about the artillery near the border part, how about this :
link up an AWACS with radar in ground search mode OR balloons with the battlefield radars, to the artillery near the border. both have the advantage of mobility, and the artillery doesn't reveal its location by using its own battery level radar.
Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
^^^
The typical weight of a 150mm artillery shell is 50 KG.Now try putting the tandem warhead+guidance into this as a shell SHOULD directly hit the tank to destroy it.Trying to destroy a tank with artillery is like,firing with an inclined rifle and expecting to hit a mobile person far off based on ballistics.
I rest my case at that.
The typical weight of a 150mm artillery shell is 50 KG.Now try putting the tandem warhead+guidance into this as a shell SHOULD directly hit the tank to destroy it.Trying to destroy a tank with artillery is like,firing with an inclined rifle and expecting to hit a mobile person far off based on ballistics.
I rest my case at that.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
i was referring to rocket artillery...smerches, pinakas, and the like...
also, if the tank can be immobilized, it is as good as destroyed, right? cluster munitions can blow off the tank's tracks. no tracks, no moving tanks. only tin cans with bull's eyes...
also, if the tank can be immobilized, it is as good as destroyed, right? cluster munitions can blow off the tank's tracks. no tracks, no moving tanks. only tin cans with bull's eyes...
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Arjun tank gets vote of support from Indian Army Chief Gen Deepak Kapoor
New Delhi, Feb 19: In a reversal of the Indian Army's stand on the indigenous main battle tank (MBT) Arjun, which has been 37 years in the making, Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor has written to the Defence Ministry appreciating the tank's performance.
The Army Chief's letter has come months before the MBT Arjun, which India has been trying to manufacture indigenously for more than three decades, is headed for head-to-head 'comparative trials' with the Russian T-90 tanks that the Army currently operates.
"The Army Chief for the first time has appreciated Arjun tank for performing well. In a letter written earlier this year he said that the tank was subjected to the most strenuous of tests and it performed 'admirably well'," a defence ministry official told reporters on the condition of anonymity.
The letter from the Army Chief came after last year's winter trials of the tank, which has already cost the exchequer Rs.3.5 billion ($71.7 million). The stand is a complete u-turn as the army had made it clear that it would buy no more than the 124 Arjuns it has contracted for because it is unhappy with the tank on various counts.
The Defence Research & Development Organisation's (DRDO) demand for the comparative trials of the two tanks is being seen as a desperate bid to save the Arjun as it would need to manufacture at least 500 tanks to make the project feasible.
"The Defence Ministry had been pushing for the joint trials for the past one-and-a-half-years but people in the military set up were not too keen," the official added.
A reluctant Army had also said that the Arjun can at best remain in service for five to 10 years while it is looking 20 years ahead and needs a futuristic MBT.
However, the Defence Ministry, which has been putting thrust on the indigenisation of the defence industry, wanted to see the project through.
On Feb 11, Defence Minister A.K. Antony had expressed his happiness on the Arjun tank becoming "a reality". "We have seen light at the end of the tunnel," Antony had said speaking of the project.
The tank has been mired in controversy with the army last year having told a key parliamentary panel that the Arjun failed to deliver at the winter trials conducted in the Rajasthan desert in 2007. The army said that many improvements would have to be carried out before it was satisfied with the tank.
Adding fuel to the proverbial fire, Minister of State for Defence Rao Inderjit Singh hinted at the possibility of "sabotage" during the 2007 winter trials.
The Indian Army laid down its qualitative requirement (QR) for the Arjun in 1972. In 1982, it was announced that the prototype was ready for field trials. However, the tank was publicly unveiled for the first time only in 1995.
Arjun was originally meant to be a 40-tonne tank with a 105 mm gun. It has now grown to a 50-tonne tank with a 120 mm gun. The tank was meant to supplement and eventually replace the Soviet-era T-72 MBT that was first inducted in the early 1980s.
However, delays in the Arjun project and Pakistan's decision to purchase the T-80 from Ukraine prompted India to order 310 T-90s, an upgraded version of the T-72, in 2001.
IANS
http://www.zeenews.com/nation/2009-02-2 ... 6news.html
New Delhi, Feb 19: In a reversal of the Indian Army's stand on the indigenous main battle tank (MBT) Arjun, which has been 37 years in the making, Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor has written to the Defence Ministry appreciating the tank's performance.
The Army Chief's letter has come months before the MBT Arjun, which India has been trying to manufacture indigenously for more than three decades, is headed for head-to-head 'comparative trials' with the Russian T-90 tanks that the Army currently operates.
"The Army Chief for the first time has appreciated Arjun tank for performing well. In a letter written earlier this year he said that the tank was subjected to the most strenuous of tests and it performed 'admirably well'," a defence ministry official told reporters on the condition of anonymity.
The letter from the Army Chief came after last year's winter trials of the tank, which has already cost the exchequer Rs.3.5 billion ($71.7 million). The stand is a complete u-turn as the army had made it clear that it would buy no more than the 124 Arjuns it has contracted for because it is unhappy with the tank on various counts.
The Defence Research & Development Organisation's (DRDO) demand for the comparative trials of the two tanks is being seen as a desperate bid to save the Arjun as it would need to manufacture at least 500 tanks to make the project feasible.
"The Defence Ministry had been pushing for the joint trials for the past one-and-a-half-years but people in the military set up were not too keen," the official added.
A reluctant Army had also said that the Arjun can at best remain in service for five to 10 years while it is looking 20 years ahead and needs a futuristic MBT.
However, the Defence Ministry, which has been putting thrust on the indigenisation of the defence industry, wanted to see the project through.
On Feb 11, Defence Minister A.K. Antony had expressed his happiness on the Arjun tank becoming "a reality". "We have seen light at the end of the tunnel," Antony had said speaking of the project.
The tank has been mired in controversy with the army last year having told a key parliamentary panel that the Arjun failed to deliver at the winter trials conducted in the Rajasthan desert in 2007. The army said that many improvements would have to be carried out before it was satisfied with the tank.
Adding fuel to the proverbial fire, Minister of State for Defence Rao Inderjit Singh hinted at the possibility of "sabotage" during the 2007 winter trials.
The Indian Army laid down its qualitative requirement (QR) for the Arjun in 1972. In 1982, it was announced that the prototype was ready for field trials. However, the tank was publicly unveiled for the first time only in 1995.
Arjun was originally meant to be a 40-tonne tank with a 105 mm gun. It has now grown to a 50-tonne tank with a 120 mm gun. The tank was meant to supplement and eventually replace the Soviet-era T-72 MBT that was first inducted in the early 1980s.
However, delays in the Arjun project and Pakistan's decision to purchase the T-80 from Ukraine prompted India to order 310 T-90s, an upgraded version of the T-72, in 2001.
IANS
http://www.zeenews.com/nation/2009-02-2 ... 6news.html
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Rahul sir, please respond to my last post as well. Our discussion was left mid way.Rahul M wrote:no rajat, these are for making ICVs more potent, not replacing MBTs.
everything else remaining the same, any decent MBT would still wipe the floor with such vehicles.
we had some nice discussions in the last 2-3 pages. (I still haven't answered sanku's last post in that discussion, will do so)
TIA
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
kiran, I'll. but please don't add sir. 
