India Nuclear News And Discussion

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 23 Jun 2009 18:23

Feb 17, 2009 :: Allocation for DAE marginally higher

The DAE’s overall budget estimates for 2009-10 has been pegged at Rs 7,173 crore, just 5.8 per cent higher than the revised estimate of Rs 6,777 crore for the current fiscal.

somnath · Post by **somnath** » 23 Jun 2009 18:34

BARC is the primary weapons manufacturing facility, and the growth in their own budgets seem to be quite liberal, in fact 2008-09 RE being 35% above the budget estimates..

http://www.barc.ernet.in/empdata/budidx.html

As mentioned above, the overall BAE capital exp budget is not just about weapons, it would be mostly power plants, mining operations, other ancillary setups etc etc...And there our performance has been patchy at best, due to various reasons - uranium fuel shortage being one...........

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 24 Jun 2009 01:48

geeth wrote:>>>Yep - I thought too that the AHWR has made decent progress. I had read this interview before (this is as late as 2008). So, why do folks seem to think that we cant deliver on the 3 stage goal?

I was more interested in knowing whether construction activities have started for the Thorium reactor. These information about design is available for the past 3-4 years. The reason for raising this issue is because of an article I read more than a year back (which I can't locate now) about the talk about construction activities to begin soon. Then came the nuclear deal and the news about budgetary cuts and no allocation of funds for construction of Thorium reactor. Hence the skepticism.

I am confused.

By "Thorium reactor" I assume you are referring to the one proposed for the third stage? IF true, how can we expect the construction of one when a test reactor started in April 2008? All articles clearly state that it will take a long time to build one (3rd stage) - 10-20 years, if not longer.

IF it is the one for the second stage, then that is still in progress. Supposed to come on-line in 2011-12.

On funding, some entities will see a decline, but some will see an increase. Total budget seems to be up.

BijuShet · Post by **BijuShet** » 24 Jun 2009 02:13

This may be relevant here hence cross posting from the International Nuclear Watch & Discussion dhaga

BijuShet wrote:U.S.-Russian Nuclear Breakthrough May Add Uranium to Market
&
Nuclear Talks Hurt Uranium Prices

geeth · Post by **geeth** » 24 Jun 2009 10:05

>>>By "Thorium reactor" I assume you are referring to the one proposed for the third stage? IF true, how can we expect the construction of one when a test reactor started in April 2008? All articles clearly state that it will take a long time to build one (3rd stage) - 10-20 years, if not longer.

I am talking of the AHWR of 300 MWe, which has a Thorium blanket - the same one as in the article below.

"2008 :: Q&A: Thorium Reactor Designer Ratan Kumar Sinha".

When the heading of the article itself mentions "Thorium reactor", I can't see what is the confusion about.

Prem Kumar · Post by **Prem Kumar** » 24 Jun 2009 10:47

Regarding the AHWR construction, the reports below indicate substantial delays in the past.

This one says that the development work is at an advanced stage - but construction doesnt seem to have begun. Because the project report including costing was still being put together. This is in Dec 2008

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Chen ... 864684.cms

This one from the Hindu in 2003, quotes Kakodkar as stating that the construction for the AHWR will begin in 2004

http://www.hindu.com/2003/10/24/stories ... 391300.htm

I wouldnt extrapolate this to say something sinister is going on. But Kakodkar hasnt been made accountable for the 5 year delay.

vera_k · Post by **vera_k** » 24 Jun 2009 12:13

The 3 stage program is not coming online in a hurry. At this time the safe operation of the PFBR is more important than the AHWR. FBRs elsewhere and even the FBTR have had issues due to sodium leakage and any such problem with the PFBR will be an immense setback for the 3 stage program.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 24 Jun 2009 14:02

I can't see what is the confusion about

Whatever.

This 2007 document, in slide 6, states that "3rd Stage AHWR : Construction expected to start in next 1 to 2 years"

Jan 2009 :: BARC scientists still awaiting site allocation for AHWR: Sinha

Mumbai, Jan 2: World's first thorium-based Advanced Heavy Water Reactor(AHWR), the construction of which is expected to begin during the 11th Five Year Plan, is still awaiting sanction of an appropriate site by the Centre, a top nuclear scientist said.

Since the 300 MWe AHWR will be a public utility, it has to be built outside the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and "we are waiting for the Centre to announce the site," R K Sinha, Group Director, Reactor Design and Development and Design Manufacturing and Automation, said.

"It is only after the site allocation, ground work for statutory clearances (environmental and regulatory) can be carried out and BARC scientists have to submit a project report for statutory clearances," he said.

Once the site is allotted and construction begins, it would take six years to complete the plant, Sinha said.

The standing committee for site selection for the AHWR was formed last year, but the final selection of a suitable site has not been announced by the Government, he said.

"We are ready with the final design and already in the project mode. By simulating safety parameters, we are preparing preliminary safety analysis report for the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board's clearance," he said.

"The site selection criteria for the AHWR was slightly different as we are planning for nuclear fuel fabrication plant, reprocessing and waste management facilities within the plant site," he said.

Sinha said, "we hope that the government announces the site for AHWR soon to start the construction of the reactor and other related facilities." Last year in April, BARC commissioned critical facility for AHWR to prove the physics design of the reactor. Currently, reference code or base-line data for Uranium is being generated.

The critical facility had each and every component of the nuclear core of the AHWR such as fuel and the moderator.

Sinha said, the AHWR is being designed to achieve large-scale use of thorium for the generation of commercial power and is also proliferation resistant to some extent.

