J & K news and discussion

AbhishekD · Post by **AbhishekD** » 27 Jun 2009 06:14

I think this attack indicates to some level the success of PA push in Swat. The Taliban from Swat could go towards Islamabad or towards Kashmir. First, they tried to go towards Islamabad and they were beaten back from there. There is a possibility that we may see more taliban action in POK in coming months.

Indian Security Forces have be to extra vigilant in coming months to stave off any taliban attack in Indian Kashmir.

p_saggu · Post by **p_saggu** » 27 Jun 2009 06:26

There is going to be no specific "Taliban" attack on Kashmir (At least on our side). A terrorist is a terrorist and will meet his 72 as soon as he's cornered and killed like a rat.

I think all the ranting about a "Taliban in Kashmir" should be left to dhimmi DDMs

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 27 Jun 2009 12:59

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethnic_Gro ... ad_Kashmir

vsudhir · Post by **vsudhir** » 27 Jun 2009 15:36

BJP opposes demand for withdrawal of Armed Forces Act in J&K

Why has this clamor for AFSPA withdrawal found traction suddenly with GoI, I wonder. In any case, I hope they replace AFSPA with something equivalent. Recovering lost ground from the terroristi will be costly in IA lives. Prevention better than cure and all that.

Y I Patel · Post by **Y I Patel** » 29 Jun 2009 03:58

Regarding gradual transfer of power to J&K Police. Given what happened in the late '80s and 90s, there is some natural concern about relying too much on J&K Police. However, over the long term, there is no security agency better suited to securing lasting peace in J&K. Lest we forget, here is an old piece from BRF that currently resides in the military issues archives:

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... f=13&t=315

a_kumar · Post by **a_kumar** » 30 Jun 2009 00:19

Banned Pakistani groups 'expand'

Page last updated at 18:28 GMT, Monday, 29 June 2009 19:28 UK
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Banned Pakistani groups 'expand'
Syed Shoaib Hasan
BBC News, Islamabad

Militant groups banned in Pakistan are expanding operations and recruitment in Pakistani-run Kashmir, according to a government report seen by the BBC.

The observations are from a detailed secret report submitted to the region's government on the groups' activities in the city of Muzaffarabad and elsewhere.

Pakistan banned the groups in 2002 after an attack on India's parliament brought the two states close to war.

There was no immediate comment on the revelations from Pakistan's government.

Pakistan's allies, including the US, have expressed fears regarding the groups' proliferation and their close links to al-Qaeda.

Cover for militancy

It finds that three banned groups - Harkatul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba - are active in Muzaffarabad.

Harkatul Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammad are said to be planning to open madrassas, or Islamic schools, in the city where Lashkar-e-Taiba is already operating a madrassa.

"No officials are allowed to enter these premises to gather any sort of information," the report says.

"We fear these madrassas maybe a cover for furthering militant activities."

The report also elaborates how the militant groups are growing in size and number across Kashmir.

It especially mentions the Neelum district, where they are said to be at their most powerful.

The report says the militants are involved in the logging of trees, one of the most lucrative trades in the region.

They have also set up offices in the Kandal Shahi market in Neelum, where they have become a major law and order headache, the report says.

The report mentions an incident which led to the killing of some locals and a resulting stand-off with the militants.

"The situation was only resolved by the intervention of the local administrator and senior army officials," the report says.

It then goes on to say that the authorities should take up the matter with the intelligence agency responsible for the militants.

The report says officials from that agency should relocate the militants to some area near the border, otherwise clashes with locals could take place.

Deadly groups

The report's contents are astonishing, as they come at a time when Pakistan's security forces are involved in a fully fledged operation against the Taliban.

The militants are said to be backed up by the jihadi organisations, especially the Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Harkatul Mujahideen.

Jaish-e-Mohammad has been involved in several assassination attempts on top Pakistani officials, including former President Pervez Musharraf.

Its members were also responsible for the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street journalist Daniel Pearl, and are said to have carried out the attack on the Indian parliament.

Harkatul Mujahideen is the Jaish's parent organisation and one of the largest militant groups in the world.

Lashkar-e-Taiba remains the prime suspect in the Mumbai attacks and is India's enemy number one.

Local people have confirmed to the BBC that there has been a great increase in militant activity in the regions mentioned.

"These people are being protected here," said Raja Faisal Majeed, a lawyer living in a village near where some of the militant groups have set up base.

"Sometimes they operate under the guise of a charity, sometimes as a school. We have protested against them to no avail."
Despite the fact that the groups mentioned are banned under Pakistan's terrorism act, the report does not advocate any action against them other than to keep an eye on their activities.

vsudhir · Post by **vsudhir** » 30 Jun 2009 05:12

x-post

Here's a classic updated example of the $hitish feigning studied neuter-ality in south asian affairs using their media muscle. From the ekhanomist rag:

Indian-held Kashmir:Grim up north

A revolting crime has renewed protests against Indian rule

OUTSIDE Shakeel Ahmed Ahangar’s house in Shopian, an apple-growing hub in the Kashmir valley, mourners gather. Spying a foreign journalist, they yell “Azadi!” (“Freedom!”). The battle-cry of Kashmiri separatists makes an incongruous lament for Mr Ahmed’s pregnant wife and teenage sister, who were raped and murdered on May 29th. Yet it is the inevitable one. Six decades after India secured the richest portion of Kashmir, its Muslim inhabitants miss no chance to tell it to leave.

And yada yada.

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 30 Jun 2009 05:30

vsudhir wrote:x-post

Here's a classic updated example of the $hitish feigning studied neuter-ality in south asian affairs using their media muscle. From the ekhanomist rag:

Indian-held Kashmir:Grim up north

A revolting crime has renewed protests against Indian rule

Waiting for the moment when similar news come from IHBritain.

Currently occupied by Pakistan .

Prasad · Post by **Prasad** » 30 Jun 2009 05:33

J&K may be freed (

) of AFSPA in phases

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 30 Jun 2009 22:26

Soldier killed on Kashmir border

An Indian soldier has been killed in cross-border firing across the Line of Control (LoC) in the disputed territory of Kashmir, officials say.

Indian army officials said the firing occurred as they foiled an attempt by a group of militants to infiltrate Indian-administered Kashmir on Sunday.

They say the attempt was "apparently backed by the Pakistani army".

vsudhir · Post by **vsudhir** » 01 Jul 2009 18:00

More kid glove treatment of KM 'protestors'. Take at least as hardline a stand against them as was taken against the Amarnath protestors, no? The latter didn't destroy public property AFAIK.

Tension in J&K: Army ambulance set ablaze

SRINAGAR: An army ambulance was set ablaze by protesters on Srinagar-Baramulla highway on Wednesday, official sources said.

The agitators, protesting the killing of four persons in Baramulla, intercepted the vehicle at Palhalan, 30 km from the state capital, and set it on fire, the sources said.

