And what makes you the expert?Their following techniques are apsoloutly shite,
Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Numerous complaints. I recall the BBC India correspondent, years ago saying in his book "its soo obvious in India that you are under surveillance, they just stand outside your house and its obvious when you are being followed etc etc"
Iran appears to be one of the toughest places to operate in.
Iran appears to be one of the toughest places to operate in.
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Rahul is right
Turdball has been most obnoxious in his dealings. Had a friend receive this pri%%^%^ phone call and he was using his contacts to get some answers etc.
my friend put him on speaker phone so that I can see what sort of ass he was.
Shyam
it depends - I could have introduced you to one of these guys who look lke the normal swarthy , potbellied types hanging out at a dhaba. A face in thousands - I was shocked to know he was IB.
In this case if only you knew Saikats history.
2 brilliant careers have been ruined by this man. Men whose writings you are familiar with
Turdball has been most obnoxious in his dealings. Had a friend receive this pri%%^%^ phone call and he was using his contacts to get some answers etc.
my friend put him on speaker phone so that I can see what sort of ass he was.
Shyam
it depends - I could have introduced you to one of these guys who look lke the normal swarthy , potbellied types hanging out at a dhaba. A face in thousands - I was shocked to know he was IB.
In this case if only you knew Saikats history.
2 brilliant careers have been ruined by this man. Men whose writings you are familiar with
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
What role did he play in ruining the career of these intelligence folks, Surya saar?
I think we should know more about this vermin.
I think we should know more about this vermin.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
He spoke to them and used their off record information in public.
MI found out and they are now reduced to writing books and articles for think tanks
MI found out and they are now reduced to writing books and articles for think tanks
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Oh, a serious lack of professional integrity indeed. What a scumbag !Surya wrote:He spoke to them and used their off record information in public.
MI found out and they are now reduced to writing books and articles for think tanks
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Someone else once told me, that Saikat goes around promising insiders that they will never get caught etc if they give info to him. I have seen the evidence (emails). I may still have it. Anyway, Had I known about these cases with MI, I would have told my friend.Surya wrote:He spoke to them and used their off record information in public.
MI found out and they are now reduced to writing books and articles for think tanks
Interesting Surya...
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
This was worse
He used parochial links in AHQ to get to talk to these guys
He used parochial links in AHQ to get to talk to these guys
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Often, the whole idea to spy on people with nuisance value is to give them a little 'jhatkaa'shyamd wrote:Well, this is the 2nd instance for me. Their following techniques are apsoloutly shite, if someone is being followed, an ordinary journo should not be able to tell the difference at all. They need to sort out their techniques big time (it shows nothing has changed in the last 10 years), I bet one of them was just hanging around smoking outside the apartment and it was the same guy every day.
- just to scare them off. And, for this reason, spooks make it obvious. These are sometimes
done by interns who are cutting their teeth in the game. Anyway, Dutta often wrote things
which were not true. he mixed about 30-40% water to milk to make the things more sensational, especially that raw guy who was called back from china.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
True...that makes sense.Often, the whole idea to spy on people with nuisance value is to give them a little 'jhatkaa'- just to scare them off. And, for this reason, spooks make it obvious. These are sometimes done by interns who are cutting their teeth in the game.
Win win situation actually since the agency lets the tailed person know that they are not liking his conduct and also gives a chance for noobs to try their hand as watchers (if they do not get detected, it means they are upto the task which is even better news)
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Hope so Kati!
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Also in this case there is nothing new in what Saikat exposed
everyone has been aware of the nepotism and other ills of RAW - there are books out there
any organisation with a chance at foreign exposure\junket (IFS,RAW all are victims or this malaise)
everyone has been aware of the nepotism and other ills of RAW - there are books out there
any organisation with a chance at foreign exposure\junket (IFS,RAW all are victims or this malaise)
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
So the DNA story about Vienna's RAW agent being sent back is true:
RAW official sent back from Vienna ; Sparks MEA and RAW conflict
RAW official sent back from Vienna ; Sparks MEA and RAW conflict
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Happy NTRO raising day! A treat for everyone.
Realities: Co-operation with other agencies have been improving. But guess what, other agencies look at them with contempt! Why? Because they are making easy money. Thats the reason for lack of co-op lol! Of course there are other reasons. Its going to take another 5-6 years to set up everything in the org. HQ is now open though and is fully functional. Other offices are opening.
