Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-2

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 21 Sep 2009 22:50

Gerard wrote:1998 thermonuclear test was a dud: Santhanam
The scientist also released photographs of "ground zero" of the thermonuclear device, which showed that there was no crater after the explosion. There should have been a crater of 72 metres radius if the device had been successful, he said.

"This picture tells a story that we have to do more honest homework in the direction of improving our thermonuclear design," said Santhanam.

Asked if the depth of the shaft made a difference to the crater size, he indicated that while he could not reveal the exact measurements, it was sufficient to create a substantial crater.

Santhanam said that the radio-chemical analysis of the test was classified and had not been shared with the scientists.
Santhanam hits out at NSA; wants independent inquiry in N-test
Santhanam, who was the DRDO co-ordinator for the 1998 nuclear tests, said there was a "strong and clear" need to form a group of stalwarts and give them access to all the relevant data.
On repeated questions on why he had raised the issue 11 years after the Pokhran-II, Santhanam said he had already told the Government about the failure of the thermonuclear device in a 50-page classified report submitted in 1998.

These statements clear some major issues.

Samuel,

I think the portion in bold provides some direction. The depth has got to be less than 200 meters?

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 21 Sep 2009 22:52

1998 thermonuclear test was a dud: Santhanam

21 Sep 2009 08:57:42 PM IST

NEW DELHI: Rebutting National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan's assertions, K. Santhanam, the scientist who was involved in India's nuclear tests in 1998, Monday reiterated that the thermonuclear device exploded by India had not worked according to design expectations and showed photographs of the site that had no crater.

Santhanam, along with physicist Ashok Parthasarthi, had last week written an article in The Hindu newspaper that questioned the official version that India's May 1998 nuclear tests were a success.

The NSA told a television channel in an interview that Santhanam and other scientists had ulterior motives and they were not privy to the classified information to come to that conclusion.

"He is barking up the wrong tree," responded Santhanam at a media interaction at the Indian Women's Press Corps.

He said there were "several inaccuracies in that statement".

The scientist recalled that after the tests when they visited the shaft of the thermonuclear device at Pokhran in Rajasthan, it was found "by and large undamaged".

In contrast, the fission bomb explosion at the time which had a yield of 20-25 kiloton, left behind a large crater, he said.

He noted that there was immediate reservation among some scientists "whether the thermonuclear device had actually worked to design expectations".

A classified technical study report was submitted to the government towards 1998-end.

"Thereafter, a meeting was held in which scientists from DRDO and BARC participated. Despite fairly long discussions the two agencies agreed to disagree," said Santhanam.

The chairman of that meeting had said the matter would be taken to the minister concerned, who would charter the future course, Santhanam recounted.

He was answering a query on why he chose to go public after so many years. "The impression that suddenly the jack-in-the-antique box is up, is not based on facts," he said.

The scientist also released photographs of "ground zero" of the thermonuclear device, which showed that there was no crater after the explosion. There should have been a crater of 72 metres radius if the device had been successful, he said.

"This picture tells a story that we have to do more honest homework in the direction of improving our thermonuclear design," said Santhanam.

Asked if the depth of the shaft made a difference to the crater size, he indicated that while he could not reveal the exact measurements, it was sufficient to create a substantial crater.

Santhanam said that the radio-chemical analysis of the test was classified and had not been shared with the scientists.

Former science advisor to prime minister Indira Gandhi, Ashok Parthasarthi said by questioning the results "the intention was not to denigrate the nuclear weapons programme, but to set the matter right".

"We have to have a credible nuclear weapons deterrent. We have already lost time," said Parthasarthi, who was involved in Pokhran-1 test in 1974.

India tested five nuclear devices in May 1998, including the thermonuclear device.

dinesha · Post by **dinesha** » 21 Sep 2009 22:53

The scientist also released photographs of "ground zero" of the thermonuclear device, which showed that there was no crater after the explosion. There should have been a crater of 72 metres radius if the device had been successful, he said.

"This picture tells a story that we have to do more honest homework in the direction of improving our thermonuclear design," said Santhanam.
Asked if the depth of the shaft made a difference to the crater size, he indicated that while he could not reveal the exact measurements, it was sufficient to create a substantial crater.

Santhanam said that the radio-chemical analysis of the test was classified and had not been shared with the scientists.

1998 thermonuclear test was a dud: Santhanam
http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/stor ... 0Narayanan

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 21 Sep 2009 22:53

Nobody sat down and came up with a map of the medium's response using multiple sources and sensors. Even heterodyning has only just been used.

They-
calibrated sensors many times.
They tested trigger many times.
They used m(b) = aY + b to determine and a and b are scalars.
Where a was used from i) Some river basin in US, ii) Nevada, iii) Previous test at Pokhran assuming a yield of 12KT (talk about propagating error!).
See articles cited on this forum.

For them to identify the medium, they would need to do some serious tests with proximal and distal sensors, progressively and or eliminating the source from the system of equations (assumed linear, but vector forms). The will need to solve an EM or EM-like problem for the dual source-medium estimation problem and they will need to do it, several times to quantify uncertainty. They will need reasonable number measurements in-situ or from magnetometric or gravity measurements and incorporate this into the inverse problem for identifying the soil. This is NOT hifi science, any text book on Linear Algebra is good. There is NO evidence this was done...see what Sikka says, actually, in his rebuttal. Is someone from BARC here? Can we get them to come give a talk at our undergraduate class on Signals and Systems?

