Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Phillipines, Taiwan, Korea, NoKo, Brunei.
Except NoKo and Myanmar, the rest don't buy chinese arms influence. Those countries are either directly sourced by the US or RU.
Wow, is India special that China picks every one of her neighbors to support?
And Why is India unable to maintain a secure and friendly neighborhood?
To see where China is going with its arms sales, go west, in Asia and Africa.
S
Except NoKo and Myanmar, the rest don't buy chinese arms influence. Those countries are either directly sourced by the US or RU.
Wow, is India special that China picks every one of her neighbors to support?
And Why is India unable to maintain a secure and friendly neighborhood?
To see where China is going with its arms sales, go west, in Asia and Africa.
S
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Why India doesn't have any ally in the region?samuel wrote:And Why is India unable to maintain a secure and friendly neighborhood?
-
- BR Mainsite Crew
- Posts: 3110
- Joined: 28 Jun 2007 06:36
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
because India vacillates between Indian interests and moralistic attitude, thus pi$$ing both factions.SRoy wrote:Why India doesn't have any ally in the region?samuel wrote:And Why is India unable to maintain a secure and friendly neighborhood?
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Are you saying that all those countries have Chinese political influence but not military influence?samuel wrote:Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Phillipines, Taiwan, Korea, NoKo, Brunei.
Except NoKo and Myanmar, the rest don't buy chinese arms influence. Those countries are either directly sourced by the US or RU.
Wow, is India special that China picks every one of her neighbors to support?
For example, North Korea is not a given. China did not remain silent after they tested the nuke and were very upfront about defanging Dear Leader. Obviously, those against China will see conspiracy but its important to notice it, especially when China has been very open of its condemnation of India.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
An American Intelligence professional wrote in 1960 that the States Integration by India was used as a fear factor by Western alliances to persuade these states that they will get swallowed into greater India. The statements of leaders of those times also did not do much to dispel this mis-perception when ever they talk of ancient ties to SE Asia.SRoy wrote:Why India doesn't have any ally in the region?samuel wrote:And Why is India unable to maintain a secure and friendly neighborhood?
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Ramana,
The reasons could be much nearer home, and that's why I have thrown open the question.
Without allies we are always fighting with one hand tied, we don't have enough levers to deal with rivals.
However, the Western propaganda has its limited application, as the integration was limited to areas under erstwhile British control. Maybe the Burmese had a reason to be wary.
What about half a dozen countries in Indo-China?
The reasons could be much nearer home, and that's why I have thrown open the question.
Without allies we are always fighting with one hand tied, we don't have enough levers to deal with rivals.
However, the Western propaganda has its limited application, as the integration was limited to areas under erstwhile British control. Maybe the Burmese had a reason to be wary.
What about half a dozen countries in Indo-China?
Last edited by SRoy on 28 May 2009 02:14, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
No...no. I'm not asking for a straight answer.ravi_ku wrote:because India vacillates between Indian interests and moralistic attitude, thus pi$$ing both factions.SRoy wrote:
Why India doesn't have any ally in the region?
However, the reason that you stated, "vacillates between Indian interests and moralistic attitude" is a symptom of a deeper problem. It is not the cause, though it appears to be so.
Let us try again...
By what logic Aus and NZ are Western allies? How does BD (after 71 war and genocide) has enough elements within to make it function like TSP ally?
I'm not asking for any answer, I wish members here ponder over it.
No future scenario is possible without suitable allies.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Let's go case by case.SRoy wrote:No future scenario is possible without suitable allies.
1) Why isn't Nepal our ally?
- Aside from having ideological connections to China, the Nepalese goverment has attempted to keep China and India at bay. Has India talked to Nepal in a while about increasing trade? As far as I've read, the budget proposal isn't grossly centrally planned but does allow for the free market. Nepal is already reliant on India for many food basics, perhaps we should help build up their infrastructure. This is what the Chinese are doing in Tibet, right?
2) Why isn't Afghanistan our ally?
- Afghanistan doesn't really a government at the moment.
3) Why isn't Bangladesh our ally?
- Can anyone answer this one?
-
- BRFite
- Posts: 1169
- Joined: 01 Apr 2008 03:32
- Location: Thrissur, Kerala 59.93.8.169
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
3: Because of Islam whether you accept it or not
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 12410
- Joined: 19 Nov 2008 03:25
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
After almost 40 pages, I think we have come back to square one and the starting page. Do we realize why just as in the nations' poliotical history, we come back in circles repeatedly to the same point on threads in forums? However, each such cycle is also necessary - to show why we fail to realize that we are going in circles.
The fundamental problem of strategy in any potential conflict situation is - What to do with the enemy?
All the problems being discussed here, about military scenarios getting jeopardized by the "lack of political will" putting the nation at a grave danger, is about answering this fundamental question - what to do with the enemy?
You can only have a clear answer to the question of "political will", if you have a clear ideological conception of what you want your nation to look like, what you characterize your nation as, what you think are the objectives that this nation has to fulfill. This is an ideological question. And we have shied away from facing that uncomfortable truth. We can castigate and deride and denigrate all that as so much hot air and abstraction, but there is no more a concrete question than this.
Because of a complete lack of clarity of purpose of the nation, characteristics of the nation, what belongs to the nation and what doesn't, what should belong to the nation and what shouldn't - we are in this mess. Does the territory of Pakistan belong to the nation or not? If it belongs that starts a chain of thought, political decisions, leading to military decisions to restore it to the nation. If it does not, then that means a different line. Do we consider the population of TSP not belonging to the nation, so that we do not have any duty towards ensuring justice and quality of life for them? If not then that means a certian line of action, if yes another.
If we think of the current existing territory as defining our nation, then we have to defend its territorial integrity. Are we really serious about defending it? If so, can we always restrict ourselves in defending it from "inside" or until we are attacked? Do we dare to identify the enemy? If we do can we identify the driving motivations behind that enmity? Or because we do not have any idea of the nation, we are confused about what really to defend? Because we are confused about the characteristics of our nation, we cannot even identify the characteristics of the enemy? Because we then find commonalities between our confused set of characteristics and that of the enemy. Because we then can longer identify the enemy. Because we don't identify the enemy, we don't know what to do with the enemy.