The ambulance was on its way to Baramulla, they said, adding that the occupants of the vehicle, however, managed to escape unhurt.

With tension gripping curfew-bound Baramulla town in the wake of security forces opening fire on protestors, Jammu and Kashmir government pulled out CRPF from the area even as the death toll in the violence climbed to four on Wednesday.

A government spokesman said a case of murder has been registered against the CRPF personnel, who had allegedly opened fire at Khanpora-Baramulla last evening leaving a youth identified as Fayaz Ahmad Gojri dead.

He said the paramilitary force authorities have been asked to handover the CRPF personnel to Baramulla police.

Wow. Try doing that in TSP or PRC (the 2 states closest to J&K).

suryag · Post by **suryag** » 02 Jul 2009 21:29

If there is something common in Kashmir it is the friday demonstrations after prayers. This event keeps recurring at regular intervals and we then see a flurry of activity. I guess the establishment has an idea of who the mischief mongers are, in that case why cant they be taken apart brainwashed silently and reintroduced into the mainstream. If we dont have these mischief mongers under control the paks can any day get one army/crpf jawan to rape someone and create trouble.

derkonig · Post by **derkonig** » 02 Jul 2009 22:28

^^^
The faithfool routinely start riots after friday prayers across the world. But what is truly worrying is the virulence & frequency of these protests, its almost as if they are being orchestrated to make the security forces defensive & ultimately make them leave the state. Besides for WKK-alpha MMS, all of those protests surely must be a cause for loosing sleep at night no matter how hard the security forces toil to maintain order in the nest of vipers.

Jamal K. Malik · Post by **Jamal K. Malik** » 03 Jul 2009 01:25

Kashmir CRPF pullout could stumble over police shortages
http://www.hindu.com/2009/07/03/stories ... 591000.htm

jamwal · Post by **jamwal** » 03 Jul 2009 02:43

From J&K may be freed of AFSPA in phases

If the Army and CRPF — engaged in anti-terror operations — were convinced of decline in violence in certain areas, the government would go for a phased withdrawal from four districts — Srinagar, Budgam, Jammu and Kathua — to begin with, they added

Jammu and Kathua don't need AFSPA anyway. Not much idea about Budgam and removal from Srinagar will be more like a cosmetic exercise only. You people can start worrying when additional districts are added into this list

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 04 Jul 2009 22:28

this is very old but I don't think it was posted here earlier.
Hey Ram: Let's give away Kashmir

I've never really followed sify chief editor's column and AFAIK, BR hasn't too.
shouldn't we give more airtime to him than the likes of a roy ?

if we focus only on the negatives, the positives will be hidden in shadows !

suryag · Post by **suryag** » 05 Jul 2009 03:58

^^^ By coincidence or by fact all Bengalis I have met are either staunch nationalists or rabid communist ideologues. People from other regions tend to be less vocal about their leanings but Bengalis take the cake when it comes to voicing their opinions

sum · Post by **sum** » 05 Jul 2009 12:41

From the Sify link:

this is very old but I don't think it was posted here earlier.
Hey Ram: Let's give away Kashmir

But if I was scared when I read all this, I was downright terrified when a reasonably reliable contact in one of our intelligence agencies hinted that this was actually a “trial balloon” being floated at the behest of the UPA government, to gauge the people’s reaction to such a proposal.

BR was right all along on this aspect!!!!

derkonig · Post by **derkonig** » 05 Jul 2009 13:40

Rahul M wrote:this is very old but I don't think it was posted here earlier.
Hey Ram: Let's give away Kashmir

I've never really followed sify chief editor's column and AFAIK, BR hasn't too.
shouldn't we give more airtime to him than the likes of a roy ?

if we focus only on the negatives, the positives will be hidden in shadows !

He used to write on rediff long back, then his columns were rather neutral, not nationalist but at least not outright seditious like the rest of dhimmedia. He had a blog back then which attracted a fair no. of WKKs & of course yours truly being the hidoootvavadi couldn't resist carrying out IED mubaraks against the WKKs which initiated major flamewars followed by comment purges by him & ultimately led him to stop blogging on rediff. AoA.

Jamal K. Malik · Post by **Jamal K. Malik** » 05 Jul 2009 17:09

Shahbir Shah has links with Lashker-e-Taiba: Police

CRamS · Post by **CRamS** » 05 Jul 2009 18:36

Rahul M wrote:this is very old but I don't think it was posted here earlier.
Hey Ram: Let's give away Kashmir

I've never really followed sify chief editor's column and AFAIK, BR hasn't too.
shouldn't we give more airtime to him than the likes of a roy ?

if we focus only on the negatives, the positives will be hidden in shadows !

Judging by the manner in which Indians were conned into surrenerding to TSP post Mumbai, if the time is right, if US/UK in collusion with Indian elites like Vir Sanghvi and others in DDM come up with a suitable "India is a great power" package; I bet you, we on BR will be mute "Hindu extremist" spectators as MMS/Sonia sign on the dotted line of the Kashmir surrender document. Recall, prior to Af-Pak strategy announcement, this is exactly the argument Obama (obviously and dutifuly regurgitating what the Halfbrights, Clintons, and Unevens have been coaching him on) used, namely, I am going to tell the Indians, you are on your way to becoming a super power; why do you want to let Kashmir drag you down. Isn't this what Vir Sanghvi also said?

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 05 Jul 2009 19:18

X-posting Paul's post from the 'Great Game' thread

Gilgit and Baltistan - Strategic Relevance
By Vikram Sood
Issue: Vol 20.4Gilgit and Baltistan are parts of India, as much as the rest of the J & K state is, but this region does not seem to figure too prominently on our collective radar screen. Instead, we seem to have made the sanctity of the LOC an article of faith and never “violate” it even though Pakistan began its invasion on India on October 22, 1947 and has continued to violate the LOC since the cease-fire 56 years ago. The implication is that we are prepared to negotiate on the basis of the LOC as a boundary. Our media or our weather bureau seems to have forgotten this area also. Weather maps of the region do not show conditions in Gilgit, Skardu or Diamar like PTV, which never fails to tell us the weather conditions in Srinagar and Baramullah in ‘Maqbooza’ Kashmir. These are symbolisms but are important ones.

Although most of us know the strategic importance of J&K and the symbolism attached to multi-religious but predominantly Muslim J&K, to our ideals of secularism and nationhood, strategic issues connected with Gilgit and Baltistan are quite often not very central in our thought processes. Maybe one could get a better idea if one imagined that what we showed on our maps reflected reality on the ground. If we had what we show on our maps then the reality would have been something like this.

