India in South East Asia

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 15 Aug 2009 20:03

the consultancy part would be under hawk eyes. Sections from within Indian establishment, as well as possibly from the Vietnam side, can and will leak it to the US. Only Jihad type fanatical commitment to faith can be somewhat successful in keeping the information in to a certain extent. But even AQK was "outed".

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 20 Aug 2009 03:42

Time for having a clear political vision for Myanmar is running out. India can yet play a vital and principled role in favour of democracy and in favour of Su Kyi. The long term consequence of this currently hush hush and vague role and stand can do immense damage once the junta is gone. And the US is playing its cards carefully, and may even come to tacit agreements with PRC to jointly "manage" Myanmar without disturbing the junta. As and when junta crashes, US can always "leave" and PRC can sulk and withdraw, but India will be made to be the culprit that allowed the junta to survive and even collaborate with the military government.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 20 Aug 2009 04:01

brihaspati ji,

I see a few ways in which the situation in Myanmar reaches a resolution.

a) The junta continues to remain in power. Democratic forces remain contained by the junta. Status Quo!

b) The junta crumbles under its own weight. Democratic forces take over.

c) The junta allows the Democratic forces to take over and work together on the basis of a Pakistan Model.

d) The junta undergoes certain fissures, and a power-struggle within the junta forces one faction to align with the democratic forces, retains the upper hand and works jointly with the democratic forces to govern the country.

I will try to elaborate a bit on the Indian strategy a bit later.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 20 Aug 2009 04:38

(a), (b), (c) perhaps out of question. Global powers have ensured that. What prospects for an Indian role or initiative for (d)?

a_kumar · Post by **a_kumar** » 20 Aug 2009 08:06

On the Indic connection of SE Asia, saw this just outside Bali International Airport.

The episode of Abimanyu and Gatodhgacha..

One cottage called "Dewa Bharatha"

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 20 Aug 2009 16:43

brihaspati ji,

there is a (e) option. This is a very far-fetched scenario but an interesting one.

Let us consider some basics -

a) What is India's biggest strategic adversary? - China.
b) What is the best way to contain Chinese rise? - USA's push to curb China.
c) How does one realize it? - Push USA to confront PRC.
d) How and Where? -

Taiwan is one option, but America seems to be not interested in using Taiwan any more. PRC has already won that tug-of-war. Taiwan now has a PRC-friendly President. Sooner or later, Taiwan could give in.
On the Korean peninsula, PRC has neutralized American influence - on the one hand, North Korea is playing crazy, on the other hand, South Korea has jumped into bed with PRC economically. USA needs PRC to pacify North Korea.
In Vietnam, America has its own story, and cannot use the old adversary well to pinch PRC - Vietnam may not be interested in being used by America.
Thailand is a developing country, very much in the American camp, but also friendly with PRC. Thailand is also not interested in getting embroiled in war with PRC.
Cambodia is very much friendly with PRC. That makes Laos, which is also communist and landlocked, an unattainable ally, and an impossible frontline.
Japan has a pacifist Constitution is also too scared of Chinese reaction to contemplate a militarization drive - the old have no fire, the middle-aged are busy making money, and the youth are lost in their mangas.
Mongolia is landlocked.
Russia is herself an adversary.
Central Asia is to a large extent under the collective thumb of Russia and PRC.
ETIM in AfPak remains one option but even that is contained by China's relations with Pakistan.
The Southern flank is manned by India, which does not want trouble with PRC, and does not want to do American bidding openly.

As I see it, Myanmar is the only land, which is not part of the global supply line, that is, it comes in the category of pre-modern underdeveloped militaristic land, which may be available as a possible battle-field between USA and PRC.

It is at the moment very much in PRC's sphere of influence. But the population is against the ruling junta, and as such susceptible to America's color revolutions. From the commentary in the Western press, and how the West speaks in favor of Aung San Suu Kyi, including Britain, one would think, that Myanmar is definitely of interest to the West.

It is clear, USA would want to deny PRC the dominant role in IOR. A switch in Myanmar from PRC camp to American camp would definitely help USA in that goal. An American presence in Myanmar would further strengthen American hold over IOR. India is still not in a position to claim supremacy in IOR in a straight contest between India and PRC. A temporary American domination would be in India's strategic interest, until India is ready for the responsibility.

Myanmar has a long border with China. An anti-PRC Myanmar would want this border secured, and that is possible only if a major power is willing to strengthen it. India may not have that strength as yet.

So I am in favor of this switch of Myanmar into the American camp. Of course this would not be a simple American project. Unlike India's presence in Afghanistan, which is to a large extent contained due to Pakistani sensitivities, there will be no such consideration in Myanmar. India would be 'allowed' to expand without limits. Whereas America can ensure the security of Myanmar on the border to PRC, or maybe with some little naval base, India can lend logistical support to American presence.

Our main mission would be to consolidate democracy in Myanmar, build a strong cooperative relationship with the 'new' Myanmarese military, empower Buddhist clergy there, build up Myanmarese services infrastructure and enter into a strong economic relationship there.

In an American presence of say 15 years in Myanmar, India would have consolidated her presence there to such an extent, that Myanmar may be ready to enter into a confederation with India or even become part of the Indian Union.

Now American involvement is not the most positive of things from an Indian PoV. But if India can enter Myanmar in a big way riding America piggy-back, then it can be worth considering.

The question is what of arrangement takes place in Myanmar. Is it going to be an arrangement of cohabitation between USA and PRC in Myanmar? In this case, it does not help India one bit. Is it going to be an arrangement where America considers it a chance to push PRC away from Indian Ocean? In this case, it would be a jackpot for India. However it must be made clear to the Americans and their poodle, that they cannot expect to push back China from Myanmar without Indian help. India has to be central to the solution in Myanmar. Secondly if USA decides for this strategy, it should also be clear to them, that India is not going to be a second-level partner, and America will be taking all the strategic decisions.

Myanmar is the right border from where USA can neutralize the Chinese.

The question arises how to go about this policy with the junta completely in tow with PRC? I would say, the answer lies in getting rid of the upper echelon of Tatmadaw completely, if they are unwilling to relent. The junior officers would not be able to hold on to power without the civilian support. Some junior officers may themselves be willing to do the needful - some brave Stauffenberg. The civilians can then dictate the new Myanmarese foreign and domestic policy.

It depends on finding the right Stauffenberg, and finding the right partner in Washington D.C. who would be willing to checkmate Communist China. As Schwarzneggar said, Obama is too skinny, he needs to put on some muscle.

AjitK · Post by **AjitK** » 20 Aug 2009 18:41

India should not do anything that destabalizes the junta.There is no need to publicly endorse the military rule as that would harm future relations if and when the regime collapses but India shouldn't support the movement for democracy.I don't trust Suu Kyi and I think Western powers are using her to gain a foothold in the IOR so close to China.

Any movement against the generals will create chaos in a region bordering the Indian NE.We have neighbours whose domestic political situation is quite volatile,there's no need to add another country to that list.Considering the level of influence China has in Myanmar right now,the generals are relatively friendly with India.I remember reading a few months ago that Myanmar assisted India in some operations targetting insurgents in the NE close to the border.I think that was G Parthasarthy's article.

Its not in India's interest to allow any kind of US influence so close to the NE where the Church has a good hold.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 20 Aug 2009 18:52

The junta also kicked India in the butt over energy deals and awarded them to China. The junta will play around to maintain their hold on power. No wonder that Indians riased their suspicions about a hidden Myanmarese nuke programme, publicly. There is another dynamic that has to be understood - the widening differences and divergence between the socially influential Buddhist monks and the junta.

