Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 15 Sep 2009 03:57

Now THIS is what I call a halal nyoo-kulear bum.

hnair · Post by **hnair** » 15 Sep 2009 04:18

Can we put THAT in Chandrayan-2 impactor? I am sick of tides.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 15 Sep 2009 06:17

Instead of 1 IED Mubarak then u will have hajaar IED Musharrafs.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 15 Sep 2009 07:09

Arun_S wrote: Many tonnes of fusion yield has been obtained using only conventional explosive implosion.

Nothing I have read so far suggests that this has been done. You are the first person on earth saying it as far as I am concerned. I will not believe it until I see the information corroborated elsewhere.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 15 Sep 2009 08:45

I searched for references for fusion explosions from conventional explosive and am unable to see the difference between these and fizzles. Not sure if these explosions would be admired and praised as great successes in Indian context. Even if they were researched in India people would die ROTFL given that this is how people react to kilotons of TNT. Milligrams of yield are like using Scotch tape as X ray source.

http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publicatio ... 2Jones.pdf
Russia managed to cause enough fusion to give the following explosion

1992 the Russian weapon laboratories reported neutron yields of 1013_1014
neutrons, corresponding to th~ fusion of 10-10to 10-9 grams of DT gas.l0 The
production of 1014neutrons would be accompanied by the release of an amount
of fusion energy equivalent to roughly 60 mg of TNT.

60 milligrams of TNT! Wow!

also

Two potential weapons applications of fusion explosives would be: i) warheads
with yield-to-weight ratios higher than achievable with conventional high
explosives(HE), and ii) mini-neutron bombs.Figure 1 shows the lethal radius
that would result from neutron radiation as a function of neutron yield. For
example, the curves indicate that a weapon with a fusion yield equivalent to 1
ton of high explosive would deliver a lethal neutron dose out to 200-400
meters.

The "curves indicate". Not the seismometers that matter to us

"While the prospects of fusion energy nuclear explosions of damaging magni-
tude do not look promising with high-explosive assembly, believe such capa-
bilities should be regarded as banned by the Treaty. Nevertheless, both scientific curiosity and some practical purposes might be served by high-explosive systems that provoke a tiny amount of fusion. Th set the scale,one gram of high explosive [HE] equivalent energy release corresponds to 1.6x1015
fusions. So one might set a limit (for HE-induced fusion only) at 0.1 gram of HE, corresponding to 1.6x1014fusions."17

I would still like to see who has achieved several tons of fusion yield from conventional implosion.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 15 Sep 2009 08:46

Arrey bhagwaan ke naam pe, please look and understand that photo I've posted there.

There are two craters of earlier tests. The huge building you see covers the new test shaft. The US used to have a deep shaft and they DROPPED their nukes from a height into that shaft to simulate an air-drop. The nuke was timed to go off when it neared the bottom of the shaft.
Those trucks parked next door contain the computers connected to the sensors all around the shaft. These were intended to survive the blast.

The theory that the village was intended to survive because the monitoring site was just as close is not correct. The village would have been decimated if the blast had indeed crossed ~100KT in khetolai, while the monitoring site would have survived because it was intended to survive and was just a light bunker with a tin roof.

wig · Post by **wig** » 15 Sep 2009 08:52

could some of the experts clarify: a neutron bomb is a further derivation of a thermonuclear bomb. herein fusion is started without the fission reaction trigger. if yes, the fusion will be initiated by some non nuclear explosive/implosive.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 15 Sep 2009 08:54

wig wrote:could some of the experts clarify: a neutron bomb is a further derivation of a thermonuclear bomb. herein fusion is started without the fission reaction trigger. if yes would the fusion be caused by some non nuclear explosive/implosive.

No. The fusion is started by a fission trigger. There is no neutron bomb that can be started by a conventional trigger. There are many easy to understand refs (for laymen like me and possibly you) on the net.

What is absent in the neutron bomb is excess fission that is caused by Uranium tamper.

Will post shortly.

