Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 02 Sep 2009 20:26

As I have said before, I am not saying anything against Dr. Santhanam either. He merely turned the NPAs' argument around and pointed out that THEY and THEIR published analyses, have precluded India signing any of their snake oil "Treaties". IOW, if they now pressurize India to sign, then they must retract their bogus papers and confess.

ALL the RhoDho is by those who want to put their political interpretations on what the scientists and Babus have said. NONE of them has given away anything, nor will they ("jails are getting more comfortable all the time"..)

PKI does articulate the demand from the engineers for more testing. He should. It is his Dharma. Because he is safely out of the loop of those who have the actual data.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 02 Sep 2009 20:53

An online book for those interested.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear Testing and Nonproliferation
The role of seismology in deterring the development of nuclear weapons

This report was prepared for the United States Congress at the request of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (see Appendix). It provides an evaluation of the role of seismology in supporting nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and an assessment of how the resources of the seismological community can be best applied for monitoring underground nuclear explosions in the context of nonproliferation. The report is designed to take into account the lessons learned from previous experiences, and at the same time, to be responsive to the dramatic events that have occurred within the past few years.

Hari Seldon · Post by **Hari Seldon** » 02 Sep 2009 20:54

FWIW

The Bomb that bombed

K. Santhanam’s revelation about India’s thermonuclear test only corroborates accepted wisdom. But it doesn’t mean that India needs to test again.

Interesting sets of links provided.

Why is the revelation of a thermonuclear failure not a surprise? In the immediate aftermath of the tests, independent studies based on the available seismic data —mostly by non-Indians—revealed a lower yield than the 45kt announced publicly. Raj Chengappa had a good overview of some of these independent assessments. Indian scientists faulted these studies by saying that the geology of the test site was unknown. Yet, independent assessors abroad did have India’s announced yield from Pokhran-I, conducted at the same site, to which to compare the 1998 test data. George Perkovich’s seminal history of the Indian nuclear program has a comprehensive discussion of the various assessments of the nuclear tests’ yields on pages 424-433 (”What did India test and why?”). ArmsControlWonk’s Jeffrey Lewis also has a good summary of this issue, as well as a valuable list of sources. Additionally, several Indian experts involved in fashioning the National Security Advisory Board’s draft nuclear doctrine made independent analyses based on the assumption of a thermonuclear fizzle, as had Indian nuclear scientists who were retired by 1998.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 02 Sep 2009 21:20

munna wrote: reducing the space of manouvre for Puja MMSji

OTH it strengthens the MMSji as he can point to dissension in Indian ranks which preclude the accession to the CTBT at this time.

Hari, That article is self deterred and reflects an inward looking mind that assumes "all are like us" onlee. India might be deterred by a Diwali cracker, others are not.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 02 Sep 2009 22:05

Nakedness of deterrence

V Sudarshan
First Published : 02 Sep 2009 12:38:00 AM IST

Then came the turn of the star performer, our National Security Advisor, M K Narayanan, a former spook and current self-styled expert on everything under the sun from Balochistan to thermonuclear devices to CTBT, who has taken the trouble to air his views in the same section of the media widely regarded as cosying up to the government. He declared Santhanam was a “bit of a maverick in these matters” and that the former head of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses had no locus standi to comment on the nuclear test yields. “First and foremost”, he taunted, “the DRDO had nothing to do with (this aspect of the tests), frankly, whatever plumage they may like to give themselves. The measurements are not done by the DRDO.” DRDO which provided the trigger devices for the tests will no doubt be properly shocked at this assertion.

Sources in the scientific community who were closely involved in the test say that the National Security Adviser needs to brush up on what really happened in Pokhran and suggest that he stick to defending words like Balochistan which have appeared mysteriously in the Sharm-el-Sheikh joint statement and which will have an accelerated tendency to appear in future joint statements as well. In an aside they suggest that the NSA remove his foot from his mouth at least when he grants interviews to friendly media. In this interview he claims that nobody has really questioned the “authorised and proven measurements” of the yields done by Anil Kakodkar and S K Sikka, who along with Chidambaram form the government’s core think tank on nuclear matters. The NSA is wrong as usual on this claim too. Chidambaram’s former boss, P K Iyengar has long and consistently questioned the result of the alleged thermonuclear blast at Pokhran. If we have an NSA who didn’t know this much he is an even bigger ignoramus than is feared.

