Afghanistan News & Discussion

[ramana]

I dont know what they are quibbling about especially those whose Presidential elections have regularly been fixed(stuffed) in Chicago and Florida. And those who want historical data look at election of 1876 when Harding won over Tilden.

Fraud as opposed to bullets mean the folks do believe in elections to legitimize their power and at this stage should be an adequate goal.

[ramana]

Chellany says US exit will help

[brihaspati]

The Taliban, with the active support of the Pakistani military, would certainly make a run for Kabul to replay the 1996 power grab. But it won’t be easy to repeat 1996. For one, the Taliban is too splintered today, with the tail (private armies and militias) wagging the dog. For another, the non-Taliban and non-Pashtun forces now are stronger, more organised and better prepared than in 1996 to resist the Taliban’s advance to Kabul, having been empowered by the autonomy they have enjoyed in provinces or by the offices they still hold in the Afghan federal government. By retaining Afghan bases to carry out covert operations and Predator missions and other air-strikes, the U.S. military would be able to unleash punitive air power to prevent a 1996 repeat. After all, it was the combination of American air power and Northern Alliance’s ground operations that ousted the Taliban from power in 2001.

Wrong! They don't need to run to Kabul. They are already all around Kabul, and most likely their sleepers are within Kabul lying in wait. What makes us so sure that the drive and ideological clarity that pushed the Northern Alliance to take revenge for Mahsud's death still exists. Sharing of government power in countries with systems like that of AFG always brings in a degenration of the moral fibre of the regime. There should have been an analysis of the effects of corruption and easy money on the Northern Alliance. There are divisions and fractures within the erstwhile NA.

In fact, the most likely outcome of the Afghan power struggle triggered by an American decision to pull out would be the formalisation of the present de facto partition of Afghanistan along ethnic lines. Iraq, too, is headed in the same direction. The Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and other ethnic minorities would be able to ensure self-governance in the Afghan areas they dominate, leaving the Pashtun lands on both sides of the Durand Line in ferment. Thanks to ethnic polarisation, the Durand Line today exists only in maps. On the ground, it has little political, ethnic and economic relevance, and it will be militarily impracticable to re-impose the line.

As in Iraq, an American withdrawal would potentially let loose forces of Balkanisation in the Afpak belt. That may sound disturbing. But this would be an unintended and perhaps unstoppable consequence of the U.S. invasion.

On the other hand the ruthlessness of Talebanization would provide an attractive model for the warlords to affailiate themselves to as an unifying framework. The successes or failures of the Soviets as well as the USA has clearly shown the warlords and "ethnicities" the value of cooperation and unification at least superficially. Instead of Balkanization they will opt for a loose federation, which is held together by even stricter imposition of the Sharia.

An American pullout would also aid the fight against international terrorism. Instead of staying bogged down in Afghanistan and seeking to cajole and bribe the Pakistani military from continuing to provide succour to Islamic militants, Washington would become free to pursue a broader and more balanced counterterrorism strategy. Also, minus the Afghan-war burden, the U.S. would better appreciate the dangers to international security posed by Pakistani terror groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed. The threat of an Islamist takeover of Pakistan comes not from the Taliban but from these groups that have long drawn support from the Pakistani army as part of a deep-rooted military-mullah alliance.

Why is the assumption that the USA does not not appreciate the role of LET or JEM - after all they had nothing to say against them when TSP was serving US interests? Why should the USA see an Islamist takeover of TSP as not in theor interest? USA is perfectly happy with the highest order of Islamization in Saudi Arabia - and knowing fully well, how Islamism is funded by Wahabi organizers from within Saudi system. Whys hould USA be bothered if Islamists takeover TSP, as long as that takeover and the resulting regime works in American interests?

[arun]

Afgahnistan’s bacha bazi :

The dancing boys of Afghanistan

It was an ancient tradition banned by the Taliban but now it's back: Ghaith Abdul-Ahad reports from northern Afghanistan on the hiring out of young male dancers by older men. ……………………

The Guardian

[Ameet]

Dozens of Taliban killed after US deaths

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090913/ap_ ... fghanistan

..........about 50 militants were killed in Saturday's battle, but no other Afghan officials could immediately confirm that figure.

Saturday's violence came the same day Afghan officials said 50 civilians, security forces and militants were killed in a spate of attacks around Afghanistan, including 20 noncombatants killed in two roadside bomb explosions.

Violence has risen steadily across Afghanistan the last three years, and militants now control wide swaths of the countryside. The U.S. and NATO have a record number of troops in the country, and the top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, is soon likely to request thousands more.

Support for the eight-year war is waning in the United States and Europe as troop deaths rise and Taliban attacks spike. A record number of U.S. and NATO troops have died in Afghanistan already this year.

[Philip]

The "Real Winner" in Afghanistan's election,Qasim Fahim.

http://www.tampabay.com/news/perspectiv ... re/1035248

In Afghanistan, this man is our future
In Print: Sunday, September 13, 2009

The real winner of Afghanistan's presidential election will not be Hamid Karzai or his main rival, Abdullah Abdullah. It's a man named Mohammad Qasim Fahim.

He is Afghanistan's senior-most military commander, with the lifetime rank of marshal, and was Karzai's running mate during the campaign. Whether Karzai or one of his opponents wins, Fahim will hold and exercise extraordinary influence over the country's military and security apparatus — more so than the elected president.

This means the real loser of Afghanistan's presidential election — besides the Afghan people — will be the United States' long-standing ambition to train and equip enough Afghan forces to allow for an eventual withdrawal of the U.S. military. Building up the Afghan military and police is at the heart of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's latest assessment for Washington of what needs to be done in Afghanistan. But McChrystal's forces will be training Afghan soldiers and police to work for Fahim: a human-rights-abusing, drug-trafficking warlord who might also have had a role in al-Qaida's assassination of his political godfather, Tajik warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud, on Sept. 9, 2001 — an operation widely viewed in retrospect as a precursor to the terrorist attacks in the United States two days later.

The story of Fahim underscores the implausibility of President Barack Obama's plans for the "Afghanization" of the conflict — the shifting of security responsibility to Afghans, the only exit strategy that either the Obama administration or the George W. Bush administration before it has ever put forward.

Fahim was born in 1957 to a prominent Tajik military and political family. After completing traditional training in Islamic law and theology in the late 1970s, he joined militia forces commanded by Massoud, the legendary "Lion of Panjshir" who was the pre-eminent mujahedeen commander in northern Afghanistan after the 1979 Soviet invasion.

Some accounts of Fahim's career say that he affiliated with Massoud's forces in the early days of the Afghan jihad and fought against the Red Army during the 1980s. Others say that Fahim actually worked in the intelligence services of the Soviet puppet regime in Kabul, only siding with Massoud after it was clear that Soviet forces were going to withdraw. Fahim's continued close ties to Russia suggest, at minimum, that he is capable of playing many sides of Afghanistan's complex political chessboard.

