Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

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Gagan
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by Gagan »

That fellow was using a false premise to begin with.
The US trident II (D5) that he was talking about with tyhe 450KT warheads has a CEP of 90-120m acheived with star sensors and GPS guidance.
He was attributing a CEP if 16m to the Agni series, which is based on Laser ring gyros and radar scene co-relation.

I don't know how good the radar scene co-relation would be, but merely laser ring gyro won't give a CEP of 16m after 3500Kms.

I would also want to know if a 25Kt nooke bang on target exploding a few meters above a missile silo hardened to 10000 psi, be as effective as a 450 kt nooke exploding some 100m away. I think 100m is too short a distance where the 450 Kt will come out a winner every time. The US has an advantage in the real economy of fissile material used in its bum, the proven effectiveness of its warhead, the power of its warhead which has been titrated to the type of use they want it for (Bunker busting / silo busting / population killing) and low enough CEP of its missiles.
This advantage has come about because the US was able to spend more and test more and do all this more freely than any one else in the world.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by Gagan »

I would like to ask this from some experts who know seismology.

How much difference on the richter scale would a 75 Kt test made from a 45 Kt test? I am talking about the professed control of yield done in order to reduce the damage to khetolai.

The difference between a 200Kt and a 45 Kt is alright understandable. But I don't think a 75 Kt is any different than a 45Kt in terms of seismic upheaval to the neighbouring villages.

How do you do dial a yield on a TN? More boosting gas in the primary? AFAIK you can't exactly alter the LiD in the secondary as the system will likely be sealed. But the amount of boosting gas can be altered.

But altering the boosting gas amount only alters the yield of the primary. It won;t result in a variation of 45 to 200Kt. Also there has to be a small margin for the primary's performance. It can't be too small and it can't be too big a bum or the whole system will fizzle.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

vera - many many thanks for this link. It has some great information that make things fall into place in my mind. Will post my thoughts in due course.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by vera_k »

shiv wrote:The point here is that if someone thinks that deterrence is not possible without publicly demonstrating a minimum of 150 kt then it means that the 1998 tests added nothing to deterrence that was not present before 1998.
I'd beg to differ. Before 1998, the nuclear deterrent could be dismissed as a figment of imagination.
shiv wrote:Therefore it is possible to conclude that at least in some people's minds

1) Deterrence does not exist vis a vis China
2) The 1998 tests made no difference in terms of value addition to deterrence.
I'd dispute 2. The 1998 tests proved deterrence exists vis-a-vis Pakistan.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

Gagan wrote: The difference between a 200Kt and a 45 Kt is alright understandable. But I don't think a 75 Kt is any different than a 45Kt in terms of seismic upheaval to the neighbouring villages.

Gagan its about depth of shaft and venting of radioactivity. Having said that "75 kt" is a figure pulled out of my head and should not be taken as ultimate truth - I doubt if any shaft would have taken 150 kt or even 100 kt.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by Umrao Das »

We should focus on Population growth and deliver more and accurately on that front.

See it is easier to grow population

http://users.rcn.com/jkimball.ma.ultran ... tions.html

Than to grow fissile material which decays exponential and leads to change of alphabet and all bets from s to z.
example
fissile --------> Fizzle - e-

Therefore more deliveries more babes to offset the calculation of the enemy, remember the Population Bomb days which India possessed according to respect western experts? Look who is laughing now Inida has the highest growing middle age and youth population ( do you think Sanjay G was a stupid to have youth congress?).

So if continue to grow exponentially imagine the number of bombs the enemy has to stockpile to elimanet us?

See how Israel shivers at the population growth of Palestinians even without deiliverence or child care.


This is called Strategic Substitute theroy which some Surheon generals are talking about, it takes understanding and time to get the whole pitcher. Not difficult though.

No Bums more babes to deter the enemy.