The chinci intrusions have not affected yindu systems, only his holiness website and have got sensitve info.
Realities: Co-operation with other agencies have been improving. But guess what, other agencies look at them with contempt! Why? Because they are making easy money. Thats the reason for lack of co-op lol! Of course there are other reasons. Its going to take another 5-6 years to set up everything in the org. HQ is now open though and is fully functional. Other offices are opening.
The chinci intrusions have not affected yindu systems, only his holiness website and have got sensitve info.
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Reason: include title for URL
Reason: include title for URL
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Great news!!!HQ is now open though and is fully functional. Other offices are opening.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Interesting info shyamd... was this raising day thing put in the press anywhere?? I wasn't able to find it...shyamd wrote:Happy NTRO raising day! A treat for everyone.
Realities: Co-operation with other agencies have been improving. But guess what, other agencies look at them with contempt! Why? Because they are making easy money. Thats the reason for lack of co-op lol! Of course there are other reasons. Its going to take another 5-6 years to set up everything in the org. HQ is now open though and is fully functional. Other offices are opening.
The chinci intrusions have not affected yindu systems, only his holiness website and have got sensitve info.
btw, how old is NTRO now???
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Info straight from the local panwaala's shop where a poster to this effect has been pasted!!!was this raising day thing put in the press anywhere?? I wasn't able to find it..
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
So far they haven't got any evidence to suggest that, they affected Indian systems. Only His Holiness's website at the moment. However, it could change over time.
China does appear to be a major threat.
China does appear to be a major threat.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Came across a few names of Indian spooks who sacrificed their life in the line of duty:
This is from Praveen Swami's book on Jihad in J&K and these four IB men were eliminated in 1987-89 period...
This is from Praveen Swami's book on Jihad in J&K and these four IB men were eliminated in 1987-89 period...
I really wish we did at least acknowledge the men who give up their lives( like the star system in the CIA HQ lobby) and no one even knows about itNilkanth Ganjoo,the judge who had sentenced Maqbool Butt to death and survived an earlier assassination attempt, was among the first to die. Indian intelligence capabilities,too, have been hit hard by the elimination of four key operatives of the Intelligence Bureau, R.N.P. Singh, Kishen Gopal, M.L. Bhan and T.K. Razdan, and the consequent degradation of their network of informers
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Little bit of googling I found this PDF heresum wrote:Came across a few names of Indian spooks who sacrificed their life in the line of duty:
This is from Praveen Swami's book on Jihad in J&K and these four IB men were eliminated in 1987-89 period...I really wish we did at least acknowledge the men who give up their lives( like the star system in the CIA HQ lobby) and no one even knows about itNilkanth Ganjoo,the judge who had sentenced Maqbool Butt to death and survived an earlier assassination attempt, was among the first to die. Indian intelligence capabilities,too, have been hit hard by the elimination of four key operatives of the Intelligence Bureau, R.N.P. Singh, Kishen Gopal, M.L. Bhan and T.K. Razdan, and the consequent degradation of their network of informers
RIP
Page 44 & Page 45
Case No.: 1
Date: 4.10.89
Place: Srinagar
Terrorists shot dead N.K. Ganjoo, ex-Sessions Judge who had tried and passed a death
sentence on the JKLF leader Mohd. Maqbool Butt. A note left by the killers warned people
against picking up the dead body.
Case No.: 3
Date: 3.11.90
Place: Anantnag
R.N.P. Singh, Govt. official was shot dead in the main market and dragged on the road. -
JKLF
Case No.: 4
Date: 9.1.90
Place: Badgam
Kishen Gopal, Govt. official was shot dead while he was making some purchases in the
market. - HuM
Case No.: 5
Date: 15.1.90
Place: Nowgam, Srinagar
M.L. Bhan, Govt. official was shot dead inside a passenger bus while he was coming to
Srinagar alongwith his son and a local friend. The friend too was killed. - JKLF
Case No.: 6
Date: 25.1.90
Place: Natipora, Srinagar
Four IAF officers were gunned down when they were waiting at a bus stop alongwith their
families. Twelve of their family members were injured in this shootout, of whom two women
died later in hospital. - JKLF
Case No.: 7
Date: 12.2.90
Place: Gowkadal, Srinagar
T.K. Razdan, Govt official who shot dead while alighting from a Matador bus. His
body was thrown on the road side. - JKLF
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This story is shocking and exposes the weak counter espionage our Indian system has !!
