Should we discontinue EVMs?

[Dileep]

Now do it and put in inside an EVM and show us how it will work/success ratio etc. instead of just claiming that you can do it.

Sure. Ship me EVM PCBs and boxes with rigged chips I suggested (chip has to take code and a wrong hashcode and spit out hash code when asked). The trojan code is ready. I need to see the manual of the chip to write the trojan in that chip's assembly. Thats would take me a few days. Then rigged EVMs with modulo-5 trojans will be at your door step.
.

It is impossible to spit out hash code because the programming will fail. I repeat it here because you tend to 'forget that'

Your claim includes the "rigged chips". You get the rigged chips, and we will get you the EVMs.

Despite that, I will bite. I gave you the manual of the chip the other day. Please post the assembly code here.

[Dileep]

(My friends in electronics says that "receive only no send" RF can fit on microcontroller. No one does it as commercial app need sending IDs and ACK. But if one has application like sending candidate number to EVM, it can be done for a price. He will get more details and I will then post more details. And the guy in van need not know that he is rigging EVMs. He could be just thinking that he is driving the van on a route and the van can have equipment that do it).

Oh, by all means, please do. I would like to dissect that technically.

Oh, and you haven't posted the voters list without photos.

[Dileep]

Since the "fake the hash" argument is still being propped up:

During the programming operation, after each byte (or block of bytes in case of word organized memory) is programmed, the corresponding hash byte is read to verify the programming. So, faking a single hash will not work.

So, the notion that a rigged controller can fake the hash is laid to rest.

[Raja Bose]

Sure. Ship me EVM PCBs and boxes with rigged chips I suggested (chip has to take code and a wrong hashcode and spit out hash code when asked). The trojan code is ready. I need to see the manual of the chip to write the trojan in that chip's assembly. Thats would take me a few days. Then rigged EVMs with modulo-5 trojans will be at your door step.

You are the ones making the allegations, you are responsible for arranging for whatever materials you need and rigging thereof. Otherwise it would be like me claiming that I can marry Monica Belluci but on being asked to prove it, I demand that 1st Monica Belluci be forced to agree to marry me and be brought before me tied up like a hog (with only her arms freed) so that I can exchange garlands with her!

[Tanaji]

The trojan code is ready

Really? Could you please post that here?

Its interesting how you wrote the trojan when all your posts indicate you dont fully understand how the EVM works.

[Pranav]

Since Rahul Mehta is bringing back old dead arguments back:

1. It is impossible to replace chips at the foundry
- The rigged chip will be a new maskset, which will result in creation of a multitude of traceable records in the fab line.
- The records are made by automatic machinery, and also by a large team of engineers, operators and QC personnel, in various shifts and departments.
- Many of these records will go to BEL, and get into the QC system.
2. A replaced chip will be detected at BEL
- Verification of mask id, datecode, fab traceability records, test reports.
- Power consumption
- Benchmark failure
3. It is impossible to replace a binary at BEL
- BEL Quality system, involving engineers and operators at all levels, in various shifts and departments.
4. A replaced binary will be detected at BEL, or later.
- Hash check, which can't be faked, since the hash is incrementally verified at programming time.

So, you can't get a trojan in.

As long as the EC continues to stonewall all requests for transparency, claims of EVM supporters have no credibility.

[Dileep]

As long as the EC continues to stonewall all requests for transparency, claims of EVM supporters have no credibility.

The technical arguments have nothing to do with the actions of EC. The point that has been proven here is that you can't rig the EVMs even if the EC is corrupt.

Determine credibility based on the technical soundness of the arguments.

[Rahul Mehta]

The technical arguments have nothing to do with the actions of EC. The point that has been proven here is that you can't rig the EVMs even if the EC is corrupt.

Determine credibility based on the technical soundness of the arguments.

You are assuming that top guys in BEL will to want not put a rigged code. This is not a technical argument. This is faith in their integrity and it is a 100% non-technical issue. You are assuming that top guys in BEL did not manipulate/force/bribe the key small number of employees so that process end up having holes and they can put trojans they like.