Military juntas around the subcontinent have always spelt trouble for India. Sooner or later they fall under the influence of eemies of India. This particular junta is also outliving its prime. India has to carefully consider the benefits of siding with democracy in Myanmar, and indirectly stand up for Buddhism, where there are possibilities for PRC influence or Islamic inroads.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 20 Aug 2009 19:00

Tanmay,

you concerns are very valid. In fact they reflect my concerns also.

But the point is that Americans already have a presence in the Indian Ocean Region, through Diego Garcia and other friendly countries in the neighborhood. China as yet has only minimal presence in IOR. America is the status quo power in IOR. China is the emerging power in IOR. America will be around in IOR for the next 20-30 years only. China would be around for ever.

Chinese influence in Myanmar is huge and growing. What do you think, how long it would take for PRC to force Myanmar into a adversarial relationship with India? There are reasons on the horizon. The Cocos Islands. Oil Drilling in Bay of Bengal. China's naval harbor in IOR. And even if India does not put up a tantrum, the Chinese may still provoke some conflict. Their potential is only increasing not decreasing.

PRC is the main threat to India's smooth takeover of dominance in the IOR from America in the next 20 years. PRC needs to be checkmated.

America's control over Myanmar would remain limited. India would have to supplement it, thereby increasing our own leeway.

I agree, that India needs to be close to the junta, but it should be a junta willing to push back China. If the higher echelons are not willing to do that, then they have to make way for the younger officers who may be willing, one way or the other.

AjitK · Post by **AjitK** » 20 Aug 2009 19:36

I agree that the junta is not reliable and may turn hostile due to Chinese pressure but my point is that the alternative to the generals is Suu Kyi.She has been supported by the US for years and will be a tool in the hands of the US.We would like to believe that the US would use Myanmar to check only China but when they perceive that India is a growing threat they wouldn't hesitate in changing their goal.Suu Kyi is more beholden to the West than Karzai and it would be wrong to assume that the Afghanistan success can be replicated in Myanmar as well.

Even if the regime collapses energy deals will go to the Western cos like it happened in Iraq.Once a democratic govt. takes office,US influence will follow.As I said,China & US on either side of the NE is extremely dangerous.There is always the fear that China will establish bases on the coast but to invite the US to counter the Chinese is foolish.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 20 Aug 2009 20:16

Tanmay ji,

If there is a choice between PRC and USA, USA is the better choice, simply because it is an empire on the wane. America does play dirty games, but India too can play dirty games. Pakistan is playing dirty games with them all the time.

If the case was, that in Myanmar, America would grow all-powerful, then I would concur with you, that it may not be worth it. However America cannot contain PRC and India both at the same time, especially as PRC would be keeping a steady pressure on any American presence in Myanmar. USA and PRC can do eyeball-eyeball in Myanmar, while India should make hay.

Suu Kyi is definitely obliged to the West, but Suu Kyi would be sharing power with many other Burmese. She cannot be seen as having completely submitted to the Americans. America would have to be in Myanmar with many other players, and NATO is hardly in any position to offer any assets. Operation in Myanmar cannot succeed without India.

AjitK · Post by **AjitK** » 20 Aug 2009 20:58

Rajesh ji,

Both of us have different assumptions w.r.t US power and its endurance.I think that India's rise will be slow as compared to the decline in American power and influence.I fear that India is still susceptible to plots by foreign powers that support balkanisation.One may call it paranoia or irrational fear.

The NE is probably the most vulnerable part of India.China and Pakistan are the usual suspects but India should be more suspicious of US intentions.Its the only power in this region that can manipulate all countries to do its biding without giving rise to any suspicion and it will be able to do it for decades to come.However strong we may think that India is or will be,its upto the US to decide whether it wants a bipolar or multipolar world.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 20 Aug 2009 21:04

Tanmay K wrote:Rajesh ji,

Both of us have different assumptions w.r.t US power and its endurance.I think that India's rise will be slow as compared to the decline in American power and influence.I fear that India is still susceptible to plots by foreign powers that support balkanisation.One may call it paranoia or irrational fear.

Tanmay K ji,
fair enough.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 23 Aug 2009 17:19

Can we have a relook at the mechanism by which the Chittagong port was given up by the Partition process? Is it possible to explore a way of getting a corridor back to the Bay of Bengal? Is it possible to negotiate for this with Myanmar? Any strategy or methods?

AjitK · Post by **AjitK** » 23 Aug 2009 19:42

I think last year Myanmar agreed to open a port (Sitve?) for transit of goods from the NE.India will build a road connecting a town with Mizoram.The cost is about $100mn and it will be completed in 2012.I can't remember where I read it.I'll post the link if I find it on google.

AjitK · Post by **AjitK** » 23 Aug 2009 20:34

Here's the link:

A sea route to Northeast in the making

Shillong, Nov 19 (PTI) As Bangladesh continues to deny India access to landlocked Northeast through Chittagong port, a little-known Burmese port on the Bay of Bengal has promised to solve the long-standing problem.
Sittwe port on the Myanmar coast was not long ago a small village of fishing communities and farmers. Now, it could serve as a commercial sea route to the north-eastern states through Burmese territory.

A Union Commerce Ministry team, which recently came here in connection with a seminar, said that the port has attained immense strategic importance with India developing the port, expanding facilities to accommodate goods traffic under an agreement signed by the two governments in April, this year.

From Sittwe the Kaladan River will be made navigable for 225 km, up to Kaletwa (Myanmar). From there, a 62-km highway will take the traffic to the India-Myanmar border in the Indian state of Mizoram.

A road from the border will link the project to India's National Highway 54. The sea distance between Kolkata and Sittwe is about 540 km. India is financing the entire $ 103 million project.

DONER minister Mani Shankar Aiyar recently said, "The Union cabinet would soon sanction a project of the Union Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways for developing highway connectivity in Mizoram and along the 250 km route to the port."

To improve road connectivity within Mizoram, one of the remotest states of the country, the Union ministry for shipping, road transport and highways has sanctioned Rs. 120 crore to state for development of national highways during 2008-09 as part of steps to develop the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport project to link Sittwe Port with India.

The Multi-Modal project, which is to make the river Kaladan navigable up to Sittwe Port, would be connected to national highway 54 at Nalkawn in Mizoram.

New Delhi's move to develop the Sittwe port in western Myanmar assumes significance in view of Bangladesh's reported reluctance to give India access to Chittagong, Ashuganj and other ports for transportation of goods to the Northeast region and the rest of India.

"Myanmar had become a country of critical importance to India in terms of trade and commerce as Dhaka has denied transit to New Delhi through Bangladesh. We can also bring goods from Sittwe to any Indian port by using sea routes," Union Minister of State for Commerce Jairam Ramesh Ramesh had recently said.

There is a river route through Bangladesh but that has not been a practical answer for steady commerce as the Bangladesh government was not very enthusiastic. Further, the shallow river bed of the Brahmaputra also did not allow movement of large vessels.

At present, all traffic is routed through the narrow and congested "chicken neck" corridor via the Indian states of Assam and West Bengal.

Ramesh said after the completion of the project in 2012, Mizoram would become a hub of international trade. The project is expected to give a huge boost to the economic activities in the landlocked Northeastern states.

On Google Maps

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 23 Aug 2009 22:33

RajeshA wrote:
Myanmar is the right border from where USA can neutralize the Chinese.

The questions is why is there a need for US interest to neutralize the Chinese.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 24 Aug 2009 11:48

Because they are competitors to the US.

And the IOR carries 60% of the world trade!

It is stated that whoever controls the IOR controls the world!

Ameet · Post by **Ameet** » 25 Aug 2009 06:29

Bangkok's surprising touch of India

http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/wireStory?id=8399679

Outdoor markets tout sari sales, five-star hotels feature Indian chefs and Thais drop by a temple in the financial district to beseech Hindu gods to send profits their way.