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
I am not a guru, however, i believe u need a ideal mix of both MBT in addition to medium and light tanks and along with Artillery.
We cannot be baised towards any of them against other.
- Nitin
We cannot be baised towards any of them against other.
- Nitin
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Rajat,
Could you give us an example as to how artillery can substitute the task of a tank as used in today's warfare?
I am asking this clarification since I feel I have not understood you.
Could you give us an example as to how artillery can substitute the task of a tank as used in today's warfare?
I am asking this clarification since I feel I have not understood you.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
okay... 
i'm NOT saying that the artillery can replace the tank completely. i'm saying that tank v tank battles are passe. artillery can be used to effectively neutralize the enemy's armored column, while tanks provide close escort and protection. artillery cannot fight one on one against a tank. if some tanks manage to escape the artillery barrage, they can be picked off by the escorts.
let me state clearly that i'm not saying my scenario is flawless. i'm just saying that i feel that tanks will slowly lose their offensive significance as weapons ranges get longer and longer. i could be completely wrong, and we could have WW2esque tank mauling in 2050 as well. i just can't see that happening.
also, i feel that if one is able to minimize loss of life, something that is a very real possibility in close combat, by utilizing other assets, it is a good thing.
i'm NOT saying that the artillery can replace the tank completely. i'm saying that tank v tank battles are passe. artillery can be used to effectively neutralize the enemy's armored column, while tanks provide close escort and protection. artillery cannot fight one on one against a tank. if some tanks manage to escape the artillery barrage, they can be picked off by the escorts.
let me state clearly that i'm not saying my scenario is flawless. i'm just saying that i feel that tanks will slowly lose their offensive significance as weapons ranges get longer and longer. i could be completely wrong, and we could have WW2esque tank mauling in 2050 as well. i just can't see that happening.
also, i feel that if one is able to minimize loss of life, something that is a very real possibility in close combat, by utilizing other assets, it is a good thing.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
If I may state, tank vs tank or meeting engagements are not passe in the conduct of war. At least, I have not heard it in the Indian context.
Artillery is used to support the attack and support manoeuvres.
However, if one is attacking an objective in the plains, one would require the armour to give close support to the infantry, which finally captures the ground and holds it. I wonder how artillery would give the close and intimate support during the attack, capture and reorganisation stages of an attack.
Artillery is used to support the attack and support manoeuvres.
However, if one is attacking an objective in the plains, one would require the armour to give close support to the infantry, which finally captures the ground and holds it. I wonder how artillery would give the close and intimate support during the attack, capture and reorganisation stages of an attack.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
RayC sir, can you also please give your inputs regarding the debate on missile based tank destroyers? Please refer page 12.
Also can other esteemed members give their 2 cents?
TIA
Also can other esteemed members give their 2 cents?
TIA
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
EFFECTS OF ARTILLERY FIRE
Destruction. Destructive fire physically damages the target to such an extent
that it is rendered useless to the enemy. A casualty rate of 30 per cent or more
should be taken as the guide. Destruction may be accomplished by penetration,
blast effect, incendiary action, fragments or by a combination thereof. Destruction of
enemy equipment or works is difficult to achieve. Results are always likely to be
small in relation to the ammunition expended, except when the target is concentrated
and without cover. On the other hand, the destruction of small pinpoint targets can
often be undertaken economically by guns especially sited to engage them directly
by assualt fire. However, achievement of destruction by this method is time
consuming. To inflict material damage to equipment or field works ,it requires a
heavy shell with delay fuze. Therefore , medium or heavy guns and howitzers are
needed.
Neutralisation. This is achieved when artillery fire prevents the enemy from
using his weapons effectively, or results in restricting his observation and/or
hampering his mobility. Actual casualties or damage to equipment assist
neutralisation . To be effective, neutralisation must fulfill the following:-
(a) It must be at least sufficiently lethal to inflict 15 to 20 per cent
casualties. Fire which is totally ineffective against the enemy’s protection is
unlikely to produce neutralisation. Mere prevention of aimed direct
fire/observation without specifying casualties would be termed as
“Suppression”.
(b) It must be of sufficient intensity to maintain neutralizing effect. The
intensity required will vary with the morale of the enemy and the amount of
protection which he has.
(c) It must be continuous in the sense that it must give the enemy no
respite, but the best effect is obtained by sudden heavy bursts at irregular
intervals rather than by maintaining a slow , steady rate of fire.
(d) The area to be neutralized must be effectively covered by fire. In case
of large targets , a definite portion of the area must be allocated to each unit
engaging it. In many cases it will be advisable for these portions to overlap,
and fort he flank portions to extend beyond the area to be covered. To
minimize the risk of leaving some portion of the area unscathed, a proportion
of the available artillery should fire on tasks already allocated to other guns.
(e) Neutralization is a temporary effect which continues only while the
shells are falling. Fire must therefore, continue as long as neutralization is
required. Moreover, neutralization is better achieved by a large number of
small shells arriving simultaneously on the target so that it is fully covered,
than by a small number of large shells where some points can remain
uncovered by fire and thus un-neutralised. These two factors indicate that in
attack, our own troops must keep close to the covering fire supporting them,
in order to take full advantage of the neutralization effect. For this purpose,
light and field guns and howitzers are better suited for neutralization because
of their lesser safety distance for own troops.
(f) A satisfactory degree of neutralization sometimes can be accomplished
by ‘blinding’ the enemy or by screening own troops from the target, with the
help of smoke ammunition.
(g) Illumination at night may assist in effecting neutralization by other
weapons as also neutralise infra-red devices.
(h) The supported arm commander should preferably indicate the
percentage of casualties that he wants inflicted on the enemy. Most armies
have tabulated data available which enables the artillery commander to utilize
his resources most economically to achieve the desired percentage of
casualties. The term neutralization without specific casualty percentages
should be avoided.
Harassment. Harassing fire inflicts losses, or by the threat of losses interferes
with enemy’s movement and in general, lowers morale. Harassing fire is of less
intensity than that intended to accomplish neutralization.
Destruction. Destructive fire physically damages the target to such an extent
that it is rendered useless to the enemy. A casualty rate of 30 per cent or more
should be taken as the guide. Destruction may be accomplished by penetration,
blast effect, incendiary action, fragments or by a combination thereof. Destruction of
enemy equipment or works is difficult to achieve. Results are always likely to be
small in relation to the ammunition expended, except when the target is concentrated
and without cover. On the other hand, the destruction of small pinpoint targets can
often be undertaken economically by guns especially sited to engage them directly
by assualt fire. However, achievement of destruction by this method is time
consuming. To inflict material damage to equipment or field works ,it requires a
heavy shell with delay fuze. Therefore , medium or heavy guns and howitzers are
needed.
Neutralisation. This is achieved when artillery fire prevents the enemy from
using his weapons effectively, or results in restricting his observation and/or
hampering his mobility. Actual casualties or damage to equipment assist
neutralisation . To be effective, neutralisation must fulfill the following:-
(a) It must be at least sufficiently lethal to inflict 15 to 20 per cent
casualties. Fire which is totally ineffective against the enemy’s protection is
unlikely to produce neutralisation. Mere prevention of aimed direct
fire/observation without specifying casualties would be termed as
“Suppression”.