And co-operation can come for many reasons - not just bribe. eg some key employees can be have beliefs that "these commons are fools" and so elections MUST be manipulated. Some people may believe in rigging elections so that "good guys" like MMS or Congressmen can win. I know many Modi , Maya, CPM etc fans who would rig elections for free if their pet leaders were to become PM. Thankfully, such dangerous fans are very small in number. But we commons do NOT want a "process" where in few people can put a trojans and decide votes in 100000s of booths before poll begins.

----

Re : Processes.

1. if PwC auditors were following the "processes", then the scam would have never become a banyan tree, but would have been caught when it was mere grass tall. But once PwC top guys decided to pull the scam, sky was the limit. So any process that involves a small number of guys is good only if they alone are going to face consequences.

2. I consider your TECH arguments as valid, and I am summarily trashing all "good process" arguments. If tech barrier cant allow something, it is good.

-----

Anti-EVMs folks,

I have submitted the ad draft to IE and Ahmedabad Mirror. If their legal dept approves, I will be giving them demand draft tomorrow. And this weekend, I will be printing 10,000 to 20,000 leaflets and distribute via newspaper. IMO, many (sic) commons dont read BRites and we need to reach them.

[Tanaji]

You are assuming that top guys in BEL will to want not put a rigged code. This is not a technical argument. This is faith in their integrity and it is a 100% non-technical issue. You are assuming that BEL did not manipulate/force/bribe the small number of employees to so that process end up having holes and they can put trojans they like.

Incorrect or misleading as usual.

We are assuming (and have proved) that in order for a EVM to be rigged successfully, one has to go through a series of steps, each of which is possible individually but when combined results in a probability of success that is very small. For example, it is not adequate just bribing the BEL guys, you have to bribe a whole lot of others as well.

Why do you repeat the same arguments that have been disproved?

[Pranav]

As long as the EC continues to stonewall all requests for transparency, claims of EVM supporters have no credibility.

The technical arguments have nothing to do with the actions of EC. The point that has been proven here is that you can't rig the EVMs even if the EC is corrupt.

Determine credibility based on the technical soundness of the arguments.

Let us assume that the government that can appoint a corrupt EC can also appoint corrupt personnel at appropriate positions in the PSUs owned by the government.

[Dileep]

You are assuming that top guys in BEL will to want not put a rigged code. This is not a technical argument. This is faith in their integrity and it is a 100% non-technical issue.

The top guys have no control on the binary. They don't walk in carrying a pen drive ans ask the engineer to load that binary. The point is, one will need co-operation from a number of people, from engineers, to operators to quality inspectors. It is impossible t do some mischief and then keep it under wraps.

You are assuming that BEL did not manipulate/force/bribe the small number of employees to so that process end up having holes and they can put trojans they like.

Firstly, a small number of people can't put holes in the process. Secondly, it is impossible to keep such mischied under wraps.

And co-operation can come for many reasons - not just bribe. eg some employees can be anti-common, believe that "commons are fools" and so elections MUST be manipulated.

How many such "anti-common" people do you know?

Just as some persons truly hate democracy and believe in dictatorship, some people may believe in rigging elections so that "good guys" like MMS or Congressmen can win. I know many Modi , Maya, CPM etc fans who would rig elections for free if their pets were to become PM. Thankfully, such dangerous fans are very small in number. But we commons do NOT want a "process" where in few people can put a trojans and decide election results even before poll begins.

You are NOT a common.You are a Neta. I would trust the engineers, operators and QC inspectors working under their quality system, a million times more than ANY neta.

And a BILLION timesmore than the "one man party neta" who is the paramount of dishonesty.

[Rahul Mehta]

As long as the EC continues to stonewall all requests for transparency, claims of EVM supporters have no credibility.

Pranav,

What transparency do you want?

EC can give you source code. How do you know what is actual binary in 700,000 EVMs in field?

EC can give you 1000 EVMs to rip apart. Are you sure that those EVMs were chosen at random?

You choose 1000 EVMs at random. Now what tools you have to read the locked ROM, microcode etc and see if chip is what it says. How much time will it take? How much audit will this cost?

