Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

vera_k · Post by **vera_k** » 16 Sep 2009 22:26

The press release makes it a point to mention Dr. Raja Ramanna's presence at the meetings held in 1999 in what seems like an effort to derive credibility. Why is mentioning his presence that important?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Sep 2009 22:36

Well he was former AEC chairman and involved in the POKI. Its an appeal to authority. Question is was it the real radio-chem or the one in the BARC paper?

And what were the underlying circumustances of the two meetings? Looks like one was before Kargil (March '99)and the other after Kargil (Nov '99) and Mushy's coup. How come PKI nor any of the dissidents is not privy to any of this if MRS is included?

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 16 Sep 2009 22:39

The world sees our strength and classifies us according to what it sees - and not necessarily according to what we desire.

can I say this?
We can see our strength and classify ourselves according to what we desire, and not necessarily according to what we have heard about what we have done.

There are a lot of obfusscations in these strategic matters, that remains to be hidden. So, I am asking can we see ourselves the strength having done, and feel comfortable in what we have, rather get perturbed by few high ranked questions, that is having a 50-50 probability in terms of agreement between the minds of AEC, and those highly ranked professionals who claim otherwise.

Finally, what we see, is what we believe.. I for one, dont want this be another magic or maya analysis, rather a clear boolean value to testing., but..that we can never see or hear.

vishwakarmaa · Post by **vishwakarmaa** » 16 Sep 2009 22:42

shiv wrote:Unless something drastic happens there will be no test. Despite all these calls that UN will ask nations to do blah blah - all these things are hogwash. If India wants to test India can test - UN or no UN, window or no window. Any anxiety we show regarding a UN demanding something or the other stems only from a desire to be called good boy and "responsible power".

We are eternally desperate to be called responsible power hoping that someone will give us status and say "OK you are big boy now". Of course that will never happen - but it's not going to sink into the Indian mindset either. Our strength is our strength. No more no less. The world sees our strength and classifies us according to what it sees - and not necessarily according to what we desire.

Nicely summed up. This should be a sticky wallpaper in MEA and PMO.

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 16 Sep 2009 22:55

So this world of cheats out to deny us of our rightful mastery of TN weapons appears to be an organized mafia fight. Five guys meet in the park and pretty much run riot there. A sixth guy comes in and says he wants to be a part of the space too and they laugh at him. The sixth guy then says look if you try to push me of our little planet, I am going to blow you up with this thing I got like you. They hesitate a little, then they say, naah, you don't got nothing and whatever you got is because of that candu f*cker out there who wanted to play all nice to you back when you seemed like you couldn't even walk. This gets the sixth guy riled a little and he insists look I got it alright and don't push me. If you play with me that's cool, I'll never use it. They think for a bit and then say, ok, may be if you let us put our hands in our pockets and squeeze those balls a little to make sure they are all there, that might be ok. After much thought mr. six, who is really desperate to stay in the park, says ok, that's cool. The others aren't so sure. They don't really like Mr. Six, he acts like he has no balls really. So, they say, nahh, this is all BS, you got no balls in the first place. Finally, one day, mr six wakes up and takes out one of his balls and throws. There is a faint sound. Mr. six says, see! see! I got the balls man! The others say, what balls, I didn't even hear a fart and it could've been that for sure. Mr. Six is now desperate. He doesn't know if his old balls are any good, he doesn't want to make a ruckus in the park, and he is desperate to get along. The story is that these guys screwed with Mr. six when he was a kid for many many years. They stole his toys, they yanked his tongue, and all that time, there was Mr. Six, singing, hum us desh ke vasi hain, jis desh me ganga behti hai. Mehman jo hamara hota hai, voh jan se pyara hota hai... Mr. six thinks he's the soul of the park. The others just look at him like a...

S

abhiti · Post by **abhiti** » 16 Sep 2009 22:59

vishwakarmaa wrote:
shiv wrote:We are eternally desperate to be called responsible power hoping that someone will give us status and say "OK you are big boy now". Of course that will never happen - but it's not going to sink into the Indian mindset either. Our strength is our strength. No more no less. The world sees our strength and classifies us according to what it sees - and not necessarily according to what we desire.
Nicely summed up. This should be a sticky wallpaper in MEA and PMO.

Even though I disagree with much of what Shiv has been posting, I do agree with the above especially the part "Our strength is our strength. No more no less." Therefore the reason to increase our strength drastically becoming nuclear weapon state in practice and not just in science of it. We need thousands of nukes deliverable using ICBM to achieve security from threats (more notably Chinese). No agreement can make India world power, it can only be done by correct decisions by MMS and Sonia.

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 16 Sep 2009 23:01

Yes, and I have been saying that since the no-clear debate: we got what we got and that's all we got. "Ain't nobody gonna do us no favors" back then, it was all about more electricity. It's looking electric alright.

vasu_ray · Post by **vasu_ray** » 16 Sep 2009 23:21

Here's something from the other side of the 'nuclear testing coin', the 3 stage nuclear power program reaching a milestone

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india ... on/517864/

which is on top of deals to obtain Uranium

mraghu · Post by **mraghu** » 16 Sep 2009 23:36

Looking at all the issues in front of GOI and indians
- China War like Noises
- Pakistan border attacks
- Pokhran - II yield issues/CTBT....

Which of these is a real attack that India is facing (or will face in the next 3 months)? it smells like that plot in the novel Disclosure where the newly appointed CEO want's to get rid of her ex-lover and also does not want him to know the real problem that the company is facing ( contaminated Manufacturing plant ) and so she creates a temp problem of sexual harrasment and makes her opponent spend most of his time trying to resolve a useless issue.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 17 Sep 2009 00:08

vasu_ray wrote:Here's something from the other side of the 'nuclear testing coin', the 3 stage nuclear power program reaching a milestone

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india ... on/517864/

which is on top of deals to obtain Uranium

Something in line with what I was proposing as the intermediate solution where PHWR can be run in mixed mode.

