Suggestions on Indian Army's Reorganisation

[RayC]

I have observed many with interesting ideas as to what the IA should have or should not have. Also how the IA should be regorganised including its manpower etc.

Could we have some ideas? Of course, it would mean that the rationale for the suggestion is also appended.

Confine it to the Indian ARMY alone! Not IN or IAF,

[KiranM]

My 2 cents.

IMHO in addition to the 8 cold start battle groups, in the next 15-20 years India needs:
1) 2 Ind Parachute Brigades with the ability to deploy 1 en masse.
2) 1 Amphibious Assault Brigade with the ability to deploy en masse.
3) Split the Strike Corps into 6 task forces (3 x 2). Each about 2 divisions size. This makes it smaller yet still packs serious punch. To be tasked with consolidating and expanding the gains made by the smaller battlegroups.
4) Raise 1 Mountain Division, in addition to the 2 being raised now. Impart all 3 limited Heli Borne capability (Note: I am saying turning them Air Assault capable. Doesnt mean they have the required number of helicopters to deploy.)

[SivaVijay]

For China, we need mountain div supported by air cav type(with GPS,datalinks) units and also light, mobile(not necessarily SP) artillery that can be airlifted and towed under helis.

For paki, we need brigades based on armored vehicles like stryker and which are divided into squads with diff vehicle configuration(IFV,APC,Mobilegun platform in a squad).The units should be integrated so that they can pool resouces at brigade level or split and take position as squads.

The army aviation corps should command attack helis and tactical airlift(C-130s and we need more of this).

[Surya]

Would prefer more focus on having integrated EW units (highly portable) with combat units rather than attach as support unit.

[sum]

IMHO in addition to the 8 cold start battle groups, in the next 15-20 years India needs:
1) 2 Ind Parachute Brigades with the ability to deploy 1 en masse.
2) 1 Amphibious Assault Brigade with the ability to deploy en masse.

Noob question but don't we already have a Ind Parahute Brigade?

[KiranM]

IMHO in addition to the 8 cold start battle groups, in the next 15-20 years India needs:
1) 2 Ind Parachute Brigades with the ability to deploy 1 en masse.
2) 1 Amphibious Assault Brigade with the ability to deploy en masse.

Noob question but don't we already have a Ind Parahute Brigade?

We did have and we still do I think (not sure because many Para battalions have been turned into SF).
But I dont think we have the assets to deply a whole brigade together (I may be wrong). I would also like a 2nd brigade to serve as a reserve (attrition reserve or otherwise) when the 1st one is deployed.
Both these brigades should have deployable armour and artillery elements in strength. Also other assets giving it a more or less combined arms character.

[VKumar]

First of all we should define what are our objectives in 5 years; 10 years; 20 years; and then calculate the strength required keeping in mind the possible hurdle (enemies) and their capabilities in the same time frame. Objectives could be defined on reasonable basis and achievable basis(economy and political will) or 'THE SKY'S THE LIMIT' basis i.e. desirable or even more than desirable.

So first of all a threat evaluation over the time frame (maybe SWOT).

For example - what will be state of economy in the time frame? what are the assumptions these estimates of economic growth based on? Are these reasonable?

Alongwith this economy what will be the political character of the Nation's leaders?

I don't think we have any interest in bullying others but we must create the impression that nobody can even dare to bully us.

So, from these basic principles, we can then go on to estimate the strength of the armed forces and internal as well as foreign (diplomatic) strengths required.

Hope this helps.

[KiranM]

My 2 cents.

IMHO in addition to the 8 cold start battle groups, in the next 15-20 years India needs:
1) 2 Ind Parachute Brigades with the ability to deploy 1 en masse.
2) 1 Amphibious Assault Brigade with the ability to deploy en masse.
3) Split the Strike Corps into 6 task forces (3 x 2). Each about 2 divisions size. This makes it smaller yet still packs serious punch. To be tasked with consolidating and expanding the gains made by the smaller battlegroups.
4) Raise 1 Mountain Division, in addition to the 2 being raised now. Impart all 3 limited Heli Borne capability (Note: I am saying turning them Air Assault capable. Doesnt mean they have the required number of helicopters to deploy.)

Correction: I realise now 3 Corps cannot be distributed into 6 task forces of 2 div strength each.
3 Strike Corps converted into 4 smaller task forces sounds about right.

[rohitvats]

To KiranM and other who are thinking on the lines of reorganizing the Strike Corps, do keep in mind the present ORBAT of these formations and the associated limitations wjen you split'em up. The ORBAT of a typical Strike Corps is as follows:

1. Armored Divisions - each has one and constitutes the main punch. The 'Mailed Fist' of the IA.
2. RAPID Division - Partially mechanized divisions of the IA. Has one Mechanized Bde (2*Armored+2*Mechanized Regimets) plus the two standard Infantry Bdes.
3. Infantry Division - Each of the Strike Corps has one plain vanilla Infantry Division.