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I really don't think it is to do with weak counter intel...I would say that our spooks did a extraordinary job despite all the odds against them in J&K, esp in the wld early 90s.Prabu wrote: This story is shocking and exposes the weak counter espionage our Indian system has !!
The scale of the assault on J&K by the Paki funded pigs took all agencies by surprise(when these IB men were lost) in first few years after which the agencies adjusted themselves and gave it back to the pigs. The more knowledgeable members could shed more light on this issue?
I wish we could get more details on other unsung heroes who laid down their lives with no one even knowing about it...
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
X-post(from election thread. Posted by Gandharva):
gandharva wrote:Ex-R&AW chief flays India’s counter Intelligence
PTI | New Delhi
In a rare admission, a former R&AW chief has said that counter intelligence operations in India have failed to prevent penetration by foreign intelligence agencies and once even a Prime Minister was under the cloud of suspicion.
“The shame lies in the fact that it (counter intelligence) could not prevent foreign penetration even into their senior ranks. There was a general belief in the country that the influence of foreign intelligence organisations has reached deep into the civil society. Suspicion was once cast even on a Prime Minister,” Anand K Verma, former chief of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) of the Cabinet Secretariat, said without elaborating any further.
In an article in the forthcoming issue of ‘Indian Defence Review’, he described the performance of counter intelligence as “a mixed bag of successes and shame” and said over the years, it had also unmasked “several” Indian agents of all major intelligence organisations of the world.
He pointed out that technological gadgets meant to get highly accurate intelligence was “very expensive” which resulted in the conversation intercepts between the 26/11 Mumbai attackers and their handlers in Pakistan coming from foreign agencies.
“Imagine, if foreigners had not been the victims of 26/11 carnage, the requisite information in all probability would have remained hidden from Indian authorities.”
http://www.dailypioneer.com/170605/Ex-R ... gence.html
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
So the conversation recorded on 26/11 was not done by RAW? A lot of claims were made in the media about the intercepting capabilities of Indian agencies including the Thuraya sat conversation.
I bet the PM under suspicion was Gujral.
I bet the PM under suspicion was Gujral.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Since this is a very sensitive information I doubt if this will ever be made public. However, it is a fact that has been alluded in many places that there was a CIA mole right inside the top echelons of the ruling Congress party. Whatever was discussed in the CWC and government meetings used to reach CIA within hours. Indira Gandhi's plan for attacking Pakistan and then destroying it completely in 1980/81 was thought to have been thwarted because the mole provided this info to the CIA and then US used diplomatic pressure to ensure that the plan fizzled out. There is a lot of speculation about this mole with fingers pointing to almost all the home ministers, PM and top ministers in the Congress rule. It is no surprise that during BJP rule when India conducted the nuclear tests, America had no clue about the tests as the mole was not in power.Dilbu wrote:So the conversation recorded on 26/11 was not done by RAW? A lot of claims were made in the media about the intercepting capabilities of Indian agencies including the Thuraya sat conversation.
I bet the PM under suspicion was Gujral.
It is a moot point as to who really is pulling the strings in India and Pakistani establishment?
In case of Pakistan we know that US is right inside the establishment. However, because the PA and ISI has been more of less an independent entity, US is unable to counter it effectively using the usual diplomatic channels. Look how effectively ISI has managed to get billions of dollars from USA without doing anything substantial in war against terror. They have effectively bled the Americans without as much a scratch on their own armour. It is for this reason that US has now started to tie the grants with certain strict performance conditions and Paksitan has refused to accept it.
India's case is different, we have a civilian government which controls all the strings in defence and intelligence. So any high level mole can effectively blunt all our intelligence and defence structures and institutions. It should also be clear as to which way the US wants the votes to flow.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
SumJi, Thanks.sum wrote:I really don't think it is to do with weak counter intel...I would say that our spooks did a extraordinary job despite all the odds against them in J&K, esp in the wld early 90s.Prabu wrote: This story is shocking and exposes the weak counter espionage our Indian system has !!
The scale of the assault on J&K by the Paki funded pigs took all agencies by surprise(when these IB men were lost) in first few years after which the agencies adjusted themselves and gave it back to the pigs.
I wish we could get more details on other unsung heroes who laid down their lives with no one even knowing about it...