This utter confusion led us to shout "Hindi-chini bhai bhai" all the while the Chini-bhai was mobilizing against us. We weep about loss of democracy in TSP and cry about helping and strengthening the "civilian government" of TSP. Because we never learn, we make common cause with the Chini-bhai to suppress Tibetan anger, and "engage" with the military junta of Myanmar (with all the smooth excuses of "collaboration" with the Myanmarese military about tackling insurgency - an insurgency which still kicks strong, and of course "collaboration" is a dirty word if not used by security experts properly authorized by the GOI to have a monopoly on the term) and shut our eyes to the plight of democracy there.
But then we must perpetuate that total ideological vacuum, where the nation has no definition, no purpose, no ideological foundation, because any such foundation gives the people independent set of criteria to evaluate GOI action. This then means that the people can measure the GOI as far as the nation's external interactions are concerned. In the current scenario, the GOI has the greatest flexibility - it need not do anything. What if some "small" territory is lost - after all nothing grows there! AP too expensive to maintain, Kashmir becoming too much of a problem, Tibetan cause too expensive - can anger the Chini bhai", maybe we can negotiate and do a trade-off? After all when the nation is itself vague, always waiting to be defined by a coterie around a dynasty as suitable for their instantaneous needs, and such vagueness to be imposed by machinery and functionary maintained on taxing all the members of that "vague" nation, no amount of foreign enmity or agrression can be a problem.
Without clarity of vision about what we want India to be finally, we cannot decide on tactics or strategy. This thread started with the concept of a core and a periphhery, where the core should expand to make the current periphery part of the core.
Such an expansion gives purpose to the nation, and contrary to those with extremely limited vision and self-inflated importance who think it is abstract, actually is quite pragmatic. Expansion forces us to think of going beyoind and looking into areas beyond our immediate horizon. It forces us to think of what is necessary to achieve this expansion. It forces us to take the aggression ebing planned by neighbours into their own front or rear yard. It jeopardizes all their careful planning over decades about how they can dismember the sleeping sloth of India bit by bit, and force sthem to think of defence also. It forces us to really look at the issues and obstacles that prevent us from resourcing such expansion - all the bottlenecks of inefficiency, governance, economic policy, everything.
I would set the goal as expansion into the entire subcontinent, a Bismarckian rolling forth perhaps, where buying out and arm-twisting go hand in hand. The entire subcontinent has to come under a single financial, and military system, and can be another version of EU. But certain territories and populations belong to Bharat, like that of TSP, and territories occupied and ceded to others by TSP, all territories occupied by China, and Tibet as a free nation, Nepal, BD, SL part of the future Union.
If that goal is set, we can provide a solid chain of arguments to show to USA+UK+Russia that such a formation under overall Bhartyia control will be to their immense advantage, and that they should not oppose this. (We can negotiate and do some trade off.
) If that goal is set, we can look into all the strategies that can unleash the forces necessary to achieve this. Only such a framework can ensure the safety and future prosperity of all the peoples in South Asia and even indirectly rest of Asia.
Added : Should not omit Myanmar, and the chain leading into SE Asia. That will be a necessary check to keep "Islamic" tendencies in BD and Malaysia getting out of hand, and keep flanking pressure on PRC restricting it from IO.
The fundamental problem of strategy in any potential conflict situation is - What to do with the enemy?
All the problems being discussed here, about military scenarios getting jeopardized by the "lack of political will" putting the nation at a grave danger, is about answering this fundamental question - what to do with the enemy?
You can only have a clear answer to the question of "political will", if you have a clear ideological conception of what you want your nation to look like, what you characterize your nation as, what you think are the objectives that this nation has to fulfill. This is an ideological question. And we have shied away from facing that uncomfortable truth. We can castigate and deride and denigrate all that as so much hot air and abstraction, but there is no more a concrete question than this.
Because of a complete lack of clarity of purpose of the nation, characteristics of the nation, what belongs to the nation and what doesn't, what should belong to the nation and what shouldn't - we are in this mess. Does the territory of Pakistan belong to the nation or not? If it belongs that starts a chain of thought, political decisions, leading to military decisions to restore it to the nation. If it does not, then that means a different line. Do we consider the population of TSP not belonging to the nation, so that we do not have any duty towards ensuring justice and quality of life for them? If not then that means a certian line of action, if yes another.
If we think of the current existing territory as defining our nation, then we have to defend its territorial integrity. Are we really serious about defending it? If so, can we always restrict ourselves in defending it from "inside" or until we are attacked? Do we dare to identify the enemy? If we do can we identify the driving motivations behind that enmity? Or because we do not have any idea of the nation, we are confused about what really to defend? Because we are confused about the characteristics of our nation, we cannot even identify the characteristics of the enemy? Because we then find commonalities between our confused set of characteristics and that of the enemy. Because we then can longer identify the enemy. Because we don't identify the enemy, we don't know what to do with the enemy.
This utter confusion led us to shout "Hindi-chini bhai bhai" all the while the Chini-bhai was mobilizing against us. We weep about loss of democracy in TSP and cry about helping and strengthening the "civilian government" of TSP. Because we never learn, we make common cause with the Chini-bhai to suppress Tibetan anger, and "engage" with the military junta of Myanmar (with all the smooth excuses of "collaboration" with the Myanmarese military about tackling insurgency - an insurgency which still kicks strong, and of course "collaboration" is a dirty word if not used by security experts properly authorized by the GOI to have a monopoly on the term) and shut our eyes to the plight of democracy there.