(b) It must be of sufficient intensity to maintain neutralizing effect. The
intensity required will vary with the morale of the enemy and the amount of
protection which he has.
(c) It must be continuous in the sense that it must give the enemy no
respite, but the best effect is obtained by sudden heavy bursts at irregular
intervals rather than by maintaining a slow , steady rate of fire.
(d) The area to be neutralized must be effectively covered by fire. In case
of large targets , a definite portion of the area must be allocated to each unit
engaging it. In many cases it will be advisable for these portions to overlap,
and fort he flank portions to extend beyond the area to be covered. To
minimize the risk of leaving some portion of the area unscathed, a proportion
of the available artillery should fire on tasks already allocated to other guns.
(e) Neutralization is a temporary effect which continues only while the
shells are falling. Fire must therefore, continue as long as neutralization is
required. Moreover, neutralization is better achieved by a large number of
small shells arriving simultaneously on the target so that it is fully covered,
than by a small number of large shells where some points can remain
uncovered by fire and thus un-neutralised. These two factors indicate that in
attack, our own troops must keep close to the covering fire supporting them,
in order to take full advantage of the neutralization effect. For this purpose,
light and field guns and howitzers are better suited for neutralization because
of their lesser safety distance for own troops.
(f) A satisfactory degree of neutralization sometimes can be accomplished
by ‘blinding’ the enemy or by screening own troops from the target, with the
help of smoke ammunition.
(g) Illumination at night may assist in effecting neutralization by other
weapons as also neutralise infra-red devices.
(h) The supported arm commander should preferably indicate the
percentage of casualties that he wants inflicted on the enemy. Most armies
have tabulated data available which enables the artillery commander to utilize
his resources most economically to achieve the desired percentage of
casualties. The term neutralization without specific casualty percentages
should be avoided.
Harassment. Harassing fire inflicts losses, or by the threat of losses interferes
with enemy’s movement and in general, lowers morale. Harassing fire is of less
intensity than that intended to accomplish neutralization.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
I couldn't spot this missile based discussion.KiranM wrote:RayC sir, can you also please give your inputs regarding the debate on missile based tank destroyers? Please refer page 12.
Also can other esteemed members give their 2 cents?
TIA
However, you could read this:
http://warandgame.blogspot.com/2007/11/ ... 01990.html
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Quoting the relevant portions.RayC wrote:[
I couldn't spot this missile based discussion.
KiranM wrote:Rahul, I would like to engage in a discourse here. I would draw a little parallel between the expected role of WW2 era tank destroyer and NAMICA.Rahul M wrote:tank destroyers were essentially light tanks with upgunned main weapons.
they were so "successful" that US never really employed that tactics or tank destroyers again !
Considering in WW2 the tank destroyers most of the time sat out, due to not coming across the ideal 'tank destroying situation', wont the same happen along the line of NAMICA/ any such system? If range of ATGMs of such systems is the advantage, we are seeing increasing innovations in tank launched munitions like LAHAT.
Disclaimer: I do not intend to cast aspersions on NAMICA or Nag.
Rahul M wrote:IMHO, there are major differences in the prospective roles and improvements in technology.
one note though : what follows is my take on the ability of tank destroyers/ICVs to take on tanks. it doesn't talk of the ICV vs ICV confrontation but in this a well designed ICV should be reasonably succesful anyway. (as is probably obvious)
WW2 tank destroyers were essentially upgunned fast and light tanks with all the trappings of that definition. you can say that tank destroyer (US term) was derived from the brit concept of cruiser tanks with improved firepower.
tactics demanded that they engage tanks on their own, leaving the battle tanks(called infantry tanks) to punch through enemy defences.
NAMICA however would be expected to be part of mech infantry, in order to give these formations much needed tank-killing punch. (and trial balloon floated by me that NAMICA can be part of rapid reaction forces that can't deploy tanks like mtn units and airborne units. VDV for example employs similar vehicles but ones armed with guns rather than missiles)
it is not meant to confront tanks head on. as mentioned it would be very effective against enemy ICVs. the NAMICA vs tank scenario is treated in next paragraph.
clearly, you can't expect a lightly armoured vehicle to survive a direct confrontation with tanks. this is also true today. although you will find that there has been a definite trend towards arming ICVs heavily enough with large bore main guns (e.g 105mm) to be able to take on tanks on their own. I've my reservations about the judiciousness of such moves.
and the reason is that of range. let me explain.
in WW2, it was expected that TDs will engage tanks beyond their lethal envelope. but it didn't happen. why ? because although the large guns of TDs could theoretically penetrate tank armour at long distances, problems with accuracy meant that in actuality they had to come much closer and given their thin skins, they were either dead meat or had to scoot at full speed immediately after firing a hastily taken shot.
no wonder they were ineffective in most cases.
so what would be different now ?
IMHO, nothing if you continue to use guns on your tank destroyers to engage MBTs. both vehicles would have similar accuracy radius and the same problem as in WW2 would continue to haunt gun armed ICVs.
a NAMICA like vehicle however, would be truly able to engage and destroy enemy tanks from outside their lethal envelope. Technology used in it is capable enough to ensure an accurate and lethal hit on an enemy tank. if used properly, NAMICA and similar lethal missile armed vehicles would finally become the stand-off tank destroyers that the WW2 designers had originally envisaged.
potentially, the NAMICA could be as revolutionary as anti-ship missiles were in naval combat, a movement spurred by the sinking of the eilat.
I personally believe there would be a move away from gun armed platforms to missile armed ones.
JMT and all that.
ramana wrote:I think the combination of NAMICA on the ground and HELINA in the copters will prove to be a deadly combination. I recall press reports of German MB105 helicopters with TOWS were able to make mince meat of the tanks in NATO exercises. However all this is pipe dream until DRDO perfects the NAG and the IA accepts in quantity!
Rahul M wrote:elaborating, with further improvements in technology, tank guns will find it impossible to keep with vehicle borne ATGMs in lethality, accuracy, range as well as versatility.I personally believe there would be a move away from gun armed platforms to missile armed ones.
a question of whenrather than if.
using missiles also open up various innovative modes which are simply not possible with guns.
consider the following scenario :
you have a couple of missile armed TDs deployed in a semi-urban environment. there are enemy tanks in the vicinity, within range but not visible, IOW a deathtrap for yesterday's TDs.
for tomorrow's version however you are likely to have a dedicated small UAV organic to the ATGM TDs which keep an eye on the surroundings and discover the enemy tanks quite quickly.
with some imagination however you can have an ATGM that is fired from the TD which can engage the enemy in NLOS mode, guided by the UAV flying above, without the TD for once exposing itself to the enemy tank.
does this sound too geeky ?
it might not be so in 2025 !!
***TD -- Tank Destroyer.
somnath wrote:Missiles replacing guns on armoured platforms - may happen at some point, but the big factor would be cost. The unit cost of a missile is a many times the unit cost of a SABOT or AFSPDS round. So deploying them in numbers would stretch budgets by quite a bit..Plus, tank guns can operate as supporting arty for accompanying ground troops. Missiles wont be able to do that, not yet in any case....
