Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist

[Pranav]

You need to ask them "Aap log ko kya lagta hai?. Yeh batao ki hamara bum aap ko dara raha hai ya aapko ROTFL ho raha hai?"

You don't have to ask them anything. They publish their views.

[Pranav]

MMS has a long history of trying to strangle India's strategic programs, as Brahma Chellaney explains:


----------------------------------------------------------------
India, a reluctant and tentative nuclear power
http://news.rediff.com/column/2009/aug/ ... -power.htm
August 31, 2009 11:11 IST

More than a decade after Pokharan II, India doesn't have much to celebrate. It still doesn't have minimal, let alone, credible deterrence, says Brahma Chellaney.

By certifying that the 1998 thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb test was a success, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh can hardly defuse the renewed national controversy over that issue. After all, Dr Singh, while in the Opposition, had not hidden his anti-nuclear sentiment. In fact, he had warned that the 1998 nuclear tests would seriously impair the national economy.

But India's foreign exchange reserves actually multiplied five times within seven years and its GDP growth accelerated sharply. Who had looked at India as a rising power before 1998?

Even former President A P J Abdul Kalam's certificate cannot squelch questions over the thermonuclear test. From the India-US civilian nuclear deal to the hydrogen bomb, Kalam has been ever ready to defend official claims, but the missile programme he headed still staggers. In the long years he spent in the missile programme, Kalam could not give India the basic missile capability for self-defence.

India's nuclear strategic programme has always been shielded from parliamentary scrutiny and CAG audit. So, it is hard to reliably determine whether India's sole thermonuclear test fizzled out quickly or was a success, as officially claimed. But some facts speak for themselves.

One telling fact is that more than 11 years later, India has still not weaponised the thermonuclear technology, even though the test in 1998 was supposed to have catapulted the country into the big-power league. The thermonuclear test, obviously, was not intended merely as a technology demonstrator. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask: What has been the security benefit for the country from that test?

Even more glaring is another fact: More than 35 years after Pokharan I, India stands out as a reluctant and tentative nuclear power, still lacking even a barely minimal deterrent capability against China. Given the growing military asymmetry with China, a proven and weaponised Indian thermonuclear capability, backed by long-range missiles, is critical to deter the assertive and ambitious northern neighbour. But today, India does not have a single Beijing-reachable missile in deployment.

Had India developed and deployed a minimal but credible nuclear-weapons capability, China would not have dared to mess with it. But the increasing Chinese bellicosity, reflected in rising border incursions and the hardening of Beijing's stance on territorial disputes, suggests China is only getting emboldened against a weaker India.

Consider yet another unpalatable fact: No country has struggled longer to build a minimal deterrent or paid heavier international costs for its nuclear programme than India. The history of India's nuclear-weapons programme is actually a record of how it helped establish multilateral technology controls. Pokharan I, for example, impelled the secret formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India's space programme helped give birth to the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Yet, before it has built a credible minimal deterrent, India came full circle when it entered into a civilian nuclear deal with the US and secured an exemption from the NSG last year to import high-priced commercial nuclear power reactors and fuel. In doing so, it had to accept nonproliferation conditions that aim to stunt its nuclear deterrent development.

Through this deal, India is seeking to replicate in the energy sector the very mistake it has made on armaments. Now the world's largest arms importer, India spends more than $6 billion every year on importing conventional weapons, some of dubious value, while it neglects to build its own armament production base.

Conventional weapons simply cannot deter a nuclear adversary. Deterrence against a nuclear foe can only be built on nuclear capability, especially a second-strike capability that can survive the enemy's first strike to inflict massive retaliation.

More broadly, Indian policymakers have yet to recognise that no nation can be a major power without three attributes: A high level of autonomous and innovative technological capability; a capacity to meet basic defence needs indigenously; and a capability to project power far beyond its borders, especially through intercontinental-range weaponry. India is deficient in all the three areas.

It is not an accident that all the countries armed with intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are permanent members of the UN Security Council. But rather than aim for a technological leap through a crash ICBM programme, India remains interminably stuck in the Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) stage.