{for those not knowing about Population Bum and Parivar Niyojan}
The Population Bomb (1968) is a book written by Paul R. Ehrlich. A best-selling work, it predicted disaster for humanity due to overpopulation and the "population explosion". The book predicted that "in the 1970s and 1980s hundreds of millions of people will starve to death", that nothing can be done to avoid mass famine greater than any in the history, and radical action is needed to limit the overpopulation. The phrase "population bomb", was already in use. for example in 1962 in the Canadian Medical Association Journal [1] became common parlance with the publication of this book.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

Gagan wrote:
How do you do dial a yield on a TN? More boosting gas in the primary? AFAIK you can't exactly alter the LiD in the secondary as the system will likely be sealed. But the amount of boosting gas can be altered.
Gagan - I suspect "dial a yield" refers to Amrican information of the fitting of a separate secondary "physics package" which is of the same physical dimension to fit inside a deliverable warhead but has a different design inside to reduce yield.

For example the tamper size and quality may be varied (I am guessing) - since the tamper produces 2/3 of the yield by fission. If they can use a non fissile tamper the entire tamper yield gets eliminated. And if they use a dummy instead of LiD/Tritium - only the primary yield will be obtained (10-20% of whole?)

The entire 150 pages of this thread can be summarized using my paragraph above :mrgreen:
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/ ... _1995.html
August-December 1995
Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao begins an internal debate within the government over whether India should conduct additional nuclear tests. The Indian cabinet is divided on the issue; some cabinet ministers support a program of tests; others such as finance minister Manmohan Singh oppose the tests on grounds that US sanctions will disrupt India's economic recovery. Some of Rao's advisors believe that tests should be preceded by preparations to ride out US sanctions for a period of at least two years. However, the Chief Scientific Advisor, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Dr. R. Chidambaram, argue in favor of tests. Rao orders Kalam and Chidambaram to make preparations so that tests can be conducted within 10 days of political authorization. Ultimately, however, Rao decides to defer the tests until later.
—Raj Chengappa, "Tell Your President, I Keep My Word," Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2000), pp. 392-395.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/ ... _1996.html
1996
In view of mounting pressure from the Indian army to embark on a policy of nuclear weaponization, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao permits "Chiefs of Staff" targets to be assigned to the Army's Prithvi-1 (150km-range/1,000kg payload) ballistic missiles. The "Chiefs of Staff" targeting plan is analogous to the US Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). The Prithvi targets range from 'point targets' such as Ichiigoil Canal, to "high-value" targets such as oil refineries and nuclear installations. This marks a critical threshold in the operationalization of India's nuclear deterrent against Pakistan. The weapons in India's inventory include 20-100kt nuclear warheads and gravity bombs weighing 200-300kg. Tritium boosted fission weapons are also available. Despite the absence of field tests, the Bhabha Atomic Research Center has high confidence in the reliability of its weapon designs.
—Bharat Karnad, "Hesitant Nuclear Realpolitik: 1966-To Date," Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), p. 376
.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/ ... _1996.html
June 1996
A senior official at India's defense ministry says it is time for India to abandon its policy of keeping the nuclear option open and "examine how best to translate this into effective deterrence to safeguard our vital interests in political and military terms" since "there is no longer any ambiguity about reports that China has helped Pakistan with its nuclear program and has supplied to it nuclear capable M-11 medium range missiles."
—"India: Officials Claim Nation Faces Nuclear Threat from Neighbors," Times of India (Mumbai), 28 June 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-128, 28 June 1996.
June-July 1996
India rejects the proposed draft of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva. India's Foreign Secretary Salman Haider says India will keep its nuclear option without disengaging from CTBT negotiations. According to Haider, India's objections to the CTBT are based on the fact that the treaty aims to contain only horizontal, not vertical, proliferation; since the treaty bans only the nuclear explosions while allowing for hydro-nuclear, hydro-dynamic, sub-critical tests, and computer simulations. He says the treaty lacks verification mechanisms to check for the transfer of nuclear technology from nuclear weapon states to their clients and does not guarantee India's security. He adds India will continue to press for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework.
—"India Delivers Blow to Nuclear Test Ban," Jane's Defense Weekly (Coulsdon, Surrey), 3 July 1996, pp. 27-29.
June-July 1996
Prime Minister Deve Gowda consults Finance Minister P. Chidambaram and Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral on the question of conducting nuclear tests. Both ministers advise against conducting tests in the near term for economic and foreign policy reasons.
—Raj Chengappa, "Why Play Pahalwan?" Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (2000: Harper Collins Publishers India, New Delhi), p. 398
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by Bade »