KiranM wrote:Rahul, this where I feel LAHAT type munitions can extend the envelope of a tank. Modern MBTs carrying such munitions, though few in number, can reserve them for use against such tank destroyers at stand off ranges.Rahul M wrote:a NAMICA like vehicle however, would be truly able to engage and destroy enemy tanks from outside their lethal envelope.
Also, just as how UAVs can aid TDs in NLOS engagement, same can be used by tanks for engaging TDs. In fact, UAVs can identify and help tank commanders to effectively use LAHAT type munitions against such targets, rather than waste them on enemy tanks which can be effectively countered using normal rounds.
But I think this is where the flexibility of tank gun and its shells score over. Considering a scenario where a tank has only APFDS, even it can be used against a cluster of enemy personnel, though may not be as effective as a HE/ fragmentation round. Can we do the same with ATGMs? Also as Ramana pointed out, factoring in the costs and the number of rounds carried by tank vs number of missiles carried by TDs?Rahul M wrote:elaborating, with further improvements in technology, tank guns will find it impossible to keep with vehicle borne ATGMs in lethality, accuracy, range as well as versatility.
This flexibility in firepower, I believe, is the main reason tanks still exist.
My 2 cents.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
An interesting discussion.
If I have understood the discussion correctly, I think there is no doubt that a missile on the Lock before Launch and Fire and Forget type is far easier for the firer than a gun, which would require the gunner's capability to aim and hit the target. This is all the more difficult owing to the battle conditions and swiftly changing mobile battle conditions. Obviously, what minimises battle fatigue is a better choice and more so, if it is more effective weapon system. Minimising battle fatigue adds to mental agility, which is necessary for snap decisions required on the battlefield.
Even though the LAHAT is designed for the Merkava tanks and does not require a tank gun, and is also being used for the Arjun, what should be noted is that the tank becomes a multi role option for the tank crew. Personally, I feel that too many options for any platform only adds to the problem of the user in battle conditions, where too many things are happening at the same time.
Now, if the equipment is on separate platforms, the commander of, let us say, the Combat Team, can knit the various groups into the battle and each group applies itself, as per the Commander's plan, to his specialisation. Thus, would efficiently deliver.
Imagine if there was a tank (without a change in the size and crew size) that could fire artillery shells, Anti tank missiles, and tank guns, what a problem it would be for the tank commander to prioritise their use. Further how would the mix of ammunition be carried within the tank so as to ensure that each of the task could be fulfilled?
If I have understood the discussion correctly, I think there is no doubt that a missile on the Lock before Launch and Fire and Forget type is far easier for the firer than a gun, which would require the gunner's capability to aim and hit the target. This is all the more difficult owing to the battle conditions and swiftly changing mobile battle conditions. Obviously, what minimises battle fatigue is a better choice and more so, if it is more effective weapon system. Minimising battle fatigue adds to mental agility, which is necessary for snap decisions required on the battlefield.
Even though the LAHAT is designed for the Merkava tanks and does not require a tank gun, and is also being used for the Arjun, what should be noted is that the tank becomes a multi role option for the tank crew. Personally, I feel that too many options for any platform only adds to the problem of the user in battle conditions, where too many things are happening at the same time.
Now, if the equipment is on separate platforms, the commander of, let us say, the Combat Team, can knit the various groups into the battle and each group applies itself, as per the Commander's plan, to his specialisation. Thus, would efficiently deliver.
Imagine if there was a tank (without a change in the size and crew size) that could fire artillery shells, Anti tank missiles, and tank guns, what a problem it would be for the tank commander to prioritise their use. Further how would the mix of ammunition be carried within the tank so as to ensure that each of the task could be fulfilled?
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
THAT is what i meant, RayC. tanks that perform tasks that tanks do these days are going to lose their relevance soon. a heavily armored artillery piece (if this is too stereotypical a word, lets just set it to a platform that can fire long range, precision guided munitions), guarded by tanks that can perform duties akin to point defense on naval ships...
tank v tank battles, i feel, are going to lose relevance soon, if they haven't already...
tank v tank battles, i feel, are going to lose relevance soon, if they haven't already...
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Tanks can never lose their relevance, at least not in the near future.
Read Brig Richard Simpkin's series on Tanks, mechanised infantry and anti armour. He is taken to be a leading tank warfare and tank design expert.
The only threat to the tank is the rotary wing revolution, but it is still developing.
Read Brig Richard Simpkin's series on Tanks, mechanised infantry and anti armour. He is taken to be a leading tank warfare and tank design expert.
The only threat to the tank is the rotary wing revolution, but it is still developing.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
you may be right.
i just think that heavy, lumbering behemoths aren't going to be of more use than overwhelming firepower in the future. nimble, more capable platforms are what will be required for actual combat.
all this came up from the fact that the IA wants to look at 'futuristic MBTs beyond the arjun, to be inducted by 2020' or something. THIS is where, i think, innovation is needed. upgrade the arjun when it is successful (or, as we've come to call it, MKIze it), but look at a better platform for the battlefields of the future.
just my thoughts...
i just think that heavy, lumbering behemoths aren't going to be of more use than overwhelming firepower in the future. nimble, more capable platforms are what will be required for actual combat.
all this came up from the fact that the IA wants to look at 'futuristic MBTs beyond the arjun, to be inducted by 2020' or something. THIS is where, i think, innovation is needed. upgrade the arjun when it is successful (or, as we've come to call it, MKIze it), but look at a better platform for the battlefields of the future.
just my thoughts...
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
^^ Would not be MKIzing in this case. It is developed by us!
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
hahaha...i know.
i meant converting a legacy system to a revolutionary one, without reinventing the wheel...
i meant converting a legacy system to a revolutionary one, without reinventing the wheel...
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Sir i feel threat of rocket launchers with anti-tank warheads wasn't discussed that much. they have high rate of fire compared to traditional artillery. they deliver large payload within matter of seconds. They can disrupt, cause confusion in armored formations.RayC wrote:Tanks can never lose their relevance, at least not in the near future.
Read Brig Richard Simpkin's series on Tanks, mechanised infantry and anti armour. He is taken to be a leading tank warfare and tank design expert.
The only threat to the tank is the rotary wing revolution, but it is still developing.
Even their accuracy is improved at long ranges due to terminal infra-red sensors and Satellite Nav System like GPS. combined with mobility and high rate of fire, they can avoid counterbattery fire after launching their salvo of rockets.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
I think the NAG and LAHAT was discussed and they can be effective.
My contention was that personally, I am of the opinion that the platforms should be different for the reasons I gave.
The employment of tanks is not merely for tank vs tank, meeting engagement, but also for close support to the infantry.
There are many tactical issues that make a tank an asset that cannot be rendered obsolete as being suggested. One cannot enumerate them since they are voluminous. For instance, in an attack, the firm base has to be protected and tanks are an important asset against spoiling attacks on the firm base. Obviously, missiles on thin skinned launchers will not suffice.
Take the case of an objective being attacked. The tanks can move ahead of the infantry or after the infantry or along different axes. Would missiles be used in an attack or against a spoiling attack against troops in the open (for both) or against bunkers (in an attack) as a support means? Will a missile be effective against troops? Some may say yes, but will it be cost effective? Which is more expensive? A tank round or a missile with an electronic homing device?
I have tried to give a very simplistic example to indicate that it does not appear that tanks are on their way out in a hurry.