India pops up in unexpected places in the Thai capital with the country's ancient Hindu civilization infusing the Thai language, classical dance and religious architecture.

An estimated 140,000 of the city's 10-plus million residents have roots in modern India, making their presence amply felt in Bangkok's hotels, markets, tailor shops, the gem trade, cricket leagues and contemporary art galleries.

"It's a little-known Indian diaspora community compared to those in places like the United Kingdom or the United States - but perhaps equally influential," says Christopher Rego, a documentary filmmaker who selected Bangkok as the starting point for a multimedia project on the world's Indian communities. "It's like a microcosm of India's diversity."

Indian influences appear all across this sprawling city. Sukhumvit, an area popular with expats, has a plethora of Indian restaurants and major hotels operated by members of the Sikh community, many of whom have become extremely wealthy. In fact, large chunks of real estate in this area are owned by Thai-Indians.

On the other side of town, far from Sukhumvit's modern buildings and Western chain restaurants, Bangkok's official "Little India" borders the vast markets of Chinatown. The golden domed Sri Guru Singh Sabha, believed to be the largest Sikh temple in Southeast Asia, towers over the area known as Phahurat, formerly an important center for the textile trade.

Rolls of cloth are still sold at Phahurat's Indian markets, along with Punjabi sweets, incense sticks, jewelry and the latest Bollywood hits on DVD. The setting is less intimidating than the larger labyrinths of Chinatown.

Royal India, said to be Thailand's first Indian restaurant, is tucked into a small alley in the heart of Phahurat, across the street from the four-story India Emporium. Bangkok's Indian community and foreign visitors alike occupy the restaurant's seven wooden tables where chicken masala and other traditional spice-laden dishes from northern India are served.

The Sikh temple in Phahurat remains very much a community place of worship, but the Hindu temple across town is a true religious melting pot. Thais and Chinese pay respect to the Hindu Goddess Uma Thewi at the Sri Mahamariamman Temple off Silom Road. Next door, Chennai Kitchen prepares fresh vegetarian food characteristic of southern India.

Tamil priests built the temple near what is now Bangkok's financial district. The current priest is a fourth generation Tamil immigrant, but many devotees are Thai Buddhists who worship Hindu gods.

One of Bangkok's top tourist draws is the Erawan Shrine, built in 1956 to ward off problems plaguing the construction of an adjoining hotel. Daily, crowds flock to a golden image piled high with flowers and incense as dancers pay homage to the four-faced Hindu god Brahma.

Although some 95 percent of Thais are Buddhists, many include elements of Hinduism in worship stemming from cultural and religious influences which flowed across the Indian Ocean to reach Southeast Asia centuries ago.

The khon - a popular, dramatic form of Thai classical dance- tells the stories of the Ramayana, an ancient Hindu epic. Thai royal ceremonies are infused with Hindu-Brahmin rituals, and many words in the Thai language originated from Sanskrit.

In more recent times, Tamils and Gujaratis migrated to Thailand in the late 1800s, trading in gems and textiles. Large-scale modern migration from northwest India began in the 1890s, followed by a wave of Sikhs and Hindus from the Punjab.

"We ourselves are Thais, but we have an Indian look," said Jesse Gulati, 59, owner of Rajawongse tailor shop, echoing many among the community. Gulati and son Victor fill orders for international businessmen, visiting heads of state and diplomats.

Gulati's father migrated to Thailand in the 1930s, a move that actually strengthened the family's cultural and religious ties to India. "We were more Sikh, more religious in Bangkok than the Sikhs in India were," Gulati said.

The tight-knit Sikh community began to really prosper at the outset of the country's tourist boom in the 1970s, renting apartments as well as building and running hotels.

Many of Bangkok's individual Indian communities, including the Sikhs, have now seen their third or fourth generations grow up in Thailand. Assimilation adds another chapter to the cultural narrative of Bangkok's India.

"Some youth are becoming westernized, living in Bangkok," Gulati said, without a trace of irony. And Thai-Indian marriages, once a rarity, are now more common as Thais shed some once strongly held prejudices against the immigrants who were referred to as "khaek," or guests, as in "unwelcome guests."

"The third generation is more accepted by Thai people," said Asha Sehgal, a second generation Thai-Indian.

Indus, a hip venue run by Asha's son Sid, showcases a blending of old and new India. Thais, Indians and other expats dine in equal numbers amid a backdrop of traditional and contemporary art Asha imports from India.

Bangkok, an international foodie paradise, is warming up to Indian cuisine, and Indian DJs no longer play to exclusively Indian audiences, says Sid Sehgal.

Nat Tuli, owner of Gallery Soulflower, said her shows of contemporary Indian artists in Bangkok are actually more popular among Thais and foreigners than ethnic Indian youth.

———

If You Go...

BANGKOK'S INDIATOWN:

—Phahurat markets: Phahurat and Chakraphet streets. Nearby: Sikh temple, Royal India restaurant.

—Rang Mahal Restaurant: Atop the Rembrandt Hotel, Sukhumvit Road Soi 18. The Sunday brunch is a rooftop feast fit for a maharajah. Cost $21 (720 Baht) for the buffet.

—Tailor shops: Indian tailors craft some of the best quality for value suits in town. See Rajawongse Tailors, Sukhumvit Road Soi 4, by the Landmark Hotel, or Raja's International Custom Tailors, Sukhumvit Road Soi 11.

—Sri Mahamariamman Temple: Silom and Pan roads. Bangkok teems with temples, but this religious crossroads is truly unique. Nearby: Chennai Kitchen — try the dosais, or Indian crepes, for lunch for under $3 (100 baht). For dessert, try one of the nearby pastry shops.

—Indus: Sukhumvit Road Soi 26. This New York-inspired restaurant and Shisha bar serves light, contemporary Indian cuisine, then turns into a happening nightspot. Special events include exhibitions of Indian art, wine tastings and monthly parties featuring international DJs. Dinner $8-$25 (300-800 Baht).

—Gallery Soulflower: Silom Galleria, Silom Road Soi 19. Contemporary Indian and Thai artists explore complex issues of identity and transition.

niran · Post by **niran** » 25 Aug 2009 07:00

Few corrections if i may

—Rang Mahal Restaurant: Atop the Rembrandt Hotel, Sukhumvit Road Soi 18. The Sunday brunch is a rooftop feast fit for a maharajah. Cost $21 (720 Baht) for the buffet.

The owner is a Puki, the cooks are BDese, the waiters are Thai & Burmese mix.
nothing Indian in there, not even the bands.

—Sri Mahamariamman Temple: Silom and Pan roads. Bangkok teems with temples, but this religious crossroads is truly unique. Nearby: Chennai Kitchen — try the dosais, or Indian crepes, for lunch for under $3 (100 baht). For dessert, try one of the nearby pastry shops.

It is 180 Bath/Thali not 100 Bath, and the owner runs a school 37 km afar, the shop opens and closes on his whim, when hungry most likely you will have to find yourself another eatery.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 28 Aug 2009 03:37

http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show ... inese.html

Myanmar military moves to crush Kokang Chinese

Bangkok - The Myanmar Army has occupied Laogai, the capital of the Kokang region in its eastern Shan State, sending thousands of refugees into neighbouring China while splitting the Kokang army into two opposing forces, media and resistance sources said Thursday. Laogai has been under Myanmar Army control since Monday, said Khuensai Jaipen, editor of the Shan Herald News Agency, a resistance media that monitors news in the remote Shan State.

The seizure of the capital followed a split in the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), as the Kokang army has been called since it signed a ceasefire with the Myanmar government 20 years ago.

