Should we discontinue EVMs?

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ArmenT
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by ArmenT »

Dileep wrote:
ArmenT wrote: Please excuse if this is a dumb question, but why not publish the source code outside the software group. That way, doubting thomases can compile the code for themselves and verify that the binaries are indeed built from the sources.
ArmenT, there are two reasons for that.

1. We are a paranoiac society where the "official secrets act" ruled for a very long time.
2. If you publish the source, the next second, a thousand Rahul Mehtas will jump up and down saying that the EC "sold the country off. Now anyone can hack the EVM, since they have the source."

The source code control, as far as I could gather from the EC disclosure, is that two small teams writes it, independently at BEL and ECIL, and another team does the review and verification. That is good enough security IMO.
Sounds good to me saar. Thanks much for the explanation. I wonder if the verification team also has access to the source. This way, they can compile their own version and verify that the hex file that was sent to Hitachi was indeed built from the source code.

Personally I'm a fan of full disclosure, so I think it would have been better for the EC to open source the hardware design as well as the source code. As they say, with enough eyes, all bugs are shallow.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by ArmenT »

At this stage, it might be prudent to point out that security is a process, not a product. Sure it is very possible to make a compromised program, but the problem is to bypass all the security checks and balances in the process and insert that crocked binary into an EVM chip. With proper security processes enforced, it will be very difficult to do so.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Raja Bose »

ah...ArmenT, how can you be so naive? :roll: :evil: CIA and Commissioner Evil Chawla with Sonia Madam have bought/bribed entire fabs, big manufacturers and the chaiwala outside the polling booth....what is a trifling security process to them...its trivial to exploit it!
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Dileep »

ArmenT wrote: Sounds good to me saar. Thanks much for the explanation. I wonder if the verification team also has access to the source. This way, they can compile their own version and verify that the hex file that was sent to Hitachi was indeed built from the source code.

Personally I'm a fan of full disclosure, so I think it would have been better for the EC to open source the hardware design as well as the source code. As they say, with enough eyes, all bugs are shallow.
The EC disclosure says:
iii. The software for this chip is developed in-house by a select group of engineers in the two PSUs independently from each other. A select software development group of 2-3 engineers designs the source code and this work is not sub-contracted.
v. After completion of software design, testing and evaluation of the software is carried out by an independent testing group as per the software requirements specifications (SRS). This ensures that the software has really been written as per the requirements laid down for its intended use only.
Code review is always part of the design verification, so I don't see any reason why it was not done by the verification team.

Disclosure will do much more harm than it can help in this case. Disclosure should be done only to competent sources only. I always support an independent evaluation by an expert committee drawn from recommendation of all parties.

But even that can create problem. Some technical experts have no shame in publicly proclaiming things that they very well know to be technically false. I have first hand experience in this with a well known professor.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Sanku »

Yawn, Yawn... so EC did the Tandav on RM (IIT Delhi waale) bhai-bondhu's eh? More power to EC. No wonder IIT D sucks....

Partial disclosure > I did not go to IITD
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Rahul Mehta »

ArmenT wrote:At this stage, it might be prudent to point out that security is a process, not a product. Sure it is very possible to make a compromised program, but the problem is to bypass all the security checks and balances in the process and insert that crocked binary into an EVM chip. With proper security processes enforced, it will be very difficult to do so.
The questions are

1. How many people one needs to bribe to get the tempered code in the chip?

2. Is there a technology to put the tempered code in a post-facto undetectable way?

If answer to (2) is YES, then people will be ready to sell out as there is no way to get caught as there is no way to detect.

For first 20 pages of this thread, pro-EVM maintained that no tempered code can exist by which Congress can benefit. They have lost that defense as I actually created a logic (which I refer as modulo-5 logic) which if put in EVMs will benefit Congress in more than 270 out of 300 seats where they would try. So now pro-EVM people are trying to show that process in BEL etc is unriggable and thus there is no way a tempered code can get it. And they are claiming that there is technologically feasible way to hide the tempered code.

---

It is possible to get tempered code inside EVMs

The BEL disclosure says that 2-3 people wrote the code at both PSUs. In Dec-2008, order was given to BEL only to make 100,000 new EVMs. Hence, as per EC's latest disclosure, only 2-3 people know this code. This should include people who did code review or looked at the source code in any way. The code was burned by Hitachi and not by BEL team. So no QE/QI in BEL needs to be bribed to put tempered code.

So putting tempered code is possible, if BEL chiefs leaks out the source code to an expert who can add lines. The only thing is that if ROM can be read back (as Dileep, Raja Bose etc say) bit by bit by bit, then it would be found. We dont know if BEL was actually reading ROM using techniques Dileep said. After all, BEL CEO has to order the staff to scan say x% of every chip shipment has to scanned to ensure that binary is same as ordered. Even if he did, how many people were involved in verification of the burned ROM or Masked ROM or whatever that came from Hitachi? If the number of person was as low as 1-3, then that too is manageable.

So here is the list of people I need to put tempered code in chip

Top 3 guys in BEL : leak the source code, manage the EVM shipment so that one lot has only one type of EVM.

No coder from BEL is needed to be bribed.

Two expert coders in CIA are needed to add lines in source which came from BEL chip

Hitachi CEO has to be paid to order Hitachi engineers to put the tempered code in the chip and not the real one.

The two guys in BEL who are in-charge of testing burned ROM's contents needs to be bribed

CEC has to manage shipment of EVMs so that one Constituency gets all EVMs from one lot only.

Sonia, 2-3 more people in Congress to ensure that nCandidates number is tweaked as needed.

----------

So number of people needed to put rigged code is small : 5 people in BEL, one CEC, 4 top guys in Congress. And other 4-5 people involved in conspiracy are outside India and dont belong to any Indian entity.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Rahul Mehta »

I am also thinking of following logic by which one can add tempered code and not get detected even if someone honestly scans the ROM.

Here, I need to bribe the team lead in BEL's programming team and dont need to bribe the person who is examining ROM bytes. So personnel count does not change.

---

1. Say the actual code size is 100K. And say ROM size is 128K

2. Then it is standard practice to add 28 K of random bytes and not leave the code blank.

3. So the BEL team lead codes a trojan and encrypts the trojan in that 28K bytes and makes them look like random bytes.

4. The code to decrypt the 28K bytes and execute them is in microcode (hard wired circuit) of the chip. It cant be put in ROM code, otherwise it becomes detectable technologically.

So if decrypting logic is simple, then a small amount of microcode (hard wired circuit) will be sufficient to decrypt it and execute it. This needs co-operation from ASIC designer in Hitachi as he has to put some microcode not in the original design. But given that Hitachi CEO will agree for a price, co-operation from ASIC designer in Hitachi is guaranteed.

Now how much change in microcode can be detected?

Or, what is the LEAST change in microcode that would go undetected? If the decrypting logic can be implemented in the "least change that will go undetected", then there is an undetectable way of putting a tempered code.

So back to Dileep, Raja Bose etc. Pls show us how microcode (i.e. hardwired circuit) can be read and ensured that there additional function added?

---

Also, I am taking your word that ROM can be read back.

