Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

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Arun_S
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

Playing poker with Pokhran, September 13th, 2009 , Deccan Chronicle.
Indeed, according to strategic affairs researcher Bharat Karnad, Chidambaram, who argued even before the 1998 tests that explosive testing is unnecessary and that India could build a nuclear arsenal using computer simulations alone (Vajpayee overruled him), himself conceded subsequently — faced with a note from the BARC Council, the highest decision-making body in the nuclear complex — in representations to the government that his “no further testing necessary” advice was valid, but only “for the next 10 years”. It would imply that by even his reckoning, India should have resumed testing by 2008. In late 2007, Chidambaram’s ambivalence, Karnad writes, led a high-powered taskforce appointed by the government to advise the external affairs ministry not to sign the CTBT.

Still, it’s nobody’s case that India, flush with the recent nuclear deal with the US and the NSG, which Santhanam supported, should conduct new nuclear tests tomorrow, or the day after. In signing the nuclear deal, Dr Manmohan Singh made a calculation that India ’s security situation would not deteriorate so far as to necessitate further nuclear tests and rapid expansion of the arsenal until at least 2020, if not later. By that time, India would have greater economic heft, its nuclear capabilities will have expanded, and the US’ global position will be under severe challenge from China. Together, these factors would let India test again and weather global opprobrium and possible US sanctions. It was a sensible bet to make. But it requires that India keep itself free from the chains of a global CTBT agreement. That’s the bottomline to which the government must stick, regardless of the yield of the 1998 H-bomb test.
I understand that it was Anil Kakodkar who dissented in BARC, and put his dissent note saying “no further testing necessary for the next 5 years”

Perhaps RC diluted that further and made it into next 10 years.

Now 11 years later R Chidambram is unwilling to follow even his own scientific determination into action. Wonder if it was scientific enough the first time around in 1998 !!!
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

Arun_S wrote:
shiv wrote:I would guess that Indian weapons are heavier and may (I am guessing) give yields of 60-80 kiloton at weights of 500 kg. Probably mostly fission and boosted fission (which is fission-fusion-fission).
The highlighted part is incorrect.
In boosted fission there is no staging/sequence the way you put it. The fission never stops from beginning to end, while fusion is a brief flash in the beginning of fission
Sorry sir. Your statement is correct but that does not make what I have written wrong. I got this from one of the refs on the net

The Pu hollow ball with say Tritium in the center is compressed. Since it is compressed from the outside the outer layers go critical first and start fissioning. That increases compression on the core and causes fusion releasing high energy neutrons that then speed up fission to such a great extent that a lot more of the fissile material fissions . So fission starts first - followed by a burst of fusion and then fission speeds up after that. It really is fission-fusion-fission as per the numerous references available on the net - to which I have access as much as you do.

Perhaps you would be happier if I wrote fis(fusion)sion to indicate fusion within the sequence of continuing fission?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

Arun_S wrote:
Like it or not, the BR Agni page itself gives reference [115A] to outside source on MIRV. Embarrassingly its from the same reputable journal that RC and Sikka publish their research articles on the nuclear bum.
The selective credibility of articles in that journal as you have yourself pointed out is exactly what makes me wary about the information.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

shiv wrote:
Arun_S wrote:The highlighted part is incorrect.
In boosted fission there is no staging/sequence the way you put it. The fission never stops from beginning to end, while fusion is a brief flash in the beginning of fission
Sorry sir. Your statement is correct but that does not make what I have written wrong. I got this from one of the refs on the net

The Pu hollow ball with say Tritium in the center is compressed. Since it is compressed from the outside the outer layers go critical first and start fissioning. That increases compression on the core and causes fusion releasing high energy neutrons that then speed up fission to such a great extent that a lot more of the fissile material fissions . So fission starts first - followed by a burst of fusion and then fission speeds up after that. It really is fission-fusion-fission as per the numerous references available on the net - to which I have access as much as you do.

Perhaps you would be happier if I wrote fis(fusion)sion to indicate fusion within the sequence of continuing fission?
:wink:
Just calling it as "fusion boosting" would be enough and perhaps most accurate.