S

Satya_anveshi · Post by **Satya_anveshi** » 21 Sep 2009 23:05

>>>along with physicist Ashok Parthasarthi

What is wrong with our newpapers and editors?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 21 Sep 2009 23:14

arunsrinivasan wrote:Pick a new orbitBy C. Rajamohan

Posting in full, it is a good summary of our strategic mistakes
Three recent developments — the resurrection of the controversy over the yield of India’s sole hydrogen bomb test in 1998, the reports on the expansion of Pakistan’s atomic arsenal and the renewed apprehension about American pressures on various international arms control treaties — have seen a nervous New Delhi walk the well-trodden nuclear ground all over again. India’s obsession with debating the familiar prevents it from addressing new challenges.

In the late ’50s and early ’60s, when China was racing to become a nuclear weapon power, India devoted its energies to promoting global nuclear peace. One would have thought the border conflict with China in 1962 and China’s first nuclear test in October 1964 would have cured India of its nuclear non-sequiturs.

Instead, India embarked on a diplomatic campaign for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. When India did respond finally in 1974 with a nuclear test of its own, it chose to call it a “peaceful” device and did nothing to launch a nuclear weapons programme.

Having broken up Pakistan in 1971 and conducted a nuclear test in 1974, India did not anticipate the response of Islamabad and Beijing, who had no reason to buy into New Delhi’s metaphysics on Pokharan-I. As New Delhi “stood up” to international pressures, Beijing decisively assisted Pakistan in acquiring nuclear weapons and missiles.

After Pokharan-I, India wasted nearly a quarter century posturing on universal disarmament and non-discriminatory non-proliferation, before testing again, declaring itself a nuclear weapon state and seeking nuclear reconciliation with the world.

When then-US President George W. Bush offered a sweetheart deal that would allow India to keep its nuclear weapons programme and regain access to the global nuclear market without signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, India spent three years agonising if it was a “gift horse” or a “Trojan horse”.

The story of India’s nuclear iner-tia continues with the current debate on the fizzle. Only one good may come out of the debate — burying the proposition that everything a “scientist” says must be “true”. As our “scientists” argue viscerally with each other, it should be quite obvious that science policy is as much about politics — personal, institutional and ideological — as it is about science.

The arguments about the fizzle are interesting but do not alter the fundamentals of the Indian strategy of nuclear deterrence, which rests on the ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. The hydrogen bomb’s main distinction is the massive size of the explosion it offers. The business of nuclear deterrence, however, is all about the certain delivery of the bang and not its size.

On Pakistan too, India’s real problem is not with the size of its nuclear arsenal. It is our inability to deter Pakistan from running its unconventional war of terror against us. Pakistan is supremely confident that its nuclear arsenal — irrespective of its size — has neutered India’s conventional military superiority and New Delhi’s ability to punish Islamabad’s transgressions.

Nor does the H-bomb debate have anything to do with India’s position on testing nuclear weapons or signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The decision to test was and will always be a political one. At this stage, India has no incentive at all to break the current de facto moratorium on nuclear tests being observed by major powers. That context would of course change if Beijing, Moscow or Washington resumes testing of nuclear weapons.

On the presumed American pressure to sign the NPT, CTBT, and the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty, the problems are all in our mind. If a much weaker India could not be coerced into signing the treaties it did not like between the ’60s and ’90s, where is the question of a rising India signing on the dotted line now? Must India jump every time the UN says something about universalising the NPT? Should we press the US to caveat all its references to NPT with a clarification that this does not apply to India? Can’t India differentiate between international rhetoric and policy?

But even a paranoid has enemies. There are many second order nuclear issues that our security establishment must address and resolve; but those are not the ones being debated today.

One is about the ability of the DAE and the DRDO to keep our nuclear arsenal in good trim, and ensure its safety and reliability. New Delhi must ask for a review of and full support for plans to create computer simulation of nuclear weapons testing and design. Instead of agonising over the H-bomb “fizzle”, New Delhi and Mumbai must put more resources to fusion research, especially the one involving high energy lasers.

Rather than worry about the CTBT, we must ask if the DAE and DRDO have the ability to conduct sub-critical nuclear tests that are legitimate under the treaty. And if they do, what is holding them back? Is it the absence of political will? On the FMCT, our speeches at New York and Geneva are less important than asking if the DAE makes the best use of its current stockpiles of unsafeguarded plutonium. It is about ending the extended delays in reprocessing accumulated spent fuel stocks.

None of these second order nuclear problems compares with our real challenges of deterrence. One is about preventing Pakistan from organising and supporting Mumbai-style terror attacks on India under the shadow of nuclear weapons. The other is about Beijing’s rapidly widening lead in missile and space technologies.

Addressing these challenges would necessarily involve a new national debate on what other great powers are calling the “new nuclear triad” — stronger conventional deterrence, theatre missile defences and a sophisticated infrastructure that can respond to the emerging atomic threats. It is to that debate that India must now turn.

Good article. Why did India do what it did as pointed out by CRM? Why is India always trying to solve yesterday's problems and fight day before yesterday's wars? When all are talking about grapefruit/pommellos the Indian elites talk of virtues of kumquats since they belong to the citrus family.

What makes Indian elite's psyche think it has to apply others solutions to India's problems? Is there a nihilist mind set that compounds the problems?

About sub-critical tests I long ago suggested on this forum doing that as estoppel.