However the most cost effective, compact and Thorium efficient reactor however will be the type that uses Enriched-Uranium (I.e. original AHWR of Indian design).

This BARC design using -Low Enriched Uranium is making lemonade from the 123/IUCNA lemon that prevents import of enriched Uranium as well as prevents enrichment of imported Uranium.

Pls recall that original Indian AHWR proposed using Plutonium and not Uranium as feed stock to maintain criticality, while 75-90% energy comes from in-situ Thorium.

vasu_ray · Post by **vasu_ray** » 17 Sep 2009 00:28

Arun, using LEU helps in allowing more reaction time for the operator? hence better safety margin for the plant? for us, plutonium isn't abundant either unless there is clarity on the reprocessing rights of imported uranium

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 17 Sep 2009 01:33

My take on this is that there will be no window to test unless we create a window and test any time. But India desires to be a good boy and show the world that it is a "responsible power" hence no test.

That is, perhaps, the extent or range of the test spectrum. From we can and will do what we want to do....... all the way to ......... do you really want us to do it, nah, it is not good manners, etc.

The window I talked about falls smack somewhere in the middle. It does not mean that India will test, it just means if India wants to test it will have the right stars aligned to do so. India, I feel, will have enough "support" to test and those that do not support will have to sit it out - granted after making a lot of noise.

Unless something drastic happens there will be no test. Despite all these calls that UN will ask nations to do blah blah - all these things are hogwash. If India wants to test India can test - UN or no UN, window or no window. Any anxiety we show regarding a UN demanding something or the other stems only from a desire to be called good boy and "responsible power".

Not an expert, but the draft seems to be a dusted off old document, with a few more bullet points.

What will be new is a President of the US chairing a meeting and thus having the entire world's focus. Not that that matters, but there will be a lot of noise around it.

I feel what really would matter is the Nov trip. The good news is that Obama has given MMS a whole lot of time to rehearse his "I have a mandate" speech. "I have a mandate to test." - would be the ideal statement to make and then extend an invitation to Obama to visit ND and test the day after he leaves.

We are eternally desperate to be called responsible power hoping that someone will give us status and say "OK you are big boy now". Of course that will never happen - but it's not going to sink into the Indian mindset either. Our strength is our strength. No more no less. The world sees our strength and classifies us according to what it sees - and not necessarily according to what we desire.

True.

But, as this thread as a testament, India does have a way of shooting herself in the foot. India really does not use her natural strengths to her advantage.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 17 Sep 2009 01:45

vasu_ray wrote:Arun, using LEU helps in allowing more reaction time for the operator? hence better safety margin for the plant? for us, plutonium isn't abundant either unless there is clarity on the reprocessing rights of imported uranium

LEU has nothing to do with reaction time for operator or plant safety.
Pls use nuclear thread for further discussion.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 17 Sep 2009 02:15

Please read in full: From the Indian Defence Review
Time to test our nuclear deterrence

Lt Gen Vinay Shankar
...
Nuclear deterrence is determined by its credibility. Credibility flows from demonstrated capability and the potential adversary's perception of our national resolve. Claims may not always convince. Consequently, an unconvinced adversary can be tempted to gamble; besides uncertainty fuels instability.
Nuclear deterrence is built primarily around warheads, their yield and delivery systems. The range of delivery systems is dependent on the weight of the warhead; heavier the warhead lesser the range. Hence the imperative of maximising yield to weight ratios. Efficient fusion bombs give yields in megatons as against the kiloton yields of fission bombs.

We claimed the yield of the hydrogen bomb we tested in 1998 to be about-42 kiloton. Agencies monitoring such tests assessed it to be of a much lower value. This is the nub of the current debate.

Admittedly, simulation techniques in the 21st century are much more sophisticated than they were earlier but whether they can totally obviate the requirement to test is highly questionable. In any case if they did the CTBT would lose its relevance and consequently we should have no issues about becoming a signatory to it.

How has our conventional and nuclear deterrence operated in the last decade? Kargil, Parakram and 26/11 have each highlighted two obviously very unpalatable deductions: the first is that our conventional deterrence is inadequate and the second- Pakistanâ€™s nuclear deterrence is effectively in place.

Militarily, India stands neutralised against Pakistan so all we can do is to `talk` and `not talk` interspersed with complaints to all and sundry. We seem to have no other options. The preceding is admittedly an overstatement, but necessary to make my point.

The equation between Pakistan and India can in some ways be compared to the equation between India and China. China`s conventional military capability is greater than India`s but both are nuclear weapon states. Yet China seems to be getting away with intimidation and intrusions with no country in the world raising alarms about the possibility of a nuclear exchange between India and China.

Should not China be worrying about India`s nuclear threshold and drawing `red lines` of the kind we have been engaged in drawing against Pakistan? Why can we not indulge in nuclear brinkmanship of the kind that Pakistan has practiced? Is it because we do not possess the nuclear deterrence that we should and China knows it, as also the rest of the world?

I am convinced - period.

The complexity of pursuing nuclear weapons capability or for that matter even conventional military hardware is recognised. It should also be accepted that the institutional decision making apparatus with its inherent caution and conservatism is unlikely to be up to the challenge of addressing these intricacies without political direction. Can our political leadership provide such direction?

On available evidence it would appear that India has to test. The timing and how the event is to be orchestrated are issues that merit examination, unless we can access the technology from those who have it.

Lastly an unrelated though relevant observation: this is about the perennial gap in perception of the performance of military hardware between the military and the designer -scientists. In such instances it would be prudent to go by the views of the military.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Sep 2009 02:56

Gagan, The core issue is the fusion achieved in S-I is not enough to sustain the scaling. The issue is not wheter fusion happened- it did by those isotopes BRAc revealed in the radio-chem paper. Its whether there was enough of it which would show up as radius of cavity size and seismic mb values. If there is clear secy evidence that what was stated was achieved there would be no discussion. None of this angst or

s.