So let me re-verify from you. Are you sure that ALL known forms of ROMs, be masked ROM or OTP ROM or any gate technology used --- ROM can be read back using X-ray or laser or whatever bit by bit by bit? Because if ROM cant be read back, the tempered code theory is complete and needs no debate anymore.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Dileep »

Rahul Mehta wrote: The questions are
1. How many people one needs to bribe to get the tempered code in the chip?
Like a hundred each in BEL and ECIL.
2. Is there a technology to put the tempered code in a post-facto undetectable way?
No.
For first 20 pages of this thread, pro-EVM maintained that no tempered code can exist by which Congress can benefit. They have lost that defense as I actually created a logic (which I refer as modulo-5 logic) which if put in EVMs will benefit Congress in more than 270 out of 300 seats where they would try.
The so called mod-5 logic is utterly unreliable to execute. So unreliable, that no one in the right mind would use it. We don't fight it anymore because that point is proven, and you are not going to drop it till an ironclad defense is brought in, which doesn't exist for that.
So now pro-EVM people are trying to show that process in BEL etc is unriggable and thus there is no way a tempered code can get it. And they are claiming that there is technologically feasible way to hide the tempered code.
There is no technologically feasible way to hide the code.
It is possible to get tempered code inside EVMs
Absolutely. All you need to do is to bribe some hundred people in BEL and ECIL each.
The BEL disclosure says that 2-3 people wrote the code at both PSUs. In Dec-2008, order was given to BEL only to make 100,000 new EVMs.
Where is the proof for that? AFAIK, ECIL also supplied EVMS at the same time.
Hence, as per EC's latest disclosure, only 2-3 people know this code. This should include people who did code review or looked at the source code in any way.
Wrong. It is clearly mentioned that 2-3 people WROTE the code. The team size of the review team is unspecified.
The code was burned by Hitachi and not by BEL team. So no QE/QI in BEL needs to be bribed to put tempered code.
In fact the guy who creates the ROM Order Data and the guys who verifies it can put the tampered code. Hitachi will fab whatever code being officially sent from BEL.
So putting tempered code is possible, if BEL chiefs leaks out the source code to an expert who can add lines.
No. That ain't going to work. The code must go officially from BEL, with necessary paperwork, to Hitachi, and its traceability will come back along with the shipments. So, the only way to put it in is to make it at the source itself.
The only thing is that if ROM can be read back (as Dileep, Raja Bose etc say) bit by bit by bit, then it would be found.
No. The lockbits are NOT set from the factory. In fact it is a normal system requirement for the customer to verify the ROM on each shipment by reading it and comparing with a master. The lockbits are set in the plant.

The bit-by-bit reading is for forensics. If someone want to verify the chip, it CAN be done.
We dont know if BEL was actually reading ROM using techniques Dileep said.
They don't need to. The chips can be read using a regular programmer device, and then the lockbits set.
After all, BEL CEO has to order the staff to scan say x% of every chip shipment has to scanned to ensure that binary is same as ordered. Even if he did, how many people were involved in verification of the burned ROM or Masked ROM or whatever that came from Hitachi? If the number of person was as low as 1-3, then that too is manageable.
Any of the quality inspectors could be doing it.
So here is the list of people I need to put tempered code in chip
Top 3 guys in BEL : leak the source code, manage the EVM shipment so that one lot has only one type of EVM.
Does the top 3 guys personally handle the source? How exactly would they get the source in their hands? They will have to ask someone from the development or test team for that. So, you need the co-operation from one guy from the team.

Coming to the logistics management, it is even stranger. The top guys don't personally manage production and shipment. So, they need co-operation from the stores clerk (to issue the proper chips), the production manager (to provide serial number info), The logistics manager and his staff (who makes shipping advice), the shipping supervisor, and EVERY operator in that group to make sure that the correct units go into the correct shipment.

Pretty big number of people, not 3 guys.
No coder from BEL is needed to be bribed.
One guy need to co-operate to get the source code.
Hitachi CEO has to be paid to order Hitachi engineers to put the tempered code in the chip and not the real one.
That is impossible. You can't walk in and give some mask data. The data is used to create the actual mask used in the fab, and the accompanied paperwork is used for tracking and traceability. there is paperwork that goes to the customer also.

On top of it, the chance of later detection is a big deterrent for anyone to attempt that.

The only credible way is for BEL to officially send the binary through proper channel.
The two guys in BEL who are in-charge of testing burned ROM's contents needs to be bribed
It is not two guys. The entire team of inspectors need to be bribed.
CEC has to manage shipment of EVMs so that one Constituency gets all EVMs from one lot only.
CEC doesn't do the shipment. BEL/ECIL does it.

On top of all, someone can open a chip and find the fact, and it will be a tremendous scandal.
So number of people needed to put rigged code is small : 5 people in BEL, one CEC, 4 top guys in Congress. And other 4-5 people involved in conspiracy are outside India and dont belong to any Indian entity.
Only in RahulWorld, where the CEO himself handles the software and shipment. The CEO of a multinational behemoth messing with a tiny fraction (which I suspect he might not even know exists) business.

That too, while everyeone knows that it can be found any day.

Even TODAY, a BEL employee who reads BR can work with one uncorrupt guy in the stores or IQC and verify the binary himself by reading it on the programmer.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Dileep »

Rahul Mehta wrote:I am also thinking of following logic by which one can add tempered code and not get detected even if someone honestly scans the ROM.

Here, I need to bribe the team lead in BEL's programming team and dont need to bribe the person who is examining ROM bytes. So personnel count does not change.

---

1. Say the actual code size is 100K. And say ROM size is 128K

2. Then it is standard practice to add 28 K of random bytes and not leave the code blank.
No. This is not done for MASK ROM, because it is not programmable. In OTP, they are normally set to ZEROs, so that they can't be overwritten.
3. So the BEL team lead codes a trojan and encrypts the trojan in that 28K bytes and makes them look like random bytes.
The microcontroller can't execute encrypted code. It needs code in a regular array to execute.
4. The code to decrypt the 28K bytes and execute them is in microcode (hard wired circuit) of the chip. It cant be put in ROM code, otherwise it becomes detectable technologically.
Where will it store the decrypted code? You need to decrypt the code, store it somewhere and execute it sequentially.
So if decrypting logic is simple, then a small amount of microcode (hard wired circuit) will be sufficient to decrypt it and execute it. This needs co-operation from ASIC designer in Hitachi as he has to put some microcode not in the original design. But given that Hitachi CEO will agree for a price, co-operation from ASIC designer in Hitachi is guaranteed.
Have you seen a decrypting program? They are pretty big even in assembly language.
Now how much change in microcode can be detected?

Or, what is the LEAST change in microcode that would go undetected? If the decrypting logic can be implemented in the "least change that will go undetected", then there is an undetectable way of putting a tempered code.

So back to Dileep, Raja Bose etc. Pls show us how microcode (i.e. hardwired circuit) can be read and ensured that there additional function added?
ANY extra circuitry will readily show up on the chip. The decryption circuitry you mention will be very big, even comparable to the processor core itself!!
Also, I am taking your word that ROM can be read back.

So let me re-verify from you. Are you sure that ALL known forms of ROMs, be masked ROM or OTP ROM or any gate technology used --- ROM can be read back using X-ray or laser or whatever bit by bit by bit? Because if ROM cant be read back, the tempered code theory is complete and needs no debate anymore.
I can guarantee that the MASK ROM used in the EVM can be ACCURATELY read back by decapping.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Tanaji »

I still dont understand Rahul Mehta's logic or his objectives. As per his own assertions the following people are corrupt:
  • The PM
  • The HM
  • The various CMs
  • The EC
  • Some District Collectors
  • BEL/ECIL heads
  • Various television companies
Given that the system is hopelessly pwned or is completely compromised, why is he spending so much effort towards the EVM issue? It is as if someone spending a lot of effort trying to cure dandruff when he is suffering from a terminal case of pneumonia and leukemia at the same time. What is the point?

Three options exist:
  • RM is incredibly dense and devoid of critical reasoning. Unlikely since he claims he has a Rutgers degree and has more than a crore in assets. Also has the low cunning to claim he is a "commons" even after having Rs. 1 crore+ in assets
  • RM is trying to drum up support for his party like any other neta and this is just his way of getting cheap publicity
  • EVMs are truly hacked and compromised and the powers that have done so are using RM to propogate absolutely ridiculous theories on purpose so anyone who is anti EVM automatically gets lumped with RM style theories, thus marking them insane so that no one takes EVM fraud theories seriously. Or, they are just laying the ground for future compromise of totalizers so when anyone objects to them, they are lumped with anti EVM nut jobs like RM.
#2 is most likely with #3 a close second IMHO ;)
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Pranav »

Dileep wrote: Let me make it clear. There is no question that you can do whatever you want (activation notwithstanding) with the EVM once the rigged code gets into the machine. I agree that. I don't think there is anyone who would not.

......

OK, do me a favour. Please present it here once again. If you believe that it was not torn down already, you should be happy to prove that once again won't you.