---

Good thing about ballot box is that is was empty when came in booth. So you have only 8 hours to rig 100000s of booth. Where in EVM, who knows what trojans were placed? IOW, EVMs may not born empty while ballot box is always born empty.

One can build a good paper on "safe EVMs". But with plethora of audits people propose (do X ray scan of chip, follow 10s of processes etc), the costs are piling skyhigh. EC may be paying only Rs 10000. But looks like BEL is spending fortune in making them.

[Dileep]

Let us assume that the government that can appoint a corrupt EC can also appoint corrupt personnel at appropriate positions in the PSUs owned by the government.

That assumption is wrong. How many people are hired at the BEL plants? What is the service levels of the people? How many years of experience?

Did the government hire the 'bots' in 1995, so that they can subvert the EVM manufacturing in 2003?

[Pranav]

That assumption is wrong. How many people are hired at the BEL plants? What is the service levels of the people? How many years of experience?

Did the government hire the 'bots' in 1995, so that they can subvert the EVM manufacturing in 2003?

PSUs are routinely used by government ministers for all kinds of corrupt activities.

[Tanaji]

Let us assume that the government that can appoint a corrupt EC can also appoint corrupt personnel at appropriate positions in the PSUs owned by the government.

The EC does not control the Fab (outside India), the District Collectors etc. etc.

The amount of such people to be amounted will be large, which increases the possibility of the conspiracy being discovered.

Also, if there is an all powerful entity (similar to the corrupt PM/CM/HM/DC argument by Rahul Mehta) then the system has already been subverted. There is no need to subvert the elections.

These arguments denote a lack of Indian polity where MPs join a party for their own selfishness and not for being wedded to a cause.

[Dileep]

One can build a good paper on "safe EVMs". But with plethora of audits people propose (do X ray scan of chip, follow 10s of processes etc), the costs are piling skyhigh. EC may be paying only Rs 10000. But looks like BEL is spending fortune in making them.

The current system is good enough. All your scenarios are lown apart based on the current systems and practices only.

[Tanaji]

That assumption is wrong. How many people are hired at the BEL plants? What is the service levels of the people? How many years of experience?

Did the government hire the 'bots' in 1995, so that they can subvert the EVM manufacturing in 2003?

PSUs are routinely used by government ministers for all kinds of corrupt activities.

PSUs are used to either launder funds or provide money for their pet pork barrel projects or to get benefits. Name one case where a PSU such as SAIL was used to provide defective steel so that a building will collapse so that an opposition member's house will be destroyed (This is the SAIL equivalent of rigging BEL)

[Tanaji]

Good thing about ballot box is that is was empty when came in booth. So you have only 8 hours to rig 100000s of booth. Where in EVM, who knows what trojans were placed? IOW, EVMs may not born empty while ballot box is always born empty.

Yet it has been repeatedly proved that ballot boxes are stuffed in each election and not a single proof exists that shows that EVMs were rigged in the last election.

Of course in RahulWorld, anything is possible.

[Dileep]

PSUs are routinely used by government ministers for all kinds of corrupt activities.

Of course they do, like ask to give favourite contracts etc. Not something the level of rigging EVMs.

Nobody cares about the "chalta hai" corruption like contracts, but technical interference will never be condoned, or borne in silence.

Take this scenario. Assume that the minister forced the purchase group of BEL to buy Elcaps from Santa Singh Pvt. Ltd. If the Elcaps fail quality testing, there is no way they gets accepted.

[Rahul Mehta]

The top guys have no control on the binary. They don't walk in carrying a pen drive ans ask the engineer to load that binary. The point is, one will need co-operation from a number of people, from engineers, to operators to quality inspectors. It is impossible t do some mischief and then keep it under wraps.

How many people in EVM making unit? And how many in chip burning unit?

The top guys will appoint a guy in middle and some guy at bottom to do this dirty job.

Firstly, a small number of people can't put holes in the process. Secondly, it is impossible to keep such mischied under wraps.

Only a small number of people make processes. You dont have 10000 people making process code.