Think of what it means with regard to our strategic security. On the other hand if he indeed knew of the widespread reservations that exist in the scientific community and Dr Iyengar’s view in particular and still persisted in maintaining the fiction that nobody has questioned the authorised version, well, in our book it makes our NSA look economical with the truth as well. For the benefit of our esteemed NSA and for the purposes of wider public dissemination we print alongside on our Oped page today an article written by Dr Iyengar that takes us lucidly through the argument he has long made. But of course, for the government no opinion matters outside this charmed circle of nuclear scientists, the PC Sorcars of the nuclear world, scientists who can do the impossible including getting a thermonuclear bomb design right even after conducting what seems to be a dud test. From the NSA’s contention he comes across as though he is a bigger expert on the Pokhran 2 than K Santhanam. The fact is Narayanan is no expert on nuclear matters. Going by what he has said in that interview it is alarmingly obvious no one briefed him accurately on what went on in the Pokhran blasts. The fact is K Santhanam was the programme co-ordinator for the Pokhran II test and his duties included instrumentation for the tests. This included instruments that measured the seismic waves emanating from the test. Significantly so far there has been no claim saying that the calibration of the instruments by the DRDO was in any way faulty. The only claims so far that have emerged contest the yield of the thermonuclear device, which was Chidambaram’s dubious baby.

Actually i dont know, who is putting their foot in the mouth. If one needs to take a dig at NSA there are many occasions, no need to piggyback on this sensitive subject to do that. He could have avoided the 'Maverick' comment, but what he says about "authorised and proven measurements" is absolutely right. No one objected to the measurements but only the interpretations differrfrom person to person. Even PKI, whom he uses, to buttress his support, hasnt claimed the measurements are wrong. He as a matter of fact, agree to the yield of TN as BARC claims. But his contention and where the difference creeps is in the design yield which is close 200KT as he claims and actual yield is what BARC claims for TN.

The National Security Advisor has challenged K Santhanam to come forward with an independent set of measurements of the yield if he had them. This taunt is a bit rich. Here is a better suggestion: let the NSA come out with the authorised and proven measurements and have them peer reviewed by our scientific community to find out whether the troika of sarkari nuclear scientists consisting of Kakodkar, Sikka and Chidambaram got it right in the first place! This column had earlier pointed out that the DRDO did submit a report to the government towards November that year after a proper analysis was done for the various parameters that was unavailable when Chidambaram & Co claimed an instant and miraculous hundred and ten per cent success soon after the Pokhran blasts. This report clearly stated that the measurements did not match the claims made by the weapon designers. If the then government chose to ignore the report then how can Santhanam be blamed for keeping quiet for ten years? That report, which also suggested a course of action for the government given the analysis and the conclusion, was not prepared by a single individual. There were about a dozen individuals involved in that exercise. Perhaps this should also be peer reviewed? “I think we need to now have a full-fledged discussion on the CTBT” the NSA absurdly claims. Absurdly because his interview has given away the direction the government plans to steer such a debate, if at all it occurs.

[email protected]

About the author:

V Sudarshan is the Executive Editor of The New Indian Express

This takes the cake. The report which is mentioned here is actually the radio-chemical analysis report carried out on the drilled out samples from the POK test site after 6 months from the test date. So here it is talked abt November report. I dont know what DRDO has to do in Radio-chem analysis and why on earth that report is called as DRDO report ? One thing is certain, before Sudharsan asking BARC to furnish facts, he should actually get proper breifing on the subjects before commiting such atrocities.

Wiithout saying, it is obvious that everyone is trying to bend the truth to project one's view.

abhiti · Post by **abhiti** » 02 Sep 2009 22:11

Arun_S wrote:Obama wants India to humour him with Indian commitment to CTBT and/or FMTC (on paper or otherwise) to earn brownie point as non-proliferation Emperor, irrespective US Senate signs its or not.

Arun saar, I admire you having the knack of being on the right end of the debate everytime. But let me correct on this one. It isn't just about Obama's brownie points.

The 1998 Diwali dhamaka awakened Pentagon to the possibility of another super power on the horizon. It isn't some Noko jokers doing the blast who don't have much funds to do anything anyway. It is a country which is already on its way to being economic super power. America's security establishment knows that the real strength comes from a countries nuclear arsenal. Once a country has a few thousand nukes deployed on nuclear submarines with global reach it becomes militarily untouchable by US military or any other military on planet leading to another pole in multi-polar world. It therefore becomes top security priority for US. US will throw everything it has including money, prestige, power to keep India from being a real nuke power. 123 was just a start, you will see CTBT suddenly being hot debate, if CTBT doesn't work then may be FMCT will become hot, or then may be India will get UN Security Council seat only if the sign NPT. It is going to be a long road from here to India being substantial nuclear power. Given that MMS and Sonia are in power, I have zero confidence that India will make it to the end. Makes me wonder what leverage America has on MMS or Sonia or Rahul.

Harsha.H.D · Post by **Harsha.H.D** » 02 Sep 2009 22:14

Removed

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 02 Sep 2009 22:22

vera_k wrote:I wonder if the reason for all the noise now when the CTBT is in sight is because both the FBF and TN failed. Which would mean that substituting a FBF for a TN weapon is not an option without further testing. Ashley Tellis's book on page 514 states that the crater characteristics do not support a successful FBF trigger.

Also, since there was some discussion about what Pakistan and China think about the results of the test series, this is from page 515-

The Pakistani scientific community, however, has already publicly expressed its disbelief about the success of India's thermonuclear experiment, and while the Chinese strategic community has made no comparable public response, there is good reason to believe that its private estimates of New Delhi's achievements do not deviate substantially from the opinions expressed in Islamabad.

