means to pursue migrant work (Li and Zahniser
2002).
Recent studies have highlighted a new generation of rural-urban migrants, who unlike
earlier migrants are more highly educated and have little farming experience (Qiu et al. 2004).
These recent migrants may be less concerned with augmenting family income than with the
prospect of obtaining urban hukou and staying in urban areas. They are also likely to be more
selective in urban work (Jian and Zhang 2005).
Impacts of Rural-Urban Migration
Impacts on urban areas
The notion that rural-urban migration is a key component of China's economic
development is widely accepted (Cai 2001: 326). Migrants’ impacts on urban areas are, however,
hotly debated (Jiao 2002). Migrant labor is seen as important for stimulating urban economy and
boosting the expansion of urban industries and services (Cao 1995; Zhong and Gu 2000). Since
the bulk of rural-urban migrants engage in low-paid, manual and services types of work, they fill
jobs that are shunned by most urbanites who can then specialize in more prestigious jobs.
Migrants in cities also generate consumption, which in turn creates employment for others
15
(Zhong and Gu 2000).13 Thus, rural-urban migrants are a major force in shaping the urban
economy.
By augmenting labor in urban areas, rural migrants are indirectly suppressing wage
increase in cities (Qiu et al. 2004). Cai (2002: 218) argues that since rural migrants’ labor cost is
low, their productivity is in fact higher than that of local urban labor.14 Moreover, the large
agricultural labor surplus supports a continued supply of new, young and cheap migrants for
cities (Yang and Ding 2005). Rural migrants are, therefore, a source of “perpetually young”
labor for urban development and are especially relevant for cities experiencing or anticipated to
experience population aging (Wang et al. 2002). Recent labor shortage in the Pearl River Delta
and other areas specialized in labor-intensive manufacturing, however, suggests that rural
migrants are increasingly selective in urban work and that their supply may dwindle in the future
(Jian and Zhang 2005).
Despite migrants’ contributions to the urban economy, public and official evaluations of
rural-urban migration are mixed. Rural migrants are criticized for overloading urban
infrastructure such as transportation and housing, engaging in criminal activities, violating the
birth-control policy, and creating chaos in urban management (Cao 1995; Solinger 1999; Zhong
and Gu 2000). Migrants are also blamed for exacerbating urban employment, especially given
the increase of laid-off urban employees from state-owned enterprises (Jiao 2002; Yang and
Ding 2005). This criticism prompted many cities to tighten migration control in the mid-1990s
(Cai 2002: 236), although scholars have shown that migrant labor and urban local labor are
complementary rather than competitive (Wang et al. 2002; Zhong 2000: 208). Workers laid off
from state-owned enterprises are more experienced and skilled than the average rural-urban
13 Based on a survey in the mid-1990s, Zhong and Gu (2000) reports that migrants’ consumption
accounts for more than half of the total retail consumption in Wuhan.
14 Cai (2002: 218) cities reports that estimate that the cost ratio between local labor and migrant
16
migrant.15 Some studies, nevertheless, warn that the competition between migrants and laid-off
workers in cities may have increased (Cai 2002: 218). In general, a consensus among
researchers is that the positive impacts of rural-urban migrants on urban areas outweigh their
negative impacts (Jiao 2002).
Rural migrants in cities are institutionally inferior and socially marginalized. Numerous
studies have shown that the dualistic structure embodied by the hukou system has reinforced the
social and economic segregation of rural migrants, fixated hierarchical statuses based on
geographic origin, and segmented the urban labor market (Cai 2002; Cao 1995; Chan et al. 1999;
Fan 2002; Gu 1992; Solinger 1999; Yu 2002: 40-41). The bulk of rural migrants occupy the
lowest social and occupational rungs of urban society, are treated as outsiders and have poor
prospect of assimilation in cities (Fan 2002; Solinger 1995). Under the dualistic structure, rural
Chinese are shut out of a system of entitlements designed only for urbanites. Thus, rural
migrants do not have access to retirement, health and unemployment benefits, governmentsponsored
housing schemes, jobs that prioritize urban residents, and the urban education system
(Lu 2005). The education of migrant children, who amounted to more than 14 million in 2000, is
rapidly becoming a burning question in Chinese cities (Wang, Fang 2005).
Impacts on rural areas and rural-urban inequality
It is widely acknowledged that labor migration contributes to raising income and
diversifying income sources for rural households and alleviating poverty in rural areas (Cai 2001:
329; CASS 2003: 54). Estimates of remittances vary, but most studies find that they account for
20% or more of the total income of migrant households (Du and Bai 1997: 131; Li 1999).
labor is 5:1 in Shanghai and 1.8:1 in Nanjing.
15 Jiao (2002) cites a work by Cai and Wang which concludes that the replacement ratio between
the two types of labor is only 0.1.
17
Moreover, rural households exhibit a high degree of consistency in the use of remittances.
Overwhelmingly, remittances are used to fund household projects (such as building or
renovating a house), support household members (such as education), maintain regular
household activities (such as living expenses and agricultural input), and lift the household out of
financial difficulties (replaying debts), rather than engage in new investing activities (Fan 2004b;
Murphy 2002: 91; Wang and Fan 2006).
When rural Chinese migrate to the city, their direct economic contribution to the
countryside is lost, except when they return during planting and harvesting seasons. Even after
factoring in this opportunity cost, labor migration is still desirable. Li (1999) shows that the
marginal contribution of migrant workers to household income is higher than that of non-migrant
workers. Hare and Zhao (2000) find that marginal returns to labor input to migration are higher
than that to agriculture. In addition, Li (1999) argues that migration raises also the productivity
of non-migrants, as the departure of migrants results in reallocation of resources within the
household and increased efficiency of the remaining labor.