shiv wrote:
Gagan wrote: The difference between a 200Kt and a 45 Kt is alright understandable. But I don't think a 75 Kt is any different than a 45Kt in terms of seismic upheaval to the neighbouring villages.
Gagan its about depth of shaft and venting of radioactivity. Having said that "75 kt" is a figure pulled out of my head and should not be taken as ultimate truth - I doubt if any shaft would have taken 150 kt or even 100 kt.
The energy released by nuclear weapons is traditionally expressed in terms of the energy stored in a kiloton or megaton of the conventional explosive trinitrotoluene (TNT).

Many academics[who?] refer to a 1 kt TNT explosion being roughly equivalent to a magnitude 4 earthquake (an often quoted rule of thumb in seismology), which in turn leads to the equation[citation needed]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_magnitude_scale
As with the Richter scale, an increase of 1 step on this logarithmic scale corresponds to a 10^1.5 = 31.6 times increase in the amount of energy released, and an increase of 2 steps corresponds to a 10^3 = 1000 times increase in energy.
So assuming a 30kt yield, gives a magnitude 5 quake, which is thirty times the yield corresponding to a magnitude 4 quake. Now, if you went for a 60kt device, then it should be 60 times more, meaning two magnitude 5 earthquakes with an epicenter just a few km away from khetolai and only 200 meters deep.

Now, if you went for a 1 Mt test, then it would be approximately a 30^2=900 times more yield than a magnitude 4 quake, which means a shaking equivalent of a 6.0 magnitude quake right under your feet literally. :shock: :eek:
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

veraK's link to the K.Sub/PVNR paper has some very interesting titbits.

It says:

1) In 1995 some scientists too were against testing
2) The delay from 1995 to 1998 gave R Chidambaram time to design a thermonuclear device.

Other links say that both RC and Kalam were for testing (within 10 days) in 1995 - which means that there must have been other scientists who were against testing - for whatever reason - perhaps as Samuel outlined earlier.

Another post on this forum points out that PKI in 1998 said that TN would take 7 years more to develop, but he also spoke of TN designs himself (which is that link - I can't find it??)

Clearly the scientific community itself was split about testing in Pokhran under the conditions imposed and RC and co had to design some form of TN to suit the conditions - possibly based on existing designs. The existence of other designs is stated by PKI. PKi speaks of a TN with a 45 kt primary, while RC and co claimed a 12 kt primary.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by amit »

A few observations, following the very interesting discussion over the past few posts.

1) Data points posted by Shiv ji suggests that RC also thinks we would need to test again if we change the requirements to fulfill the minimum part of the "Minimum" in our deterrence postion.

2) I would think it's safe to assume by now that there are several "big yield" devices which have either been weaponsied or can be weaponised in our arsenal which have not been hot tested and any future test would include at least some of these and any other future or present experimental design.

Now if these two are reasonable assumptions, then the question comes back to testing and the required shafts in which to put these bombs. Now I wonder, wouldn't it be very odd if the GoI/DAE/Army have not spent the past 11 years slowly digging more tunnels? I mean all evidence so far suggest that in 1998 the devices were placed in existing tunnels which had been dug and kept ready several years previously. While digging a 200-300 metre shaft in a couple of weeks is bound to attract attention from overhead spy satellites, the same shaft dug over a period of months or even a year can be done much more superstitiously, IMO. I'm not saying this has been done - I really don't know either way. But common sense seems to suggest that's a contingency that would have been planned for.

One final point, a bit controversial so a request, don't crucify me. And that is when India tests in future (and I'm totally confident that India will, at some point of time, test again) why assume that it will do so in a cloak and dagger manner? Of course there will be no advance PIB press release on the tests and neither would Burkha Dutt and her friends be invited to the test site etc. But I reckon people who need to know would be given indications of Indian tests.

The difference between 1998 and 20xx when India will again test is that the first was done when India was outside the tent of rich and powerful nations. The next one will be done when India is either completely in the tent or when India is in a position to p*ss inside the tent if it is displeased.

And as we've seen the biggest talent of the rich and powerful nations of the modern era is to co-opt challengers not fight them. Case in point China.