How many such "anti-common" people do you know?

On this forum alone, I can count 10s.

1. Allow commons to register YES/No for Rs 3 -- NO WAY
2. Allow commons to expel/replace PM --- NO WAY
3. Allow commons to expel/replace SC-Cj--- NO WAY

Spare (2) and (3). But (1) is a proof positive of anti-common anti-democracy mindset.

-----

We are assuming (and have proved) that in order for a EVM to be rigged successfully, one has to go through a series of steps, each of which is possible individually but when combined results in a probability of success that is very small. For example, it is not adequate just bribing the BEL guys, you have to bribe a whole lot of others as well.

Pls Spell SATYAM for me. Or pls spell Telgi for me. Or pick any newspaper and look for such words. I am sure you will find many. So much for processes.

And you dont need to bribe a whole lot. Just bribe the top guys and in the name of cost saving etc they will create loop holes in processes so that trojans can pass thru.

[Pranav]

As long as the EC continues to stonewall all requests for transparency, claims of EVM supporters have no credibility.

Pranav,

What transparency do you want?

EC can give you source code. How do you know what is actual binary in 700,000 EVMs in field?

EC can give you 1000 EVMs to rip apart. Are you sure that those EVMs were chosen at random?

You choose 1000 EVMs at random. Now what tools you have to read the locked ROM, microcode etc and see if chip is what it says. How much time will it take? How much audit will this cost?

---

Good thing about ballot box is that is was empty when came in booth. So you have only 8 hours to rig 100000s of booth. Where in EVM, who knows what trojans were placed? IOW, EVMs may not born empty while ballot box is always born empty.

One can build a good paper on "safe EVMs". But with plethora of audits people propose (do X ray scan of chip, follow 10s of processes etc), the costs are piling skyhigh. EC may be paying only Rs 10000. But looks like BEL is spending fortune in making them.

Let the EC start with transparency and publish the specs. Then it's upto the EC to prove that all the EVMs and totalisers that were used actually met the claimed specs at the time of the polls.

As many sensible people in many different countries have realised, it is a hopeless task. Then the logical conclusion will be to go back to paper ballots.

IMHO, paper ballots with real time multicasting from cams in voting booths is a system that is impossible to beat.

[Dileep]

Rahul Mehta, You owe us the following:

1. Code for the Trojan (Which is ready as per your claim.
2. Voters list without photos. Post a good quality scan please.

Thanks

[Tanaji]

Pls Spell SATYAM for me. Or pls spell Telgi for me. Or pick any newspaper and look for such words. I am sure you will find many. So much for processes.

Satyam financial fraud is the same as a EVM now? Printing stamp papers is same as making custom chips in fabs outside India?

Possibly in RahulWorld.

And you dont need to bribe a whole lot. Just bribe the top guys and in the name of cost saving etc they will create loop holes in processes so that trojans can pass thru.

Again, repeatedly proved wrong and that it requires much more people to be compromised. Your repeating a statement doesnt make it true. In RahulWorld maybe, in real world no.

[Pranav]

Nobody cares about the "chalta hai" corruption like contracts, but technical interference will never be condoned, or borne in silence.

That's your belief and you are entitled to it.

[Tanaji]

Let the EC start with transparency and publish the specs. Then it's upto the EC to prove that all the EVMs and totalisers that were used actually met the claimed specs at the time of the polls

Specs are provided. If you mean open source the code, then I doubt that will happen or is wise. Totalizers were not used in the polls on a large scale (except for one test)

Yes, EC should audit Totalizers.

[Tanaji]

This is getting to be like whack-a-mole.

[Dileep]

How many people in EVM making unit? And how many in chip burning unit?

The top guys will appoint a guy in middle and some guy at bottom to do this dirty job.

I gave you a typical process system followed in the operations. Please be specific and point out HOW EXACTLY you would subvert.

Only a small number of people make processes. You dont have 10000 people making process code.

What do you mean "making process code". Do you understand what is a manufacturing system process?

And you dont need to bribe a whole lot. Just bribe the top guys and in the name of cost saving etc they will create loop holes in processes so that trojans can pass thru.

