Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Folks on reading K Subrmanyam's article the game is over. MMS is going to have his own adaucity of hope in New York.
What KS is saying is that it doesnt matter if S-I failed or worked. The current deterrent posture is supported by the govt and the forces.
Such being the case and the many other challenges on trade, economy, environment issues, the US-PRC tie up as G-2 and the fact that India has invested in the disarmament movement I expect there will be an adaucious statement that will be out do earlier wishy-washy statements by former PMs at UN. Offcourse he will tie the CTBT accession to progress on disarmament to mollify Indians and will renounce the right to test despite any pressures in the interim.
What KS is saying is that it doesnt matter if S-I failed or worked. The current deterrent posture is supported by the govt and the forces.
Such being the case and the many other challenges on trade, economy, environment issues, the US-PRC tie up as G-2 and the fact that India has invested in the disarmament movement I expect there will be an adaucious statement that will be out do earlier wishy-washy statements by former PMs at UN. Offcourse he will tie the CTBT accession to progress on disarmament to mollify Indians and will renounce the right to test despite any pressures in the interim.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
M. Sreenivasan's comments are words of serious concern from a known proponent of the "deal".
Unless something dramatic happens in ~ 10 days, its Panipat 1761 and Plassey 1757 all over again.
Unless something dramatic happens in ~ 10 days, its Panipat 1761 and Plassey 1757 all over again.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Does this explain the short ranges of the missiles? How much does a fission warhead of 60-80 kilotons weigh?KS wrote:Fission weapons of 60-80 kilotons have been successfully fabricated and standard thermonuclear warheads of today are neither in megatons nor in hundreds of kilotons. Our fission weapon capabilities are not under question. So long as the adversary believes that the nuclear explosions in his cities will cause him unacceptable damage he will be deterred.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Its a mota lota!
But seriously think of how much maal is need for fission is notoriously inefficient~ 3-6 % of available is converted to energy. Its self inflicted defacto FMCO.
But seriously think of how much maal is need for fission is notoriously inefficient~ 3-6 % of available is converted to energy. Its self inflicted defacto FMCO.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
It is precisely between Sept 9 and Sept 10Arun_S wrote:M. Sreenivasan's comments are words of serious concern from a known proponent of the "deal".
Unless something dramatic happens in ~ 10 days, its Panipat 1761 and Plassey 1757 all over again.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Compared to >30 % for FBF.ramana wrote:Its a mota lota!
But seriously think of how much maal is need for fission is notoriously inefficient~ 3-6 % of available is converted to energy. Its self inflicted defacto FMCO.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Again a non-answer avoiding the simple question:
I am getting really tired of the cra* seen on this thread. These are INDIANS?
The deaths in those other places occurred because there was major DAMAGE - like the Italian 5.4 quake that knocked down a school on top of the kids and teacher. No one in their right mind designs a test knowing that it is going to cause large-scale damage to civilian residences. We are not friggin' Pakis. Is that really so tough for people who are so expert on seismic/ geology issues to grasp? Is this fair or honest debating?Khetolai being 5 kms away from the epicenter, with people being evacuated IMO (just asked to sit outside their houses in Narayanans opinion), would have suffered 0 casualties.
I am getting really tired of the cra* seen on this thread. These are INDIANS?
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Someone here claims that the 43kT limit is the limit of weapon payload on the Agni-something. How can this be?
The description of the dial-a-yield nuke suggested that difference between a 100KT and a 25KT was a very few kilograms of the Tritium or whatever gas went into the fusion. Pressurized, that would be 1 or 2 cubic meters more at most, plus the tank weight. Is the Agni so inflexible that there is not room for this much variation in the payload?
The description of the dial-a-yield nuke suggested that difference between a 100KT and a 25KT was a very few kilograms of the Tritium or whatever gas went into the fusion. Pressurized, that would be 1 or 2 cubic meters more at most, plus the tank weight. Is the Agni so inflexible that there is not room for this much variation in the payload?
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Is the above fair and honest debating?narayanan wrote:Again a non-answer avoiding the simple question:
I am getting really tired of the cra* seen on this thread. These are INDIANS?Khetolai being 5 kms away from the epicenter, with people being evacuated IMO (just asked to sit outside their houses in Narayanans opinion), would have suffered 0 casualties.

Previously in the thread, when I have called an argument of yours silly, you have felt free to question my 'pedigree' and 'upbringing'. I have a fairly thick skin so I dont mind if any xyz calls me names, but then to go back and whine about fairness of an argument made in a civil manner is a little rich.
I gave you a very simple explanation of why a 5.x quake in Italy might cause extensive damage and in some other areas may not, especially if we know the precise time at which the quake happens. If there is sufficient warning about the timing of a seismic wave, the number of casualties can be reduced to 0 (by the simple expedient of having everyone sit out of their homes), especially for an sparsely populated place like Pokhran.
The safety of structures is a different matter and some damage can be expected.
