Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 20 Sep 2009 22:45

shravan wrote:More scientists back Santhanam on Pokhran II

Dr Gopalakrishnan called for a technological committee comprising of international experts to review the “methodology used by Chidambaram and his colleagues to establish their claims”. Dr Chidambaram and S K Sikka — both weapon designers for the thermonuclear device — should “present their methodology to a technical committee involving international experts too

"international experts"?

Who would these be? The clueless Non Proliferation Ayatollahs? Or actual experts from the national laboratories, with actual experience designing bombs and performing radiological yield estimation from post-shot drilling?

I presume the latter. Which leaves me very puzzled.

Which experts are going to be allowed by their governments to be associated with this blatant act of proliferation?

This would be a violation of the NPT
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html

Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

This would be a violation of various national laws like the US Atomic Energy Act

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-colle ... ks&page=14

that no such cooperation shall involve the communication of Restricted Data relating to the design or fabrication of atomic weapons

Who are these experts willing to violate the NPT and their own national laws and assist India with the perfection of its atomic weapons?

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 20 Sep 2009 22:50

1. State of test.
2. State of deterrence. Do we have TN or not, is it needed, if not what?
3. Need for tests for effective deterrence.
4. The tradeoff between trade and test.

What we see is that the GOI's official response to all your questions is:

Yes, same as what we said in 1998

Which happens to be the only sensible answer. The whole tamasha appears to have a substantially lower "yield" in seismic terms, nothwithstanding the huge Thermal Venting, cratering, cave-formation etc. Because the "experts" making the "accusations" and the "expert strategic opinions" cannot decide whether:
1. The S1 test was 60% successful, 40% successful, 20% successful, less than 10% successful, or complete, utter failures that didn't even budge the container tube.

2. The Stategic Experts cannot decide whether India MUST have "4MT" weapons, "1MT" weapons (Gen. Malik and K.Santanam), "300KT weapons" (K. Santanam in the same article as the 1MT spec), "43kT weapons" or "27KT devices proving scalability".

3. None of these guys/gals/others can explain the Khetolai proof that WHATEVER was intended to occur, did occur in S1+S2. My take, of course, is that the intent was to prove that "dial-a-yield" worked at very low levels, and nothing more.

4. The NonProllotullahs are gradually realizing that they have walked into the Pu pit with their sneering "sh1t science".

5. The Chinese (The RED CHINESE!!) are calling for "TRANSPARENCY".

6. The GOI's response to all this is: "Oh, yeah! What we said in 1998!"

The only sensible article so far is the one which posted a balanced summary of the controversy and went on to conclude that the whole noise was generated by those who want the US-India civilian nuclear accord scrapped. I would add that those ppl would be fine if the present GOI was ousted somehow.

So, to "reset" the thread, Samuel, what is needed is what I asked ramana and Arun to please consider: Make a table listing all the claimed numbers, and some explanation of what test was REALLY supposed to do what (per what is clearly known). I figured that only they have the deep knowledge to do this and understand what each writer has been saying.

But Samuel, hey, with your vast skills, that should be easy 4 u too.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 20 Sep 2009 22:53

S&S,

If we could bring stability or some sense of sanity to this topic I would think the scicom of DRDO + BARC would have done it long back.

The topic is such that it will and can create only a mess.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 20 Sep 2009 22:56

Gerard:

"International experts" could be Indian citjens too, u know.... But I agree, I noticed that weird comment too. Signs of stress, I think. Maybe they are going to bring in AQ Khan, he after all has vast international experience in these things, and is a "Free Agent" now. Plus Pervez Hoodbhoy with Stephen Cohen to bring the chai-biskoot (I wonder whether that comes under ITAR/NPT).

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 20 Sep 2009 23:04

1. State of test.
2. State of deterrence. Do we have TN or not, is it needed, if not what?
3. Need for tests for effective deterrence.
4. The tradeoff between trade and test.

Fine.

Let me bring out my fav question.

Why should there be a crater at all?

From what little I know and via google (and the BR article) it seems to me that even a 45Kt yield would not have created a crater at >200 meter depth. So, what am I missing? Why is Santhanam expecting a crater?

IF (BIG IF) that is right, then there could have been a designed yield. Which now requires some proof that it was the designed yield. Since no one has been able to gather what the depth was, and the people who know are not stating it, we are in a bind.

However, based on the equations available to us, can we, should we expect a crater? If YES, then how large should the crater be? And, why?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 20 Sep 2009 23:18

2. State of deterrence. Do we have TN or not, is it needed, if not what?

India has some deterrence.

Yes, India does have a TN.

No, India does not need a TN - the missiles are a LOT more accurate and compensate for the need for a bigger blast.

Seriously, IMHO, India would be far better with better leaders (not just for strategic issues, but for domestic issues too).

PratikDas · Post by **PratikDas** » 20 Sep 2009 23:20

India has thermonuclear capabilities: NSA
Posting in full because this is a gem!
[quote]India has thermonuclear capabilities, National Security Advisor MK Narayanan has emphasised, saying the scientists who raised doubts about the 1998 nuclear tests in Pokhran had personal motives to do so.

Narayanan spoke to CNBC-TV18'S Karan Thapar in an interview to be broadcast Monday night. He insisted that India had the thermonuclear device - the first time a government official has made this statement publicly after the recent controversy.

