Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

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RamaY
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by RamaY »

ramana wrote:For starters we need a hundred people to think in national interests.
There are two options; (1) Invigorate the nationalism in "rajan" group, and (2) Make nationalistic people rajans. Arya Chanakya said, “you can win over your opponent either by improving your strength or weakening your enemy, but the right strategy is to gain strength while weakening the opponent”.

I prefer the first option above. We need continual, however small they are, victories to cultivate the idea of India in the "rajan" group as well as mass populace.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by SwamyG »

I prefer the first option above. We need continual, however small they are, victories to cultivate the idea of India in the "rajan" group as well as mass populace.
Did we not have a thread on that subject as well. As the thread on Indian (NRI) elites show us we will have division among the think-tanks too. But that is good for the country in my opinion. Just like I feel we need a strong Left (not the goon varieties but one with ideologies and national interest at heart). Hopefully, after this elections we have more of the latter.

One of the questions would be "What is India?". And we had a thread on that subject. I think the title of this thread has been chosen well as it uses the words "Indian Subcontinent" so it is clear we don't want to bicker about what India is nor not :-) But then a question in some minds would be, is there any implication that India = Indian Subcontinent? If that is the case, then then questions would be a) Is it from territorial point of view, or b) Cultural / Ideological point of view.

After all the meanderings, I think it is safe to assume that many of us have resigned to current political boundaries and these are some of the major areas of interest or summary.
A) We want the PoK territory back.
B) We like Pakistan to be gone.
C) We desire no territorial gains except a direct land route to Central Asia (if possible)
D) We aim for lots of countries to fall into our sphere of influence - cultural, political, trade etc.
Last edited by SwamyG on 20 Jun 2009 10:15, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

SwamyGji,
this thread started with the premise that India was the core, and all the other currently existing political entities on the subcontinent was the periphery. My personal consistent take has been that physical borders are temporary compromises in space and time, to demarcate and preserve identities of the present moment.

India as an entity is an idea, an ideological framework, that includes philosophy, culture and political consciousness all creating a sense of belonging. It is thus not damaged if historically its physical borders shrank. Much more important than preservation of physical borders was the reason physical borders were invented in the first place - to preserve core identities. However, as I will insist again, physical borders are temporary compromises. Just because we shrank once does not mean we make a temporary compromise a permanent scar.

If we as a people and culture of India really think of ourselves as Indians, and legitimate inheritors of Indian culture and world view, then we cannot but see all the people in the subcontinent as Indian, with their ancestry firmly and intimately linked and intermingled with that of our own. These are all "our" people, and if we think of them as family, we cannot shirk our duty to "look after" our family - which means being firm when necessary with unruly family members gone astray and making a nuisance of themselves and the name of the family in the world "outside".

Only when we do not think of them as "blood" and "kin" we raise them on pedestals of "aghnayo" faiths - "minorities", "sects" - subgroups of identities we dare not touch with our sweaty accusing fingers. This has been the line of the Congress and the Left, and perhaps of parties tending to the "right" but deluded into copying the "Left" sometimes - to separate out and push out such groups by marking them as the "special" other - almost like guests in our household, to be always treated courteously and politely - even when they create havoc in our midst.

They are part of our own, our heritage, and we have to deal with them as we would deal with our own - thrash unruly children when necessary, and love when they behave properly - but all under one household.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

What is interesting over the recent spate of Maoist violence, is that all the logic being given against this Maoist stance is against the methodology followed or adopted by the Maoists. So officially and media-wise our consensus is that Maoists have to be eliminated because of their violence. The greatest concession to any ideological consideration that I have come across is simply that the Maoists have to be eliminated because they aim to overthrow the democratically elected GOI through protracted war.

Same is the logic given as to why Jihadi violence cannot be accepted - their method is unacceptable. And what they seek to overthrow, the democratically elected GOI - is the primary reason they are unacceptable. Same is the logic given to why TSP activity against India has to be countered. All three have to be opposed because of just these two reasons.

Why do we stop here? Why do we not go deeper into the analysis of these movements and simply treat them as "law and order problem"?

The primary reason is because all three "hostiles" mentioned above have ideological overlaps with most favourably represented ideologies within India. The Maoists share the glory and rosy halo of Marxists, the Jihadis are of course almost completely ideologically untouchable because they share the same faith ideology with Deobandis and the millions of Ulema, and TSP terror masterminds simply because they are Pakistanis and therefore who supposedly share in the glory and rosy halo of supposedly syncretic Mughlai culture. The ethnic separatists in NE share the glory and rosy halo of the same faith ideology as that propagated by the EJ.

In each and every case, these groups and movements or organizations are firmly based on ideologies which have been glorified and reconstructed as ideologies far superior to those Indic traditions and framework that existed before these ideologies spread on the subcontinent. Because of this glorification, there is an automatic confusion and petrification in the rashtryia structure itself. How can such glorified ideologies give rise to tactics that aim to destroy and overthrow the very rashtryia system that glorified their ideologies? So the only escape route is to treat such acts as purely symptomatic and a law-and-order problem.

The rashtra is confused and not comprehensive and thorough or ruthless in eliminating these movements simply because it cannot clearly adopt an ideological understanding or characterization by which these movements appear as anti-Indian and anti-Indic, not just aginst the GOI or not just because of their violent methodology. This means clearly putting up an ideological framework as the Indic against which all these movements appears as departures and against the fundamental fabric of India as an ideological-political entity.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

One of the things to ponder that Maoist tactical methodology has survived and even grown to an extent from their inception in the late 40's into the subcontinent. Significantly, even after initiation they have only managed to grow in the "Hindu" majority countries - India and Nepal. They had medium level success in SL, but retreated - a country of "Buddhists". They had no success at all in the "Muslim" majority countries of TSP and BD. Maoism represents the most flexible and malleable formations of "Marxism-Leninism" and has the least ideological straightjackets. Their stress is more on the "methodology" and objectives of capturing rashtryia power by constant flexible and mobile warfare. Even lack of land-reforms need not be the sole cause - as in WB, substantial land-reforms have indeed taken place among "mainstream" peasant communities - but Maoists have found their support base among virtually landless agricultural labourers and ethnic "marginals". These are "old experiences" within the Maoist anthology in the beginning days of CCP rise. It was thus Maoism evolved a quite flexible framework to fit in whatever "dispossessed" class it could construct and who would be motivated sufficiently to follow their leadership.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