Also, please understand that the energy (and damage) from an earth quake rapidly dissipates the further you move from the fault line (or fault zone). A distance of 5 km matters a lot in this case and is not insignificant. Larger population centers are even further away and damage there would be negligible.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Please keep that in mind when you drink water in Delhi next time. That supply is from Tehri Dam, which gets it name from the town of Old Tehri (population 100,000, compare with Khetolai, population at time of test, ~1200), now under ~ 10 meters of water.narayanan wrote:Again a non-answer avoiding the simple question:
No one in their right mind designs a test knowing that it is going to cause large-scale damage to civilian residences. We are not friggin' Pakis.Khetolai being 5 kms away from the epicenter, with people being evacuated IMO (just asked to sit outside their houses in Narayanans opinion), would have suffered 0 casualties.
I am getting really tired of the cra* seen on this thread. These are INDIANS?
Do you know how people were forced to leave their homes in Tehri? A local collector had the doors and windows ripped out, so the homes became un-inhabitable in the Terai winters and people had to leave.
So much for your INDIAN-ness..
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
You have always had high faith in KS. Whether I agree with him or not, he has read the tea leaves right, most of the time. This cannot be comforting.ramana wrote:Folks on reading K Subrmanyam's article the game is over. MMS is going to have his own adaucity of hope in New York.
What KS is saying is that it doesnt matter if S-I failed or worked. The current deterrent posture is supported by the govt and the forces.
Such being the case and the many other challenges on trade, economy, environment issues, the US-PRC tie up as G-2 and the fact that India has invested in the disarmament movement I expect there will be an adaucious statement that will be out do earlier wishy-washy statements by former PMs at UN. Offcourse he will tie the CTBT accession to progress on disarmament to mollify Indians and will renounce the right to test despite any pressures in the interim.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
For what it is worth:
Sept 2, 2009 :: India has 'comprehensive' simulation capability: AEC chief new
Sept 2, 2009 :: India has 'comprehensive' simulation capability: AEC chief new
Stressing that the country has ''comprehensive'' simulation capability, Atomic Energy commission chief Dr Anil Kakodkar said Wednesday that the country did not require additional nuclear tests. Dr Kakodkar was joining issue with a small band of ex-nuclear and defence scientists who have recently questioned the success of the thermonuclear device tested on 11 May 1998 at Pokharan.
Baneberry's accidental radioactive plume rises from a shock fissure
The dissenting scientists, all very senior ex-officials and well informed, have issued a warning to the political establishment at New Delhi not to be pressured into signing contentious treaties, such as the CTBT, as the country may need to go in for additional nuclear weapon tests to validate design and technologies. It is their contention that the 'shot' on 11 May 1998 did not yield the desired results, a claim, they say, which is validated by international observations.
This has been hotly contested by other scientists, including Dr Kakodkar, who was himself part of the 11 May 'Buddha Smiles' tests.
"We have enough data. We have comprehensive simulation capability and therefore there is no need for any more tests," Dr Kakodkar said. "We are very confident about the simulation capability."
The recent controversy was ignited by ex-DRDO scientist K Santhanam, who was intimately involved with the tests. He claimed that as far as the thermonuclear device was concerned it was a 'fizzle,' which in nuclear parlance denotes a failure.
"We used the data of 'Baneberry' nuclear tests of US of 18 December1970 to validate our 3-D simulation for earth motion and displacement and this validated tool was used for bench marking," Dr Kakodkar said.
''Scaling up of neutronic calculations can always be done,'' he said, adding that all the observations and calculations were done by scientists from BARC.
Dr Kakodkar said that the measurements, carried out by BARC scientists were done meticulously and that a large number of diverse instrumentations were used for four independent measurements -- seismic, large teleseismic, accurate measurements at Gauribidanur seismic measurement site; radiochemical samples estimation done by different groups; specific evidence of fusion reaction and 3-D simulation of motion of earth and displacement.
Baneberry nuclear event
In March 2009, TIME magazine identified the 1970 Yucca Flat Baneberry Test, where 86 workers were exposed to radiation, as one of the world's worst nuclear disasters.
On 18 December 1970, the 'Baneberry' underground nuclear test (a code name accorded individually to all nuclear tests, much as hurricanes carry names in the US) conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) released radioactivity into the atmosphere. Baneberry had a yield of ten kilotons and the bomb was buried about 900 feet beneath the surface of Yucca Flat.
The energy cracked the soil in unexpected ways, causing a fissure near ground zero and the failure of the shaft and cap. A plume of fire and dust was released three and a half minutes after ignition, raining fallout on workers in different locations within NTS.
The radiation release or venting resulted in a cloud of radioactive dust that reached an altitude of 10,000 feet. Baneberry's accidental radioactive plume was carried in three different directions by the wind.
The radioactive plume released 6.7 million Curies of radioactive material, including 80 kCi of 131I.