And Arun_S was and is disparaged for asking the very same things that CRM is asking about fusion research!

Also werent the discredited elite that created the failed post POKI policy of minimalization still adovcating more of the same even now?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 21 Sep 2009 23:59

An interesting thing is despite the POKII tests, authorized at great political costs in 1998, India is at the same level of technology as before the tests and for various unmentionable reasons at same level of technology as TSP. The sad thing is TSP can still get upgrades to its level of technology from PRC while India is prevented by its own elite to aquire anything else.

If KSubramanyam garu now says 25 kt stuff is good enough for deterrent why did he wax eloquent about the POKII tests and say what an accomplishment they were in the KRC report after Kargil. What did he recommend to the govt as the NSAB chief while advising on the daft doctrine?

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 22 Sep 2009 00:15

ramana wrote:

When then-US President George W. Bush offered a sweetheart deal that would allow India to keep its nuclear weapons programme and regain access to the global nuclear market without signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, India spent three years agonising if it was a “gift horse” or a “Trojan horse”.

This is the key thing here. The question why now can be answered by this.

Good article. Why did India do what it did as pointed out by CRM? Why is India always trying to solve yesterday's problems and fight day before yesterday's wars? When all are talking about grapefruit/pommellos the Indian elites talk of virtues of kumquats since they belong to the citrus family.

It is a Indian generational issue. They are unable to formulate the vision for India in the future -100-200 years. They cannot evaluate the force of history.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 22 Sep 2009 00:16

ramana wrote: What did he recommend to the govt as the NSAB chief while advising on the daft doctrine?

Also, what did K Santhanam recommend as NSAB member in 2002?

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 22 Sep 2009 00:19

Arun_S: A-3 carrying 3 500kg warheads ? A-1 and A-2 are carrying warheads substantially larger than that it would appear - 700-1000kg. Even including decoys you're still looking at something that is larger than a 20-25kT fission weapon.
So what was the old RV for the A-2 ?

I keep saying this - a credible deterrent can be built. It will be far from ideal but it can be built.

You have to do what you can with the constraints of no testing until testing is cleared.

Shiv and Co. in my book - which is now nicely placed for a sequel - you will find reference to the fact that India has been concerned about Chinese tactical nuclear weapons since the 1960s. Sundarji addressed the issue in one of the Appendices to his book as well.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 22 Sep 2009 00:21

Chinese tactical nuclear weapons

One ayatollah estimate
http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/g ... 6_8968.php

China as of 2007 was believed to possess roughly 240 strategic nuclear warheads and another 150 tactical weapons, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 22 Sep 2009 00:23

The tacticals aren't all subkilotons etc. They include weapons in the 1-20KT range employed on short-range missiles and bombers.

Babu Bihari · Post by **Babu Bihari** » 22 Sep 2009 00:34

http://www.hardnewsmedia.com/2009/09/3243

....To the NSA's assertion that "nobody, including Santhanam can contest what is proven by the data that is there", the scientist said: "The trouble lies in what data was included in the BARC analysis and what was not. There is a wealth of seismic and other data which reveal that the thermonuclear device under-performed."
....

The TN device was a two-stage one. The first was an atomic bomb or A-bomb device which triggered the second stage and the main hydrogen bomb or H-bomb. The A-bomb trigger worked as designed and lived up to expectation. But, the main H-bomb "completely failed to ignite, let alone explode with its designed power of 25,000 tons of TNT, Hardnews learnt. Seismic instrumentation network set up by Santhanam and his seven colleagues proved that categorically. This is what the two scientists claimed in the press conference.

Also, after the TN device test was over and the scientists examined the shaft, it was found to have remained exactly as it was built. If the H-bomb stage of the device worked, the shaft would have been blown to smithereens, said Santhanam.

The scientist asserted that the rubicon must be crossed. "It is up to the government of the day to factor in all facets - technological, economic, security and diplomatic - and take a decision. If there is a window to test thermonuclear devices, test it because the CTBT will be knocking on doors soon," said Santhanam.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 22 Sep 2009 00:38

I think this is like the jitters of arranged marriage in that we have no clue that how the would be relationships going spoil individual freedoms enjoyed before marriage.

CTBT must be around the corner.. now the real feelings are being aired (courtesy santanam garu).

Masaru · Post by **Masaru** » 22 Sep 2009 01:05

shiv wrote:
In a large city 3 or 4 nukes over different areas would compound the problem. A large city has an area of maybe 200 sq km. A 50 kt bomb affects 15 sq km. 3 such bombs over different parts of the city would result in crippling casualties with people from one area fleeing into other areas only to meet other people fleeing from there. The dirtier your bomb the better - so that nobody would be able to go back for a long long time.

Within 2-3 days the city would empty out because of disruption of supplies and radiation sickness. If you do that to 25 cities the government might survive in deep bunkers - but what governance would they be able to implement. This could be called "unacceptable damage" to any rational leadership who may survive weeks in a bunker but would come out only to see anarchy.

Shiv sir, the above scenario holds if the defending country has 25*3, 50kT devices and proven delivery systems to accurately deposit them. This is far from true, considering only 20 odd A-2/3 's and 15 or 25 kT devices of questionable reliability.

Further complicating the situation would be presence of countermeasures, dud devices, inaccurate missiles, losses from a first strike and the need to cater for 2 known adversaries.