In addition, each has an assortment of Independent Infantry/Mechanized/Armored Brigades. Infact, we may be th only army which does not have the mechanized division in its ORBAT. We somehow seem to be uncomfortable with the concept. For example, the 33rd Armored Division started as a Mechanized Division and then got converted to an Armored one. Even PA has Mechanized Divisions as part of ORBAT of its ARN/ARS woith M-113 APCs

So you have a situation where the Strike Corps cannot move as one homogenous entity as each element has its own ability to move with Armored Division in the front. So you simply cannot break/re organize the Strike Corps into battle groups/task forces

Of the three holding Corps on Western front (10,11,12), X Corps has two RAPID Divisions under its ORBAT with along with Indp Armored and Mechanized Bdes gives it good strike potential. Add to it the fact that IA has very high no of Indp Armored Bdes which if amalgamated can yeild around 3 Armored Divisions minimum. Yes, these Indp Bdes provide limited offensive ability to the Corps they are assigned to but we need to take call where we need to consolidate resources into a punch. For example, 16 Corps used to have 3 independent armored bdes under its command. These bdes combined would yeild 9 Armored Regiments and 3 Mechanized Regimets.

So, do look into the resources as a whole and then accordingly apply the re organization mantra. And also, do remember, we sure have inadequate number of Armored Regimets/Divisions given size of IA and commitments.

[ParGha]

IMHO in addition to the 8 cold start battle groups, in the next 15-20 years India needs:
1) 2 Ind Parachute Brigades with the ability to deploy 1 en masse.
2) 1 Amphibious Assault Brigade with the ability to deploy en masse.

Noob question but don't we already have a Ind Parahute Brigade?

The Indian 50th Independent Infantry Brigade (Para).

We did have and we still do I think (not sure because many Para battalions have been turned into SF). But I dont think we have the assets to deply a whole brigade together (I may be wrong). I would also like a 2nd brigade to serve as a reserve (attrition reserve or otherwise) when the 1st one is deployed. Both these brigades should have deployable armour and artillery elements in strength. Also other assets giving it a more or less combined arms character.

IIRC the 50th IIB (Para) had its own artillery, ATGM (Guards), engineers and field-ambulance units. Normally they don't have organic armor, but if the PBGC is ever sent on active service they will be assigned to this brigade and they may bring some light armor if necessary (or maybe not).

[Tanaji]

Every batallion should have a civilian representative , one that has direct access to Chief Secretaries of all State governments. His sole mandate would be to give priority attention and for the civilian administration using his clout/access to expedite the various issues that a common jawan faces such as land disputes, registration of property, getting seats for children in relevant institutions etc. etc. By an act of parliament/ordinance similar to RTI, civilian administration should be forced to respond to an issue within a specified interval of time or face consequences.

IMHO, the above measure alone will improve the morale and spirit of the troops on a scale comparable to a pay raise.

[Surya]

Before we look at expansion, numbers etc. lets look to the organic quality of what we have.

Can we take a hit on information warfare?

how integrated is our EW components?

This is an area the Chinese have practiced a lot including man portable disruption tactics etc. This is worrying and we still think of this as an support arm.

all the guns and tanks will come to nought if we are not cued in to the electronic spectrum.

Likewise first lets get ample number of arty for what we have before we expand more

[KiranM]

To KiranM and other who are thinking on the lines of reorganizing the Strike Corps, do keep in mind the present ORBAT of these formations and the associated limitations wjen you split'em up. The ORBAT of a typical Strike Corps is as follows:

1. Armored Divisions - each has one and constitutes the main punch. The 'Mailed Fist' of the IA.
2. RAPID Division - Partially mechanized divisions of the IA. Has one Mechanized Bde (2*Armored+2*Mechanized Regimets) plus the two standard Infantry Bdes.
3. Infantry Division - Each of the Strike Corps has one plain vanilla Infantry Division.

In addition, each has an assortment of Independent Infantry/Mechanized/Armored Brigades. Infact, we may be th only army which does not have the mechanized division in its ORBAT. We somehow seem to be uncomfortable with the concept. For example, the 33rd Armored Division started as a Mechanized Division and then got converted to an Armored one. Even PA has Mechanized Divisions as part of ORBAT of its ARN/ARS woith M-113 APCs

So you have a situation where the Strike Corps cannot move as one homogenous entity as each element has its own ability to move with Armored Division in the front. So you simply cannot break/re organize the Strike Corps into battle groups/task forces

Of the three holding Corps on Western front (10,11,12), X Corps has two RAPID Divisions under its ORBAT with along with Indp Armored and Mechanized Bdes gives it good strike potential. Add to it the fact that IA has very high no of Indp Armored Bdes which if amalgamated can yeild around 3 Armored Divisions minimum. Yes, these Indp Bdes provide limited offensive ability to the Corps they are assigned to but we need to take call where we need to consolidate resources into a punch. For example, 16 Corps used to have 3 independent armored bdes under its command. These bdes combined would yeild 9 Armored Regiments and 3 Mechanized Regimets.

So, do look into the resources as a whole and then accordingly apply the re organization mantra. And also, do remember, we sure have inadequate number of Armored Regimets/Divisions given size of IA and commitments.

Rohit, I am aware of such limitations, hence my 2nd post on the same to bring down the number to 4.
To expand on my thoughts here are few of my assumptions over the next 20 years:
1) Mechanization of RAPID will increase.
2) Assets for the Independent Battle Groups will be from the assorted Indep Brigades you talk about, and not from Strike Corps Divs.