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 17 Sep 2009 03:07

when common sense evacuates the deterrance evoprates

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 17 Sep 2009 03:19

Only two posters use smileys in this thread. They are requested to desist.

Thanks to shiv for confessing 2 b 1 of the 2, but I am clearly the other. I am sorry but I do not see the point of this request. The problem on this thread is not people using "smileys" (hellooo - they are being used because they are available and I have to keep "testing" to assure that these Peaceful Devices are working...) but ppl continuing to ignore compelling logic in a way that can only be described by a smiley - specifically the one showing "rotfl" and continuing to "whine". This leads to the inescapable conclusion that the arguments they present are not based on logic and honest thinking but parroting some political line.

OK.. back to this. Samuel, to extend that nice analogy of yours:
*********************************************************

Mr. Six is now desperate. He doesn't know if his old balls are any good, he doesn't want to make a ruckus in the park, and he is desperate to get along. The story is that these guys screwed with Mr. six when he was a kid for many many years. They stole his toys, they yanked his tongue, and all that time, there was Mr. Six, singing, hum us desh ke vasi hain, jis desh me ganga behti hai. Mehman jo hamara hota hai, voh jan se pyara hota hai... Mr. six thinks he's the soul of the park. The others just look at him like a...

The hope of several of the bullies is that by goading Mr. Six into going and rob a jogger or tourist or, even better, assault her just to prove that he "has balls". That will destroy Mr. Six and all his hopes and aspirations and put him behind bars (or get him shot by police) and they can go rob his home, take his bicycle and all his marbles.

Question: Is Mr. Six really such an idiot? Or will be just go home, make sure his catapult and cycle chain and brass knuckles are still there with him, and continue to walk in the park carrying both (but never making a lot of noise about either)? Or, better still, join the local Community Self Defense force and organize some good people and teach them about the machinations of the Gang of 5 - and thus develop some REAL force-multipliers?
***************************************************

Arun_S:

Your proposed sequence is pretty much in sync with what I too would like to see: Get at least 2 of the P-5 firmly committed and engaged in productive activities developing nuclear power in India.. this process takes several years, not "by November 5, 2009". Whether to do any live testing in 2020 is a decision best left until then.

Otherwise, yes, be prepared with the weapons, and if the security environment demands it in a manner that is very visible, SAY SO clearly, and test the WEAPONS along with any other science tests. But NOT unless and until India is prepared to go public and show very clearly WHY the testing is essential due to a clear and present existential threat. Not just mumble-mumble and equivocate and use diplo-garbage like "some nations" (reminds me of "some postors").

I really don't think there is going to be a shortage of opportunities. Japan is getting close due to NOKO activities. And if Iran tests, won't Israel? So the NPT and CTBT are headed for rough weather. Chinese activities, esp. in NOKO and AQK activities, should be highlighted by the GOI in the Indian and world media along with satellite photos of their intrusion into India, and that should be used to show the urgent need to do some weapon tests.

sivab · Post by **sivab** » 17 Sep 2009 03:42

http://www.hindu.com/2009/09/17/stories ... 550900.htm

Pokhran-II thermonuclear test, a failure

K. Santhanam and Ashok Parthasarathi

A critical analysis of the technical facts can lead to no other conclusion. BARC must learn to tell the nation the truth.

Several inaccuracies in the claims made by BARC and in the articles published in the press, including The HinduPokhran-II need to be corrected. We have hard evidence on a purely factual basis, to inform the nation that not only was the yield of the second fusion (H-bomb) stage of the thermonuclear (TN) device tested in May 1998 was not only far below the design prediction made by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), but that it actually failed.

All the five nuclear tests conducted in May 1998 were undertaken through a joint BARC and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) team. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and R. Chidambaram assigned the DRDO team the critical responsibility for all the field instrumentation to record seismic data from all the tests: this was vital in estimating the yields. The seismic sensors were placed at many points in the device shafts and out to a radius of 2.5 km. The sensors and instrumentation were calibrated several hundred times and perfected. They fully met international standards and were acknowledged to be so by BARC.

The DRDO was thus deeply involved in all the seismic measurements and was fully aware of the BARC-projected readings vis-À-vis its own measurements. One of the authors, Dr. Santhanam, was personally aware in detail from key BARC scientists of the core designs and hence the projected yields. Consequently, the reference in a report published by The Hindu on August 28 (headlined “’Fizzle’ claim for thermonuclear test refuted”) attributed to a “former senior official of the Vajpayee government” that I was “not privy to the actual weapon designs which are highly classified,” was incorrect.

The DRDO also designed and conducted numerous tests of the High Explosive (HE) Trigger of the TN test. BARC scientists witnessed these tests, took copies of test records, and expressed satisfaction with the DRDO’s work.

Over May-October 1998, DRDO produced a comprehensive report of actual seismic readings vis-À-vis values predicted by BARC, mentioning why the former showed considerably lower yields than the latter.

The DRDO report was discussed at a meeting called by National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra in late 1998. The meeting was attended by Dr. Chidambaram and Dr. S.K. Sikka, the scientific head of the BARC team; Mr. Kalam, the Director-General of the DRDO; Dr. V.K. Aatre, the Chief Controller of the DRDO, Dr. Santhanam, and the Chiefs of the Defence Services. Despite a long discussion, largely between the DRDO and BARC, both stuck to their positions on the TN device yield. Thereafter, the NSA took a ‘voice vote’! This was highly unusual because the matter was technically very complex and the services were ill equipped to give an opinion on yields. Most surprisingly, NSA concluded saying government would stand by Dr. Chidambaram’s opinion.

