There is a curious but dangerous for India, theory, ‘Mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS), proposed by William Zartman. When and why conflicting parties are amenable to resolve conflict is a basic assumption underlying the “Ripeness theory”, advocated by Zartman. Zartman contends that “Parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so — when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament. At that ripe moment, they grab on to proposals that usually have been in the air for a long time and that only now appear attractive.”
The concept of a ‘ripe moment’ centres on the parties' perception of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS), optimally associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe. Zartman has formulated six propositions delineating important elements and components of MHS model. They are:
Proposition 1. Ripeness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the initiation of negotiations, bilateral or mediated.
Proposition 2. (Definitional): If the (two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for resolution (i.e., for negotiations toward resolution to begin).
Proposition 3. An MHS contains objective and subjective elements, of which only the latter are necessary and sufficient to its existence.
Proposition 4. If the parties’ subjective expressions of pain, impasse, and inability to bear the costs of further escalation, related to objective evidence of stalemate, data on numbers and nature of casualties and material costs, and/or other such indicators of an MHS can be found, along with expressions of a sense of a way out, ripeness exists.
Proposition 5. (a) Once ripeness has been established, specific tactics by mediators can help seize the ripe moment and turn it into negotiations; (b) If only objective elements of ripeness exist, specific tactics by mediators can bring the conflicting parties to feel/understand the pain of their mutual stalemate and turn to negotiations.
Proposition 6. The perception of a mutually enticing opportunity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the continuation of negotiations to the successful conclusion of a conflict.
MHS needs to address/contain resistant reaction, whether stemming from perseverance, agent escalation, true belief, or ideological cultures and back it up with Mutually Enticing Opportunities (MEOs). The negotiations pushed by MHS are likely to be unstable unless they are supported by the prospects for a more attractive future to pull the parties out of the conflict. This could be engineered by a “formula for settlement and prospects of reconciliation that negotiating (may) design during negotiations.”
The solution for the Irish "problem" was proposed along this way. There are intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic as well as in India, like Sumantra Bose, who could be the fronts for broaching such ideas about Kashmir.
Irish model : Democratic Institutions in N Ireland
A 108-member Assembly elected by proportional representation and a 14-member executive body in Northern Ireland in which both Catholic and Protestant political representatives sit together in government. This is only the second time such power-sharing has occurred since 1920 (the first was the short-lived Sunningdale Agreement of 1973-74).
The Assembly is capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, in the areas of finance, education, environment, health, social services, economic development and agriculture and is subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of both communities. The Agreement also established a consultative Civic Forum to support the work of the Assembly. The power-sharing executive body of ten ministers drawn from four political parties plus the First and Deputy First Ministers, is the effective government.
Following a referendum, the Northern Ireland Assembly was constituted under the Northern Ireland (Elections) Act 1998. On 25 June 1998, 108 members were elected to the new Assembly. None of the UUP candidates who opposed the Good Friday Agreement was elected. Moreover, the DUP and other anti-agreement parties failed to secure the 30 seats necessary to impede the work of the Assembly. However, the Northern Ireland government was not constituted until a year later, and brought to a standstill over the issue of IRA decommissioning.
Kashmir model: Institutionalising Intra-Kashmiri dialogue/Devising new structures in reconstituted Kashmir
Institutionalisation of intra-Kashmiri dialogue within IHK and AJK and between the Indian and Pakistani zones of Kashmir. Drawing up new structures and arrangements that would give way to the existing political, administrative and constitutional structures as a result of permanent solution of Kashmir.
I would guess that the UK would construct demographic homogeneity within POK, completely suppressing the Shia sectarian and other ethnic opposition to greater control by GOTSP, and highlight demographic fractures within Indian side of Kashmir.
Irish model: North-South Ministerial Council
The Belfast Agreement established a North-South Ministerial Council that deals with the totality of relationships within the island of Ireland. The Council was established to bring together those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland. The Council meets in plenary format twice a year, in specific sectoral formats on a regular basis, and in an appropriate format to consider institutional or cross-sectoral matters and to resolve disagreement. All Council decisions to be by agreement between the two sides. Areas for North-South co-operation include agriculture, education, transport, environment, waterways, social security/social welfare, tourism, inland fisheries and health.