Show how.

[Dileep]

Show me how exactly you would subvert this system

OK, since you are repeating the "Top 3 guys" a lot, please detail how exactly they are going to replace the binaries.

1. The binary is kept by the Quality engineer.
2. The image is issued to the programmer station by the QE
3. The Quality Inspector checks the file size and MD5 hash of the binary.
4. The QI sets up the programming station by loading the binary, and using the built in size/checksum check of the programmer
5. The operator runs the shift programming the devices. The lockbit is not set at this time.
6. The QI does random checks on the devices to verify that they are programmed correctly.
6. The devices are sent for board assembly.
7. During board level testing the binary is read and the hash is checked.
8. After the functional test, the lockbit is set.

Now tell me, how the Top3 can corrupt this system?

[Tanaji]

It is pointless... he will blithely proclaim that each and every element in the system is corrupt, so the head of BEL, the programmer, the QI, the QC person, each and every body.

Then he will also say that the above is not a large body and is not everyone.

In Rahulworld, this is what he is claiming

[Dileep]

It is pointless... he will blithely proclaim that each and every element in the system is corrupt, so the head of BEL, the programmer, the QI, the QC person, each and every body.

Then he will also say that the above is not a large body and is not everyone.

In Rahulworld, this is what he is claiming

No, I am having fun. It is even better than the AESA Radar wars! Technical debates don't come every year to BRF you know

[Rahul Mehta]

Dileep,

The psuedo code for rigged EVM is

//cMyType is some constant in ROM
// nCandidates = number of candidates
Fav_Candidate_Number = (nCandidates + cMyType ) mod 5 +1
nVotes[Fav_Candidate_Number] = TotalVotes*0.80
// Subtract others' votes accordingly.

Now pls send me the code of EVM and Assembly language manual of chip so that I can write exact code.

----

Page scan will come by 10pm today.

---

1. Let the EC start with transparency and publish the specs. Then it's upto the EC to prove that all the EVMs and totalisers that were used actually met the claimed specs at the time of the polls.

2. As many sensible people in many different countries have realised, it is a hopeless task. Then the logical conclusion will be to go back to paper ballots.

3. IMHO, paper ballots with real time multicasting from cams in voting booths is a system that is impossible to beat.

1. We have the specs. They look good. How do we know ROM has what spec says? Dileep says that "trust the processes". How far do you trust the the top BEL guys who made the processes? I dont want to trust them with 71 cr votes. Do you? So what do you do with specs?

2. Yes. Camera plus a stamper which stamps only once every 20 seconds. Now if someone duplicates the stamp, then counter on stamp and number of ballot papers will differ. Allow difference of 2-5 as acceptable error. Above this, and order a repoll. So now paper has 4 safeguards. Camera, serial number, sign of presiding officer and a stamp. stamper creates 20 second delay and thus makes rigging as difficult as EVM. And paper rules out industrial scale rigging. Also polling should be on SAME day all over India and counting should start at 9am next day. And raise the deposit to 1951 level i.e. Rs 120,000 at least.

[Tanaji]

Dileep,

The psuedo code for rigged EVM is

//cMyType is some constant in ROM
// nCandidates = number of candidates
Fav_Candidate_Number = (nCandidates + cMyType ) mod 5 +1
nVotes[Fav_Candidate_Number] = TotalVotes*0.80
// Subtract others' votes accordingly.

Now pls send me the code of EVM and Assembly language manual of chip so that I can write exact code.

.

This is not even pseudo code.

[Rahul Mehta]

No, I am having fun. It is even better than the AESA Radar wars! Technical debates don't come every year to BRF you know

Dileep,

Your counter arguments used to be technical (and my sincere thanks to you for all of them). But even since modulo-5 Trojans came, your arguments are now only "have faith in process makers in BEL", they are NOT technical anymore.

Most of us (sic) commons in India , including ITVT people, believe that top guys in BEL are physically capable of putting Trojans and for a right price, they would. Now they still have faith in EVMs only because they still dont know how a trojan can benefit a party. IOW, they dont see why anyone would put a Trojan that helps no. N, when no one knows who No. N will be on poll day. We will see how we (sic) commons react to the Trojans I have proposed.