After dropping a portion of its load locally, the hot cloud's lighter particles were carried to three altitudes and conveyed by winter storms and the jet stream to be deposited heavily as radionuclide-laden snow in Lassen and Sierra counties in northeast California, and to lesser degrees in southern Idaho, northern Nevada and some eastern sections of Oregon and Washington states.
The three diverging jet stream layers conducted radionuclides across the US to Canada, the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean.
Extensive geophysical investigations, coupled with a series of 1D and 2D computational studies were used to reconstruct the sequence of events that led to the catastrophic failure.
However, the geological profile of the Baneberry site was complex and inherently three-dimensional, which meant that some geological features had to be simplified or ignored in the 2D simulations. To address this issue, a new study was undertaken that encompassed 3D high-fidelity Baneberry simulations based on the most accurate geologic and geophysical data available.
The computational model used included about 40 million zones and the simulation required approximately 40,000 CPU hours to complete, thus making it the largest simulation of its kind.
The simulation helped establish a new capability to perform underground test containment simulations in 3D.
Following the Baneberry venting, new containment procedures were adopted to prevent similar occurrences.
In 1984, Yucca Flats was called "the most irradiated, nuclear-blasted spot on the face of the earth".
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
If it indeed was a 200kt design, resulting in a claimed yield of 43kt and was claimed to be a success. It can mean only one thing, the orders to do so, came from way above RC's pay scale. No?
So, if BARC is sticking to their guns, then they are doing the right thing?
So, if BARC is sticking to their guns, then they are doing the right thing?
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
So, what else is new?Folks on reading K Subrmanyam's article the game is over. MMS is going to have his own adaucity of hope in New York.
What KS is saying is that it doesnt matter if S-I failed or worked. The current deterrent posture is supported by the govt and the forces.
Such being the case and the many other challenges on trade, economy, environment issues, the US-PRC tie up as G-2 and the fact that India has invested in the disarmament movement I expect there will be an adaucious statement that will be out do earlier wishy-washy statements by former PMs at UN. Offcourse he will tie the CTBT accession to progress on disarmament to mollify Indians and will renounce the right to test despite any pressures in the interim.
I think India should pack the MRCA effort. Too.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Arun_S, can you explain what you mean?Arun_S wrote:M. Sreenivasan's comments are words of serious concern from a known proponent of the "deal".
Unless something dramatic happens in ~ 10 days, its Panipat 1761 and Plassey 1757 all over again.
If MMS tries to have an "audacity of hope" moment with Obama (and I'm sure that he wants to), he'll face significant pushback. KS's words notwithstanding, I don't think MMS will get away with it.
I suppose we all have to wait and see. (I, for one, will be praying.)
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
The contention is the realised yield was at best ~ 30kt per PKI's latest paper. Per K Santhanam it was ~ 27kt. Either way if you account for all contributors of the yield that leaves very little for fusion. That is the crux of the matter. Except the BARC group no one agrees it realised that much. Unfortunately its being described as by Mattoo and KS as us vs them. Its not. It might have been in the past but not in this case.
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NRao, That domain-b article has infoonthe US simulation and not on the BARC simulation of the Banberry event. Isnt it a case of quoting outside examples to bolster inside efforts?
And are you mad at me? I am saying whats on my mind.
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NRao, That domain-b article has infoonthe US simulation and not on the BARC simulation of the Banberry event. Isnt it a case of quoting outside examples to bolster inside efforts?
And are you mad at me? I am saying whats on my mind.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
A simple question to gurus here. Is there any other nuclear nation that has claimed nuclear weapons state status without testing the actual nuclear weapon i.e. they only tested a nuclear device and did not test an actual deployable nuclear weapon warhead?
If no then my discomfort comes from the knowledge that we have something that is supposed to work a certain way but we have never tested it's real performance. Most engineers are aware of Murphy's law that broadly states: "Anything that can go wrong will go wrong." but with NFU we will be in deep doodoo if Murphy's law kicks in during our second strike.
If no then my discomfort comes from the knowledge that we have something that is supposed to work a certain way but we have never tested it's real performance. Most engineers are aware of Murphy's law that broadly states: "Anything that can go wrong will go wrong." but with NFU we will be in deep doodoo if Murphy's law kicks in during our second strike.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
This is completely asinine garbage. When dams are built to provide drinking water for major areas, there is always a region that gets submerged. People are given plenty of warning, and they have legal recourse to get compensation. Nothing else can be done about it. If people don't move out by the time the water has to start rising, then yes, they condemn the homes and maybe bulldoze them. Same thing happens when roads have to be built. The government has Power of Eminent Domain. Nothing new there.Sudeepj now resorts to total OT excuses to slander India:
Please keep that in mind when you drink water in Delhi next time. That supply is from Tehri Dam, which gets it name from the town of Old Tehri (population 100,000, compare with Khetolai, population at time of test, ~1200), now under ~ 10 meters of water.