According to border sources, MNDAA deputy chairman Bai Souqian, who is backed by the Myanmar military, now leads 200 Kokang troops, while MNDAA chairman Peng Jiasheng heads the remaining 800.

Thousands of Myanmar soldiers and Bai's Kokang troops now occupy Laogai while Peng's followers have fled to the Chinese border, sending thousands of refugees into the Nansan district of Yunnan province, Khuensai said.

The Kokang are an ethnic Han Chinese minority group who have lived for centuries in north-eastern Myanmar, once known as Burma. They formed one of the core groups in the Burmese Communist Party, now defunct, and are known to still have close ties with mainland China.

Border watchers have opined that the Myanmar Army's move against the Kokang, one of the smallest ethnic minority forces in Shan State, would be followed by similar attacks on the United Wa State Army and Shan State Army, which have also rejected the government's calls to become border militias.

It remained to be seen whether the Wa and Shan would join forces with the Kokang to oppose what appears to be a government push to pressure them into bowing to its demands that they lay down their arms and become border militia before next year's polls.

"A military alliance between the Kokang, Wa and Shan could raise an army of 40,000 to 50,000 soldiers that the Burmese army would have a hard time getting rid of," said David Mathieson, a Myanmar watcher for Human Rights Watch.

Tempting opportunities - but what about our recent headache about ethics?

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 31 Aug 2009 00:27

China has apparently warned Myanmar to stop the "fighting". The PLA apparently has taken the military fatigues from refugee militiamen and gave them blue tunics to "mingle" with Chinese civilians. (Al Jazeera network). This is an interesting angle going on in the military side of the quation. Can we have more analysis on the situation?

Rony · Post by **Rony** » 31 Aug 2009 04:24

Myanmar rebels surrender in China

Some of the armed Myanmar rebels, who had sneaked into China, have surrendered to Chinese authorities. The local government did not clarify whether they will be handed over to the military authorities in Myanmar, whom they had been fighting.

The surrender might cause problems for Chinese government, which may be under pressures from Myanmar to hand over the rebels.

China rushed senior officials to examine the sensitive situation in the border region and talk to the surrendered rebels, many of whom are ethnic Chinese. It may be politically difficult for Chinese authorities to hand over the rebels to the Myanmar military

Situation in Myanmar's Kokang region remains tense

The situation in Myanmar's Kokang region or Shan State Special Region-1 in the northeastern part of the country remained tense with some small clashes between the Kokang ethnic army and the government forces going on Friday, reports reaching here from the border area said.

The splinter group of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), led by Bai Xuoqian, who is former deputy to the MNDAA chief Phone Kyar Shin, has in fact taken control of the situation with Bai becoming the top leader of the army, supported by the government forces, thus replacing the former chief Phone, the sources said.

The tense situation originated from a move-in of the government troops in Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang region, on August 8 when Phone Kyar Shin's residence as well as an arms factory were raided on suspicion of producing drugs and the standoff between the two forces have triggered large outflux of border inhabitants into the neighboring Yunnan province's Nansan area, according to local sources.

China urges Myanmar to safeguard border stability

China hoped Myanmar could properly solve its domestic issue to safeguard the regional stability of its bordering area with China, said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu Friday.
She said China was paying close attention to the development of this issue and had expressed its concern to Myanmar through the diplomatic channel. "We also urge Myanmar to protect the safety and legal rights of Chinese citizens in Myanmar," Jiang said.

Rony · Post by **Rony** » 31 Aug 2009 04:36

Kokang

Kokang was the only Burmese-Chinese feudal state in Myanmar. It was founded by the Yang dynasty, a Chinese military house that fled with the Ming dynasty to Yunnan Province in the mid 1600's and later migrated to the Shan States in eastern Burma.

For the services of Kokang during World War II, it was recognised as separate from Shan State in August 1947 by the British, and the ruler took the title Saopha

arun · Post by **arun** » 31 Aug 2009 15:49

Islamic bigotry in Malaysia.

To stop the construction of a Hindu temple, head of a freshly slaughtered cow paraded by Muslims:

Malaysia Muslims protest proposed Hindu temple
By VIJAY JOSHI (AP) – 2 days ago

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia — Dozens of Malaysian Muslims paraded Friday with the head of a cow, a sacred animal in Hinduism, in a dramatic protest against the proposed construction of a Hindu temple in their neighborhood.

The unusual protest by some 50 people in Shah Alam, the capital of Selangor state, raises new fears of racial tensions in this multiethnic Muslim-majority country where Hindus comprise about 7 percent of the 27 million population.

The demonstrators who marched from a nearby mosque after Friday prayers dumped the cow head outside the gates of the state government headquarters. Selangor adjoins Kuala Lumpur……………….....

AP via Google

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 31 Aug 2009 19:38

It is a common psychological tactic used by Muslims in Muslim majority country where Hindus still reside. It is a very common tactic in BD and a long tradition from the Sufis like Mainuldin Chisti of Ajmer, who together with his followers used to slaughter a cow in a Hindu temple each day before the local Hindus finally submitted.

From the viewpoint of military and strategic presence of India, Malaysia remains strongly anti-Indian where the muslim-majority Indonesia is much more cooperative. Malaysia has produced the key organizers of the terrorist networks that carried out terror acts in Indonesia. It is significant that teh Malaysian state also takes a rather hostile attitude towards the ethnic "Hindus" of Malaysia, and are increasingly hardening the aggressive proselytizing aspects of Islam on Malaysian "Hindus". Sooner or later Malaysia will become a new base for Islamic jihad once thinsg get too hot in AFG and Pakistan. Alread violence erupts periodically in Thailand's southern Muslim dominated areas, continguous to Malaysia,a nd it is reasonable to suspect that the Jihadi networks which appear to be allowed to flourish in Malaysia are behind this.

India's military thinking about the two rogue states - of Myanmar and Malaysia is bound up in political confusion over policy towards SE Asia. But if not seriously taken up, these two will be bastions of both PRC promoted as well as Jihad promoted violence directed against India and Indians.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 31 Aug 2009 21:00

Forbes:

The Myth Of A Moderate Malaysia
Sadanand Dhume, 08.31.09, 12:00 AM EDT

Canings, cows' heads and ethnoreligious apartheid.

If you're looking for an image that captures the conflict between fervent Islam and basic human decency, look no further than the Malaysian city of Shah Alam, about 15 miles west of Kuala Lumpur.

On Friday, a group of about 50 men, agitated by plans to relocate a 150-year-old Hindu temple to their neighborhood, made their feelings clear by staging a protest march from a mosque to a government building. Amidst the usual cries of "Allahu Akbar" and "takbeer," the protesters deposited the freshly severed head of a cow--an animal sacred to Hindus--before the building's gate. The group's leaders made threatening speeches and, perhaps caught up in the spirit of the moment, hammed it up for the cameras, stepping and spitting on the cow's head. The police--who have been known to arrest people for such crimes as attending a candle light vigil or wearing black in support of the opposition--stood by and watched.

Ironically, those scanning the globe for a Muslim-majority country that inspires neither dread nor despair often alight upon Malaysia. Until a few years ago, the Southeast Asian nation boasted the world's tallest building, the iconic 88-story Petronas Towers. Powered by electronics, palm oil and petroleum, Malaysia is the world's 20th-largest exporter, ahead of Sweden, Australia and India. Per capita income, about $14,000 in purchasing parity terms, is about the same as in Argentina. Apart from the obvious prosperity of downtown Kuala Lumpur, the casual visitor notices the comforting trappings of a British colonial past--a parliament, a judiciary, a professional police force.