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
I remember there was some kind of rumor that undercover see-eye-yeah agents were killed/present when the attack took place. May be unkil began to intercept communication as soon as the news of attacks came throughDilbu wrote:So the conversation recorded on 26/11 was not done by RAW? A lot of claims were made in the media about the intercepting capabilities of Indian agencies including the Thuraya sat conversation.
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
National security is definitly will increase by providing the planes and helicopters.This will increase the mobility at border in peace time and otherwise
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Indi ... 420306.cms
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Indi ... 420306.cms
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
MEA vs R&AW over key envoy posts
Daggers are out full throttle between the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the country's external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW).
Even though the turf war has continued for some time now the latest one is over the recall of a RAW official posted in the Indian mission in Vienna.
Prior to this, another official posted in the Indian embassy in Beijing was shown the door because of his alleged liaison with a Chinese intelligence operative.
The matter came to a boil following pressure from R&AW top bosses that led MEA to recall, the Deputy Head of Indian mission in Beijing to the Indian mission in Rome.
While in this case MEA's version is that it was a clear case of corruption, there is a bigger game involved here.
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Such a news is depressing and have direct impact on our national security.vsudhir wrote:MEA vs R&AW over key envoy posts
Daggers are out full throttle between the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the country's external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW).
Even though the turf war has continued for some time now the latest one is over the recall of a RAW official posted in the Indian mission in Vienna.
Prior to this, another official posted in the Indian embassy in Beijing was shown the door because of his alleged liaison with a Chinese intelligence operative.
The matter came to a boil following pressure from R&AW top bosses that led MEA to recall, the Deputy Head of Indian mission in Beijing to the Indian mission in Rome.
While in this case MEA's version is that it was a clear case of corruption, there is a bigger game involved here.
It seem the rivalary in corruption.
The moles are not new in agencies,but we need very effective counter-intelligence
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Wasn't it Morarji Desai ? Seymour Hersh talked about an Indian Cabinet Minister being an American intelligence asset.It was widely assumed that he meant Desai but actually it was Chavan.Dilbu wrote:So the conversation recorded on 26/11 was not done by RAW? A lot of claims were made in the media about the intercepting capabilities of Indian agencies including the Thuraya sat conversation.
I bet the PM under suspicion was Gujral.
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Oh really It is sad and badMandeep wrote:Wasn't it Morarji Desai ? Seymour Hersh talked about an Indian Cabinet Minister being an American intelligence asset.It was widely assumed that he meant Desai but actually it was Chavan.Dilbu wrote:So the conversation recorded on 26/11 was not done by RAW? A lot of claims were made in the media about the intercepting capabilities of Indian agencies including the Thuraya sat conversation.
I bet the PM under suspicion was Gujral.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
IIRC, it was Morarji...Wasn't it Morarji Desai ? Seymour Hersh talked about an Indian Cabinet Minister being an American intelligence asset.It was widely assumed that he meant Desai but actually it was Chavan.
Anyways, a view on the recent banning of Chinese phones in India:
CELLPHONE SECURITY CONCERNS: Busting the network
By Maxwell Pereira
Government's move was prompted by security concerns, since terrorists use handsets with no IMEI to evade detection.
Following the Government of India’s Department of Telecommunications’ (DoT) directive to telecom operators to stop providing service to mobile handsets with no IMEI (international mobile equipment identity) number, an estimated 25 million such handsets (most of Chinese make and origin) are expected to have finally gone non-operational with effect from April 15, 2009. Whether or not these in reality are immobilised is a tall call for anyone to guess, let alone guarantee! Neither the government nor the telecom operators have made a statement yet in this regard.
The IMEI is a unique 17 or 15-digit code used to identify an individual mobile station to a Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) or any other network. The code is important as it uniquely identifies a specific mobile phone being used on a mobile network.
The IMEI is also a fool-proof tool in preventing a stolen handset from accessing a network. Cellphone owners whose sets are stolen can contact the service provider to disable a phone with the IMEI number by blocking it from the network quickly and easily. However, a call made from a mobile phone handset without an IMEI or with a common number allotted for a bulk of them, makes the task of tracing the caller difficult.
Tracing the caller
Most handsets marketed in bulk by Chinese mobile phone companies in lots of 100, 1,000 and 5,000 are found with a common IMEI number, which made it difficult for security agencies to track actual calls made from these phones, especially in terrorist attack cases.