"We have thermonuclear capabilities. I am absolutely sure. Even if we are hit, we will have enough to be able to deliver something," said Narayanan.

Former senior DRDO official K Santhanam had raised doubts that India's thermonuclear test in 1998 had not worked.

"I have chosen my words very carefully - (the yield was) 45 kilotons... And nobody... including Santhanam, who has absolutely no idea what he is talking about... knows, for that matter any one else can contest what is a proven fact by the data which is there," said the NSA.

He said the Atomic Energy Commission had last week given the "most authoritative" statement on the efficacy of the 1998 nuclear tests and no more clarification was required from the government.

Narayanan indicated that the sudden statements by Santhanam and other senior nuclear scientists could be a result of personal rivalries within the scientific community.

He rejected the suggestion that a panel of scientists could review the Pokhran test results, asserting that it would be difficult to get neutral, independent scientists who could investigate the matter.

"Which peer scientists are we going to bring in (for a panel)? All those peer scientists are part of the establishment or are sceptics," he said.

Narayanan said he was aware of reports that Pakistan had increased its nuclear arsenal. He stated that India will suitably respond to do whatever is required in national interest to increase nuclear deterrence.

"The fact that a country not friendly is building up its arsenal is a concern... We will do what we have to do."

He added: "We have absolutely no intention of changing no-first use doctrine. We are committed to (it)."

On Pakistan reportedly diverting US technology and weapons for use against India, Narayanan said India had taken up the matter a number of times with the US but the latter had only responded by offering the same equipment to India.

But he admitted that India was worried about the modification of Harpoon missiles by Pakistan.[/quote]

Satya_anveshi · Post by **Satya_anveshi** » 20 Sep 2009 23:29

MKN wrote:"We have thermonuclear capabilities. I am absolutely sure. Even if we are hit, we will have enough to be able to deliver something," said Narayanan

"something"...Like in a 4X4 white khadi cloth hoisted on a 6ft danda standing erect atop the command center or is it a cave complex?

And these are "carefully" worded statements from NSA?

On the other hand, the latest A Gopalakrishna's piece and NSA's non-statement indicates (to me) that all this (or at least these two pieces) are well choreographed.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 20 Sep 2009 23:40

Thanks Samuel, actually probably each of the question is itself a thread (as a matter of fact there is one in strat forum), however quick takes.

samuel wrote: 1. State of test.

We demonstrated TN capability for sure. More than that no one can say.

2. State of deterrence. Do we have TN or not, is it needed, if not what?

Unclear, maybe a working TN, but if so no one know if it will work and if it does, with what yield.

Almost certainly not weaponised, not trusted by Mil brass at all.

In my book no TN based deterrence, consequently, based on the Fission weapons (boosted or otherwise) a Agni II based deterrence, not clear if A III is deployed (probably not) In short a very weak deterrence, not enough to stand the test if things go really bad.

3. Need for tests for effective deterrence.

Inevitable -- more tests are needed and soon (1-2 year time frame)

4. The tradeoff between trade and test.

None, never was, more of an issue with Mil tech trade, which as we see is not such a big deal even today. Lets just buy the Mig 35s if it comes to that.

PratikDas · Post by **PratikDas** » 20 Sep 2009 23:51

He rejected the suggestion that a panel of scientists could review the Pokhran test results, asserting that it would be difficult to get neutral, independent scientists who could investigate the matter.

"Which peer scientists are we going to bring in (for a panel)? All those peer scientists are part of the establishment or are sceptics," he said.

There cannot be a greater reason for another full-scale test of the device in its final configuration, i.e. without yield-limiting.

But the NSA seems to have preempted such thoughts earlier in the quote with:

He said the Atomic Energy Commission had last week given the "most authoritative" statement on the efficacy of the 1998 nuclear tests and no more clarification was required from the government.

I don't think I am being jingoistic or alarmist by thinking that this is as low as the Credible Minimum Deterrent can go.

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 21 Sep 2009 00:29

What was Raj Narain to 1970s
MKN is to 2009

but MKN is more funny and damaging to India.
But who cares ? no?

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 21 Sep 2009 00:34

Anujan wrote:Then the conclusion is clear. Its time we became bullies. The fault is entirely of the world.

Just read this post, clear concise and wonderful. Sorry for the one liner but wanted to agree vehemently with it.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 21 Sep 2009 00:35

There is tussle between those in power and those without and is playing out as question of yields. I find it interesting that KSanty was being considered as a remote chance of sucessor to RC as Chairman of AEC. But then its only a rumor. In India everything is maya.

Samuel, yes was thinking along that line. Lets take it off line and bring it up once we get a picture. I think you have my e-mail.

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 21 Sep 2009 00:50

abhiti,

Easy does it.

Take it easy and look busy.

archan · Post by **archan** » 21 Sep 2009 00:51

abhiti, your flame baiting continues even after my warning. If you have problems with moderator(s) feel free to complain to the site administrators. I do not moderate moderators, I moderate users. I will continue to serve you warnings if you do not behave.