The retreat from AFG by USA has either started or will start soon under cover of increased reinforcements. It is more likely that the countryside is being increasingly penetrated by the Talebs. The TalebPA will soon go for a large push against Mehsud as a cover for dispersing the Talebs further into AFG south and POK. The PA and ISI will keep the moving Talebs supplied. It will be worthwhile if we can have an analysis on the possible line of the situation developing here.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by shaardula »

B, David Kilcullen
http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10405
Key Document: Triage: The Next 12 Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by Sanku »

shaardula wrote:B, David Kilcullen
http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10405
Key Document: Triage: The Next 12 Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan
A quick summary please?
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

One of the astute tactics that can be adopted by TalebPA' is to admit or declare that military resources, arsenal including nukes have fallen into Taleb hands because the "world" community did not do enough to strengthen the hands of the "civilian government" of TSP. This could include various points of "not doing enough" like Obama not giving more zazyia and more frequently, or India still not dissolving itself, or the subcontinent has till not entirely adopted the Sharia, or Kashmir still not handed over to TSP, etc.

By admitting such loss of hardware as above, the TalebPA at one stroke absolves and diassociates itself from responsiibility ofr the use or non-use of such hardware. In fact, the greater is the pressure to secure nukes away from "Taleb-Qaeda" hands, the greater will be the temptation for the TalebPA-ISI to take this route. The actual use of nukes will still be detrmined by PA strategic needs, and only possibly mediated or influenced by the Chinese, who probably also carry out their own tests through NK. The tactical use of nukes in TalebPA hands will be a combined decision of the regular-PA, the irregular-PA the Talebs, and the PLA. It will be blamed on Talebs only.

India can pre-empt this at least psychologically, if it prepares its northern plains populations seriously and sincerely in facing the consequences of a nuke attack. During this exercise, the possible threat sources should also be categorically declared as the TalebPA combine and PRC. This will firmly associate these two entities as the nuclear blackmailers they really are, in the public mind. It also means a great political disadvantage for both these entities, as they will have to do their best to convince the world that they are not really planning to nuke India.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by ramana »

The millenial pretence of the TSPA devouts need to be called. I think its empty rhetoric just as Prabhakaran who in the end did not take the cyanide capsule that he insisted his underlings should take.

Pakjabis are hardly ghazis who want to die for glory of Islam as Hamid Gul pretends. Zia might have been a towering figure but in the end he got his mangoes if not raisins.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by shaardula »

ramana some variant of what you have said has been said again and again here. uncouple their faith & self image from their actions. but who is going to bell the cat?

the only people who can do this with authority are IM. but we cant force them. the best that can happen is that they realize the oppurtunity that exists in re-claiming primacy in matters of south asian islam. but so far they are mostly imitators. the find offence in cartoons but not in vulgarization of the concept of jihad by pakistanis, for example.

the best rest of us can do is not subscribe to their self description as jihadis but id them as islamic nihilists or something like that.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by ramana »

shaardula wrote:ramana some variant of what you have said has been said again and again here. uncouple their faith & self image from their actions. but who is going to bell the cat?

the only people who can do this with authority are IM. but we cant force them. the best that can happen is that they realize the oppurtunity that exists in re-claiming primacy in matters of south asian islam. but so far they are mostly imitators. the find offence in cartoons but not in vulgarization of the concept of jihad by pakistanis, for example.

the best rest of us can do is not subscribe to their self description as jihadis but id them as islamic nihilists or something like that.
Thats the ajlaf -ashraf divide that keeps the IM silent. With increasing economic prosperity they will find that their self interest is in the rise of India and not in the rise of the narcissists.

In mean time what others can do is highlight the extremism or anti-modernism of the terrorists and their backers. And decouple the word Islam from their actions.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by shaardula »

with the voiceless ajlafs punished for the irresponsible, lazy fantasies of ashrafs?
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by ramana »

No they will find their voices to express their self interests. The Indian state has to protect their voices.

In 1996, my taxi driver from old Hyderabad, who accompanied us on our road trip had a long talk about how he and his cohort have to adapt and reform and acquire new skills to survive in the new economy. He was ensuring his siblings get Convent style English education so they pull themselves and maybe himself up. We need to let them dream big and support them in realizing them.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

Straightforward decoupling of Islam with the actions of supposed "terrorists" might be risky in the sense of confusing us further as regards how the terrorist strand develops and maintains itself. Crucial is to identify the aspects of the faith and its organized structure that emphasizes the jihad aspect. Jihad cannot be completely decoupled from the ideology of Islam, however much non-Islamists try to do it. The task is to prevent the empowering of those leadership within IM who subscribe to the Moududi mindset.

In a way destruction of TSP will destroy the Moududi highlighting of the Jihadi aspect of Islam. it will be too simplistic to wish away the essential Jihadi methodology of Islam. But TSP and the Jihadi aspect have each shaped the other and bolstered each other up to the point they have come to on the subcontinent and the world. Defeating and suppressing the Jihadi aspect of Islam rests on the destruction of two entities - TSP and Saudi Arabia. Destroying these does not mean destruction of Jihad, but weakening of that doctrine substantially.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by ramana »

brihaspati wrote:The Maoists are now probably being allowed to take on the CPI(M), more openly, as part of an understanding with the forces opposing the parliamentary "Left" in WB. We will see more and more attrition against the "Left" in WB. But if a proper "Right" force does not fill up the resulting vacuum, with the Congress type of vacuum ideology sought to be imposed - it will be a field day for an ideology prone populace to take up Maoism or complete social disarray with the Jihadis gaining ground because of BD proximity.