In fact, in an action that ominously harks back to the 1991-95 period when Manmohan Singh as finance minister starved the nuclear programme of necessary funds for expansion, the government's 2008-2009 budget slashed the Department of Atomic Energy's funding by $529 million. No explanation was offered to the nation.

Under the nuclear deal, the government has agreed to voluntarily shut down by next year one of the country's two bomb-grade plutonium-production reactors, the Cirus, although current international estimates of India's weapons-grade fissile material stockpile put its quantity just marginally higher than Pakistan's.

More than a decade after Pokharan II, India doesn't have much to celebrate. Nuclear diffidence continues to hold it down. It still doesn't have minimal, let alone, credible deterrence. Its military asymmetry with China has grown to the extent that many in its policymaking community seem to be losing faith in the country's ability to defend itself with its own means.

Against this background, the latest claim that the 1998 thermonuclear test performed well under par can only further damage the credibility of India's nuclear posture. The controversy over the thermonuclear test, however, is nothing new. No sooner had the test been conducted than a former head of the Indian nuclear programme, P K Iyengar, questioned official claims of success.

In such a setting -- with critics within and outside the country questioning the success of the test -- India must be ready to convincingly re-demonstrate its thermonuclear capability, should a propitious international opportunity arise from a nuclear test conducted by another power.

Nuclear deterrence, after all, is like beauty: It lies in the eyes of the beholder. It is not what India's nuclear establishment claims but what outsiders, especially regional adversaries, believe that constitutes deterrence (or the lack of it).

Brahma Chellaney is one of India's leading nuclear and strategic affairs experts.

[shiv]

You need to ask them "Aap log ko kya lagta hai?. Yeh batao ki hamara bum aap ko dara raha hai ya aapko ROTFL ho raha hai?"

You don't have to ask them anything. They publish their views.

Then I guess you should know the answer to your question. I have seen no such publications from the Chinese and Pakistanis and would be happy to read those publications.

I agree that Bharat Karnad is not deterred by Indian nukes - but they are not aimed at him. One needs to ask if Bharat Karnad is deterred by Chinese or Pakistani nukes that are aimed at him.

[shiv]

BTW the non fizzle side says:

http://www.ias.ac.in/currsci/oct252001/885.pdf
Douglas et al. make elaborate imagi-
nary assumptions regarding geology,
depth of burial, seismic coupling and
position of water table and come out
with several subjective conclusions
regarding the yield of POK2. As they
have no such data available to them,
these conjectures have no relevance to
the present analysis. Moreover, why
should anybody expect such data to be
declassified by India alone? We also
fail to understand what do Douglas et
al. mean by ‘non-Indian yield estimates
of ~ 12 kt’. The yield estimate of 46 kt
obtained earlier by Evernden17 was cer-
tainly not an Indian estimate.

[Arun_S]

Have we been nuked yet?

Bas yahi hona reh gaya hai (This is but one thing yet to happen) .Else you name it we have endured it . So this line of countering a pov does not work...imho of course.

Yup.
RChidambaram taught us where to set the bar for success. "How low can you go"

Granada is also not yet nuked and so is Cuba, Venezuela, Burma, Afghanistan, Jordan, S.Africa and Taiwan. Surely their TN and Nuclear bum are as powerful, potent and scary as Chidambaram's !!

[shiv]

In fact India is building nuclear shelters proving that India is deterred by Paki nukes - but Pakistan is not doing that showing that they are not deterred by India's fakes.

Yet India has not been nuked.

Conclusion - Pakistani bombs, and therefore Chinese bombs are all duds. We are deterred by duds.

[arnab]

I think we would be satisfied if India were to buy her TNs from Harrods - full refund if does not work as advertised.

[negi]

Conclusion - Pakistani bombs, and therefore Chinese bombs are all duds. We are deterred by duds.

Baah... we needn't ,remember we phollow NFU...

[shiv]

Granada is also not yet nuked and so is Cuba, Venezuela, Burma, Afghanistan, Jordan, S.Africa and Taiwan. Surely their TN and Nuclear bum are as powerful, potent and scary as Chidambaram's !!