"This reactor will produce most of its power from Thorium with no significant external input of Uranium-233 in equilibrium cycle (in stabilised stage)," he added.

geeth · Post by **geeth** » 24 Jun 2009 15:31

Thanks NRao & Prem Kumar...I don't want to put any conspiracy thoeries on the issue, but was keen to know whether the delay is genuine or not.

IIRC, the initial plan was to set up the reactor within BARC. But don't know why it has to be outside BARC now (as per above article), particularly since it will be more of an experimental reactor in nature. It may be possible that after the nuclear deal, there are some changes in strategy and hence the shifting of location. May be they want to put it in civilian side under IAEA.

But in that case why expose the unique technology to international inspectors so early? Are the Yankees demanding it, so that they can peek into the technology??

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 24 Jun 2009 17:13

Prem Kumar wrote:I wouldnt extrapolate this to say something sinister is going on. But Kakodkar hasnt been made accountable for the 5 year delay.

If only reactor design and construction were as simple as demanding Babus stick to a deadline

Scientists plea to MPs: Don't let MAPLE reactors be another Avro Arrow

Jean Koclas, Professor, Nuclear Engineering Institute, Engineering Physics Department, École polytechnique Montréal: If you don't know how the nuclear industry works: usually, when you modify something in a nuclear reactor, when you bring forth a new type of reactor, most of the time you have unforeseen difficulties. You can think of the Darlington reactor, which was just an increment in size of a standard design, and engineering problems arose which took more than a year to solve. So I think the MAPLE reactors, MAPLE-1 and MAPLE-2, do not escape these sort of engineer constants.

The Zero Power Critical Facility has been commissioned in 2008. Only after the AHWR design has been validated using the CF can construction begin.
AHWR critical facility commissioned at BARC

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 24 Jun 2009 19:17

IIRC, the initial plan was to set up the reactor within BARC. But don't know why it has to be outside BARC now (as per above article), particularly since it will be more of an experimental reactor in nature. It may be possible that after the nuclear deal, there are some changes in strategy and hence the shifting of location. May be they want to put it in civilian side under IAEA.

During my surfing I did come across a mention about moving it outside BARC: it had to do with the separation plan. Building anything that GoI might agree to IAEA snooping automatically means that it goes outside BARC. Besides that I would imagine that building the entire reproc, waste management, etc might just be better outside BARC anyways?

But in that case why expose the unique technology to international inspectors so early? Are the Yankees demanding it, so that they can peek into the technology??

Bush did demand putting everything "civilian" under IAEA. But, GoI declined to place any newer techs under IAEA because they were "experimental". AK had proposed India have the ability to flip-flop reactors (just the way the other 5 do), but, of course Bush did not go that far.

On another note, my gut feel is that the US - with Russian help - will try and scuttle this three stage stuff using pricing of Uranium. And, if unable to scuttle it they will try and get as much tech info as possible to see how they can throttle it. For IF India does really succeed, it should become a competing, lower cost technology to anything the West has to offer.

Refresher: 2005 :: The FBTR completes 20 years in service. Here is an article from OutlookIndia.com.

It has some data points that may of interest.

Rupesh · Post by **Rupesh** » 26 Jun 2009 15:42

India may announce two nuclear sites during Clinton trip: Blake

WASHINGTON: India is likely to announce locations for two nuclear power plants, which would be made available to the American companies, during

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to New Delhi next month, a top Obama Administration has said.

"We hope, at that time, that the Indians will be in a position to announce where nuclear parks -- we hope to have two sites that would be announced, where American companies can go in and provide new reactors, which would be a major source of new business opportunities for American companies,"

sukhdeo · Post by **sukhdeo** » 28 Jun 2009 07:15

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Colu ... 711078.cms

Interesting take.

To what extent do forum members think based on current state of affairs, that US only pushed the nuclear deal to benefit American companies ?

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 29 Jun 2009 01:54

Get nuclear powered

Taken physics, math in high school? Want an exciting career? The N-energy sector could be an option, says Rahat Bano.

negi · Post by **negi** » 03 Jul 2009 08:23

Nice and a compulsory read for all those searching literature on Indian Enrichment programme; resident SME's can perhaps throw more light on the article and its accuracy.

India’s Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Program:
Growing Capacity for Military Purposes
http://www.isis-online.org/publications ... pacity.pdf
(..by David Albright and Susan Basu1
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
January 18, 2007)

PS: apologies if posted and discussed earlier.

negi · Post by **negi** » 03 Jul 2009 09:00

Here one more from MV Ramana

India’s Uranium Enrichment Program

SivaVijay · Post by **SivaVijay** » 03 Jul 2009 16:15

Atoms for War: U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal

Found this on Scribd, don't know if it was posted earlier . A good read on India's standpoint on nuclear issues...FWIW.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 04 Jul 2009 21:54

Another 660 Mw of nuclear power capacity in 6 months

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 04 Jul 2009 21:56

Areva to sell its Indian operations with proposed sale of business

Sanatanan · Post by **Sanatanan** » 05 Jul 2009 08:33

Gerard wrote:Another 660 Mw of nuclear power capacity in 6 months

Quoting from the above news report

Another 660 Mw of nuclear power capacity should become operational in another six months, from the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP) at Kota and at the Kaiga Atomic Power Project (KAPP) in Karnataka’s Uttara Kannada district.

RAPP’s current capacity is 740 Mw, using domestic uranium. The two new units, of 220 Mw each, will run on imported uranium, for which agreements were signed this January. The supply has started. Kaiga is presently generating 500 Mw; the new unit is an additional one of 220 Mw. It will also run on imported fuel.
. . .