The smaller task force is to hold - 1 Armoured Division and 1 RAPID like Infantry Division (atleast 70% mechanized). This removes the vanilla Infantry Division from each of the Strike Corps, and reassigned to Holding Corps/ Indep Brigades.
We have 3 task forces from existing Strike Corps. I am falling short of an Armoured Division and RAPID For the 4 task force.

I know it is not as easy as it sounds, it is not easy as distributing milk between 4 bottles. But can't we scrounge for the Armoured Division and RAPID from the Indep Brigades?

On a side note, any particular reason for our discomfort with a Mechanized Division?

Also, a slightly OT but related question. How many helicopter assets does it take to deploy and sustain a Light Infantry Brigade just forward of FEBA?

Thanks in advance.

Regards,
Kiran

[KiranM]

We did have and we still do I think (not sure because many Para battalions have been turned into SF). But I dont think we have the assets to deply a whole brigade together (I may be wrong). I would also like a 2nd brigade to serve as a reserve (attrition reserve or otherwise) when the 1st one is deployed. Both these brigades should have deployable armour and artillery elements in strength. Also other assets giving it a more or less combined arms character.

IIRC the 50th IIB (Para) had its own artillery, ATGM (Guards), engineers and field-ambulance units. Normally they don't have organic armor, but if the PBGC is ever sent on active service they will be assigned to this brigade and they may bring some light armor if necessary (or maybe not).

What about organic anti-air?

Not having dedicated IFV type assets makes sense when currently we do not have the capability to deply a brigade sized force. But IMHO it will be desirable when we do so.

In 1971 we deployed a whole battalion. But how much of a force can we para deploy now?

Thanks in advance.

Regards,
Kiran

[satya]

B4 going any further can we first clarify : What are the objectives that we want IA to achieve ?

Without knowing it clearly , i guess its pretty much guess work .

[ParGha]

IIRC the 50th IIB (Para) had its own artillery, ATGM (Guards), engineers and field-ambulance units. Normally they don't have organic armor, but if the PBGC is ever sent on active service they will be assigned to this brigade and they may bring some light armor if necessary (or maybe not).

What about organic anti-air? Not having dedicated IFV type assets makes sense when currently we do not have the capability to deply a brigade sized force. But IMHO it will be desirable when we do so. In 1971 we deployed a whole battalion. But how much of a force can we para deploy now?

In 1971 the 2nd Para battalion-group supposedly went in with an ADS detachmentl, so the brigade may have them as well. But I am not familiar with the particulars. Other historic detachments which airborne affiliations are somewhat better known (ex. 9th (Para) Field Artillery, 60th Field Ambulance, Bombay Sappers' Para detachment etc.). Not having or having light armor is the Army's call, but if it did the source would most likely be the PBGC.

[rohitvats]

The 50(I) Para Bde has organic AD assets in form of MANPADS manned by Para qualified AD Arty personnel

[RayC]

Interesting observations and comments.

The issue is how are these to be employed and in what scenarios.

Let us say, we have to start a war (the reasons are not being discussed), how will these increments be used?

[KiranM]

First I have to admit that I hardly have much idea of tactics/ operational art. What I have stated below is what I could hypothesize in my rustic mind.

Scenario painting for the pruned Strike Forces (2 Div + strength) when India initiates hostilities,

1) India declares war on Pakistan

2) On declaration of war, few elements from assorted Indep Brigades of Holding Corps attacks at many points along International Border and LOC. More like pin pricks, fixing the enemy forces in various theatres, wresting the initiative depending on the lay of ground, etc.

Simultaneously the Holding Corps assets bolster the defensive lines. Incursion will be few km deep.

3) Within 2-3 days of declaration of hostilities, India attacks at 5 different sectors along IB and LOC using a Battle Group (1 Div + strength) each. The earlier pin pricks kept the enemy confused where the actual assault will take place.

5) 4-5 days, the battlegroups make progress anywhere between 20 - 50 km inwards. Diplomatic pressure mounting on both sides for ceasefire. India and Pak 'influenced' to negotiate. Meanwhile, pruned Strike Force (2 Div + strength) mobilize and move to staging areas.

6) While negotiations are being planned, PA decides to mount a counter attack to either wrest back territory captured by India, or capture Indian territory to use as bargain chip.

7) On the day of counter attack by PA, 2 of the Strike Forces let loose through the gaps created by Battle Groups. Over the next few days, they envelop the attacking force in a pincer.

Scenario painting for Strike Forces in a defensive mode and scenarios for amphibious and Para Brigades will take some time. I need to smoothen the rough edges.

[SivaVijay]

On the day of counter attack by PA, 2 of the Strike Forces let loose through the gaps created by Battle Groups. Over the next few days, they envelop the attacking force in a pincer.

How will we know where PA will counter attack (beyond doubt) to move our strike elements?

[RayC]

Let's look at it this way.

The Cold Start was conceived more as a defensive measure to negate Pakistan's advantage of having the intiative when starting a war. They usually start the war.

India, thus, has to defend and wrest the initiative from them.

Having done so, India should also send the shivers down their spine without breaking it (since that would open up a nuclear war).