But then we must perpetuate that total ideological vacuum, where the nation has no definition, no purpose, no ideological foundation, because any such foundation gives the people independent set of criteria to evaluate GOI action. This then means that the people can measure the GOI as far as the nation's external interactions are concerned. In the current scenario, the GOI has the greatest flexibility - it need not do anything. What if some "small" territory is lost - after all nothing grows there! AP too expensive to maintain, Kashmir becoming too much of a problem, Tibetan cause too expensive - can anger the Chini bhai", maybe we can negotiate and do a trade-off? After all when the nation is itself vague, always waiting to be defined by a coterie around a dynasty as suitable for their instantaneous needs, and such vagueness to be imposed by machinery and functionary maintained on taxing all the members of that "vague" nation, no amount of foreign enmity or agrression can be a problem.
Without clarity of vision about what we want India to be finally, we cannot decide on tactics or strategy. This thread started with the concept of a core and a periphhery, where the core should expand to make the current periphery part of the core.
Such an expansion gives purpose to the nation, and contrary to those with extremely limited vision and self-inflated importance who think it is abstract, actually is quite pragmatic. Expansion forces us to think of going beyoind and looking into areas beyond our immediate horizon. It forces us to think of what is necessary to achieve this expansion. It forces us to take the aggression ebing planned by neighbours into their own front or rear yard. It jeopardizes all their careful planning over decades about how they can dismember the sleeping sloth of India bit by bit, and force sthem to think of defence also. It forces us to really look at the issues and obstacles that prevent us from resourcing such expansion - all the bottlenecks of inefficiency, governance, economic policy, everything.
I would set the goal as expansion into the entire subcontinent, a Bismarckian rolling forth perhaps, where buying out and arm-twisting go hand in hand. The entire subcontinent has to come under a single financial, and military system, and can be another version of EU. But certain territories and populations belong to Bharat, like that of TSP, and territories occupied and ceded to others by TSP, all territories occupied by China, and Tibet as a free nation, Nepal, BD, SL part of the future Union.
If that goal is set, we can provide a solid chain of arguments to show to USA+UK+Russia that such a formation under overall Bhartyia control will be to their immense advantage, and that they should not oppose this. (We can negotiate and do some trade off.

Added : Should not omit Myanmar, and the chain leading into SE Asia. That will be a necessary check to keep "Islamic" tendencies in BD and Malaysia getting out of hand, and keep flanking pressure on PRC restricting it from IO.
Last edited by brihaspati on 28 May 2009 02:43, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Not yet evident from your post what I'm looking after.Keshav wrote:Let's go case by case.SRoy wrote:No future scenario is possible without suitable allies.
1) Why isn't Nepal our ally?
- Aside from having ideological connections to China, the Nepalese goverment has attempted to keep China and India at bay. Has India talked to Nepal in a while about increasing trade? As far as I've read, the budget proposal isn't grossly centrally planned but does allow for the free market. Nepal is already reliant on India for many food basics, perhaps we should help build up their infrastructure. This is what the Chinese are doing in Tibet, right?
How does it matter to me if Nepal is keeping at bay the Chinese, Americans and Martians?
Why Nepal isn't an Indian ally? Simple question.
What are factors involved here? Culture commonality, trade relations, transport facilities, employment (including the Indian Army being open to them).
Can alliances be turned on or off at whims and fancies (unless you are talking about Indian politics) ?
>>
I'll state two things here.
1. Alliances must be beneficial for all the parties involved in tangible terms. Also, there should be a set of clearly defined disadvantages/dangers if one wishes to disengage from the alliance.
2. In the course of discussion, I foresee people bringing up the the American wisdom "no permanent friends/allies, only national interests are permanent". Please make a note that such rationale does not apply to Anglo-Saxon fraternity come what may. So, lets not get misled by such motivated BS propagated by others.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Can you elaborate on this since many cannot understand what you are explainingbrihaspati wrote:
If that goal is set, we can provide a solid chain of arguments to show to USA+UK+Russia that such a formation under overall Bhartyia control will be to their immense advantage, and that they should not oppose this. (We can negotiate and do some trade off.) If that goal is set, we can look into all the strategies that can unleash the forces necessary to achieve this. Only such a framework can ensure the safety and future prosperity of all the peoples in South Asia and even indirectly rest of Asia.
Expansion allows the inward looking elites to look outside
Such an expansion gives purpose to the nation, and contrary to those with extremely limited vision and self-inflated importance who think it is abstract, actually is quite pragmatic. Expansion forces us to think of going beyoind and looking into areas beyond our immediate horizon. It forces us to think of what is necessary to achieve this expansion. It forces us to take the aggression ebing planned by neighbours into their own front or rear yard. It jeopardizes all their careful planning over decades about how they can dismember the sleeping sloth of India bit by bit, and force sthem to think of defence also. It forces us to really look at the issues and obstacles that prevent us from resourcing such expansion - all the bottlenecks of inefficiency, governance, economic policy, everything.
Last edited by svinayak on 28 May 2009 02:47, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Unified Republic or Federation?brihaspati wrote: I would set the goal as expansion into the entire subcontinent, a Bismarckian rolling forth perhaps, where buying out and arm-twisting go hand in hand. The entire subcontinent has to come under a single financial, and military system, and can be another version of EU. But certain territories and populations belong to Bharat, like that of TSP, and territories occupied and ceded to others by TSP, all territories occupied by China, and Tibet as a free nation, Nepal, BD, SL part of the future Union.
If that goal is set, we can provide a solid chain of arguments to show to USA+UK+Russia that such a formation under overall Bhartyia control will be to their immense advantage, and that they should not oppose this. (We can negotiate and do some trade off.) If that goal is set, we can look into all the strategies that can unleash the forces necessary to achieve this. Only such a framework can ensure the safety and future prosperity of all the peoples in South Asia and even indirectly rest of Asia.
.
Before USA+UK+Russia, you'll have to sell the benefits to Pak, BD, Nepal, SL, etc.
So, what's on the table from our side?
Last edited by SRoy on 28 May 2009 02:50, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Brihaspatiji,brihaspati wrote:The fundamental problem of strategy in any potential conflict situation is - What to do with the enemy?...