Following the Red Army's withdrawal in 1989 and the collapse of the nascent Afghan government in 1992, the new president, Burhanuddin Rabbani, installed Fahim as the head of intelligence. By 1996, internecine struggles among former mujahedeen commanders — as well as rampant corruption and brutality toward the people living under their purview — created an opening for the mostly Pashtun Taliban to expand from their base in southern Afghanistan and capture Kabul. Subsequently, Massoud, Fahim and other non-Pashtun warlords joined together to form the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, usually referred to as the "Northern Alliance."

When I joined the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) staff in late 2001, senior Bush administration officials were already developing an opinion of the Northern Alliance as a cohesive group of heroic and relatively moderate regional commanders who united to combat the rigidly Islamist Taliban. This assessment continues to influence much Western discussion of Afghanistan. It is also, to be blunt, a myth.

The Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara warlords who nominally came together under Massoud's umbrella barely tolerated each other for five years (from 1996 to 2001) and only to resist territorial encroachment by the Taliban. Each warlord had his own individual agenda to consolidate power in particular areas of Afghanistan — and ultimately those individual agendas trumped the alliance's "shared" goal of fighting the Taliban.

Within the Northern Alliance's command structure, Fahim became Massoud's intelligence and security chief — a position that Fahim held at the time of 2001 Massoud's assassination. Although CIA analysts later raised the possibility of the warlord's complicity in his patron's death, senior Bush administration officials were never willing to investigate that possibility seriously because they had already decided to make Fahim a critical player in their strategy for "managing" post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Massoud was assassinated two days before the Sept. 11 attacks. Two al-Qaida operatives of Tunisian origin posing as Moroccan-Belgian journalists met with Massoud to "interview" him. A camera was stuffed with explosives, which the operatives detonated, killing Massoud. Four days later, Fahim took over as the effective leader of the Northern Alliance.

In the years after Massoud's death, Belgian and French authorities arrested and tried various individuals for their contributions to the assassination — such as stealing passports and providing the camera that would later be turned into a bomb. But these European investigations did not address critical questions about how the operation played out on the ground.

How did the two al-Qaida operatives get through the security screening normally required to reach Massoud? How did they maintain their cover while spending several days at one of Massoud's compounds before the actual interview? How did they get explosives through various layers of physical screening and bring them into Massoud's presence?

Massoud's assassination has been widely interpreted as an important precursor to the 9/11 attacks. As the 9/11 Commission documented, al-Qaida's killing of Massoud was coordinated with a Taliban offensive to destroy the Northern Alliance once and for all, and both might have been linked to al-Qaida's plans to attack the United States at roughly the same time.

The idea was to eliminate Massoud, the Northern Alliance's most capable leader, destroy the Northern Alliance as an effective fighting force, and enable the Taliban to take full control over all of Afghanistan. This would have made it harder for the U.S. military to respond to the 9/11 attacks by using the Northern Alliance to go after al-Qaida in Afghanistan.

But this strategic logic could also take in personally ambitious figures in the Northern Alliance willing to cooperate with al-Qaida to advance their own agendas. We know the Northern Alliance warlord Abdul Rasul Sayyaf facilitated the assassins' entry into northern Afghanistan. But what of Fahim? It was his job to vet foreign visitors. So how would he explain the fact that two fake journalists from Tunisia, posing as Moroccans, with Belgian passports — along with their equipment, including the camera that they proposed to use to record their interview with Massoud — were never physically screened?

U.S. officials dealing with Fahim should have asked him this question. They didn't. After Massoud's death, any potential loose ends that might have led inquiring minds to focus on other Northern Alliance figures were tied up. Although one of Massoud's assassins died when the camera exploded, the other survived and was captured before he could escape from the compound. But the captured assassin was himself shot and killed later that day while allegedly trying to escape, apparently before being interrogated.

Fahim's behavior after Massoud's assassination also should have compounded suspicions about his possible collaboration with al-Qaida and the Taliban. As U.S. intelligence and military officials scrambled in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to establish robust operational channels to the Fahim-led Northern Alliance, he failed to lead his forces into battle against the advancing Taliban, though he had promised to do so. Indeed, in October 2001, as the United States was launching Operation Enduring Freedom, Fahim left for Tajikistan.

In the end, the senior Bush administration officials with whom I worked turned a willful blind eye to Fahim's bizarre behavior, ultimately dismissing it as that of a formerly staunch anti-Taliban leader who had just gotten lazy. The CIA continued providing him with millions of dollars in funding, though it soon became clear that he was skimming substantial portions for his personal enrichment.

Following the expulsion of the Taliban from Kabul and other major cities, Fahim became Karzai's defense minister and then also his first vice president. As James Risen recently reported in the New York Times, the Bush administration began receiving intelligence reports in early 2002 describing Fahim's ongoing involvement not only in unsavory human rights practices, but in Afghanistan's resurgent drug trade. But by then, the White House had largely abandoned the goal of creating a genuinely national military and security apparatus for the Karzai government. Instead, it shifted to an exit strategy contingent on turning over security responsibilities to regional warlords, such as Fahim. (My dissatisfaction with this approach prompted me to stop working on Afghanistan policy at the NSC and to focus instead on the Iranian and Persian Gulf parts of my portfolio.)

U.S. law prohibits the provision of military aid to figures known to be involved in narcotics trafficking. How could the Bush administration square this legal constraint with its interest in continuing to funnel assistance to Fahim and others?

Then-Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley (who became national security adviser during Bush's second term) ordered that any discussion of the issue be limited to a so-called "restricted deputies committee." The White House said the United States provided support to Afghanistan's Defense Ministry, but never explained that its assistance then trickled to warlords. And, no less than Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, who oversaw military assistance programs in 2002 and 2003 and is now ambassador to Afghanistan, has said on the record that the Bush administration never placed any restrictions on his dealings with Fahim.

Washington's Fahim problem seemed to subside in 2004, when Karzai decided not to have Fahim as his vice-presidential running mate. In recognition of Fahim's "services," though, Karzai bestowed a lifetime military rank of "marshal" on him, thereby acknowledging Fahim's continuing influence over Afghanistan's evolving military institutions. By 2006, Karzai judged that he needed to designate Fahim formally as a "senior adviser." And, when the Obama administration came to office at the beginning of this year publicly questioning the desirability of Karzai's continued service as president, Karzai once again turned to Fahim — with his control over significant armed cadres and ability to turn out votes in Tajik areas — to stand as his running mate.

There was a brutal logic to Karzai's choice of partners. Even if the incumbent president does not technically win re-election, Fahim provides Karzai with the armed muscle he would need to challenge the published results. Furthermore, "Marshal" Fahim does and will continue to exercise more influence over Afghanistan's military and security forces than whoever ends up the winner of the presidential election.