Dr. Chidambaram’s claims and those in Atomic Energy Commission statement reported on September 16 under headline “No reason to doubt the yield of 1998 nuclear test: AEC” are wrong.

BARC basically argued that the geological structure of Pokhran was different from test sites elsewhere. However, the DRDO and BARC utilised the same published information in their calculations of TN device yield. BARC accepted the DRDO’s yield estimates of the fission (A) bomb, but not of the TN device, although the latter’s shaft was situated only a few hundred metres from the former’s shaft. Globally, geological structures do not change dramatically at such small separations. So BARC’s argument to “explain” a lower TN yield is untenable.

Dr. Chidambaram’s statement that “the post-shot radioactivity measurements on samples extracted from the test site showed significant activity [levels] of radioisotopes Sodium 22 and Manganese 54, both of which are byproducts of a fusion reaction rather than a pure fission [device]” is incorrect. He should indicate the exact level of activity instead of merely saying “significant activity” as the activity level determines whether a fusion reaction of the magnitude claimed by BARC actually occurred.

Dr. P.K. Iyengar, a former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and a former Director of BARC, informed me that trace levels of these same isotopes were detected in Apsara, a pure fission reactor not involving any fusion at all. This is the exact opposite of Dr. Chidambaram’s claim.

Dr. Chidambaram’s statement that “from a study of this radioactivity and an estimate of the crater radius confirmed by drilling operations at positions away from the shaft, location, total yield and break-up of fission and fusion components, could be calculated” is extremely surprising. First, after the TN test, its shaft remained totally undamaged: if the fusion stage had worked, the shaft would have been totally destroyed. Secondly, the A-frame sitting astride the mouth of the shaft, with winches to lower and raise personnel, materials and so on, also remained completely intact. If the fusion stage had worked, the ‘A’ frame would also have been totally destroyed.

As for radioactivity levels, senior BARC radiochemists who undertook radio-assay of fission products in samples similarly drilled at Pokhran-I (of May 1974) told Santhanam that the yield announced to the media was substantially higher than what they had submitted to Dr. Raja Ramanna. Dr. Chidambaram must publicly substantiate any claim that it did not occur in the TN test along with justification data.

Dr. Chidambaram states: “BARC scientists worked out total yield of TN device as 50 +10 kt — consistent with design yield and seismic estimates.” However, he subsequently asserts: “BARC experts established DRDO had under-estimated yield due to faulty seismic instrumentation.” BARC cannot eat the cake and have it too.

The fission bomb yield from the DRDO’s seismic instrumentation was 25 +2 kiloton and left a crater 25 metres in diameter. If the TN device had really worked with a yield of 50 +2 kt, it should have left a crater almost 70 metres in diameter. Instead, all that happened was that sand and mud from the shaft were thrown several metres into the air and then fell back, forming a small depression in the shaft mouth. There was no crater.

This factual analysis reveals India’s decade-long, grim predicament regarding the failed TN bomb and so our Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD). No country having undertaken only two weapon related tests of which the core TN device failed, can claim to have a CMD. This is corroborated by fact that even after 11 years the TN device has not been weaponised by BARC while the 25 kiloton fission device has been fully weaponised and operationally deployed on multiplate weapon platforms. It would be farcical to use a 3500-km range Agni-3 missile with a 25 kiloton fission warhead as the core of our CMD. Only a 150 – 350 kiloton if not megaton TN bomb can do so which we do not have.

(K. Santhanam was Project Leader, Pokhran-II. He worked as a physicist at BARC for 15 years. Later he was Chief Adviser (Technologies) in DRDO for 14 years and was then also Director General, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Ashok Parthasarathi, the co-author of this article, was S&T Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and deeply involved in Pokhran-I, of May.)

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 17 Sep 2009 03:57

The above article says it all.
After all Wallace zindabad looks like.

This is your brain. This is your brain on H bum any questions?

I hope amit bhai is reading too.

Over to Shivji for expert commentary and psikology of BARC ways.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 17 Sep 2009 05:02

Oh Ramaaa .....
As my sources said, KSanthnam has key data (as life insurance) and will disclose if necessary. Dr. K. Santanama has now ripped the lies of BARC /Chidambaram/Brijesh Mishra to shreds. Emperor is now totally naked.

http://www.hindu.com/2009/09/17/stories ... 550900.htm

Pokhran-II thermonuclear test, a failure

K. Santhanam and Ashok Parthasarathi

A critical analysis of the technical facts can lead to no other conclusion. BARC must learn to tell the nation the truth.

Several inaccuracies in the claims made by BARC and in the articles published in the press, including The HinduPokhran-II need to be corrected. We have hard evidence on a purely factual basis, to inform the nation that not only was the yield of the second fusion (H-bomb) stage of the thermonuclear (TN) device tested in May 1998 was not only far below the design prediction made by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), but that it actually failed.

All the five nuclear tests conducted in May 1998 were undertaken through a joint BARC and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) team. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and R. Chidambaram assigned the DRDO team the critical responsibility for all the field instrumentation to record seismic data from all the tests: this was vital in estimating the yields. The seismic sensors were placed at many points in the device shafts and out to a radius of 2.5 km. The sensors and instrumentation were calibrated several hundred times and perfected. They fully met international standards and were acknowledged to be so by BARC.

The DRDO was thus deeply involved in all the seismic measurements and was fully aware of the BARC-projected readings vis-À-vis its own measurements. One of the authors, Dr. Santhanam, was personally aware in detail from key BARC scientists of the core designs and hence the projected yields. Consequently, the reference in a report published by The Hindu on August 28 (headlined “’Fizzle’ claim for thermonuclear test refuted”) attributed to a “former senior official of the Vajpayee government” that I was “not privy to the actual weapon designs which are highly classified,” was incorrect{Arun_S: Calling Brijesh Mishra's bluff.}.