And that is post # 1500.
OK, since you are basing your arguments on the supposed impossibility of getting compromised code onto the chip, there is no need to again go into what can happen if you do compromise the binary.

As regards testing at BEL, see http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 61#p714261 , which has the press release from the EC. It is only functional testing, so any compromised code would not be detected.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Dileep »

Pranav wrote: OK, since you are basing your arguments on the supposed impossibility of getting compromised code onto the chip, there is no need to again go into what can happen if you do compromise the binary.
The question is what are YOUR allegations? You still need some kind of activation, and RM is holding onto his mod-5 theory which is too complicated, and too unreliable to be a viable solution.
As regards testing at BEL, see http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 61#p714261 , which has the press release from the EC. It is only functional testing, so any compromised code would not be detected.
That list is just a press release. It says they do functional test, and it DOES NOT say that is all they do. There will be lot of tests they would be doing other than the functional test.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Pranav »

Dileep wrote:
Pranav wrote: OK, since you are basing your arguments on the supposed impossibility of getting compromised code onto the chip, there is no need to again go into what can happen if you do compromise the binary.
The question is what are YOUR allegations? You still need some kind of activation, and RM is holding onto his mod-5 theory which is too complicated, and too unreliable to be a viable solution.
Activation by keypad is something I had mentioned; though there are other possibilities.
That list is just a press release. It says they do functional test, and it DOES NOT say that is all they do. There will be lot of tests they would be doing other than the functional test.
If they had been doing more, they would certainly be beating the drums about it, IMHO.

You are basically basing your arguments on how many people would need to be corrupted for industrial scale rigging to be accomplished. If that is the way we are measuring reliability, the logical thing to do would be to compare the 2 methods - one is the present EVM system, and the other is having paper ballots with real time video multicasting. Let us compare how many people need to be corrupted, and more importantly, who is it that has the power to appoint and transfer these critical people.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Dileep »

Pranav wrote: Activation by keypad is something I had mentioned; though there are other possibilities.
Activation by keypad is discounted already. Impossible to do without leaks. You need one person per booth to do it.
If they had been doing more, they would certainly be beating the drums about it, IMHO.
No. How much info have they gave out till now? In fact they did very little.

I don't think such a basic step, that any company would do, would be avoided by BEL, without making a scandal among employees.
You are basically basing your arguments on how many people would need to be corrupted for industrial scale rigging to be accomplished. If that is the way we are measuring reliability, the logical thing to do would be to compare the 2 methods - one is the present EVM system, and the other is having paper ballots with real time video multicasting. Let us compare how many people need to be corrupted, and more importantly, who is it that has the power to appoint and transfer these critical people.
Security doesn't depend upon technology or equipment. Security depend upon systems. Paper ballot security is also depending upon a system, which can be locally subverted. EVMs have a system that can neither be locally, nor industrially subverted.

You should be JOKING that real time video streaming is a viable solution. A great percentage of booths don't have cell coverage as it is. How are you going to provide the service? How much bandwidth?

Yesterday I was sitting at my in-laws place which is just outside the city. I couldn't get my Reliance data card to work reliably there to do BRF. What should be the rule in case of failure of the video system? Cancel the poll?

Get real!!
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Pranav »

Dileep wrote: Security doesn't depend upon technology or equipment. Security depend upon systems.
Systems depend on people. When you make statements like "impossible without leaks", "impossible without scandal amongst employees", you are relying on people.

So the methodology should be to count and compare the number of people who are critical, and consider who appoints and transfers such employees.

By the way, a significant fraction of India's population will be covered by 3G over the next couple of years. Even without video multicasting, paper ballots are still very secure, with localized consequences in the event of failure.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Sanku »

Systems truly depend on people, however that said the system design ensures that whether a system is critically dependent on one or two people for 100% failure or success or is the responsibility diffused in such a way that it takes many people to make it work 100% right and at the same time takes many people to change its direction.

As many of us has argued GoI is such a system in its implementation, it can not be turned around rapidly by a few, and when it turns its turn is very visible.

Thats why even very corrupt or sold out leaders can only only deflect its course marginally and that deflection is clearly seen (changes in Nuclear budget, mining operations etc)

If EVMs were being rigged, there would be exact data pointing to it by now.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Dileep »

Pranav wrote: Systems depend on people. When you make statements like "impossible without leaks", "impossible without scandal amongst employees", you are relying on people.
Of course. It is people that matters. Every security system in the world depends upon people, whether it is the PAL of a nuclear weapon, or the ballot system. You have a system of checks and balances that manage the people involved to create the adequate security.
So the methodology should be to count and compare the number of people who are critical, and consider who appoints and transfers such employees.
Appointment/transfer doesn't really matter. Checks and balances do. I d not subscribe to the idea that we live in RahulWorld, where 100% of the people are corrupt. I also don't believe that everyone is 100% trustworthy either. So, you need a system to manage that.
By the way, a significant fraction of India's population will be covered by 3G over the next couple of years. Even without video multicasting, paper ballots are still very secure, with localized consequences in the event of failure.
That is HUMBUG to the least. First of all cover everyone with good old GSM, and then we will talk about 3G. Though OT for this thread, I would like to see some backing up on that statement.

Is it like the statement about the EVM maintenance contract?
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Muppalla »

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 61#p714261

Complete Procedural Security

The Commission has in place elaborate administrative measures and procedural checks-and-balances aimed at prevention of any possible misuse or procedural lapses. These measures include rigorous pre-election test and inspection of each EVM by the technicians, two level randomization with the involvement of candidates and their agents, for the random allotment of the EVMs to various constituencies and their subsequent dispatch to various polling stations. Preparation of the EVMs for elections is done in the presence of the candidates/their agents and sealing of the prepared EVMs is also done in candidate’s or their agent’s presence. Thread seal are fixed on the EVM where again, the candidates or their representatives put their own signature and seals. Paper seals guards against any unauthorized access to the EVMs after preparation. EVMs are then kept in sealed strong rooms with provision for the candidates to put their individual seals on the strong rooms. The EVMs are randomized twice over. The list of EVMs going to individual polling stations is given to the candidates for them to check, on the poll day the actual machine, that is used in that polling station. Furthermore a mock poll is conducted in the presence of polling agents, when the polling agents can verify, inter-alia, the EVM numbers. A mock poll certificate is taken before the commencement of poll. After the mock poll the machine is set back to zero and green paper seal printed at Government Security Press is put in, where once again every polling agent is allowed to put his/her signature. After the polls, the EVM are also sealed in such a manner that there is no physical access to any of the buttons on the EVMs. Indeed there is no access to the EVMs itself since the carrying case is sealed completely. The machines are put in the strong room again in presence of the candidates, observer of the commission under video camera surveillance. The strong room is allowed to be guarded by the supporters of the candidates besides the police protection provided to strong rooms. At every step, the EVM is very well protected and elaborate arrangements are in place for the same.
The above are the most important points to note regarding process. If something like replacing the EVMs and tampering them can be done by INC then I would say all the other candidates are impotent and they do not deserve to win anyway. They can do nothing to the country or the people of India if they allow the INC to beat out the system at EVM level and hence deserve to lose. They are allowing the candidates and/or their agents to present all along even during the EC officials "nature calls". Cameras are there. Even if the system is 80% corrupt, how will they be able to pull this off?
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Rahul Mehta »

Tanaji wrote:As per RM;s assertions the following people are corrupt:
  • The PM
  • The HM
  • The various CMs
  • The EC
  • Some District Collectors
  • BEL/ECIL heads
  • Various television companies
Tanaji,

In the modulo-5 based tempered code, I need ONLY following crooks

1. Top 5 people in Congress = Central Govt

2. Three ECs (no one else in EC)

3. Top 3 guys in BEL, may be 2-3 more guys in BEL

4. Hitachi CEO

5. Two expert coders who are from CIA etc

I dont need support of even one collector, one Tahasildar, one presiding officer and I dont support of even one street criminal. I dont need support of even one TV company and so forth.

(The TV company is needed ONLY in "EVM with radio receive capability", and there too I need ONLY one TV company, not 10. And in modulo-5, I dont need support of any TV company.)