India would have had a border with NWFP - something that Pakistan could not tolerate given its sensitivities about the Durand Line, and the fear that India could play up this issue, and the traditionally friendly India-Afghan relations would be a disadvantage for Pakistan. All the waters of Indus and its tributaries would have substantially flown through Indian territory making the feudal farmers of Pakistan Punjab even more dependent on India. Domel, Muzaffarabad and the Haji Pir Bulge would have been in India’s control making GHQ Rawalpindi more vulnerable. India would have had access to Afghanistan through the Wakhan corridor - not the easiest of routes, but not unsurpassable, and definitely not at the mercy of Pakistan. The Karakoram Highway would not have existed and Pakistan would not have got its clandestine supplies from China and North Korea. China would not have had access to Gwadar and be able to connect Kashgar with Gwadar; nor would it have kept Pakistan supplied with lethal material clandestinely through the Karakoram Highway to counterbalance India.

There would not have been any terrorists hiding in the Neelam Valley to be launched into India and there would not have been any Kargil adventure nor the need for any troops on the heights of Siachen. There would not possibly have been displaced Mirpuris from the Mangla Dam reservoir area to migrate to the UK and form the core of anti-Indian protest in Europe. But even more crucial than the POK area, has been the Gilgit Baltistan area, and this is the one that does not figure in our strategic thinking, because this is the one that sits on the routes to China and Central Asia. The Karakoram Highway and the strategic Gwadar port close to the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf provide China vital access to the sea-lanes in the area. The US as inheritor of British imperial interests, in pursuit of Cold War first and then its new doctrine of pre-emption, would need this corridor to have access to the troubled Xinjiang.

For long, Indians have felt suspicious, and said so very often, that it was imperialist designs that got us into this situation. In two recently published books based on British Government, documents now made public set this doubt at rest. Clearly the entire exercise beginning with the impetus for the creation of Pakistan was the handiwork of British acting through their Viceroy in India. Tactical errors by the Congress when they resigned from the provincial governments at the start of the Second World War, in protest against dragging the country into their war without consulting the elected representatives, did not help.

Chandrashekhar Dasgupta’s “War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48″ depicts the two crucial years, when India lost POK and Gilgit Baltistan, not because of the superiority of the Pakistani forces, but because of three men essentially and the tangled web they wove. It was Mountbatten in Delhi, Bevin in Whitehall London and Noel-Baker in New York, who was particularly more loyal than the King. While in New York, Noel Baker zealously overplayed his hand in his blind love for Pakistan that even embarrassed Attlee. Bevin would give incomplete and slanted assessments, and in New Delhi, Mountbatten and his British officers in the Indian Army, invariably tried to underplay Pakistani transgressions, instead sought concessions from a trusting Nehru, and at the same time remained silent when it came to remotely blaming Pakistan. The ploy was the same - how could the raiders be asked to leave unless India also vacated. The same argument in different forms is applied today. This indirectly encouraged Pakistani obduracy and adventurism in Kashmir. Gradually India was pushed towards calling off operations into areas that later became to be known as Pak Occupied Kashmir and the Northern Areas; gradually India was inveigled into the UNSC route, and to find to its horror, that the tables had been turned on an unsuspecting but idealistic and newly independent government.

The stage for all this had been set in a way by the years preceding India’s independence. Nirendra Singh Sarila’s recent book “The Shadow of the Great Game- The Untold Story of India’s Partition” describes this vividly. Jinnah, and thereby Muslim League, was encouraged in his demands partly as punishment for “Hindu” Indian National Congress refusal to help the Empire in its war in Europe. The readiness of the British to help create Pakistan was more than just annoyance and pique. Imperial strategic interests are not determined solely by this sort of sentimentality. Both these books should be read by all those interested in learning how empires are managed.

The creation of Pakistan was an exercise in the preservation of imperial interests in the region. At that the time, (in the early years of the war when the British did not anticipate they would have to quit India so soon) the main perceived threat to British interests, was the growing might of the Soviet Union, and Britain was worried about a possible Soviet thrust into Chitral, Gilgit and Swat. China did not figure in imperial calculations at that time because Chiang Kai Shek was an ally. It was argued, that a friendly Muslim Pakistan, would be a better bet at handling the expanding Russian Empire, and more likely to co-operate with British military and foreign policy matters, rather than a Hindu India sitting far way from the actual scene of action. British withdrawal would severely impair that country’s ability to protect its interests in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean region - the vital sea and trade routes-and this breach could be filled by a pliant new Muslim state. The Indus valley, western Punjab and Balochistan were vital to the preservation of British security interests in the region. Besides, after Pakistan was created, the British did not want to be seen doing anything anti-Muslim, lest it further exacerbated the wrath of the Arab Muslim world, which was already angered by the creation of Israel.

From then on, it was a familiar story repeated on each occasion - Pakistan became intransigent and we know the reactions in 1965, 1971, 1999 and even in 2001. Each time there was a reluctance to blame Pakistan, and each time there was pressure on India to show restraint. We must also remember that in 1965 and 1971, neither country was a nuclear power, and so there was no question of there being a nuclear powder keg. Cold War interests reigned. Later, interests emanating from a desire for global dominance meant that the West turned a blind eye to Gen Zia ul Haq’s feverish and clandestine schemes to acquire the nuclear weapon in the 80s because Pakistan was the base country for the jehad against the Soviet Union. Then later, the AQ Khan nuclear sales have been sought to be underplayed because Pakistan is a vital ally in the war against terror. In essence, the situation today is very much the same as it was 60 years ago. Pakistan has continued its well organised and carefully calibrated war against India, with the West trying to shackle India in various ways, insisting that concessions should come from India, the bigger country. It was Attlee who urged India to exercise restraint in 1947 and it was Blair who made similar requests in 1999 and 2001. All this is history that may not have fully played itself out and likely to be repeated as the New Great Game warms up.

We need to pay more attention to this area of “Pak Occupied Gilgit and Baltistan,” as the Chairman of the Balawaristan National Front (BNF), refers to his land. The people of Baltistan (Skardu and Astore) have had close ethnic, religious ties with people of Ladakh; the Shias and Ismailis of Gilgit and Baltistan have had close ties with the Shias of Kargil and have been oppressed by the Sunnis of Pakistan. The Shias were 85 percent of the population in 1948 but are now down to 50 percent. Pakistani authorities have systematically settled Sunni Wahabbis in Gilgit and Baltistan through unfair land allocations or employment. Shias resent the education syllabus thrust on them.

The Northern Light Infantry, which was mainly manned by locals, is now increasingly manned by ‘outsiders’ because the locals, mostly Shias, are no longer trusted. All prominent bureaucratic positions are held by Sunnis from NWFP and Punjab. There is no freedom of expression and journalists are frequently locked up for reporting dissent. There are no writ petitions, no appeals to Supreme Court against any arbitrary action by the State. There has been no economic development in the area except for the construction of the Karakoram highway. No political activity is permitted. There are a few brave individuals like Abdul Hamid Khan of the BNF who carry on their campaign against Islamabad. More and more Gilgitis now seek self-determination and not a merger with Pakistan. And that their views must be taken into consideration for any discussions on the Kashmir question.