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 21 Sep 2009 02:07

Ramana, the sheer bulk of the Agni payloads lead me to think that the bulk/range tradeoff has already been made. Just cut out all estimates for a warhead smaller than 500kg. It does not materially alter much - same 3000km for A-2 and 900or so km for Agni-1. Not ideal, but not bad.

Add to that the slow production- about 2 dozen of each - you see that the trade off between bulk/range/fissile stocks is being made as a compromise in the short term.

As far as S-1 is concerned, if we accept Santhanam's figures of having achieved 50-60% of the design yield and there has yet been no dispute over the BARC claim that the S-1 primary was a FBF device we can see that some progress has been made there.

The question is that you may not be able to maximize scalability of the FBF to 10fold the basic fission yield without a dynamic test. You might certainly be able to double or even triple it without difficulty.

sivab · Post by **sivab** » 21 Sep 2009 02:09

http://www.hindu.com/2009/09/21/stories ... 800900.htm

Deterrence and explosive yield

K. Subrahmanyam and V.S. Arunachalam

Following the controversy on the success or otherwise of the thermonuclear test of India on 11th May 1998 questions have been raised by some senior ex-service officers and civilian strategists on the credibility of the Indian deterrent posture and the perceived mismatch between a 3,500-km missile and a warhead of two digit explosive yield. It is not the intention here to go into the question of success or otherwise of the thermonuclear test. Heaven knows, so much has been said about that already. Instead, there is a need to understand what we mean by deterrence and we shall also discuss whether Indian nuclear strategic posture is credible in the absence of thermonuclear warheads.

Nuclear deterrence is essentially a mind game. A potential aggressor will be deterred if he is persuaded that the nuclear retaliation that will be delivered by the survivable nuclear force of the victim will cause unacceptable damage, totally incommensurate with any strategic, political, economic or any other objective that drives him to go for the first strike. During the Cold War, the Western assumption was that communist ideological expansionism constituted a threat to the very survival of democratic system. But as George Kennan pointed out, the communists while espousing an offensive ideology were also convinced that history was on their side and were not ready to push it at the risk of a nuclear conflict. Both sides thus opted for a status-quo and the world was spared a nuclear war.

In the sixties the U.S. gave serious thought to the possibility of carrying out a total disarming strike on the Soviet Union when it had more than ten times the superiority in warheads. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff could not, however, assure the President that a few Soviet warheads would not get through to the U.S. and that was enough to deter Washington from pursuing that idea of a disarming strike.

No doubt Robert McNamara as Defence Secretary came up with very fanciful calculations of what percentages of Soviet population and industry should be threatened by assured destruction to become the deterrent. These calculations were based on the Soviet Union suffering 20 million casualties in the Second World War and enormous damage to its industry in the European part of Russia. But that happened incrementally over four years of the war and the Soviet leadership could not have known there would be such losses when the Nazi aggression took place. In real world, the Soviets could not accept the loss of fifteen thousand lives in Afghanistan and pulled out of that country. In a sense the U.S. calculations were a misplaced justification to build an arsenal of several thousand warheads and engage the Soviet Union in an arms race. Having built 30,000 warheads at great costs, both sides are now cutting back on their arsenals and dismantling those weapons, again at great cost.

Robert McNamara in later years of his life changed his views. Writing in Foreign Policy of May/June 2005 he said that he had never seen any U.S. or NATO war plan which concluded that initiating the use of nuclear weapons would yield U.S. or the Alliance any benefit. He added that his statements to this effect had never been refuted by any NATO Defence Minister or senior military leaders. Yet it was impossible for any of them, including the U.S. Presidents, to make such statements publicly because they were totally contrary to established NATO policy

War is politics by other means and the aim of a war is to compel the adversary to accept one’s terms. President Reagan and the Soviet Union’s General Secretary Gorbachev are on record that a nuclear war cannot be won. In a nuclear war, once the missiles are launched, entire countries on both sides become battlefields. It is difficult to control or regulate the firing of the missiles since both sides are under compulsion to use the missiles before they are eliminated by the enemy strike. As soon as the first city is hit, populations of all cities would attempt to empty out into the countryside since there will be panic that their own city will be the next target in the next few minutes. Think of the entire urban population of a country becoming internally displaced persons in a matter of hours. Can there be effective governance in the country?

A thermonuclear weapon of 150 kiloton explosive power or three 25 kiloton warheads delivered in a distributed way on a city will perhaps produce equal magnitudes of casualties and property damage. Can it be argued that only a 150 kiloton weapon will deter another warhead of a similar yield? Deterrence is not about the damage one causes to the adversary. It is about what the aggressive side will consider as unacceptable. It is irrelevant whether the destruction is caused by 150 kt weapons or 25 kt weapons. Obviously, it is not infra-dig for a 3,500-km range missile to carry a 25 kt warhead. Cost-effectiveness calculations have no meaning since the nuclear war itself has no meaning. In a mega-city struck by a couple of 25 kt warheads, apart from the hundreds of thousands of dead, there will be an equal number of people wounded and more people affected by radiation; all of whom will be envying the dead. One of us is revisiting the calculations involved in predicting the extent of destruction inflicted by nuclear weapons. Our preliminary results suggest that even with 25kt fission bombs, the damages are going to be far more and extensive than what Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered given the higher population densities in the cities of China and South Asia and the urban development of recent years. Therefore, the Indian deterrent posture will not lose its credibility if India is compelled to rely on fission weapons only.
Important determinants

The role of the Indian nuclear weapons is to deter others using nuclear weapons against us. It can perform that role so long as the retaliatory force is perceived as survivable and able to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. That does not depend on the explosive yield of the individual warheads. Theoretically speaking, the same unacceptable damage can be inflicted by increasing the number of delivery vehicles and warheads of lower yield and increasing their survivability. Reliability, robustness and survivability of weapon platforms are important determinants in validating the deterrence a country practices.