----

Dileep et al,

To modulo-5 scheme needs only 10-12 people in India, and not even 15. With 10-12 one can have tempered code inside 100,000 EVMs and benefit in at least 270 out of 300 seats where these tempered EVMs go.

Getting tempered code is TRIVIAL. Now only question is : is there a post-facto undetectable way to get tempered code in the chip? . IOW, I am getting into debate on "ROM reading" and deciphering micro-code etc only to establish that there also exists an undetectable way. Otherwise, as far as "detectable ways to get tempered code", it is do-able with just 10-12 people.

----

Now code was burned in Japan or US in Hitachi premises. So if Hitachi CEO is paid $ 100 million to put tempered code, he would do it. Now pro-EVM people are assuming that BEL would check the ROM when the chip arrives. Initially, Dileep assumed that BEL is following an bribe-able process with QI, QE etc to burn code in the OTP ROM. That claim has fallen flat because the code is burned in Hitachi and not in BEL. Now Dileep et al claim that BEL was indeed verifying the contents of ROM bit by bit when BEL gets the chip. Mind you, it is just a claim, they have no BEL document which says so. But lets say that some 2-3 engineers were indeed asked to check say 1% of the ROMs they got. So how difficult it is for top 3 people in BEL to rig this step?

One way : Lets say ROM tester is using a.exe to get data onto his PC from the device that gets the ROM code. Typically, a.exe would be a process that reads from some serial or USB port that connects to device which actually reads the ROM and has some front end. The BEL chief can replace a.exe with some another a.exe with following logic

Say actual code = A
Say tempered code = B
Say code that ROM reader got = X
if X = B then show A else show X

So ROM reader would lie when B comes and would speak truth otherwise. So ROM reading engineer would never notice that chip has B and not A. IOW, the final front end of a.exe which the ROM tester in BEL looks at replaces tempered code with original untempered code. Now ROM testing engineer cannot read bytes with his own eyes to challenge that.

Second way: They can select "random" sample in a way that only untempered chips are selected.

Third way : In worst case, they put some engineers who are deep in debt, also have committed some crimes , inquiry is pending, have lots of problems etc to test ROM and use carrot/stick approach to ask them to ignore the differences.

So "ROM reading" is at best a speed breaker, not a show stopper for the top 3 guys ion the BEL.

----

Now pro-EVM are claiming that if there is tempered code in EVM, one can prove by getting say 100 randomly selected EVMs. As if EVMs are sold on road. You will need 3 HONEST Supreme Court judges to form a Special Investigation Team of 5-10 honest experts. And in their world, SCjs are not MNC agents. Tough luck !! Last I checked, almost EVERY SCj has sold out. And your technical expertise and not needed on this issue, we (sic) commons are qualified to guess whether any honest SCj is still left which can be trusted with task. So even if it is technologically possible to prove that ROM in EVM is not same as what compiled source is, there is no actual way to prove that. As you will never get 3 "honest" SCjs anymore.

It is interesting to see that people like Dileep, Tanaji etc who call me dishonest are still making claims that "tempered code can NEVER get into EVMs". This is outright dishonesty on their part. If they say that "Tempered code can indeed get in, but can be proven or disproven now", it would be another thing. If they say that they still have faith in SCjs, that is at least not a dishonest statement though it is wrong one. But their claim that "tempered code can NEVER get into EVMs" only shows that now they are resorting to open dishonesty.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Rahul Mehta »

Muppalla wrote: ......

Complete Procedural Security

The Commission has in place elaborate administrative measures and procedural checks-and-balances aimed at prevention of any possible misuse or procedural lapses. These measures include rigorous pre-election test and inspection of each EVM by the technicians, two level randomization with the involvement of candidates and their agents, for the random allotment of the EVMs to various constituencies and their subsequent dispatch to various polling stations. Preparation of the EVMs for elections is done in the presence of the candidates/their agents and sealing of the prepared EVMs is also done in candidate’s or their agent’s presence. Thread seal are fixed on the EVM where again, the candidates or their representatives put their own signature and seals. Paper seals guards against any unauthorized access to the EVMs after preparation. EVMs are then kept in sealed strong rooms with provision for the candidates to put their individual seals on the strong rooms. The EVMs are randomized twice over. The list of EVMs going to individual polling stations is given to the candidates for them to check, on the poll day the actual machine, that is used in that polling station. Furthermore a mock poll is conducted in the presence of polling agents, when the polling agents can verify, inter-alia, the EVM numbers. A mock poll certificate is taken before the commencement of poll. After the mock poll the machine is set back to zero and green paper seal printed at Government Security Press is put in, where once again every polling agent is allowed to put his/her signature. After the polls, the EVM are also sealed in such a manner that there is no physical access to any of the buttons on the EVMs. Indeed there is no access to the EVMs itself since the carrying case is sealed completely. The machines are put in the strong room again in presence of the candidates, observer of the commission under video camera surveillance. The strong room is allowed to be guarded by the supporters of the candidates besides the police protection provided to strong rooms. At every step, the EVM is very well protected and elaborate arrangements are in place for the same.

=====================================

The above are the most important points to note regarding process. If something like replacing the EVMs and tampering them can be done by INC then I would say all the other candidates are impotent and they do not deserve to win anyway. They can do nothing to the country or the people of India if they allow the INC to beat out the system at EVM level and hence deserve to lose. They are allowing the candidates and/or their agents to present all along even during the EC officials "nature calls". Cameras are there. Even if the system is 80% corrupt, how will they be able to pull this off?
Muppalla,

In tempered code scenario, NO EVM is replaced. The tempered code was put in EVM in Hitachi premises.

In EVM replacement scenario, the EVMs were replaced in CEC warehouse or from way to BEL to CEC, not inside district warehouses. Now in case, Sonia et al worry that 3 honest SCjs will hear this case and order an honest inquiry, then only they need to worry about replacing EVMs back in district warehouses. But if Sonia et al assume that no SCjs will fill inquiry team with crooks (which looks reasonable assumption to me, given the way SCjs and CBI etc work in India), then again they need not bother. They can let the dummy EVMs lie in District warehouses.

----

Dileep et al claim that "if EVMs are rigged, one can prove that". As if EC is going to give them 100 truly randomly selected EVMs for Rs 10000 each or they can buy from a shop downstairs. With assumptions like these, I can prove over 98% traffic cops in India are corrupt.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Rahul Mehta »

Dileep,

1. BEL documents repeatedly use the word "OTP" ROM. So where did you come to know that EVMs use Masked ROM and not OTP?

2. Also, pls refer to the manual you posted so dearly. It advices the coder to add random bytes at the end of the code for reason of protecting the encryption array. And it is common practice to add dummy code at the end to confuse a hacker.

3. Also, are you merely assuming that BEL tests the ROM when it gets it or are you sure that BEL does it?

4. And EC also says that chips have serial number, dont they? Now you say that if masked ROMs cant have chips with serial number, right? Then who will stop BEL CEO from replacing the box of tested chips with some other box with chips having tempered code, if there are no serial numbers in chips to keep track?

5. Your claim that Hitachi CEO would ask for proper paperwork from BEL CEO to get the tempered code inside chip is hilarious. But pls do make such claims before all of us (sic) commons too. That will only further convince (sic) commons how defunct "experts" can be. And yes, normally, Hitachi CEO will not be involved in making a chip. But then, this is not a normal chip - the chip is worth budget of India and more. And there are people willing to offer $100 million to get tempered code in the chip. For this kinda money, CEO will break every "process". So unless you can show some PHYSICAL barrier, please do mention. Otherwise, "paperwork will be needed" argument is worse that my artificial skin argument (which later I myself canceled).
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Rahul Mehta »

Dileep wrote:
Also, I am taking your word that ROM can be read back.

So let me re-verify from you. Are you sure that ALL known forms of ROMs, be masked ROM or OTP ROM or any gate technology used --- ROM can be read back using X-ray or laser or whatever bit by bit by bit? Because if ROM cant be read back, the tempered code theory is complete and needs no debate anymore.
I can guarantee that the MASK ROM used in the EVM can be ACCURATELY read back by decapping.
What about OTP ROM? Can it be accurately read after lockbits are set? By decapping or any means? What about EPROM? Can that too be read back?