Each of the above factors would require factors of safety for guaranteed deterrence which may require to field at the very least 200-300 odd devices with delivery systems, which may not be even technically (forget the economic aspects) feasible considering limited fissile resources.

IMHO larger yield TN options reduces the need to field so many devices and limits the attendant economic, logistical and security (command/control) expenditures.

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 22 Sep 2009 01:20

GOI and Scientists

***picture removed by moderator***

who is who guess

satya · Post by **satya** » 22 Sep 2009 01:28

CRM's & KS's articles are establishment view ,need to be read as one to understand the future policy direction of GoI , only this far GoI will go public not beyond .

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Sep 2009 01:31

Masaru,another way of saying it is that for adequate coverage, the low yield option requires a large logistic tail: fissile materials(~ 4% efficiency), delivery vehicles(number of missiles) and subs. And such a path will have severe economic costs much more than is being realised by KS and VSA.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Sep 2009 01:35

Gerard wrote:
ramana wrote: What did he recommend to the govt as the NSAB chief while advising on the daft doctrine?
Also, what did K Santhanam recommend as NSAB member in 2002?

I think he recommended re-visiting the designs which most likely were completed and which is why he suggest two tests.

From what I recall when they were planning to bifurcate AEC after the 1998 tests, into civil and military programs, he was to lead the mil version of the design organization. So it wasnt like he doesn't know his atoms.

archan · Post by **archan** » 22 Sep 2009 01:55

People don't spend their entire lives in the labs to be called dumb on what is supposed to be a nationalist forum. If anyone has any more imaginative names for the scientists borne out of their sheer personal frustrations or complexes, keep them to yourselves. If I see them posted, I will take action.

John Snow · Post by **John Snow** » 22 Sep 2009 02:07

Our scientists are not Gods nor is our GOI saintly.
Go ahead and worship them to your hearts content.
The fact that this mud slinging comes into public by the scientists and NSA joining the fary is the significance of that post which truly reflects the sad state of affairs.

YOur warnings does not change the situation wee bit caused by failure of the system at the highest levels.

All that chanikyan jazz can fool the people of India but will not deter even BD.

watch this space very soon.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Sep 2009 02:12

Samuel, What do you know about this field of Belief Propogation?

From net:

Essentially, any time you are receiving a noisy signal, and need to infer what is really out there, you are dealing with an inference problem.

A productive way to deal with an inference problem is to formalize it as a problem of computing probabilities in a “graphical model.” Graphical models, which are referred to in various guises as “Markov random fields,” “Bayesian networks,” or “factor graphs,” provide a statistical framework to encapsulate our knowledge of a system and to infer from incomplete information.

Can we take the mass of statements in Indian press and come up with a model using sentences to infer from the incomplete information? We are getting a very noisy signal about the deterrent program.

enqyoob · Post by **enqyoob** » 22 Sep 2009 02:28

Chinese tactical nuclear weapons
Gerard: Not so very long ago, I had the opportunity to ask someone deep beneath Foggy Bottom bluntly in an environment where he was surrounded by ppl as skeptic as moi:

What's so hard about reducing weapons one for one until the US and Russia are down to parity with UK and France, and then on down, all together?

Answer:

When "START" etc claim "reductions" they r talking ONLY about Strategic warheads. They won't count tactical because Russia needs a large number to counter China in Siberia, and China matches that threat. So US won't reduce tactical warheads because Russia and China have them.. etc.

I think the 150 tactical nuke estimate is very low. The numbers these fellows were talking about were like 12,000.

Then again, I believe that PRC is 93% hot air and 7% substance. It's only because they "came over the Yalu" and beat up McArthur's divisions at Chosin Reservoir that they have this image as unbeatable ogres.
**************************
Samuel: I am even worse than that - I can retreat quite a bit in technical posturing and still have my basic argument survive. How about this? At Khetolai all they had to do was guess at the seismic magnitude and put a limit on that at, say. 5.0. Same as POK-1. Which is what I would have done in Kalam's place. It would not have been a responsible move to go for anything beyond 5.0 magnitude with any Indian village without risking a huge disaster. If the yield were held to the POK-1 level, I could always say:

What yaar! It was just at the level of 24 saal pehle!! It must be corruption onlee, if houses collapsed!

So a very good reason for TN test to not produce much fusion would be that the Li Iodide or whatever was reduced too far down in order to keep the yield low, and fusion barely occurred.

In which case, ANY fusion at all would have been enough for me to declare victory and say "Q.E.D." The rest was not practical to test at short notice, and the question of testing with much better preparation simply did not arise.

SO! There's my solution that shows that all parties are telling the truth as they see it.
Santanam says, probably with some accuracy, that as fusion blasts go, this was SDRE in the extreme.
Sikka etc. say that the test was a success because they got SOME fusion at an amazingly, unprecedented, low level, that shows the possibility of adjusting over a very wide range. 1 size fits all, almost. Great triumph (fortuituous as it may have been) of Indian Newclear Theoretical Simulation. Very TFTA.

Iyengar says that very little of the Lithium Iodide must have been used, and he thinks the tank usually contains hajaar cc of the stuff, so very very low efficiency, SDRE blast. But they may not have PUT in any more of the stuff for this test due to the constraints.

Gen. Malik thinks "TN" means 1MT. Completely innocent of all the techno-gibberish about 3 stages and what boosts whom. His view is, "Just gimme something that will wipe out the enemy",

NPAs saw only 5.2 to 5.4 quake.

Khetolai residents were shaken silly and had their houses cracked and water tank emptied by cracks.