BTW IIRC most weapons are designed with safeing method that relies on Boosting gas as a critical safeing element. In those FBF weapons the first few generations of fission be near core center.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by amit »

Arun_S wrote:Playing poker with Pokhran, September 13th, 2009 , Deccan Chronicle.
Still, it’s nobody’s case that India, flush with the recent nuclear deal with the US and the NSG, which Santhanam supported, should conduct new nuclear tests tomorrow, or the day after. In signing the nuclear deal, Dr Manmohan Singh made a calculation that India ’s security situation would not deteriorate so far as to necessitate further nuclear tests and rapid expansion of the arsenal until at least 2020, if not later. By that time, India would have greater economic heft, its nuclear capabilities will have expanded, and the US’ global position will be under severe challenge from China. Together, these factors would let India test again and weather global opprobrium and possible US sanctions. It was a sensible bet to make. But it requires that India keep itself free from the chains of a global CTBT agreement. That’s the bottomline to which the government must stick, regardless of the yield of the 1998 H-bomb test.
I understand that it was Anil Kakodkar who dissented in BARC, and put his dissent note saying “no further testing necessary for the next 5 years”

Perhaps RC diluted that further and made it into next 10 years.

Now 11 years later R Chidambram is unwilling to follow even his own scientific determination into action. Wonder if it was scientific enough the first time around in 1998 !!!
Arun_S,

The article clearly explains the calculations behind signing the nuclear deal. And that is why I'm personally sure India is not going to sign the CTBT any time soon.

However, if the idea is that we hold back on testing till at least the 2020 timeframe, provided there is no major, unexpected geopolitical event which warrants a test, then how can you conclude that R Chidambaram is unwilling to follow his own scientific determination and test now?

Do you think it's up to RC to give a go ahead for a test?

And how does all this so-called unwillingness to test on the part of RC gel with what you yourself have earlier said that in 2003 the scientists wanted to re-test by Vajpayee over-ruled that? Unless this data point is incorrect then that does not gel with your idea that RC is holding back testing now. Unless you want to say that RC didn't want to test even in 2003. However, if you are then it would be useful if you can show some reference to this point.
Last edited by amit on 14 Sep 2009 07:14, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

Arun_S wrote:
BTW IIRC most weapons are designed with safeing method that relies on Boosting gas as a critical safeing element. In those FBF weapons the first few generations of fission be near core center.

If fission starts at the core, the expansion will be outwards and tend to interfere with compression and creation of critical mass in the unfissioned Pu unless there is already compression from the outside. So fission starting from the inside is pointless.

Another safing element that is mentioned on the net is steel balls or a steel chain in the core, because absence of fusion gas is not safe enough - and accidental conventional trigger detonation could cause partial fission depending on how much Pu was there in the primary and a fizzle of 0.5 to 1 kiloton is enough to destroy your missile silo or submarine. But all this is now outmoded in the US - which is the only nation that has published any significant details.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by sivab »

shiv wrote: Incidentally have you any source outside of BR that attributes MIRV on Agni and does not use BR as source? Just curious. Ajai Shukla talks of MIRV in future.
IIRC, this article was published in deccan chronicle May 10, 2008

http://syedakbarindia.blogspot.com/2008 ... gni-5.html
May 10, 2008
By Syed Akbar
...
Interacting with a select group of reporters here on Friday after the successful test-fire of Agni-3 missile earlier this week, Avinash Chander said the next programme would be Agni-5. There's no need for Agni-4 as it's just an upgradation of the existing Agni-3. "We are looking forward to developing Agni-5 missiles with multiple warheads. The present missile system carries only one warhead. The advanced stage of Agni-5 will be capable of carrying three warheads that could hit the given target or the set of different targets with precision," he pointed out.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by John Snow »

Doing something in a crucible or in vitro or in vivo ( a few cells) is entirely different ball game from producing in massive quantities that are usable, reliable, maintainable and predictable consistently.

At bark rate, in vitro is good enough to mass market a pharmacological (Drug) product and that is also ISP albeit different kind called Indian Standard Pharmacopeia.

DRDO also has this habit of not following through with productionizing the work.