It is widely documented that rural-urban inequality in China is very high (Knight and
Song 1999: 338). Li (2003) shows that if urban non-monetary income is taken into account then
in 2000 the ratio of urban income to rural income in China was 3.62:1 and was the largest in the
world. The Chinese government reports that urban income is 5 to 6 times that of rural income
(Guomin jingji 2005: 9). Former President Jiang Zemin stated in the 16th National People’s
Congress (November 2002) that a widening rural-urban gap impedes the progress toward a
xiaokang16 society and that this trend should be reversed (CCP 2002: 19). This point is further
16 Xiaokang society is a society in which most of the population are of modest means or middleclass
(see entry in http://www.yourencyclopia.net). Though of classical literature roots, the
concept has been widely used by China’s national leaders as a goal to reach in the next two
decades. Its newfound popularity is probably a response to increased criticisms on widening
gaps in Chinese society.
18
emphasized in the current 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010) (Guomin jingji 2005:
. In this light,the economic benefits of rural-urban migration to the countryside have national importance as
they are expected to alleviate, if not narrow, rural-urban inequality.
Skeptics, however, question the equilibrating effect of migration. Croll and Huang (1997)
point out that remittances are an unstable source of income. Migration is also seen as
accelerating brain drain from the already deprived rural areas (Cao 1995). Others warn that labor
migration discourages profitable sectors to move inland and accelerate industrial agglomeration
in coastal areas, thus enlarging further the coastal-inland gap (Hu 2002). Despite the above,
most researchers conclude that rural-urban migration has positive effects on rural areas and that
its negative effects are small. Moreover, many studies have shown that migrants bring back not
only remittances but also new skills, information and ideas that are beneficial to the origin’s
economic development (Fan 2004b; Zhong 2000: 162).
A small body of work since the late 1990s has focused on urban-rural return migration.
While little systematic data about return migration exists, research based on surveys suggests that
significant proportions of rural-urban migrants have returned to their places of origin (Bai and
Song 2002: 8-27; Murphy 2002: 125). Most studies on return migrants highlight their positive
contributions, including their skills, capital, experience, demonstration effect, information
transfer and entrepreneurial activities (Ma 2002; Murphy 2002; Qiu et al. 2004). Wang and Fan
(2006), however, argue that return migrants are negatively selected and they question the extent
of the returnees’ economic contributions to the origin communities.
In short, the literature’s main findings indicate that rural-urban migration has positive
impacts on the countryside but its impacts on overall rural-urban inequality are mixed.
Policy Implications
19
The Chinese society is increasingly mobile. Both the volume and geographic extent of
migration have expanded since the 1980s and this trend is expected to continue (Zhang and Lin
2000). As described earlier, the roles of economic and market forces in shaping migration have
increased. Migration is considered as the engine of urbanization and economic development of
China, and it is generally acknowledged that the overall impacts of migration on both rural and
urban areas are positive. At the same time, the hukou system is increasingly criticized for
impeding labor flows, efficient allocation of human resources and establishment of a nationally
integrated labor market (Cai 2001: 342; Cao 1995; Liu et al. 2004; Qiu 2001; Yu 2002: 5; Zhang
and Lin 2000; Zhong 2000: 200). It is also seen as the main source of persistent inequality
between rural and urban Chinese, which threatens social stability and undermines the
government’s new goal of “getting rich together” (gongtong fuyu), as embodied in the 11th Five
Year Plan (Guomin jingji 2005:
. In addition, the difficulties and problems in accuratelydocumenting urban statistics are also attributable to the hukou system (Chan 2003; Wan 2001).
Despite the criticisms toward the hukou system, most researchers favor an “orderly”
reform rather than a wholesale abolition of the system. 17 This in part reflects the resistance of
urban residents who desire to protect their interests and entitlements (Cai 2001: 330-331), but it
is also due to the concern over exploitive growth of cities. In addition, complete abolition of
hukou cannot be achieved without also reforming housing, health insurance, social security,
labor and employment policies (Liu et al. 2004; Qiu 2001). Instead, a two-pronged approach
toward incrementally reducing the prominence of the hukou system summarizes most scholars’
recommendations. First, they suggest that urban entitlements should be reduced so that urban
residents are encouraged to compete in the labor market rather than relying on state protection
17 These views are quite consistent with the incremental, gradualist approach that characterizes
China’s economic reforms since the late 1970s. This approach is sometimes described as
“crossing the river by touching the stones.”
20
(Cai 2001: 342; Zhong 2000: 200). And second, scholars argue that certain conditions –
including freer capital flows, increased educational attainment of migrants, and reduced ruralurban
income gap – are necessary before hukou reform can be thoroughly implemented, to
ensure that migrants will not flood cities and cripple the urban infrastructure (Cai 2001: 335-336;
Zhang and Lin 2000).
Given the likelihood that the hukou system will remain relatively intact in the foreseeable
future, researchers have highlighted several issues that require policymakers’ attention. The first
issue has to do with the criteria for awarding urban hukou to rural migrants. Most favor meritbased
criteria, which are seen to be useful for monitoring the amount, quality and composition of
migrants (Zhang and Lin 2000). This is, in essence, an “elite” migrants approach, which has
indeed characterized migration policies in Shenzhen, Beijing, Shanghai and other large cities.
Related to this is a popular view that the extent of hukou reform should decrease with increasing
rank of the urban hierarchy, namely, urban hukou should be most accessible in small towns and
most strictly controlled in large and super-large cities (Cai 2003: 210-211; Wan 2001).
