somnath wrote: If one were to really stretch it, India took over Junagadh where the ruler was a Muslim presiding over a Hindu majority area. Ditto for Hyderabad. India took the position of "majority view" in these cases. In Kashmir we took the "legal" view on the rights of the rulers of princely states...
Somnath, that's not true. India had offered two principles on accession to Pakistan. One was geographical contiguity and the other was ascertaining the will of the people. Pakistan rejected both as that would have shut the door on Junagadh & Hyderabad. Jinnah and later Liaqat Ali said that such decisions were the sole prerogative of the ruler and ruler alone. Pakistan was confident that with most of the access points from J&K lying in Pakistan, with heavy dependence on day-to-day supplies from the Pakistani side, and with a majority Muslim population, it will be able to pick J&K. Its calculations went wrong.
About Junagadh
Junagadh was a Princely State in the Kathiawar area on the Saurashtra coast of Gujarat with 95% Hindu population with a Muslim ruler and like Hyderabad not having any geographical contiguity with Pakistan.The story starts with an unexpected announcement by the Nawab of Junagadh on Aug. 15, 1947 to accede to Pakistan. There was no response from Pakistan till Sep. 13 when it announced its acceptance. This came as a surprise to Indian Govt because India and Pakistan had decided not to have enclaves of one country inside the other. That was why India had refused the plea of the Khan of Kalat, the largest Princely State of Balochistan, as it had no physical contiguity with India. A mass protest movement started in Junagadh as a result. An Indian representative, V.P. Menon, was sent to Junagadh to talk to the Nawab who refused to meet him. Upon this, he met the Dewan (aka, Prime Minister), Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto (the father of Z.A. Bhutto and the grandfather of Madam BB) who agreed with VP that he personally favoured a referrendum for ascertaining the wishes of the people. Sir. Bhutto would later play a crucial role, as we would see. On the 18th of Sep, the neighbouring Sheikh of Mangrol, a vassal state of Junagadh, signed Instrument of Accession with India. Both Mangrol and Babariawad, another vassal state that had acceded to India, argued that with the lapse of Paramountcy, they were independent to take decisions. This caused resentment to the Nawab of Junagadh to order his troops to invade Babariawad. This was rightly construed by GoI as an act of aggression on Indian territory. However, the GoI desisted from taking any action till the British Constitutional experts opined on the legality of the actions of Mangrol and Babariawad. In the meanwhile, the GoI asked the Nawab to withdraw his forces from Babariawad which the Nawab refused on 25th Sep. After the legal opinion was obtained on the admissibility of the Instruments of Accession of Mangrol and Babariawad, the GoI decided to take military action by end Sep. The GoI decided to send troops to the Kathiawar region, to the borders of Babariawad and Junagdh, awaiting further orders. Even as the troop deployment was about to begin, the Nawab of Junagadh went ahead and occupied Mangrol on 1st Oct. The GoI then instructed the Indian commander to prepare a plan for the retrieval of Mangrol and Babariawad. On Oct. 5, the GoI issued a detailed press statement on the situation there. Nehru asked Liaqat Ali, the Pakistani PM, on Oct 5, to ask the Nawab to withdraw from Mangrol and Babariawad. Liaqat Ali replied evasively. More than 5 weeks after the Nawab invaded, and after repeated attempts to end it peacefully, the patience of the GoI ran out and on Nov. 1, a small Indian force accompanied by civilian administrators, re-possessed both Babariawad and Mangrol peacefully. In the meanwhile, the situation in Junagadh itself was becoming very difficult. On 27 Oct, Sir. Bhutto wrote to Jinnah thus "The Muslims of Kathiawar seem to have lost all enthusiasm for Pakistan". The Nawab had already fled to Pakistan on Oct. 24, on seeing the Indian forces, taking with him the entire cash balance of the treasury, his kennel of a thousand dogs and his Begums. It was Sir. Bhutto who was running the show in Junagadh now. On Nov. 5, the Junagadh State Council decided that "it was necessary to have a complete re-orientation of the State Policy and a re-adjustment of relations with the two Dominions even if it involves reversal of the earlier decision o accession to Pakistan". On Nov. 8, the Dewan, Sir. Shah Nawaz Bhutto requested the Indian Government to take over Junagadh. The request was promptly accepted. A referrendum was conducted on Feb 20, 1948 and the state was merged with Saurashtra on Feb 20, 1949.
About Hyderabad
Hyderabad, Deccan was a princely state ruled by the Nizam of Hyderabad, Mir Osman Ali, at the time of the Partition. The Princely state was about 85% Hindu and surrounded on all four sides by a predominantly Hindu British India with no external access except through these lands. The Princely State of Hyderabad had no sea-ports. The Nizam, at that time, was reputed to be the world's richest man.
On the same day the Maharajah of Kashmir signed the Instrument of Accession to India, Oct. 26, 1947, the Nizam was supposed to sign the "Standstill Agreement" with the GoI. The "Standstill Agreement" effectively maintained a status-quo relationship with India while the Nizam could make up his mind about the future of his state. The Nizam essentially did not want to lose his power of lordship over his citizens He wanted to strike a deal with Jinnah who promised him heaven if Hyderabad so chose to join with Pakistan (this was bribery). The draft Stand-Still agreement had earlier been approved by his Executive Council after three days of debate and had been also negotiated with the Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten. However, when the time came to sign it, the Nizam was wavering. In the meanwhile, the Razaakar goons (a private militia under the patronage of the Nizam) of Ittehadul-Muslimeen surrounded the house of the delegation carrying the Standstill Agreement and forced them to flee. At last, the Nizam signed the Agreement on Nov 29, 1947. However, this incident led to a loss of trust by New Delhi in the Nizam (and rightly so). The Nizam sent an Ittihad (the same religious organization which hounded out the delegation from Delhi earlier) emissary to Jinnah for advice. Jinnah, though he probably knew the futility of a land-locked and Hindu majority state way down south ever being part of Pakistan, still decided to make life miserable for Indian leaders at the cost of the Nizam. He advised the Nizam "not to give an inch" and the Nizam promptly played into his hands. The Princely State of Hyderabad and GoI negotiated for the next nine months to reach an agreement between the Heads of States to formalize the Stand-Still agreement, but the Nizam was steadfast in following Jinnah's advice. The distrust that GoI had started to develop with the Nizam was complete when on June 15, 1948, the Nizam rejected the final draft after it had been re-drafted three times with his Executive Council. The final draft was very generous leaving the Nizam complete control except in matters of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communication. The Nizam also approached the US which refused to intervene. After considerable debate within the cabinet of GoI, after having exhausted all reasonable avenues, after having waited more than a year, after repeated obstinacy from the Nizam, after the Razaakars had started killing Hindus and raping their women, and after a couple of last-minute postponements at the instance of the First Indian Governor-General Rajagoplachari in order to give more time to the Nizam for sanity, the Indian Government finally launched Operation Polo on Sep. 13, 1948. The blame rests entirely with the Nizam and Jinnah, the former for being greedy, power-hungry and oblivious to reality and the latter for his callousness to human lives and suffering just in order to make lives of India and Indian leaders miserable, a prospect which his inflated ego always relished and which has been passed on as a legacy till this day to his successors and nation. With the end of Jinnah nearing in August, the Nizam's game was up.
In the case of both Hyderabad and Junagadh, as in Jammu&Kashmir, it is very obvious that in spite of grave provocation, India stuck to legalities, a step-by-step process, attempt at peaceful resolution and resorted to arms as a last option only.