As I understand, Reactors running under imported fuel must be placed in the non-strategic part of the Separation Plan so that they can come under IAEA Inspection.

However, as per S. Varadarajan's blog post dated 11 May 2006, Nuclear separation plan: An update, the following reactors were to be placed in the non-strategic sector:

The 14 reactors to be safeguarded are the following:

2006: TAPS 1 and 2; RAPS 1 and 2 Kudankulam 1 and 2
2007: RAPS 5 (under construction)
2008: RAPS 6 (under construction)
2010: RAPS 3 and 4 (currently operational)
2012: KAPS 1 and 2 (currently operational)
2014: NAPS 1 and 2 (currently operational)

In other words, the thermal power reactors which will remain unsafeguarded are: MAPS 1 and 2 at Kalpakkam (both 220 MWe) ; TAPS 3 and 4 (both 540 MWe) ; and Kaiga 1, 2, 3 and 4 (all 220 MWe). Plus of course the fast breeders.

From this point of view, the news item quoted above does not seem to be accurate (unless of course, the Separation Plan has since been modified in an opaque manner, not an unusual thing for the UPA Govt).

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 05 Jul 2009 18:09

May 12, 2006
N-separation plan tabled in Parliament

According to the details given in the plan, two new atomic reactors No 3 and 4 under construction at Tarapur with the capacity to generate 540 megawatts of electricity each have been excluded from the list of 14 reactors that will be thrown open for international scrutiny and safeguards as per the Indo-US nuclear deal. Among the six other plants that are excluded are four of Kaiga's and Kalpakkam's two reactors, all of which have 220 MW capacity.

As of March 2009, when the IAEA BOG approved the Additional Protocol, no list of safeguarded facilities had been submitted to the IAEA. The annex to the Safeguards Agreement approved by the IAEA in 2008 was blank.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Jul 2009 06:47

Tilak wrote:GNEP is dead; long live Gen-4
01 July 2009

The US Department of Energy has stated that it is no longer pursuing domestic commercial reprocessing.

It announced in late June that it has cancelled the environmental impact statement of the domestic Global Nuclear Energy Partnership programme, effectively halting the programme. It said that reprocessing was the primary focus of that programme.

However, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, provides $145 million for the continuation of research and development (R&D) on proliferation-resistant fuel cycles and waste management strategies.

As described in the President’s Fiscal Year 2010 budget request, the Department’s fuel cycle R&D’s focus is on ‘‘long-term, science-based R&D of technologies with the potential to produce beneficial changes to the manner in which the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear waste is managed.’’

One outlet for this money is likely to be the Generation IV International Forum, which includes a research programme on fast-breeder reactors, which in turn require reprocessing plants.

At the close of the comment period in March 2009, the DOE had received more than 14,500 comments on the draft environmental impact statement.

This has to impact the US position on reprocessing within India under the Indo-US nuclear deal.

I would not be surprised at all IF Clinton makes a case for reprocessing in India. I would expect her to make a case to reprocess from all sources - not just Indian, and, I expect her to make a case to place the reprocessing facility directly under IAEA control, and not Indian.

I expect some heavy duty arm twisting.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 07 Jul 2009 04:16

Sweden offers India civilian nuclear technology

Sweden, a member of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, is offering New Delhi its niche expertise in nuclear waste management and security as it eyes India's $40 billion civilian nuclear energy market.

The envoy sought to dispel the impression that Sweden, like other Scandinavian countries, was reluctant to support a consensus for India in the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 07 Jul 2009 05:07

A thesis from TX A&M 2007:

NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ASSESSMENT OF INDIA: A TECHNICAL STUDY FOR U.S.–INDIA COOPERATION

Geek value:

Code: Select all

I INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................1
I.A. Motivation for this Study ...................................................................................1
I.B. Objectives of the Study ......................................................................................2
II HISTORY OF THE INDIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM....................................4
II.A. Beginning of Indian Nuclear Program: 1944 - 1960..........................................4
II.B. Early Weapons Development Effort: 1960 - 1966...........................................11
II.C. Negotiations and Aftermath of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: 1966 - 1974.....13
II.D. India’s Isolation Following Operation Smiling Buddha: 1975 – 1998............14
II.E. The Pokhran-II Tests: 1998..............................................................................15
II.F. Following Pokhran-II Tests: 1999 - 2005 ........................................................16
II.G. Current State of Indian Nuclear Program.........................................................17
III INDIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES .................................................................18
IV FUEL CYCLE ANALYSIS TO PRESENT DAY ..........................................33
IV.A. Assessment of Plutonium Production and Use: Beginning till 1974 ...............34
IV.B. Assessment of Plutonium Production and Use: Beginning till 1998 ...............38
IV.C. Assessment of Plutonium Production and Use: Beginning till 2006 ...............42
IV.D. Assessment of Natural Uranium Production....................................................44
IV.E. Assessment of Enriched Uranium Production .................................................47
IV.F. Assessment of Power Production and Uranium Consumed.............................49
V FUEL CYCLE ANALYSIS FUTURE PROJECTIONS .................................54
V.A. Projections under NO U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation.....................54
V.A.1. Future of Existing Nuclear Power Program.............................................54
V.A.2. Future of Fast Breeder Program...............................................................59
V.A.3. Effect on Weapons Program ....................................................................61
V.B. Projections under YES U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation ...................62
V.B.1. Details of U.S. – India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.........................62
V.B.2. Future of Nuclear Power Program............................................................63
V.B.3. Future of Fast Breeder Program...............................................................67
V.B.4. Future of Weapons Program ....................................................................68
VI ALTERNATE REACTOR SYSTEM FOR THE PROPOSED FUEL
CYCLE….…………………………………………………………………..72
vii
Page
VI.A. Thermal Breeder Reactor Design Concept ......................................................73
VI.B. The Theory of Breeder Reactors ......................................................................74
VI.C. Reactor Physics Simulations ............................................................................78
VI.C.1. The SCALE Code System........................................................................78
VI.C.2. Simulation Details and Design Iterations.................................................80
VI.C.3. Results from Simulations .........................................................................85
VI.C.4. Optimized Design.....................................................................................95
VI.D. Implementation of Alternate Reactor System in Indian Fuel Cycle ..............100
VI.D.1. Description of Alternate Future Fuel Cycle ...........................................101
VI.D.2. Metrics of Interest ..................................................................................103
VI.D.3. Comparisons to Existing Indian Fuel Cycle...........................................105
VII CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS........................…………108