Another issue concerns the functions of hukou. An increasingly popular view is that
hukou should serve the purpose of population registration rather than migration control (Zhong
2000: 200). Scholars argue for a single identity card as an alternative, as it is individual rather
than household and location based, it can replace the multiplicity of permits required of rural
migrants, and it can enable better and more standardized data collection (Qiu 2001).
Finally, numerous researchers have urged for greater attention on the rights and well
being of rural migrants in cities (e.g., Jiao 2002), especially since their voices are often hidden
and they have few resources for collective activities such as bargaining. In particular, there has
been increased attention on the education of migrants’ children, including recommendations to
legalize selected “floating children’s schools” and integrate them into the urban education system
21
(Wang, Fang 2005; Zhong and Gu 2000; Zhou and Chen 2004).18 Cai (2003: 205) warns that
without a systematic plan to educate migrants’ children they will repeat their parents’
marginality and thus a vicious cycle will be passed down from one generation to the next.
Furthermore, policies that aim at serving migrants on a long-term basis can help foster their
sense of belonging and contribution to the cities. These recommendations are, above all, rooted
in concerns over equity and a dualistic social and opportunity structure, which are at the heart of
the debate on migration policy and which will be the driver for hukou reform.
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Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
I hope that our Chinese posters have something to refute what I have posted. Not their views but something substantial!
It is time to open one's eyes!
Let the Chinese not delude themselves to feel that they are a land of Milk and Honey!
And anyway, their milk has plastic or adulterated with melamine!
Would make great gymnasts!
It is time to open one's eyes!
Let the Chinese not delude themselves to feel that they are a land of Milk and Honey!
And anyway, their milk has plastic or adulterated with melamine!
Would make great gymnasts!
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
well, I have just come back from my office .RayC wrote:I hope that our Chinese posters have something to refute what I have posted. Not their views but something substantial!
It is time to open one's eyes!
Let the Chinese not delude themselves to feel that they are a land of Milk and Honey!
And anyway, their milk has plastic or adulterated with melamine!
Would make great gymnasts!
Here is good link to introduce China. the writer should be a spainish man who often travel in china.
Even I am amazed that the guy has visited so many Chinese places....
there are hundreds of pictures with english introduction.
http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthrea ... 15&page=36
I have to go out for supper....I will be back in several hours.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
more pictures ! 
no wonder the chinese script is pictographic !
no wonder the chinese script is pictographic !
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amit
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Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Liu wrote: I have to go out for supper....I will be back in several hours.
Liu,
Hope you have a good dinner. You'll need a full stomach to digest what Ray Sir has posted.
BTW I really wonder, why this urgent need to get certificates from Spaniards, Americans, British, French, Polynesians, Tahitians, Somalis etc to prove to the world what a land of milks and honey the Middle Kingdom is, thanks to the wonderful dictatorship run by the (former) Communist Party.
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amit
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Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Ray Sir,Amit,
If you have the patience to read the posts above and this one that I have made, you will realise the deceit that the Chinese Communist mouthpieces spew, frothing all the way!
I know all about the deceit and I'll certainly read the interesting material you've kindly put up. I hope everyone else who visits this thread reads it as well. Makes for good education, especially for our two guest drones from the Middle Kingdom.
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Nayak
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Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Bwaahaha, my desi fingers are itching on the 3rd grade plastic made in china keyboard to give the appropriate riposte for these idiotic posts made by our esteemed gentlemen from the land of melamine milk and adulterated honey.
But no, I must resist the temptation of getting banned !!!!
I tell ya the brutal mods here are all well trained by the CCCP thugs, one post of dissent, and the peasants get thrown to the le-education camp.
But no, I must resist the temptation of getting banned !!!!
I tell ya the brutal mods here are all well trained by the CCCP thugs, one post of dissent, and the peasants get thrown to the le-education camp.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
you post too much.....I am afaid that nobody here would like to read such long paper.....RayC wrote:I hope that our Chinese posters have something to refute what I have posted. Not their views but something substantial!
It is time to open one's eyes!
Let the Chinese not delude themselves to feel that they are a land of Milk and Honey!
And anyway, their milk has plastic or adulterated with melamine!
Would make great gymnasts!
BTW,
1.this topic is speically for "CHinese economy",instead of "CHinese political".
But It is very strange that some indian people like to drive the topic to chinese political.....
2. I never declare that "china is paradise" ,"chinese is perfect".....etc.... I just pointed out that CHina is not what some indian people thought.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
It was, until comrades snooped in.Liu wrote: BTW,
1.this topic is speically for "CHinese economy",instead of "CHinese political".
Thank you Ray bhai, your post is phenomenal and will definitely be a reference for long time to come. It will also serve as re-education for our fellow comrades.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Well there are people here who are interested to know more about china even if it's a very long paper.Liu wrote:you post too much.....I am afaid that nobody here would like to read such long paper.....
Doesn't politics directly effect the economy? Aren't differences in growth rates during mao's era and deng's era proof of that?Liu wrote: BTW,
1.this topic is speically for "CHinese economy",instead of "CHinese political".
But It is very strange that some indian people like to drive the topic to chinese political.....
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
The comrades miss the point of 'political economy' entirely. Politics is reflected in the economy and vice-versa.
Lest anybody get wrong ideas, IMVVHO India doesn't have a problem co-existing with PRC. Sadly, the reverse may not be true.
Already PRC showed its tactical brilliance - by arming TSP with nukes, by stoking insurgencies inside India, by keeping the border issue vexed and on the boil, by invading Indian territory in 1962 etc - and turned a potential friend like India into an antagonistic and wary neighbor. And they did this to a country that willingly gifted the Security council permanent seat to them!