Essentially, is there any chip technology that makes reading impossible after setting lock bits

---

Also pls read following
Dileep wrote:
Also, I am taking your word that ROM can be read back.

So let me re-verify from you. Are you sure that ALL known forms of ROMs, be masked ROM or OTP ROM or any gate technology used --- ROM can be read back using X-ray or laser or whatever bit by bit by bit? Because if ROM cant be read back, the tempered code theory is complete and needs no debate anymore.
I can guarantee that the MASK ROM used in the EVM can be ACCURATELY read back by decapping.
What about OTP ROM? Can it be accurately read after lockbits are set? By decapping or any means? What about EPROM? Can that too be read back?

Essentially, is there any chip technology that makes reading impossible after setting lock bits

Because BEL document clearly says that code in EVM cant be read but can be only executed.

http://www.bel-india.com/BELWebsite/ima ... atures.pdf
Micro-controller has a One Time Programmable Read Only Memory (OTPROM). Program codes are fused in this OTPROM permanently. Program codes once written and fused in this OTPROM cannot be read back or altered by anyone including the manufacturer. Thus, it is 100% code protected from either altering or decoding the contents.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Muppalla »

Muppalla wrote:Election Commission: Press Note - Subject- Electronic Voting Machines- regarding

The Election Commission had, in an extraordinary measure, invited those who have recently expressed reservations about the Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) to come and demonstrate the points made in their allegations from 3rd to 8th August 2009. Those invited included political parties, petitioners before various courts and some individuals who had been writing to the Commission on this issue. One hundred EVM samples were obtained on random basis from ten states namely, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. These were kept at the Commission’s office in readiness for scrutiny and for any application to establish its alleged fallibility. The EVMs were offered for such demonstration in the presence of a technical experts group as well as engineers representing the EVM manufacturers, BEL and ECIL. These engineers were especially called from Hyderabad and Bangalore and stationed in ECI’s office for a whole week for this specific purpose. The outcome of this exercise is that none of the persons, who were given the opportunity, could actually demonstrate any tamperability of the ECI-EVM, in any of the hundred machines put on display. They either failed or chose not to demonstrate.
Rahul Mehta wrote: Dileep et al claim that "if EVMs are rigged, one can prove that". As if EC is going to give them 100 truly randomly selected EVMs for Rs 10000 each or they can buy from a shop downstairs. With assumptions like these, I can prove over 98% traffic cops in India are corrupt.
The EC is claiming that 100 EVMs that are picked randomly are chosen for this excercise. I guess you are questioning the validity of the randomness. Why did all the folks that attended this session did not question the randomness.
1) Are they dumb?
2) In the last minute - all BJP memebers and other anti-EVM members who attended this meet got purchased by EC and and CIA?

I guess they may have talked about the EVMs that are being given for tests to the attendees are validly random ones.
Last edited by Muppalla on 10 Aug 2009 19:57, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Pranav »

Dileep wrote:
So the methodology should be to count and compare the number of people who are critical, and consider who appoints and transfers such employees.
Appointment/transfer doesn't really matter. Checks and balances do.
Checks and balances again rely on systems which rely on people, so the appointments and transfers of these people do matter.
By the way, a significant fraction of India's population will be covered by 3G over the next couple of years. Even without video multicasting, paper ballots are still very secure, with localized consequences in the event of failure.
That is HUMBUG to the least. First of all cover everyone with good old GSM, and then we will talk about 3G. Though OT for this thread, I would like to see some backing up on that statement.

Is it like the statement about the EVM maintenance contract?
Yes, that is OT. But for your info Metro + tier 2 cities counts as a significant fraction. As of today, many tier 3 cities are also covered, and the coverage is only increasing.

But in any case, plain old paper ballots, even without video are more reliable than EVMs, if you count and compare the number of critical people, and who appoints and transfers them.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Muppalla »

Rahul Mehta wrote: In EVM replacement scenario, the EVMs were replaced in CEC warehouse or from way to BEL to CEC, not inside district warehouses. Now in case, Sonia et al worry that 3 honest SCjs will hear this case and order an honest inquiry, then only they need to worry about replacing EVMs back in district warehouses. But if Sonia et al assume that no SCjs will fill inquiry team with crooks (which looks reasonable assumption to me, given the way SCjs and CBI etc work in India), then again they need not bother. They can let the dummy EVMs lie in District warehouses.
If you see the EC press realease, they are randomizing the EVMs that go from CEC warehouse to district warehouses. They are again doing the randomization from district warehouses to constituencies. How will INC benefit unless all the EVMs are with "rigged code".?

Do you think the randomization code is hacked? Does the parties like BJP, TDP etc. are not capable to suspect this aspect?
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Pranav »

Article by GVL Narasimha Rao:
------------------------------------------------------------------
EVM expose
Is electronic 'rigging' subverting electoral mandate?

http://www.organiser.org/dynamic/module ... 04&page=28
By GVL Narasimha Rao

Shockingly, of the 13.78 lakh EVMs deployed in the 2009 Lok Sabha polls, only 4.48 Lakh are either new or upgraded machines, while as many as 9.3 Lakh EVMs (or over 2/3rd of all EVMs) deployed are old machines. The Commission has furnished this information in reply to a RTI query dated July 21 to V. Venkateswara Rao, the main petitioner who filed a PIL in the Supreme Court on the issue.

Political parties now suspect that something has wrong but appear woefully short in understanding the rigging possibilities of electronic voting machines. Most of them have nagging doubts about the tampering of the EVMs, but have not raised these concerns in an open manner for fear of retribution and ridicule. The Supreme Court in its order in disposing the writ petition on EVMs had stated last month that the issue raised are of vital concern and the political parties may approach the Commission to clarify their doubts about the EVMs.

The debate over the unreliability of the EVM that raged over the last two months is reaching a crescendo as many new facts come to light, even as Election Commission officials continue to carp ad nauseam that the EVMs used by the Election Commission are infallible, without any substantive proof, whatsoever.

On the other hand, there is now enough verifiable and circumstantial evidence to show that there is something amiss about the EVMs. The true story of the EVMs is beginning to unfold and it would be a tragedy if the political parties do not get to the bottom of the truth about these allegations and apprehensions. The poll panel is betraying signs of nervousness as it has no convincing explanations to a number of emerging concerns and the political parties owe it to the millions of the voting public to investigate and arrive at proper conclusions to show that their votes have not been robbed by unscrupulous individuals and to restore the public faith in our voting system.

Shocking verdicts
As someone who has analysed and predicted many parliamentary and assembly elections in the past, let me add a new perspective to the raging EVM debate. The only two parliamentary elections where the pollsters in general have gone horribly wrong in India’s parliamentary history are the Lok Sabha elections of 2009 and 2004. Consider this fact these are the only two national elections that were totally electronic.

In stark contrast, the Lok Sabha election results of 1991, 1996 and 1999 which were manual could be accurately predicted by most pollsters. For instance, my own Lok Sabha predictions for the Times of India and Doordarshan for all these elections were bang on target. (See box for these predictions and actual results).

That brings up the relevant question: Has the voter mood in the Lok Sabha elections that we were able to gauge very accurately until 1999 become so complex after the Election Commission made them totally electronic employing the EVMs?

Poll predictions vs. Actual results

* Polls by G.V.L. Narasimha Rao for Times of India/Doordarshan

- - Forecast Actual
1996 BJP+ 188 189
- Congress+ 142 132
- Others 212 215
1998 BJP+ 252 252
- Congress+ 140 147
- Others 145 138
1999 BJP+ 287 298
- Congress+ 174 135
- Others 77 105

Interestingly, we could accurately predict various assembly elections (held using EVMs) held between 2004 and 2009 general elections including the elections of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi. How is it that the same electronic voting machines turned in voting results that we could capture accurately in assembly polls, but not in national elections?

Is it the case that these voting machines per se are reliable when they are properly handled (which explains why there were no problems in assembly elections), but have been tampered with in the Lok Sabha polls producing startling results both in 2004 and 2009?