Does the TMC or Congress even hope to fill up the blanks? Congress will never return to WB. WB kicks out political movements once and for all. If the Left goes, it will be for the good. TMC does not have that internal political dynamic to hold on its own the entire WB populace for decades. If these two are allowing the Maoists to expand the way they are, they are making a costly mistake they will regret bitterly in the future.
Alleging that the Trinamool chief is leading the violence from behind the scenes, Ms. Karat said the Maoists and the "Trinamoolis" are killing her party workers and "conspiring to disrupt law and order in the state".

"So far 53 comrades have been killed in the orchestrated brutal attacks which has also got backing of the main opposition party," she said adding that the planned and systematic strategy to weaken Left parties in its bastion by "fascist forces" would be resisted in all forms.

http://news.in.msn.com/national/article ... id=3045658
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by ramana »

Looks like BRF style of using maps to illustrate the points is getting infectious!


Image
Very few policy makers in India dare to acknowledge the danger to the nation's territorial integrity. The security and integrity of the nation has become hostage to vote-bank politics. Democracy and more than eight percent economic growth will be of no avail if the country as such withers away.
India is not only being frayed at its borders by insurgencies, but its very writ in the heartland is becoming increasingly questionable. The rise of a nation is predicated upon unity, peace and stability, which are essentially determined by good governance.

The prevailing security scenario poses the serious question -- Is India's development and economic growth becoming unsustainable due to poor handling of the security? There are three dangers to the territorial integrity that bedevil the nation.

Danger-1

New Delhi and the state capitals have almost ceded the governmental control over 40 percent of the Union's territory to the Naxalites. The Naxals are aided and abetted by the crime mafia that runs its operations in the same corridor from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh, as well as Maoists of Nepal who in turn receive covert support from other powers engaged/interested in destabilising India.

The nexus between the United Liberation Front of Assam and Maoists in Nepal is well established.

In a recent attack in Chhattisgarh, Maoists of India and Nepal were co-participants. There are also reports to suggest that Indian Maoists are increasingly taking to opium cultivation in areas under their control to finance their activities. The Maoist-crime-drug nexus is rather explosive.

Danger-2

The security forces, primarily the Indian Army have held the state of Jammu and Kashmir physically since Independence. The politicians and the bureaucrats have contributed nothing to resolve the situation. The danger has since magnified many times as displayed by the presence of thousands of supporters of the Lashkar-e-Tayiba flying their flags in a recent rally of dissidents.

Under the garb of peace overtures, heavily armed infiltrators with tacit support from the Pakistan military-intelligence establishment continue to make inroads into Kashmir. They are at present lying low, waiting for an opportune moment for vicious strikes on several fronts to undermine the Indian Union. This ghost force reared its head in a recent rally organised by Syed Shah Geelani. Pakistan and its sympathisers in India are working in a highly synchronised fashion for demilitarisation of the valley.

Simultaneously, there is an insidious campaign to malign the Indian Army on one pretext or the other as part of the psywar being waged by the ghost force under Islamabad's directions.

After all the wars, export of terrorism, inconsistent and weak policies by New Delhi, Islamabad could not win Kashmir only because the Indian Army held its ground. If the ghost force succeeds in making locals rise against the army, it will be an unprecedented achievement for Islamabad.

The talk of demilitarisation and the campaign to repeal Armed Forces Special Powers Act, are therefore merely ploys that aim to achieve the Kashmir objective even as the Pakistan establishment expands its tentacles not only within the valley but in other parts of India as well.

While the Pakistan dispensation talks of peace, terrorist cells are proliferating in the country including new frontiers in southern part of India. Islamic fundamentalism/terrorism footprints, as evidenced by the Bangalore-centered incidents, are too glaring to be ignored.

Islamic terrorism in the garb of freedom fighting in Kashmir is therefore de-stabilising the entire country. Islamabad is determined to use Kashmir as a gateway/launching pad to rest of India.

Danger-3

Given a modicum of political will, Danger-I and II may still be manageable, however, Danger III to its territorial integrity in the northeast may prove to be the most difficult. In fact the entire northeast can easily be unhooked on multiple counts from the Union. First, these are low populated areas having contiguity with the most densely populated and demographically aggressive country in the world, Bangladesh. The country has also emerged as a major source of Islamic fundamentalism which impacts grievously on the northeast.

To add to these woes, New Delhi because of sheer vote-bank politics legitimised illegal migration for 22 years through the vehicle of Illegal Migrants (determination by tribunals) Act, 1983. Many border districts now have a majority population constituting illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. In the near future, this leverage will be used to create an internal upheaval against the Centre as in the case of the valley.

It's a classic Islamic fundamentalist principle of asymmetric warfare. What cannot be achieved by conventional wars can be done through infiltration and subsequently internal subversion. They call it jihad!

Second, the northeast if not addressed appropriately could unhook from the Union before the valley given the acute vulnerability of the Siliguri Corridor, which is merely 10 to 20 kilometres wide and 200 kilometres long. If this critical corridor is choked or subverted or severed by force, the Union of India will have to maintain the northeast by air. With poor quality of governance for which the country is infamous, the local population may gravitate towards other regional powers.

Third, with China's claim over Arunachal Pradesh becoming more strident, as evidenced by its recent stance on Tawang, the danger to the Siliguri Corridor stands enhanced. This corridor has been facing internal turmoil for many years. The area may well be further subverted by inimical regional powers.

Chinese intention to bargain for Tawang to secure Tibet is deceptive. Subsequently, it would covet entire Arunachal Pradesh to protect Tawang. The Chinese are known for expanding their areas of strategic interests with time unlike the Indians who are in a tearing hurry to convert the Siachen Glacier into a 'mountain of peace' or the LoC into a 'line of peace' or equating Pakistan as an equal victim of terrorism.

It is a matter of grave concern that New Delhi is so prone to issue statements without thinking it through, as long as it appeases the adversary even temporarily. Therefore, the northeast -- with the internal turmoil in the Siliguri Corridor, with low population surrounded by overpopulated Bangladesh exporting Islamic terrorism under tutelage of Islamabad, with China gaining influence in Nepal and Bangladesh and its upping the ante on Tawang -- the danger to the region is grave.