Kashmir model: Cross-border cooperation/Softening boundaries & Sovereignty in Kashmir
This means softening of boundaries across the reconstituted zones of Kashmir and gradually developing economic cooperation on transport, tourism, trade and commerce, environment, agriculture, cultural cooperation and management of water resources. This require a cross-border structure and as per the Irish model (North–South Ministerial Council) a Srinagar-Muzaffarabad Ministerial Council for Cooperation. The sop that can be held for GOI, or more correctly a sop for the Indian commons by the GOI and NC, the concoction that in return for gradual cooperation between the two parts of Kashmir giving Indian Kashmir an indirect, limited say in the affairs of POK.
Irish model: British-Irish Council/ British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference
The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC) was to set up under a new British-Irish Agreement dealing with their totality of relationships and incorporates both the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council and the Intergovernmental Conference established under the 1985 Agreement. The BIIC brings together the two governments “to promote bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of mutual interest’. The Conference was to meet as required at summit level (Prime Minister and Taoiseach). Otherwise, governments were to be represented by appropriate ministers. Advisers, including police and security advisers, attend as relevant. All decisions were to be arrived at by agreement between both governments. The BIIC recognises “Irish Government's special interest in Northern Ireland” on non-devolved matters on which it may forward views and proposals. The co-operation within the framework of the Conference includes facilitation of co-operation in security matters. The Conference also deals with the areas of rights, justice, prisons and policing in Northern Ireland (unless and until responsibility is devolved to a Northern Ireland administration).
Kashmir model: India-Pakistan Kashmir Council (IPKC) /India-Pakistan Intergovernmental Conference
Two mutually reinforcing structures could be identified on the pattern of BIC and BIIC. These could be India-Pakistan Kashmir Council (IPKC) and India-Pakistan Intergovernmental Conference (IPKIC). The India-Pakistan Kashmir Council (IPKC) could be set up to promote harmonious and mutually beneficial development of totality of relationships between India-Pakistan and the people of Kashmir. Membership may comprise representatives of the governments of India, Pakistan and that of reconstituted Kashmir. The Council will provide a platform to discuss, consult and reach agreement on cooperation on matters of mutual interest, i.e. transport links, agriculture, trade, environment, health, education, and cultural issues and approaches to SAARC issues. It may take decision on common policies and common actions. The council may operate by consensus.
The India-Pakistan Intergovernmental Conference (IPKIC) would bring together the Indian and Pakistani governments to promote bilateral cooperation at all levels on all matters of mutual interest. All decisions will be by agreement between both governments. IPKIC would recognise Pakistan’s special interest in Kashmir (as British government did in the case of the Irish Republic (in relation to Northern Ireland) on issues of mutual concern arising in relation to Kashmir. These would include non-devolved matters such as cooperation in security matters, policing and the areas of human rights and justice. Of particular importance would be the demilitarisation of the Kashmir Valley and joint guarantees by India and Pakistan to a quasi-sovereign status of the reconstituted Kashmir Valley. In this context, the IPKIC will intensify cooperation between the two governments on the all-Kashmir or cross-border aspects of matters of mutual interest. Relevant executive members of the reconstituted Kashmir governments will be involved in the meetings of the IPKIC, and in the reviews on non-devolved matters.
(1) A.G. Noorani, “Irish lessons for Kashmir”, Frontline, Chennai, volume 20, no. 7, March 29-April 11, 2003.
(2) Sumantra Bose, “Kashmir: sources of conflict, Dimensions of Peace”, Survival, vol. 41. no. 3. Autumn 1999;
(3) Balraj Puri, “An irrelevant model”, Frontline, 7 June 2003. Radha Kumar, “Learning from others”, <
http://www.india-seminar.com/2000.496/ 496%20radh%20kumar.htm>.
(4) Shaikh Tajammal-ul-Islam, “Irish model for Kashmir”, The News, Islamabad/Rawalpindi, 19 March 2003.
(5) “Conflict resolution in the changing world”, in International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, National Academy of Sciences. National Academies Press
http://www.nap.edu, 2000, p.1.
(6) John Burton, 'Conflict Resolution as a Political System' in Vamik Volkan, et al (eds), The Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Volume II: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work. Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1991
(7) Sundeep Waselkar, A Handbook for Conflict Resolution in South Asia, Konark Publishers Pvt, Ltd. p.4.
(8) John Burton, 'Conflict Resolution in the changing world”, in International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War.
(9) William Zartman. “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond”, in International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, op.cit., pp.228-243.
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That's why I told them "sure". Go ahead, and if it remains civil, all is fine and dandy. If this issue creates another flame war, then to quote the comedian Russell Peters' dad, "someone's gonna get a hurt real bad".