On first glance this looks like a standard "secular" modern response. However, the Chinese connection makes it suspicious. It could simply be an indication of the penetration and control of the PRC/PLA into the Malaysian Army, which prompted the army to speak out in case of "racial slur" against the Chinese "only".Racial issues: Army chief tells gov't to act Sep 9, 08 12:10pm
Departing from the norm, the Armed Forces today reminded the government on the danger of allowing racial issues to exacerbate. Categorising it as a security threat, its chief Abdul Aziz Zainal called on the authorities to take stern action against those who stoke racial sentiments. He warned that racial issues should not be raised as it had the potential to create chaos and disorder. "Racial issues are the most feared by security forces as they could lead to chaos. They are a security threat," he was quoted as saying by the Star. The general was speaking to reporters at the Wanita Umno Hari Raya contribution presentation to the armed forces and the police at the Putra World Trade Centre in Kuala Lumpur.
[...]
Meanwhile, Wanita Umno chief Rafidah Aziz urged Malaysians to refrain from questioning the racial origins of their fellow citizens. "Today, the top brass of the armed forces talked about it. When the armed forces talks like that it means it’s very serious.
"Let’s stop talking about sensitive issues. It’s not just about race. When you are talking people down, you are already talking about sensitivities," she added. Rafidah also said that street demonstrations and the mob spirit should be rejected as it affects public peace and security.
[...]
The latest ‘racial slur’ controversy to make headlines erupted when it was reported that Umno Bukit Bendera division leader Ahmad Islmail called the Chinese as ‘immigrants’ among others. This drew flak from various quarters, including from Barisan Nasional component parties. Following this, Umno deputy president Najib Abdul Razak offered an apology but Ahmad has remained defiant.
India in South East Asia
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Re: India in South East Asia
http://uncleyap-news.blogspot.com/2008/ ... -step.html
Re: India in South East Asia
The issues that have impacted the region of late are the North Korean missile test and its growing nuclear capability, the Chinese test of anti satellite missile, Indo US nuclear deal, the growing strategic equation between Russia and China, ethnic tensions in China, the US effort to encircle China, the Chinese efforts to encircle India, and the blow hot, blow cold strategic relationship of India with Japan and Australia.
Apparently, the power rivalry and the potential instability in the region have come to stay. The US which has much influence in the region is suspicious that there is an effort to undermine her influence in the region ever since the US was excluded from the East Asia summit. To ensure her pre-eminence in this region, the US is possibly nudging the India Japan Australia defence arrangement since all three are wary of the growing Chinese clout, each for its own reasons. On the other hand, this defence initiative is a source of concern for China.
India’s historical ties with SE Asia and the initiative of PV Narahasimha Rao Look East Policy indeed allows India to bond with SE Asian countries as also Japan. It is of paramount importance for India to establish its presence in SE Asia by building institution and then on firming in, move into defence arrangements including selling arms at ‘friendship’ prices, training their defence forces and even establishing some defence presence. This is essential so as to not only negate Chinese influence in these areas, but is essential if the Straits of Malacca, the entry point into the IOR is to be dominated.
The key to establishing a viable presence in SE Asia is being able to match China as an equal. There is no place for runners up in the field of influencing others. The significant area with cost benefits in the power game will be who controls the IOR since it carries 60% of the world trade and India is vulnerable from the sea. China is rapidly increasing her blue water navy. India has to match and surpass their effort and have a significant footprint in the IOR. To further bolster this footprint, littoral states have to be influenced.
The control of the IOR is contingent on control of the Straits of Bab el Mandeb, Straits of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca. Therefore, India has to go one step more than normal to establish cordial relationships with Egypt, Israel, Iran, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. A tall order, but essential nonetheless.
The move to question Myanmar about Chinese naval presence in Coco Island is a step in the right direction. Already there is defence cooperation with Singapore. There is ancient ties with Indonesia and India could invest in Indonesia (who are wary of China) and wean Indonesia India’s way. Malaysia will be a hard nut, but with Singapore and Indonesia leaning towards India, the Straits of Malacca would be covered.
Between Egypt and Iran, Iran is more important since it controls the Straits of Hormuz, through which the bulk of the world oil requirement passes and India has good relationship with Oman, which control the other shoulder of the Straits.
Notwithstanding, the US will still be the supreme power that has its presence in the IOR. And it will be in the interest of India to work in tandem with the US.
Apparently, the power rivalry and the potential instability in the region have come to stay. The US which has much influence in the region is suspicious that there is an effort to undermine her influence in the region ever since the US was excluded from the East Asia summit. To ensure her pre-eminence in this region, the US is possibly nudging the India Japan Australia defence arrangement since all three are wary of the growing Chinese clout, each for its own reasons. On the other hand, this defence initiative is a source of concern for China.
India’s historical ties with SE Asia and the initiative of PV Narahasimha Rao Look East Policy indeed allows India to bond with SE Asian countries as also Japan. It is of paramount importance for India to establish its presence in SE Asia by building institution and then on firming in, move into defence arrangements including selling arms at ‘friendship’ prices, training their defence forces and even establishing some defence presence. This is essential so as to not only negate Chinese influence in these areas, but is essential if the Straits of Malacca, the entry point into the IOR is to be dominated.
The key to establishing a viable presence in SE Asia is being able to match China as an equal. There is no place for runners up in the field of influencing others. The significant area with cost benefits in the power game will be who controls the IOR since it carries 60% of the world trade and India is vulnerable from the sea. China is rapidly increasing her blue water navy. India has to match and surpass their effort and have a significant footprint in the IOR. To further bolster this footprint, littoral states have to be influenced.
The control of the IOR is contingent on control of the Straits of Bab el Mandeb, Straits of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca. Therefore, India has to go one step more than normal to establish cordial relationships with Egypt, Israel, Iran, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. A tall order, but essential nonetheless.
The move to question Myanmar about Chinese naval presence in Coco Island is a step in the right direction. Already there is defence cooperation with Singapore. There is ancient ties with Indonesia and India could invest in Indonesia (who are wary of China) and wean Indonesia India’s way. Malaysia will be a hard nut, but with Singapore and Indonesia leaning towards India, the Straits of Malacca would be covered.
Between Egypt and Iran, Iran is more important since it controls the Straits of Hormuz, through which the bulk of the world oil requirement passes and India has good relationship with Oman, which control the other shoulder of the Straits.
Notwithstanding, the US will still be the supreme power that has its presence in the IOR. And it will be in the interest of India to work in tandem with the US.
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Re: India in South East Asia
One of the problems in the Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia dynamic is that it appears to be a zero-sum game from the viewpoint of Malaysia. They seem to have come to a position of Indonesia+Singapore's gain = Malaysia's loss.
Re: India in South East Asia
Brihaspati
malay and ethnic chinese tension has been a central plank of malaysian politics for decades. the break away of singapore is largely a result of this problem. there have been mass riots and ethnic cleansing in the past - of ethnic chinese. post WW2 this took the guise of anti-communist action and the insurgency, but it was targetted at ethnic chinese - who are economically more dominant compared to the bhumiputeras. the government and the military has always tried to exploit it and keep it in check. the statement is not out of the ordinary. the PLA doesn't have much to do with this equation.
malay and ethnic chinese tension has been a central plank of malaysian politics for decades. the break away of singapore is largely a result of this problem. there have been mass riots and ethnic cleansing in the past - of ethnic chinese. post WW2 this took the guise of anti-communist action and the insurgency, but it was targetted at ethnic chinese - who are economically more dominant compared to the bhumiputeras. the government and the military has always tried to exploit it and keep it in check. the statement is not out of the ordinary. the PLA doesn't have much to do with this equation.
Re: India in South East Asia
The insidious Islamist threat to the exercise of good judgement in the Muslim world.