See, i told this before, if one started to doubt the Secondary yield, you cannot do that as independent event. FBF too could have gone wrong. What is interesting is Ashley Tellis make this observation.
So the conclusion that some BRF members trying to do is, India can only boast of fission device and can only be talked along with Pakistan and Noko. Is that true ?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 02 Sep 2009 22:23

Harsha, Already posted in this thread.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 02 Sep 2009 22:25

pankajs wrote:Pokhran II row: Kakodkar says no more nuke tests required

"We have enough data. We have comprehensive simulation capability and therefore there is no need for any more tests," Kakodkar said here days after K Santhanam ignited a controversy that Pokhran-II was a fizzle since the thermonuclear explosion did not give the desired yield. "We are very confident about the simulation capability."

Not that the test was not a fizzle which he could have just easily said if that was the case. In my opinion AK has always tried to say the right things while staying within the politically imposed boundaries.

This pretty much settles it.

csharma · Post by **csharma** » 02 Sep 2009 22:29

PKI was saying how can one have enough data for the fusion test since only one was conducted.
For the fission tests, there would be enough data since multiple tests were conducted.

Harsha.H.D · Post by **Harsha.H.D** » 02 Sep 2009 22:29

ramana wrote:Harsha, Already posted in this thread.

Apologies Sirji. I shall remove the post.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 02 Sep 2009 22:39

Dileep wrote:So, the problem is un-availability of data. For PKI, For KS, and for NPAs. Same reason onlee!!

Beeeeeeautiiiiifuuuul!!

This cant apply to KS right he was the program director of testing.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 02 Sep 2009 22:50

ramana wrote:The Tribune report linked above on May 11 1999:

Doubts over Pokhran blasts

NEW DELHI, May 11 (PTI) — While the government is today celebrating the first anniversary of the Pokhran-II nuclear blasts, scientists outside the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) have for the first time openly raised doubts about the DAE’s claims that the nuclear explosion had a total strength of 60 kilotonnes.

A fresh analysis of the seismic signatures by these scientists has also revealed that the Indian and Pakistani tests (conducted on May 28, 1998) were “intrinsically different” in the manner in which the energy of the two explosions was distributed among different frequencies of the seismic waves generated by the blasts.

The latest study reported in Current Science was carried out by Mr Harsh Gupta, Mr M. Ravi Kumar and Mr D. Sarkar of the National Geophysical Research Institute (NGRI) Hyderabad, and Mr S.N. Bhattacharya of the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) here.

Both earthquakes and nuclear explosions generate seismic waves in different frequencies and the scientists said they compared the energy content of the Indian and Pakistani explosions in various frequency ranges.

They found that the “energy from the Pokhran event peaked in the frequency range of 3.5 to 6 hertz compared to a range of 1 to 3 hertz for the Chaghai (Pakistani) explosion”.

The NGRI-IMD team says the method used by DAE scientists to calculate the strength of the explosions on the basis of magnitude estimates is questionable.

Such estimates are usually made for seismic waves of frequencies around one hertz or lower. But in the case of the Pokhran blast the energy was found to be concentrated in frequencies up to 7 hertz, the scientists said.

Hence they said the yield of 60 kilotonne estimated by DAE scientists only on the basis of the magnitude of the seismic waves — without considering their spectral characteristics — is “uncertain to a great extent”.

Actually, is it means that the actual yield of POK-II May 11th test is much more than what DAE measured as energy distribution across the spectrum ( 3 to 7 Hz) is not counted for ?

So this supports the theory that actual yield of POK-II exceeed that of design yield and so more damage was observed to Khetolai village.

vera_k · Post by **vera_k** » 02 Sep 2009 22:55

Kanson wrote:So the conclusion that some BRF members trying to do is, India can only boast of fission device and can only be talked along with Pakistan and Noko. Is that true ?

The book also mentions that the estimated weight for a TN weapon is 250kg and for a fission weapon is 800kg. If only the fission device is asumed to be operational, that would explain why the missiles have fat bellies yet short legs.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 02 Sep 2009 23:00

^^^ By mentioning Strategic weapon weight between 100 kg to 250 kg which weapon Minister Mr. Raju talks with the weight of 100 kg ?

If fat bellies is the reason for the short leg, probably, every other nation strategic missiles have fat bellies...

vera_k · Post by **vera_k** » 02 Sep 2009 23:18

^^^

Yes, that is something that cannot be reconciled. But since the A-3 is in development, perhaps it means that the lightweight strategic payload is also in development?

vasu_ray · Post by **vasu_ray** » 03 Sep 2009 00:04

csharma wrote:PKI was saying how can one have enough data for the fusion test since only one was conducted.
For the fission tests, there would be enough data since multiple tests were conducted.

From the following article,

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india ... ed/511402/

"We used the data of Beneberry nuclear tests of US of December 18,1970 to validate our 3-D simulation for earth motion and displacement and this validated tool was used for bench marking," Kakodkar said.