And a reluctant nuclear power at that which in a few yrs (or maybe a generation) shall have the wherewithal (willingness is another matter) to visit annihilation on the PRC state should they try to arm their jihadist or maoist proxies inside and around India with deniable WMDs. If that point hasn't been made yet, I suspect it soon shall be.
Till then, enjoy the 'drone attacks' from across the border onlee....
Lest anybody get wrong ideas, IMVVHO India doesn't have a problem co-existing with PRC. Sadly, the reverse may not be true.
Already PRC showed its tactical brilliance - by arming TSP with nukes, by stoking insurgencies inside India, by keeping the border issue vexed and on the boil, by invading Indian territory in 1962 etc - and turned a potential friend like India into an antagonistic and wary neighbor. And they did this to a country that willingly gifted the Security council permanent seat to them!
And a reluctant nuclear power at that which in a few yrs (or maybe a generation) shall have the wherewithal (willingness is another matter) to visit annihilation on the PRC state should they try to arm their jihadist or maoist proxies inside and around India with deniable WMDs. If that point hasn't been made yet, I suspect it soon shall be.
Till then, enjoy the 'drone attacks' from across the border onlee....
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Catastrophic Fall in 2009 Global Food Production
To understand the depth of the food Catastrophe that faces the world this year, consider the graphic below depicting countries by USD value of their agricultural output, as of 2006.
Now, consider the same graphic with the countries experiencing droughts highlighted.
To understand the depth of the food Catastrophe that faces the world this year, consider the graphic below depicting countries by USD value of their agricultural output, as of 2006.
Now, consider the same graphic with the countries experiencing droughts highlighted.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php? ... leId=12252China
The drought in Northern China, the worst in 50 years, is worsening, and summer harvest is now threatened. The area of affected crops has expanded to 161 million mu (was 141 million last week), and 4.37 million people and 2.1 million livestock are facing drinking water shortage. The scarcity of rain in some parts of the north and central provinces is the worst in recorded history.
The drought which started in November threatens over half the wheat crop in eight provinces - Hebei, Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, Henan, Shandong, Shaanxi and Gansu.
Henan
China's largest crop producing province, Henan, has issued the highest-level drought warning. Henan has received an average rainfall of 10.5 millimeters since November 2008, almost 80 percent less than in the same period in the previous years. The Henan drought, which began in November, is the most severe since 1951.
Anhui
Anhui Province issued a red drought alert, with more than 60 percent of the crops north of the Huaihe River plagued by a major drought.
Shanxi
Shanxi Province was put on orange drought alert on Jan. 21, with one million people and 160,000 heads of livestock are facing water shortage.
Jiangsu
Jiangsu province has already lost over one fifth of the wheat crops affected by drought. Local agricultural departments are diverting water from nearby rivers in an emergency effort to save the rest.
Hebei
Over 100 million cubic meters of water has been channeled in from outside the province to fight Hebei's drought.
Shaanxi
1.34 million acres of crops across the bone-dry Shanxi province are affected by the worsening drought.
Shandong
Since last November, Shandong province has experienced 73 percent less rain than the same period in previous years, with little rainfall forecast for the future.
Relief efforts are under way. The Chinese government has allocated 86.7 billion yuan (about $12.69 billion) to drought-hit areas. Authorities have also resorted to cloud-seeding, and some areas received a sprinkling of rain after clouds were hit with 2,392 rockets and 409 cannon shells loaded with chemicals. However, there is a limit to what can be done in the face of such widespread water shortage.
As I have previously written, China is facing hyperinflation , and this record drought will make things worse. China produces 18% of the world's grain each year.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Poster banned
Last edited by Suraj on 17 Feb 2009 02:19, edited 2 times in total.
Reason: for trolling
Reason: for trolling
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Thanks Suraj
Last edited by Raghav K on 17 Feb 2009 02:16, edited 1 time in total.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Zengarl, that is a very nice video - proves that the quality of the indian train is sooperior to chinese trains because in china, nobody would dare to do this lest the train or the bridge or the tracks might get destroyed...
Meanwhile, In China, the facilities are so superior that the whole country is rushing towards catching a train as proven by the following photos..
Lesson for you - posting a video without context is called propagandu.... If you want I can tell you the context in which the above pics were taken... can you tell the context in which your youtube video was posted ??
For your re-education, I am posting some other videos of Indian Trains
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TTgMgSuA0rs
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aa1B2Op3iSA
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HH4AyRFa_uc - In this video, it looks like the bad indian railways made all the passengers sitting on the rooftop disembark before shooting this
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GtUAyqhug8w - Again a surprising lack of people on rooftops - the economy must be really bad
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=76EKoWmANmU - This is the piece de resistance : You will notice in the 2nd slide that people climbed down from the train and into the boats so that if anybody takes any pictures, we can fool them... Another couple of pics you will see that some people are walking on the train tracks - clear proof that since they cannot afford the train ticket, they are using state property without permission to get where they want to go, clearly a good case for sending them to re-education camp for improper use of state property..
Finally,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DsouYCY8wX0 - As you can see from this video, we need to learn from our 'fair' neighbor to the north about how to fill our trains to the capacity.. clearly, it is a sooperior system..
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s1GwHkOOZ-M - Sooperior and advanced
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzbiLGw4D7Y - People are thronging to the superior train system
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NcVCN661 ... re=related
Meanwhile, In China, the facilities are so superior that the whole country is rushing towards catching a train as proven by the following photos..
Lesson for you - posting a video without context is called propagandu.... If you want I can tell you the context in which the above pics were taken... can you tell the context in which your youtube video was posted ??