PS I am not an expert but I read what is easily and freely available on the net and have been re reading for many years now.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 15 Sep 2009 09:04

Neutron bomb
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/N ... #Nfaq4.3.2

The design objective of the tactical neutron bombs developed in the 1960s and 70s was to create a low-yield, compact weapon that produced a lethal burst of neutrons. These neutrons can penetrate steel armor with relative ease, enabling the weapons to be effective against tanks and other armored vehicles which are otherwise highly resistant to the effects of nuclear weapons. A flux of several thousand rems were desired so that incapacitation of armored crews would be relatively rapid, with in several hours to a couple of days at most. In this exposure range death is inevitable. To minimize the effects of collateral damage, the effect of thermal radiation and blast outside the neutron kill radius, it was also very desirable to minimize the energy released in forms other than the neutron flux.

The means for generating this intense neutron flux is to ignite a quantity of deuterium-tritium fuel with a low yield fission explosion.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 15 Sep 2009 09:15

Nuclear Fusion from Scotch tape - your secretary can be a bomb

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 15 Sep 2009 09:16

The Neutron bomb is supposed to be so dirty, that the neutrons(?) it emits will cause the buildings and surroundings to become radioactive(?)
Living beings will die of that radioactivity, the buildings and infrastructure will remain intact because the blast itself was not very big.

geeth · Post by **geeth** » 15 Sep 2009 09:39

It seems now things have boiled down to degradation of the system...It has been there since the inception of the Atomic Energy Commission - The PM dealt with a single scientist and he decided everything, and other followed - or those who objected were a minuscule part. Many posts before I had mentioned about the highly compartmental nature of the BARC and other Nuclear establishments. I realised it early enough from talks with different people (at my level) and occasional talk with senior people during chance meetings.

Many people now argue that Armed forces should be involved with the project. The impression I got was, till very late i.e., till the time it was confirmed by the outside world that Pakistan has acquired the bomb, the Armed forces were not even told in unambigous terms whether India had the bomb or not. The Atomic Energy Commission is highly secretive - there advantages and disadvantages. I happened to read a book written by TN Seshan, in which he is highly critical of the AEC (he had served as secretary in the Atomic Dept). He even calls it a white elephant. Though many things that criticized were later found to be not true, it gives an impression that even an IAS officer of the secretary level is not kept in picture about rudimentary things (knowing Sheshan's character, he would have definitely tried to find out what's going on..).

Breaking the system has its own disadvantages as well. May be some vested interests are playing on with this paranoia to continue to have a firm grip on things happening in AEC. I still can't understand why RC continues to be at the helm of affairs even after 11 years...We can't find a replacement for him?

geeth · Post by **geeth** » 15 Sep 2009 09:42

In the article about de-titration, it was mentioned that Tritium decays into Helium 3. Isn't this the wonder material that the moon explorer is looking for? I read it somewhere that few Kg of Helium 3 is enough to generate energy for the entire nation for a year. If so, when Tritum decays into Helium 3, isn't it a more worthwhile product as far as energy is concerned?

Can Helium 3 used as fuel in a TN device?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 15 Sep 2009 10:12

In the conventional sense of the term - the armed forces (of India at least) are one of the major "tools" for national security. But given India's NFU doctrine that calls for retaliation against civilian targets in response to a nuclear attack there is no way our Armed Forces can be told "OK - at this point we will allow you to use nuclear weapons to achieve certain military goals" without making complete nonsense of this doctrine (as I understand it)

I mean that if there is, for instance a "limited" use of a nuke against India - for example a nuke against a concentration of armor - the Indian response has to be total retaliation against civilian targets and not some graded incremental response where we say "OK you hit our armor with a nuke so we will hit 2 airbases with nukes"

If the latter has to be done it means that we are planning for limited tactical nuclear battles without massive retaliation. And if we are planning for limited tactical nuclear battles we have to take a wide section of the armed forces into confidence and ask them to practice scenarios where they will use nukes.

But as I understand it. India's doctrine is clear. If there is _any_nuclear_attack_ on an Indian target, there will be massive retaliation against enemy population centers. If this policy is to be followed - all that needed is a limited set of people in the armed forces to know which missiles and which planes will be armed with nukes and what the targets are. They will not be used at all until someone in India gets nuked. After that their only job will be to launch the massive retaliation.