In addition if LIF at Ahmedabad was used to validate the tested TN weapon, they have had time to fix and validate it the same way?

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 03 Sep 2009 00:06

All this talk of mardagiri, parsing of english language sentences, our chanikyan convoluted logic adds spice and demands consumption of samosa chai biscoots etc in tonnes, but the fact remains once we declared ourselves as overt Nuclear power, we are out of the closet and we need not be gun shy to test again and again. to our satisfaction and confidence

The whole concept of deterrence is based on the fact that our capabilities are clear, unambiguously demonstrated.

One test is not enough for any science based experiment even if it is mighty BARC.

The moment the intl community questioned the yield we sgould have tetsed again, not for their sake of proving our capability but to enrich our data base.

The nuke deal of CRE was offered precisely because unkil was sure things did not go off as planned. Inspite of N gurus occasional doosras.

Again Anil bhai coming out saying no more tests is the stupidest thing to have been said. Unless ofcourse his Master voice had asked him to do so.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 03 Sep 2009 00:10

All this should have been said in 1999 atleast and not after the KS disclosure. Its a matter of credibility. The shenanigans of the nuke deal have reduced the credibility of most of the folks.

One test if its big enough would have added to credinility. Too many if only this had happened in the stories.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 03 Sep 2009 00:12

Kanson wrote: Actually, is it means that the actual yield of POK-II May 11th test is much more than what DAE measured as energy distribution across the spectrum ( 3 to 7 Hz) is not counted for ?

No it just means that it is not accurate. You are not primarily interested in the energy contained in a transferred shock wave (yield sets up shock waves in ground)

What you are interested in is that how does energy in any shock wave correlates to yield.

The correlation is unlikely to be simply linear -- BARC appears to have used the wrong correlation model totally -- and the Seismic folks are saying this as clearly as possible.

In the other personal correspondence quoted before the NGRI seem to have publicly questioned the yeild before being asked to shut up. The article posted now gives credence to that personal correspondence.

negi · Post by **negi** » 03 Sep 2009 00:14

A Country which develops cold feet even at the mention of word 'TEST' ( just like me and my little brother used to when folks from sick bay used to visit for yearly malaria/filaria tests .

) I wonder if GOI will shrug the inhibitions drop the damn thing when the time comes because I can think of 101 chanakian reasons for not using nukes even in war .

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 03 Sep 2009 00:17

trying to think like N guru,

If the GOI so confident of yields it would have encouraged more dissidence about the yield so that intl community is totally and throughly bald pulling its hair.

But it seems that all contraire reprots were squelched...

BARC should have actually declared we have not tested anything at all.

We still would have been Nuclear power.

Case in point Israel and SA tests in Indian ocean , no?

The problem is we are1/2 chanikyan no?

Bheem · Post by **Bheem** » 03 Sep 2009 00:21

Arun_S wrote:Ramana: Rightly so. Reading those Radio Chem papers that you mentioned, people will be able to see the situation for themselves.

Posting PK Iyangar's latest expose that has some more details:
Time to test again
P K Iyengar
First Published : 02 Sep 2009 12:44:00 AM IST

To know how successful the fusion was, we must know how much of this came from the boosted-fission and spark-plug, which are fission reactions, and how much from the actual fusion of tritium to form helium. In earlier designs the booster has been designed for as much as 45 kt yield, so if we take the booster yield as even 30 kt, a reasonable assumption, then the fusion yield must have been 20 kt. cavity, and the yield is function of Radius^3 {i.e. cube}. Further they state additional 20% error in determining of fusion yield, where in fact there is no room for the 20% error, because those variations can be eliminated by simple process they have in their hand. [/color][/i])[/size] BARC scientists have themselves indicated an error of 40 per cent on their number of 50 kt. Under this circumstance, this radiochemical method is not absolute proof for the yield of the explosion.

If the red portion refers to designs of TN during PKI era, that would mean that he was in know of things.

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 03 Sep 2009 00:22

Arun_S wrote:
ramana wrote:Recived in e-mail from a member and friend:
Lastly after 1998, there has been a huge amount of papers from BARC on the stuff that went wrong. I have followed it. The articles are by Godwal and N.K.Gupta.(with inputs from Sikka) Papers on rayleigh-Taylor instabilities, Meshkov instabilities and even an entire Founder's day 2007 newsletter on computation to understand Radiation hydrodynamics. So it is the team of Godwal and Gupta who probably were the lead in all this TN. You can google and see the issues they are dealing with. However, it seems they are publishing theoretical studies, so how does one know how close these studies are to reality, one needs LIF or a real test.
....
Wow, that is very very insightful for those probing this elephant.

I was hoping, the fizzle, if it was a fizzle was a koon-shot type fizzle. Instability fizzle is quite painful to understand and rectify.

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 03 Sep 2009 00:38

shiv wrote:^^
All the best techniques for fission and fusion explosions are incorporated into one all-encompassing, fully-scalable design principle. Even six-inch (152 mm) diameter nuclear artillery shells can be two-stage thermonuclears.