Now we have Mumbai police importing PRC made infantry weapons, while our OFP rifle factories busy Makhi Maar ... :mrgreen:
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by amit »

sivab wrote:
shiv wrote: Incidentally have you any source outside of BR that attributes MIRV on Agni and does not use BR as source? Just curious. Ajai Shukla talks of MIRV in future.
IIRC, this article was published in deccan chronicle May 10, 2008

http://syedakbarindia.blogspot.com/2008 ... gni-5.html
May 10, 2008
By Syed Akbar
...
Interacting with a select group of reporters here on Friday after the successful test-fire of Agni-3 missile earlier this week, Avinash Chander said the next programme would be Agni-5. There's no need for Agni-4 as it's just an upgradation of the existing Agni-3. "We are looking forward to developing Agni-5 missiles with multiple warheads. The present missile system carries only one warhead. The advanced stage of Agni-5 will be capable of carrying three warheads that could hit the given target or the set of different targets with precision," he pointed out.
So as per this article it is a future capability, to be acquired once Agni 5 flies and then enters service. Agni 3 will not have it?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by amit »

What to do John Snow ji, we Indians are like that onlee: boastful, argumentative, bad managers, bad scientists, even worse engineers and can't even make a Diwali phataka which goes into the air and goes "phaat", even though DIY manuals exist on the Internet which everyone reads. :D

In a nutshell we are all "shitty" Indians (gustafi maap, did not include you in this description as I don't want you to bark up my tree and scratch my bark and open the SAP**)

Jai Ho!


** SAP: Shitty Analysis Phenomena
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

There is an old story told in humor about a conservative area in Bangalore in which unmarried girls would wear a particular type of dress and married women another type. It turned out that an unmarried girl got pregnant and started talking like this was virgin pregnancy that arose de novo.

Reading through all these refs about nukes reminded me of that story because of the way in which all the sources say that the Teller-Ulam model of X Ray compression of a fusion secondary was a secret and all the countries - i.e the US, USSR, France, Britain and China all independently discovered and developed the secret "on their own" with no outside help like that Bangalore girl.

I am virtually certain that such "de novo" development is currently happening in Pakistan, North Korea and other nations as well - but there is a related issue about nukes hat makes me curious. It appears that there are two requirements for changing the world order with nukes. The first is to get hold of fissile material. Once you have fissile material - making a successful nuke is only a short step away. The next step is to make it deliverable - and that requires some "practice" by testing - although even that is not essential to scare others.

If you look at the history of nuclear weapon development you find that the US - having got nukes initially thought "Ah we can now defeat everyone else" - until the USSR got nukes. After that there was no talk of defeating USSR - only deterrence - while a few in the US harbored notions that other nations could be "defeated". Naturally the world understood this game pretty soon and China entered in 1964, India in the 1970s, Pakistan in the 80s and Israel and South Africa somewhere in between, with NoKo becoming overt now.

Every new country that enters the game can no longer be "defeated" by other nuclear rivals. With every new nation that enters - there is a diminishing of the global power of the US, Russia and China and all other nuclear powers. The logic is simple. For example Pakistani nukes may be aimed against India - but suppose they use them against a US target - the US will have to hesitate before nuking Pakistan back. Why? because once the US breaks its own moratorium - it is a signal to all US adversaries - especially China and North Korea that the US is willing to use its nukes and that for "security" that have to be ready to hit the US first - making the US more insecure for no immediate fault of its own other than having its forces nuked by Pakistan.

The same equations hold true for China. If China initiates a border war that escalates into a nuclear exchange with India the US will clearly see that China is a nation ready to use nukes and is not deterred by nukes from an adversary nation such as India - so the US will ready itself to use nukes first against China. And China's and the US's security vis a vis each other get degraded as a result of a war with India.

The proliferation of nukes is a bit like swine flu. First the WHO tried localization - but that failed and it became a pandemic. Nukes to are heading that way. Nations with nukes are desperately trying to keep nukes localized and available only to a few. But that is not working because, in the ultimate analysis - it is not so difficult to acquire nukes and deter, and deterrence is something that everyone wants. Any use of any nukes anywhere is the failure of the doctrine of deterrence for anyone. No nation is under the impression that war can be won by nukes - but everyone knows that the most arrogant nations on earth have their power questioned fairly easily.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

shiv wrote:
Arun_S wrote:
BTW IIRC most weapons are designed with safeing method that relies on Boosting gas as a critical safeing element. In those FBF weapons the first few generations of fission be near core center.