That reality underscores the flawed logic of the ambition to bolster Afghanistan's military and police forces as an exit strategy. There is no reason to think that Fahim's military, even with U.S. training, would be a reliable bulwark against an al-Qaida resurgence in Afghanistan. That leaves Gen. McChrystal — and President Obama — without a strategy for extricating the United States from its deepening Afghan quagmire.

Hillary Mann Leverett, who served as director for Afghanistan, Iran, and Persian Gulf affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, is the chief executive officer of STRATEGA, a political risk consultancy.

[Philip]

A view from a Dawn columnist,on Pak's Afghan miscalculations.

http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/daw ... ations-199

Strategic miscalculations By Cyril Almeida

Friday, 11 Sep, 2009
What if the Americans do succeed in Afghanistan? Succeed not in the sense of eliminating Al Qaeda or defeating the Taliban with a surge of troops as everyone seems to be debating nowadays, but succeed in a $20bn plan to build Afghanistan’s army into a force of a quarter million troops trained and equipped primarily to fight a counter-insurgency. —AFP Photo IF it wasn’t obvious within days of 9/11, then it should be obvious by now, eight years later: things were never going to be the same for Pakistan.

The security state’s security environment had changed irreversibly. The question was, did we have the wherewithal and nous to adjust to a new reality?

Events to date suggest that while for years we did not, the more recent record is a mixed bag of success and failure. We needed to do two things. Recognise that the time of ‘non-state actors’, terrorists, militants, call them what you will, as a policy instrument in pursuing our security agenda had passed. And recognise that the old model of exerting influence in Afghanistan had to be dismantled.

But we came up against a familiar foe: ourselves. Or more precisely, the ability of the security establishment to perhaps correctly identify all the dots but then proceed to connect them wrongly.

Bush’s America made it easy for us; for years the Americans were satisfied if we netted Al Qaeda types for them, leaving them to focus on Iraq and bungle the post-war phase in Afghanistan.

If we did eventually wake up to the dangers posed by militants who mixed and matched groups and networks for tactical purposes while trying to stitch together a common strategic aim, we only did so after they, quite literally, blew up in our face.

For those who have followed the arc of militancy and are not ideologically wedded to a state of denial, it was apparent in the ‘90s that the tail was preparing to wag the dog. Al Qaeda’s ideologues, fervent proponents of a militant transnational Islamic agenda and rabid sectarians to boot, were harnessing those we thought were, if not quite in our harness, unlikely to harm our agenda.

The first savage wake-up call to our somnambulist security policymakers in the army high command came with the attacks on Musharraf in December 2003. The second came with the orgy of violence unleashed since 2007.

Admittedly, we had helped create a mess of such epic proportions that perhaps we could not help but cherry-pick from among the militants. The Laskhar-i-Taiba, for example, has eschewed attacks inside Pakistan and its leadership remains amenable to listening with a sympathetic ear to some of the security establishment’s concerns. Decapitate its leadership, however, and you run the risk of splintering the group and untethering its more rabid elements. Better then to start with the worst offenders – the Al Qaeda types, Baitullahs, Fazlullahs, etc – than to take on everyone at the same time.

But eight years is a long time, and it’s a measure of how poorly we have fared that retaking control of Swat is regarded as a ‘victory’. Victory, properly, morally defined, should be the security of the people of this country, security from the threat of suicide bombings and fidayeen attacks, security from the risk of abductions to finance a war machine in Fata, security from the ravages of all-to-easily available drugs, security from other states needing to pump billions of dollars into the country to fight a war against elements living among us, security from the world regarding us as a danger to ourselves and a menace to everyone else.

That’s not to say we should be all warm and cuddly and just walk away from Afghanistan and ask nothing of India. We have a legitimate interest in ensuring a dispensation in Afghanistan in the long term that is reasonably amicable towards us, and it is a reality that not every combination which could emerge fits that description. And setting aside cockamamie ideas of parity with India here, there are genuine concerns that India is unwilling to conclude a peace that involves meaningful give and take and a live-and-let-each-other-grow outcome.

But there is a nagging sense that we remain hostage to the past, a pre-9/11 framework in which we regard what has become a millstone around our necks as a still-viable bargaining chip in a high-stakes game. Fine, we’ll think about pulling the plug on our policies of old and work harder with you to shut down the militant networks, but can we also talk about what you can offer us in Afghanistan and on India, we seem to be saying to the world.

The problem is, the security establishment seems unaware that it may perhaps have connected the dots wrongly. It is so sure of Pakistan’s centrality, so convinced that the Americans will not be able to engineer the outcome they desire in Afghanistan, so ready to pooh-pooh the idea that we could possibly ever be on a slippery slope towards truly losing our internal sovereignty, so sure it is playing its cards right.

But consider this: what if the Americans do succeed in Afghanistan? Succeed not in the sense of eliminating Al Qaeda or defeating the Taliban with a surge of troops as everyone seems to be debating nowadays, but succeed in a $20bn plan to build Afghanistan’s army into a force of a quarter million troops trained and equipped primarily to fight a counter-insurgency.

What if the Americans do take that plan off the drawing board, implement it and then walk away from Afghanistan with everything else remaining the same i.e. Pakistan still dreaming of its importance, the competing strategic interests of Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries still unresolved and India growing ever more friendly with Afghanistan and leery of engaging Pakistan?

Would that not be the ultimate two-front nightmare come true, the very nightmare that contributed partly to us vying to be the predominant outside influence in Afghanistan? To be sure, the Americans will not create an army that could be a match for our conventional forces, but what’s to stop a future Afghan government from building its army’s conventional strength with help from other eager countries?

Where will that leave us? Checkmated? Perhaps not, but at the very least our security policymakers will be patting themselves on the back less and holding their heads more.

[email protected]

[CRamS]

Chellany says US exit will help

I respectfully disagree. From an Indian PoV, it will be a disaster. Average abdul in TSP goaded on by TSPA/RAPE will delude themselves into believing that they forced the sole superpower to beat a retraet, and recruitment, if any is needed that is, for slaughtering us SDREs through suicide atttacks will reach a feversish pitch. A combined TSPA/Taliban assualt on India, along with millions of yahoos unleashed on India in the backdrop of nuke blackmail will be a nightmare; and if the past is any indication, us SDREs, as both so called "Hindu nationalist" Vajpayee and Surrender Singh have demonstrated, will be left high & dry begging US for help. And where is the guarantee that once TSPA/Taliban make a push to take Kabul, USA will help the non Pashtoons from the air. At least with US in Afganisthan, as much as I hate its India containment policy, they will at least calibrate TSPA moves to keep India in check without giving them a free hand. Some restraint on TSPA/ISI, through US presence in Afganisthan, is better than nothing .