This is my understanding.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 15 Sep 2009 11:21

shiv wrote:all that needed is a limited set of people in the armed forces to know which missiles and which planes will be armed with nukes and what the targets are. They will not be used at all until someone in India gets nuked. After that their only job will be to launch the massive retaliation.

This is my understanding.

The above decision making is in the domain of Armed forces, how to plan for a effective second strike, includes
1) Dispersal of systems and making sure operational units of the same exist and can be used.
2) Planning for which enemy assets are targeted by which units in the view that some units may not survive the first strike.

Surely our massive deterrence is not based on a BARC scientist handing over a suitcase to a major somewhere in east and asking him "I just got a call from my parent in Jingopura that Delhi has been Nuked, so would you like to see if these contents can reach Bejing, I know I know this comes as a surprise, but perhaps you will try, please do"

So training, planning and operation for the big blow will involve the Armed forces (the top brasses and the missile divisions etc at least)

This separation of Armed forces and Nuclear doctrine was sought to be put to an end to by ending the "nudge nudge wink wink approach" in the 90s, I think the Armed forces must be fully on board now, it is an operational imperative.

----------------------------

Also from a different perspectives the whole Cold Start talks about using the Indian Military in a way that precludes a nuclear option, or a "full" war. During the conventional war they can expect an odd tactical nuke lobbed their way. The armed forces thus need to understand what the nuclear thresholds are, how to handle such situation and what the expected response from them should be.

I also think the question of Tactical nukes is open -- we do seem to have those as well based on Pokhran tests, I am personally not confident that Delhi will get into a full scale city busting match because a tactical nuke is used on a corner of India. Maybe it will but maybe it would want a tactical nuclear battle but not being the one to escalate.

That is my understanding

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 15 Sep 2009 11:28

Gagan wrote:The theory that the village was intended to survive because the monitoring site was just as close is not correct. The village would have been decimated if the blast had indeed crossed ~100KT in khetolai, while the monitoring site would have survived because it was intended to survive and was just a light bunker with a tin roof.

Are you using this for something I said? Please note, I did not say monitoring sites, the specific structures in question was the logistics base for the test. A bunch of Army building.

That is different from light weight monitoring site.

VijayKumarSinha · Post by **VijayKumarSinha** » 15 Sep 2009 11:58

shiv wrote:In the conventional sense ..........This is my understanding.

If the concentration of Indian armor is inside Pakistan, would it still mean massive retaliation against them? Or will that only happen if the use of nuke was used on Indian land.

I am asking this because in this interview at 4:00 minutes Ahmad Rashid says that Pak threatened to nuke Indian armor inside Sindh in 2002. So, I want to know what might happened in that scenario.

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 15 Sep 2009 13:17

A modification Shiv - if there is any WMD attack on an Indian target or Indian forces operating within or outside the country - the retaliation will be against cities.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 15 Sep 2009 16:40

Sanku wrote: So training, planning and operation for the big blow will involve the Armed forces (the top brasses and the missile divisions etc at least

Yes. But a lot more people will need to be involved in training - at corps level if a tactical war were being planned where nuclear retaliation might have to be done at a local level against a massed tank attack or air base. My understanding is that such a widespread involvement of the armed forces in utilizing nuclear weapons is not envisaged and only certain specific groups - certain squadrons and missile groups will train to attack certain targets in case such use is necessary.

The difference is a vastly smaller number of people involved in the command and control mechanism.

As I understand it - every unit of the armed forces has to ready itself to fight in an NBC environment in case they are attacked. But the retaliation is left to a small political and armed forces group. In other words only a very small number of people in the armed forces who need to know will know exactly what the training is for and and even smaller number will know where and how the nukes will be produced for retaliation.

This is my guess.