But most strikingly, Malaysia (along with next-door Indonesia) can claim something increasingly rare in the Muslim world: a large non-Muslim population. About four in 10 Malaysians are Buddhist, Christian, Hindu , Sikh or Confucian. (By contrast, Turkey, the poster-child for an Islam at peace with the 21st century, is 99.8% Muslim.) Recognizing the power of this statistic in our multicultural age, Tourism Malaysia promotes the country's allegedly harmonious blend of Malay, Chinese and Indian communities with an odd but nonetheless catchy slogan: Malaysia, Truly Asia.

The reality, of course, is a lot less sunny. Unlike neighboring Singapore, which shares the same colonial past and ethnic mix--albeit with a Chinese rather than a Malay majority--Malaysia has rejected secularism in favor of a kind of ethnoreligious apartheid that belongs more in a medieval kingdom than in a modern democratic republic.

In Malaysia, Islam is the state religion. Higher education, the bureaucracy and vast swathes of the economy are operated as a kind of spoils system almost exclusively for Malays, whom the state defines as Muslim. Race and religion determine everything from your odds of getting into medical school to the amount you're expected to put down for an apartment. The conversion laws, based on sharia, bring to mind the Eagles' classic "Hotel California": You can check in (to Islam) any time you like, but you can never leave.

Over the past 30 years, encouraged by the government and influenced by the Middle East, Malaysia's growing prosperity has gone hand-in-hand with a heightened piety. But instead of making the country more humane, this has had the opposite effect. Friday's protest was part of a larger pattern. A 32-year-old Malaysian Muslim model, Kartika Sari Dewi Shukarno, faces a sharia-prescribed caning, suspended at the moment on account of Ramadan, for the crime of drinking a beer. Muslims have been barred from a Black Eyed Peas concert next month sponsored by Guinness. Two years ago, a Muslim-born woman, Lina Joy, failed in her famous eight-year quest to convert to Christianity to marry the man that she loved. (Interfaith marriages are forbidden.) In another high-profile case, Revathi Masoosai, a practicing Hindu, was forcibly separated from her husband and infant daughter and sent to a religious re-education camp after it was discovered that technically she had been born a Muslim.

Taken together, these cases illustrate two issues--both central to the debate about Islam and modernity--that Malaysia is struggling to come to terms with. Can a Muslim majority live with a non-Muslim minority as equals, or must the former be explicitly dominant--in law as well as in day-to-day life? And can Muslims reconcile piety with a culture where the rights of the individual (say, to order a beer) are given precedence over communal beliefs?

To be sure, not all Malays, perhaps not even a majority of the sharia-minded, approve of the acts of boorishness committed in the name of their faith. Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak has ordered police to take action against the Shah Alam protesters, and members of parliament have cut across racial and party lines to condemn the incident. The English-language Malaysian blogosphere is alight with outrage, much of it Muslim. Nor are questions about secularism and individual rights absent in non-Muslim societies. In recent years, thuggish Hindu groups have developed a penchant for roughing up women in bars and castigating young couples for the high crime of celebrating Valentine's Day. America has yet to come to terms with a woman's right to an abortion.

Nonetheless, only in Muslim-majority lands are religious bigots given such broad leeway by their secular co-religionists. An Indian feminist is apt to laugh in the face of a pious Hindu who tells her that gender relations need to be ordered by the ancient laws of Manu. In America, the so-called new atheists--most prominently Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens and Richard Dawkins--don't need to think twice about ridiculing religious beliefs or savaging the most powerful priest or pastor. But in Malaysia, as elsewhere, secular liberals tend to tip-toe around Muslim religious sensibilities. They wield the word "un-Islamic" as an insult rather than as a compliment. Unless this changes, unless Malaysians can find a way to treat Islam like any other set of ideas, scenes like those in Shah Alam on Friday aren't about to disappear.

Sadanand Dhume is a Washington-based writer and the author ofMy Friend the Fanatic: Travels with a Radical Islamist (Skyhorse Publishing, 2009).

JwalaMukhi · Post by **JwalaMukhi** » 02 Sep 2009 04:44

http://www.malaysiainsider.com/index.ph ... ndu-temple

A group of Malay-Muslim protesters claiming to be residents of Section 23 have threatened bloodshed unless the state government stopped the construction of a Hindu Temple.

Amid chants of "Allahuakbar," the group also left the severed head of a cow at the entrance of the State Secretariat here as a warning to Selangor Mentri Besar Tan Sri Khalid Ibrahim.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 02 Sep 2009 20:29

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cac ... ef9f898e67

CCP is flexing its muscles and raising the stakes :

The sixth meeting of the 11th National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference's (CPPCC) Standing Committee, the highest-level advisory body of the People's Republic of China, met ahead of the general plenary that is taking place in Beijing from June 22 to 27. During one of the committee's working group meetings on June 18, the former deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and standing committee member of the CPPCC, General Zhang Li, recommended that China build an airport and seaport on Mischief Reef located in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The additional facilities, Zhang said, would enable China to conduct aircraft patrol of the area, support Chinese fishing vessels and demonstrate the country's sovereignty over the disputed islands (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], June 22). The call for building military installments on the disputed islets by General Zhang, a senior high-ranking military officer, may be signs of China's increased willingness to use force in resolving territorial disputes as tension between China and ASEAN-member states (i.e. Philippines, Vietnam) boil over the contested islets in the region.

arunsrinivasan · Post by **arunsrinivasan** » 05 Sep 2009 17:11

Not sure where to post this? ... this doesnt bode well for us...does it?
Vietnam to Its Journalists: Don't Tread on China

Hanoi is stepping up pressure on its critics, detaining one Vietnamese journalist and two Vietnamese bloggers this past week after they wrote provocative reports that questioned China's territorial aims. Though there have been no official announcements about the charges, all were allegedly arrested for violating "national security."

The latest arrest took place early morning on Sept. 3 when police detained blogger Nguyen Ngoc Nhu Quynh, 30, at her home in the coastal city of Nha Trang. Quynh's mother said that plainclothes police had been watching the house for several months, ever since her daughter had started criticizing Vietnam for giving China the green light to mine its vast stores of bauxite, a mineral needed to process aluminum, on her blog. "The warrant said my daughter was arrested under Article 258 of the Criminal Code for abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the state's interests," said an emotional Nguyen Thi Tuyet Lan, Quynh's mother. "They searched her house until 3:30 that morning and then put her in a van that disappeared into the quiet of the night." The family has not heard from her since. (Read "In Vietnam, Fears of a New Chinese Invasion.")

On Sept. 3, the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists criticized Vietnam's recent crackdown on journalists and political bloggers, whose "independent reporting challenges the tightly censored state-run media's traditional monopoly on local news and opinion." But it's not exactly a surprise. The Vietnamese government has long been extremely sensitive about its relationship with neighboring China. The two nations have battled for centuries, last going to war in 1979 over a border dispute, which Vietnam won. Today, China is a huge trading partner and investor in Vietnam — providing cash that the country desperately needs. (See pictures of the China-Vietnam border war.)

The blogger's arrest follows the detention of two other writeres. On Aug. 27, a blogger named "Wind Trader", whose real name is Bui Thanh Hieu, accused the Communist Party of rolling over when it came to China on his blog, and was also critical of the government's handling of the controversial mining project and its territorial disputes with Beijing. A day later, authorities arrested Pham Doan Trang, a 31-year-old journalist working for VietnamNet, a reform-leaning, online website, which, like all domestic media in Vietnam, including blogs, is under the control of the government. Trang covered the long-running boundary dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea. Access to several of her articles on VietnamNet are now blocked.