In this article we do not propose to sermonise on the need to eliminate nuclear weapons globally. This was articulated by Rajiv Gandhi in the United Nations many years ago, but has not been pursued since then. Along with our deterrence policy, we should once again pursue the mission for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Our world will be better for that and fission or fusion will then lose their relevance.

(K. Subrahmanyam is a well known strategic analyst and V.S. Arunachalam, a former Scientific Advisor to Defence Minister, is now Chairman of CSTEP, a Bangalore-based think-tank.)

ss_roy · Post by **ss_roy** » 21 Sep 2009 02:42

Partially true.. it is more about the willingness to inflict unacceptable damage. IMHO, the biggest problem with indian nuclear deterrence is the quality of our political leadership, not the weapons.

The role of the Indian nuclear weapons is to deter others using nuclear weapons against us. It can perform that role so long as the retaliatory force is perceived as survivable and able to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. That does not depend on the explosive yield of the individual warheads. Theoretically speaking, the same unacceptable damage can be inflicted by increasing the number of delivery vehicles and warheads of lower yield and increasing their survivability. Reliability, robustness and survivability of weapon platforms are important determinants in validating the deterrence a country practices.

csharma · Post by **csharma** » 21 Sep 2009 02:52

Essentially K Subrahmanyam and Arunachalam are saying that even 25K fission bombs India will have adequate deterrence as long as it survivable. While that is reassuring, I hope that India does not rely on 25KT weapons alone. I guess the number was picked because Santhanam mentioned the number in his article.
K Subrahmanyam has written about 60-80KT weapons having been fabricated.

satya · Post by **satya** » 21 Sep 2009 02:58

KS spells out very clearly India's Credible Minimum Deterrence .Number game is key ..........fluid & varying

ss_roy · Post by **ss_roy** » 21 Sep 2009 03:01

Ok, one question.

How many nukes does China have (strategic not tactical warheads)?

That is the number we should be interested in, for the near future.

shaardula · Post by **shaardula** » 21 Sep 2009 03:10

that article makes sense to me. if you think of logistics of a bomb on a city and its fallout, no city in the world can handle it. and what the fallout of an attack in a modern city is going to be i am guessing cannot be predicted reliably. do any gurus know if they have gamed it?

but from what i read here, gurus are saying during peace time the size of your weapon gives you leverage at various tables. also as gagan(?) put it, there is science involved in this and india must have it.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 21 Sep 2009 03:12

shiv, NOW they r using OUR brains:

Prof. K.S.' article:

A thermonuclear weapon of 150 kiloton explosive power or three 25 kiloton warheads delivered in a distributed way on a city will perhaps produce equal magnitudes of casualties and property damage. ...
It is irrelevant whether the destruction is caused by 150 kt weapons or 25 kt weapons. ..In a mega-city struck by a couple of 25 kt warheads, apart from the hundreds of thousands of dead, there will be an equal number of people wounded and more people affected by radiation; all of whom will be envying the dead. ... Our preliminary results suggest that even with 25kt fission bombs, the damages are going to be far more and extensive than what Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered given the higher population densities in the cities of China and South Asia and the urban development of recent years. Therefore, the Indian deterrent posture will not lose its credibility if India is compelled to rely on fission weapons only.

The role of the Indian nuclear weapons is to deter others using nuclear weapons against us. It can perform that role so long as the retaliatory force is perceived as survivable and able to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor. That does not depend on the explosive yield of the individual warheads. ...Reliability, robustness and survivability of weapon platforms are important determinants in validating the deterrence a country practices.

By "v r revisiting our calculations" they must mean they r reading our posts at BRF. Understandable that it takes a while with all these Gigatons of TN GH around.

FINALLY, some small glimmer of sense appears to be permeating into the desi strategic affairs writing. Of course the weapon designers and Doctrine planners had figured this basic truth out long ago.
Kudos to Prof. K.S.

What the yield vs. destruction calculations ignore is Arun's point that large warheads are necessary to hit well-protected, buried C^3.

Unfortunately, my take on that continues to be that this is not worth the effort of making MT warheads at extreme political cost. The danger is there that the regime goes maniacal and goes and sits in underground C^3 and hits the Launch buttons. But the only way to deter that is the presence of a NEST-type massive rapid-deployment force that can land there as soon as events start getting out of hand, and taking over any such facilities, or putting IED-mubaraks inside them and finishing them off before any buttons are hit. This requires massive investment in conventional technology and intel, and a quick-acting chain of command. It will, however, deter all such notions.

In WW-2, the Allies should have invested a heck of a lot more in those decapitation strike teams. In 1939.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 21 Sep 2009 03:16

Along with our deterrence policy, we should once again pursue the mission for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Our world will be better for that and fission or fusion will then lose their relevance.