So thermonuclear bombs are the most efficient way to make bombs small or big. Period.

Shiv-ji

Depends on what you mean by "thermonuclear".

The all-encompassing design principle they talk about, is to initiate fusion, through fission. The fusion neutrons then cause more fission.

How we do it is altogether another question. Technique no 1, could be to have some LiD in the middle of a pu-pit. The compression due to explosives and high temperature due to fission in the Pu causes fusion in LiD, causing more fission in the Pu. Technically this is a thermonuclear bum with the same design principle as elaborated above -- Fission-fusion-more fission.

But we can do better, if we compress LiD more.

Then comes staged weapon, where the radiation from the fission is used *to heat as well as compress* (this is key idea, using radiation to compress), LiD, to create more fusion and hence more fission from neutrons from the fusion. Adding a fissile tamper, etc etc are just icing on the cake to squeeze out the last bit of efficiency.

What I am trying to say is that FBF, by this definition is also "thermonuclear" and adopts the same "principle" for higher efficiency.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 03 Sep 2009 00:54

Sanku wrote:
Dileep wrote:So, the problem is un-availability of data. For PKI, For KS, and for NPAs. Same reason onlee!!

Beeeeeeautiiiiifuuuul!!
This cant apply to KS right he was the program director of testing.

true.

In a recent interview he stated that he saw some data + foreign analysis.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 03 Sep 2009 00:56

I guess the strategy of shooting the messenger isnt working as the message is getting thru.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 03 Sep 2009 01:00

X-posted from Psy-ops thread....

Raja Bose wrote:
Sanjay M wrote:In the run-up to CTBT, they're busily churning out the articles on who gave up nukes:

Newsweek:

http://www.newsweek.com/id/214193
Actually they have a who has nukes list too (there they claim they have no idea why India did its nuke tests )

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 03 Sep 2009 01:17

To avoid further polluting the ambience of this fine Logic-Resistant Ro-Dho dhaga, negi, the answer to your concern is very easy:

I wonder if GOI will shrug the inhibitions drop the damn thing when the time comes because I can think of 101 chanakian reasons for not using nukes even in war

Strictly depends on whether the World Bank will put sancshun on India for the loan to rebuild Dilli and Mumbai, if India uses any weapons that survive the strike. Hope the Babus are negotiating to get IAEA clearance for the World Bank loan.

So ramana, does the publication of these papers indicate that the tests failed, or that they are now confident enough to keep refining the simulation through advanced experiments? I have not read these papers, but circa 1998, I doubt if India even had the lasers to do Laser-induced fluorescence experiments (meaning experiments with the same intensity at the desired wavelengths as can only be obtained from nuclear explosions otherwise) - at least the eye-eye-tees claimed that they could not get those, though they had maybe heard of some being developed at BARC. All were under Entity List IIRC so no imports possible.

Now maybe today they can do these things in lab experiments, since GOI has successfully resisted the clamor from NPAs (and EBs since 2004) for more "proof" tests of completed weapons that would slam the Entity List handcuffs back on these scientists. Very unfortunate that the interests of the most "patriotic" of desi "nationalists", and the worse anti-Indian bigot racists, coincide so well in this respect, isn't it?

ramana, just to cite an extreme example, even today people do research on NACA0012 airfoils and send papers for publication. This does not mean that it is because the US cannot make WW1 type airplanes fly - it is because they are trying to improve the analytical simulation fidelity of some advanced system. Actually that is NOT an extreme example - I just responded to an email from someone asking for a copy of a 2008 paper that does exactly that - some experimental study on an NACA00xx something, done under US DoD research sponsorship in a very competitive program. I assure you, this does not mean that the relevant combat system is not working, it has been produced in the hundreds or maybe thousands, and is battle-proven. That is why the paper is so freely publishable and distributable and the relevant US DoD agency had a picture printed from a PPT slide I sketched up explaining the findings (between exchanging pleasantries with the experts here), posted on the wall in their lobby. Under "our Kindergarten Outreach", I am sure.

Why is it that when BARC scientists publish (mind you, PUBLISH, not XEROX) papers related to the systems that they are constantly refining, that is an indication that their weapon systems are not working?

I am very curious about this interpretation. I would think that if things were not working in a Classified program, the last place to look for evidence of that is in journal papers. The scientists would be chained to their desks, scrambling to figure out how to make things work, not drawing figures to 18-point bold font lettering for international journals. There would be nothing coming out, the only indication might be in who is asked to come and have a few discussions at BARC, obtained by asking the paanwala keeping track of the cars going in and out of the front gate.

Those poor scientist types, denied access to publication in the world media until very recently, must have to go through a horrendous security review to get permission to send papers to journals, and then all the fun starts with the NPAs bullying them to supply more info and reveal Classified stuff. No security censor will allow papers to go out that reveal the difficulties in a weapons program. That's the whole point of the review, isn't it? You must be familiar enough with this, much more than I (no one bothers to censor my papers, they just suffer injuries from

) ??

Curious at the turn of logic seen on this thread, for more than one reason, ramana.