It's not clear what work Trang was arrested for. Like many young Vietnamese, Trang also had a blog. Her last posting was in May, where she discussed the controversial bauxite mining plan that was being debated by the National Assembly. Her single entry that month contained fairly innocuous remarks, mentioning only that the government had hastily prepared their report on the bauxite project. Nguyen Anh Tuan, the editor of VietnamNet has said that all he knew was that his reporter was arrested for violating national security, insisting that these alleged crimes were not related to her VietnamNet stories. Tuan has heard nothing from Trang since her arrest, nor does he know where she is being held. "We have to wait now."

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 05 Sep 2009 18:18

I had posted about Vietnam's obvious tendency to play the field. India cannot take it for granted that just territorial disputes and past enmity will keep Vietnam permanently on Indian side. India is not really doing enough in SE Asia to enhance its long term strategic interests. This is also because India does not have an aggressive expansionist stratgey, which would have seen drawing the PLA in its flank into the South China sea an important tactical element.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 05 Sep 2009 22:39

This is the official view of Vietnam towards China.

Vietnam and China

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 05 Sep 2009 22:43

This is what Brig Subash Kapila has to say:

VIETNAM-INDIA: TIME TO MAKE PARTNERSHIP TRULY STRATEGIC

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Background

Vietnam has always been viewed and analyzed by this author in terms of perspectives as a nation most deserving with which India could and should foster the forging of a substantive strategic partnership.

With this in view, more than five years back, this author, brought this relationship in focus in his paper on this website entitled: “India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: The Convergence of Interests” (http://saag.org/papers2/paper177.html) dated 1.10.2001. After a detailed analysis, it was concluded that:

* “Such a strategic partnership is in India’s national security interests and India should not fight shy of proclaiming it as such.”
* “Vietnam has already declared (through its President Tran Duch Luang) that ‘Vietnam treats India with strategic importance’.”

The BJP Government through the visits of Defense Minister Fernandes (five day visit) and later of Prime Minister Vajpayee did put India on the road towards a strategic partnership with Vietnam.

However, with a change of Government in India, it was becoming discernible that the Congress Government’s approaches to this partnership were more routine and economic and less strategic. This author was therefore prompted to place on this website another paper on the subject “India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Needs Political Impetus From India” (http://saag.org/papers14/paper1397.html) dated 01.06.2005.

This paper re-analyzed the continuing strategic importance of Vietnam to India and the way ahead. Relevant for purposes of discussion in the present paper, one would like to reproduce the introductory and concluding paragraphs of that paper:

* “India’s upward rise on the trajectory of a rising key global power carries with it an important responsibility. The Indian foreign policy establishment and the Indian Government of the day should acutely remember that in the process of rising stardom, India does not forget its traditional friends of long standing.”
* “Vietnam is one such country that deserves special consideration by virtue of the geo-strategic importance, potential to be a regional power and convergence if strategic interests with India.”
* “Sustaining the India-Vietnam strategic partnership needs re-affirmation of its value by the new Indian Government and by adding political impetus to it in visible terms.”

The recently concluded 13th Vietnam-India Meeting (February 27, 2007) between Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Gia Khiem and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee, was focused on trade, economic and science and technology aspects. Such a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the two countries ideally should have emphasized the strategic aspects too.

One would now avidly watch the visit of the Vietnamese Prime Minister to India in April 2007 to see whether India emphasizes the strategic partnership or fights shy of reiterating it.

It needs to be recalled that following Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Vietnam in 2001, the BJP Government signed in 2003 the “Joint Declaration on Framework of Comprehensive Cooperation Between Republic of India and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam As They Enter The 21st Century”. It was emphasized that in addition to other things, India and Vietnam would take steps to expand cooperation in security and defense.

The Foreign Ministers’ (27 Feb 2007) meeting statement spoke of “Two sides agreed to raise traditional relationship to new heights”. New heights have not been touched even in the economic, trade and commerce, and science and technology fields, leave alone defense and security.

Words alone cannot forge relationships; they have to be forged through substantive gestures. One may also like to note that no Indian President has visited Vietnam since 1991 and Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit has yet to be followed by present Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh who has been in office from May 2004 onwards.

Strategic partnerships entail a comprehensive engagement and cooperation in all fields – strategic convergences, defense and security cooperation, political convergences, economic and trade cooperation on a preferential basis and cooperation in science and technology. Details of these in relation to what is required to be done were discussed in the author’s two papers referred above.

It is not the intention to once again repeat those aspects. This paper would prefer to focus on the strategic imperatives that should determine India’s approaches to a “Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership” and cooperation in the defense and security fields, in a generic sense.

This is being examined in this paper under the following heads:

* Strategic Partnerships: India Needs to Change its Mindsets
* Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership: The Contextual Determinants Present an Opportune Moment to Declare Intent
* India Should Assist Vietnam’s Emergence as a Regional Power
* Vietnam’s Security and Defense Requirements: India’s Role

Strategic Partnerships: India Needs to Change its Mindsets

India, of late, seems to be bestowing the appellation “strategic partnership” in its diplomacy to every set of relationships on the occasion of foreign dignitaries visiting India or Indian dignitaries visiting abroad. India’s foreign policy establishment must not confuse “strategic” with “long range”. While it may be the intent to develop a long range and substantial relationship with a particular country, it can only qualify for a “strategic partnership” only when there is included an overwhelming strategic, defense and security and military component, and it is time tested and enduring.

India’s “strategic partnership” in its effective sense exists only with Russia. The US-India partnership is presently not a true strategic partnership, as it is still evolving and its enduring aspect has to be tested by time. Besides, dissonance exists in terms of strategic perceptions within South Asia itself between the two nations.

India as it rises economically and militarily and entertains hopes of being a key global player if not a global power, should realize that it would need meaningful strategic support from countries in different regions in which it wishes to exercise influence.

India, to achieve the above end- objective, would need to strategically and militarily invest in the future of its chosen friends in each region. One could even term it that India should invest strategically and militarily in the emergence of its traditional friends in such regions to gain regional pre-eminence.

Global power and influence do not come cheap, and India should recognize this. As I have been constantly reiterating in my papers, India can become an economic superpower, but it cannot become a key global power, unless it develops the political will to exercise its attributes of power and secure its national security interests, unapologetically.

“Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership” qualifies to emerge as a true strategic partnership which can be developed to its fullest strategic potential for achieving mutual national security interests. India must accordingly change and energize its mindsets and policy approaches to forge such a partnership with Vietnam.

India also needs to get out of the mindset that in its quest for substantive strategic partnerships it should not ruffle the strategic sensitivities of other powers in the region. In the case of Vietnam, the present Indian Government seems to be sensitive to China’s strategic sensitivities.

India can borrow here a leaf from China’s strategic policies. China was never sensitive and continues to be insensitive to India’s strategic sensitivities on the building of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and nuclear capable missile arsenal. Then why should India be sensitive to what China thinks when it comes to Vietnam.

In terms of “Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership”, Vietnam too would have to change its strategic mindset of being concerned all the time of the China factor in its policy approaches to India or others.

Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership: The Contextual Determinants Present an Opportune Moment to Declare Intent

As a strategic analyst, one could dare to say that the contextual determinants presently provide an opportune moment for India and Vietnam to declare their intent to move towards forging a strategic partnership. Diplomats can work out the soft words to paraphrase this declaration of intent, and this should be declared without any apologetic overtones.