Do you know how people were forced to leave their homes in Tehri? A local collector had the doors and windows ripped out, so the homes became un-inhabitable in the Terai winters and people had to leave.
So much for your INDIAN-ness..
That has absolutely NOTHING to do with a situation where someone DESIGNS a nuclear test and assesses the safety of the test. NO engineer in India is going to design the test in a way that endangers civilians. To suggest that they will, is blood libel and damnable slander against decent, hardworking professionals, whose standards you will obviously never aspire to.
Your resort to these ridiculous examples to defend the indefensible, proves all I need to know about you and your standards of honesty.
You know that, I know that, and we both know that you know that. The arguments have been laid out clearly enough for any honest person old enough to get on the internet to understand them. Enough of this useless false "discussion".
We both understand what you are, and I have you well calibrated. Thanks.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
All nice rhetoric, except for the fact that there was no danger of any civilian getting hurt, at least from the seismic waves.narayanan wrote: That has absolutely NOTHING to do with a situation where someone DESIGNS a nuclear test and assesses the safety of the test. NO engineer in India is going to design the test in a way that endangers civilians. To suggest that they will, is blood libel and damnable slander against decent, hardworking professionals, whose standards you will obviously never aspire to.

How nice.. You havent managed to counter even a single logical point made by the fizzle camp:~We both understand what you are, and I have you well calibrated. Thanks.
1) Prominent people involved with the test expressing doubts about the yield.
2) Lack of subsidence crater
3) Intensity of seismic waves
your initial attempt was to derail this thread by flame bait and trolling, when all of that failed, and it was proven that there was a high probability of a fizzle, you question the 'pedigree', the 'upbringing' and mysterious threats of 'I have you calibrated'. Is that supposed to scare me? Are you hoping that I will feel bad that Dr. Narayanan did not think highly of me?..
Last edited by sudeepj on 04 Sep 2009 05:32, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Man..I gotta say this.. N^3 has this unique kapakity to claim Pakistan is better than Switzerland in terms of standard of living and still defend it. Well...that is BRF. I am just glad and thank god that he or anyone of his talent are not in Pakistan (there just can't be...we would have been screwed by now
)

Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Going by the BARC stand, 5.2 is result of interferrence and 5.4 translates to the actual blast. Considering this would be the basis while designing I dont think the design yield will be greater than this claimed yield.narayanan wrote:The "fizzle" caused at least Mag 5.2 in Khetolai, some say 5.4. With a 43KT blast. Damaged houses, etc. but the designers did not consider it necessary to any more evacuation than that, showing what magnitude they expected.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
From BRM:
R. Chidambaram's Lecture at IISc(Indian Institute of Sciences)
In notes taken by Dr. Shiv Sastry [4] at a lecture by R. Chidambaram at IISc, (also
see [5]) the following points were made by Dr. Chidambaram.
(a) For a 1 kt. device a burial depth of 150 metres is needed to prevent crater formation.
The meaning of this is now clear from the Toman plots. The emplacement depth
Chidambaram refers to is clearly in alluvium. Thus in alluvium the critical burial depth
Dcritical satisfies the relation,
Dcritical = 150(Y )^1/3.4
(b) Chidambaram also made the statement that the burial depth at Pokharan is about
half. One thus suspects that the strength of the material at the depth at which the S-1
device was emplaced is roughly double that of alluvium. Thus the material has a strength
midway between alluvium and hard, dry rock. Thus the critical depth of emplacement
where only a retarc will be produced at Pokharan is
Dcritical = 75(Y )^1/3.4 - eq (5)
Now using the announced yield of S-1, Y = 45 kilotons, we easily compute using eq(5) that
Dcritical = 229 metres. Thus if S-1 was buried at over 200 metres as per Chengappa[3], pg.
427, S-1 would have produced a small subsidence crater or a retarc. This was indeed the
case, pg. 431,
R. Chidambaram's Lecture at IISc(Indian Institute of Sciences)
In notes taken by Dr. Shiv Sastry [4] at a lecture by R. Chidambaram at IISc, (also
see [5]) the following points were made by Dr. Chidambaram.
(a) For a 1 kt. device a burial depth of 150 metres is needed to prevent crater formation.
The meaning of this is now clear from the Toman plots. The emplacement depth
Chidambaram refers to is clearly in alluvium. Thus in alluvium the critical burial depth
Dcritical satisfies the relation,
Dcritical = 150(Y )^1/3.4
(b) Chidambaram also made the statement that the burial depth at Pokharan is about
half. One thus suspects that the strength of the material at the depth at which the S-1
device was emplaced is roughly double that of alluvium. Thus the material has a strength
midway between alluvium and hard, dry rock. Thus the critical depth of emplacement
where only a retarc will be produced at Pokharan is
Dcritical = 75(Y )^1/3.4 - eq (5)
Now using the announced yield of S-1, Y = 45 kilotons, we easily compute using eq(5) that
Dcritical = 229 metres. Thus if S-1 was buried at over 200 metres as per Chengappa[3], pg.