Anti-Shia violence continues in Gilgit and Baltistan and more than 80 persons had been killed in 2005 by October in clashes with State forces as Shias protested against state oppression or demanded better conditions. The practice of anti-Shia pogrom started in the 80s, and one of the persons who led a brutal campaign against the Shias in Gilgit in 1988, was Brig (now Gen) Pervez Musharraf, who was then based in Khapalu.

India needs to refocus attention on this region of Gilgit and Baltistan in the new globalisation context. If we are to be dependent on the uncertainties and unreliability of Pakistan for our energy supplies, it is also necessary to look elsewhere. Land routes from Russia and Kazakhstan through Kashgar could also reach India. Undoubtedly this means some negotiations with China on the boundary and trade issues. It means a new approach, less dependent on a volatile West Asia and a neighbour with whom the trust deficit remains high and will remain so for a long time to come. It means looking at the boundary question differently. It also means that we should now put 1962 behind us without forgetting the lessons of realpolitik. China may be described as a competitor or a threat on different occasions but it is equally an opportunity. It means giving shape to the Russia-India-China strategic triangle - among the three largest landmasses in the world, the largest markets in size and diversity, countries with the highest rates of growth, a Russia that would need manpower imports in the years ahead, and which could remain militarily and economically strong without total dependence on sea lanes controlled by others. This is what an Asian Century should be all about.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 05 Jul 2009 19:20

derkonig wrote:
Rahul M wrote:this is very old but I don't think it was posted here earlier.
Hey Ram: Let's give away Kashmir

I've never really followed sify chief editor's column and AFAIK, BR hasn't too.
shouldn't we give more airtime to him than the likes of a roy ?

if we focus only on the negatives, the positives will be hidden in shadows !
He used to write on rediff long back, then his columns were rather neutral, not nationalist but at least not outright seditious like the rest of dhimmedia. He had a blog back then which attracted a fair no. of WKKs & of course yours truly being the hidoootvavadi couldn't resist carrying out IED mubaraks against the WKKs which initiated major flamewars followed by comment purges by him & ultimately led him to stop blogging on rediff. AoA.

Knowing Ramanand Sengupta, he is a true BRite-like jingo and he follows BR. Let's not discuss individuals anymore.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 05 Jul 2009 19:32

Book review by Khaled Ahmed in DT

My Kashmir: Conflict and the Prospect of Enduring Peace
By Wajahat Habibullah; Vanguard Books Lahore 2009; Pp201

Wajahat Habibullah’s view is important because he served as a civil servant in Jammu & Kashmir when it was going through the throes of the insurrection starting 1990. He was the only Muslim in that year’s batch of the Indian Administrative Service, a branch of the All India Services, and the ruling chief minister happened to be a friend of his father’s, which became “the subject of some conjecture in the press gossip”.

The majority of the Jammu and Kashmir population now living within India — more than 5.4 million according to the 2001 census — are in the Kashmir Valley, known as the Kashmir Division. The Kashmiri language, spoken in the valley and in the areas immediately abutting it, is a Dardic language. The second major component is the Jammu Division, with a population of just under 4.4 million, more than 60 percent Hindu and 30 percent Muslim — the latter forming a majority in three of Jammu’s six districts with languages that are variations of Punjabi, distinct from Kashmiri.

The third component of Jammu and Kashmir, though administratively under the Kashmir Division, is Ladakh (population 233,000), the largest of the three in area, with a slim Muslim majority, mostly Shia, in contrast to predominantly Sunni Kashmir. One of Ladakh’s two districts, Kargil, theatre of war between India and Pakistan in 1999, is predominantly Shia Muslim (73 percent), as is adjoining Baltistan in the Northern Area of Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The district of Leh, to the south, has a Buddhist majority. (p.7)

Habibullah is disturbed by Pakistanis’ newfound contempt for the tolerant Sufi culture in Islam. He writes: “In November 2003, while talking to a group of Pakistani Americans in Washington, DC, over an iftar, I was surprised to learn of the Pakistani Americans’ low regard for the influence the Sufi shrines still exert over common folk in India and Pakistan. The general feeling was that these shrines were the haunts of deluded illiterates and instruments for extortion by avaricious con men. Although many Indians, Muslims as well as Hindus, look askance at the extortion in the guise of religion that occurs at several Sufi shrines — identical to what occurs at many Hindu temples — the Indian intelligentsia does not view the shrines with the same contempt expressed by the Pakistani intelligentsia.” (p.17)

The author is clear about why Sheikh Abdullah, the charismatic leader of J&K, did not join Muslim Pakistan: “As a National Conference leader, Sheikh Abdullah faced a clear choice: he could join a Muslim nation whose leadership would surely be Punjabi, a people whom Kashmiris feared and distrusted and who were unlikely to respect the distinct religious tradition and identity of Kashmiris. Alternatively, he could join a secular state, where Kashmiris would be assured freedom in a new nation and the source of those assurances of freedom was someone of Kashmiri descent, who cherished that heritage and was a personal friend of the Sheikh’s, with an inclusive vision of what India was to be.” (p.19)

India had its first war with Pakistan immediately after Independence, after it moved to annex J&K. Nehru went to the UN for justice but got an in-between verdict from the Security Council. The UN Resolution of August 13, 1948, called for determination of the future status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir; it was qualified by the resolution of January 5, 1949 which called for a plebiscite to determine the future of Jammu and Kashmir, with the limited choice of opting either to be a part of India or of Pakistan.

This also caused the first wrinkle to appear in the Abdullah-Nehru friendship. In May 1953, the National Conference, led by Sheikh Abdullah, set up a committee to address the prevailing uncertainty and explore the feasibility of a plebiscite, allowing also for the third option of independence. That committee included Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, GM Sadiq, Girdharilal Dogra, and Shamlal Saraf, many o whom went on to serve in government (p.21)

The book reveals another cause for the disturbance in the New Delhi dovecotes. What is said to have particularly incensed the Indian government were Abdullah’s two meetings in Srinagar with Adlai Stevenson, the recently defeated US Democratic presidential candidate. Supposedly, Stevenson urged the Sheikh to opt for independence, perhaps in return for US bases in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah was arrested on charges of treason in August 1953. (p.22) The ‘third option’ which is reality in 2009 could thus be the seed sown by Sheikh Abdullah and watered by the Americans.