PS Thx Sanjay for the correction

K_Rohit · Post by **K_Rohit** » 15 Sep 2009 20:37

I had a question here..what is the sense in investing in mega-accurate, conventional long-range (read intermediate or inter-continental) missiles?
- Can we foresee a scenario where conventional attacks with long-range missiles will not be (mis)interpreted as breach of the nuclear threshold?
- And if such a scenario is indeed not practical and we will always be using nuclear warheads, why invest in accuracy in these missiles. As long as it falls in the general vicinity of the city, I am ok, right?
Instead, just concentrate on mass production of these missiles?

I am sure I am missing the point somewhere, but where?

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 15 Sep 2009 20:45

Sanku wrote:Are you using this for something I said?

I was referring to Narayanan's theory of the yield being what the test team wanted, based on the monitoring station being located closer to the test site than khetolai.
As was seen in the picture of the US test preparation, the monitoring stations can lie very close to the test shaft even if the yield was quite big. This argument is very weak when one corelates distance from shaft of the village and the monitoring site as a guide to what the expected yield was.

Just say that the village was close and so the test team went in for a lower yield. This is what the test team at pokharan-2 said and this fact has been disputed before.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 15 Sep 2009 21:55

The flux compressor generator stuff, as reported, doesn't yield anything practical. It has a long history, starting with experiments on magnetic flux compression (liner implosion) using Hi explosives, which dates back to the late 1960's and early 1970's at Frascati in Italy. The work was abruptly stopped (for obvious reasons), and furthered elsewhere using more efficient drivers.

Search and you may find. Z-pinch is evolving. but all that is Off Topic.

So let us stop digressing and stick to POK-II and Indian nuclear testing.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 15 Sep 2009 22:44

I was referring to Narayanan's theory of the yield being what the test team wanted, based on the monitoring station being located closer to the test site than khetolai.
As was seen in the picture of the US test preparation, the monitoring stations can lie very close to the test shaft even if the yield was quite big. This argument is very weak when one corelates distance from shaft of the village and the monitoring site as a guide to what the expected yield was.

Sorry Gagan, but that post above is rather, how shall I say it, "less-than-outstanding". Clearly you did not read either my post or Gerard's post that clarified what should have been perfectly obvious with a little thought - that these "monitoring stations" do not stay there DURING the nuclear test. Or ignored them. Says a lot for the quality of discussion on this thread.

For that matter, the news reports of the time speak of the "monitoring" huts etc. (India is SDRE - where Pakistan and US use concrete/steel Monitoring Towers, India uses pucca thatched hut onlee) located at S1/S2/S3/S4/S5 being "charred" and destroyed.

. So by your logic, if those US Megaton blasts left the tower right next to them unscathed, then the Indian tests must have been HAJAAR Megatons. IOW, GIGATons onlee.

Meanwhile, here's the Ultimate Fusion Test Solution, that does not even violate See Tee Bee Tee. Enjoy.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 15 Sep 2009 22:55

shiv wrote:
Sanku wrote: So training, planning and operation for the big blow will involve the Armed forces (the top brasses and the missile divisions etc at least
In other words only a very small number of people in the armed forces who need to know will know exactly what the training is for and and even smaller number will know where and how the nukes will be produced for retaliation.

I agree, and this has been my point too. However the term "involving the armed forces" seem to suggest different things to different people including asking them to "just take it for granted that it will work".

I was just trying to explore what the minimum needed involvement and "A-OK" by armed forces in different scenarios would be, just like you have in the above post.

Jonathan Allen · Post by **Jonathan Allen** » 15 Sep 2009 23:28

Times of India: No Reason to doubt yeld of Pokhran II

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 16 Sep 2009 00:45

http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ ... 913a2.html

Sunday, Sept. 13, 2009

READERS IN COUNCIL
India must continue nuclear tests

By DIPAK BASU
Nagasaki

Ramesh Thakur is quite wrong in his Sept. 8 article, "Revisiting the folly of India's nuclear tests." The nuclear tests of India in 1998 did not create a nuclear-armed Pakistan. According to A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani scientist who developed nuclear weapons with the help of China, Pakistan got its nuclear weapons in 1983. Thus, if during the Pakistani invasion of Kargil in 1999, India had crossed the international border to take away a major chunk of Pakistan, the response from Pakistan would have been a nuclear attack, as it was ready with Chinese missiles fitted with nuclear weapons.