[shynee]

Three Pakistanis killed in Afghanistan - More Shia Slaughter

According to sources, Mohammad Hussain, Mumtaz Ali and Tajir Hussain were going from Kabul to Parachinar with their Afghan driver when their vehicle was stopped in Mirzaka near Gardez, the capital of Afghanistan’s Paktia province, by unidentified gunmen. The four men were sprayed with bullets and their bodies were thrown on the highway.

The three Pakistanis, hailing from Kurram and belonging to the Turi tribe, had come from Dubai and landed in Kabul instead of Peshawar because of the closure of main highway to Parachinar.

[shravan]

Bombs kill Canadian, US troops in Afghanistan

[Atri]

Chellany says US exit will help

If US exits after at least 10 years from now, then that exit will surely help a lot. Hasty exit is next 4-5 years will seriously undermine reputation of US and interests of Bhaarat.

[shravan]

CIA Chief: Karzai Apparent Afghan Election Winner

In an exclusive VOA interview, CIA director Leon Panetta says that even if suspect ballots are discounted, President Hamid Karzai will in all likelihood win re-election.

"It's clear that there was some degree of corruption and fraud involved in the election," Panetta said. "It's being viewed now by the commissions involved in counting those votes. I think what appears to be the case is that even after they eliminate some of the votes that resulted because of fraud, that Karzai will still - still looks like the individual who's going to be able to win that election."
------

[svinayak]

An Afghan man feeds birds at the Shrine of Hazrat Ali in Mazar-i-Sharif, northern Afghanistan, on September 3, 2009.


http://beta.thehindu.com/news/internati ... e21216.ece

[arunsrinivasan]

McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'

Changes Have Obama Rethinking War Strategy

COMISAF Initial Assessment (Unclassified) McChrystal's declassified assessment

[Sanjay M]

As I've mentioned in other threads, the Atlanticists want to disengage from the Afghan entanglement ASAP by whatever means is most expedient - which means driving the nails into the coffin of the ISAF mission by playing up any bad news, such as MacChrystal's concerns:




What the Atlanticists are conveniently ducking, is the issue of what will happen to the AlQaeda threat to the US once Taliban comes back into power.

[Johann]

Chellany says US exit will help

Chellaney is mistaken is assuming that a US military withdrawal from Afghanistan would substantially reduce Pakistani leverage on the USG.

The US would become even more dependent on drone and special forces raids to disrupt plots and kill operational figures, and that will require continuing Pakistani cooperation which will come at a high price. This is in addition to other forms of intelligence cooperation such as FBI monitoring of traffic through Pakistani airports, etc.

In addition a reduction in US forces will reduce US abilities to secure Pakistani fissile material in an emergency.

The fall of the Pashtun south to the Taliban will produce a surge in the amount of surplus manpower, narcotics revenue, and training opportunities available to the private jihadis and the PA. As Chellaney himself points out, it is Central Asia, Iran and the Subcontinent that will pay the highest price for this.

[Sanjay M]

Obama Mulling Shift in Afghan Strategy:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world ... olicy.html

Basically the Atlanticists at the NYT are hoping aloud that the Whitehouse will wind down the conflict in Afghanistan, going in for a lighter troop mission against AlQaeda directly, rather than a broader mission against Taliban requiring heavier troop deployments.

I think it's obvious that if Taliban comes back to power, then AlQaeda will be massively buffered by them.
Not only that, but after having tasted success with Baitullah Mehsud, then the AlQaeda and Taliban would go back on the offensive by resuming operations to seize swathes of Pak territory, instead of staying on the defensive and waiting to be picked off by drones or specops raids.

So if Obama is stupid enough to try some easy cop-out approach -- and I think he is -- then he'll soon see the ugly results of it on the ground. This will hasten the collapse of his meandering presidency.
The Brzezinski types are giving him bad advice, just as they did when they lost Iran to the revolution.

[SSridhar]

X-Posting from TSP thread

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world ... ml?_r=1&hp

Biden recommends reducing effort in afghanistan to focus on al-qaeda in pakistan.
guess they are preparing the ground to cut and run in af, while pak will provide
a few heads every month in exchange for arms and money.

From the above, it seems that the US is miffed at the re-election of Hamid Karzai. They are looking for a more reliable partner who will also have the support of the Afghan population, an utterly impossible combination.

For one, it is difficult to find one person who will have support among all Afghans. It is a deeply fractured society. Secondly, whatever the US does, it is going to be looked down upon as the Great Satan both in Afghanistan and neighboring countries. The NATO countries, especially the UK, Italy and Germany would like to quit the scene as quickly as possible while at the same time they recognize the dangers of allowing 'bad' Taliban and consequently Al Qaeda to sneak in. They are thus caught between a rock and a hard place. Pakistan, masters at managing the Western mind, is milking the situation very well.

[arun]

X Posted. :

India’s growing clout in Kabul may impact stability: US Gen

Chidanand Rajghatta , TNN 23 September 2009, 01:33am IST .............................

The mixed signals emanating from Washington is best illustrated by one paragraph, the only one relating to India, in the report by US General Stanley McChrystal about the dire situation in the Af-Pak theatre. It reads: “Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan, including significant development efforts and financial investment. In addition, the current Afghan government is perceived by Islamabad to be pro-Indian. While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India.’’

Dubbed the “McChrystal Unclear’’ report, the observation has left Indian officials scratching their heads. So what exactly does the remark imply? That India should scale down its influence in Afghanistan, even though its activities “largely benefit the Afghan people”? That the Obama administration needs to ask New Delhi to dilute its presence in Afghanistan in order not to “exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India’’ a thinly-disguised euphemism for Pakistani terrorism? ...............................

Times of India

[Sanjay M]

I think all of these contradictions surrounding Pakistan show that Pakistan is the common central obstacle, and is the odd man out of the region.

The best solution to harmony in the region is therefore obviously the removal of Pakistan.

[Pranav]

Is UPA warming up to Taliban?
http://www.dailypioneer.com/204605/Is-U ... liban.html

Kanchan Gupta

The venerable Wall Street Journal, which still takes the business of journalism seriously, has carried an interesting news story in its Wednesday’s edition. Headlined “Indian Minister Urges Afghan Political Settlement”, it is based on an interview with Minister for External Affairs SM Krishna, who apparently spoke to the writer, Joe Lauria, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, which is now in session. The opening paragraph of the story is truly attention grabbing: “India, one of the biggest investors in Afghanistan, believes there is no military solution to the conflict in that country and that NATO combat operations should give way to a political settlement with the Taliban, according to Indian Foreign Minister SM Krishna.”

The newspaper quotes Mr Krishna as saying, “India doesn’t believe that war can solve any problem and that applies to Afghanistan also... I think there could be a political settlement. I think we should strive towards that.” According to the daily, Mr Krishna “dismissed suggestions that India’s growing involvement in Afghanistan is intended to encircle Pakistan, a fear prevalent in some circles in Pakistan. ‘I think that is a baseless allegation,’ he said.” Mr Krishna, in his interview, “charged that Pakistan’s disruptive role in the Taliban insurgency continued”, and said “the military situation in Afghanistan was complicated by the ongoing aid for the Afghan Taliban provided by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency”.