Manipur is a stark indicator. The insurgents have nearly weaned the state from the Indian Union. The writ of the Indian Union has ceased to operate; insurgents, compelling people to turn to South Korean music and films, ban Hindi music and films. :?:

New Delhi continues to fiddle while the northeast burns which in turn poses a grave problem to the territorial integrity of the Union of India. The world once again is getting polarised into two camps after the end of the Cold War -- democracies and authoritarian regimes of all hues, which includes Islamists, Communists, and the Maoists. Their perspectives are totally totalitarian. Therefore with China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal (Maoists), being neighbours, the danger to the Indian territorial integrity stands enhanced.

Bharat Verma is Editor, Indian Defence Review
LINK
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by Pulikeshi »

ramana wrote:Looks like BRF style of using maps to illustrate the points is getting infectious!
Nah - its missing strange arrows, odd lines that intersect the map, etc. :P
Mr. Verma has much to learn from BRF yet :mrgreen:
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

It worries me a bit that the sundry ministers of GOI are out in a sweat declaring revolutions in their respective domains to be carried out within the first hundred days. Are they so much taken in and taken "by" the US speak, that they think the first 100 days of honeymoon supposedly enjoyed by every newly elected US president, also has rubbed off on India? So much so that within this period of smooching all around, things have to be hurried through?

This appear too much of a break neck speed, and things are not being thought out. Is there any non-public domain information that makes MMS and party panic? What is it that they fear, now since political stability is assured, that they have to let the ministers make rash statements on the fly. From such wily and seasoned characters like Kapil Sibal, some of the statemenets regarding "education reform" appeared staggeringly naive and completely disjoint from the realities of financial-political-nexus realpolitik.

Any reasoned hypotheses?
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by ramana »

All those plans are by babus which gathering dust due to many factors. So what happening is there is a selection of those projects which can be implemented fast while there is a honeymoon period for the new govt. If something good happens lets cheer. A lot of proposals were lockedup due to paralysis in last govt. Yes its US speak but then what else is new.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

It is worrying because too much enthusiasm to show something "new" "done" "fast", appears to be throwing up proposals which are definitely going to be against the interests of many existing power and "exchange" relationships. In the end, the survival instincts of the current crop in LOI will mean sacrifices and meatballs made out of a lot of essentially good proposals whihc can then be very difficult to revive in the future because of the bad name they have earned.

Also the hurry is something worrying from a strategic viewpoint, because if they are hurrying for some expected bottleneck, then that bottleneck itself could be a point of concern. In any case, water-wars on the subcontinent could itself be a far greater trigger than any envisioned nuke "har-meggido".
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

Monsoon difficulties can have impact not only inside India, but also in the periphery of the subcontinent. Crisis in water resources can be a further weapon to distract India, in the hands of TSP, or BD. Water management crisis overall in the subcontinental core-periphery model is something we have not accounted for very much compregensively in the strategic sense. We have discussed this sporadically in different threads. Can we have an over all analysis or discussion with particular attention to developing, using and managing conflict situations keeping the core-periphery model?
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

The Maoists knew very well that the area they chose for the showdown could not be maintained as "fluid base area" for long. But even then they did it. My proposition was to find a pattern in electoral weaknesses of the Congress in states that see spectacular Maoist violence. Now the model can be that, at an opportune moment the leftists/separatists/religious fanatics strike and create public outrage. This can of course be facilitated by undercover secret services personnel who have infiltrated these outfits. Externally, foreign secret services can trigger the same in coordination with domestic counterparts, and through NGO's or faith based structures.

The centre sends in its crack forces, scores spectacular success. This sends a clear message to those in the states who want to survive, as to which side their votes should land up. Obviously this strategy has its limitations. Foreign secret services would not want their field resources to be destroyed too much. Congress itself may not want these resources to be fully destroyed as they can come in handy in political bargaining.

This can mean a strange "moonwalking", where spectacular initial gains against the Maoists/separatists will appear to peter out a bit, and the "struggle" becomes much more protracted than initial indications. In WB itself, I would see a certain section of the Congress strategists already planning to bolster the Left a bit, at least as potential viable opposition in the state Assembly, to keep TMC in line.

But how far will this politicization be beneficial for India? The USA nurtured the Talebs and the Qaeda, and used them for its own "dirty" wars to score political points. The end result is a frankenstein. And a lot of innocent bystanders getting seriously hurt.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

As a completely different angle to think of (compared to the recent posts), is the issue of rather surprising and dramatic publicity of IA increasing its visibility and presence in NE. If I trusted in my instincts, I would trust in the Chanakyan mind games that GOI plays from time to time, (shall we say inadvertently or innocently if no one minds for we must implicitly trust any GOI and never even express our doubts) on its own people, and that the GOI has planned some new initiatives in bringing Indo-PRC relationship to new and peaceful heights. Hence all the postrurings of a tough line.

But there is a deeper alternative thinking, which I am sure the GOI is not thinking. Why do we still have to give the Silk Route on land through CAR the mythic status that the Europeans have given it? Why do we not define the new Silk-route through both land and sea from the Persian Gulf through India and along the coast and Indian Ocean on the eastern shores of Bay of Bengal to SE Asia? The importance of the Silk Route was primarily because it connected two sources, India and China on the east with sinks around the Mediterranean.

Why not create a much larger source and sink in the southern hemisphere? Connect the dots bewteen South America, southern Africa, India, and SE Asia? Massive increases in shipping technology and capacity, IT, both food and soft products and even skills as merchandise, can make the Sil Route a pale shadow of its reouted glory. In fact, India and Iran are currently uniquely placed to serve as lateral conduits, cross railways sidings if you say, to connect this much bigger potential Indian Ocean "gold route" and the older, necessarily limited Silk Route.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

Is it possible that we are seeing a repeat of the scenario that developed around Sanjay Gandhi? A group of "young guns" who act as think-tank and carry out their pet projects? Maybe the babus are not at all behind this sudden scurry of proposals but a small group like so-called experts of the category of Sashi Tharoor (likely to be the real "cabinet minister" overshadowing S.M.Krishna). MB's speech and proposal looks like a hurried job from such unripe "youthful" think tank.