BR cited!!!!

shaardula · Post by **shaardula** » 07 Jul 2009 06:17

NRao wrote: BR cited!!!!

congrats br. way to go. that should ultimately be the goal. a source of record.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 08 Jul 2009 06:46

RaviBg wrote:All set for a quiet launch of India’s first indigenous nuclear submarine

The need for a nuclear submarine was felt by New Delhi as Beijing is moving towards a sea-based doctrine and already has one Xia class and two Jin class nuclear submarines with JL-1 and 2 series submarine-launched nuclear missiles. Each of these submarines carries up to 12 JL-1 or 2 strategic missiles. Even Pakistan has eight tactical submarines that have deep sea diving capability with advanced air propulsion and Harpoon missiles.

Just so that we ALL are clear.

FMCT, NPT, 123, XYZ, should all be in light of this one, singular fact.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 08 Jul 2009 08:36

NRao wrote:A thesis from TX A&M 2007:

NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ASSESSMENT OF INDIA: A TECHNICAL STUDY FOR U.S.–INDIA COOPERATION

Geek value:

.... ... BR cited!!!!

This is the most factual study on the subject matter. Worth reading it all. Has tons of new-clear nuggets. In greater details it largely reconfirms the deduction of Ashley Tellis and my paper (on IRF website) on India having more than required amount of Plutonium for a grand weaponization program if it chooses to take that path.

On page 61

Effect on Weapons Program
According to the assessment of Figure 4, India has sufficient plutonium to produce 69 implosion weapons (considering 6 kgs of plutonium used for each weapon).
If uranium production is solely diverted to DHRUVA, addition of four weapons a year can be maintained. PHWRs operating at lower capacity factor could produce weaponsgrade plutonium, even if not operated deliberately for that cause. The same rate of success of enrichment plant assures the possibility of thermonuclear weapons and nuclear submarine core fuel.

If the collaboration efforts fail then most of the nuclear power plants could be closed down from power mode and plutonium production continues at the present level
from the production reactors. The plutonium production rate may also rise because of low capacity factor operating power reactors. Contribution from breeders could be an additional boost to the weapons program. Each fast core can produce approximately 140 kilograms of 233U every year [37]. The total stockpile of nuclear weapons which has been added over four decades of struggle can then be repeated every year. This scenario would still have its doors open to cooperation but no effort could role back the clock to lower rate of weapons-grade fissile material production.

A possible case of all the 8 PHWRs not under safeguards being operated at 50% capacity, the fuel needs for next five years (2007-2011) would be (9.4 tons/plant/year * 8 plants * 5 years) 376 tons. This is definitely possible given the present uranium reserves along with the lowered rate of production. The alarming scenario is production of 460 kilograms of plutonium by each PHWR for next five years at a 240Pu / 239Pu ratio of 20.3%. India is presumed to have tested nuclear device with reactor-grade plutonium in Pokhran-II tests in 1998 [17].

On page 66 the "Fig. 5. (Latency capability with/without cooperation and uranium constraint)" is very enlightening to NPA Ayatollah's as well as MegaTonn BUM proponents.

These eight PHWRs dedicated for power generation and would need 244 tons of natural uranium at the rate of one refueling a day. The requirement of 244 tons of fuel is
close to the assumption of 250 tons of natural uranium as material constraint in the analysis of latency capability in Figure 5. If the unsafeguarded reactors operate at the assumed capacity factor of 90% then annually 1280 kgs (160 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium can be produced by each PHWR annually) of reactor-grade plutonium would be at India’s disposal.

This quantity of reactor grade plutonium can drive one and half fast reactor cores every year with an assumption of 850 kgs being required to fuel each FBR. Figure 5 concludes that the material constraint also brings down the latency capability of producing weapons-grade plutonium. Diverting 250 tons of natural uranium would lead to production of 1027 kgs of weapons-grade plutonium annually considering no restrictions on the refueling rate is described by point ‘A’ in Figure 5. The points B, C and D in Figure 5 state the weapons-grade plutonium production DHRUVA and CIRUS operational simultaneously, only DHRUVA and only CIRUS operational respectively.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 08 Jul 2009 08:47

BTW UK is now transitioning its BUMs from 100 kt yield to 400 kt yield.

Someone will try to convince me they are on wrong side of history and are idiots.

Or wait !!! Indian will be on wrong side of history and are idiots to need more than 17 kt or even 50 kt BUM, much less 45 kt TN fizzlya of R.Chidambraum vintage.