Sethna, well, was probably woken up from a nap and asked whom he would believe: Santanam or Kalam.

MKN says the official GOI line: no intention of being stampeded into testing or signing CTBT. Inaction is Action. Bhavitavyam Bhaveteava. All is Maya. We will deal with Any Eventuality By Giving Befitting Reply.

No sense in BRFee postors getting their undies all in a knot and getting themselves banned over this tamasha.

Cheers

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 22 Sep 2009 02:54

field of Belief Propogation

They need plenty of data.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Sep 2009 02:57

A few news reports of the KS and AP press interviews:

Chandigarh Tribune:

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20090922/main3.htm

Santhanam says it again: Pokhran-II a fizzle
Hits back at NSA, claims data could’ve been fudged
Ashok Tuteja
Tribune News Service

New Delhi, September 21
The ongoing debate over Pokhran II intensified today with former DRDO scientist K Santhanam reiterating that the May 1998 nuclear tests had not worked in accordance with ‘design expectations’ and suggesting more tests to refine the country’s thermonuclear capability.

At a press meet here, Santhanam said the government could set up an independent panel, comprising scientists and nuclear experts, to probe the success of the Pokhran tests as also to suggest if there was need for India to conduct more tests since national security was of paramount importance.

Observing that pressure was likely to mount on the government in the coming days from the Obama administration to sign the CTBT, he wondered why the ‘window of opportunity’ available at this stage could not be utilised to conduct a few more tests.

Hitting back at National Security Advisor (NSA) MK Narayanan for the latter’s comment in a television interview that Santhanam had personal motives in questioning the efficacy of the Pokhran tests, he said Narayanan was ‘barking up the wrong tree’.

Referring to the NSA’s assertion that nobody could contest what was proven by the data about the nuclear tests, Santhanam said “the trouble lies in what data was included in the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) analysis; and; what was not. There is a wealth of seismic and other data which reveal that the thermonuclear device under performed.”

He also ridiculed Narayanan’s suggestion that Santhanam had not been privy to the test measurements and information. “This is a false assertion. I was…we are not in the business of selling chocolates.”

Santhanam alleged that Narayanan was making ‘misleading statements’ as he was not even the NSA when Pokhran tests were conducted. “There is a large body of evidence in seismology circles around the world, and India, which raised doubts about the yield, almost immediately after the tests.”

Santhanam also released to the media pictures of the test crater site, pointing out that there was no crater there. The thermonuclear device had a yield of 20-25 kilotons and not 45 kilotons as claimed by the NSA. He wondered if Agni III missile, which has a reach of 4,000 km, was required just for a 20-kilotone bomb.

Asked why it took him 11 long years to say that the 1998 tests were a ‘fizzle’, he said reservations about the efficacy of the tests had been recorded in a classified report sent to the government. “It is not that we kept quiet about it.” Asked if the Vajpayee government had committed a fraud on the people by terming the tests as successful, he said “that’s a loaded question…I will only go on the scientific path.”

The government of the day had conducted the tests in view of the increasing nuclear capability of Pakistan. On reports that India was not conducting some critical tests which could be done despite the CTBT being there, he said the technology needed for such tests was quite advanced and he was not aware if that technology was there with India since he was not in the government now.

{This must be the sub-critical tests that Rajamohan was talking about}

On whether he had ever thought of the consequences for India of any further tests, Santhanam said, “This kind of concern, especially from the economy lobby, is well known.”

Rounding up the press meet, he said, “My remarks are in the interest of national security…to attribute them the overtones of jingoism is not fair.”

So he does say the TN was ~ 20-25kt. Now how can that not produce a crater? Must have been quite deep. So these are teh 25kt things that people are throwing around.

Is it likely that RC and co fixed the bad design and issued these nominal 25kt ones? but in reality they can go for the value that shaft was designed for?

Expressbuzz:

LINK

Pied Piper of the PMO

V Sudarshan

First Published : 22 Sep 2009 11:53:00 PM ISTLast Updated : 22 Sep 2009 12:09:44 AM IST

The National Security Adviser M K Narayanan knows that he has a couple of problems in his hands — China and an 11-year-old malfunctioning thermonuclear bomb that simply refuses to go away. Both are somehow linked. And he is getting edgy over the way they are coming together, at least in the media. It has been made clear that the government will go after those who indulge in reporting on China in a manner that the government doesn’t want, an extraordinary thing to do considering that Vajpayee had cited China as the reason for the nuclear tests in 1998. And his defence minister George Fernandes had termed the country India’s “potential threat number 1”. Why is the UPA government developing a thin skin now on China? This irritability is the clearest indication why there is no progress in core issues with China even though our national security adviser keeps having numerous “good meetings” with his Chinese counterpart regularly in exotic places. It would be a good idea if they come clean on what really goes on at these meetings.

Now if Narayanan’s remarks over the media reporting on the malfunctioning thermonuclear device have been properly reported, — he has said it is “a matter of concern for the government the kind of interested propaganda being put out by various people” in the media. Whatever could this mean? That propaganda is a single window clearance in the PMO? Does it mean that the government is sufficiently concerned to set at rest the doubts over the thermonuclear weapon in a manner that satisfies the sceptics? No. It means that the national security adviser wants no more dissident opinions in the media on the dud thermonuclear weapon which is supposed to provide deterrence against China, which in sharp contrast has thermonuclear weapons that actually work, mainly because they conducted more than one test as per that sensible adage: practice makes perfect. NSA’s outpouring is a bit of a veiled threat, a thanedaar with a laathi kind of threat.