So,

1. What should be the regorg in the Corps and Divisions.

2. What should be the organisation and weaponry of the elements which comprise of these Divisions and Corps.

Do also take into account that Pakistan has the capabilty of releasing irregulars like the Taliban, who are but actuallly an extension of their Army.

[Anoop]

Ray sahab,

In my view, IA has to have the following capabilities:

1. Win a war against Pakistan without crossing the nuclear threshold. For now, the Cold Start doctrine applies.

2. Defend against Chinese aggression.

3. Be able to aid friendly countries by deploying at least a Bde worth of troops overseas, either alone or as part of a coalition.

4. Maintain at least current levels of internal security duties.

This means that re-organization will have to be Command specific, with Western and Southwestern and Central Commands being the most affected.

The political goal of a war with Pakistan will be to inflict a visible defeat of the Pak conventional forces and force them to negotiate from a position of weakness. The word visible is meant for Indian, Pakistani and the world audience – there should be no room for Pak to claim a stalemate. Concessions extracted after a cease-fire would be realignment of LoC to plug infiltration passes and creation of a DMZ 50 km wide (say) along IB, with 40 km on Pak side and 10 km on our side of the IB.

Going with your explanation of the Cold Start doctrine, I envisage the following events:

1. In the first 2-3 days, IBGs make 5 or 6 shallow (10 km) bridgeheads along IB in Southern Punjab and Rajasthan sectors.
2. In 4-5 days, Pak ARN and ARS movements detected and contact made by own IBG and Holding Corps along 2 or 3 routes around 50 km inside Pak territory.
3. In 6-7 days, battle of attrition between IAF and own Strike Corps and Pak ARN and ARS. By now, IAF should have established air superiority, allowing the use of close air support.

For this to happen, I would like the following features in the re-organization.

1. The purpose is two-fold – (i) to provide high mobility and survivability to IBGs for the initial shallow thrusts and (ii) to disguise the movement of the two Strike Corps for the final phase of the battle.
2. The 8 IBGs to be constituted from current Independent Brigades and elements of two Strike Corps. These elements would be UAV assets, Engg. detachments, AAD regiments and some area saturation weapons like MLRBs. IBGs retain organic assets of Indp Bdes. The initial phase of battle will require large scale mine-clearing, river crossing, desert track laying and digging in for consolidation, hence the large Engg. detachments and AAD regiments.

3. Two Pivot Corps get additional armor regiments from the Strike Corps to exploit the gains of the IBGs quickly.

4. Each Strike Corps retain 2 Armd Bdes, helos and missile regiments and infantry & arty assets that a depleted Holding Corps would. The Strike Corps get re-constituted from the IBGs and Pivot Corp elements along the 2 or 3 promising axes of attack, even though some attrition has happened.

5. Extra forward ammunition dumps and POL depots (hardened) in peace-time locations to be the responsibility of the Pivot Corps. This is to reduce logistical tail for the final phase of the battle.

6. The supply chain must now cater not for a deep thrust, but for several shallow thrusts along the front. So they must be able to switch from one axes to another in relatively short time. That means better containerization for less transfer time at holding depots and quick usage in the field. The initial mobile phase of the war (2-3 days) will see intense fuel and ammo usage, more so than food and water, so perhaps a restructuring of supplies so that food and water replenishments come up in the second phase?

Equipment wise, I would like to see the following:

1. More UAV assets for real-time information. Better communication network across echelons and electronic warfare capabilities.
2. Accurate and detailed maps of Pak territory obtained in peacetime by high resolution satellite.
3. More attack and medium-lift transport helicopters.
4. More MLRB regiments for saturation attacks. Definitely more tube artillery and WLRs.
5. More short and medium range SSMs for use against airfields and high value targets.
6. Night-fighting capability – whatever that calls for. The tempo of operations will require that at a minimum.

Please offer your comments and critiques.

Thank you
Anoop

[RayC]

Anoop,

Good to see you after quite sometime.

The analysis is rather professional.

I would suggest status quo with the Strike Corps and reorganise the Pivots.

[ParGha]

-self-deleted-

[Sanku]

From another perspective on reorg -- I have the following suggestion to make -- we need to increase the effectiveness of manpower of IA -- by effectiveness of manpower I do not mean the intake quality alone necessarily -- but overall ability.

For a concept like IBG, cold start and a mixed mode warfare where everything from irregulars to air assets will be thrown at our men -- we need our men to be have "broad" abilities.

Each infantry/artillery/engineer man can be cross trained on a large section of weapons (even if not specialists) such as MANPADs, mine clearing, using mortars and UBGL and primary fire arms more effectively (for artillery and engineers) -- the essential idea being that any group and if needed have high degree of survivability on its own and can lend a hand. (note I am not asking for specialization to be diluted necessarily)

A high degree of "book" knowledge and technical training can also be imparted.

[HariC]

In 1971 the 2nd Para battalion-group supposedly went in with an ADS detachmentl

ADS = Air Defence? I wonder why? Wasnt the PAF done with by then?