A tour de force of a post. You have summed up the problem as well as it can possibly be summed up.
If I could add only one thing... envisioning "what to do with the enemy" only gets more and more difficult and frustrating when there is no apparent answer to the question: how can it be done? What are the precise extents, and limitations, of our capabilities to fulfill our designs (be they grand or humble)? Behind all the argument and running around on circles that we see on BR is a general pessimism, a deep seated fear that nothing will ever change because we are not capable of making it change. Bismarck said that politics is the "art of the possible". Coming from a perspective where we have internalized the defeated belief that nothing is possible, what do we have to work with?
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Brihasapati's Brahad Bharat like EU instead of Akhand Bharat.
-
- BR Mainsite Crew
- Posts: 3110
- Joined: 28 Jun 2007 06:36
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
SRoy,SRoy wrote: No...no. I'm not asking for a straight answer.
However, the reason that you stated, "vacillates between Indian interests and moralistic attitude" is a symptom of a deeper problem. It is not the cause, though it appears to be so.
Let us try again...
By what logic Aus and NZ are Western allies? How does BD (after 71 war and genocide) has enough elements within to make it function like TSP ally?
I'm not asking for any answer, I wish members here ponder over it.
No future scenario is possible without suitable allies.
We dont stand up for our allies. We give moralistic crap to them even though it doesnt affect us. Why would anyone be with a nagging aunt, who would not even help you when one needs help.
You get allies by standing up for them in times of need, using the occasional danda to keep them in line- and rest of the time by leaving them alone.
You never stand up for them. You never use danda when they go out of line but threaten to use danda when it is none of our business.
Could India not have made a big scene and thrown a big tantrum when Srilanka/nepal was going towards China, then they will understand that we would not sit silently if go away from them and stay in line. Threats from junior ministers stating that India will revoke 2-3 treaties with them if they went on that line would have done the trick. No, we are too moralistic to do that. Why should SL/BD be with India, when India doesnt do anything even when they move into China's orbit, after all they get double benefit.
Unless we say "with us or against us", why will the other take a stand with us?
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 12410
- Joined: 19 Nov 2008 03:25
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Acharyaji,
If this is the question:
If the threat posed by US+UK interests is not neutralized they will support all sorts of spanners in the works. So I would suggest showing them how such an expansion by Bharat is to their advantage. Overall stable control of the subcontinent by Bharat means economic stability and democratic politics - the soft side of "rashtryia management" in which matured "capitalism" thrives. This means more profitable markets for them.
If this is the question:
If the threat posed by US+UK interests is not neutralized they will support all sorts of spanners in the works. So I would suggest showing them how such an expansion by Bharat is to their advantage. Overall stable control of the subcontinent by Bharat means economic stability and democratic politics - the soft side of "rashtryia management" in which matured "capitalism" thrives. This means more profitable markets for them.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
In the present situation they (US/UK) have an economically stable India with enough matured capitalism to make a profit. But they also have an easily-manipulated ruling elite disjointed from the nation, docile as farm animals, presiding over an ideological vacuum as unthreatening as anything could possibly be. The US/UK have the best of both worlds right now... how will you convince them that there is an advantage to replacing that ruling elite with one which had undertook expansion, which articulated a clear national vision making itself genuinely accountable to an empowered population?brihaspati wrote:Acharyaji,
If this is the question:
If the threat posed by US+UK interests is not neutralized they will support all sorts of spanners in the works. So I would suggest showing them how such an expansion by Bharat is to their advantage. Overall stable control of the subcontinent by Bharat means economic stability and democratic politics - the soft side of "rashtryia management" in which matured "capitalism" thrives. This means more profitable markets for them.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Good points to think over. I agree. As I said.ravi_ku wrote: SRoy,
We dont stand up for our allies. We give moralistic crap to them even though it doesnt affect us. Why would anyone be with a nagging aunt, who would not even help you when one needs help.
You get allies by standing up for them in times of need, using the occasional danda to keep them in line- and rest of the time by leaving them alone.
You never stand up for them. You never use danda when they go out of line but threaten to use danda when it is none of our business.
Could India not have made a big scene and thrown a big tantrum when Srilanka/nepal was going towards China, then they will understand that we would not sit silently if go away from them and stay in line. Threats from junior ministers stating that India will revoke 2-3 treaties with them if they went on that line would have done the trick. No, we are too moralistic to do that. Why should SL/BD be with India, when India doesnt do anything even when they move into China's orbit, after all they get double benefit.
Unless we say "with us or against us", why will the other take a stand with us?
Is there a leadership problem from the Indian side? We don't seem to be able put together a decent team.Alliances must be beneficial for all the parties involved in tangible terms. Also, there should be a set of clearly defined disadvantages/dangers if one wishes to disengage from the alliance.
SAARC seems to me a lost opportunity. What if it did not include Pakistan?
Rest of the countries could have concentrated on fruitful ventures. Reduced trade barriers? Common currency? Eased visa norms (or no visa at all)? Integrated rail/waterways? Etc. etc.
I think we would have the basic framework in place to achieve what Brihaspati is proposing.
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 12410
- Joined: 19 Nov 2008 03:25
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
SRoyji,
Pak, Nepal, BD,SL all have elites whose existence depends on utilizing the fear of the big-brother, "India", and representing or sharpening the divide between India and the "commons" of those countries. This is crucial for them to stay in power because they can pose themselves as the "intermediary" who are "preserving" the commons. Almost all of the elites of these countries are reputed to be immensely "corrupt", and the threat perception helps in extracting "resource" and immunity from accountability, from the "enemies" of India.
These elite survive, simply because either someone from EU, or "inner commonwealth", or USA or Japan, the entire "Western" axis, or Russia or China supports them. This is why neutralizing these (except PRC) is important, which will also simultaneously tieup PRC. Once the elite can no longer be sure of such support, and India approaches alternative leadership of factions from within these elite who want to hitch their wagon to the new ship, and brings in the commons through "soft approaches" (educational facilities for example) to get them converted and expose their own elite, we can establish "sympathetic" elite who will however always need some degree of "carrot and stick".