A full reading of the news story and the extensive quotes of the Minister published alongside would reveal that he has not suggested a “political settlement with the Taliban”, at least not in so many words. But it is only logical to deduce that this is what he meant when he talked of a “political settlement”. Given the political reality of Afghanistan where the Taliban are determined not to allow democracy and modernism to take root, and want the country to return to the joyless, dark days when a one-eyed monster called Mullah Omar ruled that benighted nation with ruthless force in the name of Islam, the only people you can strike a deal with and come to a “political settlement” are the Taliban.

“If India can work happily with Great Britain after they having ruled us for so long, it only shows that we can play the game,” Mr Krishna told The Wall Street Journal. That is an allusion which only the naïve would miss or misinterpret. In interpreting foreign policy, each word, especially when uttered by the Foreign Minister of a country, is dissected many times over. And the most casual reading of Mr Krishna’s comments would suggest that they indicate a major shift in the Government’s policy on Afghanistan and a break with the national consensus that has helped its evolution: The Congress-led UPA is now willing to “play the game” and cut a deal with the Taliban.

What Mr Krishna has also signalled is the UPA Government’s rethinking on American involvement in Afghanistan. Till now, although India has steered clear of the US-led military intervention in Afghanistan, it has been a beneficiary of everything that has followed the fall of the criminal Taliban regime and the installation of the Government headed by President Hamid Karzai. New Delhi would not have been able to reopen its mission in Kabul and set up consulates elsewhere had Mullah Omar still been in power. Nor would India have been able to re-establish its people-friendly profile among the Afghan masses through infrastructure development and healthcare projects.

It would be foolish to believe that the ‘Indian presence’ in Afghanistan will remain untouched and undiminished if the US and NATO troops were to abruptly pack up and leave that country. A “political settlement” — or, to put it more bluntly, a deal with the Taliban — may please those in the UPA Government who believe Islamism is a benign idea and Islamists are the natural allies of ‘secularists’, but it will be disastrous for India and its national interest.

Since Mr Krishna is the Minister for External Affairs, we must presume that whatever he has told The Wall Street Journal, as well as the implied meaning of his statement, reflect current thinking in South Block. More important, since Mr Manmohan Singh unilaterally frames foreign policy these days, Mr Krishna’s comments must be taken to reflect the Prime Minister’s views — unless they are refuted or denounced by the Government’s drum-beaters in the media. It may not be entirely coincidental that the Prime Minister’s prescription for redrafting India’s policy on Afghanistan bears close resemblance to the current thinking in Washington, DC.

As US President Barack Hussein Obama watches his much-touted AfPak policy unravel, his strategists work overtime to convert the 21st century’s Great Game into a Grand Bargain. Mr Obama spoke of a ‘surge’ in the deployment of US troops, but there are as yet no signs of 40,000 more Americans being sent to win the war against the Taliban. And while policy-makers in the Obama Administration dither, Gen Stanley McChrystal, the top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, has submitted a ‘confidential’ report — whose contents have been leaked to The Washington Post! — to the American President, underscoring the problems posed by “inadequate resources” at his disposal. “Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) — while Afghan security capacity matures — risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible,” he has said.

While Gen McChrystal has made a case for the immediate deployment of additional soldiers to bolster the presence of 64,000 troops in Afghanistan, Pentagon appears to be divided on the issue. It would like Mr Obama to take a political call on whether to go ahead with the ‘surge’ or begin pulling out troops from Afghanistan, and then strategise on the next steps to be taken. Interestingly, Gen McChrystal is also believed to have said in his report that “while Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increa-sing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India”.

That’s an understatement, but it nonetheless accurately reflects the Afghan reality which is intimately enmeshed with the reality of Pakistan’s ‘strategic depth’ policy that visualises Islamabad’s control over Kabul with the Taliban’s help and the imposition of Islamist absolutism. In such a scenario, it is amusing to think of the UPA Government cutting a deal with the Taliban.

-- Follow the writer on: http://twitter.com/KanchanGupta. Blog on this and other issues at http://kanchangupta.blogspot.com. Write to him at [email protected]

[Pranav]

^^^ The Taliban are dinosaurs, but ideally India should be friendly with Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand line. This is very much possible - in Afghanistan, India already has the support of the people. Even in Pakistan, the people of NWFP supported the secular Awami National Party, which reveres Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and is generally well-disposed to India.

On the other hand, interests of the Tajiks and other long-time friends from the North cannot be compromised.

[Sanjay M]

Taliban are not the Pashtuns to be friendly with. Ideally, we should have saved Najib from execution at Taliban's hands, but we never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.

The best we could hope from befriending Taliban, is to keep them locked in a fight with Islamabad.
But certainly a Taliban victory would not be in our interest.

Meanwhile, Taliban are acontinually expanding the scope of their strikes from their Pak based into Afghan territory:

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/24/world ... itary.html

[SSridhar]

NYT Editorial
Excerpts

. . . Seven years of neglect by the Bush administration has made defeating, or even containing, the Taliban far harder. And any policy decision must be carefully reviewed. But there is not a lot of time.

The anxiety in this country is profound. Many of the allies whose troops are also fighting and dying in Afghanistan are looking for a way out.

If the plan is still to train the Afghan Army and bolster the desperately flawed government so it can hold off the Taliban, what will that take and for how long? If that is no longer realistic, and Mr. Obama decides to draw down American troops, how will he ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a haven for Al Qaeda and a launching pad for attacks on the United States?

If the United States decides to cut its losses in Afghanistan, how will Mr. Obama persuade Pakistan (a far more tempting prize with its nuclear weapons) to press the fight against the Taliban and other extremists.

[pgbhat]

Afghanistan may introduce compulsory military service

General Stanley McChrystal, commander of Nato-forces in Afghanistan, said in his grim recent strategic assessment of the situation in the country that the army should grow from 92,000 to 134,000 in the next year.

It should then reach 240,000 as soon as possible, which commanders admit would need the recruitment and training of 5,000 men each month.

"These issues have so far not been finalised." General McChrystal also said the Afghan police force should grow from 84,000 to 160,000.

[Pranav]

ANP wants India to stay involved in the Pushtun region.

--------------------------------------------------------
ANP seeks friendly ties with Afghanistan, India
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=199963

Adeel terms McChrystal’s statement detrimental to regional economic integration

Friday, September 25, 2009
By Riaz Khan Daudzai

PESHAWAR: The Awami National Party (ANP) on Thursday said it sought friendly economic and political relations with both Afghanistan and India and asked the government to avail the economic and investment opportunities being offered by the reconstruction process in the war-shattered country.