For your re-education, I am posting some other videos of Indian Trains
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TTgMgSuA0rs
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aa1B2Op3iSA
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HH4AyRFa_uc - In this video, it looks like the bad indian railways made all the passengers sitting on the rooftop disembark before shooting this
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GtUAyqhug8w - Again a surprising lack of people on rooftops - the economy must be really bad
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=76EKoWmANmU - This is the piece de resistance : You will notice in the 2nd slide that people climbed down from the train and into the boats so that if anybody takes any pictures, we can fool them... Another couple of pics you will see that some people are walking on the train tracks - clear proof that since they cannot afford the train ticket, they are using state property without permission to get where they want to go, clearly a good case for sending them to re-education camp for improper use of state property..
Finally,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DsouYCY8wX0 - As you can see from this video, we need to learn from our 'fair' neighbor to the north about how to fill our trains to the capacity.. clearly, it is a sooperior system..
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s1GwHkOOZ-M - Sooperior and advanced
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzbiLGw4D7Y - People are thronging to the superior train system
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NcVCN661 ... re=related
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
PRC sooperiority is now so concloosively demosntrated that moi shall henceforth reverentially address it as soup-e-rear onlee.
Last edited by vsudhir on 17 Feb 2009 02:54, edited 1 time in total.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Folks, enough of this 'my train is bigger than yours' please - your point has been made. The trolling poster has been banned; I merely gave him sufficient rope to hang himself with, and he obliged. Thanks.
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KarthikSan
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Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Suraj, can you please clean up this thread and move some posts like RayC's to the "Let Us Understand the Chinese" thread. Very interesting posts IMO. Thanks.
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KarthikSan
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Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Getting back to business
Chinese Exporters Look to Sell in the Home Market
Chinese Exporters Look to Sell in the Home Market
Even if domestic consumption increases some of these companies have to re-learn doing business with their own people. This is a wake-up call for Indian companies that are 100% EOUs. If they don't diversify and don't have a foot in the domestic market they are bound to be caught in such a situation.Over the past three decades hundreds of thousands of small factories making everything from rivets to refrigerators have popped up across China. While competition was always cutthroat, many of these companies—both domestic and foreign-owned—prospered by avoiding the brutal domestic scrum and selling abroad.
But with overseas consumers reining in spending, Chinese manufacturers are now piling into the crowded domestic market. "Competitors are coming out of the woodwork," says Frank Rexach, Asia chief for Michigan-based office furniture maker Haworth, which faces a slew of new rivals that once sold primarily to such foreign giants as Wal-Mart Stores (WMT) and Office Depot (ODP).
Across the economy, the story is the same. On Feb. 5, Beijing-based Lenovo Group (LNVGY), the world's No. 4 PC maker, fired its American CEO and said it would refocus on China. In November, a Russian customer cancelled an order for 50,000 TVs from electronics manufacturer Skyworth, so the Shenzhen-based company quickly dispatched them to the domestic market. And Dongguan Meng Qiren Fashion, which once sent all of its sweaters to Polo Ralph Lauren (RL) and a host of smaller Western brands, is selling more to Chinese supermarkets and shops.
"EVERYBODY IS CHASING SHARE"
These companies couldn't have picked a worse moment to wade into their home market. At least 20 million migrant workers have lost their jobs, and urban unemployment is rising. Chinese customers, among the world's biggest savers when they're feeling flush, are likely to cut back wherever they can. "The toughest times are yet to come," says Stephen Shao, president of paper products maker Kimberly-Clark China (KMB).
The shift threatens foreign manufacturers that had high hopes for China. The country has long been a bright spot for the likes of General Motors (GM), Ford Motor (F), and Toyota Motor (TM), but they face renewed competition from domestic rivals that ramped up in anticipation of export demand that isn't likely to materialize anytime soon. "Everybody is chasing share" in the mainland, says Nigel Harris, Ford's No. 2 executive in China.
Some foreigners have already had to revamp mainland plans. On Feb. 5, Swedish appliance maker Electrolux said it will close a refrigerator factory in the central Chinese city of Changsha because it couldn't compete with low-cost domestic rivals. "This downturn is the most significant setback multinationals have had in China in the last 10 years," says Gordon Orr, partner at consultancy McKinsey in Shanghai.
It won't be easy for Chinese companies to break into their home market overnight. Exporters that have worked with just a handful of foreign customers don't know how to negotiate the Byzantine distribution channels. Shing-Hing Group, one of China's 10,000-plus manufacturers of screws, has supplied clients abroad for two decades. Now it faces years of hard work to build a sales network at home, says founder Edward Tsui. "In China, the culture is different," he says, "and more difficult than overseas."
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Maybe they are long, but when one has to give the correct perspective of an issue, there is no shortcuts.Liu wrote: you post too much.....I am afaid that nobody here would like to read such long paper.....
BTW,
1.this topic is speically for "CHinese economy",instead of "CHinese political".
But It is very strange that some indian people like to drive the topic to chinese political.....
2. I never declare that "china is paradise" ,"chinese is perfect".....etc.... I just pointed out that CHina is not what some indian people thought.
This Forum is not only for debate but sharing knowledge.
I would not have posted them in full since that is frowned upon at the BRF, but I did it so that there is some record and those posters who read it can make their own opinion of the issues at hand.
Politics and Economy are two peas in a pod.
What and why is there the Hukou system, where one cannot migrate to other regions (internal passport system) in China? It is politics, economy and social all rolled in one.
I am sure there are great things going on in China, like the Olympics, but then everything is not rosy and hunky dory!
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
bhavin wrote:Zengarl, that is a very nice video - proves that the quality of the indian train is sooperior to chinese trains because in china, nobody would dare to do this lest the train or the bridge or the tracks might get destroyed...
Meanwhile, In China, the facilities are so superior that the whole country is rushing towards catching a train as proven by the following photos..