One must also look a little below the operational art level, since that is the level that decides the outcome of battles.
My contention was that personally, I am of the opinion that the platforms should be different for the reasons I gave.
The employment of tanks is not merely for tank vs tank, meeting engagement, but also for close support to the infantry.
There are many tactical issues that make a tank an asset that cannot be rendered obsolete as being suggested. One cannot enumerate them since they are voluminous. For instance, in an attack, the firm base has to be protected and tanks are an important asset against spoiling attacks on the firm base. Obviously, missiles on thin skinned launchers will not suffice.
Take the case of an objective being attacked. The tanks can move ahead of the infantry or after the infantry or along different axes. Would missiles be used in an attack or against a spoiling attack against troops in the open (for both) or against bunkers (in an attack) as a support means? Will a missile be effective against troops? Some may say yes, but will it be cost effective? Which is more expensive? A tank round or a missile with an electronic homing device?
I have tried to give a very simplistic example to indicate that it does not appear that tanks are on their way out in a hurry.
One must also look a little below the operational art level, since that is the level that decides the outcome of battles.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Here's something on the topic written by Viktor Suvorov in one of his books ("Inside the Soviet Army").ajay_ijn wrote: Sir i feel threat of rocket launchers with anti-tank warheads wasn't discussed that much. they have high rate of fire compared to traditional artillery. they deliver large payload within matter of seconds. They can disrupt, cause confusion in armored formations.
Even their accuracy is improved at long ranges due to terminal infra-red sensors and Satellite Nav System like GPS. combined with mobility and high rate of fire, they can avoid counterbattery fire after launching their salvo of rockets.
When will we be able to dispense with the tank?
One day, in Paris, I bought a book, published in 1927, on the problems
of a future war. The author was sober-minded and reasonable. His logic was
sound, his analysis was shrewd and his arguments unassailable. After
analysing the way military equipment had developed in his lifetime, the
author concluded by declaring that the proper place for the tank was in the
museum, next to the dinosaur skeletons. His argument was simple and logical:
anti-tank guns had been developed to the point at which they would bring
massive formations of tanks to a complete halt in any future war, just as
machine guns had completely stopped the cavalry in the First World War.
I do not know whether the author lived until 1940, to see the German
tanks sweeping along the Paris boulevards, past the spot at which, many
decades later, I was to buy my dusty copy of his book, its leaves yellowing
with age. The belief that the tank is reaching the end of its life is itself
surprisingly long-lived. At the beginning of the 1960s, France decided to
stop production of tanks, because their era was over. It is fortunate that
this delusion was shattered by the Israelis' old `Sherman' tanks in the
Sinai peninsula. Israel's brilliant victory showed the whole world, once
again, that no anti-tank weapon is able to stop tanks in a war, provided, of
course, that they are used skilfully.
The argument used by the tank's detractors is simple--`Just look at the
anti-tank rockets--at their accuracy and at their armour-piercing
capability!' But this argument does not hold water. The anti-tank rocket is
a defensive weapon--part of a passive system. The tank, on the other hand,
is an offensive weapon. Any defensive system involves the dispersal of
forces over a wide territory, leaving them strong in some places and weak in
others. And it is where they are weak that the tanks will appear, in
enormous concentrations. Even if it were possible to distribute resources
equally, this would mean that no one sector would have enough. Try deploying
just ten anti-tank rockets along every kilometre of the front. The tanks
will then choose one particular spot and will attack it in their hundreds,
or perhaps thousands, simultaneously. If you concentrate your anti-tank
resources, the tanks will simply by-pass them. They are an offensive weapon
and they have the initiative in battle, being able to choose when and where
to attack and how strong a force to use.
The hope that the perfection of anti-tank weapons would lead to the
death of the tank has been shown to be completely unfounded. It is like
hoping that the electronic defences of banks will become so perfect in the
future that bank robbers will die out as a breed. I assure you that bank
robbers will not become extinct. They will improve their tools, their
tactics, their information about their targets and their methods of
misleading their enemies and they will continue to carry out raids.
Sometimes these will fail, sometimes they will succeed, but they will
continue so long as banks continue to exist. The robbers have the same
advantage as tanks--they are on the offensive. They decide where, when and
how to attack and will do so only when they are confident of success, when
they have secretly discovered a weak spot in the enemy's defences, whose
existence is unknown even to the enemy himself.
Soviet generals have never been faced with problems of this sort. They
have always known that victory in a war can only be achieved by advancing.
To them defensive operations spell defeat and death. In the best case, such
operations can only produce a deadlock, and not for long, at that. Victory
can only be achieved by means of an offensive--by seizing the initiative and
raining blows on the enemy's most vulnerable areas.
Thus, to win, you must attack, you must move forward unexpectedly and
with determination, you must advance. For this you need a vehicle which can
travel anywhere to destroy the enemy, preferably remaining unscathed itself.
The one vehicle which combines movement, fire-power and armour is the tank.
Perhaps, in the future, its armour will be perfected, perhaps it will not
have tracks but will travel in some other way (there have been wheeled
tanks), perhaps it will not have a gun but be armed with something else
(there have been tanks armed solely with rockets), perhaps all sorts of
things will be changed, but its most important characteristics--its ability
to move, to shoot and to defend itself--will remain. As long as there are
wars, as long as the desire for victory lasts, the tank will exist. Nuclear
war has not only not written it off, but has given it a new lease of
life--nothing is so suited to nuclear war as a tank. To survive a nuclear
war you must put your money on these steel boxes.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Manoeuvre Warfare is a war fighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion though a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which creates a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope.
This is not to imply that fire power is unimportant. On the contrary, the suppressive effects of fire power are essential to our ability to manoeuvre.
It does not mean to imply that one will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy.
And this is where the Ar,our and the Infantry comes into being.
One will have to concentrate fire power and force at decisive points to destroy enemy
elements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purpose. But
the aim is not an unfocussed application of firepower for the purpose of incrementally reducing the enemy’s physical strength. Rather, it is the selective application of firepower in support of manoeuvre to contribute to the enemy’s dislocation and psychological disruption.
Manoeuvre Theory
In physical terms manoeuvre theory is a dynamic, three dimensional system. One is now concerned with not just mass and time but with the interaction of mass, time and space or in terms of dimensional analysis, of mass, time and length. This three-fold relationship is best and most commonly expressed as momentum. Thus strength or combat worth is not just mass but momentum, i.e, mass x velocity.
A lever requires a fulcrum to develop its effect, and this implies the existence of at least two distinct masses on the side employing manoeuvre theory. These are Mobile and Holding Forces. Since these two elements interact dynamically with the enemy, whose force, however distributed, will have a mass centre somewhere, one arrives at the fundamental schematic model of manoeuvre theory, as a three element system. The operation of this system turns on the relative positions of the three elements, and on the absolute and relative rates at which these positions change.
Development of leverage and its rate of change is one of the most distinguishing features of the manoeuvre theory. This explains what happens when manoeuvre takes place and how the defeat of the enemy is brought about by “dislocation” and “psychological disruption”.
Momentum-Leverage Relationship. Fundamentally, momentum represents the resistance of a moving body to any change in velocity or direction. Momentum is equal to mass multiplied by velocity. Thus it also represents the “physical manoeuvre value” of a force, the counterpart to “physical fighting power”. Since,momentum is mass x velocity or mass x length over time, it also stands for “rate of change of leverage”.