Responding to a question about a report submitted by the US commander General Stanley McChrystal warning against the destabilising effects of the increasing economic influence of India in Afghanistan, which may escalate tension in the region, Senator Haji Muhammad Adeel, acting president of the ANP, termed the viewpoint of the US general detrimental to the economic integration of the region.

He said Pakistan should revisit its economic ties with both India and Afghanistan and other countries of the region to strengthen its economic condition instead of isolating itself economically.

He said that he did not attach any importance to the report submitted to the Pentagon by McChrystal and termed it a mere feeler and said that it would not augur well for the political and economic ties of the three important countries of the region.

Haji Adeel was of the view that the report may create an atmosphere of misunderstanding, adding that it was not a pro-Pakistan report. It will rather increase difficulties for Pakistan, he added.

He said with regard to relations with India and Afghanistan, Pakistan would have to reconsider its role in the regional perspective and the fast changing economic scenario. The ANP senator said his party will be pleased to be a part of any forum and mechanism aimed at enhancing and strengthening economic and political ties with Afghanistan and India.

The ANP leader said that there were numerous economic opportunities in Afghanistan for Pakistan and it should avail them. The same could be made possible through friendly political ties, he said.

He also sought an active role of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) in the region to work for the economic integration in the region.He also underlined the need for more active role of the Pak-Afghan ministerial committee for the purpose.

Haji Adeel said food items of billions of dollars were informally being exchanged among the three countries that needed to be formalised so that it could benefit their national economies.Similarly, Professor Dr Ijaz Khattak, chairman of the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar, said the “geography and economics” should be given a chance in the region.

About the tension in the region, he said that economic integration was the only way to ease the political tension. He also advocated enhanced economic ties with India and Afghanistan and said nobody would come to fix the problems being faced by the three countries of the region and therefore, they will have to rectify the situation themselves.

[shravan]

6 foreign troops killed in Afghanistan

KABUL — A suicide car bomb explosion targeting Afghanistan's energy minister killed four civilians Sunday, while attacks and a violent storm killed six international troops, including three French and two American forces, officials said.

Taliban assassination attempts against Afghan officials have intensified this year, with more than 100 officials and pro-government tribal elders attacked — half of them fatally.

The convoy carrying Energy Minister Ismail Khan, a powerbroker in the western region of Herat, was headed to the airport when a suicide car bomb exploded outside a high school, said Raouf Ahmadi, a police spokesman.
.
.
This year has been the deadliest of the eight-year war for U.S. and NATO troops. The latest six deaths bring to 64 the number of NATO troops killed this month.

[Sanjay M]

Well, Obama always likes to be compared to JFK.

Now Peter Galbraith, son of JFK's irreverent ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith, is at the heart of another anti-establishment confrontation, as he gets fired for opposing the rampant vote-rigging that has occurred in Afghanistan.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/w ... 856029.ece

[Pranav]

Excerpts: Galbraith’s Letter to U.N. Secretary General
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/world/01text.html

The following are excerpts of the Sept. 28 letter from Peter W. Galbraith, deputy special representative of the U.N. secretary general at the U.N. mission in Afghanistan, to Ban Ki-Moon, the U.N. secretary general in New York:

As you know, Kai Eide and I have had prolonged disagreement as to whether UNAMA should take action to prevent or mitigate fraud in the Afghanistan elections. Given our mandate to support “free, fair, and transparent” elections, I felt UNAMA could not overlook the fraud without compromising our neutrality and becoming complicit in a cover-up. For a long time after the elections, Kai denied that significant fraud had taken place, even going to the extreme of ordering UN staff not to discuss the matter. And, at critical stages in the process, he blocked me and other UNAMA professional staff from taking effective action that might have limited the fraud or enabled the Afghan electoral institutions to address it more effectively.”

In July, I came to the realization that the greatest risk to the Afghan elections was from “ghost” polling stations, that is polling centers sited in areas so insecure that the centers would never open. In coordination with the Ambassadors from the US, UK, EU and NATO, I pressed the Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior either to secure these polling centers or to close them. The Afghan Ministers, whose continued tenure in office was to depend on the fraud, complained about my intervention and Kai ordered me to drop the matter. As it turned out, most of the electoral fraud occurred in these ghost polling centers.

With Kai’s blessing, UNAMA established and manned an election center that ran around the clock through the balloting and counting period. At considerable personal risk, UNAMA field staff collected data on turnout and fraud. Our data showed a miniscule turnout in key Southern Provinces, but these provinces were to report a large number of votes for Karzai. Once it became clear to Kai that the output from our election center would be deeply disturbing to President Karzai, he ordered the staff not to share the data with anyone, including the Afghan institutions charged with preserving the integrity of the electoral process.

On September 2, I learned that the Independent Election Commission (IEC) was about to abandon its published safeguards so as to include in the final tally a large number of Karzai votes that it knew to be fraudulent (including those from polling centers that never opened). As OIC, I spoke with the chief electoral officer to urge that the IEC stick with its established procedures. President Karzai had the Foreign Minister protest my supposed interference in the electoral process and, as you know, the Afghanistan Permanent Representative threatened to have me expelled from the country. Kai sided with Karzai in this matter, seemingly indifferent to fact that these fraudulent ballots were the ones that put Karzai over 50%.

Shortly after the elections, Kai told President Karzai that “I am biased” in your favor and that “those who are out to get you are also out to get me.” When I asked Kai about this, he explained that being biased did not mean he was supporting Karzai and I accept that explanation. But, I am not sure President Karzai sees it that way. Kai also told me the “those” referred to Ambassador Holbrooke. I think this was an inappropriate conversation for the SRSG to have with the head of state and, in the context, likely interpreted as meaning that UNAMA did not share the concerns Holbrooke was then raising about electoral fraud.

[Pranav]

^^^

1. It seems the fraud in favour of Karzai was sponsored by Western elites. (See also "US accepts Hamid Karzai as Afghan leader despite poll fraud claims": http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/w ... 853123.ece)

2. They also want to help the Pakis by bringing the so-called "moderate Taliban" into the government.

3. On the other hand, Karzai, despite his incompetence, is a good friend of India at heart. But India is not in a strong position to resist a joint Paki-Western putsch for "moderate taliban".

4. Karzai's opponent Abdullah is an equally good friend of India. India needs to help protect the interests of the Tajiks.

5. These are tricky waters to navigate. Should keep a low profile, but consult with Russia and Iran.

6. SM Krishna has been making pro-"moderate Taliban" statements in the press. Although there has been some sort of denial, it should be assumed that these statements are being made at the behest of MMS, who was a world bank appointed Finance Minister. His performance vis-a-vis nuclear deal, climate change, Sharm-el-Sheikh indicates that MMS cannot be relied upon to have Indian interests at heart.

[ramana]

That Peter Galbraith is a Paki supporter in US SD. He was a yaar of Benazir Bhutto.
So his reports are 400% suspect even if there is an iota of truth!