Indian needs high power 2 laser Inertial Confinement test facility pronto, and finish the unfinished business of practical thermonuclear weapon .

From
http://www.indiaresearch.org/WayToACred ... errent.pdf

Per the separation plan most of the facilities will go to civilian side, yet the facilities in the
classified weapons side are fast approaching end of life thus requiring even more investments.
Lacking the investment of about US$ 30 billion over the next 5 years, it is clear that the nuclear
weapons program will be crippled. The above cost is for:
1. 7 -10 research reactors (150 MW modified and scaled up R-5/Dhruv design)
2. 3 - 4 heavy water plants15
3. 2 - 3 re-processing plants physically removed from the safeguarded sites
4. 2 - 3 fuel fabrication plants
5. Scientific facilities - hot cells, plutonium foundries, libraries etc.
6. Duplication and up gradation of scientific skills built on knowledge over 40 years
7. Laser Ignition ICF Facility including two independent design and review teams
8. Fast Breeder Reactor test facility
9. Physics collaboration programs in universities

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 09 Jul 2009 01:47

Arun_S wrote:BTW UK is now transitioning its BUMs from 100 kt yield to 400 kt yield.

UK has to use whatever warhead the US is using on their SLBMs. Pre-Obama, the US was working on reduction of the W76 yield to 90 kt. The new UK warhead would have been an 'anglicized' version of the WR1.

The modernization of the W76 warhead continues with three specific efforts under way. One involves an LE programme that inter alia replaces the arming, firing and fuzing (AF&F) system on the W76/Mk4 re-entry vehicle to add a ground-burst capability that will significantly enhance the lethality of the weapon against harder targets. The modified warhead, which will be called the W76-1, may permit a reduction of the explosive yield. A second effort involves adding the 'accuracy adjunct' to the Mk4 re-entry vehicle to enhance the effectiveness of the W76-1/Mk4 and to enable deployment of conventional warheads on the Trident II (D-5) SLBM. The third effort involves a design incorporating the W76-1 on the larger Mk5 re-entry vehicle normally used for the W88 warhead in order to relax the design constraints required when using the smaller Mk4 re-entry vehicle…

The RRW programme replacement warhead for the W76, the WR1, would have been 90 kt

While the W-76 warhead is housed in a Mk-4 re-entry body, the Pentagon wants to use the larger Trident aeroshell, the Mk-5, for the replacement warhead. One reason for the switch appears to be that the Mk-5 offers design features that might compensate for the new warhead’s slightly lower yield. The replacement warhead design trades away some of the W-76’s 100-kiloton yield in exchange for improvements in safety, security and reliability, according to defense officials.

Mk-5 re-entry body, which is employed today in fewer than one in every eight Trident D-5 submarine-launched warheads.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 09 Jul 2009 03:31

Looking beyond the nuclear deal

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 10 Jul 2009 20:29

India, Germany discuss nuclear disarmament

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 10 Jul 2009 20:30

India's BHEL says European co to join nuclear JV

negi · Post by **negi** » 11 Jul 2009 01:07

G8 blocks ‘full’ nuclear trade with India

Less than a year after the Nuclear Suppliers Group waived its export rules to allow the sale of nuclear equipment, fuel and technology to India, the United States has persuaded the G8 to ban the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) items to countries which have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including India.

The ban, buried deep within a separate G8 statement on non-proliferation, commits the eight countries to implement on a “national basis” the “useful and constructive proposals” on ways of strengthening controls on ENR items and technology “contained in the NSG’s ‘clean text’ developed at the 20 November 2008 Consultative Group meeting.”
Minimum criteria

Though the “clean text” is not a public document, a senior diplomat from a G8 country confirmed to The Hindu that the eight countries had agreed to certain minimum criteria — including adherence to the main instruments of nonproliferation — as a condition for the sale of equipment and technology destined for safeguarded ENR activities in a recipient country.

With consensus proving elusive during the recent June meeting of the 45-nation club, the Obama administration decided to decouple the question of ENR sales to India from the NSG process — something the latest G8 agreement on interim implementation of a national-level ban effectively does.

India’s ability to purchase nuclear fuel and reactors from the G8 or NSG countries will be unaffected by the latest ban. Unless, of course, the new decision becomes the trigger for attempts to further dilute or qualify the core bargain contained in the ‘India exception’ last year.

Folks is this unnecessary scaremongering or this has some serious repercussions ?

--tugs at resident SME's shirt --

sraj · Post by **sraj** » 11 Jul 2009 01:16

G8 ban is sign India’s nuclear quest is not over
posting in full
Siddharth Varadarajan

Reversal raises questions about effectiveness of Indian diplomacy

New Delhi: In diplomacy, as in football, smart players know the consequences of losing sight of the ball. The blink of an eye is all it takes to miss a goal or lose a hard-won advantage.

2008 was a signal year for Indian diplomacy when a set of international restrictions that had starved the country’s nuclear industry of fuel and equipment for two decades was lifted on terms less restrictive than what Washington — which initiated the drive to make an exception for India — had been prepared to grant New Delhi.