In summary, the lack of a shaft or the logistics of digging one secretly is not going to prevent a future Indian test. And neither will the fear of sanctions if the timing of the tests is correctly calculated. I would tend to think that it has and hence all this dramabazi about voluntary moratorium but NO signing CTBT, NPT etc.

JMT and all disclaimers.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

Gagan wrote:
I would also want to know if a 25Kt nooke bang on target exploding a few meters above a missile silo hardened to 10000 psi, be as effective as a 450 kt nooke exploding some 100m away.
Gagan - in the same way that Pakistan bypasses Indian conventional superiority by sending Kasabs to Mumbai - the "Minimum deterrence" does not bother to pinpoint missile silos - it just promises to hit civilian centers. Given the size of cities a CEP of 1 km is fine.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by Gagan »

Saar the JDAM option has its problems.
It is related to terrorism by non state actor who does not have a fixed base, assets, identifiable pressure points to target in retaliation.
This problem is a vexed one, which has every nation state in the world flummoxed.

The JDAM has similar problems associated with it. Here preemption should take over, in that Pakistan and china should be told that since they are the original sources of these weapons, they hold ultimate responsibility of their safety too. If a nuke goes off in an Indian city, Pakistan will get it immediately, and china soon enough.

Another aspect to this is to make the international stakeholders within pakistan that that nation is unsuitable to hold something as destructive as a N weapon. Once pakistan's major master gets convinced, and feels the heat himself, pakistan's nuke problem will be solved. Now if rumors are to be believed, pakistan's nukes are PAL-ed with massa in joint custody.

This means that for a pakistani nuke to go off, massa has to consent to this??? Is that a logical conclusion to arrive at given the PAL story?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by Rien »

Gagan wrote: The JDAM has similar problems associated with it. Here preemption should take over, in that Pakistan and china should be told that since they are the original sources of these weapons, they hold ultimate responsibility of their safety too. If a nuke goes off in an Indian city, Pakistan will get it immediately, and china soon enough.
Please tell me with what warheads will China "get" it? Indian's estimated arsenal is of >70 50 kt weapons. How will India deliver unacceptable damage to a country with 700 3 Mt warheads exactly? Now, if India has tested and working thermonuclear weapons, they would automatically have the ability to turn 100 fission devices into 1000 TN weapons of far higher yield and much lesser weight. Then, and only then, is the threat of China being nuked plausible.

Also, India's NFU doctrine guarantees that India will take a decapitating strike first. There won't be anyone or anything to hit back *with*. Even Pakistan can take out the entire Indian arsenal as long as they have more warheads/missiles than India.
Gagan wrote: This means that for a pakistani nuke to go off, massa has to consent to this??? Is that a logical conclusion to arrive at given the PAL story?
No, anyone can create a PAL. The US provided negative guidance to France to help it make one via reverse engineering. They offered the technology freely, even to the USSR, so it cannot be the case it would make the warheads vulnerable to remote kills.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by rakall »

shiv wrote:
Gagan wrote:
I would also want to know if a 25Kt nooke bang on target exploding a few meters above a missile silo hardened to 10000 psi, be as effective as a 450 kt nooke exploding some 100m away.
Gagan - in the same way that Pakistan bypasses Indian conventional superiority by sending Kasabs to Mumbai - the "Minimum deterrence" does not bother to pinpoint missile silos - it just promises to hit civilian centers. Given the size of cities a CEP of 1 km is fine.

Shiv - do you have a copy of "Weapons of peace"? (been tryign every bookstore in Blr for last 4years.. cant get anywhere)

is there a chance I can borrow it?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

Rien wrote:
Please tell me with what warheads will China "get" it? Indian's estimated arsenal is of >70 50 kt weapons. How will India deliver unacceptable damage to a country with 700 3 Mt warheads exactly? Now, if India has tested and working thermonuclear weapons, they would automatically have the ability to turn 100 fission devices into 1000 TN weapons of far higher yield and much lesser weight. Then, and only then, is the threat of China being nuked plausible.
Welcome to this thread rien 8)

Interesting concepts you have posted there. is there a source from where you got that or are they your thoughts?