It will be interesting to see if the “moderate” incoming provincial Government of Aceh will have the cojones to take on laws sanctioned by Islam and revoke the stoning law. Wait and watch:
It will be interesting to see if the “moderate” incoming provincial Government of Aceh will have the cojones to take on laws sanctioned by Islam and revoke the stoning law. Wait and watch:
Indonesia's Aceh to allow stoning for adulterers
By FAKHRURRADZIE GADE (AP) – 4 hours ago
BANDA ACEH, Indonesia — Lawmakers in a devoutly Muslim Indonesian province voted unanimously that adulterers can be sentenced to death by stoning, just months after voters overwhelmingly chose to throw conservative Islamic parties out of power.
With only weeks to go before a new government led by a moderate party takes over in Aceh province, hard-liners still in control of the regional parliament pushed through legislation Monday to impose steep punishments for adultery and homosexuality. ........................
Stoning is legally sanctioned in varying forms in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and parts of Nigeria. ..............................
"It's discriminatory, and it's saddening, but we are quite sure members of civil society who are concerned with human rights will not sit by silently," the activist said, adding that he hopes the new moderate leadership in the province will overturn the law after taking power next month.
Aceh Vice Governor Muhamad Nazar said that even though his office opposed the clause on stoning to death it has no legal power to block it. "Whatever law is passed we have to enforce it," he said.
Associated Press writers Irwan Firdaus and Anthony Deutsch contributed to this article from Jakarta.
AP via Google
Re: India in South East Asia
to impose steep punishments for adultery and homosexuality
Homosexuality not there in Malaysia?
Visit Frangipani in KL!
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Re: India in South East Asia
This thread was meant to primarily discuss the potential for increasing strategic and military reach of India in the area. So the genral issue of Islamist repression of modern human rights did not come up. But this attitude in the Islamist world especially in Malaysia is tactically important as part of a general general weakness in the Islamist thought process. Maybe it is possible to exploit this weakness.
We need to weaken the Islamist regimes slowly from within and outsode. However raising the issue of homosexuality too much in world fora should be carefully balanced. On the one hand, this can lead to a hardening of stance by the Islamists openly as Islamic core literature is unashamedly and clearly homophobic - so they can become even more repressive bolstered by "Islamic" confidence. If outside military intervention to protect the targets of repression cannot be undertaken, then the campaign can actually liquidate potential sources of alienation from the Islamists within those societies. On the other hand a nuanced and more "Chankyan" campaign to highlight the repressions can be maintained to gradually weaken the ideological hold of the regime and discredit its ideology altogether.
This article may help :
http://www.iiav.nl/ezines//web/Nebula/2 ... lliams.pdf
We need to weaken the Islamist regimes slowly from within and outsode. However raising the issue of homosexuality too much in world fora should be carefully balanced. On the one hand, this can lead to a hardening of stance by the Islamists openly as Islamic core literature is unashamedly and clearly homophobic - so they can become even more repressive bolstered by "Islamic" confidence. If outside military intervention to protect the targets of repression cannot be undertaken, then the campaign can actually liquidate potential sources of alienation from the Islamists within those societies. On the other hand a nuanced and more "Chankyan" campaign to highlight the repressions can be maintained to gradually weaken the ideological hold of the regime and discredit its ideology altogether.
This article may help :
http://www.iiav.nl/ezines//web/Nebula/2 ... lliams.pdf
Malaysian women’s rights activist Zaltun Mohamad Kasim points out that local laws are becoming even more repressive. She has been speaking out publicly about the dangers of increasingly strident attacks on sexuality by Muslim leaders. She gave a speech at an international human rights conference in 2004 in which she stated that in Malaysia, “Sexuality [is] Under attack….Inspired by the ideology of Islamic conservatism, there is a growing obsession with… guarding and policing morality.” One of the most insidious new laws, that was passed with hardly any objection, provides that “anyone who gives, propagates, and/or disseminates any opinion contrary to any fatwa [Islamic directive] in force commits a criminal offense.” Since a fatwa issued by Muslim leaders states that homosexuality is a sin, anyone in Malaysia who tries to suggest otherwise is subject to arrest merely for stating their opinion.21 Zaltun also points out that:
The state-administered Islamic or Shariah laws are ostensibly only applicable to Muslims. However, what has been happening in effect is a quiet redefinition of what is considered ‘matters related to Islam.’ The scope of Shariah laws in the country has slowly widened, from personal status laws on marriage, [to] divorce [and] sexual orientation.... State governments have also used this provision to enact their own versions over and above the existing [national laws]. [These local and national] laws contain numerous provisions that blatantly and facially disproportionately discriminate against and violate the rights of women and the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community. The Shariah laws have also found their way into municipal laws, subsidiary legislation, regulations and policy directives that affect both Muslims and Malaysians of other faiths.22
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Re: India in South East Asia
There were some reports about a possible move to construct a "Kra canal" over Thailand by China to bypass the straits of Malacca. Does anyone have any info on the reliability of this or if and at all such a move has taken off from the planning or proposal stage?
http://cominganarchy.com/2007/05/06/byp ... f-malacca/
http://cominganarchy.com/2007/05/06/byp ... f-malacca/
Re: India in South East Asia
To say that the Singaporean Foreign Minister backs the PRC’s claim to Tawang is tendentious. OTOH if working up into a lather is the need then IMO at best what one can say is that the Singaporean Foreign Minister did not outright reject the PRC’s claim to Tawang as he ought to have:
Between China and India: Is Tibet the Wedge or Link?
The referred to article in Yale Global:Singapore backs Tawang claims
Seema Guha / DNA
Wednesday, September 16, 2009 2:16 IST
New Delhi: Singapore's foreign minister George Yeo has backed China's claim to the Tawang monastery in Arunachal Pradesh. The ancient monastery is one of the holiest shrines of Tibetan Buddhists as the sixth Dalai Lama was born there.
George Yeo, the minister, refers to Tawang as a "Tibetan area controlled by India and claimed by China", in a recent piece he wrote for the Yale Centre for the Study of Globalisation. The article was published after Yeo became the first foreign dignitary to visit Tibet since last year's March uprising and its brutal reprisal by the Chinese state machinery ahead of the Beijing Olympics. Yeo was in Tibet in August and obviously taken in by China's claims. ……………..
DNA
Between China and India: Is Tibet the Wedge or Link?
Re: India in South East Asia
Actually, the Minister should understand that Tibet was highly under the influence of Bengal.
Bengal and Tibet
Therefore, it is a part of Bengal! And therefore, is a part of India!
Raman and Brihaspati can throw more light.
Bengal and Tibet
Therefore, it is a part of Bengal! And therefore, is a part of India!
Raman and Brihaspati can throw more light.
Re: India in South East Asia
An article on the unfulfilled potential of Indo-Vietnamese ties by Iskander Rehman on BBC World:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/world/2 ... ship.shtml
The English translation was retrieved from his blog:
http://indiangeopolitics.blogspot.com/
The Indo-Vietnamese Strategic Partnership.
Over the past year, a chill wind has been blowing over the South China Sea, and the waters lapping the coast of Vietnam have grown choppy with tension. A distinct increase in the level of Chinese assertiveness in the region has led to multinational companies being pressured out of participating in offshore energy ventures with Vietnam, to the routine rounding up of Vietnamese fishermen by Chinese patrol vessels for ‘fishing in Chinese waters’, as well as to a steady ramping up of Chinese naval activity which has, in some instances, led to tension-fraught stand-offs with the US Navy.