The Sheikh was arrested in 1953 without even the opportunity to bid his family farewell. He was released in 1958, only to be arrested again. Released in 1964 as part of Prime Minister Nehru’s final effort to settle Kashmir, the Sheikh visited President Ayub Khan in Pakistan. But he was arrested again in the summer of 1965 on his return from a pilgrimage to Mecca. Released in 1967, he was detained once more in 1968, when his political activism for greater autonomy was perceived as a threat by Indira Gandhi’s Congress government. He was finally returned to power in February 1975 after a November 1974 Sheikh Abdullah-Indira Gandhi Accord. (p.33)

When Sheikh was restored to power in 1975, wealthy Kashmiri businesses were eager to assist the government, but the Sheikh’s political support was largely limited to the Kashmir Valley. Further support would have to be bought. Thus, the Bakshi tradition — which the Sheikh had re turned to power on a pledge to eradicate — not only persisted but was relied upon. There was growing corruption in the Abdullah government that lasted from 1975 to 1977. (p.47)

The author was deputy commissioner when the 1977 election came around. All the deputy commissioners in Kashmir were given orders requiring that leading National Conference volunteers be arrested under the Preventive Detention Act, which permitted detention without trial. Under the law, the deputy commissioner, as signatory of the arrest warrant, was expected to exercise judgement in reviewing grounds, and the detention had to withstand the scrutiny of a judicial review. (p.39)

After Sheikh Abdullah, New Delhi had to deal with his son Farooq Abdullah. The relationship soon went sour. Indira Gandhi’s cousin, BK Nehru, governor of Jammu and Kashmir since 1981, had advised against unseating Farooq. BK was replaced in April 1984 by Governor Jagmohan who advised that popular rule be replaced by governor’s rule under Article 92 of the Constitution. The overthrow of Farooq’s government in 1984 was reminiscent of the events of 1953, down to the collusion of his cohorts with the ruling party at the centre.

Did violence against Kashmiri Pandits begin after Pakistan sent in its non-state actors? The book tells us that it actually began in 1986, with the Rajiv Gandhi government in its infancy. The most remarkable aspect of this outbreak was that even though the community had faced persecution by bigoted rulers in the past, this marked the first person-to-person conflict in all of Kashmir’s history (p.55).

This is new information for a Pakistani reader. Also new is the fact that many Muslim clerics fled anti-Muslim violence in Assam and filled up the Kashmiri madrassas run Jamaat Islami. They became a potent influence on young minds and played a critical role in nurturing the religious mind-set of young Kashmiris by the close of the 1980s, when the insurgency erupted. (p.57)

Just as the elections of 1977 were a referendum on the Indira-Sheikh Accord, the state assembly elections in March 1987 were a referendum on the Rajiv-Farooq Accord. The alliance was returned to power with an overwhelming majority: sixty-six seats between the two parties, forty for the National Conference and twenty-six for the Congress party.

The elections were partly rigged but this decided the career of Syed Yusuf Shah, the discomfited candidate in the Amira Kadal constituency in 1987, who went on, under the nom de guerre Syed Salahuddin, to become head of the militant Hizbul Mujahideen. (p.63) Note the observation: ‘partly rigged’. This is definitely not the way Syed Salahuddin looked at what happened in 1987.

What is surprising is the fact that the Kashmiri Pandits were attacked by the JKLF and not by the mullahs of the Jamaat. Even though the JKLF philosophy was supposedly secular, minuscule minority of the pandits from the Kashmir Valley became the principal targets of terrorists from both JKLF, and the violence sparked emigration of almost the entire Pandit community from the valley into Jammu and different parts of India. (p.66)

For Habibullah, the insurgency of March 1988 was caused by disillusionment, carefully nurtured and armed by the ubiquitous ISI. It led to an outflow of young men to Pakistan Kashmir and Afghanistan for training in the use of weapons seized from the retreating Soviet armies. The AK-47 became the preferred armament. Among those who took charge of this training was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, ‘a fanatical Afghan warlord and among the bitterest opponents of the USSR’. (p.67)

Then Hizb fell out with JKLF. In April 1993, the chief ideologue of the JKLF, Dr Guru, was kidnapped and brutally murdered by the Hizb militant Zulqarnain. Guru, a leading Srinagar physician who had funded a medical college, had commanded wide respect and presented reasonable face of separatism. (p.82) That year also came the Hazratbal Shrine Incident, followed by a far more damaging debacle at Charar-e-Sharif in March 1995.

Charar-e-Sharif is located near Shopian, District Badgam, in South Kashmir and straddles the ancient route through which the imperial Mughal caravan brought India’s Mughal emperors from Agra or Delhi to the summer retreat in the valley. It is a shrine dedicated to the fourteenth-century saint Sheikh Nooruddin Wali of the Kubravi School of Sufis, known t s Hindu devotees as Nanda Rishi or Sahajanand. Charar Sharif was destroyed in May 1995 and the terrorist Mast Gul escaped to Pakistan to be feted as a hero. (p.94)

The book wants a bit of all the solutions so far at hand: autonomy, Indo-Pak joint handling, and Manmohan Singh’s devolution ‘without changing maps’. Above all, he wants Kashmiri pride assuaged. *

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Jul 2009 23:24

CRPF not leaving Valley, says Omar Abdullah

The gist of it is there are 72 batallions of CRPF in J&K. State police has 21 batallions and would need to increase quite a bit in order to take over. And who is going to pay for this?

So Omarbhai wants the CRPF to stay with a kindler gentler nature. He can thus have it both ways rile against CRPF when needed.

There is a lot of US interference in J&K for quite sometime which is not understood in India. it didnt start with Robin Raphael. Look at Adalai Stevenson, a defeated candidate comes to Sheikh Abdullah and wants him to declare Independence in 1954! Recall around that time JLN was creating the NAM at Bandung.

Can someone google for Adalaa Stevenson's connections to Kashmir? What made him a credible interlocutor to Sheikh?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Jul 2009 23:39

Amitabh Matto says:

Obama and the Valley

OBAMA AND THE VALLEY
- Is the pragmatic realism in Washington good for Kashmir?
Amitabh Mattoo

The most charismatic American president in recent years, Barack Obama, is paradoxically also the most inscrutable. Given his limited administrative experience and his lack of exposure to a public office, few can claim to know how Obama will actually respond to challenges around the world. Not surprisingly, there is a lack of clarity on his likely policy towards India and South Asia. Much of the political punditry is based on a casual remark by Obama, a newspaper interview, a sound-bite or an off-the-cuff statement.

The issue of Kashmir is a case in point. If the pundits are to be believed, one of the first initiatives that Obama will take will be on Kashmir with a Bill Clinton or a Bill Richardson being appointed as a special envoy. Obama firmly believes, we are told, that until Kashmir is resolved, Pakistan cannot be stabilized and, consequently, the war against al Qaida cannot be won. And that even while Richardson has been designated special envoy for Pakistan and Afganistan, Kashmir is there in the sub-text. This is not serious analysis, but juvenile doodling designed to generate public hysteria on the basis of a single sound-bite in a television interview and a couple of lines to a news magazine.

Can someone as smart as Obama really believe in this facile logic? And does he not know from his understanding of American foreign policy that Kashmir is, and has been, a tar baby? Obama’s foreign policy advisors — at last count, he has about 1,000 — must have, by now, produced a ready reckoner on South Asia which would probably be the following written in bold: “The easiest way to jeopardize relations between India and the United States of America, and ironically prevent any real change in Kashmir, is for Washington to get hyperactive on the valley.”