But Japan's bombs are less "powerful, potent and scary " than Chidambaram's so Japan got nuked. India's bombs are better than Japanese bombs but only as good as the bombs of "Cuba, Venezuela, Burma, Afghanistan, Jordan, S.Africa and Taiwan."

The logical wonders of the Indian scientific mind will one day rule the world.

[Arun_S]

Granada is also not yet nuked and so is Cuba, Venezuela, Burma, Afghanistan, Jordan, S.Africa and Taiwan. Surely their TN and Nuclear bum are as powerful, potent and scary as Chidambaram's !!

But Japan's bombs are less "powerful, potent and scary " than Chidambaram's so Japan got nuked. India's bombs are better than Japanese bombs but only as good as the bombs of "Cuba, Venezuela, Burma, Afghanistan, Jordan, S.Africa and Taiwan."

The logical wonders of the Indian scientific mind will one day rule the world.

You are the "Master", well above science. Jai guru dev.

[AdityaM]

2 good articles:
Why Pokhran yield does not matter now
Good becuase it gives this quote:
[quote]
One of the methods adopted in such discussions to encourage participants to speak freely is to adopt the so-called 'Chatham House' Rule. The audience is told that the statements made in the meeting may be quoted but without attributing them to the speaker concerned. This is a rule widely prevalent and found to be very useful in making available the relevant information without embarrassment to the speaker or the government.

In this case, an eager beaver journalist appears to have violated the rule, making the controversy bigger than it really is. The organisation employing the journalist could have checked on the circumstances in which the statement was made and exercised restraint. Perhaps, it is too much to expect that in these days of severe competition among the media for breaking news. If so, it is certain to inhibit disclosure of important information in future.
[/quote]

India, a reluctant and tentative nuclear power
What influence does Brahma Chellaney have on your security policy making? Or are his words left alone for media sound bites?

[Sanku]

So we are now down to saying that FBF is enough deterrence? All other nonsense has been put paid to including villagers in Khetolai (who were not there in the first place)?

I hope so, for all our sakes.

[Sanatanan]

From: IBNLive » India

DOUBTS OVER INDIA'S NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Kalam no one to slam N-scientist: Ex-AEC chief
CNN-IBN
Published on Tue, Sep 01, 2009 at 10:27, Updated on Tue, Sep 01, 2009 at 10:56 in India section

New Delhi: Former Atomic Energy Commission chief Homi Nusserwanji Sethna has slammed APJ Abdul Kalam saying the former president was no qualified authority to criticise former Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) scientist K Santhanam's claims that the 1998 Pokhran II test was a fizzle.

"What did he (Kalam) know about extracting, making explosive grade? He didn't know a thing. By being a president he appeared to wear the stature. He relied on atomic energy to gain additional stature," said Sethna about Kalam.

. . .

Kalam had on August 27 claimed that Pokhran II nuclear tests were a success rubbishing Santhanam's claim that tests were not successful.

Kalam, who mentored India's nuclear programme, said the only thermonuclear device (hydrogen bomb) tested in 1998 produced the "desired yield".

Earlier, Santhanam, who coordinated the Pokhran II tests, had claimed that the only thermonuclear device tested was a "fizzle".

Santhanam told CNN-IBN his comment on the thermo-nuclear device meant that its "yield was lower than what was claimed and indicated a need to refine the designs in order that we have assured performance." {Mr Santhanam does not seem to have stated, at least in this interview, whether the "refined designs" also need to be tested, and if so how -- computer simulations or subcritical test alone or a full scale under ground test of the weapon?}

[Sanku]

Goody, Well Shiv your Nuke just landed on Delhi

[shiv]

Goody, Well Shiv your Nuke just landed on Delhi

This actually sparks off thoughts on the nature of deterrence.

Idealism aside - a nuke on Delhi will not deter me or a lot of Indians because we are selfish creatures who have escaped the nuke. It certainly will not deter the Indian armed forces.

So just where should nukes be used to actually deter anyone? I will state my opinions and I am not posting them as the ultimate truth. There are likely to be other views and I shall be happy to hear them.