This upsurge in Chinese naval self-confidence has sent ripples of unease across Southeast Asia, and most particularly in Vietnam, which has been embroiled in a bitter territorial dispute with China over the possession of the Spratly and Paracel islands for several decades. Vietnamese officials, when in private, frequently lament what they perceive to be Vietnam’s relative isolation on the diplomatic scene, and fear for the future. When discussing these issues recently in Paris with someone with close ties to the Vietnamese leadership, I was issued with the following dire prediction: “We think that the Chinese will press for a final resolution of the sovereignty dispute over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the next ten to twenty years. If Vietnam has not reinforced its strategic partnerships by then, while simultaneously strengthening its Navy, China will be able to just seize the islands without anyone abroad lifting a hand in protest or even batting an eye-lid. ”
Vietnamese dignitaries seem to believe that their window of opportunity to press an advantageous deal with China is rapidly closing and this has instilled their military diplomacy with a new sense of urgency.
Having taken tentative steps to reinforce its ageing and minute fleet, most notably by ordering a flotilla of six Kilo-class submarines from Russia, Hanoi has also been endeavouring to reinforce its defence ties with several other regional powers such as Singapore, Japan, Australia (which Secretary General Nong Duc Manh paid visit to only a few weeks ago) and India.
A Partnership Grounded in History:
Vietnam’s relationship with India goes back a long way. Indeed, one could say that India, along with ex-Soviet Russia, has been one of Vietnam’s staunchest allies over the years. The Indian Prime Minister Jawahrlal Nehru was the first foreign leader to visit the newly independent North Vietnam in 1954, and throughout most of the Cold War, India and Vietnam were strong political allies. Both had very close ties to the Soviet Union, and both bore the brunt of Chinese border invasions; India in 1962, and Vietnam in 1979. India’s support of Vietnam during the Vietnam war and during its invasion and occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s came at a high political cost, injecting bitterness into Delhi’s difficult relationship with Washington, as well as delaying the process of Sino-Indian normalisation by almost a decade. In return, Vietnam supported India in its conflicts with Pakistan, and was one of the first countries in the world to recognize newly independent Bangladesh in 1971.
The Indo-Vietnamese relationship throughout the Cold War, however, remained mostly diplomatic and political in nature. Bilateral trade was minimal, and the security component of their rapport limited itself, by and large, to information sharing protocols. It was only with the profound restructuring of Asia’s security environment at the end of the Cold War, and the advent of India’s “Look East Policy” in the early 90s that the relationship gradually evolved into a genuine strategic partnership.
The Burgeoning of a Wide Ranging Strategic Partnership:
The abrupt disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War had an enormous impact on both countries’ diplomacies. Almost overnight, both Hanoi and Delhi lost their most reliable strategic guarantor in Asia. Both countries reacted to this radically new security environment by opening up to the world, liberalizing their economies, and taking steps to normalize their relationships with their neighbours, while making an effort to diversify their strategic partnerships. The end of Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia facilitated its integration into ASEAN in 1995, and in the early 90s India launched what it termed its “Look East Policy”, which heralded a new era of engagement,both diplomatic and economic, with Southeast Asian nations.
It was only with the advent of an intensely nationalistic government in Delhi in the late 90s, however, that bilateral ties began to really pick up speed and take on a genuinely strategic turn. With the nuclear explosions of Pokhran II, in 1998, the BJP governement of Atal Behari Vajpayee signalled to the world, and more particularly to China, that India had become a hard power to be reckoned with.Vietnam, for its part, was intent on extricating itself from an excessive dependence on its timeold Russian partner in terms of both arms procurement and military-to- military diplomacy .Leaders from both countries also recognized that, despite significant progress in their relations with Beijing, both India and Vietnam still share a natural strategic congruence on the need to restrain China.
Since 1998, both countries have thus been steadily shoring up their ties, whether it be on the military or on the diplomatic front.
Vietnam has come out in support of India’s bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC, has lobbied in favour of India’s presence at the first East Asian Summit in 2005, and helped block Pakistan’s inclusion in the ASEAN Regional Forum. India, in return, was in favour of Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Organization, and helped Vietnam secure a temporary seat at the UNSC in 2007. Bilateral trade has also grown extremely rapidly, surging from little more than 72 million dollars in 1995 to more than two billion in 2008. Indian multinationals such as Tata Steel and ONGC Videsh Limited have started to heavily invest in Vietnam, in what many hope is just the beginning of a new trade pattern in Asia.
The aspect of the Indo-Vietnamese partnership that has known the most progress, however, is on the military one.
Strategically placed on the eastern fringe of Southeast Asia, Vietnam is viewed by India as the main obstacle to China’s southwards expansion. Much as China has attempted to constrain India by forming a military nexus with Pakistan, New Delhi has been involved in defence cooperation with, and provided military assistance to its rival’s smaller, militaristic neighbour.
In 2000, George Fernandes, the BJP government’s Defence Minister signed a 15-point Defence Protocol with Vietnam, which promised to provide Vietnam with assistance in the modernization of its armed forces and to intensify defence cooperation between the two countries. Three years later, India and Vietnam stepped up their military cooperation by signing a “Joint Declaration and Framework of Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of India and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as they enter the 21st century.” In 2007, this was followed up by a formalized Strategic Partnership.
India has been providing Vietnam with assistance in the shoring up of its naval and air capabilities in an attempt to deny China total supremacy in the South China Sea. This is greatly facilitated by the fact that Vietnam’s Air Force and Navy’s military hardware have the same Russian origin as their Indian counterparts, which has enabled the Indian armed forces to frequently help their Vietnamese partners overcome their operational difficulties by supplying them with spare parts and by providing advanced repair and maintenance services. New Delhi has repaired and upgraded 125 Mig 21 planes of the Vietnamese Air Force, and supplied them with enhanced avionics and radar systems. Indian Air Force pilots have also been training Vietnamese fighter pilots, and in 2005 the Indian Navy dispatched more than 150 tonnes of spares to Hanoi for its Russian Petya and OSA-11 class missile boats. The Indian and Vietnamese coast guards have engaged in joint patrols, and both navies participated in a joint exercise in 2007.
Indo-Vietnamese military cooperation also extends to their respective ground forces; as both countries have engaged in joint exercises, and Indian army officers have benefited from Vietnamese expertise in jungle warfare and counter-insurgency.
In return, the Vietnamese have been supplied with advanced light helicopters (the Indian made AHLs) at “friendly prices”, and Vietnamese officers have been provided with English lessons at an Indian Language Institute.
A Feeling of Unfulfilled Potential:
Despite all this, there is a feeling, both in India and in Vietnam, that the partnership is far from having achieved its potential, and, what’s more, has started to lose its momentum.
Hanoi has been particularly disappointed in India’s unreliability as a weapons procurement partner. Although India has engaged in some token efforts to help modernize Vietnam’s military, the Vietnamese are frustrated by the fact that New Delhi seems so reticent to supply it with some of the missile systems it had initially promised. Indeed, in 2000 and at several occasions during the BJP governnment’s tenure, India had vouched that it would gift Vietnam with the Prithvi and BrahMos missile systems. The Prithvi is an SRBM (Short Range Ballistic Missile), with a maximum range of approximately 200-350km,whereas the BrahMos Cruise Missile, co-produced by the Indians with the Russians, is a very advanced anti-ship missile, based on the Russian Yakhent anti-ship missile, which has a range of more than 300km and that can fly at more than twice the speed the sound. If the Vietnamese Navy were to acquire such a weapons system, it would prove to be a major challenge to Chinese naval dominance in the South China Sea, and greatly aid Vietnam in its strategy of sea denial and coastal defence. Various theories have been put forward to explain India’s failure to provide Vietnam with the Prithvi and BrahMos. Some claim that India’s Congress government, which has increasingly focused on economic rather than military cooperation with Vietnam, does not want to run the risk of antagonizing China. Others blame it on traditional Indian bureaucratic sloth or have stated that, in the case of the BrahMos, it must first be fully inducted into the Indian Armed Forces before a surplus can be generated for friendly states such as Vietnam. Most analysts concur in saying that Vietnam will probably obtain the Prithvi system in the long run. When it comes to the vaunted BrahMos, however, things are far from certain.