BTW, to answer this question:

However, it seems they are publishing theoretical studies, so how does one know how close these studies are to reality, one needs LIF or a real test.

You don't publish theoretical studies from a highly secure govt. institute unless the things are already working long since and (a) you are no longer shy about your theory and (b) you are not giving anything away about the Classified program by publishing those studies - it's at least 5 to 10 years past the stage at which the results were used in the weapon-building. Otherwise you are not going to get censor approval, IMO.

Now you also note that the authors are the team leaders behind the weapon design calculations. That just makes it very clear that they have succeeded and gone at least 5 years beyond the stage where they communicated their results to the developer/builders, to be allowed to publish. That is standard practice - AT LEAST 5 years, maybe 10 or more in India. I have a lot of stuff locked away that is perfectly innocuous, but the ppl who paid for the experimental studies and analyses were afraid that just showing the results would compromise the info that they were even WORKING on such things - I mean pictures of the inside of the facility showing how many Coke Machines they had and whether they had separate "Mard" and "Aurat" p-p places, and things of that sort, more than anything I did. They didn't want ANYTHING to be published for 5 years. So if you are able to figure out from a paper that BARC is(was) thinking along some lines, then that is because they don't care any more that you and all the reviewers and editors and readers can figure that out.

Bottom line is that the weapons program is Classified. All of us amateur Technology Level Assessment Experts are just that: amateurs. The whole idea of a Classified program is that you don't let anyone know what you haven't decided very carefully, and with approval up the line, to let them know. Am I wrong in that? Some here who claim to be Inside-Knowledgeable or OnSite-Returned Experts will say that in India it is all different, secrecy is chalta hai, and this is the nation where it is a jailable offence to take a photo of a radio station, or out through the window of an airplane!

It does not make sense to me. So I am clearly not seeing the motivation for such claims. Is BRF being used for something other than plain open discussions?

I mean, other than the BENIS threads, which are A++ class Research?

Satya_anveshi · Post by **Satya_anveshi** » 03 Sep 2009 02:17

Army chief: Pak going "beyond nuclear deterrence"

Pune: Pakistan is "going beyond nuclear deterrence" if reports of it having a large stockpile of nuclear missiles with India specific delivery system are true, Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor said on Wednesday.
"It is a matter of concern for us," Gen. Kapoor said reacting to an article published in the latest issue of "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist" about enhanced nuclear arsenal of Pakistan. "There were certain degrees of deterrence and the figure of 70-90 nuclear warheads directed against a country certainly goes beyond the concept of deterrence," the Army Chief said.
In the article, US experts Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen estimate that Pakistan's nuclear stockpile has jumped to an estimated 70-90 warheads from a previous figure of 60.
"A new nuclear-capable ballistic missile is being readied for deployment, and two nuclear capable cruise missiles are under development. Two new plutonium production reactors and a second chemical separation facility also are under construction," they wrote.
On the Chinese incursions along the border, the Army Chief said there was no cause for "alarm." "The level of incursions was the same as it was last year," he said adding that Indian troops also carry out patrolling along the border which "could be perceived differently".
"The basic issue is to resolve the border dispute," Gen. Kapoor, who was on a visit to the Artificial Limb Centre of Southern Command here, said noting incursions happened because of that. Asked about China's denial of Indian air space violation, the Army Chief said he had already expressed his views on the issue and now he had "no comments" to offer.

Prem Kumar · Post by **Prem Kumar** » 03 Sep 2009 02:33

Narayanan: response to your post about simulations (this has nothing to do with whether the 1998 tests were a sizzle or a fizzzle).

Are there any papers or claims that there were simulations done prior to the 1998 tests & the predictions were validated by the tests? This goes beyond just yield estimations. If not, then best case scenario is this: before the 1998 tests, there would have been some simulation models developed. The models would have been tweaked based on measurements during the tests. However, there is no feedback loop in this process subsequently (post 1998) - so, we dont know how good these models are.

On what basis is RC claiming that the simulation is good enough? Did the simulation predicted X (for say a new weapon design) and what was observed was X +/- 5%?

Without the feedback loop, which can only be done by new tests, I remain skeptical of simulation claims. I am not saying that we dont have *any* simulation capabilities. I think we do (it may even be quite sophisticated) - but it lacks experimental validation.

So I question the scientific temper of people like RC and Kakodkar, who make claims about simulation after just 1 series of tests (not counting 1974). And use that as a justification to say that "no more tests are required". Since your background seems to be in experimental aeronautical engineering, I am sure you would appreciate this.

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 03 Sep 2009 02:44

How many Agonys are ready really? i.e inducted and army trained to use?
I am now able to empathize with services generals who say talks are the best way to resolve issues with PRC and TSP. War is expensive crowd is basically saying for India war is expensive because our deterrent is more of deterrent to us than the enemy.

In other words they are saying, Ours is minimally credible deterrent.
Where do we sign, enlist etc etc...