Lesson for you - posting a video without context is called propagandu.... If you want I can tell you the context in which the above pics were taken... can you tell the context in which your youtube video was posted ??
For your re-education, I am posting some other videos of Indian Trains
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TTgMgSuA0rs
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aa1B2Op3iSA
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HH4AyRFa_uc - In this video, it looks like the bad indian railways made all the passengers sitting on the rooftop disembark before shooting this
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GtUAyqhug8w - Again a surprising lack of people on rooftops - the economy must be really bad
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=76EKoWmANmU - This is the piece de resistance : You will notice in the 2nd slide that people climbed down from the train and into the boats so that if anybody takes any pictures, we can fool them... Another couple of pics you will see that some people are walking on the train tracks - clear proof that since they cannot afford the train ticket, they are using state property without permission to get where they want to go, clearly a good case for sending them to re-education camp for improper use of state property..
Finally,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DsouYCY8wX0 - As you can see from this video, we need to learn from our 'fair' neighbor to the north about how to fill our trains to the capacity.. clearly, it is a sooperior system..
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s1GwHkOOZ-M - Sooperior and advanced
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzbiLGw4D7Y - People are thronging to the superior train system
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NcVCN661 ... re=related
well, what your pictures shows is how people fight their way into railway station/buses during the week-long vacation of Chinese new Year.
Here is my opinions:
1. Chinese communication&transportation system is not perfect and need provement indeed.
As your pictures shows, it is very hard to get a railway ticket during the week-long vacation of chinese new year every year.
Even if you have got a ticket, the crowded railway trip won't be comfortable.
2.Such a crowned terrible case only happens during week-long vacation of CHinese new year ,when half of 1.3 billion Chinese are on the train,buses ,ships and planes,because during the week of CHinese new year, All chinese should return back to their families,however far they are away from families.
Except the crazy vacation-rush of CHinese new year, Chinese communication&transportation system is fairly good.
3.To be fair, the vacation-rush of Chinese-new-year is so harsh and abrupt that no coutries ,including USA and the whole EU, can deal easily with it.
For example, during the week-long vacation of Chinese new year of 2009, 2.39 billion guests's ticket were sold. If such harsh and abrupt vacation-rush happened in USA or EU, the transporation system of USA and EU would be more terrible and crowded than Chinese now.
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-01-12/07 ... 341s.shtml
Last edited by Liu on 17 Feb 2009 10:15, edited 2 times in total.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
well, In the past several decades ,CHinese domestic consumption has kept growing 10+% every year while it export has kept growthing 20+%.KarthikSan wrote:Getting back to business
Chinese Exporters Look to Sell in the Home Market
Even if domestic consumption increases some of these companies have to re-learn doing business with their own people. This is a wake-up call for Indian companies that are 100% EOUs. If they don't diversify and don't have a foot in the domestic market they are bound to be caught in such a situation.Over the past three decades hundreds of thousands of small factories making everything from rivets to refrigerators have popped up across China. While competition was always cutthroat, many of these companies—both domestic and foreign-owned—prospered by avoiding the brutal domestic scrum and selling abroad.
But with overseas consumers reining in spending, Chinese manufacturers are now piling into the crowded domestic market. "Competitors are coming out of the woodwork," says Frank Rexach, Asia chief for Michigan-based office furniture maker Haworth, which faces a slew of new rivals that once sold primarily to such foreign giants as Wal-Mart Stores (WMT) and Office Depot (ODP).
Across the economy, the story is the same. On Feb. 5, Beijing-based Lenovo Group (LNVGY), the world's No. 4 PC maker, fired its American CEO and said it would refocus on China. In November, a Russian customer cancelled an order for 50,000 TVs from electronics manufacturer Skyworth, so the Shenzhen-based company quickly dispatched them to the domestic market. And Dongguan Meng Qiren Fashion, which once sent all of its sweaters to Polo Ralph Lauren (RL) and a host of smaller Western brands, is selling more to Chinese supermarkets and shops.
"EVERYBODY IS CHASING SHARE"
These companies couldn't have picked a worse moment to wade into their home market. At least 20 million migrant workers have lost their jobs, and urban unemployment is rising. Chinese customers, among the world's biggest savers when they're feeling flush, are likely to cut back wherever they can. "The toughest times are yet to come," says Stephen Shao, president of paper products maker Kimberly-Clark China (KMB).
The shift threatens foreign manufacturers that had high hopes for China. The country has long been a bright spot for the likes of General Motors (GM), Ford Motor (F), and Toyota Motor (TM), but they face renewed competition from domestic rivals that ramped up in anticipation of export demand that isn't likely to materialize anytime soon. "Everybody is chasing share" in the mainland, says Nigel Harris, Ford's No. 2 executive in China.
Some foreigners have already had to revamp mainland plans. On Feb. 5, Swedish appliance maker Electrolux said it will close a refrigerator factory in the central Chinese city of Changsha because it couldn't compete with low-cost domestic rivals. "This downturn is the most significant setback multinationals have had in China in the last 10 years," says Gordon Orr, partner at consultancy McKinsey in Shanghai.
It won't be easy for Chinese companies to break into their home market overnight. Exporters that have worked with just a handful of foreign customers don't know how to negotiate the Byzantine distribution channels. Shing-Hing Group, one of China's 10,000-plus manufacturers of screws, has supplied clients abroad for two decades. Now it faces years of hard work to build a sales network at home, says founder Edward Tsui. "In China, the culture is different," he says, "and more difficult than overseas."
So,in fact ,it is not that " CHinese domestic comsuption performs too poorly" ,but that "China's export performs too well".