The US and USSR entered the cold war out of the ruins of WW2. In WW2 it was considered effective to blast the crap out of civilian targets as a war winning strategy and this is where they started from. Both being huge countries - they decided that every city/town of the other side needs to be wiped out to be effective. There is (obviously) no proof that this assumption would be correct but for "deterrence" to work each side had to know that the other had thousands of warheads to implement the "doctrine of deterrence" that both agreed upon. Teh build up of weapons was to destroy civilian targets.

The idea that destroying civilian targets will deter someone may be slightly naive in a country where the government that controls a whole lot of nukes does not give a damn for its own civilians. This meant that the leadership had to be taken out. For this reason the leadership anywhere ensures that they are safe and doubly ensures retaliation by talk of "second strike" capability. If greedy, insane leaders and their nukes are safe, and busting cities is not good enough deterrence, what can deter?

The next step towards deterrence would be to deter the people who would be in a position to impose counter punishment - that is the adversary's armed forces who will not be deterred by either city busting or by an decapitation attempt. That means that "tactical nuclear weapons" would have to be used against military targets to degrade and adversary's military to an extent that they are unable to mete out punishment. But this leads straight back to "second strike" capability in which such an attack leads to automatic retaliation designed to cause severe damage. I am saying "severe damage" and I am not using the words "Unacceptable damage" because what is acceptable and what is unacceptable is relative. There is no guarantee that the Chinese for example would greatly rue the loss of half a dozen cities. Or that Indians would cry forever after losing as many cities after all I have almost stated in this very post that a nuke on Delhi is no skin off my nose.

The idea of this sort of madness is not "winning" but ensuring that the other party also loses and cannot claim outright victory without extreme pain. Deterrence is the guarantee of severe and costly losses.

If I were planning nuclear war - I would first attempt to degrade the other party's armed forces by taking out his armored columns (if any), air bases and major supply routes/passes/storage that he uses for support. Nukes larger than 10 kilotons for these would IMO be pointless. However it push comes to shove and we are looking at city busting - then the bigger nukes are handy although peppering a city with 5 X 50 KT nukes is unlikely to cause the receiving city much joy.

Would a China that loses 5 cities be happier than an India that loses 25 cities? Perhaps. But the ability to make China lose 25 cities needs to be developed if it is not already there. If it comes to nuclear war - 250 warheads should be enough.

About a 100 for starting the war and tactical nuking of enemy forces. Once he starts taking your forces out or takes out cities. You need to take out 25 of his cities and be done with it.

Just a guess.

[shiv]

I found an interesting url about craters at Los Alamos

http://www.onlinenevada.org/Underground ... _Test_Site

After the nuclear detonation in a shaft, a formation called a “subsidence crater” usually occurred. Such craters are not caused directly by the nuclear blast itself, but from the earth’s surface sinking due to the void created by the underground explosion’s liquefying of surrounding rock. Some subsidence craters formed shortly after the detonation, others took much longer to develop.

That means the earth does not "bulge" at the time of explosion, but a crater forms later.

but that is Yamerika and I am in India. In India the earth bulges to form a huge pimple that later subsides.

This happened in 1974 as well in 1998. Check this video


In fact there even appears to be venting in the earlier explosion.

What gives? Are we not able to dig holes deep enough to even contain fizzles? Imagine what would have happened if it had not been a fizzle.

[amit]

Interesting video Doctor Saab. I now see N^3 and you have raised a very valid point. However, I'm afraid it may not be complex and technical enough to impress people who love to think in a non-linear manner.

[Sanku]

Okay so since now we are debating the nature of deterrence --> a valid discussion by its own means but I think already closed in the current context by our published doctrine even if draft (or should it be daft?)

The first question that we need to answer is whether we believe that we will follow our doctrine or not, if not every thing I say below is moot.

We clearly say that we have a NFU doctrine with credible minimum deterrence.
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTB ... _1999.html

What are the main take aways?
If some one uses Nukes on us we will retaliate in a manner of our choosing. It leaves open ended what the response will be. The idea appears to be to deter the use of Nukes on India in toto.