After K Santhanam’s sensational disclosure last afternoon that the shaft in which the thermonuclear bomb was placed as well as the winch that lowered the personnel and the equipment survived the allegedly 45 kilotonne blast completely unscathed we have to take the national security adviser’s calculated remarks on the issue with more than a generous pinch of salt. A nuclear test behaves like an earthquake and seismic waves radiate from the explosion and in the process the shaft is destroyed. The import of what Santhanam says is thus very clear. Imagine that you place a thermonuclear bomb with three times the power of the bomb that was dropped in Hiroshima in a hole and the shaft is totally intact after the so-called blast and the winch and the superstructure are also very much intact as well. How much more of scientific mumbo jumbo do you need to understand that this bomb failed? And this is the very bomb which the national security adviser M K Narayanan says gives us thermonuclear capability and presumably deterrence against China. A bomb that leaves the shaft and the winch intact. Whereas in the other shaft presumably not as deep given that it was a more modest fission device, a device not as powerful as the thermonuclear weapon, the shaft is destroyed as well as the winch and there is a big crater after the explosion.

The problem the government has is as follows: How do you pass a dud off as the real thing? The government knows that if you repeat a dud is not a dud a hundred times the dud does not metamorphose into the real thing. This is elementary logic. This is where the Atomic Energy Commission comes in. To certify that the dud was indeed the real thing. Is this certification credible? Not at all. I asked a few former members of this commission and came away with this impression: It is a bit like going to the cobbler for an eye check-up. But the national security adviser claims this is a “peer review”. Normally a peer review is a completely unbiased and independent professional assessment of a work done by an independent professional of equal standing. The last time I visited the AEC website (http://www.aec.gov.in) the following were listed as members of the AEC: “Shri Prithviraj Chavan, Minister of State PMO, Shri M K Narayanan, NSA, Shri T K A Nair, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Shri K M Chandrashekhar Cabinet Secretary, Shri Ashok Chawla, Finance Secretary… and so on. You do get the picture, don’t you? Of the twelve members as many as six are assorted babus and politicos and one retired policeman. They have nothing to do with the science of making thermonuclear weapons. The others that the NSA cites are not seismologists or independent scientists of standing in the field of weapon designing and thermonuclear explosion assessment. One is a metallurgist, a classmate and close associate of the science adviser, R Chidambaran; one is a chemical engineer: and one M R Srinivasan curiously, is already on the record as having asked for a peer review (‘Differences to the fore on Pokhran 2’, Times of India, September 18), presumably not the kind he has lent his name to. What the NSA claims is a peer review is in fact a convenient government-certified in-house job. He who pays the piper surely calls the tune. Who is going to be fooled by this?

It is significant that the previous NSA Brajesh Mishra seems to concur with his successor. He is on record as saying that he, a non-scientist as well, was satisfied with the efficacy of the nuclear test, a multi-disciplinary, highly complex exercise, almost the minute it was conducted in an intuitive hey presto kind of way. The Mail Today (‘No voice vote over result’, September 18) quotes him as saying: “In fact, there were never any doubts in my mind regarding the tests. After the tests, Kalam had called me from the Pokhran test range and conveyed the results. I was satisfied.” Faster than a two minute noodle. It is almost as if the BJP was waiting for the test to be over so it could declare it a success and sign the CTBT. In fact after the May 11 tests the NDA government declared it was ready to consider adhering to “some of the undertakings of the CTBT” soon. Ten days later it declared unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. The full seismic analysis of the tests were not to come in till months later, analysis that showed that the thermonuclear bomb had failed. But the BJP did not want to conduct any more tests, even if they were needed to refine the thermonuclear bomb because it simply didn’t want to weather the storm. The point is: if our national security advisers are of this calibre then surely we deserve the deterrence that we allegedly have. Of course in China (and Washington) they are having a long, quiet laugh over this.

[email protected]

About the author:

V Sudarshan is Executive Editor of ‘The New Indian Express’

Pay attention to the chronology narrated about the May 1998 tests and recall ABV's statements in 2004 for which he was laughed at.

HINDU:

‘Naked’ India needs ‘series of tests’ to deal with China: Santhanam

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 22 Sep 2009 03:16

he wondered why the ‘window of opportunity’ available at this stage could not be utilised to conduct a few more tests.

Is there a window of opportunity?

Asked whether he had factored in the international consequences of India testing afresh, Mr. Santhanam said it was for the government to weigh the political, economic and strategic costs. The “pain of testing” was unlikely to be as severe as it was being made out. “In any case, it [testing] was better than our current situation of dar dar ke marna (dying out of fear),” he said.

dying out of fear ?

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 22 Sep 2009 03:17

Ramana,

Yes, my group studies Belief Propagation (BP) algorithms for loopy graphs and constructs graphical models for spatially extended stochastic systems. We try to use it as a way both to do (approximate) inference and learn (probabilistically) what the best model for doing inference is.

For Linear Dynamical systems or Gauss-Markov problems, this is related to the good old variable elimination and, for probabilistic systems, recursive marginalization. The underlying problem is about Bayesian inference (generally) and all that I've posted in the past with graphs and nodes and links were basically graphical models.

Most people don't know the word, but anyone who has studied linear algebra, will recognize the process when they see it.