In the months that followed the successful campaign to lift trading restrictions on India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, however, a complacent establishment decided to rest on its laurels and forgot about the obstacles and dangers still remaining. And then, seemingly out of the blue, came the first American attempt at clawback: on Thursday, the G8 agreed to adopt new rules prohibiting the sale of ENR components and technology to countries like India which have not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Much to the consternation of U.S. legislators, last year’s NSG exemption placed American nuclear vendors at a disadvantage by making imports from the U.S. far less attractive than comparable purchases from elsewhere, especially Russia and France. The 123 agreement, which governs bilateral commerce between the U.S. and India, allowed for the sale of reactors and fuel to India but these came saddled with a risky ‘right of return’ clause in the event that Washington terminated cooperation. At India’s insistence, enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) items were not excluded but their sale was made conditional on a subsequent agreement that both sides knew would never see the light of day. Reprocessing of spent fuel was allowed but only in a new, permanently safeguarded facility and that too, under yet-to-be-negotiated arrangements and procedures.

By comparison, the NSG’s exemption made no provision for ‘right of return’ and allowed U.S. competitors to make ENR transfers so long as they were satisfied these would not be misused by India. The spent fuel could also be reprocessed in existing Indian facilities provided the reprocessing was done under safeguards. Net-net, this made non-U.S. reactors more attractive.

Somewhere along the line, the Indians assumed the game was over. The whistle blown at L’Aquila is a reminder that the U.S. has plenty of extra time in hand.

Of course, the tell-tale signs were all around: in the U.S. State Department’s answers to pointed queries from Congress about the need for a ‘level playing field’ at the NSG. And in the assurances Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave to Capitol Hill in order to ensure the speedy ratification of the 123 agreement last October.

Getting the NSG to agree to prohibit the export of ENR equipment and technology to states such as India that are not members of the NPT would be the United States’ “highest priority,” Dr. Rice told Congressman Howard Berman at the time.

The fact that the NSG held intensive consultations on the issue last November was also well known, as was the fact that the U.S. was managing to create a consensus around NPT conditionality, even as other issues like adherence to the Additional Protocol was opposed by some NSG members like Brazil and uranium-rich countries like Canada objected to ENR sales being restricted to so-called black-box technologies which could prevent them from developing their own enrichment know-how.

Full cooperation

Although India is technologically self-sufficient in reprocessing and enrichment technology, the inclusion of ENR components in the nuclear deal was a matter of principle, positioning and ‘paisa’. That is why Indian negotiators insisted in July 2005 that they would settle for nothing less than “full civil nuclear cooperation.”

After all, if an exception was being made for India because of its status as a responsible country with advanced nuclear technology, excluding sensitive technologies made no sense. India was also aware of the role ENR services would play in the future evolution of the global nuclear industry. With attempts under way to monopolise the fuel cycle, India needed to ensure its status as a ‘supplier’ country was recognised. Finally, costs were also an issue. Why spend crores producing components for ENR plants when the parts could be imported for a fraction of the cost? When push came to shove, the U.S. reneged on “full cooperation” but allowed India to get what it wanted at the NSG. Now, that is in jeopardy too.

As part of the NSG exemption, New Delhi pledged voluntary adherence to the cartel’s present and future rules. But the NSG also said it would “consult” with India prior to new rules being adopted. If these consultations have been held, New Delhi has clearly not been effective in putting its views across. The fact that the cartel is still some distance away from reaching a final decision provides cold comfort: the G8’s endorsement of last November’s “clean text” will certainly have the effect of speeding up the deliberative process at Vienna.

India had a chance to press its case with friends and allies and also to leverage the massive expenditure it is prepared to make on Russian, French and American nuclear reactors in order to ensure it does not become the target of fresh restrictions. By failing to be proactive, however, it has allowed the U.S. to gain the first mover advantage.

If a formal consensus does not emerge in the Nuclear Suppliers Group by the time the next plenary is held, India may have a small window to undo the symbolic and substantive damage that has occurred at L’Aquila. But it needs to lobby hard to ensure the interim ban adopted on ENR sales is not carried over to next year’s G8 statement.

Otherwise it should prepare for several rounds of bruising negotiations ahead. The second U.S. target will be spent fuel reprocessing. Existing agreements with Russia and France do not stipulate a new standalone facility or more intensive safeguards. And as the Obama administration presses ahead with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, attempts could be made to get the NSG to adopt a version of the U.S. ‘right of return’ for exported items in the event that India is seen as deviating from the disarmament and non-proliferation commitments it made last September.

negi · Post by **negi** » 11 Jul 2009 01:21

On a lighter note the locals should build some small 'temple'/'mosque' at the sites allocated for GE/westinghouse folks lets see then who gets hurt pretty bad.GOI aint gonna touch that place with a barge pole.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 11 Jul 2009 01:24

G8 calls upon all countries to sign NPT

The G8 countries on Thursday called upon all countries to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) while deciding to step up efforts for swift implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), in a message that seems aimed at India -- the only `outlier' country at the summit.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 11 Jul 2009 01:33

http://www.president.kremlin.ru/eng/eve ... 9354.shtml

Statement on Non-Proliferation

1. We recognize, as we did at Hokkaido Toyako and at previous Summits, that the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery continues to represent a global challenge and a major threat to international security. We are determined to seize current opportunities and the new momentum to strengthen our common non-proliferation and disarmament goals through effective multilateralism and determined national efforts. All States must meet in full their arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation commitments under relevant international treaties and multilateral arrangements. The universalization and reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime remains an urgent priority. We call upon all States still not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to accede without delay.

2. We underscore that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and reiterate our full commitment to the objectives and obligations of its three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament. We will work together so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty’s regime and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars. We call upon all States Parties to the NPT to contribute to the review process with a constructive and balanced approach.