A very important part of the doctrine is that it does not define a escalation ladder as far as Nuclear KT usage is concerned.

So it is unlikely we will use tactical nuke first or finger someone into going the Nuclear chain. We are saying that we dont want to use the nuclear option, but if needed we will make some one regret that it is used.

Since by claiming NFU we anyway lose the advantage of pro activeness, while trading it for stability, we lay ourselves bare to the threat of someone planning on using the weapons on us in the hope that they will end the game.

Normally -- A nuclear exchange would be a typical western shoot out on a larger scale, the one who draws first and gets an accurate shot wins. By claiming NFU we have given our right to shoot first, as a matter of fact we have set up ourselves as a target saying -- "go ahead, make my day"

Our posture is that of Clint Eastwood, and for that we must be Clint Eastwood. Big bad and capable of taking a few hits and getting back with the force that makes any potential adversary piss in his pants.

We thus need that Magnum, you see, no .22s for us.

[Sanku]

What gives? Are we not able to dig holes deep enough to even contain fizzles? Imagine what would have happened if it had not been a fizzle.

Thats actually a sever indictment of the nuclear program. You are essentially saying we CAN not test a success of a weapon.

So we test data and devices and hope for success later -- not good.

[amit]

From: IBNLive » India

DOUBTS OVER INDIA'S NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Kalam no one to slam N-scientist: Ex-AEC chief
CNN-IBN
Published on Tue, Sep 01, 2009 at 10:27, Updated on Tue, Sep 01, 2009 at 10:56 in India section

New Delhi: Former Atomic Energy Commission chief Homi Nusserwanji Sethna has slammed APJ Abdul Kalam saying the former president was no qualified authority to criticise former Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) scientist K Santhanam's claims that the 1998 Pokhran II test was a fizzle.

"What did he (Kalam) know about extracting, making explosive grade? He didn't know a thing. By being a president he appeared to wear the stature. He relied on atomic energy to gain additional stature," said Sethna about Kalam.

. . .

Kalam had on August 27 claimed that Pokhran II nuclear tests were a success rubbishing Santhanam's claim that tests were not successful.

Kalam, who mentored India's nuclear programme, said the only thermonuclear device (hydrogen bomb) tested in 1998 produced the "desired yield".

Earlier, Santhanam, who coordinated the Pokhran II tests, had claimed that the only thermonuclear device tested was a "fizzle".

Santhanam told CNN-IBN his comment on the thermo-nuclear device meant that its "yield was lower than what was claimed and indicated a need to refine the designs in order that we have assured performance." {Mr Santhanam does not seem to have stated, at least in this interview, whether the "refined designs" also need to be tested, and if so how -- computer simulations or subcritical test alone or a full scale under ground test of the weapon?}

I'm sorry but Homi Sethna's swipe at Abdul Kalam comes more personal than professional. As far as I recall, Kalam was the Chief Scientific Adviser in 1998, thus effectively to top scientist in the country then. Surely he didn't become that without a reason.

And this:

By being a president he appeared to wear the stature. He relied on atomic energy to gain additional stature," said Sethna about Kalam.

is in bad taste to say the least.

Just as BC's claim that Kalam couldn't deliver on the missiles.

And if we go by this point:

"What did he (Kalam) know about extracting, making explosive grade? He didn't know a thing.

Then one could legitimately ask (though please note I'm not casting aspersions and questioning) what does KS know about how to design an atomic bomb?

Incidentally Sanatanan ji your comment is spot on. KS has only said that India should not foreclose the option to test by signing CTBT before proofing. (He has not talked anywhere about the need for a POKIII that I've seen.) The CTBT part is something which I think everyone can agree to. And I personally think that's precisely the reason he spoke out now using Western data to say the test fizzled.

Do note that a person who thinks on the one hand thinks the TN was fizzle and we need POKIII and on the other makes a statement after the nuclear deal that India's security is safe would otherwise come out as a .... person. Hence IMHO, the whole idea was a warning shot about CTBT.