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KarthikSan
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Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Thanks for your great insight about the Chinese economy. However, I was talking about something else.Liu wrote:well, In the past several decades ,CHinese domestic consumption has kept growing 10+% every year while it export has kept growthing 20+%.
So,in fact ,it is not that " CHinese domestic comsuption performs too poorly" ,but that "China's export performs too well".
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Whats the state of PRC's SME sector, btw? I understand its a good driver of local economies in yindia.
Where do chini SMEs raise capital from? Debt? equity?
Where do chini SMEs raise capital from? Debt? equity?
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KarthikSan
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Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
I did not know that Chinese population growth rate also follows the CCP's GDP growth rate. Thanks for you insight once again.Liu wrote:2.Such a crowned terrible case only happens during week-long vacation of CHinese new year ,when half of 1.3 trllion Chinese are on the train,buses ,ships and planes,because during the week of CHinese new year, All chinese should return back to their families,however far they are away from families.Except the crazy vacation-rush of CHinese new year, Chinese communication&transportation system is fairly good.
3.To be fair, the vacation-rush of Chinese-new-year is so harsh and abrupt that no coutries ,including USA and the whole EU, can deal easily with it. For example, during the week-long vacation of Chinese new year of 2009, 2.39 trillion guests's ticket were sold. If such harsh and abrupt vacation-rush happened in USA or EU, the transporation system of USA and EU would be more terrible and crowded than Chinese now.
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-01-12/07 ... 341s.shtml
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
tpye errorKarthikSan wrote:I did not know that Chinese population growth rate also follows the CCP's GDP growth rate. Thanks for you insight once again.Liu wrote:2.Such a crowned terrible case only happens during week-long vacation of CHinese new year ,when half of 1.3 trllion Chinese are on the train,buses ,ships and planes,because during the week of CHinese new year, All chinese should return back to their families,however far they are away from families.Except the crazy vacation-rush of CHinese new year, Chinese communication&transportation system is fairly good.
3.To be fair, the vacation-rush of Chinese-new-year is so harsh and abrupt that no coutries ,including USA and the whole EU, can deal easily with it. For example, during the week-long vacation of Chinese new year of 2009, 2.39 trillion guests's ticket were sold. If such harsh and abrupt vacation-rush happened in USA or EU, the transporation system of USA and EU would be more terrible and crowded than Chinese now.
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-01-12/07 ... 341s.shtml
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
So Much For Stimulus: Chinese Loans Diverted to Stocks, Feeding Rally
The China bulls have commented approvingly on the growth in loans in China, seeing it as a sign of pending recovery, along with an upswing in stock prices. We've pointed out that economist and China commentator Michael Pettis has heard quite a few reports that many of these loans were in fact sham transactions to meet government targets.
And now it gets even better. One analyst estimates that more than 1/3 of the total "new" lending (assuming that the loans were truly extended) may have gone into the stock market.
From Bloomberg (hat tip reader Michael):
Chinese companies may be using record bank lending to invest in stocks, fueling a rally that’s made the benchmark Shanghai Composite Index the world’s best performer this year, according to Shenyin & Wanguo Securities Co.
As much as 660 billion yuan ($97 billion) may have been converted by companies into term deposits or used to buy equities, Li Huiyong, Shanghai-based analyst at Shenyin Wanguo, said in a phone interview today, citing money supply figures.
China’s banks lent a record 1.62 trillion yuan in January as part of a government drive to stimulate the world’s third- largest economy, while M2, the broadest measure of money supply, climbed 18.8 percent from a year earlier. The Shanghai Composite has surged 29 percent since the start of 2009, compared with a 10 percent decline in the MSCI World Index.
Last edited by Raghav K on 17 Feb 2009 10:31, edited 1 time in total.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
it depends on where the SME is.vsudhir wrote:Whats the state of PRC's SME sector, btw? I understand its a good driver of local economies in yindia.
Where do chini SMEs raise capital from? Debt? equity?
In southeast provinces of China,such as Zhejiang, SME is very active and is the main driver of local economy.
The province per GDP surpassed 7000 USD (per nominal GDP) or 20000 USD( PPP)in 2008.
However,in northeast CHina,SEM is not that important.
Last edited by Liu on 17 Feb 2009 10:35, edited 1 time in total.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
This does not answer the question. More shooting in the dark answers.Liu wrote:it depends on where the SME is.vsudhir wrote:Whats the state of PRC's SME sector, btw? I understand its a good driver of local economies in yindia.
Where do chini SMEs raise capital from? Debt? equity?
In southeast provinces of China,such as Zhejiang, SME is very active and is the main driver of local economy.
The province per GDP surpassed 7000 USD (per nominal GDP) or 20000 USD( PPP)in 2008.
However,in northeast CHina,SEM is not that important.
Last edited by Raghav K on 17 Feb 2009 10:33, edited 1 time in total.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
it is not a good phenominon.Raghav K wrote:So Much For Stimulus: Chinese Loans Diverted to Stocks, Feeding Rally
The China bulls have commented approvingly on the growth in loans in China, seeing it as a sign of pending recovery, along with an upswing in stock prices. We've pointed out that economist and China commentator Michael Pettis has heard quite a few reports that many of these loans were in fact sham transactions to meet government targets.
And now it gets even better. One analyst estimates that more than 1/3 of the total "new" lending (assuming that the loans were truly extended) may have gone into the stock market.
From Bloomberg (hat tip reader Michael):
Chinese companies may be using record bank lending to invest in stocks, fueling a rally that’s made the benchmark Shanghai Composite Index the world’s best performer this year, according to Shenyin & Wanguo Securities Co.