---

And I am 100% a common - from hair to toes. Every citizen who considers himself no more intelligent than a common is a common. IMO, I am no more intelligent than a common of India, and thus I am a common. There are some (like many BRites) who think they are cut above the rest and more qualified to decide public issues. They are IMO the Uncommons. On all public issue, I consider myself as 1/71cr, and thus again I am 100% a common.

---

Tanaji,

The key issue in Trojan design is ONLY one : how to get Favorite Candidates Row number. How/when to favor him is non-issue. I have given logic to calculate Favorite Candidates Row number = (nCandidates + k) mod 5 + 1 ., where K is constant in ROM, can be 1 to 5.

[Tanaji]

So now paper has 4 safeguards. Camera, serial number, sign of presiding officer and a stamp.

Using your same logic:

Camera output stream can be manipulated
Serial numbers can be made to match
Presiding officer is corrupt
Stamp can be duplicated TRIVIALLY

I dont want to trust them with 71 cr votes. Do you?

And raise the deposit to 1951 level i.e. Rs 120,000 at least

there you go with your neta's agenda once again eh? Get rid of the smaller players, so that the rich netas can benefit.

[Dileep]

Your counter arguments used to be technical (and my sincere thanks to you for all of them). But even since modulo-5 Trojans came, your arguments are now only "have faith in process makers in BEL", they are NOT technical anymore.

No. The counter arguments for all the possibilities of trojan insertion had been always there. The defense against corruption at BEL is a system. And your modulo-5 activation theory itself is disproven. It has so many unknowns.

you are conveniently ignoring the example I posted above. Tell me how you would subvert that system

Most of us (sic) commons in India , including ITVT people, believe that top guys in BEL are physically capable of putting Trojans and for a right price, they would. Now they still have faith in EVMs only because they still dont know how a trojan can benefit a party. IOW, they dont see why anyone would put a Trojan that helps no. N, when no one knows who No. N will be on poll day. We will see how we (sic) commons react to the Trojans I have proposed.

You are NOT a common. You claim to be one for your own benefit. You also believed the almighty CIA can design chips and insert them into a fab's production without leaving a trace.

That shows the value of your beliefs.

The commons will be outraged, because they have no clue on either side. I mentioned that earlier. The EVMs WILL BE shot down by the unscrupulous netas like you.

And I am 100% a common - from hair to toes. Every citizen who considers himself no more intelligent than a common is a common. IMO, I am no more intelligent than a common of India, and thus I am a common. There are some (like many BRites) who think they are cut above the rest and more qualified to decide public issues. They are IMO the Uncommons. On all public issue, I consider myself as 1/71cr, and thus again I am 100% a common.

That is your definition of common. Can you find any other place that definition is shown? Like websters?

You are a Neta who is simply using the name "common" as defined by yourself, as convenient to yourself, and to benefit yourself.

The key issue in Trojan design is ONLY one : how to get Favorite Candidates Row number.

No. The key issue in any trojan is how the hell it is going to get into the system, and you are most conveniently ignoring it.

How/when to favor him is non-issue. I have given logic to calculate Favorite Candidates Row number = (nCandidates + k) mod 5 + 1 ., where K is constant in ROM, can be 1 to 5.

The nCandidate scheme is proven to be utterly unreliable, still you harp on it. Maybe because you didn't figure out anything better.

1. The process to get the nCandidate is unreliable. You yourself claim that it is chaotic. No one maintains an updated list of withdrawals. So, it is impossible to correctly judge the number of withdrawals needed.

2. The list of valid candidates is drawn after the deadline for withdrawals, and after verification of the forms. There could be rejection of the withdrawals after the deadline.

3. Rejecting a candidate doesn't happen after acceptance. That system is not there in the handbook.

So, the technique to get ncandidates is utterly unreliable.

4. If the ncandidates is wrong, a wrong guy gets the vote, which no party wants.

5. It is utterly difficult to manage the spread of the "rigged" machines. If by any chance other machines come into the constituency, the votes go to the wrong party.