Prem Kumar · Post by **Prem Kumar** » 03 Sep 2009 02:47

Gerard wrote:
Prem Kumar wrote:Mb = 4.262+0.973 logY
But we do not know the empirical constants for Pokhran.
Kang et al do not know the constants for NoKo.

Gerard: I almost missed your reply. Its amazing how many pages this thread moves in a day.

Yes - I know that this equation is not exact and the constants are not be known for Pokhran. My point was not to measure the Richter scale of an individual test. It was to measure the "relative destructive powers" of 2 yields, one of which is 60% of the other. The reason to do that was to get a ballpark idea of what would have happened to the village if the actual yield was say 75kT or 150kT, instead of 45kT.

By doing a ratio, the first constant cancels out. The second one remains. So, the yield ratio of 75kT to 45kT may not be exactly 2.1 (as showed by my calculations). It may be different. But how much different?? Not by much, I'd argue.

Essentially, what this analysis allows us to see is this: there is no way the 1998 TN test had a planned yield of 150kT or 200kT. If the yield was 150kT, it would have had 5.8 times the destructive power of a 45kT device, which would have flattened the village.

So, even for people who claim that it was a fizzle, the % of fizzle-ness has to be a relatively small number.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 03 Sep 2009 02:48

Are there any papers or claims that there were simulations done prior to the 1998 tests & the predictions were validated by the tests? This goes beyond just yield estimations. If not, then best case scenario is this: before the 1998 tests, there would have been some simulation models developed. The models would have been tweaked based on measurements during the tests. However, there is no feedback loop in this process subsequently (post 1998) - so, we dont know how good these models are.

Thanks for reading my posts, but please do read my post.

CLASSIFIED programs means SECRET programs. Most governments don't keep secrets by publishing hypotheses and then publishing validations. They don't allow ANYTHING to be published until there is NO LONGER ANY REASON to keep it secret - and then those who want to publish it have to show pretty clearly and convince the censors that this is the case.

So - any BARC paper must have gone through that process. Is there some evidence that BARC does not operate like that at all?? Who would benefit by publishing to the world what BARC is working on in the CLASSIFED programs, please? Are we unique in being able to think through that before firing off papers for publication? Are Indian nuclear weapon scientists and engineers told at Employee Orientation:

You have signed Ophishial Secrets Act. But it is only an ACT, you can in fact go and shoot your mouth off wherever you think that will impress people, especially foreigners. Please check passports of all visitors to BARC, and if they are not Indian, then please take them around and show them how our weapon cores are designed, simulated, calculated, verified, and the weapons themselves put together. Then (like ArunS here claimed to know) please tell them exactly how many weapons of what kind we have already built and deployed, and exactly where they are located and what their targets are. If it fits in their briefcase, please give each visitor a sample of our finest Pu to take home so that they can be impressed by our ancient Bharatiya civilijashun too. Ask them it you can get visa to go along and present papers at their conferences too! We want the phoren world to think very highly of us!

Of course, if the visitors are just Indians, spit on them. Don't allow them through the gate. Put them in jail if their cellphones have cameras in them.

A few years ago, I wrote, giving my credentials as an Indian citizen, to the Indian Navy people asking how to get a copy of the Indian Navy report on rescue operations after the Tsunami, stating that I wanted to write an article for BRM on those operations. The same report had been reported in the media to have been given to visiting foreign diplomats.

I got a brief answer: Sorry, but the Report is Restricted. We cannot allow you access.

Gotta check if I can't get it on inter-library loan through a phoren library, when I remember to do so. I bet I can.

Participating in this thread has been very educational for me.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 03 Sep 2009 02:50

vasu_ray wrote:
csharma wrote:PKI was saying how can one have enough data for the fusion test since only one was conducted.
For the fission tests, there would be enough data since multiple tests were conducted.
From the following article,

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india ... ed/511402/

posting in full:

Joining issue with an ex-DRDO scientist that Pokhran-II was not a full success and India needs to go for a few more nuclear tests, Atomic Energy commission chief Anil Kakodkar on Wednesday said the country has strong simulation capability and that additional tests were not required.

"We have enough data. We have comprehensive simulation capability and therefore there is no need for any more tests," Kakodkar said, days after K Santhanam ignited a controversy that Pokhran-II was a fizzle and did not give the desired yield. "We are very confident about the simulation capability,"

Indian nuclear scientists had already validated and bench marked the validated tool of the three dimensional simulation for earth motion and displacement data collected following Pokhran II tests in 1998, he said.

"We used the data of Beneberry nuclear tests of US of December 18,1970 to validate our 3-D simulation for earth motion and displacement and this validated tool was used for bench marking," Kakodkar said.

There is no need for series of tests to validate the yield since the tool and also observations are available, he said adding that it was published in the international journal Nuclear Technology in 2006 four years after its communication from Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC).

Scaling up of nuetronic calculation can always be done, he said adding that all the observations and calculations were done by scientists from BARC.