It increasingly looks like the new crop of GOI ministerial initiative products of "not thought out", over-enthusiastic "youth" who obviously do not recognize their own limitations. Nothing against "youth" proper, for people like RG(jnr) or Tharoor are no longer in their youthful prime either - in fact the former is only two years junior to our very own intrepid law-drafter, RM - who shows much greater tenacity and seriousness and maturity of purpose. Indians in the past have shown far greater talents, at far younger age - like Shivaji for example.

The problems I see with a repeat of the "Sanjay" phenomenon, is that, a plethora of such half-baked initiatives will be manna for a host of western interests who can then make the new coterie and regime, dependent on western inputs and support to face resulting crises. Internally, this can mean chaos which needs a repeat of the "emergency" "procedure".
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by Atri »

X-posted from babri dhaga...
brihaspati wrote:It has allowed the commisssion to wrap it up now, because the Congress for some unknown reason, is in a hurry. It thinks it has to sort out all outstanding issues in a jiffy, probably a time frame of one to two years, after which for some reason things could go rough. Doing anything concrete is problematic as it raises an issue more likely to be utilized by the BJP, doing nothing shows that the Congress is as cynical a manipulator of religious commitments on "all" sides as any other political player in field.
I am worried about this underlined part, Brihaspati ji.. Somehow, I had this strong feeling as well, but I was unable to express it in words.. My regards..

I wish, INC does not do something stupid in its hurry to wrap things up in its desire to emerge as problem solver. My reference is towards kashmir... Either relinquishing Kashmir to be in good books of unkil.. or a half baked military offensive to win back PoK... Either way, bhaarat will suffer serious consequences...
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

Chironji,
My hope is that GOI is playing the Chinese bluff properly, and raising a din in the NE, knowing fully well that the real attack is going to come from the NW. But it could equally be playing a dead end game. The political forces behind this GOI are permanently hamstrung because their exceptional insistence and maintenance of "diversity" and "separate minority communities" stems from a deep rooted feeling of distrust of the "other" - from the time of JLN's sudden swings in moods towards the Muslim League. They can therefore always feel shaky about any offensive action taken against TSP as to how it would affect the Ummah, both inside and outside. This gives the military a handicap. They will however be very defensive about giving up on territiry - once again, not knowing for sure how that would go down with the non-chalant "majority community". Any factor that unifies the latter is the worst possible nightmare for such a GOI, as well as a wide range of foxes sitting in the Anglo-Saxon world.

So it is stalemate action. The Congress may toy with the idea of bartering territory for peace now, and I guess a lot of the potential "young guns" care a fib about territiory in that part of the country, given the number of pious hopes about converting the LOC to IB seemingly increasing. But the older generation still within the Congress will be shaky about the potential political impact. So I do not think that stalemate within the Congress between the "old" and the "new" will be quickly resolved. The older, and wizened politicians are probably now pretending to "bend before" the "young" wind, but they are doing it in classic sabotage style - by allowing certain things to go through that will discredit the "young guns" thoroughly, but still not be drastic enough so that their own political base gets damaged in backlash. Kashmir will be such an issue where this internal stalemate will prevail.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

Is it possible that GOI is actually moving along a trajectory as "proposed" by UK, in implementing a model of the "Irish peace accord" in Kashmir?

There is a curious but dangerous for India, theory, ‘Mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS), proposed by William Zartman. When and why conflicting parties are amenable to resolve conflict is a basic assumption underlying the “Ripeness theory”, advocated by Zartman. Zartman contends that “Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so — when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At that ripe moment, they grab on to proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that only now appear attractive.”

The concept of a ‘ripe moment’ centres on the parties' perception of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS), optimally associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe. Zartman has formulated six propositions delineating important elements and components of MHS model. They are:

Proposition 1. Ripeness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the initiation of negotiations, bilateral or mediated.

Proposition 2. (Definitional): If the (two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution (i.e., for negotiations toward resolution to begin).

Proposition 3. An MHS contains objective and subjective elements, of which only the latter are necessary and sufficient to its existence.

Proposition 4. If the parties’ subjective expressions of pain, impasse, and inability to bear the costs of further escalation, related to objective evidence of stalemate, data on numbers and nature of casualties and material costs, and/or other such indicators of an MHS can be found, along with expressions of a sense of a way out, ripeness exists.

Proposition 5. (a) Once ripeness has been established, specific tactics by mediators can help seize the ripe moment and turn it into negotiations; (b) If only objective elements of ripeness exist, specific tactics by mediators can bring the conflicting parties to feel/understand the pain of their mutual stalemate and turn to negotiations.

Proposition 6. The perception of a mutually enticing opportunity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the continuation of negotiations to the successful conclusion of a conflict.

MHS needs to address/contain resistant reaction, whether stemming from perseverance, agent escalation, true belief, or ideological cultures and back it up with Mutually Enticing Opportunities (MEOs). The negotiations pushed by MHS are likely to be unstable unless they are supported by the prospects for a more attractive future to pull the parties out of the conflict. This could be engineered by a “formula for settlement and prospects of reconciliation that negotiating (may) design during negotiations.”


The solution for the Irish "problem" was proposed along this way. There are intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic as well as in India, like Sumantra Bose, who could be the fronts for broaching such ideas about Kashmir.

Irish model : Democratic Institutions in N Ireland

A 108-member Assembly elected by proportional representation and a 14-member executive body in Northern Ireland in which both Catholic and Protestant political representatives sit together in government. This is only the second time such power-sharing has occurred since 1920 (the first was the short-lived Sunningdale Agreement of 1973-74).

The Assembly is capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, in the areas of finance, education, environment, health, social services, economic development and agriculture and is subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of both communities. The Agreement also established a consultative Civic Forum to support the work of the Assembly. The power-sharing executive body of ten ministers drawn from four political parties plus the First and Deputy First Ministers, is the effective government.