U.S. President Bill Clinton saved both countries by asking Pakistan to withdraw. It would be complete madness and stupidity for India not to have a full-scale nuclear defense against both China and Pakistan. For that reason, India must conduct more nuclear tests until it can achieve that credible defense.

Thakur's arguments remind me of what Gandhi advised the British in 1940 — welcome Hitler into Britain and, in response, Hitler's heart would melt. Gandhi brought disaster to India, with the eventual partition of the country and the deaths of 3 million to 4 million people. At least 14 million became homeless, as he had no strategy against the Muslim League and the British. Similarly, without plans for a nuclear deterrent, India will surely be destroyed by either China, Pakistan or both.

The opinions expressed in this letter to the editor are the writer's own and do not necessarily reflect the policies of The Japan Times.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Sep 2009 01:02

Mr. Basu will be accused of watching too many Bushido movies.
Per AEC everything is fine. Which it is, till it hits the fan. But then these folks wont be there any more. Neither will we be there. Only history to record the delusions and gullibility.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Sep 2009 01:45

Siddharth Vardarajan writes:

Sing NPT, accept full safeguards US want UN to tell India

Sign NPT, accept full safeguards, U.S. wants U.N. to tell India

Siddharth Varadarajan

Obama nonproliferation resolution in Security Council has no place for India exception

New Delhi: In a measure of how the official line in Washington on India’s nuclear status has changed from the Bush to the Obama administrations, the U.S. is circulating a draft U.N. Security Council resolution calling, inter alia, for all Indian nuclear facilities to be placed under international safeguards and not just those that have been declared “civilian” under the July 2005 Indo-U.S. civil nuclear agreement.

The ostensible rationale for the resolution President Barack Obama would like adopted at the special UNSC session he will chair on September 24 is to demonstrate the seriousness of his stated commitment to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

But there is a sting in the tail for India: For the first time since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force, the UNSC is going to demand that all states outside the treaty sign it immediately or begin adhering to its provisions.

The only other time the UNSC has adopted such a prescriptive demand for a country or group of countries that never accepted the treaty was in 1998, when it passed resolution 1172 urging India and Pakistan to sign the NPT as well as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the wake of the nuclear tests both countries conducted in May that year.

Since then, 1172 has been treated by the international community, and the U.S. in particular, as a dead letter as far as India is concerned.

.....

Of special concern to India, therefore, is the third operational paragraph of Mr. Obama’s proposed resolution, which says the U.N.: “Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to join the Treaty so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and in any case to adhere to its terms;”.

For a country like India, that is not a party to the NPT and did not explode a nuclear device prior to 1968, the phrase “to join the treaty… and in any case to adhere to its terms” essentially means it should open up all nuclear facilities for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency so that the latter can ensure that Indian reactors and fissile material stocks are not being used for weapons purposes.

Preambular paragraph 15 also reaffirms “all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council,” an implicit reference to Resolution 1172.

Taken together, these references to India may lack enforceability but they do signal a quiet return to the “roll back” rhetoric and discourse of the Clinton era, before President George W. Bush pushed for India to be made an exception to the requirements of the NPT-related non-proliferation architecture.

Over the past few months, U.S. administration officials have revived the push for NPT universality at various international forums and sought to get the G8 to back a ban on enrichment and reprocessing technology sales to countries like India that have not signed the treaty.

Though these moves have been accompanied by statements of support for the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and the beginning of talks on reprocessing, the repeated foregrounding of the NPT suggests growing American impatience with the Bush administration premise that India’s nuclear credentials warrant it being placed in a category different from Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.

Other provisions

The draft resolution also contains a range of other provisions on the CTBT, the permanence of safeguards and so on, as well explicitly requiring that all situations of “noncompliance with non-proliferation obligations” be brought to the UNSC which would then determine whether this non-compliance was a threat to international peace and security.

The only reference the resolution makes to the actual abolition of nuclear weapons is its call for all NPT and non-NPT members to undertake to pursue good faith negotiations on “a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” By clubbing together non-NPT states with all NPT states (i.e. both the nuclear and non-nuclear), this formulation avoids extending de facto recognition to the nuclear weapon status of India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea.