Let us now apply the development of “leverage” to the basic manoeuvre theory model of holding force (H), mobile force (M) and the enemy force (E). When a mobile force, using the holding force as a hinge, penetrates and projects its mass beyond the enemy mass, it starts exercising leverage or turning movement to dislocate the enemy force. ‘Turning’ in the military sense implies an actual or potential, constraint on the freedom of movement of the body of troops turned or being dislocated. Thus to apply turning movement or leverage, the body to be
“turned”, or at least its mass centre, must lie within a triangle formed by the two ends of the lever arm and the other extremity of the holding force. Otherwise, just as a over size nut flies out of the nutcracker, it will simply be pushed sideways, retaining most of its freedom of action, notably to “counter turn” the holding force.
Thus useful leverage will depend not only on the value of the mobile force, but on its relative position both to the holding force and to the mass centre of the enemy force in question.
Since useful leverage depends upon the relative position of the mobile force, the holding force and the enemy mass centre intended to be ‘turned’, it also stands to reason that their relative velocities will also come into play assuming that they all are capable of mobility in one form or the other. It is for the sake of simplicity that the term “velocity” is being used. In due course we shall translate it into momentum and tempo. For ease of understanding we shall call them just relative velocities of the three elements – M,H and E of manoeuvre warfare theory.
To establish leverage in the simple situation the mobile force (M) simply has to advance beyond the enemy mass centre (E). Its velocity Vm will determine how long it will take to do this and the rate at which the leverage once established will increase by its further advance; and increase it must , at a faster pace than the movement of the enemy mass centre, which will be forced to move. The longer the lever arm, the greater the leverage or the force it applies. Of course there is an optimum length, beyond which leverage cannot be exercised and the lever breaks unless an additional hinge is provided. It must be clarified that mobility of three elements is also relative.
As mentioned earlier, leverage and its rate of change is the dynamic element on which depends the success of manoeuvre warfare. Before examining it in more detail, it is important to analyse the characteristics of the holding and mobile forces.
Based on Brig Richard Simpkins RAce to the Swift.
This is not to imply that fire power is unimportant. On the contrary, the suppressive effects of fire power are essential to our ability to manoeuvre.
It does not mean to imply that one will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy.
And this is where the Ar,our and the Infantry comes into being.
One will have to concentrate fire power and force at decisive points to destroy enemy
elements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purpose. But
the aim is not an unfocussed application of firepower for the purpose of incrementally reducing the enemy’s physical strength. Rather, it is the selective application of firepower in support of manoeuvre to contribute to the enemy’s dislocation and psychological disruption.
Manoeuvre Theory
In physical terms manoeuvre theory is a dynamic, three dimensional system. One is now concerned with not just mass and time but with the interaction of mass, time and space or in terms of dimensional analysis, of mass, time and length. This three-fold relationship is best and most commonly expressed as momentum. Thus strength or combat worth is not just mass but momentum, i.e, mass x velocity.
A lever requires a fulcrum to develop its effect, and this implies the existence of at least two distinct masses on the side employing manoeuvre theory. These are Mobile and Holding Forces. Since these two elements interact dynamically with the enemy, whose force, however distributed, will have a mass centre somewhere, one arrives at the fundamental schematic model of manoeuvre theory, as a three element system. The operation of this system turns on the relative positions of the three elements, and on the absolute and relative rates at which these positions change.
Development of leverage and its rate of change is one of the most distinguishing features of the manoeuvre theory. This explains what happens when manoeuvre takes place and how the defeat of the enemy is brought about by “dislocation” and “psychological disruption”.
Momentum-Leverage Relationship. Fundamentally, momentum represents the resistance of a moving body to any change in velocity or direction. Momentum is equal to mass multiplied by velocity. Thus it also represents the “physical manoeuvre value” of a force, the counterpart to “physical fighting power”. Since,momentum is mass x velocity or mass x length over time, it also stands for “rate of change of leverage”.
Let us now apply the development of “leverage” to the basic manoeuvre theory model of holding force (H), mobile force (M) and the enemy force (E). When a mobile force, using the holding force as a hinge, penetrates and projects its mass beyond the enemy mass, it starts exercising leverage or turning movement to dislocate the enemy force. ‘Turning’ in the military sense implies an actual or potential, constraint on the freedom of movement of the body of troops turned or being dislocated. Thus to apply turning movement or leverage, the body to be
“turned”, or at least its mass centre, must lie within a triangle formed by the two ends of the lever arm and the other extremity of the holding force. Otherwise, just as a over size nut flies out of the nutcracker, it will simply be pushed sideways, retaining most of its freedom of action, notably to “counter turn” the holding force.
Thus useful leverage will depend not only on the value of the mobile force, but on its relative position both to the holding force and to the mass centre of the enemy force in question.
Since useful leverage depends upon the relative position of the mobile force, the holding force and the enemy mass centre intended to be ‘turned’, it also stands to reason that their relative velocities will also come into play assuming that they all are capable of mobility in one form or the other. It is for the sake of simplicity that the term “velocity” is being used. In due course we shall translate it into momentum and tempo. For ease of understanding we shall call them just relative velocities of the three elements – M,H and E of manoeuvre warfare theory.
To establish leverage in the simple situation the mobile force (M) simply has to advance beyond the enemy mass centre (E). Its velocity Vm will determine how long it will take to do this and the rate at which the leverage once established will increase by its further advance; and increase it must , at a faster pace than the movement of the enemy mass centre, which will be forced to move. The longer the lever arm, the greater the leverage or the force it applies. Of course there is an optimum length, beyond which leverage cannot be exercised and the lever breaks unless an additional hinge is provided. It must be clarified that mobility of three elements is also relative.
As mentioned earlier, leverage and its rate of change is the dynamic element on which depends the success of manoeuvre warfare. Before examining it in more detail, it is important to analyse the characteristics of the holding and mobile forces.
Based on Brig Richard Simpkins RAce to the Swift.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
One must understand that everything flow out from the above.Cold Start and Battle Groups for Offensive Operations
Gurmeet Kanwal
05 June 2006
Exercise Sanghe Shakti, held over one week in Punjab in May 2006, was designed to test the Indian Army's new concept for offensive operations in the plains. This was only the most recent in a series of annual exercises that have included Poorna Vijay (2001), Vijay Chakra, Divya Astra, Vajra Shakti (May 2005) and Desert Strike (November 2005), all of which were all aimed at concentrating and coordinating firepower and fine-tuning Army-Air Force joint operations in a strategic setting that was premised on operations in a nuclear environment. The COAS had said during Exercise Vajra Shakti that it had been conducted with a nuclear backdrop, battle procedures had been refined and 'high synergy' had been achieved with the IAF.
The offensive doctrine prior to Operation Parakram was to employ massive Strike Corps combat potential to advance deep into Pakistani territory to capture strategic objectives and to bring to battle and destroy Pakistan's Army Reserve (North) and Army reserve (South) so as to substantially degrade its war machinery. This concept was evolved in 1981-82 and tested in Exercise Digvijay when General Krishna Rao was Army Chief. It was further refined during the famous Exercise Brass Tacks IV in 1987 by General K. Sundarji as Army Chief and was accepted as the army's offensive doctrine for war in the plains. After India's nuclear tests of May 1998 there have been several attempts to refine the army's doctrine so that it is suitable for offensive operations with a nuclear backdrop.