Pak, Nepal, BD,SL all have elites whose existence depends on utilizing the fear of the big-brother, "India", and representing or sharpening the divide between India and the "commons" of those countries. This is crucial for them to stay in power because they can pose themselves as the "intermediary" who are "preserving" the commons. Almost all of the elites of these countries are reputed to be immensely "corrupt", and the threat perception helps in extracting "resource" and immunity from accountability, from the "enemies" of India.
These elite survive, simply because either someone from EU, or "inner commonwealth", or USA or Japan, the entire "Western" axis, or Russia or China supports them. This is why neutralizing these (except PRC) is important, which will also simultaneously tieup PRC. Once the elite can no longer be sure of such support, and India approaches alternative leadership of factions from within these elite who want to hitch their wagon to the new ship, and brings in the commons through "soft approaches" (educational facilities for example) to get them converted and expose their own elite, we can establish "sympathetic" elite who will however always need some degree of "carrot and stick".
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Very true.brihaspati wrote:SRoyji,
Pak, Nepal, BD,SL all have elites whose existence depends on utilizing the fear of the big-brother, "India", and representing or sharpening the divide between India and the "commons" of those countries. This is crucial for them to stay in power because they can pose themselves as the "intermediary" who are "preserving" the commons. Almost all of the elites of these countries are reputed to be immensely "corrupt", and the threat perception helps in extracting "resource" and immunity from accountability, from the "enemies" of India.
These elite survive, simply because either someone from EU, or "inner commonwealth", or USA or Japan, the entire "Western" axis, or Russia or China supports them. This is why neutralizing these (except PRC) is important, which will also simultaneously tieup PRC. Once the elite can no longer be sure of such support, and India approaches alternative leadership of factions from within these elite who want to hitch their wagon to the new ship, and brings in the commons through "soft approaches" (educational facilities for example) to get them converted and expose their own elite, we can establish "sympathetic" elite who will however always need some degree of "carrot and stick".
But, then we should put together something that is of importance to the existing elite or should offer tangible benefits to alternative power centers in these countries. You propose similar solution, though I'm not sure who'll do that GoI or front organizations propagating people to people contact. Does religious/cultural organizations play a role here (makes sense in case of SL/Nepal)?
Second part of your post actually has a broad sweep ... EU, US, Japan, Russia and China (I would include KSA/Islamic block as well). Why is it that even a single one of these are not our allies?
-
- BR Mainsite Crew
- Posts: 3110
- Joined: 28 Jun 2007 06:36
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
SRoy,SRoy wrote:
2. In the course of discussion, I foresee people bringing up the the American wisdom "no permanent friends/allies, only national interests are permanent". Please make a note that such rationale does not apply to Anglo-Saxon fraternity come what may. So, lets not get misled by such motivated BS propagated by others.
You might or might not agree with it. But that statement can be made only with certain assumptions.
You understand what your nation is which means you have defined who is "other" and understand what your national interests are.
We unfortunately do not complete this assumption and thus for us, that statement has no meaning. Completely different from statement having no rationale.
-
- BR Mainsite Crew
- Posts: 3110
- Joined: 28 Jun 2007 06:36
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
"Allies" is a dualistic word. I cannot be a ally to someone who is not an ally to me. This should answer your question.SRoy wrote: Second part of your post actually has a broad sweep ... EU, US, Japan, Russia and China (I would include KSA/Islamic block as well). Why is it that even a single one of these are not our allies?
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
You have not understood my question.ravi_ku wrote:"Allies" is a dualistic word. I cannot be a ally to someone who is not an ally to me. This should answer your question.SRoy wrote: Second part of your post actually has a broad sweep ... EU, US, Japan, Russia and China (I would include KSA/Islamic block as well). Why is it that even a single one of these are not our allies?
Of course you cannot get married if no lady is willing, but that doesn't tells me why no lady finds you good enough.
-
- BR Mainsite Crew
- Posts: 3110
- Joined: 28 Jun 2007 06:36
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
or I am too good for themSRoy wrote:
Of course you cannot get married if no lady is willing, but that doesn't tells me why no lady finds you good enough.

Edit: Also there is a large amount of space for ladies between a lady who is married to me and the vamp girl.
-
- BRFite
- Posts: 1635
- Joined: 28 Mar 2007 18:27
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
[/quote][quote="SRoySecond part of your post actually has a broad sweep ... EU, US, Japan, Russia and China (I would include KSA/Islamic block as well). Why is it that even a single one of these are not our allies?
This is extremely well thought out situation. Any of these nations being an ally to India against all the other paltry powers is valueless proposition. Meaning India does not need them to neutralize the paltry powers. At best, India needs these nations to stay neutral and India can beat up on these paltries.
However, when they align with the underdog, then the value of the "ally" is tremendous as they are extremely important to checkmate India. Precisely, why Bakis are embraced, while India is ignored.
Hence ally is tenacious and depends on who is against who.
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 17249
- Joined: 10 Aug 2006 21:11
- Location: http://bharata-bhuti.blogspot.com/
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Dear Mr. Ravi-Ku,ravi_ku wrote: We dont stand up for our allies. We give moralistic crap to them even though it doesnt affect us. Why would anyone be with a nagging aunt, who would not even help you when one needs help.
You are incorrect. Indis did standup for all its neighbors, when they needed. This includes Pakistan.
If India didn't stand up for SL and Nepal, SL couldn't have destroyed LTTE and Maoists couldn't have entered into the Nepal govt.
India wishes all its neighbors to be successful, strong, and sovereign. If India meant ill-well, it could have made their life a living hell be it BD land, Nepal, Burma, SL or even Pakisthan. The neighbors do understand this. Unfortunately they are too week to stand against foreign influence be it US or UK or PRC.
Unfortunately what these neighbors don't see in India is a sense of purpose, confidence, cohession, and decisivenss that they see in the other world powers eventhough they see the capability in India. That makes them confused and doubt India's intensions (incorrectly).