The DRDO also designed and conducted numerous tests of the High Explosive (HE) Trigger of the TN test. BARC scientists witnessed these tests, took copies of test records, and expressed satisfaction with the DRDO’s work.

Over May-October 1998, DRDO produced a comprehensive report of actual seismic readings vis-À-vis values predicted by BARC, mentioning why the former showed considerably lower yields than the latter. {Arun_S: Who else but K.Santhanam's team did this.}.

The DRDO report was discussed at a meeting called by National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra in late 1998. The meeting was attended by Dr. Chidambaram and Dr. S.K. Sikka, the scientific head of the BARC team; Mr. Kalam, the Director-General of the DRDO; Dr. V.K. Aatre, the Chief Controller of the DRDO, Dr. Santhanam, and the Chiefs of the Defence Services. Despite a long discussion, largely between the DRDO and BARC, both stuck to their positions on the TN device yield. Thereafter, the NSA took a ‘voice vote’! This was highly unusual because the matter was technically very complex and the services were ill equipped to give an opinion on yields. Most surprisingly, NSA concluded saying government would stand by Dr. Chidambaram’s opinion {Arun_S: NSA in question is Brijesh Mishra}..

Dr. Chidambaram’s claims and those in Atomic Energy Commission statement reported on September 16 under headline “No reason to doubt the yield of 1998 nuclear test: AEC” are wrong.

BARC basically argued that the geological structure of Pokhran was different from test sites elsewhere. However, the DRDO and BARC utilised the same published information in their calculations of TN device yield. BARC accepted the DRDO’s yield estimates of the fission (A) bomb, but not of the TN device, although the latter’s shaft was situated only a few hundred metres from the former’s shaft. Globally, geological structures do not change dramatically at such small separations. So BARC’s argument to “explain” a lower TN yield is untenable.

Dr. Chidambaram’s statement that “the post-shot radioactivity measurements on samples extracted from the test site showed significant activity [levels] of radioisotopes Sodium 22 and Manganese 54, both of which are byproducts of a fusion reaction rather than a pure fission [device]” is incorrect. He should indicate the exact level of activity instead of merely saying “significant activity” as the activity level determines whether a fusion reaction of the magnitude claimed by BARC actually occurred.

Dr. P.K. Iyengar, a former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and a former Director of BARC, informed me that trace levels of these same isotopes were detected in Apsara, a pure fission reactor not involving any fusion at all. This is the exact opposite of Dr. Chidambaram’s claim.

Dr. Chidambaram’s statement that “from a study of this radioactivity and an estimate of the crater radius confirmed by drilling operations at positions away from the shaft, location, total yield and break-up of fission and fusion components, could be calculated” is extremely surprising. First, after the TN test, its shaft remained totally undamaged: if the fusion stage had worked, the shaft would have been totally destroyed. Secondly, the A-frame sitting astride the mouth of the shaft, with winches to lower and raise personnel, materials and so on, also remained completely intact. If the fusion stage had worked, the ‘A’ frame would also have been totally destroyed.

As for radioactivity levels, senior BARC radiochemists who undertook radio-assay of fission products in samples similarly drilled at Pokhran-I (of May 1974) told Santhanam that the yield announced to the media was substantially higher than what they had submitted to Dr. Raja Ramanna. Dr. Chidambaram must publicly substantiate any claim that {Arun_S: I.e. repetition of inflated yield claim:}.it did not occur in the TN test along with justification data.

Dr. Chidambaram states: “BARC scientists worked out total yield of TN device as 50 +10 kt — consistent with design yield and seismic estimates.” However, he subsequently asserts: “BARC experts established DRDO had under-estimated yield due to faulty seismic instrumentation.” BARC cannot eat the cake and have it too.

The fission bomb yield from the DRDO’s seismic instrumentation was 25 +2 kiloton {Arun_S: In line with my statement that total yield was 30 kT and fusion was only ~2-3 kt, i.e. 25 +/-2 kT fission yield came from primary, sparkplug and tertiary. KS skips specifying the fusion yield for now; and use it to beat anyone who wants to carry this debate forward}.and left a crater {Arun_S: cavity; this is not quoted, and likely mistyped during interpretation}. 25 metres in diameter. If the TN device had really worked with a yield of 50 +2 kt, it should have left a crater {Arun_S: yes, it would left as subsistence crater of}. almost 70 metres in diameter. Instead, all that happened was that sand and mud from the shaft were thrown several metres into the air and then fell back, forming a small depression in the shaft mouth. There was no crater.

This factual analysis reveals India’s decade-long, grim predicament regarding the failed TN bomb and so our Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD). No country having undertaken only two weapon related tests of which the core TN device failed, can claim to have a CMD. This is corroborated by fact that even after 11 years the TN device has not been weaponised by BARC while the 25 kiloton fission device has been fully weaponised and operationally deployed{Arun_S: I.e. Boosted Fission}. on multiplate weapon platforms. It would be farcical to use a 3500-km range Agni-3 missile with a 25 kiloton fission warhead as the core of our CMD. Only a 150 – 350 kiloton if not megaton TN bomb can do so which we do not have.

(K. Santhanam was Project Leader, Pokhran-II. He worked as a physicist at BARC for 15 years. Later he was Chief Adviser (Technologies) in DRDO for 14 years and was then also Director General, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Ashok Parthasarathi, the co-author of this article, was S&T Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and deeply involved in Pokhran-I, of May.)

[/quote]

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 17 Sep 2009 05:07

Now this article makes sense. We can now get to a conclusion.

Key:

It would be farcical to use a 3500-km range Agni-3 missile with a 25 kiloton fission warhead as the core of our CMD. Only a 150 – 350 kiloton if not megaton TN bomb can do so which we do not have.

sudeepj · Post by **sudeepj** » 17 Sep 2009 05:43

Santhanam's article clears some things up, but creates some more confusions..