No one is going to put so much of effort on such an un reliable method.

[Dileep]

You don't need the whole code to do the code. You just need the interface spec. Here is it is:

Symbol 'keyCallBack' will be called after processing every key press. You can use it to activate your code.
Candidate number to bias: 4.

Memory Map:

nCandidates: 0xFE SIZE 1 in Expanded RAM
nVotes: 0x100 Array[64] of SIZE 2 in Expanded Ram
Scratchpad memory: 0x50 in RAM

The chip datasheet can be downloaded from : http://www.atmel.com/dyn/resources/prod ... oc4188.pdf

Part No: TS83C51RD2

Instruction Set Reference: http://www.atmel.com/dyn/resources/prod ... oc0509.pdf
Platform Hardware Manual: http://www.atmel.com/dyn/resources/prod ... oc4316.pdf

[Raja Bose]

^^ This is getting to be fun!

[Pranav]

Show me how exactly you would subvert this system
1. The binary is kept by the Quality engineer.
2. The image is issued to the programmer station by the QE
3. The Quality Inspector checks the file size and MD5 hash of the binary.
4. The QI sets up the programming station by loading the binary, and using the built in size/checksum check of the programmer
5. The operator runs the shift programming the devices. The lockbit is not set at this time.
6. The QI does random checks on the devices to verify that they are programmed correctly.
6. The devices are sent for board assembly.
7. During board level testing the binary is read and the hash is checked.
8. After the functional test, the lockbit is set.

Now tell me, how the Top3 can corrupt this system?

QE issues a compromised binary, and the hash is computed for the compromised binary.

[vera_k]

A security measure may have many useful features. Quoting one of them doesn't mean that the corresponding threat is possible. Condoms protect you against STD. You use condom while having sex with your wife. Does that mean your wife have STD?

The keylogging is a good security measure in any case. For example, if you see that a number of votes cast in quick succession, with a delay just over the set guard limit, you can infer that there is something fishy.

The committee asked for this security measure and relied on it to explain how the Election Commission could detect the activation of a Trojan. At the minimum this means that the Election Commission should perform a post-election analysis of key presses on all EVM control units and publish the results to assure people that a Trojan was not activated. This activity has to be performed after each Election if the Trojan threat is to be mitigated using the Indiresan Committee's recommendations.

Secondly, the very fact that this measure was added as a detection mechanism for Trojans raises more questions -

1. This new security measure is present in newly manufactured EVMs, leaving the existing stock of EVMs unprotected

2. The measure does not protect against Trojan's that do not require activation, and

3. A Trojan can tamper with the keypress log after activation to hide the activation sequence

The committee examined the possibility of a Trojan horse sub-program being wilfully activated after knowing key number allocation to favour a particular key (i.e. candidate), by activating the "Trojan Horse" through some mechanism at time of poll. Such entry is viable only thro' "specific Key presses sequence" on CU or by wireless signal or CU ports. The former activity is not viable as all "key presses" are to be time-date-logged in the memory (as per advise of committee), and a "repeat pattern" in all CU's at various booths can be easily visible on post-election analysis.

[Dileep]

Show me how exactly you would subvert this system
1. The binary is kept by the Quality engineer.
2. The image is issued to the programmer station by the QE
3. The Quality Inspector checks the file size and MD5 hash of the binary.
4. The QI sets up the programming station by loading the binary, and using the built in size/checksum check of the programmer
5. The operator runs the shift programming the devices. The lockbit is not set at this time.
6. The QI does random checks on the devices to verify that they are programmed correctly.
6. The devices are sent for board assembly.
7. During board level testing the binary is read and the hash is checked.
8. After the functional test, the lockbit is set.

Now tell me, how the Top3 can corrupt this system?

QE issues a compromised binary, and the hash is computed for the compromised binary.

OK. So, do you, and RM agree that if the QE gets a GOOD Binary, then there is no way it can be REPLACED with a bad one? Want more time to think? I want that question answered before I will work on the source of the binary.