This call would not have been there is there wasn't ambiguity about Indian tests. The fizzle or reduced sizzle places India at mercy of such moves.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 16 Sep 2009 02:08

Discussion moved to India-nuclear thread

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Sep 2009 02:47

OK will follow there.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 16 Sep 2009 02:59

ramana: I have to disagree strongly with your statement

This call would not have been there is there wasn't ambiguity about Indian tests. The fizzle or reduced sizzle places India at mercy of such moves.

There would continue to be these sorts of things because the NPAs would never recognize India as P-6 regardless of whether 1-MT or 5-MT tests were conducted. The demand is for India to "CRE". "CRE" would be demanded whether India was seen to have 5 SDRE fizzle bums, or 500 maccho TFTA megabums.

BECAUSE India presents the image of a nation that puts up with such garbage from the likes of the NPAs.

China is not being pressured, because everyone knows that China would just not put up with anything like that, and would probably retaliate in very clear ways for any China-directed attacks/moves.

Going and conducting 5 more mega-tests like France did in 1998 would do nothing to enhance India's position and much to degrade it.

The golas that the GOI needs to acquire are not nuclear in nature at all, as we all know. Testing megaweapons that everyone knows are useless Doomsday bluffs, is no way to compensate for the lack of the golas to act decisively in all other matters.

If India would do any of the following, it would promptly improve matters: I am citing what I think China would have done (and usually does).
1. Issue an outright condemnation of the NPT.
2. Reiterate the nonsense, illegal nature of the CTBT and the fraudulent manner of its attempted imposition - IOW, reiterate the Arundhati Ghose statement from 1998.
3. Show very clear rejection of all the nasty NPAs as far as participation in any India-based discussions. "Cut them dead" -figuratively speaking, of course, ignore them and reduce their stature. Make them non-functional, as in rejecting any discussions where they have any role.
4. PUBLICIZE everything GOI knows about the Xerox Khan / Pakistan Government / China relationships, and the American acquiescence therein, including the repeated false statements made by US Presidents and their representatives before the US Congress swearing that Pakistan had no nuclear weapon program. NAME the guys/gals who lied. Post it on the web.

Testing hydrogen bombs is not the answer.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Sep 2009 03:17

N^3 while I agree to most of what you say I still retain my right to express my opinion. I will not take a back seat where Indian interests are concerned and will articulate them as needed.

Most of what you suggest is to prop up the power structure and appeal to their soft side. Its like "appealing from Philip* drunk to Philip sober!" It still is to an appeal to Philip. And so wont work.

* Philip was the King of Macedonia before his son Alexander and notorius for being drunk and arrogant. Not our Philip.

What should have happened but didnt for what ever reasons has not brought hte structure down. And that is why we are here.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 16 Sep 2009 03:24

N^3,

Although I agree with pretty much everything you state, what is your 'game plan'. What is it you would want the next move Obama makes?

Clearly Omaba has the lead (and the mike, etc). He is trying to force the issue because he has the attention.

However, everything there was very predictable - absolutely nothing new.

The good news is that India has flat 7-8 days to formulate a response. The bad news is that the Indian Amby - in past few days - trumpeted that Indo-US efforts on proliferation was very good. It seems to me that even she did not see this coming!!!! Which is very strange for a topic like this.

India's nuclear Kargil?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 16 Sep 2009 03:32

IMHO, the silence that ND maintains, breaks it only when everything is very, very quite, speaks in very low voice, etc - is all fine. But, it really does not do any good for the debate that one needs to have in public (what goes on in the background is nothing we can control or even perhaps influence). IF ND feels that this draft is bad, it is the right time to say that in public.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 16 Sep 2009 04:12

India's nuclear Kargil?

ramana, I too am blindsided with the facts (if true) in SV's article. BO's claim is that neither the G-8 scam nor this (I am predicting, here) is aimed at India, and the US-India and IAEA agreements supersede all this.