[amit]

This IDSA policy brief, dated April 24, 2009 says some interesting things about India's Nuclear Doctrine:

The sub-paragraph of interest of the press release subsequent to the Cabinet Committee on Security endorsing the nuclear doctrine of 04 Jan 03 reads: “(ii) A posture of “No First Use”:
Nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory
or on Indian forces anywhere; (iii) Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to
inflict unacceptable damage.”

The inclusion of the term ‘massive’ was a discernible
change from the earlier formulation of the Draft Nuclear Doctrine in which the term had
not found mention. Instead the Draft had used the term ‘sufficient’ implying a degree of
choice on the nature of the response being available to the political decision maker. The
specific sentence in the subparagraph on Credibility in the Draft reads: ‘Any adversary must
know that India can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and
punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against India
and its forces.’ Though the Draft was just that - a ‘draft’ to compel the government’s attention, the
critique stands. The principal problem with the change is that it restricts the choice of the decision
maker by excluding the set of less expansive responses.

‘Massive’, not defined explicitly, can be taken as a product of throw weight and target set that
produces the promised ‘unacceptable damage’. There are three implications: one is in terms
of ‘pain’ implying counter value targeting; second, is reducing the ability of the enemy to mount a
counterstrike, which would be counter force; and third is a mix of both. Since in all three options
‘unacceptable damage’ is inflicted, it is worth questioning whether only ‘massive’ nuclear counter strike would cause ‘unacceptable damage’. It is well understood that even a single warhead through a counter value strike can be ‘catastrophic’.

Therefore, the term ‘massive’, in its emphasis on throw weight or numbers, is superfluous. It has
even been averred that the inclusion of ‘massive’ was likely an ‘unconsidered formulation’.
On this count there is a need for review.

I know big megaton kabooms are considered sexy and TFTA around these parts. However, not everyone thinks like that.

[Sanku]

So Homi Sethna also becomes a garrulous old crank who is motivated by petty vendetta because he said the right thing?

No wonder AK appeared to cave into to Sanjay Baru's poison pen -- if the powers that be a willing are happy to jump on to every nay sayer and use personal tar and feathering then might as well go with the flow....

------------------------

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homi_Sethna

[/quote]Homi Nusserwanji Sethna, was an Indian chemical engineer who had the full technical responsibility for the setting up of the plant at Alwaye, Kerala India, for separation of rare earth from Mohazite sands.

He completed the construction of the Thorium plant and the plant for the production of nuclear grade uranium metal at Trombay, India. His first major challenging assignment was the setting up of the Plutonium Plant at Trombay in 1959. This was designed and constructed entirely by Indian scientists and engineers under H. N. Sethna as the Project Engineer. The Uranium Mill at Jaduguda, Bihar was also constructed under his guidance in 1967. He was also the Project Manager of a 40 MW reactor called Canada-India Reactor in 1956-58.

He was the guiding force behind the first peaceful nuclear explosion, Project Smiling Buddha in India on May 18, 1974 [1], and in 1975, Homi Sethna, then chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Raja Ramanna and Nag Chaudhuri (head of the DRDO) received the Padma Vibhushan - India's second highest civilian award.[/quote]

[amit]

I have no problem Sanku if you agree to this:

By being a president he appeared to wear the stature. He relied on atomic energy to gain additional stature," said Sethna about Kalam.

But I'm sure there are lot of people, me included who thinks Kalam's contribution to India and Indian security is as much, if not more than Sethna's who also has done yeoman's service to India's cause.

And excuse me, why are you putting words in my mouth? Where did I say this:

Homi Sethna also becomes a garrulous old crank who is motivated by petty vendetta

Is saying a particular statement is in bad taste equivalent to describing that person in your pretty vocabulary?

Note to Admins: I know you want me to keep off this poster but as you can see I've been accused of callng Sethna names. I don't take that lightly.

[shravan]

How the CIA was Fooled

Is the above article correct ?

[Sanku]

This IDSA policy brief, dated April 24, 2009 says some interesting things about India's Nuclear Doctrine:

http://www.idsa.in/faculty/ali-ahmed.htm

So Shri Ali Ahmed thinks so...