BARC claimed the fission weapons yield was 15KT, Santhanam says it was 25KT, why the discrepancy here?

Perhaps the FBF primary of the S1 experiment has been deployed as the weapon and not the 15KT weapon in TajMahal shaft?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 Sep 2009 06:28

samuel wrote:So this world of cheats out to deny us of our rightful mastery of TN weapons appears to be an organized mafia fight. Five guys meet in the park and pretty much run riot there. A sixth guy comes in and says he wants to be a part of the space too and they laugh at him. The sixth guy then says look if you try to push me of our little planet, I am going to blow you up with this thing I got like you. They hesitate a little, then they say, naah, you don't got nothing and whatever you got is because of that candu f*cker out there who wanted to play all nice to you back when you seemed like you couldn't even walk. This gets the sixth guy riled a little and he insists look I got it alright and don't push me. If you play with me that's cool, I'll never use it. They think for a bit and then say, ok, may be if you let us put our hands in our pockets and squeeze those balls a little to make sure they are all there, that might be ok. After much thought mr. six, who is really desperate to stay in the park, says ok, that's cool. The others aren't so sure. They don't really like Mr. Six, he acts like he has no balls really. So, they say, nahh, this is all BS, you got no balls in the first place. Finally, one day, mr six wakes up and takes out one of his balls and throws. There is a faint sound. Mr. six says, see! see! I got the balls man! The others say, what balls, I didn't even hear a fart and it could've been that for sure. Mr. Six is now desperate. He doesn't know if his old balls are any good, he doesn't want to make a ruckus in the park, and he is desperate to get along. The story is that these guys screwed with Mr. six when he was a kid for many many years. They stole his toys, they yanked his tongue, and all that time, there was Mr. Six, singing, hum us desh ke vasi hain, jis desh me ganga behti hai. Mehman jo hamara hota hai, voh jan se pyara hota hai... Mr. six thinks he's the soul of the park. The others just look at him like a...

S

A beautiful summary of world power politics wrt to India.

Babu Bihari · Post by **Babu Bihari** » 17 Sep 2009 06:33

Arun_S wrote:Oh Ramaaa .....
As my sources said, KSanthnam has key data (as life insurance) and will disclose if necessary. Dr. K. Santanama has now ripped the lies of BARC /Chidambaram/Brijesh Mishra to shreds. Emperor is now totally naked.

http://www.hindu.com/2009/09/17/stories ... 550900.htm

ya allah, what to say of our NSAs! Former believed in voting as a method of settling the doubts of top scientists.....and current one believes in God in negotiating the contracts.......wah waah.....truly an "Indian" way of securing vital national interests.

this article also confirms one more thing. it is very unfortunate and sad that Kalaam saab was acting as an establishment's man, rather than being on the side of the truth, when he called TN test to be "100% successful". his credibility stands much diminished. i am truly very sad. although there is little reason to the capability of India's mijjiles, just wonder what is their state.....the pakis received their ding dongs well tested.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 Sep 2009 06:35

John Snow wrote:
Over to Shivji for expert commentary and psikology of BARC ways.

My turn John Snowji to ask that you do not need to think of shiv when certain viewpoints appear and then disappear off the map when other viewpoints appear. Could I ask you to leave me alone because it will be your piskology that appears here via my usual devious language?

Thanks in anticipation. Enjoy the debate see the viewpoints but don't invite psychonalysis. The pattern of posts and chosen subjects themselves tell a story

amit · Post by **amit** » 17 Sep 2009 06:36

John Snow wrote:I hope amit bhai is reading too.

Yes I am John Snow. I always look out for your analysis (BARK and not BARC).

I can see the warm and fuzzy feeling that is permeating through you in your insightful post. And why not? If the article is factual (remember it's one side of the story - the other side hasn't spoken in this case) then it does prove your guru Wallace - who's name you love to invoke - to be right!

Take a bow John Snow (on behalf of Wallace)!

After you have done that perhaps we can discuss the implication to India's deterrence in the light of this disclosure?

My tubelight brain seems to think that even if every word is on the money it doesn't do anyone (but India's enemies) good to do a full disclosure in a national newspaper in order to prove a point.

But then I'm no expert, I wouldn't be able to tell a nuclear bomb even if I saw one, nah?

amit · Post by **amit** » 17 Sep 2009 06:38

shiv wrote:The pattern of posts and chosen subjects themselves tell a story

This is why I love to read your posts Shiv. You sum it up so wonderfully well.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 Sep 2009 06:46

ramana wrote:Gagan, The core issue is the fusion achieved in S-I is not enough to sustain the scaling. The issue is not wheter fusion happened- it did by those isotopes BRAc revealed in the radio-chem paper. Its whether there was enough of it which would show up as radius of cavity size and seismic mb values. If there is clear secy evidence that what was stated was achieved there would be no discussion. None of this angst or s.

The only problem is that BARC hold all the cards. They will not say what was the size of the primary. They will not say what material was used as reflector or spark plug. They will not say anything and claim that these are sensitive information that nobody releases. They are right in saying that - nobody really publishes those details.

If fact when it comes to tamper there are a few refs on the net that say Thorium can be used. US refs always speak of U 238. Is it possible that India has chosen Thorium route? Was neutral tamper used so that yield would be low with an intent to measure Neutrons only? Did we use Tritium gas injection or LiD in Primary? Was Beryllium used at all? What differences in radioactive signature appears when different materials are used.

We have no answers either in publicly available information from any country in the world or India specific information regarding the radioactive signature of these materials as a function of high energy neutron production

So it is fair to say that most of our inferences are inferences based on speculation. I am not saying "wrong" or "right". It could be right. It could be wrong. But it remains speculation.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 17 Sep 2009 06:48

What can BARC say IF (BIG IF) S-1 was total fizzle? As in zilch.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Sep 2009 06:49

Do you still have that article from Goa Times by Morasker?