3. Safeguards are an essential tool for the effective implementation of the NPT and its non-proliferation objectives. We confirm our full support for the IAEA and are committed to continuing our efforts towards the universal acceptance of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol as the verification standard. We will also work to establish the Additional Protocol as an essential standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We call upon all States that have not yet adopted an Additional Protocol to do so without delay while implementing its provisions pending ratification. We seek to ensure that the IAEA continues to have the technology, expertise, authority and resources needed to fulfil its vital, statutory responsibilities. We also agree that measures are needed to address non-compliance, to include real and immediate consequences for States that withdraw from the NPT while in violation of it, including appropriate action by the UN Security Council, and full use of IAEA inspection authorities that provide for access to all relevant locations, information and people.

4. We welcome the announcement made by the President of the United States of America that he has decided to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and we will intensify our efforts towards the early entry into force and universalisation of the CTBT as one of the principal instruments of the international security architecture and a key measure of non-proliferation and disarmament. Meanwhile, we urge all States concerned to observe a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions.

5. We welcome the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a program of work for its 2009 session. We strongly support the early commencement of international negotiations on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) including verification provisions, and call upon all States concerned to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of such material. We welcome the fact that the nuclear-weapon States among the G8 members have already decreed such a moratorium. We will take action to resume substantive work in the CD as soon as possible.

6. We are all committed to seeking a safer world for all and to creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT. We welcome the nuclear disarmament measures implemented thus far by the nuclear-weapon States among G8 members. We welcome the Joint Statement by the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States of America of 1 April 2009, their Joint Understanding signed on 6 July 2009, and their intention to conclude a legally binding agreement to replace the START Treaty before it expires in December 2009. We call upon all States to undertake further steps in nuclear disarmament and to greater transparency.

7. We reaffirm the inalienable right of all NPT Parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in conformity with all their Treaty obligations; compliance and effective verification will not hinder the use of nuclear energy, but rather facilitate its safe and secure development and deployment as energy source. We are committed to promoting nuclear non-proliferation, safeguards, safety and security in cooperation with the IAEA and welcome new initiatives in emerging nuclear energy countries on nuclear education and training as well as institutional capacity building in these fields. We encourage the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply, as effective means of addressing the expanded need for nuclear fuel services, while taking into account the global interest in minimizing the risk of proliferation.

In this regard, we appreciate the ongoing work at the Russian-led International Uranium Enrichment Centre at Angarsk and welcome progress made towards establishing a Nuclear Fuel Bank administered by the IAEA, Russia’s proposal to guarantee supply of low enriched uranium and the further development of Germany’s Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project. We also take note of other initiatives, including Japan’s proposal for an IAEA Standby Arrangement System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply, the UK’s proposal for a political assurance of non-interference in the delivery of commercial nuclear contracts and the U.S. nuclear fuel reserve generated from material from its national security stocks.

8. To reduce the proliferation risks associated with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, equipment and technology, we welcome the progress that continues to be made by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on mechanisms to strengthen controls on transfers of such enrichment and reprocessing items and technology. While noting that the NSG has not yet reached consensus on this issue, we agree that the NSG discussions have yielded useful and constructive proposals contained in the NSG’s “clean text” developed at the 20 November 2008 Consultative Group meeting. Pending completion of work in the NSG, we agree to implement this text on a national basis in the next year. We urge the NSG to accelerate its work and swiftly reach consensus this year to allow for global implementation of a strengthened mechanism on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, equipment, and technology.

9. We acknowledge the UN Security Council’s key role in addressing the challenges of proliferation and the consequences of non compliance. We call upon all States to fully implement UNSC Resolution 1540 on preventing non-State actors from obtaining WMDs, their means of delivery and related materials. We support the 1540 Committee’s fulfilment of its renewed mandate. We encourage all States to participate actively in the comprehensive review of the status of implementation of the Resolution and contribute to its success.

10. We welcome the ongoing progress under the CWC and BTWC and highlight the vital importance of the full and effective implementation of both Conventions.

11. We reiterate our unanimous commitment to working for a comprehensive, peaceful and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and strongly support ongoing efforts to resolve it through negotiations. We urge Iran to use the present window of opportunity for engagement with the international community in a spirit of mutual respect and to respond positively to the offers advanced, in order to find a negotiated solution which will address Iran’s interest as well as the international community concerns. While recognizing once again that Iran has the right to a civilian nuclear program under the NPT, we stress that Iran has the responsibility, as reiterated by UNSC Resolutions, to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear activities, allowing for the establishment of a fruitful and wide-ranging cooperation with the G8 and other countries.

The proliferation risks posed by Iran’s nuclear program continue to be a matter of serious concern. We urge Iran to comply with the relevant UNSC Resolutions and to fully cooperate with the IAEA by providing the Agency such access and information that it requests to resolve the issues raised in the IAEA Director General’s Reports.

12. We condemn in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 25 May 2009 which constitutes a flagrant violation of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. Such a test undermines peace and stability in the region and beyond. In this regard, we welcome the UN Security Council Resolution 1874 of 12 June 2009 which represents the clear and strong will of the international community. We also condemn the April 2009 ballistic launch conducted by the DPRK which is in contravention of UNSCR 1718. We continue to urge the DPRK to abide by UNSCRs 1695, 1718 and 1874, not to conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology and to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as ballistic missile programs, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. We demand the DPRK to return to full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations. We call upon the DPRK to return immediately and without preconditions to the Six-Party Talks and reiterate our strong support for the early resumption of the Talks and the full implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement, including the resolution of all the outstanding issues of concern.