Following a referendum, the Northern Ireland Assembly was constituted under the Northern Ireland (Elections) Act 1998. On 25 June 1998, 108 members were elected to the new Assembly. None of the UUP candidates who opposed the Good Friday Agreement was elected. Moreover, the DUP and other anti-agreement parties failed to secure the 30 seats necessary to impede the work of the Assembly. However, the Northern Ireland government was not constituted until a year later, and brought to a standstill over the issue of IRA decommissioning.

Kashmir model: Institutionalising Intra-Kashmiri dialogue/Devising new structures in reconstituted Kashmir

Institutionalisation of intra-Kashmiri dialogue within IHK and AJK and between the Indian and Pakistani zones of Kashmir. Drawing up new structures and arrangements that would give way to the existing political, administrative and constitutional structures as a result of permanent solution of Kashmir.

I would guess that the UK would construct demographic homogeneity within POK, completely suppressing the Shia sectarian and other ethnic opposition to greater control by GOTSP, and highlight demographic fractures within Indian side of Kashmir.

Irish model: North-South Ministerial Council

The Belfast Agreement established a North-South Ministerial Council that deals with the totality of relationships within the island of Ireland. The Council was established to bring together those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland. The Council meets in plenary format twice a year, in specific sectoral formats on a regular basis, and in an appropriate format to consider institutional or cross-sectoral matters and to resolve disagreement. All Council decisions to be by agreement between the two sides. Areas for North-South co-operation include agriculture, education, transport, environment, waterways, social security/social welfare, tourism, inland fisheries and health.

Kashmir model: Cross-border cooperation/Softening boundaries & Sovereignty in Kashmir

This means softening of boundaries across the reconstituted zones of Kashmir and gradually developing economic cooperation on transport, tourism, trade and commerce, environment, agriculture, cultural cooperation and management of water resources. This require a cross-border structure and as per the Irish model (North–South Ministerial Council) a Srinagar-Muzaffarabad Ministerial Council for Cooperation. The sop that can be held for GOI, or more correctly a sop for the Indian commons by the GOI and NC, the concoction that in return for gradual cooperation between the two parts of Kashmir giving Indian Kashmir an indirect, limited say in the affairs of POK.

Irish model: British-Irish Council/ British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference

The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC) was to set up under a new British-Irish Agreement dealing with their totality of relationships and incorporates both the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council and the Intergovernmental Conference established under the 1985 Agreement. The BIIC brings together the two governments “to promote bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of mutual interest’. The Conference was to meet as required at summit level (Prime Minister and Taoiseach). Otherwise, governments were to be represented by appropriate ministers. Advisers, including police and security advisers, attend as relevant. All decisions were to be arrived at by agreement between both governments. The BIIC recognises “Irish Government's special interest in Northern Ireland” on non-devolved matters on which it may forward views and proposals. The co-operation within the framework of the Conference includes facilitation of co-operation in security matters. The Conference also deals with the areas of rights, justice, prisons and policing in Northern Ireland (unless and until responsibility is devolved to a Northern Ireland administration).

Kashmir model: India-Pakistan Kashmir Council (IPKC) /India-Pakistan Intergovernmental Conference


Two mutually reinforcing structures could be identified on the pattern of BIC and BIIC. These could be India-Pakistan Kashmir Council (IPKC) and India-Pakistan Intergovernmental Conference (IPKIC). The India-Pakistan Kashmir Council (IPKC) could be set up to promote harmonious and mutually beneficial development of totality of relationships between India-Pakistan and the people of Kashmir. Membership may comprise representatives of the governments of India, Pakistan and that of reconstituted Kashmir. The Council will provide a platform to discuss, consult and reach agreement on cooperation on matters of mutual interest, i.e. transport links, agriculture, trade, environment, health, education, and cultural issues and approaches to SAARC issues. It may take decision on common policies and common actions. The council may operate by consensus.

The India-Pakistan Intergovernmental Conference (IPKIC) would bring together the Indian and Pakistani governments to promote bilateral cooperation at all levels on all matters of mutual interest. All decisions will be by agreement between both governments. IPKIC would recognise Pakistan’s special interest in Kashmir (as British government did in the case of the Irish Republic (in relation to Northern Ireland) on issues of mutual concern arising in relation to Kashmir. These would include non-devolved matters such as cooperation in security matters, policing and the areas of human rights and justice. Of particular importance would be the demilitarisation of the Kashmir Valley and joint guarantees by India and Pakistan to a quasi-sovereign status of the reconstituted Kashmir Valley. In this context, the IPKIC will intensify cooperation between the two governments on the all-Kashmir or cross-border aspects of matters of mutual interest. Relevant executive members of the reconstituted Kashmir governments will be involved in the meetings of the IPKIC, and in the reviews on non-devolved matters.


(1) A.G. Noorani, “Irish lessons for Kashmir”, Frontline, Chennai, volume 20, no. 7, March 29-April 11, 2003.
(2) Sumantra Bose, “Kashmir: sources of conflict, Dimensions of Peace”, Survival, vol. 41. no. 3. Autumn 1999;
(3) Balraj Puri, “An irrelevant model”, Frontline, 7 June 2003. Radha Kumar, “Learning from others”, <http://www.india-seminar.com/2000.496/ 496%20radh%20kumar.htm>.
(4) Shaikh Tajammal-ul-Islam, “Irish model for Kashmir”, The News, Islamabad/Rawalpindi, 19 March 2003.
(5) “Conflict resolution in the changing world”, in International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, National Academy of Sciences. National Academies Press http://www.nap.edu, 2000, p.1.
(6) John Burton, 'Conflict Resolution as a Political System' in Vamik Volkan, et al (eds), The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work. Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1991
(7) Sundeep Waselkar, A Handbook for Conflict Resolution in South Asia, Konark Publishers Pvt, Ltd. p.4.
(8) John Burton, 'Conflict Resolution in the changing world”, in International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War.
(9) William Zartman. “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond”, in International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, op.cit., pp.228-243.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

An undercurrent of the above model would provide at least one explanation why TSP will continuously try (and probably being encouraged to do so) to drive the situation to where hopefully GOI will agree to perceive a MHS. This could be a sign that TSP's primary western backers, USA and UK are weary of supporting and bolstering the TSP regime at indefinite cost for the future. Thus they would indirectly encourage TSP stepping up terrorist pressure and publicize about the "Kashmir connection" so that ultimately the MHS model can be implemented.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

From Uighur discussion thread, it comes to my mind that we need to take into account the long term role of ideology in developments that go on around the subcontinent.