The government’s move was prompted by security concerns voiced by police and other security agencies following major terrorist strikes in the country last year, over fear of terrorist groups making extensive use of such handsets to evade detection, since absence of IMEI number made tracing calls from such handsets a difficult task. The problem is further compounded by the fact that most cellular phone sets are sold in the informal markets and by unregistered sellers.
When DoT’s directive was first announced last year, the telecom operators’ response was anything but positive.
Many expressed their inability to meet the deadline due to technical reasons. They cried foul of the extra load on networks because of the need to block all calls with zeroes as IMEI numbers or from blacklisted numbers, the existence of many combinations of non-genuine IMEI numbers, etc., making it extremely difficult to block them.
Operators rued the extra expenditure that would be needed for network upgradation, as not all multiple equipment vendors were equipped to block as envisaged. They also claimed the move will affect customers who unknowingly bought mobiles without IMEI or whose numbers have been duplicated by others.
National interest nor concern for duty towards customers’ equipment safety worry the Indian operators — flushed as they were with a burgeoning market, raking in from the boom in sales of new connections to eager urban owners and even more curious rural aspirants. Their lukewarm attitude towards the need for safeguards against cellular thefts reflected the mood of the Indian industry.
Unlike in the United Kingdom, where the Mobile Industry Crime Action Forum, set up by the UK mobile telecommunications industry, including mobile handset manufacturers, to address the issues of mobile phone theft, the Indian telecom providers have not as yet exhibited any civic concern for crime prevention strategies to reduce mobile phone theft in association with the law enforcement agencies.
Implications of DoT’s order
Speculations have been rife in various discussions fora on the implications and impact of DoT’s ban order; starting with whether at all the security concerns voiced were grave enough, and the actual number of cases involving misuse by terrorists in such numbers as to constitute a national threat, and reason enough to immobilise and relegate to the dustbin 25-million sets and cost the country an expenditure upwards of Rs 2,500 crore, especially in today’s depressed economic situation.
Then the question of impact on revenue of telecom firms. The phones in question being usually low-cost, unbranded and used by low-end subscribers, the actual financial implications of replacing these with more expensive sets with IMEI were not clear. Unsubstantiated reports estimated this at Rs 2,500 crore conservatively invoicing just Rs 1,000 per set (at depreciated value…or subsidised/ provided free by telecom providers, to keep the affected subscribers or get them back on their network?)
“No fear of environmental cost of so many phones being discarded in one go,” says Pankaj Mahindroo, president of Indian Cellular Association: “We Indians never throw our phones — they will just remain as souvenirs with the owners for perpetuity!” Mahindroo was quite clear on the beneficial impact of the DoT’s move meeting the security concerns; and happy with the government’s positive action on the association’s suggestion to impose restrictions on handsets without IMEI at the point of import.
In the run up to the deadline, most telecom providers did send SMS intimations to handsets without IMEI on their networks about discontinuance of service to their sets — with effect from April 15. It would be interesting to hear from the government and the industry the ultimate result of its “security” exercise.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Guerrillas for guerrillas
G.D. Bakshi
April 22, 2009
First Published: 22:16 IST(22/4/2009)
G.D. Bakshi
April 22, 2009
First Published: 22:16 IST(22/4/2009)
The 2008 Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir were peaceful and witnessed a record voter turnout. In contrast, the first day of the Lok Sabha polls on April 16, 2009, saw an upsurge of Naxal violence; 14 attacks claimed 16 lives. On Wednesday, ahead of the second phase of polls, Maoists seized a train with nearly 700 passengers in Jharkhand’s Latehar district and triggered blasts in the state and Bihar. The bulk of these attacks have been in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. However, what is a cause for concern is the scale of these coordinated assaults across the Red Corridor, which also includes Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. This insurgency has overtaken both J&K and the Northeast in terms of the threat it poses to the internal security of India.
Demography is often overlooked in our security analysis. Sixty-two per cent of India’s population is in the working- age group and the bulk of them resides in villages. This rural-urban divide fuels Left-wing extremism. Naxalism started as an agrarian rebellion by the Santhals of Naxalbari in West Bengal in 1967. But thanks to the lack of political will to undertake reforms in the agrarian sector, all attempts by the State have failed to curb this insurgency.
The Naxal insurgency resurfaced in the 1980s with the rise of the Peoples’ War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). In 2004, the two merged to form the CPI (Maoists). Thereafter, the spatial growth of Left-wing extremism has been dramatic. Large-scale displacement of tribals by hydro-electric projects and extensive mining in jungle areas have led to the third phase of Left-wing extremism. From just nine states and 53 districts in 2001, Naxalism today affects some 203 to 252 districts in 18 states.