If fission starts at the core, the expansion will be outwards and tend to interfere with compression and creation of critical mass in the unfissioned Pu unless there is already compression from the outside. So fission starting from the inside is pointless.

Another safing element that is mentioned on the net is steel balls or a steel chain in the core, because absence of fusion gas is not safe enough - and accidental conventional trigger detonation could cause partial fission depending on how much Pu was there in the primary and a fizzle of 0.5 to 1 kiloton is enough to destroy your missile silo or submarine. But all this is now outmoded in the US - which is the only nation that has published any significant details.
Web is full of material with explaination for easy understanding. Recall that purpose of the implosion is supercriticality, and triggering it with neutrons at an appropriate time (pls note criticality on its own does not mean fission starts instantaneously). Reality is more dynamic, probabilistic and involved.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

shiv wrote:The proliferation of nukes is a bit like swine flu. First the WHO tried localization - but that failed and it became a pandemic. Nukes to are heading that way. Nations with nukes are desperately trying to keep nukes localized and available only to a few. But that is not working because, in the ultimate analysis - it is not so difficult to acquire nukes and deter, and deterrence is something that everyone wants. Any use of any nukes anywhere is the failure of the doctrine of deterrence for anyone. No nation is under the impression that war can be won by nukes - but everyone knows that the most arrogant nations on earth have their power questioned fairly easily.
Long time ago John Snow uvaach somethign liek this:
  • An ICBM wirh N bum on every backyard ensures Global Peace & Brotherhood.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

John Snow wrote:
At bark rate, in vitro is good enough to mass market a pharmacological (Drug) product and that is also ISP albeit different kind called Indian Standard Pharmacopeia.

There is a problem in applying American standards in India. They are not followed here. Initially a few medical men in India who used to live in phoren will be shocked at how Indians are taking short cuts because they (phoren returnees like me) are full of knowledge of how things "should be done" in phoren. Gradually they will see that in India everyone is doing his own technique and still there are results. The results are not as good as in phoren, but not as bad as predicted by phoren observers. So both feel they are are correct and both are happy.

In medicine I can give a thousand examples of this but I will give only one. Everyone used to talk about transplanting animal organs into humans and were saying "Ethics, research, proof, etc" but one surgeon in India found a dying man and gave him a pig heart . The man (patient) survived for a full two hours proving that it should not be done "simp-simply." You can imagine the short cuts that are taken in India with sterilization, instrument re use etc. But the Indian is proud of all this and is not bothered by trifles like failure rates as long as there is some success rate. This is worrying only to people whose minds have been contaminated by phoren standards like my mind used to be. All is well in India as long as you ignore failures and still go ahead to show that failed methods can succeed if you break all accepted rules that have been made elsewhere.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

Arun_S wrote:Reality is more dynamic, probabilistic and involved.
Still - if anyone can get fusion to start at the center of a hollow pit within a Pu primary before the periphery then fusion would be easy to achieve and this thread would not exist.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Gagan »

Image
N^3 saar,
please look at this photo carefully. Please note the distance of the test equipment form the shaft. This test is NOT FOR a subkiloton weapon. It is for a TN weapon ~ 200KT or more, yet the test equipment possibly with people withing is less than a Kilometer from the shaft!

Please re-examine your argument that the monitoring site in the deserts of rajasthan was as close as kehtolai => that the yeild was exactly as BARC wanted, and the motive was primarily to save Khetolai.

If the intent was to save kehtolai, that village would have had its water tanks repaired by a grateful government. GOI only went into khetolai as a afterthought and then too halfheartedly when media reports of people having to buy water from tankers because the water tanks had all broken. That shows the concern.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by dinesha »

A BANG AND A FIZZLE
- Doubts about India’s nuclear deterrence may be well-founded

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090914/j ... 481281.jsp
Even as the nation embarked on a highly ambitious and classified nuclear weapons programme, we chose to deviate from fundamentals of weapon design and development. We bypassed the established decisionmaking system with the scientific adviser being the sole repository and reporting directly to the prime minister. We had no integrated project management structure with BARC and DRDO working in their respective areas of expertise. The one agency that would normally be able to act as impartial observer and the one which would ultimately have to make the system deliver, was deliberately kept out.