What's wrong with India taking that at face value and acting accordingly? Why keep seeking reassurance as in the Roberta Flack song:

So tell me nyaaaaaaw... and I'll keep asking agaaaaaain!
Do u still love me, tomooooooooooooorrow?

The IAEA exemption is signed and sealed. The US-India Nuclear Deal is signed and sealed and ratified by COTUS. End of story. BILATERAL agreements have been signed/ are in process with Vodkastan and Frogistan, and probably with 'Roostan. These are based on mutual interest, meaning $$$$.

Why see a "sky is falling" here? If the NSG / UNSC etc bring in new conditionalities etc., India should ignore them. Do what Babus do best - foot-drag, equivocate, express happiness, lose the file and declare complete ignorance.

OB is reduced to negotiating directly with Dear Leader - and I predict soon with Ahmedinejad if the Israel lobby will agree to suffer that. Or else he will be forced to cut loose his leftist loony supporters.

If India is to be a credible power, nuclear or otherwise, the first trait to show is that of cheerfully doing

to the duniya.

So - I see no reason for India to respond to anything. Act like it does not apply to India, and that India is an NWS.

Play the P-4 against each other, and if they start bullying, then, yes, it will be time for other types of demonstrations that India is a free country.

As I see it, the official US WHOTUS position, ratified by COTUS, is that India has a bilateral agreement with US, and a "clean exemption" from IAEA (yes, yes, I know, there are many who do the equivalent of running a silk handkerchief over the distributor caps and declaring the car dirty). India should ignore these other machinations, because without India's acquiescence, there's diddly-squat that they are going to do.

Quit the UN if needed, declaring that it is an illegal organization because it passes resolutions that are blatantly against the norms of international law - no country can be held to any "treaty" that it has not signed. Read the Arundhati Ghose declaration again, ramana. As far I can see, that is still GOI's position. So unless proven otherwise, SV's article is a bit murgi-ki-choti-beti.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 16 Sep 2009 04:25

NRao wrote:IMHO, the silence that ND maintains, breaks it only when everything is very, very quite, speaks in very low voice, etc - is all fine. But, it really does not do any good for the debate that one needs to have in public (what goes on in the background is nothing we can control or even perhaps influence). IF ND feels that this draft is bad, it is the right time to say that in public.

This silence and no debate before this announcement indicates that ND had these information and has discussed. There is a lobby which actually favors this and wants to slide in this without much debate.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 16 Sep 2009 04:28

There is nothing new in the UNSC resolution draft. "Universal adherence" has been official US policy since the NPT was signed. Testing and yields are immaterial to this US policy.

They called on India to sign it before the 1974 PNE test, after it, before the 1998 tests, after them, last year and now again. They can call until all the cows come home. India is full of cows.

Obama has made no move to abrogate the nuclear deal and reimpose the NSG full scope rules.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 16 Sep 2009 04:39

Well, for one these past few posts need to be moved to the Indian nuclear thread.

The question about yield still remains. N^3, I can buy what you state - that Obama has two tracks. But, where I differ is: a) I am inclined to support Ramana's contention that this draft has something to do with the fizzle debate currently going on (receding?) in India, and b) From Obama's PoV, the two track (1) IAEA/NSG/country signatures, etc and 2)CTBT/NPT) are related.

However, what Obama is saying (my read) that IAEA/NSG/etc is fine BUT India NEEDS to place everything under safeguards.

Again, these discussions need to be moved to the other thread - they really do not reflect on the Pokhran issue.

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 16 Sep 2009 04:40

Yup, shrug it off and move on. We've (India) been here before. Whether we got the yield or not, we got what we got and we gotta get what we gotta get. So keep at it.
(Do we have enough to take on chipak?)

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 16 Sep 2009 04:44

Obama has made no move to abrogate the nuclear deal and reimpose the NSG full scope rules.

He tried and seems to have failed - at the G8.

I can see him splitting the entire topic and getting what he can. Then he will repeat the process and go as far as he can. He will never threaten India (or Pak/Israel), but will constantly push.

However, the Pokhran issue is now on the back burner. India really cannot afford to test under these circumstances for some time to come.