The core of the insurgency is Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand with significant activity levels in Bihar, Andhra Pradesh (AP), Maharashtra and Orissa. What is becoming a cause for alarm is the adverse casualty ratio between the Police/Central Police Organisations and the Naxals. Between 1999 and 2006, the ratio was 1:1.4 to 1:2. But in 2007-08, this ratio has tilted in favour of the insurgents.
Tribals make natural guerrillas. Only 12 per cent of India’s tribal population lives in the Northeast. They revolted in 1956 and tied down two to six divisions of the Indian Army and three times that number of police and paramilitary forces. Eighty-five per cent of the Indian tribal population lives in central and peninsular India. It is this section that is now in varying stages of rebellion.
Unlike the earlier insurgencies in the Northeast and the terrorist movements in Punjab and J&K, this is not a rim-land insurgency but a heartland rebellion. The Army obviously is not keen to intervene because it will draw its men far away from the borders. The key issue is: can we (or should we) militarise our police forces to quell this insurgency? The world over, armies are employed to tackle insurgencies. Militarising the police forces would take eight to ten years with the existing training infrastructure. Would it be cost-effective or possible to raise tactical skills of state police forces to even a basic military level?
The AP’s Greyhound model — an elite, specialised police force — is the solution. Can the AP model be replicated in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand? The outlook is pessimistic as the state of road infrastructure in these two states is not as good as in AP. The better road communication network in AP enabled the police to gain the upper hand. Unfortunately, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand have been focusing more on raising the general level of training of the entire police force rather than creating an elite force.
In these states, counter-insurgency training and operations are treated as punishment postings and the morale of the policemen is poor.
If this fight deteriorates further, the government will have to consider a genuine para-militarisation of the conflict, i.e. intervention by the Rashtriya Rifles or the Assam Rifles. Or, we might consider a repeat of Operation Steeple Chase (Army assistance provided to anti-Naxal operations in Bengal in 1971) and the focus should Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.
G.D. Bakshi is a retired Major General of the Indian Army.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Isnt the objective of raising standards of entire force a better option?The better road communication network in AP enabled the police to gain the upper hand. Unfortunately, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand have been focusing more on raising the general level of training of the entire police force rather than creating an elite force.
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
Sirsum wrote:Isnt the objective of raising standards of entire force a better option?The better road communication network in AP enabled the police to gain the upper hand. Unfortunately, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand have been focusing more on raising the general level of training of the entire police force rather than creating an elite force.
Where is fund to raise the general level or creating an elite force?????????
I have a doubt in our spending power in these states
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
[quote=I bet the PM under suspicion was Gujral.[/quote]
Wasn't it Morarji Desai ? Seymour Hersh talked about an Indian Cabinet Minister being an American intelligence asset.It was widely assumed that he meant Desai but actually it was Chavan.[/quote]
I remember very well having read the news in the BR forum, that it was I.K.Gujral, directly asking/ humiliating our RAW chief, personnel contracted by RAW will not get their pay cheques with immediate effect ! and got the whole setup dislodged(which took years to establish) by one order. Ramanji, if my memory serves me right, then it was your post.
Wasn't it Morarji Desai ? Seymour Hersh talked about an Indian Cabinet Minister being an American intelligence asset.It was widely assumed that he meant Desai but actually it was Chavan.[/quote]
I remember very well having read the news in the BR forum, that it was I.K.Gujral, directly asking/ humiliating our RAW chief, personnel contracted by RAW will not get their pay cheques with immediate effect ! and got the whole setup dislodged(which took years to establish) by one order. Ramanji, if my memory serves me right, then it was your post.
Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion
IK Gujral rolled up our covert action capabilities in Pakistan around 96-97 when he was the PM as part of some Confidence Building Measures (I think it was a unilateral action from our side). We are still paying for it and will continue to pay for some more time till it gets reestablished. Morarji Desai was the PM who initially wanted the RAW shut down (due to a misplaced belief of it being the Congress's paw) but on becoming the PM and talking with the then chief, Shri RN Kao, realised the truth. Of course, that didn't stop him from reducing it's headcount to nearly half, as pointed out by Shankaran Nair, the head after Kao. So yeah, both did do irreparable damage to our abilities to prosecute against external threats in the intelligence world.