It is believed that frustration at this, as well as at successive delays in amrs deliveries, is what led the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security to purchase sub machine guns and sniper rifles from Pakistan in 2007, in a veiled but nevertheless significant expression of its displeasure. The Indians for their part, are somewhat disappointed that the possibility of the Indian Navy gaining permanent berthing rights at the Vietnamese deep sea port of Cam Ranh Bay now seem to be increasingly remote. While the Vietnamese aired this possibility at the turn of the century, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien declared in 2004 when questioned on the matter that Cam Ranh was “no longer a military port”. Most analysts now concur in viewing Cam Ranh Bay as Vietnam’s strategic trump card, that it occasionally brandishes to balance China, but that it will most probably refuse to give up to a foreign power, unless it is compelled to in extreme circumstances.
Things are also far from perfect on the economic front. Indeed, while bilateral trade has grown substantially over the past decade, it is also increasingly unbalanced in nature, with Vietnam suffering from a crippling one billion dollar trade deficit with India. As a net benificiary of this imbalance, India has politely brushed aside the Vietnamese proposal to establish an FTA and has refused to grant tax reductions and exemptions to Vietnamese products.
An Uncertain Future:
While it is clear that ties in-between India and Vietnam have strengthened over the past few years, particularly in the field of defence, it is equally apparent that for it to endure it needs to be put on a more equal footing.
India should consider lowering its trade tarriffs and opening its markets to some Vietnamese products, and should encourage more Indian companies to invest in Vietnam. Indian policy makers that hesitate to provide Vietnamese ships with BrahMos cruise missiles should maybe wonder whether China was beset by the same moral qualms when it supplied Pakistan with its first state-of-the-art F-22P frigate this summer.
Last but not least, the future of the Indo-Vietnamese partnership will increasingly depend on both states’ attitude towards China. India’s Congress government, which has generally shown a slightly more conciliatory attitude towards Beijing than its BJP predecessor; is currently facing renewed tensions along its 4,057 km with China. It may not wish, therefore, to durably aggravate its transhimalyan neighbour by strengthening the military facet of its ties with Vietnam.
Vietnam’s leadership, for its part, is currently riven by factional in-fighting as a prelude to the 11th National Congress in 2011. The recent crackdown on nationalist Vietnamese bloggers and journalists seems to indicate that the China-aligned fringe of the Party, which controls domestic intelligence gathering via the military intelligence unit General Department II, is gradually gaining ascendancy in the struggle in-between conservatives and liberals. If the pro-China conservatives win this subterranean battle for power and influence, it will undoubtedly have a highly negative impact on the Indo-Vietnamese partnership.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/world/2 ... ship.shtml
The English translation was retrieved from his blog:
http://indiangeopolitics.blogspot.com/
The Indo-Vietnamese Strategic Partnership.
Over the past year, a chill wind has been blowing over the South China Sea, and the waters lapping the coast of Vietnam have grown choppy with tension. A distinct increase in the level of Chinese assertiveness in the region has led to multinational companies being pressured out of participating in offshore energy ventures with Vietnam, to the routine rounding up of Vietnamese fishermen by Chinese patrol vessels for ‘fishing in Chinese waters’, as well as to a steady ramping up of Chinese naval activity which has, in some instances, led to tension-fraught stand-offs with the US Navy.
This upsurge in Chinese naval self-confidence has sent ripples of unease across Southeast Asia, and most particularly in Vietnam, which has been embroiled in a bitter territorial dispute with China over the possession of the Spratly and Paracel islands for several decades. Vietnamese officials, when in private, frequently lament what they perceive to be Vietnam’s relative isolation on the diplomatic scene, and fear for the future. When discussing these issues recently in Paris with someone with close ties to the Vietnamese leadership, I was issued with the following dire prediction: “We think that the Chinese will press for a final resolution of the sovereignty dispute over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the next ten to twenty years. If Vietnam has not reinforced its strategic partnerships by then, while simultaneously strengthening its Navy, China will be able to just seize the islands without anyone abroad lifting a hand in protest or even batting an eye-lid. ”
Vietnamese dignitaries seem to believe that their window of opportunity to press an advantageous deal with China is rapidly closing and this has instilled their military diplomacy with a new sense of urgency.
Having taken tentative steps to reinforce its ageing and minute fleet, most notably by ordering a flotilla of six Kilo-class submarines from Russia, Hanoi has also been endeavouring to reinforce its defence ties with several other regional powers such as Singapore, Japan, Australia (which Secretary General Nong Duc Manh paid visit to only a few weeks ago) and India.
A Partnership Grounded in History:
Vietnam’s relationship with India goes back a long way. Indeed, one could say that India, along with ex-Soviet Russia, has been one of Vietnam’s staunchest allies over the years. The Indian Prime Minister Jawahrlal Nehru was the first foreign leader to visit the newly independent North Vietnam in 1954, and throughout most of the Cold War, India and Vietnam were strong political allies. Both had very close ties to the Soviet Union, and both bore the brunt of Chinese border invasions; India in 1962, and Vietnam in 1979. India’s support of Vietnam during the Vietnam war and during its invasion and occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s came at a high political cost, injecting bitterness into Delhi’s difficult relationship with Washington, as well as delaying the process of Sino-Indian normalisation by almost a decade. In return, Vietnam supported India in its conflicts with Pakistan, and was one of the first countries in the world to recognize newly independent Bangladesh in 1971.
The Indo-Vietnamese relationship throughout the Cold War, however, remained mostly diplomatic and political in nature. Bilateral trade was minimal, and the security component of their rapport limited itself, by and large, to information sharing protocols. It was only with the profound restructuring of Asia’s security environment at the end of the Cold War, and the advent of India’s “Look East Policy” in the early 90s that the relationship gradually evolved into a genuine strategic partnership.
The Burgeoning of a Wide Ranging Strategic Partnership:
The abrupt disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War had an enormous impact on both countries’ diplomacies. Almost overnight, both Hanoi and Delhi lost their most reliable strategic guarantor in Asia. Both countries reacted to this radically new security environment by opening up to the world, liberalizing their economies, and taking steps to normalize their relationships with their neighbours, while making an effort to diversify their strategic partnerships. The end of Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia facilitated its integration into ASEAN in 1995, and in the early 90s India launched what it termed its “Look East Policy”, which heralded a new era of engagement,both diplomatic and economic, with Southeast Asian nations.
It was only with the advent of an intensely nationalistic government in Delhi in the late 90s, however, that bilateral ties began to really pick up speed and take on a genuinely strategic turn. With the nuclear explosions of Pokhran II, in 1998, the BJP governement of Atal Behari Vajpayee signalled to the world, and more particularly to China, that India had become a hard power to be reckoned with.Vietnam, for its part, was intent on extricating itself from an excessive dependence on its timeold Russian partner in terms of both arms procurement and military-to- military diplomacy .Leaders from both countries also recognized that, despite significant progress in their relations with Beijing, both India and Vietnam still share a natural strategic congruence on the need to restrain China.
Since 1998, both countries have thus been steadily shoring up their ties, whether it be on the military or on the diplomatic front.
Vietnam has come out in support of India’s bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC, has lobbied in favour of India’s presence at the first East Asian Summit in 2005, and helped block Pakistan’s inclusion in the ASEAN Regional Forum. India, in return, was in favour of Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Organization, and helped Vietnam secure a temporary seat at the UNSC in 2007. Bilateral trade has also grown extremely rapidly, surging from little more than 72 million dollars in 1995 to more than two billion in 2008. Indian multinationals such as Tata Steel and ONGC Videsh Limited have started to heavily invest in Vietnam, in what many hope is just the beginning of a new trade pattern in Asia.