In his book, Weapons of Peace, Raj Chengappa gives us an insight into those times. When V.P. Singh took over as prime minister, he was so dismayed to find a rudimentary and informal command and control structure with regard to the nuclear programme that he is quoted to have told his principal secretary, “This is scary. The matter cannot just be between the Prime Minister and the Scientific Adviser.” Accordingly, he set up an informal committee under Arun Singh to carry out a confidential review of India’s nuclear preparedness.

It was now Arun Singh’s turn to be dismayed when he realized that the chiefs of staff of the armed forces were not briefed about India’s capability. Chengappa quotes Arun Singh as having said, “It was clear we had to end the wink and nudge approach. When it is crunch time you just can’t ring up a chief of staff and say press the button. The army will not take the scientists’ word that it will work. They will want to know if they have a usable credible deterrent. Otherwise they are likely to say buzz off….” Prophetic words, except that the military was reduced to accepting the scientists’ word without a whimper.

Arun Singh also found the lack of coordination between the DRDO and BARC disconcerting: “I thought it was crazy that BARC didn’t know where DRDO stood or vice versa…. It was an unacceptable situation. There was just no institutionalized way of doing things.” Today, we are facing the consequences of not having heeded these valuable warnings.

While Santhanam has only expressed his differences on the results of the thermo nuclear tests, a worrisome concern is that along this challenging design and development route there would perforce have been innumerable technical challenges and design compromises. As per established military procedures, an independent chief resident engineer is located in all such facilities to ensure on behalf of the users that design and technical and safety standards are met. Certainly, no such safety net was available to the armed forces in this programme. This begs the question as to how many areas of difference surfaced during the entire development phase and what compromises were made that are still not known to the users of the weapon systems. How many more Santhanam-like surprises may from time to time rear their ugly heads? Will it then be too late?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

Gagan those craters must have names of tests attached to them. The US did so many tests that they could have moved the people and equipment to an area that had old craters where it was known that there was no radioactivity in order to test at some other remote place. So in the case of your picture it is important to name the craters and date of tests and the date on which the photo was taken before assuming hat those craters were formed while the people sat next to them. Or everything may have been moved away before the actual testing. That data is absent from the picture you have posted.

The net has a lot of information about exactly how far away people were. There is one spectacular story about the use of "light pipes"
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon_design
It is not clear from the public record how successful the Shrimp light pipes were. The data bunker was far enough back to remain outside the mile-wide crater, but the 15-megaton blast, two and a half times greater than expected, breached the bunker by blowing its 20-ton door off the hinges and across the inside of the bunker. (The nearest people were twenty miles (32 km) farther away, in a bunker that survived intact.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

dinesha wrote:A BANG AND A FIZZLE
- Doubts about India’s nuclear deterrence may be well-founded

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090914/j ... 481281.jsp
This is one of the best articles I have read about the issue.

That means that nothing that this man says will be done
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by rkirankr »

That means that nothing that this man says will be done
If something was going to be done about it , he would not have written an article. GOI would have started doing it. Since it is not/will not do anything and this man's words must have fallen on deaf ears with dumb minds,he is expressing it here. We all will just do :(( .
The babus will be :-?
our enemies will :twisted:
Jai ho
The only bums which are not fizzle or the ones coming out of the musharaffs of our ruling elite who are attending endless iftar parties. However these can be classified as biological weapons and not TN
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ShauryaT »

shiv wrote:
dinesha wrote:A BANG AND A FIZZLE
- Doubts about India’s nuclear deterrence may be well-founded

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1090914/j ... 481281.jsp
This is one of the best articles I have read about the issue.

That means that nothing that this man says will be done
Nothing less can be expected from Air Marshal Brijesh Dhar Jayal. Shivji: Just a feeling that the armed forces, who were quiet till now are asking WTF is going on. I am hopeful that things will change in this realm.
Last edited by ShauryaT on 14 Sep 2009 21:12, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by NRao »

On the flip side, including the armed forces, there seems to a systemic collapse - specially in the areas of project management and the like. It is too late for ANYONE to ask WTF is going on. They ALL were a part of it.