Some of the things you have said are - um.. debatable and some are original

And we have had 150 pages of debate on that :rotfl:
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

rakall wrote:
Shiv - do you have a copy of "Weapons of peace"? (been tryign every bookstore in Blr for last 4years.. cant get anywhere)

is there a chance I can borrow it?
Yes - do you have my number? (or email?)
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by amit »

shiv wrote:

Please tell me with what warheads will China "get" it? Indian's estimated arsenal is of >70 50 kt weapons. How will India deliver unacceptable damage to a country with 700 3 Mt warheads exactly? Now, if India has tested and working thermonuclear weapons, they would automatically have the ability to turn 100 fission devices into 1000 TN weapons of far higher yield and much lesser weight. Then, and only then, is the threat of China being nuked plausible.
Welcome to this thread rien 8)

Interesting concepts you have posted there. is there a source from where you got that or are they your thoughts?

Some of the things you have said are - um.. debatable and some are original

And we have had 150 pages of debate on that :rotfl:
Shiv ji,

The cycle starts again! :)

Aha the sense of déjà vu
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

:lol: Well I'm ready for the next 150 pages before one more "Who is Sita?" appears.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by amit »

shiv wrote::lol: Well I'm ready for the next 150 pages before one more "Who is Sita?" appears.
:)
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

I have a serious question.

Now suppose India has 25 kt nukes and China has 1 MT nukes. Naturally, when India launches a 25kt nuke at China, China will launch a 1 megaton nuke against that. But to stop the Indian 25 kt nuke the 1 megaton will have to dash against it no? Won't that damage the 1 megaton nuke so that it will fall out of the sky after dashing the Indian nuke. Now won't that fallout fall on some country en route? I have read that missiles used to go over the arctic to won't the fallout be in Canada (North parts)

Another thing is that I know 1 megaton is 40 times more than 25 kt. So won't the smaller 25 kt be able to dodge? I mean in space, where the atmosphere is thin, dodging should be easy leading to dodgy results no?
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by rakall »

shiv wrote:I have a serious question.

Now suppose India has 25 kt nukes and China has 1 MT nukes. Naturally, when India launches a 25kt nuke at China, China will launch a 1 megaton nuke against that. But to stop the Indian 25 kt nuke the 1 megaton will have to dash against it no? Won't that damage the 1 megaton nuke so that it will fall out of the sky after dashing the Indian nuke. Now won't that fallout fall on some country en route? I have read that missiles used to go over the arctic to won't the fallout be in Canada (North parts)

Another thing is that I know 1 megaton is 40 times more than 25 kt. So won't the smaller 25 kt be able to dodge? I mean in space, where the atmosphere is thin, dodging should be easy leading to dodgy results no?

:rotfl: :rotfl: :rotfl: :rotfl:

cy***surg - you have email...
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by Guddu »

shiv wrote:I have a serious question.

Now suppose India has 25 kt nukes and China has 1 MT nukes. Naturally, when India launches a 25kt nuke at China, China will launch a 1 megaton nuke against that. But to stop the Indian 25 kt nuke the 1 megaton will have to dash against it no? Won't that damage the 1 megaton nuke so that it will fall out of the sky after dashing the Indian nuke. Now won't that fallout fall on some country en route? I have read that missiles used to go over the arctic to won't the fallout be in Canada (North parts)

Another thing is that I know 1 megaton is 40 times more than 25 kt. So won't the smaller 25 kt be able to dodge? I mean in space, where the atmosphere is thin, dodging should be easy leading to dodgy results no?
Am no expert in this area, my understanding was that one does not use new-clear tipped missiles to "dash", the enemies new-clear missile. But yes, one could use a ballistic missile defense missile to knock of incoming nucklear missiles. No idea if this will cause a nucl. explosion in the air, most likely only nucl. debris will fall on the ground, location being dependent on the stage at which the collison occurs. Overall, I would expect that nucl. missiles have limited "dodging" capabilities.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

Guddu wrote:
Am no expert in this area, my understanding was that one does not use new-clear tipped missiles to "dash", the enemies new-clear missile. But yes, one could use a ballistic missile defense missile to knock of incoming nucklear missiles. No idea if this will cause a nucl. explosion in the air, most likely only nucl. debris will fall on the ground, location being dependent on the stage at which the collison occurs. Overall, I would expect that nucl. missiles have limited "dodging" capabilities.
Ah! Thanks!
8)
But seriously Guddu - that "serious question" was a joke meant to illustrate a point.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by Rien »

With only a 100 fission nuclear warheads, how exactly is China's 700 warheads 3 MT warheads going to be survived?