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 Sep 2009 06:54

I have, this morning received the pdf of the original Evernden paper whose yield estimates agree with BARC and point out how any other interpretation is rightfully called "bark" in an insightful if inadvertent occurrence of self description.

I will leave out the technicals, but I quote:

The failure to achieve accurate estimates of yield via mb derives not from undeveloped scientific procedures but rather from incompetence, ignorance and/or carelssness of investigators

-Physics and Society, Vol 27, No. 4, Page 10, Oct 1998

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 Sep 2009 06:56

NRao wrote:What can BARC say IF (BIG IF) S-1 was total fizzle? As in zilch.

1) It can bluff
2) it can tell the truth

Take your pick (TYP)

This is what I have been saying from the beginning. No u turns.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 17 Sep 2009 07:06

If fact when it comes to tamper there are a few refs on the net that say Thorium can be used. US refs always speak of U 238. Is it possible that India has chosen Thorium route? Was neutral tamper used so that yield would be low with an intent to measure Neutrons only? Did we use Tritium gas injection or LiD in Primary? Was Beryllium used at all? What differences in radioactive signature appears when different materials are used.

We have no answers either in publicly available information from any country in the world or India specific information regarding the radioactive signature of these materials as a function of high energy neutron production

Then only one sample exists.

Need to conduct more tests.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 Sep 2009 07:09

ramana wrote:Do you still have that article from Goa Times by Morasker?

yes - will post when i find it - but I suspect it is also in the BRF archives - will search and post the link if so.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 Sep 2009 07:09

NRao wrote:
Need to conduct more tests.

Nobody on BR has questioned this.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 17 Sep 2009 07:12

amit wrote: My tubelight brain seems to think that even if every word is on the money it doesn't do anyone (but India's enemies) good to do a full disclosure in a national newspaper in order to prove a point.

But then I'm no expert, I wouldn't be able to tell a nuclear bomb even if I saw one, nah?

Amitji: Wrong again. It is high time India lives by the motto of Satyameva Jayate. The nation is way too important to leave it to the good offices of the government alone. KS should have done this a long time back. But, better late than never.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Sep 2009 07:13

Arun_S, What boosted thing you refer to?

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 17 Sep 2009 07:15

Could I ask you to leave me alone because it will be your piskology that appears here via my usual devious language?

no no it is your pisko analysis that shows in your views and so does mine. I have been on this forum as long as you have been so... we know each other very well indeed.

to amit bhai, right after the POK II when Wallace disputed the yields I was hammer and tongs after his views on this forum, but that is not important, the credibility of our establishment is at stake.
I am not the one to disclose that it was a fizzle, its the powers be that have done very late in the game.

Lastly you bring to mind "patriotism is the last resort to a scoundrel”

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 Sep 2009 07:16

Goa Times article
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 24#p481224

shiv wrote:As a random thought, seeing discussions on this page, I recalled an article I picked up while on holiday in Goa in 1999. I post here FWIW. Sorry about the OCR formatting that I have not corrected.

Atomic War and its holocaust - by Prakash Morasker
Goa Herald 5 th May 1999
An atomic bomb causes explosion by
either splitting (Fission) or by the join
ing (fusion)of the Atomic Nuclei. The
energy is supplied by the isotopes of Uranium,
Plutonium or Hydrogen, and is released when
the nucleus of the atom undergoes fission or
fusion. The yield of energy from thermonuclear
reaction is vastly greater than that from TNT
(Trinitrotoluene) explosions. Complete fis-
sion of 500gms of Uranium of Plutoniurn would
release approximately as much energy as an
explosion of 9000 tons of TNT, Fusion of all the
nuclei in 500 gms of Deuterium would yield the
energy of 36000 tonnes of TNT. TNT explosion
destroys by shock only, whereas a nuclear war-
head causes damage by intensive heat, releasing
lethal radiation and lasting poisonous contami-.
nation. The atomic bomb which was dropped on
Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 consisted of
Uranium, and the one which was dropped on
Nagasaki on August 9, 1945 consisted of Plu-
tonium. The Hydrogen bomb is a
fusion device. A vast amount of energy is released
when common hydrogen isotopes like
Deutenum or Tritium are fused
at extremely high temperatures (millions of de-
grees) These reactions are know n as Therrno-
nuclear or heat induced reactions hence the
weapon is known as a Thermonuclear bomb to serve as
a trigger The atom bomb produces neutrons and -
the heat that is needed to ignite the hydrogen
bomb. The yield or total energy released by a
Hydrogen bomb is expressed in rnegatons. About
500 gms of 'Hydrogen can yield power equivalent
to about 29 kilotons of TNT needed to
produce an explosion of the same intensity.
A fission device, which proves the capability
to build a quick and crude bomb (already proved
in 1974); a low-yield device which can be
weaponised as warhead for the Prithvi missiles,
and a thermonuclear device of superpower cat-
egory which can be converted into bombs of
hundreds of kilotons.
At present, India has leapfrogged into a po
tential megaton superpower from mere nuclear
capability. India's thermonuclear device was
actually a technological breakthrough achieved
by the BARC scientists in extracting Tritium
from heavy water available in the country's
atomic power reactors. India had chosen heavy
water as moderator in its reactors long ago.
Heavy water has a high content of highly radio-
active isotopes of Hydrogen. BARC scientists,
in order to avoid the exposure of the reactor
workers for the radiation levels, first attempted
to extract the Tritium through water distillation,
but they were failed in this process. so they
thought of chemical exchange process, followed
cryogenic distillation. In this method, Tritium
exists in liquid form only during the chemical
exchange process. Through cryogenic distillation,
it IS converted into a gas which can be stored
in reinforced containers. The Tritium thus ob-
tained is 90 percent enriched which incidentallv
is the requirement for the thermonuclear device.
incidentally, another Hydrogen isotope Deute-
rium can also be used for the thermonuclear
weapon design and this is why thermonuclear
bombs are popularly called Hydrogen bombs.
Tritium has a half life of 12.3 years, in other words,
the stockpile will be reduced to 50 percent in this
period and the vanished half would have con-
verted into Helium-3.
Nuclear weapons that are not pure fission
weapons use fusion, the reaction that produces
energy in the sun, to enhance their destructive
effects. But these weapons require a fission bomb
to provide the energy to initiate the fusion reac-
tions. In these weapons, a few kilograms of a
Deuterium or Tritium gas mixture is included in the
centre of the fissionable core. When the bomb core
undergoes enough fission, it becomes hot enough
to ignite the D-T fusion reaction, which proceeds
swiftly. It turns out that I kg of Plutonium
suffices. The D-T fusion reaction produces an
intense burst or high energy neutrons that causes
a correspondingly intense burst of fissions rate in
the core. This accelerates the fission rate in the
core, and allows a higher percentage of the material
in the core to fission before it blows apart. The
efficiency of the weapon can be further increased
by having a Uranium-238 blanket around the
central assembly, because the neutrons produced
in the D~T reaction have the right energy to split
the U-238 nuclei. However, an interesting method
exists that obviates this by the use of a solid fuel
in the form of Lithium Deuteride (LiD). When a
neutron from an initial fissile trigger strikes LID,
it produes Tritium and Helium. The D and T then
fuse to produce a lot of energy and lots of neutrons.
The device exploded on May 11 last year, had in fact
used LiD, but its energy yield was kept down
by using a mantle made up of non-fissile material
and reducing the amount of D and T.
Right in the' beginning the Uranium is mined
and milled. India's Uranium mill is in Bihar. Here,
the ore js milled and then sent for purification to
plants in Hyderabad and Trombay and fabricated
into Uranium oxide fuel bundles at Hyderabad' s
nuclear fuels complex. Following this, the ura-
nium bundles are sent to the Dhruva reactor in'
Trombay. Here the Uranium fuel bundles are
irradiated to create the kind Plutonium needed
for nuclear weapons. Plutonium -239 is' chemi-
cally extracted from irradiated fuel, and pressed
into a coconut-sized spherical cores. This job is
done usually at three main Plutoniom process'ing
plants at Trombay , Tarapur and Kalapakkam. One
spherical core is weighing around 8 kg which is
the core of the nuclear weapon . After this a
nuclear device is ready for a test explosion.