The aspect of the Indo-Vietnamese partnership that has known the most progress, however, is on the military one.
Strategically placed on the eastern fringe of Southeast Asia, Vietnam is viewed by India as the main obstacle to China’s southwards expansion. Much as China has attempted to constrain India by forming a military nexus with Pakistan, New Delhi has been involved in defence cooperation with, and provided military assistance to its rival’s smaller, militaristic neighbour.
In 2000, George Fernandes, the BJP government’s Defence Minister signed a 15-point Defence Protocol with Vietnam, which promised to provide Vietnam with assistance in the modernization of its armed forces and to intensify defence cooperation between the two countries. Three years later, India and Vietnam stepped up their military cooperation by signing a “Joint Declaration and Framework of Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of India and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as they enter the 21st century.” In 2007, this was followed up by a formalized Strategic Partnership.
India has been providing Vietnam with assistance in the shoring up of its naval and air capabilities in an attempt to deny China total supremacy in the South China Sea. This is greatly facilitated by the fact that Vietnam’s Air Force and Navy’s military hardware have the same Russian origin as their Indian counterparts, which has enabled the Indian armed forces to frequently help their Vietnamese partners overcome their operational difficulties by supplying them with spare parts and by providing advanced repair and maintenance services. New Delhi has repaired and upgraded 125 Mig 21 planes of the Vietnamese Air Force, and supplied them with enhanced avionics and radar systems. Indian Air Force pilots have also been training Vietnamese fighter pilots, and in 2005 the Indian Navy dispatched more than 150 tonnes of spares to Hanoi for its Russian Petya and OSA-11 class missile boats. The Indian and Vietnamese coast guards have engaged in joint patrols, and both navies participated in a joint exercise in 2007.
Indo-Vietnamese military cooperation also extends to their respective ground forces; as both countries have engaged in joint exercises, and Indian army officers have benefited from Vietnamese expertise in jungle warfare and counter-insurgency.
In return, the Vietnamese have been supplied with advanced light helicopters (the Indian made AHLs) at “friendly prices”, and Vietnamese officers have been provided with English lessons at an Indian Language Institute.
A Feeling of Unfulfilled Potential:
Despite all this, there is a feeling, both in India and in Vietnam, that the partnership is far from having achieved its potential, and, what’s more, has started to lose its momentum.
Hanoi has been particularly disappointed in India’s unreliability as a weapons procurement partner. Although India has engaged in some token efforts to help modernize Vietnam’s military, the Vietnamese are frustrated by the fact that New Delhi seems so reticent to supply it with some of the missile systems it had initially promised. Indeed, in 2000 and at several occasions during the BJP governnment’s tenure, India had vouched that it would gift Vietnam with the Prithvi and BrahMos missile systems. The Prithvi is an SRBM (Short Range Ballistic Missile), with a maximum range of approximately 200-350km,whereas the BrahMos Cruise Missile, co-produced by the Indians with the Russians, is a very advanced anti-ship missile, based on the Russian Yakhent anti-ship missile, which has a range of more than 300km and that can fly at more than twice the speed the sound. If the Vietnamese Navy were to acquire such a weapons system, it would prove to be a major challenge to Chinese naval dominance in the South China Sea, and greatly aid Vietnam in its strategy of sea denial and coastal defence. Various theories have been put forward to explain India’s failure to provide Vietnam with the Prithvi and BrahMos. Some claim that India’s Congress government, which has increasingly focused on economic rather than military cooperation with Vietnam, does not want to run the risk of antagonizing China. Others blame it on traditional Indian bureaucratic sloth or have stated that, in the case of the BrahMos, it must first be fully inducted into the Indian Armed Forces before a surplus can be generated for friendly states such as Vietnam. Most analysts concur in saying that Vietnam will probably obtain the Prithvi system in the long run. When it comes to the vaunted BrahMos, however, things are far from certain.
It is believed that frustration at this, as well as at successive delays in amrs deliveries, is what led the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security to purchase sub machine guns and sniper rifles from Pakistan in 2007, in a veiled but nevertheless significant expression of its displeasure. The Indians for their part, are somewhat disappointed that the possibility of the Indian Navy gaining permanent berthing rights at the Vietnamese deep sea port of Cam Ranh Bay now seem to be increasingly remote. While the Vietnamese aired this possibility at the turn of the century, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien declared in 2004 when questioned on the matter that Cam Ranh was “no longer a military port”. Most analysts now concur in viewing Cam Ranh Bay as Vietnam’s strategic trump card, that it occasionally brandishes to balance China, but that it will most probably refuse to give up to a foreign power, unless it is compelled to in extreme circumstances.
Things are also far from perfect on the economic front. Indeed, while bilateral trade has grown substantially over the past decade, it is also increasingly unbalanced in nature, with Vietnam suffering from a crippling one billion dollar trade deficit with India. As a net benificiary of this imbalance, India has politely brushed aside the Vietnamese proposal to establish an FTA and has refused to grant tax reductions and exemptions to Vietnamese products.
An Uncertain Future:
While it is clear that ties in-between India and Vietnam have strengthened over the past few years, particularly in the field of defence, it is equally apparent that for it to endure it needs to be put on a more equal footing.
India should consider lowering its trade tarriffs and opening its markets to some Vietnamese products, and should encourage more Indian companies to invest in Vietnam. Indian policy makers that hesitate to provide Vietnamese ships with BrahMos cruise missiles should maybe wonder whether China was beset by the same moral qualms when it supplied Pakistan with its first state-of-the-art F-22P frigate this summer.
Last but not least, the future of the Indo-Vietnamese partnership will increasingly depend on both states’ attitude towards China. India’s Congress government, which has generally shown a slightly more conciliatory attitude towards Beijing than its BJP predecessor; is currently facing renewed tensions along its 4,057 km with China. It may not wish, therefore, to durably aggravate its transhimalyan neighbour by strengthening the military facet of its ties with Vietnam.
Vietnam’s leadership, for its part, is currently riven by factional in-fighting as a prelude to the 11th National Congress in 2011. The recent crackdown on nationalist Vietnamese bloggers and journalists seems to indicate that the China-aligned fringe of the Party, which controls domestic intelligence gathering via the military intelligence unit General Department II, is gradually gaining ascendancy in the struggle in-between conservatives and liberals. If the pro-China conservatives win this subterranean battle for power and influence, it will undoubtedly have a highly negative impact on the Indo-Vietnamese partnership.
Re: India in South East Asia
Skratu, It is highly unlikely that India will be able to convert its relationship with Vietnam into a highly strategic relationship.
China will not allow Vietnam to be inimical to their interests beyond a point and India is having difficulty with Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
Don;t want to sound too negative but we have see some real tangible action before we can believe it.
Btw, what is your assessment of India capability to project power in South China sea on its own?
China will not allow Vietnam to be inimical to their interests beyond a point and India is having difficulty with Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
Don;t want to sound too negative but we have see some real tangible action before we can believe it.
Btw, what is your assessment of India capability to project power in South China sea on its own?
Re: India in South East Asia
Vietnam tense as China war is marked
China Vietnam Disquiet
Though dated (Feb 2009), it gives an insight of the Vietnamese China relationship.
China Vietnam Disquiet
Though dated (Feb 2009), it gives an insight of the Vietnamese China relationship.
Re: India in South East Asia
I know this is not addressed to me but the answer is 'none'. if it is any consolation neither has PLAN (capability to project power in our backyard I mean).csharma wrote:Btw, what is your assessment of India capability to project power in South China sea on its own?
Re: India in South East Asia
But with bases in IOR, they can play plenty of cold war games and cause a severe headache to the IN.
It seems that China knows that once war breaks out, its goose is cooked in IOR. But until then they can by increasing deployment, cause the IN to divert resources into keeping track of them. Maybe even indulge in some cold war style ship to ship banging.