What Brihaspati-ji saying is, if I understood it correctly, make India to be a strong, assertive, and capable alternative to those powers so the neighbors are part of a more natural federation, allowing them to care for their citizens and prosper.
Last edited by RamaY on 28 May 2009 19:18, edited 1 time in total.
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 12410
- Joined: 19 Nov 2008 03:25
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Rudradevji,
in expanding, we also expand that "captive" market, with lucrative promise of "dhimmitude" spread over greater areas. Imagine the attraction of not having to deal with a "big" Chinese economy but a much smaller one. Shouldn't we stop discussing this particular line here?
in expanding, we also expand that "captive" market, with lucrative promise of "dhimmitude" spread over greater areas. Imagine the attraction of not having to deal with a "big" Chinese economy but a much smaller one. Shouldn't we stop discussing this particular line here?

Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
You know Roy - I sometimes think that Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka behave like Indian states who have not accepted the Indian constitution, but somehow want part of the union with some special favors for themselves. Obviously they cannot "break away" physically, and they remain culturally and economically tied to India.SRoy wrote:Why India doesn't have any ally in the region?samuel wrote:And Why is India unable to maintain a secure and friendly neighborhood?
Of these Pakistan in particular has done its best to identify groups within India whom they say feel just like they (i.e Pakistanis) do and want to break away from India because they are not getting the special favors that they should.
To an extent, the behaviour of the 4 states - let me call them - SLPBN - reflects the dilemmas faced by Indian leaders in the late 1940s and early 1950s in cobbling together a set of rules which would give each Indian state/region equal rights and yet keep them together under a common federation. Defence and foreign policy rightly became issues of the federation (center) not state issues.
For whatever reason (and against a whole lot of doomsday predictors) this so called "cobbling together" has worked. We have spent a lot of time trying to say why it has worked and one of the reasons that has been put forward is that there is an innate sense of nation. Fine. It is not my purpose to argue with that. All I am saying is that we currently have a "nation" that excludes SLPBN who are natural, cultural and geographical allies, but are not "allies" in the sense of military-diplomatic ties (foreign policy-defence). These 4 nations represent the "old India" of monarchic states where the monarch, for his personal interest in controlling his domain made alliances with distant powers.
Your question can be asked in a non India centric way. Why do Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal (SLPBN) NOT have India as an ally in the region?
What do each of these nations expect from India in order to form an alliance? All these nations actually do suffer from lack of such an alliance. India is powerfully placed to spoil any party they may have, and if India goes haywire - every one of these countries will fell the brunt in a way that they will not be able to handle. They know that. Their survival is dependent on Indian stability, but yet Indian stability and progress is seen by some of their leadership cadre as a threat. I suspect that their populations do not necessarily see India as a threat (except Pakistan)
In the case of Pakistan - the demands were set out by Jinnah and the Muslim league. That demand was so alien and destructive to the process of unification that post-Independence India sought was not compatible at all with the Pakistan demand.
So we can break up the question into what it would take for India to ally with the country in question (or for the country in question to ally with India)
1) Pakistan: The demand for Islam and Muslim to have a "special place" and special voting rights in a union is totally incompatible with BOTH a "secular" viewpoint and an "Indic/Hindutva/Nationalist" viewpoint. There is no way Pakistan can be an ally without putting the Islam/Muslim question in its place - i.e no special favors on the basis of Islam.
2) Bangladesh: same as Pakistan, but Bangladesh has acquired some cohesion on the "Bengali nationalism" platform. Bengali nationalism at its core has the Bengali language and culture with powerful Indic routes at its core. Islamic exclusivism is the spoiler. Bangladesh can become an ally - but I will not bother fleshing out the details in this post. Only love will not suffice. Coercion will be required IMO
3) Nepal despite Nepali independence - Indian roots run deep. The ending of Nepal's monarchy did not come because Nepalese saw Ireland or Norway as examples. It was Indian democarcy that sowed the seeds of democracy in Nepal. Nepal's elite power base - be they commies or kings are overwhelmed by the sheer dominance of India. Whether india wants to show benign dominance or militant dominance is a debatable point. India has chosen to show only benign dominance so far - although continuously accused of showing militant dominance. Maybe militant dominance by Indai is what they will need to see before they learn how lucky they are.
4) Sri Lanka- SL is somewhat similar to Nepal. India has only shown benign dominance because of its presence and clout. Maybe Sri Lanka will need to see military dominance if they take foreign alliances too far.
Last but not the least - for India to dominate and do well, internal fissures need to be reduced. They are not gone yet. "nationalism" at a subcontinental level will always play second fiddle to local needs and aspirations. Either the latter have to be suppressed ruthlessly or handled with kid gloves and settled. If that is done - India will dominate the world enough to be taken as a serious threat by everyone else. We are different enough and have enough original thought in our culture to create social dissension and a therat to current forms of leadership in faraway countries - even in the west, let alone Chicoms. In fact Chinese/Western interference in SLPBN is an indicator of just that anxiety
But ignoring factors that damage nationalism from within is not an option for indians. Nationalism cannot be taken for granted and misused by the controllers of India.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Let me post an additional data point.
brihaspati has suggested a model in India that describes a particular elite set of "controllers" in power in India.
If you look at SLBPN (Sri Lanka Bangdesh, Pak, Nepal) - each of these nations has evolved its own set of "elite controllers".
The elite controllers of these countries see an existential threat from the elite controllers of a united, strong India. Even a weak, disunited India is a big threat to the elite controllers of SLBPN. A coherent, strong India is something that will force them to choose between being dominated or cooperating.
One suggestion that I have tried to make is that by increasing Indian internal unity and internal cohesion - by addressing the most important causes of disunity and dissatisfaction - India will become too united and too powerful for the pipsqueaks of the region to do anything but choose to bandwagon with. This may sound like a threat - but I think the elite leadership of SLBPN need to stop buggering about and accept where the cultural pivot of the region lies. That will come if Indians play their cards right.