[Pranav]

That Peter Galbraith is a Paki supporter in US SD. He was a yaar of Benazir Bhutto.
So his reports are 400% suspect even if there is an iota of truth!

It's not just Galbraith alone - there is a whole institutional mechanism within Afghanistan that has been reporting on the fraud.

But my concern is about what the ultimate game plan is - a discredited Karzai becomes a pliant tool who has to accept anything that is demanded of him.

It could be that the Western elites are working to prevent Pakistan from implosion, and putting a Paki-friendly government in Afghanistan is a part of that agenda.

[Rudradev]

It is amusing to see these Amirkhans weeping, wailing and gnashing their teeth over the allegations of "electoral fraud" by Hamid Karzai.

How forthright and upstanding are these doyens of Jeffersonian democracy. Of course, Karzai should have held a free and fair election... relying solely on his popularity among people whom the Americans bombed, strafed and shot up village by village while the country struggled to rebuild itself under his aegis for the last eight years. That would have been fair indeed!

Too independent this Karzai... complaining about USAF air raids, insisting that Pakistani support to Taliban terrorists be curtailed, demanding that the Americans apply pressure where it really needs to be applied. Who does he think he is?

Meanwhile, I wonder where Little Peter Galbraith and all of these other self-righteous clowns were, when the Amirkhans' most allied Al-Lie, Pervez Meretricius Musharraf, oversaw and won all those "free and fair" elections with 99.99999999% of the Pakistani electorate behind him (the 0.000000001% being the Supreme Court Justice whom he threw in jail).

Pranavji... there is not even any shadow of a doubt that Karzai is being abandoned by the US, for being too anti-Pakistan by virtue of supporting India's efforts to rebuild the nation of Afghanistan. His stance of allowing access to Indian aid benefits the Afghan people, but... how did McChrystal put it? "Exacerbates regional tensions and encourages Pakistani countermeasures".

Pakistan has demanded the installation of a pro-Paki puppet regime in Kabul to secure their backyard for Allah-mandated "strategic depth"... and the paragons of democracy in DC are scrambling to oblige.

That the GOI, S&M Krishna and Moorkh Mumble Singh actually appear to be going along with the maligning and abandonment of India's best hope in Afghanistan, is genuinely sickening to observe.

[Pranav]

Pranavji... there is not even any shadow of a doubt that Karzai is being abandoned by the US, for being too anti-Pakistan by virtue of supporting India's efforts to rebuild the nation of Afghanistan. His stance of allowing access to Indian aid benefits the Afghan people, but... how did McChrystal put it? "Exacerbates regional tensions and encourages Pakistani countermeasures".

Rudradev ji, if you ask the Pakis to chose between Karzai and Abdullah, they will choose Karzai. Because Karzai's incompetence and weakness will allow them to get back into the game. Karzai does not enthuse even his own Pashtun ethnic group.

On the other hand Abdullah is of mixed Pashtun-Tajik descent, and is closest in spirit to the legendary Ahmed Shah Masoud. He seems to have the solid backing of most non-Pashtuns (who form 60% of the population), and also a significant number of Pashtuns.

One has to ask oneself why the UN backed this fraud, going so far as to sabotage the investigations.

Finally, if Karzai is inevitable, then how do we make the best of the situation, how do we reduce his dependence on Pakistan and on western elites, and how do we help protect interests of other friends in Afghanistan?

[ramana]

Pranav, Stop falling for this Karzai is inefficient line etc. Its pro-Paki line. He represents the best option to keep Afghanistan together. He has the right tribal (Durrani) affliations. Abdullah could never get the Pashtun vote and his election would have lead to fissiparous forces. The Paki hope to de-legitimize him and prop up the Ghilzais who are mostly Talibanised. This way they recover thier 'strategic depth'.
If Karzai is in-efficient its because of the US molly coddling the TSP based Taliban by not going flat out and searching for ghosts: going after Al Quaida when the real trouble makers are the Taliban who shelter and give sustenance to the former. They do this to preserve the TSP's Taliban option for later use in Central Asia and in India. You cannot run with the hares and hunt with the hounds.
The time has come for them to choose for defeat is not an option for it will have far reaching ramifications.

In the pre-modern Afghan society one should be happy that they want to stuff ballots and win rather than last time they took to guns. Karzai would have won even without stuffing and the constant whine about stuffing by US is to exert pressure on him to go easy on TSP.

[amdavadi]

Mullah omar is Ghilzais,and lower in rank to durranis. Since founding of present day afghanistan by ahmed shah durrani,
most of the leader came from durrani tribe.

[Rudradev]

Rudradev ji, if you ask the Pakis to chose between Karzai and Abdullah, they will choose Karzai. Because Karzai's incompetence and weakness will allow them to get back into the game. Karzai does not enthuse even his own Pashtun ethnic group.

Pranavji,

I disagree completely. If the choice is between those two individuals only, the Pakis will prefer the ascendance of Abdullah Abdullah... the Tajik. Once the "Coalition" candidate in Kabul becomes a non-Pashtun, it's all over for the Americans. The battle lines will then become very clearly redrawn in Pakistan's favour.

By the absence of a Pashtun leader in Kabul, the mantle of Pashtun popular support will *immediately* fall on a Paki candidate under ISI control... Mullah Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani or some such character. Any hope of a stable, united, non-Jihadi Afghan nation emerging from Operation Enduring Freedom will be extinguished forever.

In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if all this "election fraud" rubbish derives wholly from a UK-Saudi-Pak effort to discredit Karzai and put Abdullah Abdullah in the hot seat of the Afghan presidency. That will inevitably lead to a "moderate-Taliban" controlled Afghanistan: exactly what the UK, Saudis and Pakis have been proposing as a solution.

In the best case scenario for India, Afghanistan will disintegrate and the Pashtun south will merge with Pakistan under a Paki-controlled leader... giving Islamabad the "strategic depth" it craves. Pashtun resistance in NWFP, FATA and Swat against Islamabad will disappear as the TSPA/ISI are celebrated for establishing the new Islamic Pashtunistan against a Kufr-backed Tajik candidate.

In the worst case scenario the Paki-controlled leader will repeat the Mullah Omar conquest of 1996-97, gaining control of all Afghanistan with US/UK/Saudi/Chinese blessings. Meanwhile India will be stuck backing the quickly-eroding authority of Abdullah Abdullah, a minority candidate who simply does not possess any popular mandate in southern Afghanistan. Of course, backing Abdullah will meanwhile alienate whatever crucial support we now enjoy among the Pashtuns.

Karzai because of his Popolzai tribal heritage and relationship to the blood line of Ahmed Shah Durrani, holds some amount of culturally relevant claim to pan-Afghan authority even if purely symbolic. He is the only Pashtun candidate for the job with any legitimacy... even Zalmay Khalilzad is tainted by his overly westernized stature. The other Pashtun candidate in the 2009 elections, Ashraf Ghani, is a 400% Paki stooge... fortunately he doesn't seem to enjoy any popular support. But this could change if Abdullah Abdullah were foisted on the Pashtuns by Obama and co.