S

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Sep 2009 03:19

Can we use this to study the current issues?

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 22 Sep 2009 03:22

As NRao points out, graphical models need lots of data. But in geophysical problems such as the problems we have, data is always at a premium and very expensive to gather. For example, oil companies might drive around a shot + receiver system to quantify the seismic stack of the subsurface and this for a few square miles will run into millions. It is very hard to produce dense observations in space and time.

So, what is to be done.

Enter physics.

If we assume that physical theories provide us at least a mean field sort of approximation to the stochastic system we want to study and it is only stochastic because we don't know what the heck the exact input, boundary etc is, then we can use simplified physical models (nonlinear growth, hysterisis, saturation etc.) to act as the "prior" that data usually represents in statistically based graphical models.

In this way we can combine statistics and physics, observational and theoretical data to improve inference in difficult problems. Hot area of research, OT here.

S

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 22 Sep 2009 03:23

Yes, if you recall I had many graphs for geostrategic stuff...they all came from graphical models only. If we use an information theoretic measure on top of probabilities, we have a very powerful inference engine for all sorts of problems (it takes lot of computation to "converge").

S

PS: If some good electrical engineer who is well versed with estimation is interested in stochastic systems and the application of graphical models to geostrategic modeling, we may be able to generate a doctoral plan. May be BRF members can sponsor it too!

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Sep 2009 03:29

OK. No dice then at current level of info.

What do you make of KS's persisitence? Just his conviction or backing? Its no mean task to take on MKN.

shaardula · Post by **shaardula** » 22 Sep 2009 03:36

deleted. misunderstood.

samuel · Post by **samuel** » 22 Sep 2009 03:41

ramana wrote:OK. No dice then at current level of info.

What do you make of KS's persisitence? Just his conviction or backing? Its no mean task to take on MKN.

KS won't fold and I think things don't add up. There's no TN deterrent. $1 to anyone if I lose (happily). There of course is a deterrent of the smiling buddha kind, proven at ~25KT, extensible probably to ~100-125KT and developed probably for around 80KT. The rest is not there. It will take a few more tests before that works, too bad they gave that option up for all practical purposes.

S

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 22 Sep 2009 04:11

So this is what me and my layman friends got after reading 60 + 32 pages of POK II threads:

Pro Test Groups arguments:
1. TN weapons will weigh less: 300Kt TN warhead 200kg. while 20Kt. Fission warhead will be 800 kg. [Don't remember which page I read in the last thread but remember reading]. This would shorten the range of Agnis. Would require more Agnis, while India is still producing only few handmade Agnis 10-20. So against China after their first strike don't know how many will survive and how many will succeed to get past ABM shields + duds.

2. Fission type warhead or nonTN warhead will eat up lots of fissile material which India is anyway having in a very very small quantity. Although it has not been made clear by Pro test group what is the ratio of fissile material used in TN and Fission warheads.

3. Excessive secrecy is useless: The policy of secrecy around the warhead capacity or design is too much. Even if P5 + Porkis know about our design that can hardly make our bomb less effective. Deterrent is supposed do send a strong and clear signal to the deterred about our capacity only then it achieves its purpose. Now 3 MIRVs falling over Shanghai can't be disable by chipanda even if they have the blueprints of the design. So this excessive secrecy can only harm the unknowing citizens of the country. The need for keeping it above checks and balances is not justified. The GoI should come out and say the exact yield of warheads and their number if they think what they have is enough to deter anyone.

4. 12 Chipanda biggest and industrial cities, 3 gorges dam (which can withstand 20kt warhead, 5 refineries, 5 ports, significant chunk of the cultivating land + Army, Navy, Airforce assets and the missile launch sites.
16 Porki sites : Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sargodha, Multan, Islamabad, Muzzaffarabad, Gilgit, Bannu, Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Karachi, Gwadar, Hyderabad, Chaman, Sukur, Khairpur

PLUS

ARMY NAVAL AIRFORCE targets.

In case some of the assets from Porkistan are moved to Saudis and they help porkis with F-16 block 60 with conformal fuel tanks which the IAF think is mainly to be used agains us. Don't know what is the number of their oil wells but all should be taken out.

Don't think it is possible with Fission warheads.

Against the Test Group:
1. Most potent argument has been that if the TN test was a fizzle or achieved 60% yield then Khetolai would have been kaput. If fizzle can create cracks then sizzle would have levelled the village completely.
This point was argued against by Sanku in detail.
But belonging to layman or aam junta category (me and my three friends got 34% to 42% in maths in our Xth standard) so please treat this post as how the common man with average buddhi grasps things from the BR forum.
We were unable to understand Sanku's points.
Also surprising was the argument from Narayanan when the point was raised about how undamaged S1 shaft was. He tried to prove by attributing it upto the sharp 90 degree angles of the shaft.
The question is how come the shaft right above the explosion remained undamaged but Khetolai few kilometers away got cracks.

2. 25-30 kt bomb can cause enough damage. Specially Chipanda which has a special tendency to build everything on Mega level. The more clustered and huge their infrastructure is the more vulnerable it is to our tiny winy fission bombs.

3. The most convincing argument has been the lack of will by any indian leader to cause death is such a mega manner. In short lack of b**lls.

4. It would bring sanctions and might stop India's economic growth, curtail conventional warfare technology which is crucial to fight the proxy war and border skirmishes in NE. Another way of putting it is: Why have this Golden Bell of TN tests when no leader has the b$lls to tie it around cat's neck.