Nuclear device test-explosion is carried out by
two different systems; first is the actual test
explosion at the test site. And, second is by means
of simulated test-explosion with the help of a
supercomputer.
Initially, the Plutonium cores and the triggers are
carried to the test site separately, and there they are
assembled. A nuclear bomb explodes when electri
cal switches on each segment of the conventional
explosive 'lens' are charged. The explosive implodes
simultaneously and symmetrically onto the
fissile core and sets off the nuclear chain reaction.
With the development of Param- 10,000 by C-
DAC (Centre for Development of Advanced Corn-
puting) at Pune. Lndia is confident of testing a
nuclear device. The 100-gigaftops Param-10,000
has been designed using sun's latest 1 60ultrasparc -
II processors. 100-gigaflops means, it can do
lOO;000,000,0OO floating point operations per sec
ond; a flop is the addition of two large decimal
numbers. It works on a principle that if a single
computer takes 'X' amount of time to perform a
function, 100 computers should take x/l00! Of the
same time to perform the same function. A bunch
of microprocessors split the task and do "Parallel
processing" at lightning speed. It can stimulate
nuclear-explosions; help miniaturisation of N-weap-
ons and solve storage problems. Besides it can
simulatemissile launch , cutting missile
development cycles programme by the order of a
decade. C-DAC's 'Sabre' software can simulate war
games, troop and infrastructure movements ctc.
Invariably computer simulation and modelling
are meant to reduce the cost of any manufacturing
programme. In the nuclear case, it involves the
weaponising programme, the design, production,
testing and certification of nuclear weapons. Since
the weapons are expected to vary, so too will the
modelling and computational capabilities. Once a
weapon enters a stockpile, opportunities for direct
inspection and testing are limited and expensive.
Maintaining such high levels of product reliability
and safety without direct testing requires computa-
tion and modelling at every stage. Still, there are
several handicaps behind the com puter simulations
of N-explosions. Computer simulations cannot
substitute live testing. Any nuclear physicist will
vouch that data from nuclear tests arc far more
crucial for developing and maintaining an arsenal
than the availability of high power computing. No
computer in the world, however powerful, can
execute nuclear weapons design codes based only
on fundamental physics. Extremely physical condi-
tions produced in a nuclear explosion, temperatures.
pressures, densities, and the very brief time over
which it occurs, one-millionth of a second or less,
make accurate and detailed physical measurements
of a nuclear explosion difftcult and expensive.
Modern theononuclear weapons are typically
around a metre in length and consist of two stages.
These are structurally distinct and produce different
effects in terms of temperature, pressure etc. and
the numbers of photons and neutrons produced and
their energies . During the explosion,energy in the
form of Gamma rays ,and neutrons flows from the
first stage (primary) to compress and ignite the
second stage (secondary) which typically produces
95 per cent or more of the total weapon yield.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Sep 2009 07:20

Thanks.

X-posted....

vina wrote:Pokhran II thermonuclear test, a failure . An opEd piece in Al-Hundi by Santhanam who practically demolishes whatever the BARC team has said until now and challenging BARC to show actual data and prove what they are saying is true.

I think that is a fair point. If you actually are dead sure that the TN bomb was not a fizzle, prove it with actual data. Mumbling it is all fine wont do. Getting facts right is the first step. The next steps on what to do can follow.