The Indian Army's new concept of offensive operations is a combination of "cold start" - the ability to launch quick strikes across the International Boundary (IB) without prior warning by moving rapidly to battle positions from the cantonments - and integrated "battle groups" that are offensive forces of divisional level to penetrate across the IB over a wide front but not necessarily too deeply. The new doctrine is in marked contrast with the old concept of launching massive Strike Corps operations for deep strikes across the IB as Pakistan's nuclear threshold is perceived to be low. Achievement of the military aim in the next war in the plains while ensuring that operations do not escalate to nuclear exchanges poses a unique strategic challenge in the planning and conduct of defensive and offensive operations.
The need to be able to mobilise quickly ("cold start") and launch multi-pronged offensives deep into Pakistan, as well as the need to mass firepower rather than forces when planning to fight in a nuclear environment, prompt the need for some fresh thinking about force structures for offensive operations. As is well known, India has three Strike Corps. Because of their massive size, the present Strike Corps are difficult to concentrate, side-step, deploy and manoeuvre and this virtually rules out surprise and deception. During Operation Parakram the Strike Corps had taken too long to move to their concentration areas. However, if the Indian Strike Corps are going to be employed only to achieve small, operational or even tactical-level gains, why have them at all? In the coming decades, Indian military genius will lie in finding a suitable via media for launching meaningful offensive operations as well maintaining strong countervailing forces.
If a fleeting opportunity is to be exploited, the strike formations must be capable of launching an offensive operation from a cold start. Within 72 to 96 hours of the issue of the order for full-scale mobilisation, three to five strike division "battle groups" must cross the IB straight from the line of march. They should be launching their break-in operations and crossing the "start line" even as the holding (defensive) divisions are completing their deployment on the forward obstacles. Only such simultaneity of operations will unhinge the enemy, break his cohesion and paralyse him into making mistakes from which he will not be able to recover.
One of the options that the army is reported to be considering is to split the three Strike Corps into several division or division-plus size integrated "battle groups" of the size and capabilities of Russia's famed OMGs (operational manoeuvre groups) that were designed to be launched after a "break-in" had been affected. While one "battle group" each could be allotted to the holding (pivot) corps for providing an offensive punch to them, the others will need to be so structured that they are capable of independent action. These could also be designated as theatre and Army HQ reserves. Each one will need to be specifically structured to achieve designated objectives in the terrain in which it is expected to be launched and yet be flexible enough for two or more of them to fight dispersed under a corps HQ to bring to bear the combined weight of their combat power on a common military objective deep inside enemy territory. Hence, at least two out of the three Strike Corps HQ must be retained and should be capable of taking under command strike battle groups at short notice to achieve laid down military objectives.
The "pivot" or holding Corps have been provided significant offensive capability that is now integral to them. According to the COAS, "they have been assigned roles, which are offensive as well as defensive… The decision-making has been left to theatre commanders, depending on their assessment and evaluation of the situation." If the peace time locations of offensive army formations can be changed to areas that are closer to the western border, these will be in a better position to launch trans-IB operations from the line of march to achieve surprise even as the pivot Corps to which these belong is still in the process of deploying in its defences. Only innovative measures of this type will lead to success in short and sharp future Indo-Pak conflicts that may spill over to the plains. The art of generalship will lie in achieving India's military aims quickly without crossing Pakistan's nuclear threshold before the international community blows the whistle for a cease-fire. If this is not done, the next war will be as futile and India will have no major gains to show.
The author is Director, Security Studies and Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.
http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/ ... issueno=18
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Armen T's post should be read to realise the issue.
As also the punchline:
The anti-tank rocket is a defensive weapon--part of a passive system. The tank, on the other hand, is an offensive weapon.
They are an offensive weapon and they have the initiative in battle, being able to choose when and where to attack and how strong a force to use.
Notwithstanding, anti tank missiles ground based or on mobile platforms are a potent force multiplier!
As also the punchline:
The anti-tank rocket is a defensive weapon--part of a passive system. The tank, on the other hand, is an offensive weapon.
They are an offensive weapon and they have the initiative in battle, being able to choose when and where to attack and how strong a force to use.
Notwithstanding, anti tank missiles ground based or on mobile platforms are a potent force multiplier!
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Cross posting from the Indian Missile Technology Discussion thread. Relevant to ongoing discussion.
ramana wrote:rakall and kprasad a dated but relevant article on ATGMs. Explains why the cost of 3rd gen ATGMs is so high.
Recent advances in ATGMs- N Iyer, DRDO
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Some bad news from IndianExpress, 23 Jan2009, page3, under 'Political Pulse':Nitesh wrote:Arjun tank gets vote of support from Indian Army Chief Gen Deepak Kapoor
http://www.zeenews.com/nation/2009-02-2 ... 6news.html
Testing times for Arjun tank
THE beleaguered Arjun tank is once again in the news, this time with the Defence Ministry's production department claiming that the Army Chief has written a letter "praising"
the Arjun and saying that the tank has passed the most "stringent of tests". The Army has denied sending any such letter, saying that a selective part of the conversation with the Army Chief is being "planted" in an attempt to hardsell the tank. Clearly, another round of tussle is set to unfold as the Army is standing its ground that the tank is "behind time, unreliable and does not fully meet its requirements".
What the hell!
Check page3 at:
http://epaper.indianexpress.com/IE/IEH/ ... ndex.shtml
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
oh, boy...here we go again...
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Yes,the "praise" sounded too sweetly worded to be true.Let's wait for the trials in June,during the heat of summer!
Given the manner in which tank warfare has developed over the last century,the trend for the future appears to be low-silhouette and smaller three man crewed tanks with a larger calibre heavier gun,firing missiles as well, and an assortment of defensive weaponry,both passive and active to defeat enemy sensors and projectiles.Some concepts even envisage a turretless tank,with the crew in armoured capsules within the hull,the gun and ammo apart from the creww compartments ,which are tasked and equipped for NCW.In addition,the same chassis is also going to be the same for a family of armoured vehices,making logistics and maintenance comparitively much easier due to the commonality of systems and eqpt.
In this context the Arjun does not appear to fit in as a tank design for the future for the IA.It's basic concept has been influenced by the Leopard design and its 4 man crews are in a minority,as the T-72s and T-90s of which the majority of tanks in the army are comprised of,have three man crews.The two design concepts,Leopard/Arjun and T-72/T-90 are headed in different directions,though the technology developed for them (armour,gun,missiles,self-defence systems),could be used for either.Though Arjun may have turned the corner adn is now ready to be tested against the T-90,it is for the above reasons why the IA prefers a forward looking design and concepts,which are also part of the Russian lineage of tanks,given that our armoured vehicles stretch back to the days from the T-54/55,T-72 now the T-90 and possibly the T-95 in the future.A smaller tank with one crew member less also comes in at a lower price and lower operating costs helped by having one crew member less.