13. The threat of terrorist acquiring WMDs continues to be cause for deep concern. We are determined to continue working together to ensure that terrorists never have access to those weapons and related materials. We look forward to the development of the initiative announced by the President of the United States of America regarding a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world. We will further promote the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), which plays an important role in developing its participants’ capacity to confront this global threat on a determined and systematic basis, consistent with national legal authorities and obligations under relevant international legal frameworks.

14. We maintain our support for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which plays an important part in preventing and countering proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials. We recognize the progress in combating the financing of proliferation activities, and the role of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

15. We will continue to uphold the importance of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), by promoting its universalization and full implementation. In this respect, we are encouraged by the positive developments announced at the 2009 HCoC annual meeting, and are confident that all subscribing States will soon fully implement their commitments. We call upon all States that have not subscribed to the Code to do so without delay.

16. The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction launched in 2002 at Kananaskis has become a successful large-scale initiative for the enhancement of international security. In parallel with the implementation of ongoing priority projects in Russia and Ukraine, to which we fully reconfirm our commitments, we are discussing the options for the Partnership’s further expansion by engaging potential new participants, including CIS countries, committed to the Kananaskis Principles and Guidelines.

The G8 is also ready to include new fields of cooperation in areas where the risks of terrorism and proliferation are greatest. To prevent global WMD knowledge proliferation, particularly through collaboration with scientists, we welcome the Recommendations for a coordinated approach in this field.

17.Regarding nuclear safety, we acknowledge the progress made since the last Summit meeting in ongoing projects at the Chernobyl site and, while noting that additional financial resources will be needed for their completion, we reassert our commitment to undertake joint efforts with Ukraine to convert the site into a stable and environmentally safe condition.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 11 Jul 2009 02:55

Areva submits Indian nuclear reactors bid

Nuke business in top gear in France on eve of PM's visit

The bilateral nuclear cooperation pact, that was inked during Mr. Manmohan Singh's visit to Paris September 30 last year making France the first country to sign such an agreement, has already reached the Senate, upper chamber of the French parliament.

France has also indicated that it's ready to re-process spent fuel at a facility in its territory if India requested for it.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 11 Jul 2009 07:09

sraj wrote:G8 ban is sign India’s nuclear quest is not over
posting in full
Siddharth Varadarajan

2008 was a signal year for Indian diplomacy when a set of international restrictions that had starved the country’s nuclear industry of fuel and equipment for two decades was lifted on terms less restrictive than what Washington — which initiated the drive to make an exception for India — had been prepared to grant New Delhi.

And, more restrictive than what New Delhi was prepared for. Just for the record.

At India’s insistence, enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) items were not excluded but their sale was made conditional on a subsequent agreement that both sides knew would never see the light of day.

Interesting. IF that is true then on what basis could/would one ever think that the US could sell a reactor to India?

Reprocessing of spent fuel was allowed but only in a new, permanently safeguarded facility and that too, under yet-to-be-negotiated arrangements and procedures.

By comparison, the NSG’s exemption made no provision for ‘right of return’ and allowed U.S. competitors to make ENR transfers so long as they were satisfied these would not be misused by India. The spent fuel could also be reprocessed in existing Indian facilities provided the reprocessing was done under safeguards. Net-net, this made non-U.S. reactors more attractive.

Attractive? They would be the only game in town - based on the previous statement (light of day).

The fact that the NSG held intensive consultations on the issue last November was also well known, as was the fact that the U.S. was managing to create a consensus around NPT conditionality, even as other issues like adherence to the Additional Protocol was opposed by some NSG members like Brazil and uranium-rich countries like Canada objected to ENR sales being restricted to so-called black-box technologies which could prevent them from developing their own enrichment know-how.

What is this? I am lost. TIA.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 11 Jul 2009 07:21

May 2008 NSG meeting
Nuclear Export Criteria Lacks Consensus

Leading nuclear exporters at a recent Berlin meeting apparently failed to reach consensus on adopting new criteria to regulate certain sensitive nuclear technology transfers

members of the voluntary Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG ) were debating criteria to limit which countries would be eligible to acquire uranium-enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies

The Bush administration recently signaled a change in course by offering its own criteria ideas. It also proposed that permissible enrichment and reprocessing exports be conducted in ways to impede recipients from replicating the technologies or building their own indigenous facilities.

This later proposal triggered objections from Canada as well as reportedly from fellow NSG member South Africa. Both countries have large uranium deposits but no current enrichment capabilities. Exporters can profit more from selling enriched uranium than just uranium, a consideration that has been assuming greater significance in Ottawa and Pretoria as a growing number of countries eye starting or increasing nuclear energy operations.

Nov 2008 NSG meeting
http://www.armscontrol.org/print/3459

First, the United States has demanded that if enrichment or reprocessing transfers do occur, they should be executed only via "black box" technologies, wherein only the supplier can access and own the technology. Canada, which is the world's largest uranium miner but has no enrichment facilities, opposed this provision, thereby blocking consensus on the package. Second, Brazil, which has rejected signing an additional protocol, has opposed making the protocol a condition for such transfers

They said that, under the proposed new rules, the NSG would consider proposals from other members, such as Canada, to export any enrichment technologies they developed on their own if they adhered to at least "black box" techniques for transfers of that technology.

In a concession to Brazil, the rules would also allow the additional protocol standard to be waived if regional arrangements could offer similar levels of nonproliferation confidence.

Diplomats said that the compromise also would make comprehensive, or full-scope, IAEA safeguards a condition of supply to non-nuclear-weapon states in addition to NPT adherence. This would rule out transfers to those NPT members that have only small quantities protocols (SQPs) with the IAEA.