Try to imagine 21 MT. Per each and every single nuclear missile. This is what fission advocates are claiming can be survived. Or avoided. Lucky thing we aren't betting a billion lives on the possibility of them being wrong.

Is that even possible? Is there any credible reason to expect that there will be even one missile left to retaliate? Please answer this question, because after 150 pages of meaningless gibberish about how 17kt fission weapons are better than fusion weapons, I thought this was the comedy channel :roll: . Pakistan has, right now, more weapons than India has now. How, if India is restricted to fission only weapons, can it build more and assure survival? However few weapons will survive a first strike, is it even possible to launch even a second strike on Pakistan? Please don't forget that fission weapons are heavy. They have less range, they are vulnerable to being neutralized by fusion weapons. A single megaton fusion warhead going off, can cause predetonation[url=http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boosted_fission_weapon[/url] in pure fission warheads.
Just one 3MT Chinese warhead can easily mission kill(disable, not destroy) without even a close miss.

All of the P5 countries have fusion TN weapons. The Indian government's official stance, is that is has TN weapons up to 200 kilotons, and two heads of the armed services have stated 0.5-1MT. Are all of these people idiots?
Or does BR have some morons? Who is more likely to be wrong?

However, iff India does have thermonuclear technology, the same amount of fissile material that can make only 100 fission bombs can make 1000 thermonuclear bombs. It is mathematically absolutely impossible to take out 1 000 missiles with only 800(+100 for Pakistan). Not even if the Pakistanis and Chinese do a combined first strike and know the exact location of every missile. But a first strike is possible for fission warheads alone.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

Rien wrote:With only a 100 fission nuclear warheads, how exactly is China's 700 warheads 3 MT warheads going to be survived?
But China does not have 700 X 3 megaton warheads.

OK let me assume China has 700 X 3 Mt warheads.

Each 3 MT warhead can destroy at maximum 100 square Km area

So 700 warheads will destroy 70,000 sq Km

But India has a land area of 3 million sq km

So China's 700 megabooms will destroy only 2% of India land area. 98% of India will be left intact.

So China's 700 warheads are not much. Let China get 20,000 warheads then it will be something.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by H.B.Krishna »

shiv wrote:
Rien wrote:With only a 100 fission nuclear warheads, how exactly is China's 700 warheads 3 MT warheads going to be survived?
But China does not have 700 X 3 megaton warheads.

OK let me assume China has 700 X 3 Mt warheads.

Each 3 MT warhead can destroy at maximum 100 square Km area

So 700 warheads will destroy 70,000 sq Km

But India has a land area of 3 million sq km

So China's 700 megabooms will destroy only 2% of India land area. 98% of India will be left intact.

So China's 700 warheads are not much. Let China get 20,000 warheads then it will be something.
Ohh yeah, if they have 20K warheads, they will offload all into our way, and dance nude before Unkil and NATO chelas to be given a lesson on "discipline" lolz :rotfl:

The new clear weapons .... The big stick once taken out looses its value just like Abdul's :P
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by NRao »

Rien,

First and foremost, this is a "deterrence" topic, so please take the discussion to the "deterrence" thread.

Secondly, we seem to confuse three very distinct sub-topics:
1) Conventional warfare - where topic of discussion WRT parity between combatants is normal,
2) Pre-nuclear strike - where deterrence has tremendous value, but parity as envisioned in a conventional war is normally not valid.

Please read the two articles I have posted in the "deterrence thread, where the US was scared of a puny NoKo threat - both during the Clinton and Bush II era. This is proof enough that deterrence is not based on what we think of as parity - that is I have a total of 500 Kt and he has a total of 100 MTs so he is stronger, no he is not. Deterrence is never a ratio of what you have vs, what the opponent has. It is the unacceptable pain you can inflict upon him which prevents him from starting a nuclear war.