It seems that China knows that once war breaks out, its goose is cooked in IOR. But until then they can by increasing deployment, cause the IN to divert resources into keeping track of them. Maybe even indulge in some cold war style ship to ship banging.
Re: India in South East Asia
the question is where will that happen ?
to be able to deploy in each others backyard both navies would need to be able to secure the routes through SE asia and even neutralize the whole of ASEAN's naval forces. such a capability is not forthcoming for a long time for either.
the routes bypassing indonesia are too time consuming and impractical. at most you can send a fwe attack subs for harassment, that's it.
to be able to deploy in each others backyard both navies would need to be able to secure the routes through SE asia and even neutralize the whole of ASEAN's naval forces. such a capability is not forthcoming for a long time for either.
the routes bypassing indonesia are too time consuming and impractical. at most you can send a fwe attack subs for harassment, that's it.
Re: India in South East Asia
Any naval force that you want to hit at chinese cities along the south china sea and northwards, will have to be in the south china sea when hostilities break out. It is futile to try and transit the malacca when the shooting has already started.
The ASEAN will grumble, even try and stop you. The chinese will be waiting on the other side.
The chinese have taken a lead by having bases in IOR where they will be posting ships during peacetime. These can spring into action if a war breaks out. It will be a small force, but the IN will have to track them and take them out.
China calculates that there will be a border skirmish at the most, a-la kargil redux all along the indo tibetean border. China will try ensure as much as possible to not let it deteriorate any further, since then the indian advantage will also kick in.
Now conventionally at least, the IA is weaker, the IN is not deployed regularly in the south china sea.
The ASEAN will grumble, even try and stop you. The chinese will be waiting on the other side.
The chinese have taken a lead by having bases in IOR where they will be posting ships during peacetime. These can spring into action if a war breaks out. It will be a small force, but the IN will have to track them and take them out.
China calculates that there will be a border skirmish at the most, a-la kargil redux all along the indo tibetean border. China will try ensure as much as possible to not let it deteriorate any further, since then the indian advantage will also kick in.
Now conventionally at least, the IA is weaker, the IN is not deployed regularly in the south china sea.
Re: India in South East Asia
Rahul M wrote:I know this is not addressed to me but the answer is 'none'. if it is any consolation neither has PLAN (capability to project power in our backyard I mean).csharma wrote:Btw, what is your assessment of India capability to project power in South China sea on its own?
The reason I ask is because there have been multiple write ups in the recent past on how India is becoming a player in Asia Pacific balance of power. The first place in Asia Pacific would be South China Sea.
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Re: India in South East Asia
That is why I am scanning the reports for news of India basing 20-30 Su-30 MKi armed with Brahmos in the Andamans. That will signal that India is serious about China. Until that happens there will not be any border conflict.
Re: India in South East Asia
^^^
aroor has reported that such a proposal is being considered seriously. I would hope that the IAF buys new mki's and modify at least some of those for naval strike rather than use the regular mki.
gagan, which bases in IOR for china ? a penny packet deployment without means to protect them will be a disaster for any force risking it. say, for example a couple of PLAN destroyers are based in qwadar. (hypothetical situation as will be clear)
why this will not happen
a) to give such a force a fighting chance (no more, most likely a suicide) PLAN would have to base its most advanced vessels, the 05* ships. they have too few of those to spare for an overseas deployment.
b) a small surface fleet deployment of middling tech and capabilities would be mincemeat in the opening hours of hostilities. you would be better served to gather your forces at one place with overlapping protection.
c) again, the only possible force would be subs, these can operate without a large cover.
aroor has reported that such a proposal is being considered seriously. I would hope that the IAF buys new mki's and modify at least some of those for naval strike rather than use the regular mki.
gagan, which bases in IOR for china ? a penny packet deployment without means to protect them will be a disaster for any force risking it. say, for example a couple of PLAN destroyers are based in qwadar. (hypothetical situation as will be clear)
why this will not happen
a) to give such a force a fighting chance (no more, most likely a suicide) PLAN would have to base its most advanced vessels, the 05* ships. they have too few of those to spare for an overseas deployment.
b) a small surface fleet deployment of middling tech and capabilities would be mincemeat in the opening hours of hostilities. you would be better served to gather your forces at one place with overlapping protection.
c) again, the only possible force would be subs, these can operate without a large cover.
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Re: India in South East Asia
Thought they had already stored several of the nuke subs at Hainan. They could be doing regular tours in the IOR.
Re: India in South East Asia
India and Vietnam Friendship
Author Geetesh Sharma recalled his first visit to Vietnam in 1982. “I had read a lot about Vietnam when I was in college from R C Mazumdar’s book. I wanted to find out about the other aspects of Vietnam that is similar to India. I found there are more than 200 Hindu temples in Vietnam and over 1000 Hindu deities are being worshipped over there,” said Sharma.
He informed that there is a particular group in Vietnam who call themselves Cham Ethnic group. They claim their origin is from India. Their alphabets sound pretty similar to that of our Hindi, Bengali, or Sanskrit scripts.
what differences is he talking about ?Nguyen Tuan Anh, first secretary, embassy of S R Vietnam in India signed off by saying that despite some differences between the two countries there is no need to sever ties ever.
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Re: India in South East Asia
Differences have cropped up over the exact nature of military cooperation especially with hardware supplies - missiles for example. Vietnam also ordered small arms from Pakistan which was not much liked by Indian side. But more recently there have been Vietnamese government action to protect proposed Chinese investments over and above local Vietnamese concerns.
Re: India in South East Asia
Tanmay K wrote:I think last year Myanmar agreed to open a port (Sitve?) for transit of goods from the NE.India will build a road connecting a town with Mizoram.The cost is about $100mn and it will be completed in 2012.I can't remember where I read it.I'll post the link if I find it on google.
Indeed India is building the Sittwe port and the road.
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Re: India in South East Asia
Has anyone been tracking the recent reflaring of the border disputes bewteen BD and Myanmar? So much so that BD media has reported that BDR has been put on alert after the Myanmarese side began to build fencing from their side. As ususal there is typically always a lot of crying and indignation if any of the neighbours builds a separation wall on their own side of the border - from BD. The BD has really made it into a fine art of keeping the border absolutely flexible on the expansive side! They also have a running fight on sea-territory with Myanmar. BD gov I think has proposed complaining at the UN level - against both India and Myanmar.
An interesting angle developing here!
An interesting angle developing here!
Re: India in South East Asia
Myanmar is worried about the Rohingya who are a Muslim ethnic group of the Northern Arakan State of Western Burma . The Rohingya population is mostly concentrated in 2 bordering townships of Burma to Bangladesh namely Maungdaw and Buthidaung, and spread in 3 townships of Akyab, Rathedaung and Kyauktaw. They speak Chittagonian.
The Myanmar govt is ensuring that they all migrate to Bangladesh.
The repression of the Myanmar govt is such that they have fled as far as Thailand.
On 18 and 30 December, 2008 the Thai navy pushed out to high sea at least 992 Rohingya boatpeople in boats without engines or sufficient supplies. An estimated 400 to 500 of them are believed missing and feared drowned. The Indian Navy rescued a total of 257 boatpeople in December 18 and January 10, while some 193 were rescued near Indonesia's Sabang Island in Aceh province on January 7. In addition 126 surviving boat people are now in Thai custody in southern Thailand. The action of the Thai navy is unacceptable. It is violation of international law and other international practices. We strongly condemn this heinous action.
The Myanmar govt is ensuring that they all migrate to Bangladesh.
The repression of the Myanmar govt is such that they have fled as far as Thailand.