Look at the Uighur-Tibet issue from the Indic viewpoint and Indian interests, without being emotional. It is not just about perception of rights of self-determination and self-assertion by any population. We should also think of the long term consequences of any separatism. The Uighurs have long been almost completely Islamized. Any separate ethnic and traditional pre-Islamic cultural identity or elements are likely to be increasingly eroded in the days of mass-communication and electrinic or media penetration of isolation. The existing Islamization will make the Uighurs much more vulnerable to Wahabi or Sunni preaching for Jihad, and no other ideologies can compete given that all other memes have been carefully edited out of the Uighur consciousness.

Moreover, the Uighurs are likely to get inclined towards Wahabi Jihadism from very practical tactical considerations. Since no international forum committed ideologically (formally - need not be in reality) to "democracy" have come forward in their favour, they would find the Jihadi ideology the only hope of gaining any leverage or international support. The Islamic powers may remain formally silent and non-committal. But they have a wonderful weapon in "non-state" actors, and they can always activate their terror networks in Uighur support. However this they will do under a complicated and delicate balance of considerations about how far they want to and risk their own interests in "milking" PRC. The covert support of Uighurs can be a good leverage point in bargaining with PRC for more concessions.

From the Indic viewpoint and interest, we must consider that we can revel here on BRF in bashing those who apparently "bash religions", but the reality of the proselytizing branches of the Abrahamic religions cannot be simply swept under the carpet. We cannot afford to allow the expansion of Islamic zones of influence, especially greater accession of Islamics to any form of state power and international recognition around the Indian subcontinent.

By this criterion, Tibetan nationalism has to be supported for a future free Tibetan Republic. The Uighur movement can only be encouraged to the point that PRC has to tie in more military resources in Xinjiang. In fact such a case was made by me in the future strategic scenario thread long ago. My line was exactly this - that we do everything possible to flank the core of Han Chinese power base. We encourage Xinziang disturbances and increase our military presence and penetartion in SE-Asia towards South China Sea. This implies the PLA has to divide and give more attention to this two widely separated theatres of potential war. I had also suggested encouraging the Talebs to either "travel" from North Pak to Xinjiang and settle there or face complete and systematic liquidation (the only way that Jihadis can be finished off - encircle populations and regions, shift them to secure bases, filter and liquidate Jihadis and systematically destroy all elements that can help human survival in the medium term in the areas vacated). This way we move the frontline to NE China and push back the PLA from the Karakorums.

This critical analysis must be undertaken also for SE Asia. What should be our attitude if in the future some of the areas of Indonesia dominated by non-Muslims, tend to take up "separatism" as a means of preserving their cultural and fight any perception of socio-economic injustice? What about potential conflicts again in Malaysia?
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by Atri »

brihaspati wrote:This critical analysis must be undertaken also for SE Asia. What should be our attitude if in the future some of the areas of Indonesia dominated by non-Muslims, tend to take up "separatism" as a means of preserving their cultural and fight any perception of socio-economic injustice? What about potential conflicts again in Malaysia?
I don't know about Malaysia, but if such Separatist movement starts in Indonesia, it will be detrimental to India's control over Indian ocean.

The identity of India and Indian-ness is still in the process of rejuvenation. Until that is done, India lacks the purpose of interfering in internal affairs of Indonesia.

This is not the case with Malaysia as they are radicalised to large extent, thereby stirring the soft corner in the hearts of Hindus. In case of Indonesia, however, it will be tricky as even the hardcore right wing of Hindu nationalists cite Indonesia's example of Sanskritized Islam. The probability of this happening in Malaysia is a bit more than it is in Indonesia. But such revolts will force GOI to define itself and its stand on Hindutva.

Strategically, Indonesia having favourable attitude towards India is more important for India than Malaysia.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by RajeshA »

brihaspati wrote:Moreover, the Uighurs are likely to get inclined towards Wahabi Jihadism from very practical tactical considerations. Since no international forum committed ideologically (formally - need not be in reality) to "democracy" have come forward in their favour, they would find the Jihadi ideology the only hope of gaining any leverage or international support. The Islamic powers may remain formally silent and non-committal. But they have a wonderful weapon in "non-state" actors, and they can always activate their terror networks in Uighur support. However this they will do under a complicated and delicate balance of considerations about how far they want to and risk their own interests in "milking" PRC. The covert support of Uighurs can be a good leverage point in bargaining with PRC for more concessions.

From the Indic viewpoint and interest, we must consider that we can revel here on BRF in bashing those who apparently "bash religions", but the reality of the proselytizing branches of the Abrahamic religions cannot be simply swept under the carpet. We cannot afford to allow the expansion of Islamic zones of influence, especially greater accession of Islamics to any form of state power and international recognition around the Indian subcontinent.
Brihaspati ji,

In the short term, :) , I think that Asia is likely going to be a tug of war between Han Chinese, Indics and Islamists, and to some extent US-led West and a dying Russia.

At the moment, Chinese and the Islamists have a stronger hand. Our walls against both the PRC and the Islamists are relatively weak. Both can encroach upon us. The Indics have a chance only if these two also happen to be in a tussle for power. Far too long, China has avoided Islamic ire and attention, perhaps by going into a partnership with the Islamists (Pakistan, and others). They did it on the premise of a common adversary - USA.

USA however is also leaking power, while China is on the rise. As China rises, the wolves will start baying for its blood also. It is natural. Islam too would turn its attention to the Chinese. It has to do with the question of dominance in Asia. India needs time for national consolidation, economic growth and military build-up. Just as China used the intermezzo as USA went head-to-head with the Muslim world, in order to build-up its economy, India too would need Chinese preoccupation with other matters, in order to have a chance at catching up.