Meanwhile this what the cabinet thought.

The sub-paragraph of interest of the press release subsequent to the Cabinet Committee on Security endorsing the nuclear doctrine of 04 Jan 03 reads: Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to
inflict unacceptable damage.”

I know big megaton kabooms are considered sexy and TFTA around these parts. However, not everyone thinks like that.

No no we always no that all people dont think like us, in fact some people dont think bombs are needed at all.

The point is that the people who wanted India to have a minimum credible deterrence thought so.

BTW werent you the also saying we should trust GoI 400% so where is Ali Bhai's locus standi? Or now its different?

[Sanku]

Note to Admins: I know you want me to keep off this poster but as you can see I've been accused of callng Sethna names. I don't take that lightly.

No Amit I have not said that you have, and I am sure that you can not find my ascribing such motivations to you.

I am merely looking at a overall pattern where KS starts off as instrument of GoI and then when that is not shown to be correct immediately becomes the target of attack.

So it happened with AK and Sanjay Baru and some forumites here.

I see that happen to Homi Sethna now too.

Observing a trend that's all -- of some things not being in good taste so to say.

-------------------

Anyway on to your specific post, what does the "taste" of what Sethna says to you has anything to with the accuracy and import of his remark.

In one shot he has claimed that "Kalam's defense is not enough defense" and if I was seriously looking into the fallout, thats what I would look into.

Actually the "taste" of his remarks reminds me of Oh so superior JLN saying that partition was like "birth pangs".

[dinesha]

There is surge in the news and leaks about the worsening security environment in and around India.. China’s intrusion in Arunachal and Leah, Pak modifying Harpoons and developing new missiles and now news about developing new nuclear warhead and missiles...
May some subtle massage is being send my GOI..

Pakistan building new nuke weapons: Report

The report says that Pak is expanding its fissile material stockpile for use in weapons, building two new plutonium production reactors and is also constructing a chemical separation facility for the purpose.

The report also says that nuke capable ballistic missile (Shaheen II) has also been readied for deployment. It is also developing a submarine launched ballistic missile, two new nuclear capable cruise missiles - the ground-launched Barbur and the air-launched Ra'ad - and.

However, the most concerning part is that Islamabad is keeping missiles with warheads in an assembled form, implying that they can be used anytime thus posing a grave danger to India’s security.

[Sanku]

May some subtle massage is being send my GOI..

Either that or some subtle message is being sent TO the GoI

or in view the most plausible explanation is the simplest -- its a natural evolution of decisions and actions taken over last few years.

[geeth]

>>>Either that or some subtle message is being sent TO the GoI

Not subtle, but loud message being given by unkeel (to India) by making its Chini & paki cronies jump up and down by pinching their (cronies') buttocks is that:

Make a choice on the MRCA fast - and a decicive one in favour of Amreekha. Give the moolah, so that we can give it to Bernanke for distributing it to Goldman Sachs. After substantial amount is given, we will design methods and regulations how not to deliver the maal to you. Worse, we will also blackmail you into signing on the dotted line, after which we won't deliver anything to you anyway.

Three thing achieved - we get the moolah ; you don't get the maal - not from us, not from anybody else ('caue, by then it is too late for another chai biscoot session) ; we will try to force you to sign on the dotted line by dangling the carrot of delivery, for which you have paid the money already.

[shiv]

What gives? Are we not able to dig holes deep enough to even contain fizzles? Imagine what would have happened if it had not been a fizzle.

Thats actually a sever indictment of the nuclear program. You are essentially saying we CAN not test a success of a weapon.

So we test data and devices and hope for success later -- not good.

Another explanation is that the bums were tested in porous soil above the water table which is at 200 meters or so.

Of course it is easy to go below the water table and do a test, but they have chosen to remain above. I wonder why?

[Bob V]

How the CIA was Fooled

Is the above article correct ?

this article had appeared as a cover story in IndiaToday immediately after the test.

[shiv]

http://ibnlive.in.com/news/kalam-no-one ... 386-3.html

Could anyone speculate on what Sethna means by this - if this is not ddmitis?