A quick reading of American policy will reveal to Obama the reason for Indian sensitivities. Let us remember that the US did have a deep interest in the future of Kashmir during the Cold War. Pakistan was an ally and had acceded to the Baghdad Pact in 1955, which was later renamed the Central Treaty Organization, and Kashmir had a unique geo-strategic location. Declassified American sources suggest that the idea of an independent Kashmir was seriously explored (and promoted) within the state department and the Central Intelligence Agency. An undivided, independent Kashmir would share borders with five countries: the erstwhile Soviet Union, China, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. It could well have served as a vital listening post to monitor both communist China and the Soviet Union, and, with crafty manipulation and luck, may have even become an American military base.

In the Fifties, suspicion about American policy on Kashmir had reached such a level that in 1953, Sheikh Abdullah — the Wazir-e-Azam of Jammu and Kashmir — was dismissed, it is believed, after he had a series of meetings in Srinagar with Adlai Stevenson, who was touring Kashmir (among other places) after having lost the American presidential election. Indian intelligence operatives, it seemed, had “listened” to their conversations, and had concluded that Stevenson had assured Abdullah of American support for an independent Kashmir. Abdullah’s proximity with the US ambassador, Loy Henderson, also aroused suspicions.

After it became clear that there were few takers for an independent Kashmir (not even Islamabad), the Americans continued to support Pakistan’s demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir. It was only because of a sustained Soviet veto, after the mid-Fifties, that the United Nations security council was not able to press for an enforcement of earlier resolutions on Kashmir.

Suspicions about official American thinking on Kashmir were resuscitated in the early Nineties, after the end of the Cold War. This time, however, there were no great strategic interests at stake. The Cold War was over, the Soviet Union had disintegrated, China was almost an ally, and there were easier gateways to Central Asia than through Kashmir. It was, however, the bleeding-heart liberals of the Clinton administration who — it seemed — were deeply disturbed by the new troubles in Kashmir. Outraged by the alleged human rights violations committed by the Indian security forces while combating the insurgency, they again raised the slogan of an independent Kashmir.

What made things worse was the presence of Robin Raphel — the first ever assistant secretary of state for South Asia — in the first Clinton administration. Raphel had been a political counsellor in the American embassy, and despite the knowledge that as a “friend of Bill” she was destined for higher positions, had been largely ignored by the protocol-conscious mandarins of the ministry of external affairs.

The Kashmiri militants and collaterals in the Pakistan embassy had, however, been smarter and more politically astute. They had, over delicious Kashmiri gushtabas and Peshawari naans, convinced Raphel of their cause. Not surprisingly, at one of her first off-the-record briefings as assistant secretary, Raphel set the Ganges on fire by stating that the official position of the US was that “the accession of Kashmir to India was disputed”. India’s suspicions seemed to be confirmed: the liberal trail for an independent Kashmir ran from Adlai Stevenson to Robin Raphel.

This, of course, was wide exaggeration. Bleeding-heart liberals can mouth slogans, but what determines policy is American national interest, and there was no real American national interest in Kashmir; at worst, Kashmir was a stick to use for putting pressure on India on the non-proliferation issue.

What, then, is the position today? Quite clearly, America has interests in preventing a war in South Asia, particularly given the presence of nuclear weapons. A war in South Asia could be deeply destabilizing for the international system, and every hegemonic power would be deeply concerned about such a possibility. Washington is also concerned about the Islamic jihadis, al Qaida and the Taliban in Pakistan, who are wreaking havoc in Afghanistan, unleashing terror in the region and beyond, and are explicitly targeting the US. There are significant lobbies in the US as well as self-styled do-gooders who want a resolution of the Kashmir problem, and want to see greater US involvement.

However, the surest way to diminish American leverage is through explicit involvement on Kashmir, given Indian suspicions. The most prudent way is for Obama to continue exercising pressure on Islamabad to clamp down on the terrorists and extremists, and then gently nudge India to resume bilateral talks. Once New Delhi is persuaded of Islamabad’s real intent to end terrorism as an instrument of policy, the back channel on Kashmir can be resumed. The understanding between Pervez Musharraf and Manmohan Singh can then become the basis of a real win-win solution in Kashmir. Fortunately, Obama is a pragmatic realist, and has little time for either the Adlais or the Robins of the Democratic party.

The author is a member of the National Knowledge Commission to the prime minister of India, and a professor of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University

Liberal attitudes dont explain the sutained interest over five decades even after the nuke deal. Something else is at stake.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Jul 2009 23:49

in answer to my above question.....
Dated but confirms this thread premise.

Exit Kashmir, enter Iraq

Exit Kashmir, enter Iraq
17 December 2002
The Pioneer
Claude Arpi
Younghusband, who became famous after his military expedition in 1904, once wrote: "We, who have dealt with Asiatics, can appreciate so well (the following tactic): Taking the opportunity, striking while the iron is hot, not letting the chance go by, knowing our mind, knowing what we want, and acting decisively when the exact occasion arises." For decades, London scrupulously followed Younghusband's advice. In 1946-47, although the British had decided to leave the subcontinent, they were not ready to renounce their influence in Asia. In the 1940s, two new factors appeared on the strategic scene: Aviation and the need for petrol. London took note of the new changes. In a report on the strategic consequences of the subcontinent's independence, the British generals concluded that Pakistan was the more important than India for 2 reasons. First, Pakistan was a Muslim nation and friendship with Pakistan could facilitate the rapport with oil-rich Muslim states in the Gulf; second, Pakistan was ideal for installing air bases to control Russia and Central Asia. This explains why London systematically took Pakistan's side in the Kashmir issue.

The US has stepped into British shoes. The same basic principles remained: Control over the air bases to control the region. The sober French monthly Le Monde Diplomatique published recently an article arguing that the US, the last colonial empire, did not require allies, but vassals. The US position vis-a-vis Kashmir, for the past 50 years, has to be seen in this perspective. Successive US administrations have been trying to find a pliable vassal in the region which will allow bases to keep a tab on Afghanistan, the Central Asian republics, Xinjiang and Tibet. The best bet for the US was, therefore, to have an independent Kashmir which they could fund and directly influence. Just a look at the map of Jammu and Kashmir makes one realise the extraordinary strategic importance of the state. The British knew it. Back in 1873, the GOvernor General of British India informed the Maharaja that London had decided to post a British Resident in Kashmir "in view of the important position of Your Highness's territories on the northwestern frontiers of British India." The concept of an independent Kashmir continued to ripen with the US administration. In May 1953, Adlai Stevenson came to Srinagar to discuss with Abdullah the creation of an independent Sheikhdom. It suited perfectly the US interests: They could thus check Chinese advances in Xinjiang and Tibet and the Soviets' in Afghanistan. A "non-aligned" Nehru could certainly not be considered as a reliable ally for the purpose. Unfortunately for them, Abdullah was arrested in August 1953 and the idea had to be temporarily abandoned.