But, what else is new. More Chai-biscut. The one thing we seemed to have been proud of seems to have got the better of us.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by samuel »

It is time for the government to set up an independent evaluation group, comprising scientists, experts and the armed forces, to assure themselves and the nation that the weapons systems constituting our nuclear deterrent are battleworthy. Then the armed forces must take ownership and be held to account.
I fully concur with that assessment. What is needed in my view is:

1. Open Standards and Methodology for testing.
2. Open Methodology used for development and testing. Publish lots on small experiments.
3. Closed parameters and values -- these are not revealed. The objective must not be to fuddle the truth in papers, but to control access to information. Those on the inside know and those on the outside don't. But there should, for matters as big as this, not be anything presented but the truth and the complete truth. This integrity is vital because when we say we will punch, we have to. That is how the other respects and is deterred by what we say and that is how we can believe in what we have when the details are lost in history.
4. Verification (by developer) and reverification (by auditor) and validation (by user). All tests.
5. A certification of the state of nuclear deterrence by the user to the prime minister.
6. A certification by the prime minister to the nation during each 5 year period.

Not this "we believe our scientist" crap. This isn't about believe; it's about just showing it works as advertised. Keep love, belief, adulation, admiration, secrets within secrets and obfuscations within smoke and gas out of it. This is important to the survival of our nation.
S
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

NRao wrote: there seems to a systemic collapse

:lol: Not really. Systems have to be built up from a state of collapse i.e it's not as though all was well and it later collapsed. It was born collapsed and needs building.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by NRao »

shiv wrote:
NRao wrote: there seems to a systemic collapse

:lol: Not really. Systems have to be built up from a state of collapse i.e it's not as though all was well and it later collapsed. It was born collapsed and needs building.
Hmmmmmmmmmm...... Not quite. However, topic for another thread.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by NRao »

It is time for the government to set up................................
Indians have to first decide if they want to drive cars on roads or roads + side walks. Some cannot be expected to drive on the roads, follow the rules, while others - no matter who they are - are allowed to drive anywhere they please.

Else this 'government to set up' will function for the time being and then fall apart.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by shiv »

shiv wrote:
:lol: Not really. Systems have to be built up from a state of collapse i.e it's not as though all was well and it later collapsed. It was born collapsed and needs building.
More seriously, I have seen in India an utter scathing contempt and disdain between the armed forces and defence industry and scientists. We all talk about how the DRDO is held in contempt by some of the Armed Forces.

What is less apparent is the contempt with which DRDO people may regard members of the armed forces. This was very apparent to me a few months ago when I happened to play golf with a retired and elderly DRDO man and an equally elderly retired Lt General. The DRDO type was jovial and talkative and the Army guy was the silent type. He would play his stroke and walk right on ahead of us, and the DRDO man would repeatedly laugh and tell me "The General is a clever man. He knows the difference between golf course and battlefield. He knows this is a golf course so he is walking right up in front. If this was a battlefield he would be right behind"

While this may have been an isolated joke the man also told me a joke that he heard in Pakistan - I can't recall the details but it was basically a contemptuous story about "Faujis" running from "jang". The man himself struck me as WKK who believed hat fauj in IndiaPakistan were the source of all troubles.

There is a basic lack of trust which needs to be bridged. It is being done in some areas - but institutional mistrust goes beyond personalities. The Government must play a role in building trust compelling each side to soak up the viewpoint of the other without disdain and contempt. Indians are very quick at dismissing someone as stupid or incompetent - it is a national trait that is of little consequence in college or on the internet. But at the national security level it is a liability. This must not go on much longer. It is a management issue and there has been serious mismanagement.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by John Snow »

Amit ji>> I am addressing this to you, I have not addressed you in person but I have expressed my opinion about the workings of DRDO, HAL, BARC .
You are the one talking about shitty Indians.
Open your eyes wide shut and read AM Birjesh Dayal article.