[Rahul M]

http://livefist.blogspot.com/2009/06/se ... ndias.html

A seminar on modernisation of India's infantry was held on May 25 by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies in Delhi. Here's a brief list of some of the immediate recommendations that were drawn up after the seminar:

*
An infantry battalion or individual should preferably be rotated between two different or three near congruous terrain profiles only.
*
A project to reduce weight of the present medium machine gun, automatic grenade launcher, and anti-material rifle by at least 6-8 kgs should be undertaken.
*
Replacement of the existing Hand Grenade No 36 should be expedited with the introduction of a variety of grenades to meet all requirements.
*
81 mm Mortars should be made lighter and possibly based on tracked carriers and their range should be not less than 7,000 metres.
*
A man-portable unmanned aerial vehicle troop (four-six aerial vehicles) should be authorised to the intelligence and surveillance platoon of infantry battalion. This would enhance the infantry battalion’s area of influence.
*
The ‘bayonet strength’ of a rifle section should be preserved. In a single section, there should at least be 6-7 persons available for launching an assault on the enemy.
*
Custom-built obstacle crossing expedients should be made available to infantry for negotiating water obstacles as well as mine fields.
*
Infantry company ‘F’ echelon should be based on two 1.5 ton capacity low silhouette vehicles.
*
Ghatak platoons should be trained for helicopter-borne operations and provided with light strike vehicles.

[Jagan]

Infantry company ‘F’ echelon should be based on two 1.5 ton capacity low silhouette vehicles.

whats an F echelon?

[Anoop]

I think F echelon is the forward (company in this case) in battle.

Ray sahab,

As per your suggestion, with the Strike Corps retaining it's formations, how does one hasten and disguise its deployment? Any pointers to public domain information on movement times etc? I read in Brig. Sawhney's book "Logistics" that an infantry battalion can move out from camp in 2 hours. Any such rules of thumb for larger formations like Bdes and Divs?

[RayC]

Infantry company ‘F’ echelon should be based on two 1.5 ton capacity low silhouette vehicles.

whats an F echelon?

The transport in an Infantry battalion is divided into three echelons.

F ech is the Immediate replenishment vehicles.

A ech carries the 2nd line ammunition.

B ech carries the cookhouses and other Q stores.

[RayC]

I think F echelon is the forward (company in this case) in battle.

Ray sahab,

As per your suggestion, with the Strike Corps retaining it's formations, how does one hasten and disguise its deployment? Any pointers to public domain information on movement times etc? I read in Brig. Sawhney's book "Logistics" that an infantry battalion can move out from camp in 2 hours. Any such rules of thumb for larger formations like Bdes and Divs?

As I understand from what is in the public domain and I think I have posted an article on the issue somewhere on BRF, the Pivot Corps will have limited offensive capablilties which will allow the IBG to debouch to their mission objectives and by the time the shallow bridgehead has been achieved, and there are mulitple options, the Strike Corps would have moblised and reached to commence their operations.

I believe Lt Gen Uberoi has posted many articles on the issue on the net or he has a blog site.

The moving out of the Strike Corps will be known to the enemy through human intelligence, satellite surveillance and so on. However, at the launch end there are means to disguise the intent and location.

The timings for mobilisation depends on the warning and state of readiness, availability of 2nd line transport, the mode of movement (it took a long time when formations had to move out by rail) and so on.

[Anoop]

Thank you, Ray sahab.

What do you make of the recommendation that an Inf Battn should be deployed only in congruous terrain profiles? As I understand it, our system gives flexibility in rotating units through different static formations as opposed to the American system that creates formations for specific roles. But on the other hand, the recommendation would require less reorientation of troops to different terrain. Would this reduce the workload on a battn, especially as they already spend so much time in COIN? What I mean is, would it allow more time on a "peace" station before returning to a forward area, since they require less orientation at the latter and the hand-off from the unit leaving the area can be easier?

[Sanku]

@Anoop, w.r.t. IA reco's
I would actually argue to continue the current method which gives the widest exposure to the troops -- from my perspective cross training and broad profile is the most useful and critical thing.

[RayC]

Thank you, Ray sahab.

What do you make of the recommendation that an Inf Battn should be deployed only in congruous terrain profiles? As I understand it, our system gives flexibility in rotating units through different static formations as opposed to the American system that creates formations for specific roles. But on the other hand, the recommendation would require less reorientation of troops to different terrain. Would this reduce the workload on a battn, especially as they already spend so much time in COIN? What I mean is, would it allow more time on a "peace" station before returning to a forward area, since they require less orientation at the latter and the hand-off from the unit leaving the area can be easier?

Anoop,

X posting:

Rahul M wrote:


________________________

was this posted before ?
http://livefist.blogspot.com/2009/06/se ... ndias.html

Quote:
A seminar on modernisation of India's infantry was held on May 25 by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies in Delhi. Here's a brief list of some of the immediate recommendations that were drawn up after the seminar:

*
An infantry battalion or individual should preferably be rotated between two different or three near congruous terrain profiles only.
*
A project to reduce weight of the present medium machine gun, automatic grenade launcher, and anti-material rifle by at least 6-8 kgs should be undertaken.
*
Replacement of the existing Hand Grenade No 36 should be expedited with the introduction of a variety of grenades to meet all requirements.
*
81 mm Mortars should be made lighter and possibly based on tracked carriers and their range should be not less than 7,000 metres.
*
A man-portable unmanned aerial vehicle troop (four-six aerial vehicles) should be authorised to the intelligence and surveillance platoon of infantry battalion. This would enhance the infantry battalion’s area of influence.
*
The ‘bayonet strength’ of a rifle section should be preserved. In a single section, there should at least be 6-7 persons available for launching an assault on the enemy.
*
Custom-built obstacle crossing expedients should be made available to infantry for negotiating water obstacles as well as mine fields.
*
Infantry company ‘F’ echelon should be based on two 1.5 ton capacity low silhouette vehicles.
*
Ghatak platoons should be trained for helicopter-borne operations and provided with light strike vehicles.


any comments from the knowledgeable ones ? RayC ?