Besides, Karzai's "incompetence" and "weakness" are completely American-invented (and Paki-parroted) slander. The man has been sabotaged by the Americans at every step, and now they blame him for having been crippled by their own restrictions.

He begged for funding to finance the reconstruction of Afghanistan, but Washington gave him peanuts and financed the Iraq war instead.

He has repeatedly stressed the need for a strong, modern Afghan National Army... but that institution was deliberately kept weak, under-funded and under-equipped to assuage Pakistani concerns.

He has supported the expansion of Indian reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan... AFAIK the *only* international reconstruction efforts that have actually benefited and been appreciated by the Afghan people on a large scale... but that initiative too has been opposed, shackled and limited by the pro-Pakistan DC operators.

He has pleaded for more sensitivity from the Americans in limiting civilian casualties in Afghanistan... yet they continue to bomb Afghan villagers and wedding parties while allowing the Taliban leadership to live and function comfortably in Quetta under the protection of the TSPA and ISI. To top this, the Americans expect Karzai to win a "free and fair" election based on the support of the same Afghan villagers they have bombed repeatedly for the past 8 years, under his nominal presidency!

In such circumstances how is he expected to have been "competent"?

The Americans have tied his hands behind his back and blame him for "incompetence", to the immense satisfaction of their Paki allies. Wah. If indeed the UN has somehow intervened to prevent Karzai's abandonment and dismissal, it would be one of the few good things that organization has ever done.

[Pranav]

Pranavji,

I disagree completely. If the choice is between those two individuals only, the Pakis will prefer the ascendance of Abdullah Abdullah... the Tajik. Once the "Coalition" candidate in Kabul becomes a non-Pashtun, it's all over for the Americans. The battle lines will then become very clearly redrawn in Pakistan's favour.

Pranav, Stop falling for this Karzai is inefficient line etc. Its pro-Paki line. He represents the best option to keep Afghanistan together. He has the right tribal (Durrani) affliations. Abdullah could never get the Pashtun vote and his election would have lead to fissiparous forces. The Paki hope to de-legitimize him and prop up the Ghilzais who are mostly Talibanised. This way they recover thier 'strategic depth'.
If Karzai is in-efficient its because of the US molly coddling the TSP based Taliban by not going flat out and searching for ghosts: going after Al Quaida when the real trouble makers are the Taliban who shelter and give sustenance to the former. They do this to preserve the TSP's Taliban option for later use in Central Asia and in India. You cannot run with the hares and hunt with the hounds.
The time has come for them to choose for defeat is not an option for it will have far reaching ramifications.

In the pre-modern Afghan society one should be happy that they want to stuff ballots and win rather than last time they took to guns. Karzai would have won even without stuffing and the constant whine about stuffing by US is to exert pressure on him to go easy on TSP.
Pranav, Stop falling for this Karzai is inefficient line etc. Its pro-Paki line. He represents the best option to keep Afghanistan together. He has the right tribal (Durrani) affliations. Abdullah could never get the Pashtun vote and his election would have lead to fissiparous forces. The Paki hope to de-legitimize him and prop up the Ghilzais who are mostly Talibanised. This way they recover thier 'strategic depth'.
If Karzai is in-efficient its because of the US molly coddling the TSP based Taliban by not going flat out and searching for ghosts: going after Al Quaida when the real trouble makers are the Taliban who shelter and give sustenance to the former. They do this to preserve the TSP's Taliban option for later use in Central Asia and in India. You cannot run with the hares and hunt with the hounds.
The time has come for them to choose for defeat is not an option for it will have far reaching ramifications.

In the pre-modern Afghan society one should be happy that they want to stuff ballots and win rather than last time they took to guns. Karzai would have won even without stuffing and the constant whine about stuffing by US is to exert pressure on him to go easy on TSP.

Ramana and Rudradev Jis,

You make excellent points. However, where I disagree with you is:

1. Competence of Karzai: While western powers have definitely played a blame-worthy role by molly-coddling the Talibs and the Pakis, Karzai is really not known for efficiency. There is an element of disillusionment, and you certainly can't put 100% of the blame on US / NATO.

2. Election fraud: It is wrong to dismiss all the fraud allegations as rubbish - they are too widespread, and coming from too many credible and independent sources. Also, there is collusion of the UN in this fraud, so we need to be concerned about decisions being made by the Western "deep state".

3. Supposed Paki preference for Abdullah: I disagree - anybody linked with Ahmed Shah Masoud is anathema for the Pakis. Take a look at this excellent interview of Amrullah Saleh, Afghan intelligence chief:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qYf-xkOjTFg (part 1)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8t-SNtUjip4 (part 2)

Nevertheless, I quite agree with the thrust of your agreements - Karzai was given a raw deal by the US / NATO, Karzai is a friendly element, and the fracturing of Afghanistan is not in India's interests.

Ultimately what India needs in Afghanistan is a nationalistic, efficient and legitimate government. If Karzai wins credibly, that is good. But a less-than-legitimate government is bad for India.

[Pranav]

Split in White House Re troop surge (http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/art ... gD9B2B5G00):

The talks revealed the emerging fault lines within the administration, with military commanders solidly behind the request for additional troops and other key officials divided.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and special Afghan and Pakistan envoy Richard Holbrooke appeared to be leaning toward supporting a troop increase, the official said.

White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel and Gen. James Jones, Obama's national security adviser, appeared to be less supportive, the official said. Vice President Joe Biden, who attended the meeting, has been reluctant to support a troop increase, favoring a strategy that directly targets al-Qaida fighters who are believed to be hiding in Pakistan.

The meeting, the second of at least five Obama has planned as he reviews his Afghanistan strategy, comes after a critical assessment of the war effort from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the man he put in charge of the war earlier this year. McChrystal declared that the U.S. would fail to meet its objective of causing irreparable damage to Taliban militants and their al-Qaida allies if the administration did not significantly increase American forces.

[Rudradev]

3. Paki preference for Abdullah: I disagree - anybody linked with Ahmed Shah Masoud is anathema for the Pakis. Take a look at this excellent interview of Amrullah Saleh, Afghan intelligence chief:

Abdullah is a "preference" for the Pakis only if the other choice is Karzai (not because of any qualities Abdullah may possess in and of himself). He may be anathema to the Pakis as an ally, but that's not the point at all.

The ISI doesn't expect to be doing business with or co-opting Abdullah... they will welcome a Tajik as the ISAF Coalition-Backed Candidate only because it will bring all the Pashtuns completely on to their side, weakening the Kabul government to their advantage. The Taliban will then become the natural repository of Pashtun nationalist aspirations, gaining full support from the Pashtun people of southern Afghanistan against the Americans and their Tajik figurehead.