427, S-1 would have produced a small subsidence crater or a retarc. This was indeed the
case, pg. 431,
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
There are 52 POWs in Pakistani jails who have suffered 40+ years of torture for their country, apart from thousands killed in Wars.sudeepj wrote:
Do you know how people were forced to leave their homes in Tehri? A local collector had the doors and windows ripped out, so the homes became un-inhabitable in the Terai winters and people had to leave.
So much for your INDIAN-ness..
And you are talking of people giving their mere homes for development which they can easliy rebuild in less than 6 months.
Well, my life and my home both are for my country and I am ready to sacrifice both. If your's is not, maybe a superior

Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
This is Khetolai, in 2009.
http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&source= ... 3&t=h&z=17
I am willing to place a bet that there arent more than 350 structures in the village, probably none of any larger historical, cultural or religious significance.
For 350 structures, BARC and GoI were willing to forego once in a life time opportunity? In contrast, even middling C towns have upwards of 50,000 structures.
http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&source= ... 3&t=h&z=17
I am willing to place a bet that there arent more than 350 structures in the village, probably none of any larger historical, cultural or religious significance.
For 350 structures, BARC and GoI were willing to forego once in a life time opportunity? In contrast, even middling C towns have upwards of 50,000 structures.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Dude.. take a look at the context in which the argument was made. What I am saying is pretty similar to what you are.Karna_A wrote:There are 52 POWs in Pakistani jails who have suffered 40+ years of torture for their country, apart from thousands killed in Wars.sudeepj wrote:
Do you know how people were forced to leave their homes in Tehri? A local collector had the doors and windows ripped out, so the homes became un-inhabitable in the Terai winters and people had to leave.
So much for your INDIAN-ness..
And you are talking of people giving their mere homes for development which they can easliy rebuild in less than 6 months.
Well, my life and my home both are for my country and I am ready to sacrifice both. If your's is not, maybe a superiorneighboring country will take you.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Do you understand that Richter magnitudes are always at the epicenter of the event? The event was Mag 5.2, at the epicenter. Its nonsense to say Mag 5.2 at Khetolai.. It was Mag 5.2 (or whatever) - centered at the test site, in London too..Kanson wrote:Going by the BARC stand, 5.2 is result of interferrence and 5.4 translates to the actual blast. Considering this would be the basis while designing I dont think the design yield will be greater than this claimed yield.narayanan wrote:The "fizzle" caused at least Mag 5.2 in Khetolai, some say 5.4. With a 43KT blast. Damaged houses, etc. but the designers did not consider it necessary to any more evacuation than that, showing what magnitude they expected.
Secondly, how do you know that the seismic stations are at a lat-long (that would determine their relative locn from the two events) at which seismic waves would interfere destructively? Is there any way in which this can be proven? Even if there is destructive interference, that would be true for a particular frequency, not for a range of frequencies spanning 1-7 Hz. I may be incorrect, but IMO, its impossible.. (Note how Narayanan has not made 1 post defending this... He cant..)
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
From Current Science:
From BRM:As has been earlier pointed out, the spectral seismograms of both the nuclear explosions under study show that the maximum energies are concentrated even at frequencies up to 7 Hz and not necessarily at 1 Hz. Hence, any type of magnitude, including mb (the quantity often used in yield estimations), cannot measure the true size of the events, since the maximum energy concentrations are not represented.
The Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) responded to the preliminary objections by publishing a series of papers arguing that the yields were in accordance with the design objectives. The first paper (13, 13 a) argues in favor of the necessity of accounting for the interference in seismic waves caused by the simultaneous S-1 and S-2 detonations. As the devices were aligned in an E-W direction, they determined, from physical considerations, that interference of the seismic waves of the twin explosions could only be neglected in a narrow azimuthal window. This window was determined to be +/- 20 degrees off the North South axis. They also updated the seismic constants used for mB wave magnitude for Pokhran site.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Ramana,ramana wrote:Folks on reading K Subrmanyam's article the game is over. MMS is going to have his own adaucity of hope in New York.
What KS is saying is that it doesnt matter if S-I failed or worked. The current deterrent posture is supported by the govt and the forces.
Such being the case and the many other challenges on trade, economy, environment issues, the US-PRC tie up as G-2 and the fact that India has invested in the disarmament movement I expect there will be an adaucious statement that will be out do earlier wishy-washy statements by former PMs at UN. Offcourse he will tie the CTBT accession to progress on disarmament to mollify Indians and will renounce the right to test despite any pressures in the interim.
It's a matter of perspective, but after re-reading KS' Tribune article, I really don't understand you pessimistic assessment.