One example I give remember TDC12,TDC 312, TDC 316 etc? the Trombay Designied computer that was boasted as IBM 360 of India?
ECIL quietly went to sign on collobration with Norsk Data!

so just get back slumber.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

shiv wrote:
Arun_S wrote:Reality is more dynamic, probabilistic and involved.
Still - if anyone can get fusion to start at the center of a hollow pit within a Pu primary before the periphery then fusion would be easy to achieve and this thread would not exist.
Possible but only if you want to burn few micrograms of fusion fuel for a N bum with passive inert tamper.
Many tonnes of fusion yield has been obtained using only conventional explosive implosion. And per CTBT this is legal because no fission chain reaction involved.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by NRao »

Shiv,

Did not want to get into it here, but ...................

There are functioning systems in India. Some systems have systems within them. And they, for the most part, work very well. It is typically the interactive forces between these systems that are rather weak - as you mention above.

Recall we had (a few weeks ago) mentioned (in the LCA thread IIRC) about project management being one of the issues WRT the LCA. It is actually beyond that. The virus has infiltrated R&D (this could be true in other parts of the world too). Collapse was and is very predictable (in this field). Why then is anyone surprised by events unfolding in the nuclear tests?

Cannot be bridged when fundas are absent.

Nuclear test being in the scientific domain, a test is a nearly binary answer - failed or succeeded. It should have nothing to do with politics, policies, strategies, NFU, ABC or XYZ. IF we can plan future tests based on this we can lick the current problem and prevent future ones.

Else, our grand kids will inherit this thread.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Arun_S »

samuel wrote:
It is time for the government to set up an independent evaluation group, comprising scientists, experts and the armed forces, to assure themselves and the nation that the weapons systems constituting our nuclear deterrent are battleworthy. Then the armed forces must take ownership and be held to account.
I fully concur with that assessment. What is needed in my view is:

1. Open Standards and Methodology for testing.
2. Open Methodology used for development and testing. Publish lots on small experiments.
3. Closed parameters and values -- these are not revealed. The objective must not be to fuddle the truth in papers, but to control access to information. Those on the inside know and those on the outside don't. But there should, for matters as big as this, not be anything presented but the truth and the complete truth. This integrity is vital because when we say we will punch, we have to. That is how the other respects and is deterred by what we say and that is how we can believe in what we have when the details are lost in history.
4. Verification (by developer) and reverification (by auditor) and validation (by user). All tests.
5. A certification of the state of nuclear deterrence by the user to the prime minister.
6. A certification by the prime minister to the nation during each 5 year period.

Not this "we believe our scientist" crap. This isn't about believe; it's about just showing it works as advertised. Keep love, belief, adulation, admiration, secrets within secrets and obfuscations within smoke and gas out of it. This is important to the survival of our nation.
S
Perfectly stated.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by samuel »

Sometimes, I come across papers where I read them and think, that can't be true. I tell myself, well they published it, so it must be true. Let's start from that. And I work backwards from there and it takes a very long time to figure out that oh if that and that and that were true then this will work. Usually all that assuming makes the paper worthless, and many years later they sometime crawl back into my head whence I think why bother publishing such a paper in the first place?

But there is another side to it. When one is under immense pressure and there was a foregone conclusion they bet on and does not turn out to be true in the end, then one is faced with a choice of stopping all of it and restarting or "with one small adjustment" make it all believable. We must not leave it to the human to be in that position so that with high probability they will err on the "make the adjustment" side. It will be our failing to not recognize that as a normal human failure mode.

But there are many other ways things could go bust and humans in the loop do odd things and are motivated by many many forces which no one really can unravel. It's interesting chatting subject but it's not security.

A system must exist where people perform roles and a mechanism for trust and verify is in place. Yeah, there are ways to beat that too but more often than not, two or three tier locks get us most of the way. They would've in this case too, if the problem truly is that a dud is covered up as success.

We must remove the burden of delivering success and the fear of failure from the individual but ensure that integrity of the system they are a part of is maintained to an extraordinary degree. What shame it would be if on the eve of a war we learn we cant shoot. Who do we go chasing after then and what point would that be?

S
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ramana »

All that process is for ab-initio development.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by samuel »

That's true and it kinda shows in the nation's projects doesn't it? But a new generation will be able to take things much farther than before, I have that confidence.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Sanku »

samuel wrote: But there are many other ways things could go bust and humans in the loop do odd things and are motivated by many many forces which no one really can unravel. It's interesting chatting subject but it's not security.