But when the "commons" of India are up in arms against the elite controllers of India, it provides ammunition for outside powers (elite controllers of outside powers) to oppose India's elite controllers and pretend to support India's commons. Pakistan's game (the game of the Paki elite controllers)was to suggest that India's elite controllers are the "Brahmin-Bania nexus" who needed to be opposed by giving support to India's "commons" as per Paki definition - i.e. Muslims and Dalits and other assorted groups like Sikhs and "Tamils"
brihaspati has suggested a model in India that describes a particular elite set of "controllers" in power in India.
If you look at SLBPN (Sri Lanka Bangdesh, Pak, Nepal) - each of these nations has evolved its own set of "elite controllers".
The elite controllers of these countries see an existential threat from the elite controllers of a united, strong India. Even a weak, disunited India is a big threat to the elite controllers of SLBPN. A coherent, strong India is something that will force them to choose between being dominated or cooperating.
One suggestion that I have tried to make is that by increasing Indian internal unity and internal cohesion - by addressing the most important causes of disunity and dissatisfaction - India will become too united and too powerful for the pipsqueaks of the region to do anything but choose to bandwagon with. This may sound like a threat - but I think the elite leadership of SLBPN need to stop buggering about and accept where the cultural pivot of the region lies. That will come if Indians play their cards right.
But when the "commons" of India are up in arms against the elite controllers of India, it provides ammunition for outside powers (elite controllers of outside powers) to oppose India's elite controllers and pretend to support India's commons. Pakistan's game (the game of the Paki elite controllers)was to suggest that India's elite controllers are the "Brahmin-Bania nexus" who needed to be opposed by giving support to India's "commons" as per Paki definition - i.e. Muslims and Dalits and other assorted groups like Sikhs and "Tamils"
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Re the Psy-Ops and media watch thread. It is one of the most useful threads on BRF.
Should it not be in the Strategic Issues forum, as it originally was? After all, as the saying goes "By way of deception shalt thou do war".
Now, it appear to have been moved to the General Discussions forum, and that forum itself appears and disappears erratically in the Discussion forums index: http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewforum.php?f=20
Will one of the Adminullahs shed light on what is going on with respect to that thread?
Should it not be in the Strategic Issues forum, as it originally was? After all, as the saying goes "By way of deception shalt thou do war".
Now, it appear to have been moved to the General Discussions forum, and that forum itself appears and disappears erratically in the Discussion forums index: http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewforum.php?f=20
Will one of the Adminullahs shed light on what is going on with respect to that thread?
Last edited by Pranav on 28 May 2009 08:55, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
shiv wrote:Let me post an additional data point.
brihaspati has suggested a model in India that describes a particular elite set of "controllers" in power in India.
If you look at SLBPN (Sri Lanka Bangdesh, Pak, Nepal) - each of these nations has evolved its own set of "elite controllers".
The elite controllers of these countries see an existential threat from the elite controllers of a united, strong India. Even a weak, disunited India is a big threat to the elite controllers of SLBPN. A coherent, strong India is something that will force them to choose between being dominated or cooperating.
Shiv,
What makes you say the above ?
Why do the elite controllers in SLBPN not see an existential threat from China, for instance, which is far more militant, opportunistic, ruthless and powerful..........able and willing to dominate.....
Why dont they feel an existential threat from Uncle or to a lesser extent Russia.....but particularly the US......who maybe less so than China.....due to distance etc.......but certainly willing and able to dominate.....even culturally......??
Why only India ??
Whats wrong with the idea that India is just that weak school master who cannot control the class. Therefore, kids hurl chaulk at him, yell and scream, come and go.......basically create chaos in the classroom. A firmer teacher not only is able to discipline, but also commands more respect from his class and also is able to teach better.......
You and I can agree that India is a weak school master because of lack of internal cohesion and internal weakness, in general.
Last edited by raji on 28 May 2009 08:56, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Internal cohesion slowed down by Commie, Pinkoes and islamists thus being impediment to India's march toward strength . Sad part is we have too many of these mentally slaved weaklings. Good thing is beginning of their end has already benn started.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Quite right.Prem wrote:Internal cohesion slowed down by Commie, Pinkoes and islamists thus being impediment to India's march toward strength . Sad part is we have too many of these mentally slaved weaklings. Good thing is beginning of their end has already benn started.
These commie, pinkos, islamists and if you add......ignorant, softies and hypocrites (all of them criminals).....get 99.99% of the vote. Mr. Rahul Mehta got 6000 and we all think he has conqured Everest......because for a good man to get 6000 in India is more difficult than for a blind man to climb Everest.......
Why ??
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
OK the reason why I said that is hidden in my first post. The opinion in the second post (of mine) is rooted in the following impression stated in the first post:raji wrote:
Why do the elite controllers in SLBPN not see an existential threat from China, for instance, which is far more militant, opportunistic, ruthless and powerful..........able and willing to dominate.....
Why dont they feel an existential threat from Uncle or to a lesser extent Russia.....but particularly the US......who maybe less so than China.....due to distance etc.......but certainly willing and able to dominate.....even culturally......??
Why only India ??
Whats wrong with the idea that India is just that weak school master who cannot control the class. Therefore, kids hurl chaulk at him, yell and scream, come and go.......basically create chaos in the classroom. A firmer teacher not only is able to discipline, but also commands more respect from his class and also is able to teach better.......
You and I can agree that India is a weak school master because of lack of internal cohesion and internal weakness, in general.
I agree with your point that India is a weak schoolmaster because of a host of internal dissensions. That allows the elite of SLBPN to make alliances with "others" (US/China etc) and get away with it because the opposition of the SLBPN elite to the "weak (but nevertheless threatening to them) Indian elite" is exactly in line with the US/China need to keep India in check (as it will be a threat to their dominance).I sometimes think that Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka behave like Indian states who have not accepted the Indian constitution, but somehow want part of the union with some special favors for themselves. Obviously they cannot "break away" physically, and they remain culturally and economically tied to India.