Please understand me and my friends are reading BR for last 2 years but only now I got a non public email ID so started posting. The above post is only to convey the understanding BR is able to give when read by aam junta with average mind. Not to criticize or take sides.

Warm Regards
Manish

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Sep 2009 04:15

Taking the CEP quoted in this article, Testing Diversion, can we figure out if Gen Sunderji's MTe requirements are met and how many delivery vehicles to get there?

Double/triple the CEP for longer range vehicles.

pgbhat · Post by **pgbhat** » 22 Sep 2009 05:15

‘Naked’ India needs ‘series of tests’ to deal with China: Santhanam ---- The Hindu.

“We are totally naked vis-À-vis China which has an inventory of 200 nuclear bombs, the vast majority of which are giant H-bombs of power equal to 3 million tonnes of TNT,” a note circulated by K. Santhanam, former Chief Adviser (Technologies) of the Defence Research Development Organisation, at a press conference addressed by him said.

Mr. Santhanam reiterated his earlier claim that the thermonuclear device had been a failure, “totally incapable of weaponisation,” and urged the government to lift the unilateral voluntary moratorium on testing announced in May 199

Asked whether he had factored in the international consequences of India testing afresh, Mr. Santhanam said it was for the government to weigh the political, economic and strategic costs. The “pain of testing” was unlikely to be as severe as it was being made out. “In any case, it [testing] was better than our current situation of dar dar ke marna (dying out of fear),” he said.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 22 Sep 2009 05:26

ramana,

I feel that there are three elements that need to be considered: RVs, CEP and blast radius.

Estimate the destruction that would have been possible during Sundarji's time and use the current elements to see how many and in what config would we need to achieve the same amount of pain.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 22 Sep 2009 05:36

ramana wrote:A few news reports of the KS and AP press interviews:

Chandigarh Tribune:

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20090922/main3.htm

Santhanam says it again: Pokhran-II a fizzle
Hits back at NSA, claims data could’ve been fudged
Ashok Tuteja
Tribune News Service

New Delhi, September 21
So he does say the TN was ~ 20-25kt. Now how can that not produce a crater? Must have been quite deep. So these are teh 25kt things that people are throwing around.

Is it likely that RC and co fixed the bad design and issued these nominal 25kt ones? but in reality they can go for the value that shaft was designed for?

Expressbuzz:

LINK
Pied Piper of the PMO - by V Sudarshan

... . . . . Santhanam also released to the media pictures of the test crater site, pointing out that there was no crater there. The thermonuclear device had a yield of 20-25 kilotons and not 45 kilotons as claimed by the NSA. He wondered if Agni III missile, which has a reach of 4,000 km, was required just for a 20-kilotone bomb.

First Published : 22 Sep 2009 11:53:00 PM ISTLast Updated : 22 Sep 2009 12:09:44 AM IST
Pay attention to the chronology narrated about the May 1998 tests and recall ABV's statements in 2004 for which he was laughed at.

HINDU:

‘Naked’ India needs ‘series of tests’ to deal with China: Santhanam

Babu Bihari wrote:http://www.hardnewsmedia.com/2009/09/3243

....To the NSA's assertion that "nobody, including Santhanam can contest what is proven by the data that is there", the scientist said: "The trouble lies in what data was included in the BARC analysis and what was not. There is a wealth of seismic and other data which reveal that the thermonuclear device under-performed."
....

The TN device was a two-stage one. The first was an atomic bomb or A-bomb device which triggered the second stage and the main hydrogen bomb or H-bomb. The A-bomb trigger worked as designed and lived up to expectation. But, the main H-bomb "completely failed to ignite, let alone explode with its designed power of 25,000 tons of TNT, Hardnews learnt. Seismic instrumentation network set up by Santhanam and his seven colleagues proved that categorically. This is what the two scientists claimed in the press conference.

Also, after the TN device test was over and the scientists examined the shaft, it was found to have remained exactly as it was built. If the H-bomb stage of the device worked, the shaft would have been blown to smithereens, said Santhanam.

The scientist asserted that the rubicon must be crossed. "It is up to the government of the day to factor in all facets - technological, economic, security and diplomatic - and take a decision. If there is a window to test thermonuclear devices, test it because the CTBT will be knocking on doors soon," said Santhanam.

So the data that is added from above is:

1. the TN device had a yield of 20-25 kilotons and not 45 kilotons (I.e. same yield as the S2 Pure Fission warhead)
2. The primary FBF trigger of the TN worked as desired
3. The S1 Secondary fusion that completely failed to ignite should have produced 25 kT Fusion yield (design yield).
4. The failed thermonuclear device “totally incapable of weaponisation,”

And for the sake of completeness :

5. S2 pure fission yield was also 20-25 kT.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 22 Sep 2009 05:46

Sanjay wrote:The question is that you may not be able to maximize scalability of the FBF to 10fold the basic fission yield without a dynamic test. You might certainly be able to double or even triple it without difficulty.

I do not know what is the basis/substance behind to claim "without difficulty" part. It is not simple either, lot of sweat work and horsepower required. And what is difficult, for BARC it is even more difficult.

ss_roy · Post by **ss_roy** » 22 Sep 2009 06:00

Arun_S,

I have read that a few grams of tritium/deuterium (gas mixture) injected in the core, results in a 2-3x boost for even older fission designs.

Having said that, it is important that we test our designs at full yield.