In the '80s, the US fell back on Pakistan as a palliative to dominate the region and get rid of the Soviets in Afghanistan. By the time the SOviet Union collapsed, the US had begun to realise the danger of the ISlamic fundamentalism: The genie they had liberated was now out against them. On September 11, 2001, the US experienced the dimension of the problem. Supporting terrorism whether in overt or covert form was no longer in their interests. hence the slow shift in their Kashmir policy. However, to assert their world supremacy, a new target had to be found. Iraq for several reasons became the ideal one. An American think-tank Stratfor.com published recently an in-depth analysis of the US motivations for a military take-over of Iraq. Their conclusion was similar to the one reached 55 years ago by the British: "The primary reason is geography. If we look at a map, Iraq is the most strategic country between the Levant and the Persian Gulf. It shares borders with Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait and most of all, Saudi Arabia.... It would have ample room for deploying air power in the heart of the region...Within a matter of months, the US would become the most powerful military force native to the region."

After their timid Afghan campaign against the Taliban, an independent Kashmir lost its meaning. With a strong nuclear India, the idea of an "autonomous" Kashmir receded further. The US also realised that the heart of Islamic fundamentalism was not a resourceless Pakistan, but the oil-rich Gulf countries which had the means to sustain it. Therefore, the shift towards Iraq. This change in US policy was noticed when Ambassador Blackwill visited the Valley. For the first time, a US Ambassador did not meet the Hurriyat leaders. Instead, he lauded India for the peaceful conduct of the elections.

So if we extrapolate from what Arpi is saying that its the drive for bases that spurs the 'cashmere' initiatives, then its the drawdown in Iraq and the slow boil in TSP that are spurring the renewed interest in 'cashmere'.

They want bases and think Kashmir would be a good place as its not too fundoo to throw them out and the elite is Macaulayised and will survive only with outside help.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Jul 2009 23:58

And Ind Exp 1997!

Reading Men and Minds in Kashmir

Reading men and minds in Kashmir

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Kashmir's history for the last 50 years has been one long chain of errors of judgment on the part of decision makers. At every turning point, they chose the wrong direction. Most of their lapses are fairly well known. But what has gone largely unnoticed is the grave failure to judge men and moments. They failed to judge Sheikh Abdullah. They failed to size up Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at Shimla in 1972 and Zia-ul-Huq at a later stage, when he was quietly preparing to wage a proxy war in Kashmir.

Duane R. Clarridge has recorded the following in his book, A Spy For All Seasons: My Life In the CIA:

``In 1964, Nehru released Sheikh Abdullah from prison. Abdullah immediately left for Paris. I flew to Paris to see him. He seemed a bit tentative, and nothing much came of the meeting.

``Later, I flew to Jidda and contacted him. This time, Abdullah really did have something to say, and it was explosive. During his pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, for the Haj, and before my arrival in Jidda, Abdullah claimed he had been briefed on Pakistan's next moves on Kashmir, which would result in the first Indo-Pakistani war in the fall of 1965.

``The Lion of Kashmir basically gave me the whole plan of the Pakistanis for Kashmir. The Pakistanis were going to begin infiltrating small guerrilla units out of Azad Kashmir into Kashmir proper. Those units would then begin to stir things up. Once the insurrection got under way in Kashmir, regular Pakistani military forces would come to Kashmir's aid.''

The disclosure speaks for itself. It is yet another piece of evidence to show how the Indian leadership failed to understand the mind and motivation of those with whom it had to deal on the Kashmir problem.

It should have been clear to a discerning mind that for Sheikh Abdullah it was his power game that took precedence over all else. What suited him at a particular moment was all that mattered. From 1947 to 1952, he kept proclaiming that Kashmir's accession was based on fundamental principles and was irrevocable. At the same time, he was sounding out various quarters for support to the idea of an independent `Sheikhdom'. As early as January 28, 1948, he discussed the subject of independence with American officials. This is evident from the note sent by Warren Austin to the State Department after an interview with Sheikh Abdullah on January 28, 1948. The report (September 1950) of Loy Henderson, the US Ambassador to India, noted: ``In discussing future-Kashmir, Abdullah was vigorous that it should be independent''. On May 3, 1953, Adlai Stevenson came to Srinagar and had a long meeting with Sheikh Abdullah.

All these events, taken together, should leave nobody in doubt that Sheikh Abdullah was dreaming of becoming an independent ruler of Kashmir and the Anglo-US bloc was encouraging him.

Having ignored the streaks of duplicity and deception in Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru was caught on the wrong foot in August 1953 when he found that there was no alternative to dismissing Sheikh Abdullah. This extreme step could have been avoided if Sheikh Abdullah had been understood correctly.

The same lack of understanding was shown in respect of Bhutto at the Shimla Conference (1972). At that time, India held all the cards. Indira Gandhi's advisers failed to read the mind of Pakistan's Prime Minister. The way Bhutto's mind was actually working comes out clearly in his letter of June 23, 1972, to General Tikka Khan: ``So, neither a few years of arranged peace, nor the present situation can possibly permit us to ignore the reality that there must inevitably, sooner or later, come another war...every invasion from this side has defeated India...And we ourselves have ruled them for eight centuries. All this is not ancient history. It is current history...''

P.N. Dhar, in an article published in a national daily on April 4, 1995, said that Bhutto had agreed to change the ceasefire-line into a de facto international border. He asserted, ``It was thought that with the gradual use of the LoC as a de facto frontier, public opinion on both sides would get reconciled to its permanence...''

This account has been refuted by a senior diplomat and member of Pakistan's delegation to Shimla, Abdul Sattar. But even if Dhar's account is taken as true, it only confirms how naive India had been in accepting Bhutto's words.

Pakistan was in disarray and its potential for mischief crippled. It was a time when links between Kashmir and the rest of India could be firmly founded and institutionalised. All the laws which encouraged a separatist attitude could have been scrapped and the common Kashmiri persuaded to realise that he stood to gain in every way by becoming an effective and vibrant part of the national mainstream. This was a mainstream that emerged not only from the great tradition of catholicity and compassion but also from a liberal, humane and enlightened Constitution which provided full scope for advancement of every culture, language and literature.

But, unfortunately, the habit of relying solely on personalities persisted. Sheikh Abdullah was brought back to the helm of affairs through the Kashmir accord of February 1975. It was not even ensured that he would not revert to his game of whipping up insular and parochial forces to build his own nest.

By the time Sheikh Abdullah passed away, the adverse fallout of unsound decisions of the post-1972 period had spread far and wide both in the Valley and abroad. If proof were needed, it was forthcoming in the form of virulent anti-India demonstration at the time of the India-West Indies cricket match in Srinagar in October 1983; the vicious attack on the central income-tax team; and the kidnapping and killing of Indian diplomat Ravinder Mahatre, by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, at Birmingham in February 1984.