Lest the cynics argue that my theory of “electronic rigging” in national elections based on this circumstantial evidence is a figment of my imagination and rubbish it on the promise that the BJP would not have performed creditably well in states like Bihar and Chhattisgarh in 2009 general elections if that were the case, let me substantiate my claims with some pertinent information and questions.

EC owes explanation
The Election Commission is less than truthful in claiming that the EVMs deployed in general elections are tamperproof, when its own technical committee led by Prof. P.V. Indiresan held otherwise. The Expert Committee in its September, 2006 report (points 3.6 and 3.7) recommended that the old EVMs should be upgraded with suggested modifications, testing and operating precautions to make them tamper proof.

Shockingly, of the 13.78 lakh EVMs deployed in the 2009 Lok Sabha polls, only 4.48 Lakh are either new or upgraded machines, while as many as 9.3 Lakh EVMs (or over 2/3rd of all EVMs) deployed are old machines. The Commission has furnished this information in reply to a RTI query dated July 21 to V Venkateswara Rao, the main petitioner who filed a PIL in the Supreme Court on the issue. (Copy of the ECI reply enclosed)

New, improved EVMs were deployed in the states of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and some UT’s and all north eastern states except Assam. In all others states, old EVMs, which do not meet the technical specifications, were used.

Why is it that these new, improved machines were not deployed in any of the key Congress-United Progressive Alliance (UPA) ruled states? Who were the persons responsible in making these decisions and what was the rationale in making the choice of states with the new, improved EVMs?

Curiously, while many states seem to have been selected following some alphabetical sequence, the UPA ruled states like Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Haryana, Maharastra and Tamil Nadu (which fall in the same sequence) have been left out systematically.

Naturally, the following questions arise and the EC is duty bound to answer them satisfactorily. What considerations guided the deployment of the old EVMs, more susceptible to tampering in all the states ruled by the ruling combine at the Centre? Why all the EVMs were not upgraded or replaced as recommended by the Expert Committee? Isn’t the Commissions guilty of misleading the political parties and the public opinion that it’s EVMs are tamper proof when it is fully aware of their limitations and shortcomings? All these serious questions warrant convincing answers from the Commission.

Latest statements from Commission officials reveal that they themselves seem to entertain doubts about the functioning of the old EVMs deployed in Lok Sabha elections. The Commission officials now say that only new, improved and ‘certified’ EVMs will be deployed for by-polls due shortly in Tamil Nadu where the opposition parties led by the AIADMK have decided to boycott by-elections. Does it not amount to admission of guilt that the old EVMs used in the Lok Sabha polls in Tamil Nadu were not reliable and prone to tampering?

‘Stand alone’ EVMs
Election Commisison officials have time and again argued that the EVMs cannot be tampered as they are stand alone machines without being part of any network and are not based on operating systems as the EVMs used elsewhere in the world.

That is an erroneous argument. The stand alone EVMs can be hacked on a selective basis; in any state, constituency or polling station of one’s choosing. Granted, this cannot happen without tampering with the individual EVMs deployed for election duty at some stage of their handling in the manufacture or election operations. That brings up the relevant question as to who can actually be involved in tampering.

It may be difficult or even impossible to influence lakhs of government functionaries deployed for election duty to tamper all the EVMs. But, it appears that there are a number of private players involved in gaining access to the EVMs at various stages, starting from their manufacture to their operations and maintenance at various stages of elections. Evidently, they are a huge potential security hazard.

Role of private players
Election Commission officials now claim that the EVMs are tamper proof and this confidence stems merely from the certificates of authenticity given by their manufacturers namely the ECIL and BEL, both in the public sector. Is that a valid ground for unbridled optimism about their tamper proof reliability? Is there any way that the officers on election duty or political party representatives to verify that these EVMs are indeed not tampered with? The answer is a no.

In addition to the manufacturers, there are a number of private players and individuals who are engaged in handling these machines at several crucial stages. There is not much information available on who these people are, who hires them, what duties they perform, what process is adopted to hire them and what are the terms of their engagement?

Preliminary enquiries show that they include chip manufacturers, service maintenance staff, manpower suppliers, outsourcing agencies, transporters of EVMs etc., who have unlimited access to the EVMs. What prevents them from tampering with the EVMs at some stage of election operations? In some states, we found reports suggesting that the maintenance and EVM handling work has been done by people belonging to the ruling parties. Does that not give ample scope to these parties to manipulate these machines?

A few authorised, unscrupulous elements gaining access to the machines can play havoc with them. No one would even get a hint of such manipulation as most officials are completely ignorant of the technology manipulation possibilities. Experts allege that these manipulations are so simple and devious that these could be done even without any knowledge on the part of the operational staff engaged in such manipulations who will mistake these activities to be part of the operational procedures.

EC operations in mystery
The biggest problem is that all the operations of the Election Commission of India are shrouded in mystery and there is a veil of secrecy that surrounds them, while as a public institution; it is expected to function in a transparent manner. India’s democracy cannot be held hostage to the whims and fancies of a few high ranking and well meaning officials of the Election Commission who would like us to simply believe that under their watchful supervision, nothing can go wrong.

Most senior officials of the Election Commission and those engaged in the polling process at various levels seem blissfully unaware of the manipulation possibilities of the EVMs. Worse, ECI officials see any doubts raised against EVMs as attacks on their personal integrity.

But, in a country where the election commissioners are appointed owing to their known political affiliations and former election commissioners are rewarded with positions and ministerial berths for ‘services’ rendered, doubts are bound to be raised about their impartiality. It is the duty of the Commission to reveal all facts to show that it has little to hide.

The Election Commission has the responsibility to initiate a national debate to discuss all issues threadbare. In stead of addressing valid concerns, it has been asking everyone to prove that their EVMs are tamper prone. Granted, no tampering can be done without physically manipulating it. Experts are challenging that the EVMs used in the elections can be tampered if one has physical access to them and the commission is not willing to take the challenge. The Commission perhaps wants the petitioners to perform some magic skills in manipulating their machines without gaining any physical access.

In the wake of serious concerns and the emerging potential possibilities for manipulation at various stages, it is the onerous duty of the poll panel to demonstrate basis for their oft repeated claims that their EVMs cannot be tampered with and not anyone else. The Commission should take voluntary steps in promoting a healthy debate and remove all hurdles to restore public faith in a system that has been junked by most western democracies rather than attempt to muzzle all opposition by making unsustainable claims.

Political parties must demand accountability
Most political parties now suspect that something has wrong but appear woefully short in understanding the rigging possibilities of electronic voting machines. Most of them have nagging doubts about the tampering of the EVMs, but have not raised these concerns in an open manner for fear of retribution and ridicule. The Supreme Court in its order in disposing the writ petition on EVMs had stated last month that the issue raised are of vital concern and the political parties may approach the Commission to clarify their doubts about the EVMs.

At stake is not just the fate of the political parties but the sanctity of our electoral process and the essence of our democracy. Parties must vociferously raise their concerns in public domain and in Parliament and ensure that the poll panel is held accountable to the millions of its electorate and conduct future elections in a manner that enhances the confidence of the electorate and that of the political parties in their outcomes.

(The author is a leading political analyst and a member of the BJP. Views expressed here are his own.)
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by SRoy »

Muppalla wrote:
Rahul Mehta wrote: In EVM replacement scenario, the EVMs were replaced in CEC warehouse or from way to BEL to CEC, not inside district warehouses. Now in case, Sonia et al worry that 3 honest SCjs will hear this case and order an honest inquiry, then only they need to worry about replacing EVMs back in district warehouses. But if Sonia et al assume that no SCjs will fill inquiry team with crooks (which looks reasonable assumption to me, given the way SCjs and CBI etc work in India), then again they need not bother. They can let the dummy EVMs lie in District warehouses.
If you see the EC press realease, they are randomizing the EVMs that go from CEC warehouse to district warehouses. They are again doing the randomization from district warehouses to constituencies. How will INC benefit unless all the EVMs are with "rigged code".?