The suggestion to specialise units and individuals in two different or three near congruous terrain in not a practical sugggestion.

The terrain profile varies from High Altitude Area (HAA) to mountains, to jungles, to deserts, to plains, to flats as in Kutch et al.

The operational profile varies from offensive, defensive, CI which is different in Kashmir and different in NE, DCB, Amphibious Warfare. Jungle Warfare, Mountain Warfare, HAA Warfare, Riverine Warfare etc.

Therefore, dedicating units and individuals in such a varied terrain and operational mix and given the permutations and combinations, it will be a nightmare to rotate units and individuals and ensure that none are over extended in their areas beyond the mandatory tenure.

Further, it will not be fair to the units and individuals to typecast and bound to only a set of operational and terrain conditions as it will only induce boredom through stereotype scenarios.

Promotion management and personal management will also be problematic since the vacancies may not be commensurate to their slot and thus, though cleared for the next rank, if there is no vacancy in one's specialisation in operational and terrain environment, he will have to languish, while his juniors get promoted since vacancies exist in their areas of specialisation. If a person moves out to command in areas not his specialisation, it will not be fair to him or the troops he will then command.

Take the role of the Scouts battalions. They were for a specific purpose. Right now, they are being used like Infantry!

Square peg in a round hole.

Reducing the weight of weapons for the infantry is always welcomed. However, reduction of weight causes a weapon to shake vigorously when fired in the auto mode. Therefore, at best, I think it is a wishlist, but then the DRDO may come up with something novel. No harm in wishing!

This vareity of grenade for specific purpose is not understood. On the one hand, we want to reduce weight and on the other, we recommend an increase in the inventory. If a variety of grenades are to be carried, the weight carried by the man will increase and if such a type of grenade does not find its use during the operation, it will be unproductive weight being carried.

Modernisation of the Infantry is always welcomed, but it should not be at the expense of the bayonet strength. The fact that they are talking of 6 to 7 in a section indicates that already the bayonet strength has been milked away for man other ''fancier'' equipment that are also essential!! A situation of robbing Peter to pay Paul. The suggestions of the new equipment that should be inducted is excellent, but then one has to ensure that the Govt and the Army takes a hard look and increase the manpower of the Infantry battalion and not to the usual adhoc business of 'managing' the induction by cutting corners and inducing an inefficent fighting potential.

It must be understood that it is the Infantry Company that will deliver in the attack and in defence and no amount of fancy weaponry, weapon platforms and gadgetery will change the situation. The bayonet strength cannot be denuded as it is being done.

One aspect one forget is the psychological impact of manpower. Imagine the situation where a police force is attacked by 10 men in a riot situation to being attacked by 100. 10 men can be handled with ease. 100 will create worries and even panic. Now, given that as a background, check how many in a section today actually are the 'bayonet sterngth'. Who cares if out of the 6 or 7 men in the section as suggested, only 3 are the chaps who attack me?

I have not read the blog and these are my first impressions on what was written on the post.

I also visited my unit recently and asked them the same question and well, I got some real "interesting" answers!

It is a good idea that the Ghataks are HB operable. In fact, they are even now. But what is a light strike vehicle and with which helicopter are they to be heli-lifted?

[Rahul M]

But what is a light strike vehicle and with which helicopter are they to be heli-lifted?

something like this the paras use ?
with light ATGMs like milans attached ?

[RayC]

Rahul M,

In active ops, as the waves are going in, one would not go with underslung loads, be they vehicles or guns.

If they are light strike vehicles, I presume it means for immediate use on landing or being slithered down.

Not connected, one may mention that not only the Ghataks, all infantry units are trained from slithering and also jumping down from helicopters which hover above the ground!

Further, I would go on record to state that the exact discussions during this seminar is not known to me and so my comments are basically based on what was summarised.

[Rahul M]

thanks for the clarification Sir.

a search at the CLAWS website gives the full report.
http://www.clawsindia.in/index.php?acti ... s&m_id=344

Modernisation of Infantry in India

General

The Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) organised a seminar on “Modernisation of Infantry in India” on May 25, 2009 at the CLAWS campus. The seminar was attended by a large gathering of serving officers from the army and select guests from the strategic community. Lt Gen GK Duggal (Retd) chaired the seminar. Lt Gen Jasbir Singh, AVSM, VSM, Director General Infantry, delivered the Keynote Address. Col HS Faujdar presented a paper while Maj Gen GD Bakshi (Retd) and Brig Rahul Bhonsle (Retd) were the discussants.