On 18 and 30 December, 2008 the Thai navy pushed out to high sea at least 992 Rohingya boatpeople in boats without engines or sufficient supplies. An estimated 400 to 500 of them are believed missing and feared drowned. The Indian Navy rescued a total of 257 boatpeople in December 18 and January 10, while some 193 were rescued near Indonesia's Sabang Island in Aceh province on January 7. In addition 126 surviving boat people are now in Thai custody in southern Thailand. The action of the Thai navy is unacceptable. It is violation of international law and other international practices. We strongly condemn this heinous action.
Re: India in South East Asia
X Posted.
INS Mahish and INS Trinkat on "coordinated patrol" with the TNI-AL:
Indian Navy and Indonesian Navy to conduct two weeks of coordinated patrol from 18 Oct 09
INS Mahish and INS Trinkat on "coordinated patrol" with the TNI-AL:
Indian Navy and Indonesian Navy to conduct two weeks of coordinated patrol from 18 Oct 09
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Re: India in South East Asia
Why does Canada get anxious about India in SE Asia while it is okay with China's potential impact?
http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/archive ... m1art9.pdf
http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/archive ... m1art9.pdf
How far are comparisons of an "imploding Europe" scenario of the 20th century world wars with a "multi-polar" SE Asia where India is mentioned as one of the four principal players - realistic?Participation in RIMPAC allows Canada to begin to address the maritime challenges in the Asia-Pacific region,
both in operational and political terms. But the political challenge cannot be met by a single biennial exercise
alone. Not only will we be asked to prepare ourselves for a rising China, we will be forced simultaneously to prepare for a strong China, a strong India, an established Japan and an unstable Indonesia in an evolving Southeast Asia.
This task will require more effort than planning for China alone. We cannot pretend that preparing for a multi-polar
Asia will simply involve a scaled-up version of preparing for a strong China. A bipolar system characterized by a
China challenging US hegemony in Asia provides Canada with relatively simple policy options. As seen in the Cold
War, a bipolar system invites a basic balancing calculus Unfortunately relations in a multi-polar system are more complex and defy the logic of ‘with us or against us.’ A multi-polar Asia will be prone to unstable relationships and shifting allegiances as competing powers, wary of one another, guard their sovereignty and act in their own interests.
In short, preparing for the Asia of tomorrow will be much harder than we think. A multi-polar Asia will not provide
us with the same kind of certainty in this century that a bipolar Europe offered in the last. Determining which policy approaches will be the most successful will be no easy task – particularly as Canadian officials do not have any experience with this. We have not experienced multi-polarity in the international system for almost a full century; this means of course, that the Canadian Navy has never truly operated in a multi-polar environment. The
Royal Canadian Navy was in its infancy when a multipolar Europe imploded. Not only did the main players in Europe fail to keep the peace among themselves, but Canada ended up fighting a large-scale conflict far from home.
Re: India in South East Asia
Can anyone comment of the strategic implication of the recent India - BD treaties to include the impact of Khaleda's Zia threat of Hasina 'selling out' BD?
Re: India in South East Asia
Story on Malaysia warming up to India. Essentially ASEAN countries are looking to India to balance China.
Malaysia and the growing importance of India
http://beta.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article82789.ece
Malaysia and the growing importance of India
http://beta.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article82789.ece
Quite revealing was his answer to a question about the possibility of a new concert of Asian powers consisting of China, India, Japan, and the ASEAN. In an interactive session at his office at Putrajaya, Malaysia’s administrative capital, on January 11, Mr. Najib said: “If you extrapolate [the current trends], I think, the first part of the 21st century will be essentially [one] uni-polar [global order]. But, gradually, people will see it as a multi-polar kind of world, in which the growing influence of China obviously [is felt]. The projection is that by 2050 China would be the biggest economy in terms of the size of GDP [Gross Domestic Product] and that India would be following not too far behind. And, we will see the integration of the ASEAN as an economic community with East Asia and also with India. So, I see that kind of a nexus developing as we move on in the 21st century.”
Does it show that western worldview is not exactly in concert with SE Asian countries when it comes to the future of strategic Asia?A Harvard professor may have written about the possibility of Americans seeing, at some stage, their Hollywood as a word-play on India’s Bollywood. But India does not equal China in the larger international opinion circles. Indeed, a 2009 treatise from the West traces a scenario of “when China rules the world.” In such a broad sweep of futurology, Mr. Najib’s perspective on the possibility of a new East Asian economic nexus inclusive of India is surely novel.
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Re: India in South East Asia
Since we do not have a separate East Asia thread, with the indulgence of the mods, letting SEAsia 'annex' Korea!
Our guest this year for the RD parade - South Korean President.
Why the South Korean president's visit is important
Our guest this year for the RD parade - South Korean President.
Why the South Korean president's visit is important
A member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group which supported India during its efforts to get a waiver, S Korea is keen to enter into a bilateral civil nuclear agreement with India to facilitate not only the sale of its nuclear power reactors, but also high technology, much of which is for dual uses.
Already, South Korea is only the second country (after Singapore) with which India has signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, and bilateral trade is currently around $16 billion, rising at an average of 15 per cent annually. There has also been what officials called 'an investment surge' from Korea and, under the agreement, South Korea will eliminate duties on 93 percent of its industrial and agricultural products and India will do the same on 85 percent of its goods.
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Re: India in South East Asia
watch thailand.. thaksin seems to be moving back and forth between europe, dubai and us is moving in, slowly but steadily.. the reddies are getting together and thaksin too is in the same camp..
seems like the king is as usual silent.. this seems like another one of those color revolutions, outsourced by the zbig cabal.. why thailand, i wonder.. is it because the zbig cabal want to strengthen the chinis on the kokang, mekong, yunnan soft underbelly?? two days back, there was a report on the mekong water shortage.. amusing coincidence.
seems like the king is as usual silent.. this seems like another one of those color revolutions, outsourced by the zbig cabal.. why thailand, i wonder.. is it because the zbig cabal want to strengthen the chinis on the kokang, mekong, yunnan soft underbelly?? two days back, there was a report on the mekong water shortage.. amusing coincidence.
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Re: India in South East Asia
Both Thailand and Myanmar hotting up. The junta in Myanmar and the military in Thailand both are under pressure. In Thailand, isn't the game also about control over the army? Thailand's monarchy could be facing very similar situation as to Sihanouk.
Re: India in South East Asia
Reporting from Ground Zero:
Red Shirt Mobs (RM) were formed after the Yellow Shirt Mob(YM)
toppled the then ThaiRak Thai party in with a new name party
GoTh.
It is thought that YMs had covert Military support and overt
financial support from many bizness houses. what with, military
proclaiming its inability to impose ISA when the to be toppled GoTh
asked them to do so, and currently both Military and Police are in
action on imposition of ISA, with RMs reduced to cheap gimmicks of splaying
blood and yelling obscenities.
YM protesters were provided with 500 Bath/day allowance, free tents, free medical treatment, compensation if injured or died during protest, free top dog lawyers, free entertainment including live Soccar and Boxing Telecast. most important 3 free meals/day.
there were never less than 15000 protesters and they did their protesting
for 193 days, the maths is simple no?
RMs protesters are provided with 350 Bath/day 3 meals / day, no compensation
and they are forced to watch protest leaders bak-bak & yak-yak antics for entertainment, the number is around 5000 protesters this morning, reduced from around 80,000 on the first day of protest, and it is onlee the 5th day.
The conclusion is concluded, and i do not think i need to more yak-yak.
Red Shirt Mobs (RM) were formed after the Yellow Shirt Mob(YM)
toppled the then ThaiRak Thai party in with a new name party
GoTh.
It is thought that YMs had covert Military support and overt
financial support from many bizness houses. what with, military
proclaiming its inability to impose ISA when the to be toppled GoTh
asked them to do so, and currently both Military and Police are in
action on imposition of ISA, with RMs reduced to cheap gimmicks of splaying
blood and yelling obscenities.