Do you think the randomization code is hacked? Does the parties like BJP, TDP etc. are not capable to suspect this aspect?
Hypothetically, assuming that EVM's are rigged, is EC going or any political dispensation demonstrate us as how to prove or disprove it? Never. What if EC is not even aware of contamination?

If I were a CIA scoundrel, I'll "manage" just the point where EVM code is actually burnt. Hitachi? Any MNC can be bought. Period.

As long as there is a trojan in the EVM code that could be activated by particular key sequence/combination, the job is done. The trojan just needs to be capable of dynamically logging all keystrokes to just one counter. And of course, a deactivation key sequence/combination at the end of the day of poll is assumed.

I pity Rahul Mehta and his anti-EVM cheer group. There is not going to be any material evidence if EVM is indeed rigged. Circumstantial evidence if any is difficult to come by and will not stand in court of law. What Rahul Mehta needs to understand is that there is no need to bribe a whole chain of people in the hierarchy.

Rahul Mehta, grow up. Its a lost argument.

Pro-EVM guys need to take a deep breath. If EC's credibility is lost, there will lots of interested parties to exploit that.
So, it doesn't matter if Rahul Mehta is posting crap or not. Rahul Mehta's credibility does not matter to me, but EC's does. So, EC better demonstrate that every vote polled can be audited.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Muppalla »

SRoy wrote:Hypothetically, assuming that EVM's are rigged, is EC going or any political dispensation demonstrate us as how to prove or disprove it? Never. What if EC is not even aware of contamination?

If I were a CIA scoundrel, I'll "manage" just the point where EVM code is actually burnt. Hitachi? Any MNC can be bought. Period.

As long as there is a trojan in the EVM code that could be activated by particular key sequence/combination, the job is done. The trojan just needs to be capable of dynamically logging all keystrokes to just one counter. And of course, a deactivation key sequence/combination at the end of the day of poll is assumed.
Those are the only two aspects that I interested in and am trying through this thread to learn if that is possible. All other subversions through EC employees, Chawla and employees at BEL/ECIL is structurally impossible. To do something to beat out EC process is also remote to produce a favorable result.
Raju

Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Raju »

the highest likehood is that that trojan or whatever is already present in all the sets, a kind of backdoor which escapes EC/BEL supervision or it is just that they do not mind it. (EC has admitted that the chips were manufactured by an American company and also Hitachi). But this very backdoor can be used during the maintenance routine to hack the EVMs and rig the codes.

Also I believe that this was the reason why this time around there were a lot more cases of malfunctioning EVMs as compared to last time.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Dileep »

Rahul Mehta wrote:
In the modulo-5 based tempered code, I need ONLY following crooks

1. Top 5 people in Congress = Central Govt

2. Three ECs (no one else in EC)

3. Top 3 guys in BEL, may be 2-3 more guys in BEL

4. Hitachi CEO

5. Two expert coders who are from CIA etc

I dont need support of even one collector, one Tahasildar, one presiding officer and I dont support of even one street criminal. I dont need support of even one TV company and so forth.

(The TV company is needed ONLY in "EVM with radio receive capability", and there too I need ONLY one TV company, not 10. And in modulo-5, I dont need support of any TV company.)
The problem with your scenario is that any of the non-bribed people can blow the cover any time. For example, pretty much anyone in IQC can grab a chip and verify it.

And how are you going to adjust the number of candidates without the help from the RO? You are ignoring a lot many number of people in the chain. That doesn't fly.
To modulo-5 scheme needs only 10-12 people in India, and not even 15. With 10-12 one can have tempered code inside 100,000 EVMs and benefit in at least 270 out of 300 seats where these tempered EVMs go.
WRONG!! You need much more number of people, and the non-bribed people can blow the cover any time.
Getting tempered code is TRIVIAL.
PRETENDING Something is trivial doesn't make it so.
Now only question is : is there a post-facto undetectable way to get tempered code in the chip? . IOW, I am getting into debate on "ROM reading" and deciphering micro-code etc only to establish that there also exists an undetectable way. Otherwise, as far as "detectable ways to get tempered code", it is do-able with just 10-12 people.
Forget the 10-12 people fetish. That is not real, and the other unbribed people can blow the cover any time.

Of course we can debate the ROM reading.
Now code was burned in Japan or US in Hitachi premises.
Hitachi (Renesas) have no fab in USA, so it is only Japan.

The code is not burned. It is fabricated in.
So if Hitachi CEO is paid $ 100 million to put tempered code, he would do it.
Hitachi is not your two bit software company. They are a big conglomorate, and the 100Million will be pocket change for the CEO. Also, the CEO might not even KNOW that there is a microcontroller division in his company.

No CEO EVER will do something that affects the trust on his company, when it is clear that it will be exposed in the future. ZERO Chance.
Now pro-EVM people are assuming that BEL would check the ROM when the chip arrives. Initially, Dileep assumed that BEL is following an bribe-able process with QI, QE etc to burn code in the OTP ROM. That claim has fallen flat because the code is burned in Hitachi and not in BEL. Now Dileep et al claim that BEL was indeed verifying the contents of ROM bit by bit when BEL gets the chip. Mind you, it is just a claim, they have no BEL document which says so. But lets say that some 2-3 engineers were indeed asked to check say 1% of the ROMs they got. So how difficult it is for top 3 people in BEL to rig this step?
Any decent mfg unit will have that system in place, because ROM integrity is absolutely critical. You are NOT assuming the entire organization is corrupt, so the system WILL be in place, and will be executed in good faith. Only your 'bribed' elements will try to do something. The rest of the team can blow the cover any time.
One way : Lets say ROM tester is using a.exe to get data onto his PC from the device that gets the ROM code. Typically, a.exe would be a process that reads from some serial or USB port that connects to device which actually reads the ROM and has some front end. The BEL chief can replace a.exe with some another a.exe with following logic
Do you think the BEL chief even knows where it is done? Do you think he can walk into any part of the plant secretly? Do you think he even knows how the programmer works? Even the production manager will not know how to operate the station. The shift engineer will know, but he can't be contacted directly by the top guy.

In all your scenarios, you assume that the huge coeporations are in fact like your two bit software company, where all the staff sit in one room, and the 'CEO' does the design and coding, and he can do anything on any machine any time. That is totally incorrect.
Say actual code = A
Say tempered code = B
Say code that ROM reader got = X
if X = B then show A else show X

So ROM reader would lie when B comes and would speak truth otherwise. So ROM reading engineer would never notice that chip has B and not A. IOW, the final front end of a.exe which the ROM tester in BEL looks at replaces tempered code with original untempered code. Now ROM testing engineer cannot read bytes with his own eyes to challenge that.
This is worse than the CIA making silicon fab machines. Not worth a reply IMO.
Second way: They can select "random" sample in a way that only untempered chips are selected.
Do you know how many people you need to compromise for that?
Third way : In worst case, they put some engineers who are deep in debt, also have committed some crimes , inquiry is pending, have lots of problems etc to test ROM and use carrot/stick approach to ask them to ignore the differences.
Stop assuming that BEL is like a two bit company. IT is a big corporation, where the CEO doesn't even see the plant.
Now pro-EVM are claiming that if there is tempered code in EVM, one can prove by getting say 100 randomly selected EVMs. As if EVMs are sold on road. You will need 3 HONEST Supreme Court judges to form a Special Investigation Team of 5-10 honest experts. And in their world, SCjs are not MNC agents. Tough luck !! Last I checked, almost EVERY SCj has sold out. And your technical expertise and not needed on this issue, we (sic) commons are qualified to guess whether any honest SCj is still left which can be trusted with task. So even if it is technologically possible to prove that ROM in EVM is not same as what compiled source is, there is no actual way to prove that. As you will never get 3 "honest" SCjs anymore.
Anyone can grab a chip from BEL and blow the cover.
It is interesting to see that people like Dileep, Tanaji etc who call me dishonest are still making claims that "tempered code can NEVER get into EVMs". This is outright dishonesty on their part. If they say that "Tempered code can indeed get in, but can be proven or disproven now", it would be another thing. If they say that they still have faith in SCjs, that is at least not a dishonest statement though it is wrong one. But their claim that "tempered code can NEVER get into EVMs" only shows that now they are resorting to open dishonesty.
Only in your RahulWorld, where big corporations are in fact run like two bit software companies, where the CEO can walk in and do what he wants, all these possible.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Muppalla »

GVLNR's article is true ( from a layman's perspective) and that really proves that EC's tranasparency is the real problem. They have to be seriously transparent and open to any question and should put out everything.