On further reading it becomes clear that the above mentioned recommendations were from a paper presented by a serving officer, Col HS Faujdar. There were a number of other participants with their own views.

The link above has the full report.

This is the complete part about Col Faujdar's recommendations.

Col HS Faujdar

Col HS Faujdar stated that India is faced with a security situation where it has to counter adversaries armed with nuclear weapons, combat a long-drawn proxy war, terrorism and issues relating to internal security. India is yet to develop a ‘two-front’ capability to face a simultaneously launched conventional threat from China and Pakistan. In addition, the growing proximity of Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar towards China does not bode well for India’s external and homeland security concerns. Besides, significant emerging flashpoints in the form of left wing extremism involving as many as 160 districts in 14 states are leading to critical concern.

In future, the conventional conflicts would be of a shorter duration with greater intensity, causing large-scale destruction owing to the increased range and lethality of weapon systems and munitions. Upgraded surveillance systems will not only detect the targets but will successfully bring down effective fire through in-built or networked fire control systems. Sensor-shooter loop will thus be shortened to reduce time lag and exploit fleeting opportunities. Junior commanders will have to be prepared to shoulder greater responsibility with regards to decision-making and command of mission-oriented small teams. Operations shall continue to be infantry-centric, albeit with greater reliance on mission-oriented small teams. Challenges to an infantry soldier in the battlefield will likely arise from detection, engagement during day and night, mines, lasers and precision-guided munitions.

Therefore, while the basic role of the infantry across the spectrum of conflict will continue to be to close in with the enemy and destroy him and hold ground against all forms of enemy attack, modernisation would be instrumental in improving the infantry’s lethality, survival, mobility, sustainability and communications.

Col Faujdar said thrust areas of modernisation in infantry include lethality and effectiveness of its weapons, mobility, survival, sustainability and communications. Infantry has to adopt defensive measures to defeat the adversary’s weapon systems and ammunition. Secondly, it has to improve upon its own weapons arsenal so as to achieve a distinct edge in terms of range, precision and attrition. Mobility continues to be a sore point with infantry units and formations for which the issue of organic mobility, matching mobility with mechanised formations and exploitation of the third dimension needs to be seriously considered. It should also be pointed out that the survival of infantry is related to the ability to suppress enemy’s fire and surveillance means in the battlefield. In the nuclear, biological and chemical backdrop of future conflicts, there would be a requirement of providing protection to the personnel, equipment and materials by means of providing hardened and environmentally controlled shelters. For operations in a prolonged- duration set up, there should be a reliable system of re-supply and evacuation. In an intense and fluid battlefield, communications are bound to assume primacy. Modern day communication means the ability to transmit and receive voice, data, video and imagery in real or near real time. The equipment should be light, rugged, tropicalised and hardened against electro-magnetic pulse damage. The other features should include enhanced range, frequency-hopping, encryption and electronic counter-measures.

While outlining the shortcomings in the present organisational set up, Col Faujdar highlighted the following key areas:

• The present personal weapon is outdated in design and performance. A 5.56 mm INSAS Rifle and Light Machine Gun still has shortcomings.
• The night-fighting capability is limited in sections/platoons/companies.
• Present support weapons are very heavy and bulky.
• The surveillance capability with the Infantry battalions is very limited.
• The existing anti-tank resources are prone to jamming and errors.
• The Infantry battalions lack tactical mobility.
• Water crossing expedients are not made available to an Infantry soldier.

Spelling out recommendations for modernisation of infantry, Col Faujdar listed the following:

• A road map for modernisation needs to be drawn up with an effective time line that must be adhered to.
• An internal defense force should be raised to free infantry from the task of dealing with the non-conventional threats during peace time.
• An infantry battalion or individual should preferably be rotated between two different or three near congruous terrain profiles only.
• A project to reduce weight of the present medium machine gun, automatic grenade launcher, and anti-material rifle by at least 6-8 kgs should be undertaken.
• Replacement of the existing Hand Grenade No 36 should be expedited with the introduction of a variety of grenades to meet all requirements.
• 81 mm Mortars should be made lighter and possibly based on tracked carriers and their range should be not less than 7,000 metres.
• A man-portable unmanned aerial vehicle troop (four-six aerial vehicles) should be authorised to the intelligence and surveillance platoon of infantry battalion. This would enhance the infantry battalion’s area of influence.
• The ‘bayonet strength’ of a rifle section should be preserved. In a single section, there should at least be 6-7 persons available for launching an assault on the enemy.
• Custom-built obstacle crossing expedients should be made available to infantry for negotiating water obstacles as well as mine fields.
• Infantry company ‘F’ echelon should be based on two 1.5 ton capacity low silhouette vehicles.
• Ghatak platoons should be trained for helicopter-borne operations and provided with light strike vehicles.

[Samay]

Give them good food to eat , better pension plans, , better support to their families ....with or without them, etc, that is basic facilities should be top class,
And they are capable enough to sort out rest of the things themselves ..... that is the core

[ramana]

RayC, Timely thread.

From Pioneer

EDITS | Wednesday, June 24, 2009 | Email | Print |


Being big is not good enough

Ashok K Mehta

India has the third largest standing Army, fourth biggest Air Force, sixth largest Navy, second largest Central Police Force and… Yet, it cannot prevent terrorist attacks, infiltration and nibbling of unsettled borders. It is internally insecure and externally not optimally integrated to maximise utilisation of resources in an era of ‘uncertain challenges’ and ‘persistent conflict’.