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 03 Sep 2009 02:53

http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1

On Sept. 24, President Barack Obama will bring together 14 world leaders for a special U.N. Security Council meeting in New York. On the agenda: how to rid the world of nuclear weapons. The summit is the latest step in the administration's campaign to eliminate nukes, a priority Obama stressed on the campaign trail and formally announced in April during his speech in Prague. U.S. attempts to stop Iran from acquiring the bomb and to pry the weapons out of North Korea's fingers are also key parts of this campaign.

These efforts are all grounded in the same proposition: that, as Obama has said several times, nuclear weapons represent the "gravest threat" to U.S. security. This argument has a lot going for it. It's strongly intuitive, as anyone who's ever seen pictures of Hiroshima or Nagasaki knows. It's also popular; U.S. presidents have been making similar noises since the Eisenhower administration, and halting the spread of nukes (if not eliminating them altogether) is one of the few things Obama, Vladimir Putin, Hu Jintao, and Benjamin Netanyahu can all agree on. There's just one problem with the reasoning: it may well be wrong.

A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable.

The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states."

To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price.

Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?"

The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.

Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes—and there's no deterring rogues.

But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad because even "if half of mankind died … the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens.

Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.

Still, even if Iran or North Korea are deterrable, nuclear pessimists fear they'll give or sell their deadly toys to terrorists, who aren't—for it's hard to bomb a group with no return address. Yet look closely, and the risk of a WMD handoff starts to seem overblown. For one thing, assuming Iran is able to actually build a nuke, Desch explains that "it doesn't make sense that they'd then give something they regard as central to their survival to groups like Hizbullah, over which they have limited control. As for Al Qaeda, they don't even share common interests. Why would the mullahs give Osama bin Laden the crown jewels?" To do so would be fatal, for Washington has made it very clear that it would regard any terrorist use of a WMD as an attack by the country that supplied it—and would respond accordingly.

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Reply Report Abuse Posted By: ridahoan @ 09/02/2009 5:13:19 PM
Interesting points, and it may be inevitable that all countries that survive in the long run will possess nuclear weapons, but I hardly think it a good choice if there is a choice. The nuclear deterrent is across a line drawn in the sand, and that line is nebulous. For many regimes this line would certainly be crossed before decapitization, as it would hardly take a Hitler to push the button on his attackers, and assue the destruction of the remainder of his own people, before taking his own life. However, that line in the sand is not defined enough to deter highly visible attacks on enemies that are not a direct and absolute threat to a nation's survival, eg. terrorism or cold war maneuvres. That was the genius of the Doomsday Machine -- it defined the line in the sand.

If Afghanistan had the bomb, would 911 have triggered an invasion? I think not. So in the future, when all surviving states have a bomb or ten, a regime will rarely be deposed externally. That is a form of stability.

The last administration seemed to be intent to rush into that future world. When you label three countries as an axis of evil, and invade one that does not have a bomb, you send a very clear signal to the other that its survival depends on the possession of a nuclear weapon......

Prem Kumar · Post by **Prem Kumar** » 03 Sep 2009 02:58

Narayanan: agreed these reports are classified. So we are all speculating in the dark here.

But my point is this: if you are trying to get your PhD and it involves developing a simulation for predicting, say vibration patterns of an aircraft wing. Then you do 1 experiment & tweak your model after the experiment. Then present results to your advisor claiming that based on your "1 experiment" you can predict the vibrations of the wing over a wide variety of load conditions & for different kinds of wings. And no more experiments are needed. What do you think your advisor will say? Will you get your PhD?

That's essentially the message that RC & Kakodkar want us to swallow. My bullshit meter needle is swinging wildly when I hear that - even without knowing the details of the simulations or its predictions.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 03 Sep 2009 03:01

Prem Kumar wrote:Narayanan: agreed these reports are classified. So we are all speculating in the dark here.

But my point is this: if you are trying to get your PhD and it involves developing a simulation for predicting, say vibration patterns of an aircraft wing. Then you do 1 experiment & tweak your model after the experiment. Then present results to your advisor claiming that based on your "1 experiment" you can predict the vibrations of the wing over a wide variety of load conditions & for different kinds of wings. And no more experiments are needed. What do you think your advisor will say? Will you get your PhD?

That's essentially the message that RC & Kakodkar want us to swallow.

No expert, but just two posts earlier:

"We have enough data. We have comprehensive simulation capability and therefore there is no need for any more tests," Kakodkar said, days after K Santhanam ignited a controversy that Pokhran-II was a fizzle and did not give the desired yield. "We are very confident about the simulation capability,"

Indian nuclear scientists had already validated and bench marked the validated tool of the three dimensional simulation for earth motion and displacement data collected following Pokhran II tests in 1998, he said.

"We used the data of Beneberry nuclear tests of US of December 18,1970 to validate our 3-D simulation for earth motion and displacement and this validated tool was used for bench marking," Kakodkar said.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 03 Sep 2009 03:04

Looks to me that the game is slowly escalating, without giving out the score.

From what K stated, it appears that PKI was not aware of "We used the data of Beneberry nuclear tests of US of December 18,1970 to validate our 3-D simulation".