Why must India pursue this mission? If the con artists who play this game of passing off arms control as disarmament wish to make statements and gestures, let them.

Sanjay M · Post by **Sanjay M** » 21 Sep 2009 03:21

Gerard wrote:
Along with our deterrence policy, we should once again pursue the mission for the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Our world will be better for that and fission or fusion will then lose their relevance.
Why must India pursue this mission? If the con artists who play this game of passing off arms control as disarmament wish to make statements and gestures, let them.

To me, for global elimination to be credible, we need full elimination of all nukes from every country. We can't have Pakistan hiding a few in the closet, so that they can still continue their terror games against us from behind a deterrent shield.

Otherwise, then trying to make a pretense of it means that it will go nowhere.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 21 Sep 2009 03:32

Testing diversion

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 21 Sep 2009 03:48

Why must India pursue this mission?

Why not say the right words for appearances? It does no good to say: "WE DON'T WANT NUCLEAR DISARMANENT!" Much better to conduct an Annual Global Conference on Total Disarmament - across the street from the Historical Marker where Timur made the huge hill of skulls the last time there was Failure of Deterrence. Have Lamp-Lighting Tours to the Gandhi Samadhi. Saturday Tour to the Kalinga Battlefield where Asoka took up NonViolence (AFTER finishing off his foes), with a stop-off at the Ruins of Vijayanagaram. And - Highlight!!! A weekend trip to Northern Arunachal Pradesh to view Mt. Gopalankutty, stopping to pick berries at the farms where the farmers have had to run away as refugees due to Chinese aggression. A good tour guide can do what megavolumes of History papers and PPT presentations cannot do.

If it's Tuesday, this must be Sikkim
If it's Wednesday, this must be Leh..
If it's Shillong, why is there shelling?

Disarmament should start in the Indian arsenal when the US, Russian, Chinese, British and French arsenals have come down to the level of the Indian arsenal. India should be ALL for this!

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 21 Sep 2009 03:55

Unfortunately, the chai-biscoot becomes chai-biscoot-and-treaty

Note the latest Canadian position. Now "necessary prerequisite treaties must first be in force" before any negotiation on disarmament.

Too soon to talk disarmament: Canadian government

"Canada supports the principle of creating a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) as the final step in a progressive, incremental effort to end the capacity of states to produce and develop nuclear weapons, and to reduce and eventually eliminate existing nuclear stockpiles," DFAIT spokeswoman Dana Cryderman wrote in an emailed statement.

The statement said it is too early to negotiate an NWC. Necessary prerequisite treaties must first be in force, Ms. Cryderman wrote, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a functioning Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

"Until other treaties are in place to end the capacity of states to develop and produce nuclear weapons, it would be premature to launch NWC negotiations," the email said. "Canada is taking action to urge all states to support the treaties that must first be in place before a NWC should be considered."

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 21 Sep 2009 04:02

Recently I came across 2 PPTs on the upcoming Copenhagen December 2009 Meeting of the UNFCCC (UN Framework for Climate Change Control). This is Son of Kyoto Protocol, to come into effect in 2013. One was from Oirope, all rah-rah. The other was from Africa. Very interesting differences in pov. If one read only the Oiropean rah-rah, and did not read the African one, one would have no clue about the sheer canyons between the Oiropean public position and reality.

Same with Disarmament. The Canadastanis and the Roos etc. can have their big Positions under the musharrafs of the P-5, just like the "North" in Copenhagen is going to be trying to impose new scams and undo all the good points of the Kyoto Protocol. India can insist that Disarmament and FMCT cut in when the arsenals are at the same level. "Parity". Non-negotiable.

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 21 Sep 2009 04:07

shaardula wrote:that article makes sense to me. if you think of logistics of a bomb on a city and its fallout, no city in the world can handle it. and what the fallout of an attack in a modern city is going to be i am guessing cannot be predicted reliably. do any gurus know if they have gamed it?

Shaardula-saar
The issue is not of just deterrence. IMHO there are a few major issues

1. The way in which progress on national objectives is being handled. Nobody knows if the bum worked. There is no third party verification. If the bum fizzled, nobody knows if RC/Sikka/APJ mislead the nation, or were buying time in collusion with powers that be and doing a calculated psyops on the west and NPAs. Santy's angle is confusing. Nobody knows if he is part of the establishment psyops, a patriot, a guy with an axe to grind, or all of the above.

2. The mental fences that we have built upon ourselves. We dont want to test, because we dont want to "upset the non-proliferation regime". Nobody asks the question, "who does the non-proliferation regime serve ?". It doesnt seem to serve us ! Unkil threatened us in '71 with a carrier. Cheenis have the bum. They have given it to the pakis. Who may have given it to Iranians who have missiles that can reach us. The only other guys in the neighborhood are Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. I am 400% sure that in 50 years, they will have bums too.

3. Combining 1&2 the way in which policy decisions are being made. Consider the nook agreement. Commies say it will upset the muslims -- they might have taken money from the cheenis. MMS says its all about electricity -- not substantiated by economics. Montek says its about access to technology -- no progress yet on that front. BJP first took credit and then said it will re-negotiate. What are the objectives exactly ?