It is very simple.

3) Post-nuclear strike - this is when deterrence fails (there is an assumption here - about sanity of the opponents).

Now take this discussion to the other thread.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by Umrao Das »

Even the most eloquent Surgeon General does not know who sita is? How can we operate with out knowing?

It is legitimate to go back to the original question who is actually sita?

We can weaponize any size of arsenal but will they work?

That is the Sita's agnoy pariksha.

We dont need bums we have enough of them, we need delivery.
NRao
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by NRao »

how exactly is China's 700 warheads 3 MT warheads going to be survived?
A deterrence is PRECISELY to make sure that THIS question never arises.

ONLY when you have NO deterrence will this question arise.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

If I have 6 knives and my enemy has 25 spears can 6 knives stop 25 spears?

Technically one knife thrown properly is enough. OK the enemy while dying may throw all 25 spears at me. But 1 spear is enough damage for me. He dies from 1 knife damage and I die from 25 spears damage.

Like all analogies this is imperfect - but only illustrative of the fact that no matter how many 3 megaton devices China has - unless they know how and where to destroy all 100 50kt India devices they will still be fcued because they will have uselessly used up 3 MT devices in getting hidden nukes. 20 surviving nukes can do enough damage.

That is what deterrence is about.

Wrong thread.
Last edited by shiv on 16 Oct 2009 20:31, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by Amber G. »

With only a 100 fission nuclear warheads, how exactly is China's 700 warheads 3 MT warheads going to be survived?
FWIW - Let me paraphrase the response of a similar question from one (I think Bethe) ( who by all accounts an expert in nuclear weapons - he was head of theoretical division in Manhattan project). To answer such types of questions, old classical math (where 100 is twice 200) may not be relevant in arriving the right answer. His analogy was something like this:
There are two adversities, both are soaked in Gasoline, one has 100 (working) matches and other has 150 matches (and may be some lighters/ignition sticks etc.). It may not be relevant to think how 100 matches will survive against 150 matches.
Last edited by Amber G. on 16 Oct 2009 20:46, edited 1 time in total.
shiv
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by shiv »

NRao wrote:
Please read the two articles I have posted in the "deterrence thread, where the US was scared of a puny NoKo threat - both during the Clinton and Bush II era. This is proof enough that deterrence is not based on what we think of as parity - that is I have a total of 500 Kt and he has a total of 100 MTs so he is stronger, no he is not. Deterrence is never a ratio of what you have vs, what the opponent has. It is the unacceptable pain you can inflict upon him which prevents him from starting a nuclear war.

.
Here they are. Mountain being brought to Mahomet
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by SaiK »

I am thinking the scientist insiders were split largely on the yield requirements and deterrance value projections (device ratings) rather the tests itself. Hence, all insiders agreed to tests, and none were against the tests.

Later on, piss-a-lexicals were added to say, they had to protect the huts and brick walls near by., and which has much more weight than the yield discussion, of course. Who would want those 100 kids in the school to die under falling bricks.

We could also conclude, that we can come up with 200KT, but we have not chartered our path to conclude, that we can come up with a mega ton. This could be the Santanic versus saying.

We would be back on the deterrence drive towards any nation satisfying our nofu doctrine, by having our new lawerance type lab to prove a design that satisfy Santanic values.

Essentially, my point is, our next gov or the current one should announce in the next budget, mil expenses for setting up such labs (basically solemnize the money for creating the new device), and eshtablish the new oomphed up deterrence value that is required.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by Umrao Das »

Pre and Post deterrence failure paradigms are different.

Mixing scenarios is flamable
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by NRao »

Umrao Das wrote:Pre and Post deterrence failure paradigms are different.

Mixing scenarios is flamable
Flammable is the scare that arises from ignorance or fear.
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by geeth »

>>>Pakistan has, right now, more weapons than India has now

How do you know that for sure..??

I think people who curse and leave this forum go straight across the border, take the inventory of nuclear material there. After that they change their name to sound like a firangi (''cause their seismic data are more reliable..?) and again try to prove that RC is a liar? :roll:
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Re: Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist - Part-3

Post by SaiK »

fear is the key from the ignorance of requirements (real).
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