As much as 660 billion yuan ($97 billion) may have been converted by companies into term deposits or used to buy equities, Li Huiyong, Shanghai-based analyst at Shenyin Wanguo, said in a phone interview today, citing money supply figures.
China’s banks lent a record 1.62 trillion yuan in January as part of a government drive to stimulate the world’s third- largest economy, while M2, the broadest measure of money supply, climbed 18.8 percent from a year earlier. The Shanghai Composite has surged 29 percent since the start of 2009, compared with a 10 percent decline in the MSCI World Index.
It is not good to actual economy,but cause more bubles...
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Raghav K wrote:Whats the state of PRC's SME sector, btw? I understand its a good driver of local economies in yindia.
Where do chini SMEs raise capital from? Debt? equity?
sorry wrong picture+wrong answer...
CHiense SEM has the following ways to raise their capital:
1.small banks.
Except big banks such as ICBC and BOC,there are hundreds of small banks in CHina.
those small banks are the main fund supporters of Chinese SEM.
2.underground banks.
Those undergound banks are illegal and out of the supervision of chinese center bank. But such uderground banks are very active in southeast CHina.
3. a special stock market for SEM in Shenzhen.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
Liu, that post was in reply to zengarl's post... I know why the rush was there and the point that I was trying to make was that one can selectively find bad about anything but if the things are put into context, only then can we gain proper understanding of either the pics or videos...Liu wrote:......
well, what your pictures shows is how people fight their way into railway station/buses during the week-long vacation of Chinese new Year.
Here is my opinions:
1. Chinese communication&transportation system is not perfect and need provement indeed.
As your pictures shows, it is very hard to get a railway ticket during the week-long vacation of chinese new year every year.
Even if you have got a ticket, the crowded railway trip won't be comfortable.
2.Such a crowned terrible case only happens during week-long vacation of CHinese new year ,when half of 1.3 billion Chinese are on the train,buses ,ships and planes,because during the week of CHinese new year, All chinese should return back to their families,however far they are away from families.
Except the crazy vacation-rush of CHinese new year, Chinese communication&transportation system is fairly good.
3.To be fair, the vacation-rush of Chinese-new-year is so harsh and abrupt that no coutries ,including USA and the whole EU, can deal easily with it.
For example, during the week-long vacation of Chinese new year of 2009, 2.39 billion guests's ticket were sold. If such harsh and abrupt vacation-rush happened in USA or EU, the transporation system of USA and EU would be more terrible and crowded than Chinese now.
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-01-12/07 ... 341s.shtml
The above pics are actually taken sometimes last year when there was really bad snow storm and a lot of people were stranded
Regards,
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
In 2005 I traveled by train from Wuhan to Guangdong(Shenzhen). My Chinese interlocutor was curious about the state of trains in India. He was surprised when I mentioned to him that in India most trains of that distance that I was familiar with, were electric rather than the diesel that we were riding on. Also that even in second class compartments in India, the seats were cushioned!
Clearly, PRC and India need to talk to each other and urgently. And they should stop fighting other peoples battles.
Clearly, PRC and India need to talk to each other and urgently. And they should stop fighting other peoples battles.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
/Drone mode on....
In 2005 you say? But you celeverly omit to mention whether AD or BC? See!
See, if its BC, then it doen't count because it was so long ago. You should try the same thing on or after 2005 AD birader.....
/Drone mode off....
Sorry couldn't resist....shall delete in a while....
Aha..Sagar birader? You forget to mention one critical detail which will lay to rest any fanatasies about India being ahead of China in any area - even be it train seat cushioning - onlee.Sagar wrote:In 2005 I traveled by train from Wuhan to Guangdong(Shenzhen). My Chinese interlocutor was curious about the state of trains in India. He was surprised when I mentioned to him that in India most trains of that distance that I was familiar with, were electric rather than the diesel that we were riding on. Also that even in second class compartments in India, the seats were cushioned!
Clearly, PRC and India need to talk to each other and urgently. And they should stop fighting other peoples battles.
In 2005 you say? But you celeverly omit to mention whether AD or BC? See!
See, if its BC, then it doen't count because it was so long ago. You should try the same thing on or after 2005 AD birader.....
/Drone mode off....
Sorry couldn't resist....shall delete in a while....
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
It is impossible that another " Mao" appears in China today.because the hero era in China has passed.
after Deng Xiaopin died,all presidents of China ,such as Jiang and Hu ,are just one of 9 equal standing members of Political Bureau, although Jiang and Hu are the principle one of them.
When Xi becomes Chinese president, he will be also just one of 9 equal stantding memebers of CCP's polictal-burean. Without the agree from other 8 standing memebers, Xi can do nothing.
So, chinese government today is "Oligarchy" ,instead of "dictotorship".
Anyhow, dictatorship without a dictator doesn't exist.
Re: PRC Economy News and Discussions-II
China and russia signed a contract of "long-term loans for oil".
According to the contract, China is going to give Russia long-term loan of 25 billion USD at a fixed preferential interest rate of about 6% ",instead of floating "LIBOR".
Russia will give China 0.3 trillion tons of oil druing 2011-2030. the oil price can fluctuate according the market price.
The contract seems that very good to Russia.It seems that china now gifts a big carrot to Russia in a big finaical trouble.
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/sh ... p?t=151822
According to the contract, China is going to give Russia long-term loan of 25 billion USD at a fixed preferential interest rate of about 6% ",instead of floating "LIBOR".
Russia will give China 0.3 trillion tons of oil druing 2011-2030. the oil price can fluctuate according the market price.
The contract seems that very good to Russia.It seems that china now gifts a big carrot to Russia in a big finaical trouble.
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/sh ... p?t=151822
Last edited by Liu on 18 Feb 2009 09:48, edited 1 time in total.