YM protesters were provided with 500 Bath/day allowance, free tents, free medical treatment, compensation if injured or died during protest, free top dog lawyers, free entertainment including live Soccar and Boxing Telecast. most important 3 free meals/day.
there were never less than 15000 protesters and they did their protesting
for 193 days, the maths is simple no?
RMs protesters are provided with 350 Bath/day 3 meals / day, no compensation
and they are forced to watch protest leaders bak-bak & yak-yak antics for entertainment, the number is around 5000 protesters this morning, reduced from around 80,000 on the first day of protest, and it is onlee the 5th day.
The conclusion is concluded, and i do not think i need to more yak-yak.
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Re: India in South East Asia
SM Goh visits India
SENIOR Minister Goh Chok Tong is headed to New Delhi for a three day official visit from Thursday to Saturday.
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Re: India in South East Asia
The Kunming - BD raillink is going forward. SH has announced this formally. They are going to have a stretch through Myanmar. Why cannot we buy a strip corridor from Myanmar running from Indian border to the sea?
Re: India in South East Asia
IOW the religious orders are preparing for transformation in NoKo.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1eea3320-464f ... ab49a.html
FINANCIAL TIMES
Buddhists give North Korea food for thought
By Christian Oliver in Seoul
Published: April 12 2010 17:49 | Last updated: April 12 2010 17:49
Buddhists at prayer in Seoul
Buddhists at prayer in Seoul.
Worshippers are in conflict with South Korea’s evangelical Protestants, hoping for gains after any unification
Inspiration comes easily to South Korea’s Buddhist abbots.
The Venerable Bop Ta decided in the late 1990s he should build noodle factories in North Korea, and not just because of starvation in the secular dictatorship. The factories could increase the role of Buddhism in inter-Korean rapprochement, clawing back ground from tenacious South Korean Protestant missionaries, who are eagerly seeking North Korean converts.
Religion is officially banned in North Korea and anyone who believes in any religion must practise in the utmost secrecy.
“I felt very uncomfortable the Protestants had set up so many North-South links, laying ground for unification. Buddhism has been a Korean religion for 1,500 years, while Protestantism has only been around for just over a century,” said the portly abbot, wearing the grey robes of the Jogye order.
South Korean Protestants, 18 per cent of the population, have put North Korea high on the agenda of their rich and politically influential churches, funding clandestine evangelical networks on the Chinese border. South Korean missionaries are famed for braving trouble spots and two were executed in Afghanistan in 2007.
Bop Ta, one of South Korea’s leading abbots, disapproved of such evangelists, who sometimes send North Korean converts back home to risk death as missionaries, depicted in state propaganda as child killers.
“Seducing people into defection is a business for Protestant missionaries but ultimately causes more conflict between North and South. It won’t undermine the regime. The families left behind by defectors suffer terribly,” he said in his office in Seoul. “The motivation for the noodle factory was that ideology should not matter. People just needed food.”
Anthropologists have said North Korean defectors, disillusioned with the personality cult dedicated to the founder of the nation, Kim Il-sung, yearn to fill the void with another faith. Jesus is beating Buddha.
“The difference when it comes to Christians and Buddhists approaching North Koreans is that the Christians are much more active and aggressive,” said Yoon Yeo-sang, president of a group collating data on North Korean human rights.
Bop Ta’s noodles form only one strand of Buddhist moves to make sure Christians do not monopolise the struggle for North Korea’s soul after unification. Buddhist monks are helping restore temples; only 60 of North Korea’s 500 shrines survived the 1950-1953 Korean war. The Venerable Jaseung, South Korea’s senior abbot, visited North Korea last year to arrange pilgrimages by thousands of South Korean Buddhists but Seoul, which has icy relations with Pyongyang after last year’s tests of an atomic warhead and long-range missile, vetoed them.
Bop Ta now runs two factories in North Korea, one in Pyongyang and one in Sariwon, a city 56km to the south. Sariwon has a strong Buddhist pedigree and is known across the peninsula for a song set there, “Night at Songbul temple”. Employing 70 staff, the factories import ingredients from South Korea before giving the noodles away.
During the “sunshine policy” of South Korea’s two previous leftwing presidents, Bop Ta sent 60 tonnes of ground wheat a month, feeding 7,700 people. Under President Lee Myung-bak, a conservative who is cooler towards North Korea, that has dropped to 20 to 30 tonnes every two months. The missile test also reduced donations.
Bop Ta has visited North Korea almost 100 times, sometimes checking the recipients of handouts. Still, he admits he must largely trust the noodles are given to the needy and not to the military.
Bop Ta raises funds through a Buddhist charity, registered with South Korea’s unification ministry. Like many Buddhists, he has a prickly relationship with the government of Mr Lee, a Presbyterian accused of sidelining the country’s 23 per cent Buddhist population.
Suspicion of Bop Ta runs deep among conservatives. An activist against military dictatorship, he was arrested in the early 1990s for showing excessive sympathy for North Korea. More recently, the abbot was fined – he claims unfairly – over a construction contract.
Still, Mr Lee recently has called for better relations with the Buddhists.
Although North Koreans are unaware Bop Ta’s “Keumgang Noodles” hail from a Buddhist charity, South Korea’s Buddhists are also promoting cultural exchanges to bolster the old faith. While Christians were persecuted brutally under communism, Bop Ta said North Korean attitudes towards Buddhism were more ambivalent, with some 10,000 people (out of 24m) practising some kind of Buddhist rites.
“Buddhism is regarded as a patriotic institution in North Korea, associated with the nationalist movement and fighting Japanese colonial rule,” he said, but added temples were often tourist sites.
North Korean Buddhism is waning. Hwang Jang-yop, a former senior communist official and North Korea’s most high-profile defector, says the monks at temples there are “fakes”. Bop Ta said North Korea’s outlawing of Chinese script prevented proper study of ancient texts and that monks also defy tradition by marrying.
The Catholic Church has also responded to the challenge of Protestants dominating the landscape after unification, training priests to specialise in the North from Seoul.
Hwang Soon-il, a professor of Buddhist studies at Seoul’s Dongguk university, conceded Buddhists had not mobilised quickly on North Korea but argued Seoul’s cool relations with Pyongyang could not excuse inaction.
“If the government cannot do anything about it, we – the Buddhists – should.”
Additional reporting by Kang Buseong
If Protestants are 18% and Buddhists are 23% of SoKo who are the rest?
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- BRF Oldie
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Re: India in South East Asia
Their denominations barely recognise others as Christian. Catholics, Presbytarians, Anglicans?, no religion.
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Re: India in South East Asia
Quite a large fraction (>50%) does not believe in any official religion, but more in "pragmatic" values aka Confucian "practicalism." This segment of the population is the one that Christianity is trying to convert. Already, many of the Xian value systems are used commonplace in urban SK today (such as marriage ceremonies).ramana wrote: If Protestants are 18% and Buddhists are 23% of SoKo who are the rest?
Samuel Huntington labels Korea as an officially "sinic" civilization. While that is de facto true for NK, SK's push to embracing their sinic (Goryo) past is primarily due to Japan. Japan scored a huge own goal with WWII atrocities. From what I remember, folks are more accepting of china but there is some sorta resentment with the Japanese, which could range from friendly competition to takleef of the WKK kind. If and when SK and NK embrace each other (sooner than later) with SK bringing in the bread and NK the bums, another realignment is expected with unified Korea trying to act as the balancer between china and japan as a "third pole." Now it is little more than the US' poster-boy with a relationship with Japan that mirrors Greece-Turkey.
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Re: India in South East Asia
Thailand’s Recurrent ‘Colour’ Protests ---- Pankaj K Jha
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Thailan ... jha_120410
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Thailan ... jha_120410