Sethna, who was the guiding force behind the first peaceful nuclear explosion in India in May 1974, also advised politicians to not interfere in scientific matters.

"I don't like politicians to interfere specially lay politicians to interfere any more. I firmly believe that they should stay out. When we did the test... the first test there was no politician. It was a raw one. We were lucky that the whole thing collapsed," he said.

[pankajs]

Of course it is easy to go below the water table and do a test, but they have chosen to remain above. I wonder why?

Contamination of the water perhaps?

[shiv]

Of course it is easy to go below the water table and do a test, but they have chosen to remain above. I wonder why?

Contamination of the water perhaps?

Or masking?

[Sanku]

Another explanation is that the bums were tested in porous soil above the water table which is at 200 meters or so.

Of course it is easy to go below the water table and do a test, but they have chosen to remain above. I wonder why?

Given that there some value in telling folks that we have done the right thing, I wonder why such statements are not made by GoI explaining the seismic results?

And why did ABV go from "we have a bomb" to "we can make a bomb" -- arent we multiplying entities unnecessarily if things just worked out the way we wanted?

[pankajs]

Contamination of the water perhaps?

Or masking?

I am no expert saar!

‘Colonel Srinivas’ recalls N-day, Pokhran II tests

The shafts holding the devices for testing were so deep, they were sloshing with water. “There was water cascading about,” says K. Santhanam, who was in charge of the test site as Colonel Srinivas.

The problem is that all description are partial, it is difficult to make any sense. Here KS talks about water but does not specify if it was found in all shafts or a particulat shaft.

[shiv]

http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articl ... rtid=17991

Testing can also be conducted in dry alluvium, which is a geologically young sediment of low rigidity. An explosion in dry alluvium produces relatively small seismic waves because much of the energy that would otherwise produce seismic waves goes into closing of air-filled pore spaces, reducing the body waves about one magnitude unit. One portion of the Nevada Test Site is among the few regions in the world with areas of thick alluvium and a climate dry enough to allow the water table to be very deep. Most areas with thick alluvial deposits are fairly wet, at least seasonally, so the water Table is generally fairly shallow and the dry alluvium is generally too thin to assure containment of a test. In deserts in which the water table is deep, including the Thar (or Great Indian) Desert (Fig. ​(Fig.2),2Figure 2), the surficial sand and porous alluvium is generally too thin for containment of any but the smallest tests. It is, however, interesting to note that two announced Indian nuclear explosions on May 13, 1998 reportedly were conducted within a sand dune in the Thar Desert. It is not clear whether these very small tests, which according to the Indian government had yields of 0.5 and 0.3 kt, had a significant radioactive release at the surface because data from radioisotopic monitoring stations are not yet publicly available from the region.

[shiv]

Given that there some value in telling folks that we have done the right thing, I wonder why such statements are not made by GoI explaining the seismic results?

My take on this was posted 2 pages ago
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 31#p729531

Talking openly about masking has two drawbacks that I can think of

1) It reduces credibility because you can claim a "masked test" even when no test or a fizzle was conducted
2) It gives away information about seismic structure of the area. This is important information that is used (as per many papers that I have read and linked on here over the past decade) to determine yields. If you do not know the structure of the rock you cannot determine yield.

However, if you already know (with certainty) the yield of any single test at any single site - you can use that data to determine the yield of all future tests (provided masking is not used)

For example if the exact yield of POK I (1974) is known, the exact yield of 1998 can be determined because the rock characteristics are the same.

Having said that there is even more confusion because teh May 11 1998 test produced a smaller squiggle in the seismic station at Gauribidanur in Karnataka than the 1974 tests

This issue is ridled with contradictions and questions.

[Sanku]

Given that there some value in telling folks that we have done the right thing, I wonder why such statements are not made by GoI explaining the seismic results?

My take on this was posted 2 pages ago
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 31#p729531

Ah but that does not inspire confidence, not at all.

[shiv]

Ah but that does not inspire confidence, not at all.

Not for you and me. No.