Defence modernisation has lagged behind due to under-performance by Defence Research Development Organisation and systemic delays in procuring contemporary military hardware coupled with a brittle long-term planning process. Cutting-edge technology cannot be compensated by sheer numbers of soldiers, police and cheerleaders.

Three decades on, the so-called indigenous main battle tank Arjun and light combat aircraft Tejas are muddling through and are not yet operational. The advance jet trainer and the long-range strike aircraft took equal time to acquire, though only the latter is in service. Funds for modernisation, even when available, have gone underutilised at least for the last 15 years. Lack of optimal joint planning, red tape and the fear of three Cs — CBI, CVC and CAG — have delayed decision-making despite refined and overly elaborate defence procurement procedures which seek transparency and zero tolerance of corruption.

Given the dried up inventories, the much-celebrated fast track procurement takes 18 months when the longest war we have fought has been 16 days, a skirmish 45 days and a terrorist attack 68 hours. That is why Gen Ved Malik said, “We will fight (Kargil) with what we have”. Modernisation has suffered due to cumulative failures of indigenisation, complex acquisition systems and cumbersome decision-making and planning procedures.

The 11th Defence Plan 2007-12 in its third year is yet to be approved by Government. Nor has the 15-year Long-Term Perspective Plan 2007-22 been cleared. Defence spending, usually erratic has had its big bursts following military failures like 1962 or after Kargil. Only once in the 1980s did Government invest nearly three per cent of the GDP to create capabilities rather than cater to threats.

The fluctuation in allocation is damaging for modernisation and force development. The last two annual budgets were down to below two per cent of the GDP. A sound planning process requires a Government authorised National Security Document and approved long, medium and short-term integrated plans, backed by political and fiscal guidance.

The armed forces excel in crafting individual force and capability-creation plans which are only cosmetically integrated with the other two services but are almost totally insulated from diplomacy. The interface between defence and diplomacy is between the two ministries and neither has any representation from the military which is accountable.

The Ministry of Defence was to be integrated with the Services Headquarters but that has not happened despite the recommendation of the Kargil Group of Ministers’ report. The Army has managed to push in an officer in the Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, which is a drop in the ocean.

The Integrated Defence Staff was the fallout of the GoM report, though a key recommendation — appointing the Chief of Defence Staff — has been ignored, due not so much to stated inter-service rivalry as bureaucratic opposition.

Studies by services, vital to keep them relevant, ought to be ordered by Government, which never happens. The Army is currently engaged in a seminal exercise of ‘Transformation’ which has been uplinked with its Long-Term Perspective Plans and the other two services.

While the Army has been successful in preventing war through credible deterrence, it has not deterred proxy war. Surprisingly, the modernisation of Infantry, the arm to meet this challenge, was a low priority, though it has recently picked up.

This month, seven companies were blacklisted when corruption was detected in an Indian Ordinance Factory. Army Chief Gen Deepak Kapoor has admitted that this will further delay acquisition of the light Howitzers for the Mountain Division. In a previous case of corruption, the selection process of the 155 mm gun in all its three versions was suspended, seriously undermining the artillery modernisation programme, haunted since the purchase of 410 Bofors guns in 1988.

The IAF’s combat strength has fallen from 39-and-a-half to 32 squadrons. The new Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, has said rejuvenation of depleted combat squadrons is his priority. He has blamed the procurement process and the indigenisation programmes which have not kept pace with phasing out of aircraft. Aircraft numbers will be made up through the induction of Su 30 MKI, the LCA and 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft for which six vendors have been asked to field their aircraft for trials.

The Navy is set to become the dominant force in the Indian Ocean region and is the most sought after service for foreign naval cooperation. Its modernisation and expansion plans are better anchored than the Army and Air Force as most of its ship-building is done at home. Of the 39 service ships on order, only five are being procured from outside. Six French-designed Scorpene hunter-killer submarines are also being manufactured in India to add to the 20 diesel-powered submarines already in service.

The big problem has been with the Gorshkov aircraft carrier which has tested nerves and Indo-Russian relations after Moscow doubled the original price to nearly $ 3 billion with ancillaries. The Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, raised a storm by suggesting India should cancel the purchase and relook its defence relations with Russia.

Russia is upset over our opening up to the US, Israel and South Africa for fear of losing its primacy as the main arms supplier to India whose defence inventory is still 70 per cent Russian in origin. It will take a long time for India to diversify, so heavily reliant it is for capital platforms on Moscow. The Russians are to lease the Akula nuclear-power submarine so that our own Advanced Technology Vessel project, slated for water trials, in August, can catch up.

In the last five years, Rs 23,000 crore of modernisation funds went unspent. For the modernisation process to be institutionalised, Government must

• Appoint a CDS;
  
  
  Provide political and fiscal guidelines;
  
  
  Insulate procurement from kickbacks;
  
  
  Ensure full utilisation of funds ; and,
  
  
  Hold detractors of modernisation accountable.

[RayC]

A well summarised article by Maj Gen Ashok Mehta (Retd).