Given the manner in which tank warfare has developed over the last century,the trend for the future appears to be low-silhouette and smaller three man crewed tanks with a larger calibre heavier gun,firing missiles as well, and an assortment of defensive weaponry,both passive and active to defeat enemy sensors and projectiles.Some concepts even envisage a turretless tank,with the crew in armoured capsules within the hull,the gun and ammo apart from the creww compartments ,which are tasked and equipped for NCW.In addition,the same chassis is also going to be the same for a family of armoured vehices,making logistics and maintenance comparitively much easier due to the commonality of systems and eqpt.
In this context the Arjun does not appear to fit in as a tank design for the future for the IA.It's basic concept has been influenced by the Leopard design and its 4 man crews are in a minority,as the T-72s and T-90s of which the majority of tanks in the army are comprised of,have three man crews.The two design concepts,Leopard/Arjun and T-72/T-90 are headed in different directions,though the technology developed for them (armour,gun,missiles,self-defence systems),could be used for either.Though Arjun may have turned the corner adn is now ready to be tested against the T-90,it is for the above reasons why the IA prefers a forward looking design and concepts,which are also part of the Russian lineage of tanks,given that our armoured vehicles stretch back to the days from the T-54/55,T-72 now the T-90 and possibly the T-95 in the future.A smaller tank with one crew member less also comes in at a lower price and lower operating costs helped by having one crew member less.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Aah!! Philip Saar..... perhaps we should also ask whether the Future will be low tech, with no hi-fi FCS like on Arjun, or with only Rorsion bars... perhaps ze germans got it all wrong , and only Mother Russia is right!!!
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
The Arjun may have its own set of issues, the IA may have its reasons for choosing T-90s over it etc. etc., but has the IA made its "vision" of the future armored warfare known? Can you provide us any literature on this vision? Because right now it sounds suspiciously like IA's vision comes out of a Russian tanks export brochure. And curiously the "vision" you narrate to us makes no mention of certain broader context in which IA will employ those tanks: No mention of the overall land-warfare doctrine it is going to be used in? (The Russians have always been blessed with artillery, Indians not nearly as well) No mention of the strategic landscape it will be developed in? (The Russians own >20% of the world's gas supply; Indians don't get nearly the trainign they wish because of fuel costs). So on and so forth... It is a very curious "vision" indeed!Philip wrote:... it is for the above reasons why the IA prefers a forward looking design and concepts,which are also part of the Russian lineage of tanks,given that our armoured vehicles stretch back to the days from the T-54/55,T-72 now the T-90 and possibly the T-95 in the future.A smaller tank with one crew member less also comes in at a lower price and lower operating costs helped by having one crew member less.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
AFAIK IA has never said what its vision of a future tank looks like -- Chief mentioned a few features, but that were at a very high level, extremely difficult to get what it means in design terms from that.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
^^^
There was an entire international seminar on this.And also if it is FMBT 2020,and u still have HIGH LEVEL FEATURES god help.
There was an entire international seminar on this.And also if it is FMBT 2020,and u still have HIGH LEVEL FEATURES god help.
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Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Oh, the Natasha lobby got gob smacked in that conference by that IDF general 'Isreal Tal ?' , that the "Quantum Jump to Futurustic Capabilities" spinmeisters, just like the religious fundamentalists, dont believe in the law of evolution 
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
just out of curiosity...what were those features that we need divine assistance for?
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Dear Sir; can you please tell me how an international seminar == IAs requirements for future tank? Now I am hoping you will be specific and mention that IA presented a paper where they said officially --kvraghav wrote:^^^
There was an entire international seminar on this.And also if it is FMBT 2020,and u still have HIGH LEVEL FEATURES god help.
Future tank doctrine -- close infantry support/Tank buster roles -- combo/role specific --
reliance on guns or missile or mix -- what ratios?
What kind of armor?
How many crew?
Turret less design or with turret?
I would look forward to see what IA as an organization has put forward in public domain as its official stance for what kind of armored warfare it sees in the future, what kind of mix of tanks it wants? what features of each of the mix.
God helps those who helps themselves you see.
-----------
And while you guys are it try and look up the difference between IA/MoD and how takes what decision etc.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
^^^
That is the problem.IA as an organisation has not put forward anything regards to FMBT which it wants in 2020.And also..i am not clear about the requirements..
Could you please answer the above questions with respect to formulating GSQR for Arjun and then buying T-90s..So that it will be easy for me to look up wat sort of information u r expecting WRT FMBT 2020.AS of now,as i understand and answer that They need a turretless design.
That is the problem.IA as an organisation has not put forward anything regards to FMBT which it wants in 2020.And also..i am not clear about the requirements..
Could you please answer the above questions with respect to formulating GSQR for Arjun and then buying T-90s..So that it will be easy for me to look up wat sort of information u r expecting WRT FMBT 2020.AS of now,as i understand and answer that They need a turretless design.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
^^^
Yes that was my point IA has not mentioned what it wants the future tank to be -- so lets keep that in mind while (from my perspective) being free to speculate.
To the next part --
Its quite simple really -- the GSQRs were for Arjun -- however since no Arjun was present meeting the GSQR and Pakistan had T 80s, and upgrade was needed for the strike corps. Note that we have 6000 tanks, most of them being T-55,T-72. T 90 was the obvious natural choice.
And why we have T55/72s in large number is hopefully a well understood phenomena of cold war period.
Its very difficult to shake of legacy of a existing functional system -- and a disruptive change (like Arjun) even when desired creates a whole lot of difficulties.
There is no shortage of examples where entire companies died trying to make disruptive changes (and these were all their initiatives).
But this is a simplistic answer. Some one (Avid?) posted a ebook on Arjun development where the 30 years of frustration pain and toil where chronicled while trying to make a home grown tank on shoe string budget and facing two live borders was chronicled in detail. Makes for good reading.
Yes that was my point IA has not mentioned what it wants the future tank to be -- so lets keep that in mind while (from my perspective) being free to speculate.
To the next part --
Its quite simple really -- the GSQRs were for Arjun -- however since no Arjun was present meeting the GSQR and Pakistan had T 80s, and upgrade was needed for the strike corps. Note that we have 6000 tanks, most of them being T-55,T-72. T 90 was the obvious natural choice.
And why we have T55/72s in large number is hopefully a well understood phenomena of cold war period.
Its very difficult to shake of legacy of a existing functional system -- and a disruptive change (like Arjun) even when desired creates a whole lot of difficulties.
There is no shortage of examples where entire companies died trying to make disruptive changes (and these were all their initiatives).
But this is a simplistic answer. Some one (Avid?) posted a ebook on Arjun development where the 30 years of frustration pain and toil where chronicled while trying to make a home grown tank on shoe string budget and facing two live borders was chronicled in detail. Makes for good reading.
Re: Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread
Why was T-90 the natural choice? Because 90 > 80 > 72 > 55?Sanku wrote:Its quite simple really -- the GSQRs were for Arjun -- however since no Arjun was present meeting the GSQR and Pakistan had T 80s, and upgrade was needed for the strike corps. Note that we have 6000 tanks, most of them being T-55,T-72. T 90 was the obvious natural choice.
How is the Arjun disruptive? What exactly does it disrupt?Its very difficult to shake of legacy of a existing functional system -- and a disruptive change (like Arjun) even when desired creates a whole lot of difficulties.