4. It is high time we made a clear articulation (for everyone to see, without being apologetic) of our national objectives and followed through. If we feel we need TN to assure our deterrence, we should come out and say "Cheenis have it, Pakis have it, we have been attacked by both. Unkil has it, he has threatened us once. We need it for our safety". In this sense, I even envy the pakis -- they yelled at their top of their voice that they will eat grass till they got it, and followed through with it (notwithstanding the fact that when they bent down to graze grass, unintended side effect ensued). If we feel what we have is sufficient, I would like to hear that too.

4. The direction in which the world is moving. The NP framework was constructed with an objective of "universal nuclear disarmament". So how is that going along ? It is clear that the treaty seeks to do one thing and one thing only. Divide the world in to rulers and dhimmis. We are in the borderline, and considerably inconvenienced. It is time we woke up. Change the rules of the club to accommodate us, else we will clean our musharraf with the agreement and set up a sulabh sauchalai in front of the entrance gate. Once we are in the country club, we will uphold the rules like it is god-revealed truth.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 21 Sep 2009 04:07

I think the article written by K. Subrahmanyam and V.S. Arunachalam makes absolute sense.

Just one topic WRT CTBT: no form of testing should be allowed under the treaty AND the P-5 club should be disbanded.

Suresh S · Post by **Suresh S** » 21 Sep 2009 04:34

Anujan,

Great post. truthful and entertaining

nahata

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 21 Sep 2009 04:39

WRT TN, the question is not if a TN is needed, but how many and what is the reason for that many.

I still feel that with very accurate missiles there should be sufficient deterrence. TN will only mean the unacceptable pain will be more. But if Kt nukes can cause unacceptable pain, why TN?

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 21 Sep 2009 05:26

narayanan wrote:Recently I came across 2 PPTs on the upcoming Copenhagen December 2009 Meeting of the UNFCCC (UN Framework for Climate Change Control). This is Son of Kyoto Protocol, to come into effect in 2013. One was from Oirope, all rah-rah. The other was from Africa. Very interesting differences in pov. If one read only the Oiropean rah-rah, and did not read the African one, one would have no clue about the sheer canyons between the Oiropean public position and reality.

Same with Disarmament.

N^3
This is OT, and probably nitpicking, but climate change agreement as it exists today is not exactly like disarmament. They are similar in the sense of western perfidy, but considerably different in objectives. Its an interesting tamasha to follow.

Consider this: On one hand, the threat of climate change is real. On the other hand, targeting piddly emission guys like the street corner chai wallah who is running his boiler with coal, makes no sense as far as cutting global emissions is concerned. Leave alone Africa, even if you consider desh, the per-capita emission is 20 times lower than what US emits. If you consider absolute numbers, it is 3 times lower. Then why does it make any engineering sense to force desh into proportionate reduction regime, which begins in conjunction with the west ? As opposed to asking desh to sign a treaty now to reduce emissions starting, say 2030.

There are two explanations:
Explanation 1: (unlikely) To build public opinion in the west, to show that everyone in the world is doing their best

Explanation 2: (likely) If you observe, the problem of increasing wealth in a self sustained manner beyond a particular level, has never been solved in history. If the west expects that their standard of living should go up and not stagnate, they should ensure a captive market for western products (aka British Indian empire, read up on their textile imports and Gandhi's strike at the root of the problem, but colonies are out of fashion these days) Or kinda what cheenis are doing to Unkil. The problem now is that powers that be do not manufacture anything in a competitive manner that the rest of the world wants. Ensuring that they develop an international market for their products is the only way to boot strap their economies.

In this context, the west wants to use their technological superiority in conjunction with legal framework to ensure that they score a captive market. The formula is simple:

Step 1: Get 3rd world countries into legally binding agreements to reduce emissions
Step 2: Sell them the technology to do so

This (from western POV) needs to be taken up in a urgent basis. Because if (considering fairness) the caps are enforced in the west first, say for 10-15 years, followed by enforcement in the rest of the world, the manufacturing advantage would have dissipated. Kinda like cars. The staggered automobile demand (much demand in the US in the 60's 70's 80's followed by demand that is picking up in Cheen/Desh these days) mean that cheen/desh/Koreans/Japanese have had time to import and perfect the technology and Detroit has reaped no rewards. All this "millions of new jobs on clean energy" tamasha is along these lines.

Interesting times ahead, because the cheenis have caught on to the game and are giving unkil a run for the money, as far as investments in alternative technologies are concerned. The investments are also very secretive with myriad laws about cheeni ownership and international funding.

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 21 Sep 2009 06:13

In a rational world you dont need a bum.

It is not how much pain can the enemy endure, It is how much pain we can endure that is what deterent is for.

If the goverment feels that one Indian life is enough to retaliate overwhelmingly, then you have to match enemy arsenel otherwise we an as well deter him with massive passive resistance as has been proved by Gandhiji.

In case of India we have deter both PRC and Pakistan, very shortly may be even Bangladesh.

Out 200 odd nations only very few have WMD and some few have the capacity to develop in short span, how come the majority of nations dont have WMD.

If you want to chart a course of independent foreign policy want to claim a place at the high table, then its not just deterrence of one or half a player but more than dozen players.