Here's the link once more
Maybe I'm in a minority on BRF by I fully agree with the bolded portions.Whether it is the CTBT, the FMCT or conducting nuclear tests, it is counter-productive to look at these issues in a narcissistic manner. We should try to exploit the opportunities as they arise. This country is just learning to do it and we have a long way to go. The need of the moment is to avoid chauvinism and steadily improve the capacity of the country to grow and deliver without demagoguery.
And this portion below seems to indicate that the theory that Indian tested in order to pre-empt the Pakistanis is not correct:
This quote is also interesting:Do we conduct some more tests to satisfy the sceptics? This cannot be publicly debated just as conducting the nuclear tests was not debated. The nuclear tests of 1998 were not to pre-empt any Pakistani move but were a response to the provocative Pakistani Ghauri missile test and also to declare India a nuclear weapon state in the early days of the new BJP-led NDA government before the Americans started applying pressure on India. At that time it was expected that the CTBT would come into force in 1999.
Now we've had people here saying that K Santhanam was part of the team responsible to measure yield and there's been claim that he immediately knew that it was not what was expected. My question is, was he part of this meeting that BM is supposed to have held with the design team - or did he express his doubt during this timeframe? Apparently India was ready to test once more.The issue was examined in a review by then National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra. If the weapon designers had doubts about the yield they could have conducted one more test within the first few days after the May 11 test since one more shaft was available, before any commitment was made on voluntary moratorium.
He also makes a comment about the design level for the shaft which seems to be really rattling to poor little Richter scale over the past few pages. If we go by what he writes then the shaft was definitely not designed for 200 KT.Apparently, the weapon design team did not have any doubts on the result. But on the very first day the sceptics had doubts. There was a popular view that the thermonuclear test should be of 100 kilotons and above and, therefore, this could not be a thermonuclear explosion.
Added later: Of course one could take the John Snow view of life and the universe and say:In any case, the shaft could not have withstood any explosion higher than 60 kilotons.
Makes life much more simpler.THese days I respect K Subhramnayam garu as much as I used to do Dr. Wallace garu!
Jai Ho!
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
True. However, it did surprise me that this was a "fizzle" in some other respects and that the Indian SciCom picked that as a model!!!! Oh well.ramana wrote: NRao, That domain-b article has infoonthe US simulation and not on the BARC simulation of the Banberry event. Isnt it a case of quoting outside examples to bolster inside efforts?
Yup, I am mad.And are you mad at me? I am saying whats on my mind.
But, only because I have not been able to keep up with various posts.
It is blissful too tho'. I envy JCage.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Might be relevant to this thread as it runs contrary to K Subramanyam's article.
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090901/j ... 434603.jsp
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090901/j ... 434603.jsp
China already has deterrent capabilities against India, while India is still developing them.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Vera,vera_k wrote:Might be relevant to this thread as it runs contrary to K Subramanyam's article.
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090901/j ... 434603.jsp
China already has deterrent capabilities against India, while India is still developing them.
I think that's more to do with the delivery systems and not the bombs per se. KS was talking about the bombs. And as you'll be aware the delivery systems are a work in progress.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Skeptics vs Sceptics... Is it the editorial mistake or part of the message. I wonder.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Wouldn't it be relevant? If the bombs are heavy fission weapons, then that explains why the delivery systems need more work. It explains why an A-2 cannot reach Beijing and why an A-3 was necessary.amit wrote:Vera,
I think that's more to do with the delivery systems and not the bombs per se. KS was talking about the bombs. And as you'll be aware the delivery systems are a work in progress.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Of course it would be Vera.vera_k wrote:Wouldn't it be relevant? If the bombs are heavy fission weapons, then that explains why the delivery systems need more work. It explains why an A-2 cannot reach Beijing and why an A-3 was necessary.Vera,
I think that's more to do with the delivery systems and not the bombs per se. KS was talking about the bombs. And as you'll be aware the delivery systems are a work in progress.
However, please try to understand what I'm trying to say. My understanding is KS was talking about deterrence in the specific context of bomb yields and their deterrence value and not about delivery systems and the whole package (bombs versus delivery).
JMT
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Folks consider this.
The type of shenanigans going on sponsored by GoI now saying that there is no need to test, is exactly the kind of argument India will have to face if ever god forbid India is a victim of a nuclear weapon attack.
India's nuclear doctrine of an immediate maximum response to cause unacceptable damage to the adversary, will be fudged by our netas and their advisers in a manner similar to what we see today.
It is plainly obvious when you talk to the various people in the know, that India's thermonuclear test was a failure, yet we balk at the mere mention of a 'Test'
This weakness is of our political leaders, and is once again manifest in its crudest form. Now our politicians are forcing our scientists to lie to allow their political objectives to be met.
The type of shenanigans going on sponsored by GoI now saying that there is no need to test, is exactly the kind of argument India will have to face if ever god forbid India is a victim of a nuclear weapon attack.
India's nuclear doctrine of an immediate maximum response to cause unacceptable damage to the adversary, will be fudged by our netas and their advisers in a manner similar to what we see today.