The contextual determinants that India needs to factor-in her approaches to this strategic partnership are as follows:

* Vietnam today lies at the strategic crossroads where her rich geopolitical and geo-strategic assets have become the strategic focus of United States, China and Japan
* Vietnam figures prominently in the strategic calculus of USA and China in their approaches to East Asian security. This author’s following papers refer: “Vietnam in China’s Strategic Calculus: An Analysis” (
* http://www.saag.org/papers17/paper1609.html) of 11.11.2205 and “Vietnam’s Renewed Significance in United States Strategic Calculus” (http://www.saag.org/papers18/paper1796.html) of 5.11.2006. USA, China, Japan, European Union, Australia and Singapore are intensifying their exchanges with Vietnam including trade investments
* Vietnam has recently been admitted to WTO and is fully integrated with ASEAN, APEC and EAS
* In recent times, the Chinese President and US President have paid visits to Vietnam
* Vietnam’s sustained economic growth rates are the second highest in Asia
* Vietnam’s strategic significance stands enhanced today by virtue of its pivotal location astride the sea-lanes of East Asia with particular reference to South China Sea.

All of the above and many more factors suggest that Vietnam is destined to play a major role in South East Asia and the South China Sea region.

Keeping in mind that the United States, Japan, Singapore and Australia have a strategic stake in Vietnam and that with all these nations, India has a strategic congruence in South East Asia and East Asia, the declaration of intent by India to work towards a strategic partnership should not create any misgivings. They would all welcome such a possibility contributing towards the national strengths of Vietnam.

China expectedly will frown on a “Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership”. But then China would have to be reminded of its assertions that it views China-India and China-Pakistan relations as two different sets of relationships. India would have to tell China that it views India- China and India-Vietnam relations also as two different sets of relationships and that it is not strategically aimed at China the way it has aimed Pakistan at India.

India Should Assist Vietnam’s Emergence as a Regional Power

Before too many hackles are raised, it must be clarified that emergence of a regional power does not necessarily imply the emergence of a “regional hegemon”. Further regional powers can be benign and constructive regional powers like India, with no record of aggressive intents. And then, a regional power or a pre-eminent power in a region inhibits unrestrained intrusive presence or interference by external powers.

It is with this perspective, the proposition is being offered that Vietnam should be assisted by India to emerge as the regional power in South East Asia. It is already so in the Indo-China region. Vietnam as a regional power would not be hostile to India or Indian national security interests in the region.

India’s “Look East” policy originated by PM Narasimha Rao was a visionary policy and the credit goes exclusively to him. India consequently today stands economically and politically integrated with ASEAN/South East Asia and with EAS.

The ASEAN region today is no longer plagued by Cold War divisions and concerns of inspired propaganda of Vietnam aggressiveness. ASEAN today is more concerned over China’s rise in East Asia. India’s economic and political integration in regional groupings of ASEAN was prompted to offset China’s unipolar dominance in the region.

Following economic and political integration in the region, India should not fight shy in contributing to the security of the region through the mechanism of a “Vietnam-India Strategic Partnership”. Vietnam lies at the Eastern fringe of South East Asia, with a strategic significances more towards the South China Sea. ASEAN nations therefore should have no concerns with such a proposition.

India is politically well placed to assist Vietnam’s emergence as a regional power than the United States or Japan. The major reason being that such assistance is not aimed at creating a military alliance. Further, that unlike USA and Japan, India is not tied down by other military alliances in the region.

Before moving to the next related aspect the author would like to highlight the stress laid by India’s Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherji and Defense Minister Antony at the 9th Asian Security Conference in New Delhi recently. In relation to South East Asia, they stressed (1) Convergences in security perspectives. (2) Commitment to peace and stability in the region. (3) Security of sea-lanes. (4) India’s assistance in capacity building of the regional Armed Forces to deal with maritime threats. (5) Stable regional environment conducive for economic and social growth.

Keeping the above assertions of the Indian Foreign Minister and the Defense Minister, India would be well advised to begin her capacity building commitment with the Vietnamese Armed Forces, as Vietnam’s pivotal location makes her eminently qualified for the security roles envisaged by India above.

Vietnam’s Security & Defense Requirements: India’s Role

Vietnam’s “strategic culture” has been viewed by one author, as being determined by the necessity of maintaining good relations with China while at the same time creating military deterrence so as to raise the cost of any aggression against it. India can play a vital role in the capacity building of Vietnam’s military deterrence capabilities.

Vietnam’s Armed Forces till the mid-1990s were hampered in their military up-gradation and modernization by low budgetary allocations and restricted sources of supply. Thereafter, Vietnam embarked on a process of selective motorization of its Armed Forces, but still a lot has to be done.

Vietnam’s future threat perceptions have to focus on maritime and aerial warfare threats. Its ground forces are large enough to deter aggression, though they need modernization and advanced equipment.

Details of India’s commitments to Vietnam in the defense and security field stood enumerated in the 15 point Defense Assistance Agreement committed by Defense Minister George Fernandes in 2000. Details stand covered in this author’s earlier papers. Impetus needs to be added to its materialization.

Countries that can assist in substantial up-gradation and modernization of Vietnam’s Armed Forces are the United States, Japan and India. The problem with US military assistance is long lead times and delays caused by US Congressional approvals and interference, Japan is prohibited by its Constitution to export military hardware. That leaves India as the only nation which can fulfill this role and it synchronizes with its national security interests.

India is singularly well placed to cater for Vietnam’s defense and security needs by virtue of a certain commonality of Russian origin weapon systems and India’s indigenous defense industry including production of such equipment.

Since India has stressed heavily through its two senior ministers on South East Asia maritime security, sea lanes security and capacity building, India would be well advised to offer substantive assistance to the Vietnamese Navy to build up its capacity (1) To counter maritime threats in the South China Sea, Gulf of Tonkin and the Gulf of Thailand (2) Maritime surveillance by the Navy over such extended areas both by sea and air (3) Surveillance of its EEZ and (4) Protection of its off shore oil platforms. These tasks are akin to the Indian Navy operational roles and India can therefore offer valuable help to the Vietnamese Navy in terms of force modernization, communication and surveillance systems integration, training and operational expertise.

India’s help to the Vietnamese Air Force perforce get restricted to refurbishment of Russian origin combat aircraft, weapon systems and honing aerial combat skills. However, India can provide at “friendship prices” its Advanced Light Helicopters and other aviation equipment for all three Services of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

Details can be worked out by respective Armed Forces Headquarters of both the countries through a process of fast track consultations.

The major defense and security requirement of Vietnam would be to build up its conventional military deterrence. India can contribute vitally by providing Prithvi Ballistic Missiles and Brahmos Cruise Missiles. These are produced indigenously in India and therefore do not need approval from any other nation. Nothing more would highlight India’s commitment to contribute to the security of Vietnam than these conventional missiles.

It is high time that India recognizes the tremendous value of “Military Diplomacy” which includes military aid and weapons supplies as an added instrument of India’s foreign policy. In cases where India has to build up strategic partnerships, such provision of military assistance should not be on a commercial sales basis, but at ‘friendship prices’ like the Chinese do.

Concluding Observations

On the threshold of the 21st Century the global strategic, political and economic center of gravity stands shifted from the Euro-Atlantic region to East Asia.

India today stands fully integrated politically and economically with East Asia. However it has yet to demonstrate its political will to integrate itself with the security requirements and concerns of East Asia and everybody knows what they are.

India’s integration with East Asian security architecture would require forging of strategic partnerships within the region. The existing pattern of strategic partnerships in East Asia is bi-lateral in nature.

In this sort of pattern, Vietnam offers the best strategic bet in terms of a strategic partnership with India. It would be a bilateral relationship and not a military alliance.

Former Prime Minister Vajpayee had this in mind when during his visit to Vietnam in 2001 he asserted.

“History has willed that we become strategic partners in the New Century to promise peace, stability, security and sustainable cooperation among countries in Asia.”

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila@yahoo.com)
India and Vietnam

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 09 Sep 2009 03:13

http://solyaris.net/2009/05/cam_ranh_bay/

A good summary of possible viewpoints from a non-Indian interests viewpoint about strategic opportunities and how they can be thwarted in Vietnam. Here specifically it is Camh ranh Bay.