In theory India can do a China. By "doing a China" I mean ruthless suppression of all internal dissent by a ruling elite in favor of geopolitical dominance. What would India look like if it did that? Let me answer that. India would look like Pakistan it the Indian elite tried to ruthlessly suppress internal fissures in favor of geopolitical games.
Why will India not look like China if India "does a China"?
That is because India does not have the uniformity of the Han people and language that China had, and India has not (yet) had a Mao who will ruthlessly kill off the old elite to replace them with a new elite.
So India does not look like or behave like China, and India looks like but does not behave like Pakistan.
So does India behave like the US? Not at all. The US is the most efficient and "best" of all these countries. Internal dissent in the US has been satisfactorily resolved and average wealth and satisfaction with leadership is high enough for the US to be unconcerned about Internal fissures. They really can play external games in other people's soil.
India behaves like India - a weak schoolmaster with internal dissension and external enemies. SLBPN are a variant of "internal dissension" where countries that are socio-culturally Indian (SLBPN) are opposing India whose elite are too weak from internal fissures to set those nations right - leave alone countries outside the region.
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Also, in deference to forum adminstrators wishes, I will refrain from using the word "corruption" again in this thread. I will instead use the more benign sounding, less controversial and more acceptable phrase........"internal weakness and lack of internal cohesion" to describe the state of affairs in India today......
The administrators are very wise......I have come to appreciate their profound thinking on this matter......
The administrators are very wise......I have come to appreciate their profound thinking on this matter......
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
So, am I correct in understanding that you are saying:shiv wrote:OK the reason why I said that is hidden in my first post. The opinion in the second post (of mine) is rooted in the following impression stated in the first post:raji wrote:
Why do the elite controllers in SLBPN not see an existential threat from China, for instance, which is far more militant, opportunistic, ruthless and powerful..........able and willing to dominate.....
Why dont they feel an existential threat from Uncle or to a lesser extent Russia.....but particularly the US......who maybe less so than China.....due to distance etc.......but certainly willing and able to dominate.....even culturally......??
Why only India ??
Whats wrong with the idea that India is just that weak school master who cannot control the class. Therefore, kids hurl chaulk at him, yell and scream, come and go.......basically create chaos in the classroom. A firmer teacher not only is able to discipline, but also commands more respect from his class and also is able to teach better.......
You and I can agree that India is a weak school master because of lack of internal cohesion and internal weakness, in general.
I agree with your point that India is a weak schoolmaster because of a host of internal dissensions. That allows the elite of SLBPN to make alliances with "others" (US/China etc) and get away with it because the opposition of the SLBPN elite to the "weak (but nevertheless threatening to them) Indian elite" is exactly in line with the US/China need to keep India in check (as it will be a threat to their dominance).I sometimes think that Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka behave like Indian states who have not accepted the Indian constitution, but somehow want part of the union with some special favors for themselves. Obviously they cannot "break away" physically, and they remain culturally and economically tied to India.
In theory India can do a China. By "doing a China" I mean ruthless suppression of all internal dissent by a ruling elite in favor of geopolitical dominance. What would India look like if it did that? Let me answer that. India would look like Pakistan it the Indian elite tried to ruthlessly suppress internal fissures in favor of geopolitical games.
Why will India not look like China if India "does a China"?
That is because India does not have the uniformity of the Han people and language that China had, and India has not (yet) had a Mao who will ruthlessly kill off the old elite to replace them with a new elite.
So India does not look like or behave like China, and India looks like but does not behave like Pakistan.
So does India behave like the US? Not at all. The US is the most efficient and "best" of all these countries. Internal dissent in the US has been satisfactorily resolved and average wealth and satisfaction with leadership is high enough for the US to be unconcerned about Internal fissures. They rally can play external games in other people's soil.
India behaves like India - a weak schoolmaster with internal dissension and external enemies. SLBPN are a variant of "internal dissension" where countries that are socio-culturally Indian (SLBPN) are opposing India whose elite are too weak from internal fissures to set those nations right - leave alone countries outside the region.
1) Not desirable to do a "China"........which is the suppression of internal dissent model...
2) Not desirable to do an "India"......which is the magnifying of internal dissent model.....
3) Desirable to do, dare I say......a "US".........only to the extent where we resolve internal dissent satisfactorily and play far away from home
If you are saying the above, I would agree.......not only would I agree, I think it is a pre-requisite to get over the existential crisis that India finds itself at present......
I apologise, because I have now opened you up for stone throwing by people crying "Macaulyite", "Dimi", "Western Stooge", "blind to internal strife in the US"....."blind to inner city crime"........."blind to legalized brothels in Nevada", "blind to one time existence of smog in LA".....etc
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
We are in agreement.raji wrote:
So, am I correct in understanding that you are saying:
1) Not desirable to do a "China"........which is the suppression of internal dissent model...
2) Not desirable to do an "India"......which is the magnifying of internal dissent model.....
3) Desirable to do, dare I say......a "US".........only to the extent where we resolve internal dissent satisfactorily and play far away from home
If you are saying the above, I would agree.......not only would I agree, I think it is a pre-requisite to get over the existential crisis that India finds itself at present......
100%
Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent
Great then.shiv wrote:We are in agreement.raji wrote:
So, am I correct in understanding that you are saying:
1) Not desirable to do a "China"........which is the suppression of internal dissent model...
2) Not desirable to do an "India"......which is the magnifying of internal dissent model.....
3) Desirable to do, dare I say......a "US".........only to the extent where we resolve internal dissent satisfactorily and play far away from home
If you are saying the above, I would agree.......not only would I agree, I think it is a pre-requisite to get over the existential crisis that India finds itself at present......
100%
Now we have arrived at a distinct topic for a new thread............."how to satisfactorily resolve internal dissent in India".....
I know......I know.......you will start a new thread with the topic of your choice........at the time of your choice.....on a date of your choice........with the words of your choice........
I knew that..........