Ananth wrote:
Utilizing peace talks to mine overground and underground networks is not new. Further this was not the first instance of peace talks, CBN also held peace talks with them (pg 5):
link
Peace talks were held between the People's War Group and the state government of
Andhra Pradesh during June-July 2002 at the initiative of Committee of Concerned
Citizens. Three rounds of talks were held but there was no agreement on the substantive
issues.
Peace talks were again held from October 15 to 18, 2004 at Hyderabad. The Naxals
presented an 11-point charter of demands. The most important point related to land
reforms. Again, there could be no agreement.
So then why did AP police succeed? AP police's tactics need a wider dissemination if it is unqualified success. On the flip side, is the success just offloading AP's problems to other states? One cannot deny that decrease in violence in AP there was a commensurate increase in violence especially in CG.
The peace talks initiated by YSR/Cong. regime was very different from those of CBN's time. YRS/Cong. lifted the ban. The talks were not with intermediaries/overground sympathizers of naxals. Naxal leadership came overground for the first time for the talks in 2004. For instance, though Ramakrishna was known as a top naxal leader, nobody really knew who he was.
People like him and other Dalam commanders came into the open and exposed their overground links, making it easy for AP police to move in for the kill.
You seem to be saying that AP police facilitated naxal movement to CG and other areas due to lifting of the ban on naxals. It does not compute.
North Telegana region was the first "liberated zone" declared by the naxals. The force of police crackdown during CBN's first tenure (1995-1999), forced them to withdraw from the telegana plains, northwards to forest areas in Bastar, MP (there was no Chattisgarh then) and southwards to Nallamalla forest range in AP (closer to Prakasham district, where there was no previous naxal presence). The naxals then declared Nallamala a "liberated zone" and an "impregnable fortress". CBN's regime had very little success in breaking through to this naxal stronghold. The Police crackdown was unabated, but the naxals learned better evasive tactics and they managed to protect their funding sources, arms dumps and courier networks (the kind run by Binayak Sen in Chattisgarh, but it was originally evolved in AP). The naxals regrouped during 1999-2003, and became so bold as to attack CBN himself in Tirupathi.
AP police badly needed to re-work their strategies. YSR's election manifesto promise of lifting the ban on Naxals and conducting talks came in handy. CBN was voted out, YSR came in, the ban was lifted and the naxals really believed that their time had come and emerged from their foreast hideouts and gave away vital leads to the Greyhouds/Police and the rest is history.
Naxals had been building their strongholds simultaneously in Bastar in M.P. (now in Chattisgarh). Where do you think the Nepal to AP "Red Corridor" myth originated? It did not happen post-2004, after the naxal decimation in AP. The liberated "Dandakaranya"/"Red Corrdidor" was in common usage from early 1990s.
Naxal strengthening in Chattisgarh is due to success of AP police to decimate the naxals from their stomping grounds in AP.
I agree that if the crackdown in AP in 2004 was supplemented by a push in Chattisgarh (and Orissa and Jharkhand), the naxals menace would have been wiped out to a very large extent in the country.
But, that required a central Govt. (and Union Home Ministry) headed by a someone better than the nincompoop, Shivraj Patil.
Even between 1999-2004, if the "Loh Purush" led Home Ministry had been really alive to the threat, a coordinated action between the Police forces of AP, MP/Chattisgarh and Orissa could have really dented the naxals from establishing themselves in Bastar forests and the hilly forests of Orissa/AP border. Alas, the Central Govt. then was exclusively focussed on Paki inspired terror war and the naxal threat was left to fester.
So, when the heat in AP became unbearable, the naxal leadership shifted lock, stock and barrel to Chattisgarh. That is why you have the situation of naxal leadership being telugu and the footsoldiers being the tribals of Bastar and Orissa today. There were many reports to that effect. If the naxals had continued to have strongholds in AP, with local recruitment of cadres in AP, the overall threat would have been vastly more dangerous than it is today.
It is a crying shame that the Police forces of contiguous states do not work well together. The inter-state Police coordination mechanism has to be totally recast. If you remember, Karnataka and TN police also could not work well to eliminate Veerappan during his prime. This despite a special combined force being instituted to track him down.
This aspect of our internal security should be strengthened. Just sending in CRPF or other Central Forces to tackle naxal insugency does not work. You need Chattisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand police taking the help of AP Police/Greyhouds and conducting joint ops. Such things are a rarity. When Greyhounds venture beyond their own zone of comfort in AP, the disaster of the kind that occured in Orissa (32 Greyhounds killed when their boat overturned) deters further probing operations.
Also, the infrastructure in Chattisgarh needs a drastic overhaul. The succesful AP strategy is due to a combination of highly trained special force (Greyhounds), accelerated socio-economic development and vastly improved infrastructure (mainly communication & road infrastructure).
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