Possession of a WMD does not mean immidiate use, it is more to sleep with it in peace...

Take the example of non use of WMD in AFghanistan or in Pakistan by unkil or for that matter NoKo

Guddu · Post by **Guddu** » 21 Sep 2009 06:25

shiv wrote: What is small about the promise of delivering 100 "thousand bomber raids" or 40,000 B52 bombloads on civilian targets in nuclear retaliation.

Its all relative, as you point out...yes compared to 40,000 B52 Bomb loads its big, but a 1-2 MT device might equal 400,000 B52 raids. The important factor is the perception of the unacceptable damage that can result from a 1 MT bomb. Put that way, a 1 MT is going to impress the Chinks a helluva lot more than a 15 KT bomb. Its the same for us, how many 1-4 MT bombs can we take, vs a couple of 15 KT. Yields focus the mind tremendously.

Masaru · Post by **Masaru** » 21 Sep 2009 06:43

sivab wrote:http://www.hindu.com/2009/09/21/stories ... 800900.htm
Nuclear deterrence is essentially a mind game. A potential aggressor will be deterred if he is persuaded that the nuclear retaliation that will be delivered by the survivable nuclear force of the victim will cause unacceptable damage, totally incommensurate with any strategic, political, economic or any other objective that drives him to go for the first strike. During the Cold War, both sides thus opted for a status-quo and the world was spared a nuclear war.

The unstated important assumption is that in the case of cold war both sides considered each other as roughly equal and had respect/fear for the adversaries' military and economic strength. In contrast in the current case China has demonstrably larger industrial and military capacity. Further from their actions both china and pak have shown that they are revisionist rather than status quo nations.

The role of the Indian nuclear weapons is to deter others using nuclear weapons against us. It can perform that role so long as the retaliatory force is perceived as survivable and able to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor.

Most likely 'unacceptable damage' as perceived by the enemy leadership is a dynamic variable depending on the prevailing doctrine, and the leadership of the enemy country. So if the threshold for 'unacceptable damage' of the enemy shifts upward during a critical time, what is the fall back option? Surely, in the worst case scenario, new potent options can't be created in matter of weeks or days from design table to be field deployed. What are the hedges here?

Theoretically speaking, the same unacceptable damage can be inflicted by increasing the number of delivery vehicles and warheads of lower yield and increasing their survivability. Reliability, robustness and survivability of weapon platforms are important determinants in validating the deterrence a country practices.

The absolute yield is irrelevant, but the relative potency of the arsenal wrt the adversary definitely is. If a an aggressor is unarmed, he can be deterred by a knife. But if the aggressor already has a knife one needs at least a knife and more likely a sword to deter the aggressor. This in no way reduces the potential damage a knife can do, but surely reduces its deterrence ability. How does the absence of any working TN option, coupled with significantly lesser (both in quality and quantity) fission devices and delivery systems, when faced with MT TN weapons provide credible deterrence? For an aspiring 'world power' having access to technology of late 60's like proven TN tech is a given, why there is a debate at all?

Multiple fission weapons do provide equivalent deterrence value as a few TN ones. But does India have enough fission devices and delivery systems in numbers to survive a first strike, and deter potential threats from proven TN weapons? So far the data doesn't support this and is possibly not achievable due to limited fissile source.

War is politics by other means and the aim of a war is to compel the adversary to accept one’s terms.
... the damages are going to be far more and extensive than what Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered given the higher population densities in the cities of China and South Asia and the urban development of recent years. Therefore, the Indian deterrent posture will not lose its credibility if India is compelled to rely on fission weapons only.

The only known n-weapon use was to achieve precisely that goal. Suppose in an imaginary scenario, an enemy nation (to teach a lesson!) explodes a MT TN weapon any where over India (be it a city or a desert) and asks the (surviving) leadership to subscribe to whatever conditions it puts forth, threatening more punitive strikes to follow otherwise; confident in its belief (may be false) that it can handle the 50 odd 25 KT systems (by ABMs or counter measures and absorb 1-2 strikes). Most likely the (surviving) 'leadership' following the in the best interest of humanity will just fold to the enemy demands. How does the strategic doctrine (in the absence of TN device, and limited number of fission devices) address this scenario? No amount of TN or other systems will prevent this course of action, but IMVHO the existence of TN device will likely create a small doubt/hesitation in the minds of a rational aggressor and ensure plausible deterrence.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 21 Sep 2009 07:08

Once we are in the country club, we will uphold the rules like it is god-revealed truth.

Anujan: Glad u c that. Because, Per GOI, that is ALREADY and exactly the present situation. MMS& Co may have slightly forgotten to tell that to the desi voters, but that's it. Consider:

(1) Detergent all fine and dandy.
(2) Voluntary Morarithorium in place per (1) above.
(3) Space cooperation deal (First Step in Strategic Blah-Blah) shows how to operate the scam of Total Separation Between Civilian and Military Space Programs. Removes ISRO from Entities List. Sends probe on ICBM-class launcher, and demonstrates targeting precise enough to achieve low lunar orbit, and uses remote sensing at resolutions well into the ITAR regime.
(4) TWO missile-intercept launches successful. Correlate that with (3) and if u r Gen. Li, that is enough to say that R-e-Hant with SDRE mijjiles and puny payload is enough to reduce Gleat Harr of Peopre to Gleat Growing Clatel - and the number of mijjiles to hit any target in India just went up by factor of 20.
(5) Per C-Villain New Clear Deal (which is v. v. popular here), India 2 become Eastern Hemisphere Central Glowing Garbage Recycling Dump.
(6) Civilian Deal totally ignoring any other types of facilities in "tourist site list". (ignore Bo's G-8 scam).