The mind and motivation of Zia-ul-Haq was not properly assessed either. While the Indian leadership continued its usual wishful thinking to hold that the Shimla Agreement provided a framework for durable peace Zia went on preparing for his proxy war, making deft use of lethal and light weapons placed at Pakistan's disposal by the US for Afghan Mujahideens. The result is there for all to see: over eight years of a bloody `proxy' war.

Copyright © 1997 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.

Baljeet · Post by **Baljeet** » 09 Jul 2009 00:29

Ramanaji
It was indeed great find. It just shows how Indian Netas live in wonderland that can't be matched by Bollywood. Our enemies understand us more than we understand them. Every single neta is more worried about his Gaddi and Paisa than his nation. It seems like their mindset is, If India has to go down that is phine as long as I have all da money. Even though BJP promised to scrap Article 370 if they came to power, guess what, they turned out to be the biggest hypocrite. J&K problem can't be resolved unless we take some concrete steps. Let rest of the nation buy property there, we will flood the state, these cousins of piglet will become minority within few years. Lets us beat them into submission that way. By giving special status to J&K we are feeding the enemy. Pakis will always say, how can you say kashmir is part of India when it is not assimilated like other states into Indian Union, why does this state enjoy special status. Paki Kashmir doesn't enjoy that status, it is part of pakistan. And there is a merit to their argument.

derkonig · Post by **derkonig** » 09 Jul 2009 00:56

^^^
Stop criticising the BJP. It was the NDA govt. that was in power & not a BJP govt. The NDA govt. was a 20+ party coalition with its fair share of seookoolaar parties who would have their musharrafs on fire if the BJP talked about Art.370. That the Art.370 was not abolished inspite of the BJP being in power during 99-04 should not be misconstrued as a failure of the BJP but rather as the successful hijacking of national interests by anti-national sekoolaar forces.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 09 Jul 2009 01:18

ramana wrote:And Ind Exp 1997!
Reading Men and Minds in Kashmir

Ramanaji,

Great find as usual. Looks to me that GOI didn't learn the lesson even now. Perhaps its interests or somewhere else.

I cannot find any other way to understand INC sleeping with NC or PDP at present. If no local JK political party will recommend abolition of Art. 370, and two out of three national coalitions (INC, BJP, 3rd Front) didn't do it for the past 30-40 years, it says something.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 Jul 2009 01:32

Its not that great thing to figure out. Its important to keep those guys on India's side or they will be willing fools for others. And keeping these in power prevents others from rising. After all is said and done the KM should have opted for Azad, but still back the Abdullahs and the Muftis. So as long as KM dont see light the need is to keep these people propped up.

The key words are what Habibullah states -retain kashmiryat and get money. Only GOI and US can do that. So the game in Kashmir is with US and not TSP. TSP is proxy.

Can you model this in your analysis? Who benefits from 'free' Kashmir?

satya · Post by **satya** » 09 Jul 2009 01:37

My 2 cents :

Rulers in India have always relied on individual personalities to negotiate & make deals & will / mood of people/subjects always come second if there's anything as second in matter of opinion . To understand Indian Political Leadership , one has to look them as modern day aristocracy with First Family in each party/kingdom of their own . If u ask any ruling party leader was it a mistake to talk or do deal with Abdullahs of J&K , unanimous answer is No but could a better deal been stuck yes for history is one such field where better options than one acted upon always exist in much greater numbers than in present or future . We can talk here about will of people , its nothing trust me no one be it INC or BJP or even RSS believes so for each of them consider people as ''subjects'' and ones who rise among them are treated differently depending on roles they play .
Anyhow we can continue how things could have been & would have been different , reality is neither what could have been or should have been rather it is what it is nothing more nothing less .

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 Jul 2009 01:42

Total advaita!

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 09 Jul 2009 02:19

ramana wrote:Can you model this in your analysis? Who benefits from 'free' Kashmir?

I am building the event library Ramanaji. I am trying to capture as many "related" events as possible. From 1947 to 2008 I expect to have > 1000 events. Then the graphs will start making sense. Imagine you can see a relationship graph in "Radar" chart type

(who does what to whom) {check your mail}

Will keep your question in mind and write to you.

One question: Somewhere you mentioned that we have a BR database that captures the linkages. Do we have any analytical or causal-network database in or outside BR that we can use?

Samuel-ji, where art thou? My mails are bouncing. Can you pls ping me @ ramay.brf

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 09 Jul 2009 02:34

RAMANA,
Sad part is , after six decades India is still so weak that outsider can play games with us. OTOH, write down and put all of their names in "ghara/clay pot" and when time comes, pull it out and get even counting each and every wrong done . They forget we dont forget even after 1000 years.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 Jul 2009 02:59

RamaY, 1000 things is too large. Winnow them to key events. Or lese will look like every sneeze is an impact. And it could.

I dont recall any database with linkages. What are we talking about? Samuel has some diagrams in the Geo-dynamics thread. And shiv posts sometimes on that.

Prem, Take heart. Thats why need to grow the economy to be able to pay-off the dudes and let them become stakeholders.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 09 Jul 2009 03:06

ramana wrote:Its not that great thing to figure out. Its important to keep those guys on India's side or they will be willing fools for others. And keeping these in power prevents others from rising. After all is said and done the KM should have opted for Azad, but still back the Abdullahs and the Muftis. So as long as KM dont see light the need is to keep these people propped up.

The key words are what Habibullah states -retain kashmiryat and get money. Only GOI and US can do that. So the game in Kashmir is with US and not TSP. TSP is proxy.

The next question is why did not the Indian political elite in the last 60 years close all the options in Kashmir in favor of India.
The real question is - were the Indian Elite(Politicos/bureaucrats) paid to keep the Kashmir question open so that decades of geo-political games could be played by the big boys

Prem wrote:RAMANA,
Sad part is , after six decades India is still so weak that outsider can play games with us. OTOH, write down and put all of their names in "ghara/clay pot" and when time comes, pull it out and get even counting each and every wrong done . They forget we dont forget even after 1000 years.

Only conclusion is above

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 09 Jul 2009 03:34

I may be wrong, but if I dont have the means to close the case I will try to keep it half shut in the hope that I can slam it shut at the right time.

SA was replaced with his BIL GM Sadiq, who turned out to be totally corrupt or rather a looter. So had to bring back Sheikh. Later his progeny was propped up.

Depite all Paki and US dreams and machinations with spies and houries, Kashmir is still with India and will be. Whats for negotiation is when the TSP will vacate the occupied land along with the PRC.

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 09 Jul 2009 03:43

Keeping J&K issue in liquid oxygen can be double edged sword but we have not seen much cuts on the antagonist "parties". Eitehr we dont know how to use this Sword or playing Chess to keep our moves hidden.