We must remove the burden of delivering success and the fear of failure from the individual but ensure that integrity of the system they are a part of is maintained to an extraordinary degree. What shame it would be if on the eve of a war we learn we cant shoot. Who do we go chasing after then and what point would that be?
Kudo's, a set of exceptional posts.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by SaiK »

shooting with what to where does matter too. given the fact it is not the incapability factor that drives, but the capability factor to do n things that is totally not important, does kill projects, especially strategic kinds.

how many times we take serious views of cag reporting one in 3 round is a dud? have we followed up with such reports to correction, and see an upward moving flag from them.

well.. it all comes back to our approach to this whole thing. too much has been kept secret in the name of "first you catch my shirt"., saying things not knowing we largely still follow with respect to that revered no shirt wearing fakir.

its time we change.. yes we can. testing times is nicer than time testing.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by ramana »

Saik, That was a vintage post from you. Cant make head or tail but thats the standard.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by enqyoob »

N^3 saar,
please look at this photo carefully. Please note the distance of the test equipment form the shaft. This test is NOT FOR a subkiloton weapon. It is for a TN weapon ~ 200KT or more, yet the test equipment possibly with people withing is less than a Kilometer from the shaft!

Please re-examine your argument that the monitoring site in the deserts of rajasthan was as close as kehtolai => that the yeild was exactly as BARC wanted, and the motive was primarily to save Khetolai.

If the intent was to save kehtolai, that village would have had its water tanks repaired by a grateful government. GOI only went into khetolai as a afterthought and then too halfheartedly when media reports of people having to buy water from tankers because the water tanks had all broken. That shows the concern.
That's a very nice picture, Gagan. Do you have any evidence that the tall structure shown in the parking lot was there BEFORE those nice craters were created? That would indeed be some blast design, hey? Ground craters right by the side, tall building unscathed?

If this is the quality of discussion, I really don't see any point in posting arguments here - this should be exchanged with the BENIS thread, which is by far the more serious thought on BRF.

The parking lot does look very nice. That's what Khetolai would have been if the blasts had been any more intense.
village would have had its water tanks repaired by a grateful government. GOI only went into khetolai as a afterthought and then too halfheartedly when media reports of people having to buy water from tankers because the water tanks had all broken. That shows the concern
I had Noooo idea that the water tanks broke too. Doesn't that prove my point that the damage was far beyond what was expected? Thank you.

For the rest, a very good reason for Indian designers to design not to break houses, water tanks, etc., is precisely that the govt. is not known for its speed in compensating people who suffer due to govt. stupidity.

But it is untenable to argue that this somehow proves that Indian test designers were such criminal morons that they callously designed a test that would have wiped out the village and all its inhabitants, but it was pure Providence that the blast fizzled and only yielded one-third of what it was intended to yield. Not only is that utterly opposite to basic engineering sense, it may also be seen as blood libel against the engineers of BARC. Your intepretation, not mine.

Thanks for making my point about the people arguing for the "fizzle" and "Test Now!" lines. I hope they don't feel callous about what happens to Indians, but at this point it would not surprise me, since none seem willing to address the basic Khetotali Design Criterion issue.

Great, thanks! Q.E.D.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by SaiK »

ramana ji, i tried.. shall try again:-

doesn't it all end up with: "its our fault"?

question: are we at a time to ask or tell?

I still think, we have missed the bus and buzz eons ago., and I still think we should sign the treaty no matter we fizzled or we frizzled the results.

again.. we can still test.. that is what our indo-us nuke agreement conveys [read from an aam admi eyes].
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Post by Gerard »

yet the test equipment possibly with people withing is less than a Kilometer from the shaft!
The instrumentation trailer park (on the left) is evacuated prior to the test shot. The trailers are air conditioned and shock mounted. They are built to withstand extreme ground movements.

There is a clip from "Trinity and Beyond" that shows the trailers rocking during a test in Alaska.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TDgOg0cWEqM

The tall structure (at right) is the assembly tower where instruments are mounted inside the diagnostic cannister (itself mated to the device and lowered into the hole). It is disassembled prior to firing.

After some time a reentry crew enters the area and retrieves data from the trailers.
Locked