It is not enough to say, "I am technically knowledged and hence you are all idiots so shut up" There is a need/responsibility on part of EC to explain it to even an illiterate person to make everyone confident. Unless they do that there is no great point is saying EVMs are not hackable. Voters just does not consist of chip designers and manufacturers.

The in-house manufacture of EVMs is slowly showing snags as more vendors are involved and it is important to know who is doing what. Are the ECIL/BEL just assembling the manufactured units? Yes, people can assume that way if they do not explain everything threadbare.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Dileep »

Rahul Mehta wrote: What about OTP ROM? Can it be accurately read after lockbits are set? By decapping or any means? What about EPROM? Can that too be read back?

Essentially, is there any chip technology that makes reading impossible after setting lock bits

Because BEL document clearly says that code in EVM cant be read but can be only executed.

http://www.bel-india.com/BELWebsite/ima ... atures.pdf
Micro-controller has a One Time Programmable Read Only Memory (OTPROM). Program codes are fused in this OTPROM permanently. Program codes once written and fused in this OTPROM cannot be read back or altered by anyone including the manufacturer. Thus, it is 100% code protected from either altering or decoding the contents.
There is absolutely no technology to make a chip read proof. There are some proposals and patents, but all those involve special processing, and are not available mainstream.

BEL talks about non-readability in the normal way, ie through the pins.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Sanku »

SRoy wrote: If I were a CIA scoundrel, I'll "manage" just the point where EVM code is actually burnt. Hitachi? Any MNC can be bought. Period.
This was discussed before, given the current process and level of transparency, there is very little chance of there being a possible method of rigging even if CIA can buy out Hitachi, not without involving tons of folks anyway.

At which time the following comes into picture...
Circumstantial evidence if any is difficult to come by and will not stand in court of law..
That this point of time there is not even circumstantial evidence comes into the picture, when there was electoral roll tampering, there was enough circumstantial evidence, (some demographics not getting cards on time mysteriously and/or names disappearing from the list)

For this, there are not even whispers on how it was done (outside RMs looney tune of course)
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by SRoy »

Sanku wrote: That this point of time there is not even circumstantial evidence comes into the picture, when there was electoral roll tampering, there was enough circumstantial evidence, (some demographics not getting cards on time mysteriously and/or names disappearing from the list)
If you recall, this was actually posted by me right after Nov 2008 Delhi Assembly Polls. Few thousand votes can swing results.

And in as many as 50-60 places the 2nd party finished with a differences of few thousand votes.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Sanku »

Muppalla wrote:GVLNR's article is true ( from a layman's perspective) and that really proves that EC's tranasparency is the real problem. They have to be seriously transparent and open to any question and should put out everything.
I think it has gone beyond the issue of transparency, as RM has shown brilliantly here, if you replace a human being with a thick brick wall nothing will get through even if EC was wearing nothing but its birthday suite.

I think things are squarely in the domain of fear mongering, thankfully the ECs open challenge seems to have taken some wind out of their sails...
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Sanku »

SRoy wrote:
Sanku wrote: That this point of time there is not even circumstantial evidence comes into the picture, when there was electoral roll tampering, there was enough circumstantial evidence, (some demographics not getting cards on time mysteriously and/or names disappearing from the list)
If you recall, this was actually posted by me right after Nov 2008 Delhi Assembly Polls. Few thousand votes can swing results.

And in as many as 50-60 places the 2nd party finished with a differences of few thousand votes.
Yes I remember that, I have seen that from my own sources too, but you are only making my point aren't you.

So far there is no remotely possible process to rig EVMs which does not involve manpower on the scale of something like 1 person per polling machine.

And not a wind of that process? This is not the India I know and love so well.

Note --> Rig EVMs is different from in general rigging polls or unfairly influencing polling, including deliberate hatchet jobs by media and use of state machinery for intimidation etc.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Muppalla »

Sanku wrote:
I think it has gone beyond the issue of transparency, as RM has shown brilliantly here, if you replace a human being with a thick brick wall nothing will get through even if EC was wearing nothing but its birthday suite.

I think things are squarely in the domain of fear mongering, thankfully the ECs open challenge seems to have taken some wind out of their sails...
I disagree and not everyone in the world are with the same syndrome or paranoid to that extent. Elections are high stake things and is a place where there needs more transparancy and cannot be pushed away by saying "all governement agencies work in similar way". Public trust is very important here as compared to other Government institutions.

EC had published some documents before recent press release. Every press release is giving some new information which is not in the right fashion. They need to put a list of all vendors clearly with who is doing what.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Sanku »

Muppalla wrote: Public trust is very important here as compared to other Government institutions.
I do not disagree, but games of perception can never be fought with rationality. EC may or may not do a good enough job (and it is trying IMVHO) but it will never be able to take on some of those arguments. Trust can be destroyed even without reason. That is my point.
EC had published some documents before recent press release. Every press release is giving some new information which is not in the right fashion. They need to put a list of all vendors clearly with who is doing what.
Well the debate whether EC is doing the best possible PR exercise is a slightly different matter, you may think it is not, I may think it is okay, but the bigger point I have is that many of these people indulging in this matter are not there for the information (there are ofcourse exceptions) those who approach the matter with a open mind and clear heart will still be able to find the right answers despite EC hamming it up a bit.

These things are such that it takes two to tango, EC can give out info but as we have seen from RM he will keep dissing it till eternity on a minor pretext of it not be presented on a A4 sheet in Gujrati in Times roman font.

That is my major point. With rights come responsibilities, so far the media reports do not show that the challengers are using responsibility with their right to question.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Raja Bose »

Rahul Mehta wrote: What about OTP ROM? Can it be accurately read after lockbits are set? By decapping or any means? What about EPROM? Can that too be read back?
For the nth time, YES! This is standard part of forensics for ICs.

---
Rahul Mehta wrote: Essentially, is there any chip technology that makes reading impossible after setting lock bits

Because BEL document clearly says that code in EVM cant be read but can be only executed.

http://www.bel-india.com/BELWebsite/ima ... atures.pdf
Micro-controller has a One Time Programmable Read Only Memory (OTPROM). Program codes are fused in this OTPROM permanently. Program codes once written and fused in this OTPROM cannot be read back or altered by anyone including the manufacturer. Thus, it is 100% code protected from either altering or decoding the contents.
BEL is talking about reading contents through the external pins of the chip. This is something totally different from decapping the chip - Let me explain with a non-technical analogy: Say you go to the airport and go thru a security check. What BEL is talking about is equivalent to the security man asking you verbally (i.e. thru external interface) if you are carrying a bomb. The decapping and associated methods mentioned by Dileep and me is equivalent to the security man doing a full body cavity search on you and X-raying you to make sure you are not hiding a bomb in any of your bodily orifices. Nothing will escape that process, no matter how well hidden.

Half the posts here seem to be spent on repeating the same stuff infinite times since RM clearly doesn't bother to read/listen and instead only wants to talk (hallmarks of a true neta!) but then that moves the old post counter forward, eh! :mrgreen:
Last edited by Raja Bose on 10 Aug 2009 22:32, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Should we discontinue EVMs?

Post by Muppalla »

Sanku,

I understand the thrust of your post. We have to take out RM and similar types from the equation otherwise discussion will be very narrow.

Not all who went there are with a pre-concieved notions. I am not even saying that they are right. We have to note the point that even normal folks (not GVL types too) are suspecting the EVMs means there is something woefully wrong with the EC.

Even some very decent/not so involved folks say "there got to be something in the machines". I do try to convince that may not be the case. No big party did any propaganda to create such an image and still that is the perception.

On top of that EC comes out with piece meal information revealing something new everytime. This created more devils.
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