All hunky-dory. India is Pee-Six. IF u believe (1). But as I point out, (3) is a very very important part of the CEP reduction that makes a "fuzzle" perfectly adequate as Detergent.

However, no GOI, and no GOTUS, is going to acknowledge that part of the Detergent equation. And no GOI will admit that (1) does not exist, whatever may be the truth.

SO! India is now in the forefront of Unkil's Army of Disarmament and EnPeeTee Obedience By All NonNWS. Regularly gives advice to Eyeran, NoKo etc. on need to obey what they signed on EnPeeTee.

This is the Noo Whirled Odor. MMS is very much a part of it.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 21 Sep 2009 07:24

Guddu wrote: The important factor is the perception of the unacceptable damage.

Thanks for spelling that out. This is exactly correct, and when you talk of perception you are heading straight down into the realm of psychology and who will perceive what as a threat

Let me try and express what I am talking about as clearly (and as briefly) as possible - I intend to come out with some images to illustrate a point later.

Disclaimer: Please do not confuse "Me" and "You" with India. Unless India's develops conventional superiority the scenario below will not work.Or NFU will have to be rapidly discarded during a war

When you speak of "perceptions" there are 3 parties involved who may perceive things in different ways:

1) Me: I have a multimegaton bomb. My perception is that I am so powerfully armed that you are scared of me. The size of my bombs gives me comfort. If I had bombs of lesser yield and you have bombs of greater yield -it would worry me because i am scared of your big bombs and I hear you mocking me and saying that my bombs are small and that you are not scared.

2) "You" in this case can be divided up into adversary nation's population and adversary nations government.

2a) Adversary nation's population: For those who are interested in these matters - the perception may be exactly like "me". If their bombs are bigger - the population may feel greater confidence because they perceive greater strength. If their bombs are fewer or smaller they feel more threatened.

2b) Adversary nation's government: The adversary nation's government has to make a decision about how to use their "superior" nuclear forces of megaton bombs versus my two-digit kiloton bombs.

If they do not use it on me, their only advantage is "perception" and a feeling that they are superior. If they are being defeated conventionally the perception is of no use and they will have think of using nukes

Now there are two situations in which and adversary nation might start losing a battle conventionally:

X) I have attacked you (adversary nation) and am defeating you on your soil
Y) Adversary nation attacks me and I am defeating you on my own soil.

In either of these instances the "perception of superiority" that the multimegaton owning adversary nation feels is of no use unless that superiority is used in some way.

This is where the adversary government has to decide whether to use nukes to defeat me or not. If I have no nukes at all - then it might be tempting to use nukes (but still not advisable as I have stated in the deterrence thread in the other forum).

But if I do have nukes the adversary government will have to decide how they are going to respond to my threat of nuking population centers and causing millions of casualties. Can the adversary government guarantee that they can knock out my leadership and all my nukes? That will depend on how good my "second strike" capability is - not on the size of my bombs. If I have hidden away 400 missiles in various places each armed with 15 kt warheads - even the survival of 100 of those missiles means that 100 x 15 kt warheads might hit the adversary population centers.

Is the adversary government ready to have 25 million dead and 50 million wounded and 200 million people fleeing and still declare "victory" over me. If the answer is yes - he will not be deterred even if I cause 100 million deaths with megaton bombs. If no, his megaton bomb superiority is useless. In either case the country will not have "won" the war. The adversary nations leadership ability to govern will have been destroyed and they will either have to use any existing army for relief and food/water/medical supply - or they to will have to give up and join the ranks of refugees.

This was the calculus that stopped a superior US from doing a first strike on the USSR.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 21 Sep 2009 07:44

shiv: 2 questions:

1. Could u pls post succint answer to this: "If I have no nukes at all - then it might be tempting to use nukes (but still not advisable as I have stated in the deterrence thread in the other forum)." Trying to find that post there would take too long. I am curious. Is it the fear that Big Brother will come in and beat up small bully? Would Big Brother want to risk own cities just to Teach Befitting Lesson to bully?

2. What happens to your above calculus if we were discussing two nations where
(i) A has 1000 SMALL (artillery or surface-2-surface or air-2-surface) 2KT-5KT nukes and 200 15KT type fizzles with accurate delivery systems, while B only has 200 1-MT weapons with accurate delivery systems, and no small devices?

(ii) Both A and B have a large inventory each of tactical devices, but there is lopsided imbalance in heavy nukes (A has all puny 15KTs while B has TFTA 1-MT types)?

The last situation describes India-China rather well, assuming that India has weaponized the little things and produced enough numbers. The first one may describe Russia-China. I think in both cases, the tactical weapons are highly likely to be used in a border war, but the big things are irrelevant except that they neutralize each other and render all unusable.