Since the Russians left the base has remained mostly empty and its future open to much speculation. Every so often since then the Vietnamese have hinted to different national delegations that they are amenable to granting access, although to date the port remains vacant. The airfield has been opened up to some commercial traffic (in what may be a sign of things to come).

There are only three powers with naval forces in the region sizeable enough to make access to such a facility worthwhile – China, India, and the United States. (Russia is presumably not interested, having just left, and Japan’s history and defense-oriented policy rule out overseas basing for the present.)

A fourth scenario – the most likely in the opinion of many - is that Vietnam opens the bay as a commercial port, perhaps granting visitation rights to all three of the above. If Solyaris were to offer odds, it would place them as follows: China – 100:1; US 50:1; India 10:1; open to commerce: 1:1.

China is not likely to be considered an acceptable candidate for a Cam Ranh Bay deal due to historical tensions and current disputes. A long standing land-border dispute was only settled last year, and both countries lay claim to the same resource-rich portions of the South China Sea.

The United States likewise has much historical baggage that would make it difficult to secure any sort of basing deal with Vietnam. Further, it doesn’t recognize Vietnam’s claims to the Spratly Islands or other places disputed with China and so its presence back in Vietnam is unlikely to shift the balance of power in a manner that country would find significantly advantageous. Vietnam does occasionally allude to US access to the Bay in private talks, suggesting it is within the realm of possibility – albeit a very distant one – that the US returns.

India has a much better history with Vietnam than either China or the United States, a growing Navy, and like Vietnam is wary of China’s naval ambitions. Further, it would welcome a base in the South China Sea as a counter to China’s Indian Ocean presence, straddling India with a base in Gwadar (Pakistan) and “friendly” ports in Myanmar. In the words of the Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, “India needs Vietnam in strategic terms as a spear in the Chinese underbelly to counter the threatening Beijing-Islamabad-Rangoon entente now taking shape against New Delhi” (quoted in “Cam Ranh Bay…” article mentioned above). Vietnam and India both maintain Russian equipment and this has been a convenient common ground in several recent defense partnerships between the two countries. There is also a history of nuclear cooperation and officer exchange programs.

Despite this, the fourth option (opening Cam Ranh Bay to private commerce) seems like it would be the best from Vietnam’s point of view for the following reasons:

* Money. Both for its own benefit and in response to public pressure from within – regional authorities are pressuring Vietnamese leadership to open the port to commerce for the money it will bring.
* Flexibility. Doing so will allow Vietnam to continue to balance China and the United States (and any other regional powers) by granting visitation rights on an individual, non-committal basis.
* Diplomacy. Doing so will have the extra benefit of not appearing to “take sides.” Vietnam is pursuing closer relations, despite its differences, with both China and the United States.
* Security. Connecting this port to the broader South China Sea lines of communication gives everyone using it an interest in maintaining the status quo. Further, America seeks “places, not bases” in South East Asia: agreements with countries to use their ports rather than sovereign, U.S.-run facilities (like Subic Bay). This option would still be on the table for the U.S. if Vietnam opened to port to commercial traffic.
* Politics. By retaining sovereignty over the Bay the Vietnamese leadership wouldn’t have to worry about popular backlash granting rights to a foreign power would likely produce.

arun · Post by **arun** » 10 Sep 2009 09:14

arun wrote:Islamic bigotry in Malaysia.

To stop the construction of a Hindu temple, head of a freshly slaughtered cow paraded by Muslims:

Malaysia Muslims protest proposed Hindu temple .....................

AP via Google

Good sense prevails over Islamic bigotry in Malaysia.

Besides handing out exemplary punishment to the perpetrators, the Malaysian authorities must ensure the temple is constructed and operates without being disrupted by the forces of Islamic bigotry:

6 Muslims charged with sedition for anti-Hindu protest in Malaysia

PTI 9 September 2009, 11:47am IST

KUALA LUMPUR: Six Malaysian Muslims were on Wednesday charged with sedition and illegal assembly for indulging in an act that hurt the sentiments of the Hindu community during a controversial demonstration against the relocation of a century-old temple in a Muslim majority neighbourhood.

Besides six others were charged with illegal assembly under the Police Act.

PTI

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 10 Sep 2009 11:01

Malaysia's ethnic composition consists of approximately sixty percent Malay, thirty percent Chinese, and ten percent Indian.

The Chinese controlled the economy of Malaysia completely resulting in 1969 riots, pitting the Malays against the Chinese.

As a result of the 1969 riots, and to reduce the Chinese dominance, the legal imposition in 1970 of the New Economic Policy (NEP), designed to redress the "bumiputra” was enacted to rid the Malays of their economic disadvantages and other disadvantages. The NEP, however, was remedial only to ethnic-Malays and not the other communities of Malaysia. It thereby ensured Malay political and military dominance with economic power, and was disadvantageous to the others communities. The Malays have disproportionate advantage in employment, economy, social benefits, education etc. And they are encouraged to have more children for which compensation is ensured.

Notwithstanding, the West coast states like Penang, Perak, Selnagor, Kuala Lampur, Johor etc have a very high percentage of Chinese (ranging from 30% to 40%) and notwithstanding the NEP, their economic clout is increase in both rural and urban areas including the agriculture sector.

As of 2008, the majority of Chinese people are mainly concentrated in the west coast states of west Malaysia with significant percentage of Chinese (30% and above) such as Penang, Perak, Selangor, Kuala Lumpur, Johor.

Malaysia's ethnic composition consists of approximately sixty percent Malay, thirty percent Chinese, and ten percent Indian.

As more ethnic Chinese develop business opportunities in Malaysia, their growing economic power and land holdings are changing the structure of the agricultural and urban sectors. The resulting Chinese economic dominance led to riots in 1969, pitting Malays against Chinese. To reduce the economic gap among different ethnic groups and to promote social harmony, the government embarked on a policy of Bumiputera or "Malays First." The policy begins with education and employment and extends across the entire range of social relations.

Race defines politics in Malaysia, where ethnic Malays account for about two-thirds of the 27 million population.

Under the 38-year-old policy of the National Front, Chinese and Indian minorities must pay more for homes and apply for jobs and contracts once Malay allocations have been filled.

However, since the Chinese still control the economy of Malaysia, the Malays can do little to the Chinese. Therefore, they take out their pent up frustration on the Indian minority, who are mainly blue collar workers.

One wonders if the jihadis can establish themselves in great numbers in Malaysia because the Chinese control the economy and hence backseat drive the Malaysian govt.

The Malaysian govt is not pro India and Malaysia has wiped out the Hindu historical background of their country, even though much of the language has Indian words and many Malays are of mixed origin and have Indian blood. Mahatir has Indian heritage (Malayali Muslim) and he has done much to disown and move away from this fact. He has been the most ruthless of them all against Indians.

V_Raman · Post by **V_Raman** » 10 Sep 2009 12:05

then why MKI for them? dosent that carry the risk of exposing it to the chinese?

V_Raman · Post by **V_Raman** » 10 Sep 2009 21:15

whenever this mki to malaysia question is raised, there is either silence or admin warnings in this forum. strange.

i just want to understand more about what is going on between india/malaysia.

surinder · Post by **surinder** » 10 Sep 2009 21:35

Chittagong was 98% Budhist at the time of partition. It was offered to Nehru & he refused it. That is what I read, where I don't recall.

Prasad · Post by **Prasad** » 11 Sep 2009 02:03

V_Raman wrote:whenever this mki to malaysia question is raised, there is either silence or admin warnings in this forum. strange.

If you're talking about the Su-30 then Malaysia has the MKM variety. Its based on teh MKI but is a lot different, similar to the chinese MKK.