Unlike Indians, Chinese like to hit back. Just like the Americans. So there is a chance that like America, China too can get bogged down in some military adventure, though hopefully not with India. Uyghuristan is one such marsh. China could hit back hard against its Islamist adversaries, which can inflame the situation enough to waken the larger Islamist ire against it.

In order to bog down China, India just does not have too many options. Which other people, other than the Islamists and Jihadis are willing to take up the challenge of endless war? Nobody!

So in order to bring about a balance of power in the region, it is imperative that Chinese and Islamists have a proper tussle. Otherwise PRC's rise is assured.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by ramana »

Huntington in his book "Clash of Civilizations" was worried about a Sino-Islamic alliance. The Uigher fire could have been stoked to preclude that.

My hopes are that a deCommunised PRC will revert to Indic sphere if the West leaves them alone. However the evanjihadis wont leave them alone. In fact communist PRC was a result of the growth Christian movement in Imperial China. Mao Tse Tung attended Yale Divinity School In China! So the struggle for post Commie China will be between Indic ideas and evanjihadi forces. In a perverse way the British hopes to evangelize India by Macaulayite education were realized in China for it was modern education that turned the elite towards Commie movement.

In my view all Sunni Islam will get Wahabised. The reason is its an Arabist revivial in Islam, after the loss of control after Persia fell to Islamic political power. The Sufi strain was developed to Islamise the Turks and with Ottomon decline, meaning Sufis on the wane, we see rise of Arabist Islam(Wahabi) in Arabia and in parts of North India(Deobandi). So in the big picture what we see are a hammer (Wahabi) and anvil (Deobandi) approach to re-Arabise Islam. The Deobandi anvil prevents the adherents to escape the Wahabi hammer to the Indic stream. The West sees this as a good thing for they fear Arab nationalism based on modernity and KSA is under their umbrella aka chaatra chaaya. Its the old Wilfrid Scawen Blunt plan and all this was before oil was found in Arabian peninsula.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

RajeshAji,
I agree with most of your comments in the post above. Only where I would like to differ, is that I think Russia is not dying, and it is Han China which is dying. Islamists are yet to reach their peak. USA is at the same stage essentially as where the British empire was in 1920's. It thinks that it is at the top of the world, and fears that any move in any direction will take it down from the top, paralyzing it in fear. The antidote to EJism in PRC is revival of the Buddhist orders as the core dharmic in its Indic form may not be acceptable to the Hans now within a short few generations because of mental association with India's majority. There are some discernible patterns in Russia, China and Indian historical peaks and troughs. Russia is now on an upward slope. India is too, but its cycles are complicated.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by brihaspati »

There is some line of thought within the Europeans that seeks to have bragaining between India and PRC on India, and Japans permanent membership of the UNSC, in return for Indian "concessions". The nature of possible concessions that PRC can demand obviously include territorial claims. But it can also extend to indirect further curtailment of India's reach by insisting on concessions on "Kashmir", Tibet, access and presence in the IO, etc.

Our PM's stringently rising voice about UNSC reforms is a bit curious, not to say potentially worrying. What other concessions (other than I mentioned) can be sought to be squeezed out of India in return for a steady seat at UNSC?
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by darshhan »

brihaspati wrote:RajeshAji,
I agree with most of your comments in the post above. Only where I would like to differ, is that I think Russia is not dying, and it is Han China which is dying. Islamists are yet to reach their peak. USA is at the same stage essentially as where the British empire was in 1920's. It thinks that it is at the top of the world, and fears that any move in any direction will take it down from the top, paralyzing it in fear. The antidote to EJism in PRC is revival of the Buddhist orders as the core dharmic in its Indic form may not be acceptable to the Hans now within a short few generations because of mental association with India's majority. There are some discernible patterns in Russia, China and Indian historical peaks and troughs. Russia is now on an upward slope. India is too, but its cycles are complicated.
Brihaspatiji , But if you look at the demographic statistics it is Russia which is at severe disadvantage.It's population is declining at an extremely fast pace.It is projected that due to the negative population growth Russia's population will fall to 80 million some time in future.Some of our states have more people(UP,Maharashtra etc).Large parts of eastern russia will be depopulated and you can bet chinese immigrants will fill their place.

Now some will say that even china's birth rate is down because of one child policy but they already have such a huge population that they still wouldn't be short on manpower.

Also if you compare the economies of russia and china you will find that China's economy is much more diversified and advanced.By advanced I mean manufacturing,services and value addition.In contrast Russia's economy depends almost completely on energy and mineral exports.They also generate a little bit from their defense products.In all the other sectors Russia is far behind.In fact the instance oil prices go down Russia's economy starts feeling the pinch.

Even in central asian republics where Russian influence was dominant the chinese are now muscling in.Ditto for Africa.

I would myself like Russia to do better.But at this point of time Chinese are ahead.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by RamaY »

brihaspati wrote:There is some line of thought within the Europeans that seeks to have bragaining between India and PRC on India, and Japans permanent membership of the UNSC, in return for Indian "concessions". The nature of possible concessions that PRC can demand obviously include territorial claims. But it can also extend to indirect further curtailment of India's reach by insisting on concessions on "Kashmir", Tibet, access and presence in the IO, etc.

Our PM's stringently rising voice about UNSC reforms is a bit curious, not to say potentially worrying. What other concessions (other than I mentioned) can be sought to be squeezed out of India in return for a steady seat at UNSC?
If UNSC seat costs India POK+Kashmir, Tibet, Access and Presence for PRC in IO then it is not worth it. A UNSC seat will cost (converted in $$$ terms) not more than $100B-$250B, IMO, if properly executed. Losing POK+Kashmir+Tibet+Control of IO is worth more than couple of trillion $$$ IMO.

The point is there are some things a nation can change with internal cohession and three are few things that a nation cannot change without going to war (type options).

will post the updated graphic tomorrow...
Last edited by RamaY on 11 Jul 2009 07:17, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by svinayak »

Where is Russia in this
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by RamaY »

Acharya wrote:Where is Russia in this
Oops....

Will add and repost. Do we need any other nations? How about P5+G8+BRIC?
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Re: Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

Post by RamaY »

Here we go...

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