It is plainly obvious when you talk to the various people in the know, that India's thermonuclear test was a failure, yet we balk at the mere mention of a 'Test'
This weakness is of our political leaders, and is once again manifest in its crudest form. Now our politicians are forcing our scientists to lie to allow their political objectives to be met.
The enemies are watching the game with a smile on their faces. And they are no fools.The nation which doesn't have the balls to test, will, of course NOT have to balls to retaliate with nuclear weapons if attacked.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
I tend to agree with amit on the K Subrahmanyam article. It actually is reassuring.
Following is what I gather from the article:
1) All bomb designers including Raja Ramanna agree with the yield. PKI is the only one who does not agree with the yield. The ones who are not bomb designers may not know all the nuances.
2) There are some reputed foreign seismologists who agree with BARC's claim of 60K. In addition, there would be data that only BARC and the weapon designers have. They could have gone for one more test since one shaft was available but the bomb designers were confident that their device works.
3) Even without the thermonuke, the military and the govt (both UPA and NDA) feel that the there is adequate deterrance. In fact based on KS, there is no reason to believe thermonuke did not work.
Following is what I gather from the article:
1) All bomb designers including Raja Ramanna agree with the yield. PKI is the only one who does not agree with the yield. The ones who are not bomb designers may not know all the nuances.
2) There are some reputed foreign seismologists who agree with BARC's claim of 60K. In addition, there would be data that only BARC and the weapon designers have. They could have gone for one more test since one shaft was available but the bomb designers were confident that their device works.
3) Even without the thermonuke, the military and the govt (both UPA and NDA) feel that the there is adequate deterrance. In fact based on KS, there is no reason to believe thermonuke did not work.
Last edited by csharma on 04 Sep 2009 07:41, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Good.
Let us turn off the lights now.
Let us turn off the lights now.
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
Am neither arguing with the claims not supporting the credibility of the weaponistion and tests.
One simple question..
If India does testing again just for the sake of shutting up few mouths who are saying that budha didnt smiled,what will be the consequences?
Are were rolling back to the same sanction age again?
Is the 1234565 agreement will be a failure?
If sanctions come over us as like Iran,Will India be in a position to deal with its supernaturally growing economy and will it be able to keep the growth rate constant at the least case?
Even ignoring the growth will the renewed testing able to deter the so called enemy China?
One simple question..
If India does testing again just for the sake of shutting up few mouths who are saying that budha didnt smiled,what will be the consequences?
Are were rolling back to the same sanction age again?
Is the 1234565 agreement will be a failure?
If sanctions come over us as like Iran,Will India be in a position to deal with its supernaturally growing economy and will it be able to keep the growth rate constant at the least case?
Even ignoring the growth will the renewed testing able to deter the so called enemy China?
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
csharma wrote:I tend to agree with amit on the K Subrmanyam article. It actually is reassuring.
Following is what I gather from the article:
1) All bomb designers including Raja Ramanna agree with the yield. PKI is the only one who does not agree with the yield. The ones who are not bomb designers may not know all the nuances.
{This was before the seismic analysis.}
2) There are some reputed foreign seismologists who agree with BARC's claim of 60K. In addition, there would be data that only BARC and the weapon designers have. They could have gone for one more test since one shaft was available but the bomb designers were confident that their device works.
{The British seismologist Clarke was speaking from preliminary data.}
3) Even without the thermonuke, the military and the govt (both UPA and NDA) feel that the there is adequate deterrance. In fact based on KS, there is no reason to believe thermonuke did not work.
{True: There is adequate deterrence. However KS does not say no reason to beleive T/N did not work}
Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist
One more prediction of your not so humble rambler comes true. We are now 50 pages into the thread.
Coming back to the topic, the article by KS is interesting. Please read it carefully a couple of times, gentle readers, both for what it says and what it has left unsaid. The question is not about fizzle ya sizzle, for all you may know it may be somewhere in between. While postors on both camps are tying themselves in knots, the sword of intuitive intellect needs to be used to cut through the self inflicted knots.
ramana says it is game over. That the GOI and the forces are prepared to translate the present capability, with all its intrinsic doubts, into an operational nuclear deterrence doctrine. As per the assessment of the GOI it is adequate. He has also interpreted the KS article is that the GOI is prepared to freeze the nuclear capability at this level and make a push for disarmament in stages - by first carefully negotiating a lot of economic and other paybacks to India for doing this freeze and signing up to treaties. The assessment is that there will be an international push for disarmament and renegotiation of treaties like NPT anyway.
Now gentle reader, if you go back and read what I had posted in page 12 of this thread again, it will bring to your attention once again the need to examine the questions of "Why?" and "Why now/" for Santhanam's "revealation".
The real issue/danger is not whether the TN weapon worked or not. It is about the trading of sovereign options and acceptance of a position for India in the global context.
There are people here and outside this forum who have an implicit faith in the political leadership (both past and present) to do the right thing and defend it based on the track record. There are others who have such implicit faith in the scientific community (both past and present) to do the right thing and again base it on the track record. Ultimately it is a matter of faith.
All one can say is that while there is much debate with fire and brimstone on whom to trust within the scientific community, in my opinion it is the wrong debate to have. Much as I dislike it, the present administration is prepared to settle for being a "Karna". As a citizen I cannot do much about the impending relegation of India except to build awareness of this looming relegation. It is the same status that K. Santhanam is in right now. He is retired. Only his call may have greater resonance and effect to warn those who are charged with protecting the sovereign options of India to do the right thing. But at the end of the day he is as powerless as anyone here.
Some have argued here that the GOI has never officially stated that it going to sign this treaty or that. So there is no need to ascribe motives now. Doing that now is a sign of political bias. Fair enough. Let us not rush to judgement. In the interim it would be foolhardy to ignore signals. The NSA has talked about big ideas. The PM has spoken about the primacy of growth over anything else in multiple occassions. The PM has also said that we must make bold moves and be a contributor to international efforts in important areas like disarmament and climate control and not be seen as an irritant and obstacle creators. He has also announced that we will talk to neighbours despite actions that are clearly unfriendly because avoidance of war is a must for keeping the GDP growing.
In addition to all this, the track record of this PM when it comes to nuclear capabilities is there. It has been recounted well in the past and I wont do it once again. Even if the past actions are not a guide to future actions, if you look at some of the present actions and views expressed and take that into account, it does not inspire confidence that the present administration will preserve India's sovereign optiions in the area of nuclear capability and deterrence. This will be a departure from a national consensus.
So gentle readers, while you continue debating about what happened, what could have happened and what should we do now, please keep this in the back of your mind, it is India's destiny and position in the world that is at stake not just deterrence capability.
Take it for what it is worth.
Coming back to the topic, the article by KS is interesting. Please read it carefully a couple of times, gentle readers, both for what it says and what it has left unsaid. The question is not about fizzle ya sizzle, for all you may know it may be somewhere in between. While postors on both camps are tying themselves in knots, the sword of intuitive intellect needs to be used to cut through the self inflicted knots.
ramana says it is game over. That the GOI and the forces are prepared to translate the present capability, with all its intrinsic doubts, into an operational nuclear deterrence doctrine. As per the assessment of the GOI it is adequate. He has also interpreted the KS article is that the GOI is prepared to freeze the nuclear capability at this level and make a push for disarmament in stages - by first carefully negotiating a lot of economic and other paybacks to India for doing this freeze and signing up to treaties. The assessment is that there will be an international push for disarmament and renegotiation of treaties like NPT anyway.
Now gentle reader, if you go back and read what I had posted in page 12 of this thread again, it will bring to your attention once again the need to examine the questions of "Why?" and "Why now/" for Santhanam's "revealation".
The real issue/danger is not whether the TN weapon worked or not. It is about the trading of sovereign options and acceptance of a position for India in the global context.
There are people here and outside this forum who have an implicit faith in the political leadership (both past and present) to do the right thing and defend it based on the track record. There are others who have such implicit faith in the scientific community (both past and present) to do the right thing and again base it on the track record. Ultimately it is a matter of faith.
All one can say is that while there is much debate with fire and brimstone on whom to trust within the scientific community, in my opinion it is the wrong debate to have. Much as I dislike it, the present administration is prepared to settle for being a "Karna". As a citizen I cannot do much about the impending relegation of India except to build awareness of this looming relegation. It is the same status that K. Santhanam is in right now. He is retired. Only his call may have greater resonance and effect to warn those who are charged with protecting the sovereign options of India to do the right thing. But at the end of the day he is as powerless as anyone here.
Some have argued here that the GOI has never officially stated that it going to sign this treaty or that. So there is no need to ascribe motives now. Doing that now is a sign of political bias. Fair enough. Let us not rush to judgement. In the interim it would be foolhardy to ignore signals. The NSA has talked about big ideas. The PM has spoken about the primacy of growth over anything else in multiple occassions. The PM has also said that we must make bold moves and be a contributor to international efforts in important areas like disarmament and climate control and not be seen as an irritant and obstacle creators. He has also announced that we will talk to neighbours despite actions that are clearly unfriendly because avoidance of war is a must for keeping the GDP growing.
In addition to all this, the track record of this PM when it comes to nuclear capabilities is there. It has been recounted well in the past and I wont do it once again. Even if the past actions are not a guide to future actions, if you look at some of the present actions and views expressed and take that into account, it does not inspire confidence that the present administration will preserve India's sovereign optiions in the area of nuclear capability and deterrence. This will be a departure from a national consensus.
So gentle readers, while you continue debating about what happened, what could have happened and what should we do now, please keep this in the back of your mind, it is India's destiny and position in the world that is at stake not just deterrence capability.
Take it for what it is worth.