Afghanistan News & Discussion

[ramana]

weep for india as there is a combined pak/china escalation is coming...

i think the only way to prevent it is some surprising developments during the MMS state visit on nov 24...

Now-now. Lets not be defeatist. Best opportunity for the butterfly.

Nightwatch comments on the show:

Afghanistan: NightWatch comments on the Frontline Report on PBS. The one-hour special is important more for its visual images than for any words in the script or from interviews. The visual images add dimensions to understanding.

The script is about protecting people and establishing local rapport. The interviews with generals reinforce those messages. The video and audio of a local village encounter show that young US Marines are clueless. Even the more reflective Marine captain, with all the best intentions in the world, comes off as clueless, far too young and inexperienced for the task his superior set for him to establish rapport with the Pashtuns of Helmand Province.


The language of the script is that of Western academic study of insurgency. The ironic reality is that very young American men presume to preach about survival to Afghans old enough to be their grandfathers. There is no respect for age shown in any of the local encounters PBS filmed. The videos showed the Americans to be afraid, unprepared and ill-informed and the Afghans were uniformly defiant, in the NightWatch view. One wondered whether the young officer knew the clan of the men he was addressing?

The most startling segment of the telecast was a scene in which a Marine officer tried to persuade locals that the village was now safe because the Marines arrived. They wanted the locals to help them. The Afghans challenged how could the Afghans help the Marines? They did not even own a sword.

The setting was a village that was empty of inhabitants who fled when they learned the Marines were coming to save them from the Taliban. Nevertheless, inexplicably and in an empty village, the Marine officer was interrogating a dozen or so Afghan men, using an interrogator who did not speak the local dialect.

The US officer got impatient with the Afghans because they were not being cooperative, the script indicated. He could not speak the language and his interpreter was not qualified but he directed his anger at the Afghans … and the insanity of the situation, no doubt. Th4e video showed him to be arrogant and disrespectful of the residents and especially of the elders in the group. He probably was mostly scared and maybe a little embarrassed.

Neither PBS nor the Marine officer noticed that a significant portion of the men wore black turbans, the signature headdress of the Taliban. Who can know for sure, but experience suggests any men found in a Helmand village without children or women are Taliban. These facts raise a significant probability that the Marine officer was issuing orders to and expressing frustrations with the actual rulers of the village, who were Taliban or Taliban sympathizers and apparently was not aware. It was like watching films from the early period of the Vietnam War all over again.

And when did governance, or more accurately government, become so important in Afghanistan? A significant portion of the video focused on this issue in interviews and commentary.

This is an American obsession. Louis Dupree, the foremost US expert on Afghanistan before he died, never thought good government was important. His writings and experience indicate that Afghans prefer no government outside the local shura. What westerners call corruption Afghans call survival.

The message of the Frontline special is not in the script, but rather in the images which invariably put the lie to the words. The take away is that US words to not match US actions. That is the fundamental Afghan gripe against the US: it promised a lot and did not deliver. The Pashtuns judge they were better off under their own leaders, after waiting eight years for some benefits from having ousted the Taliban.


Note: this comment is not a criticism of the American soldiers and Marines. It is a criticism of those who prepared them, or rather failed to prepare them. Watching US helicopters sweep across the broad expanses of Helmand Province, the words from officials in Kabul about progress, protecting people, development and governance seemed otherworldly.

At the risk of repetition, the US Army and probably all the NATO armies are not large enough to protect the villages, were they entirely deployed in Afghanistan. That is a key NightWatch takeaway from the Frontline special.

[surinder]

Raman, is Nightwatch a TV program?

BTW, thanks for announcing the PBS show in advance; I may have missed watching it if I hadn't read it here.

It would be nice if we could let each other know of an upcoming program.

[surinder]

^^^

I had similar feelings when I watched the show. The marines were not showing respect to the men in the way it is supposed to be shown in A'stan. There is a certain protocol in the society & they were more buddy-buddy in the american style.

What was amazing was the defiant suspicious look of the villagers. They were scared, no doubt, but uncooperative & deeply suspicious. Not taken in much by the flattery the amerikhans were showing them. This, I think, defines A'stan in many ways. This is why holding A'stan is much harder. The village they showed did not even have the typical treacherous A'stan terrain; all it had was rugged men.

[Philip]

A little bird tells me that Obama will make a major pitch at MMS ,that India replace Japan for naval logistic help for its Afghan Warring,when he hosts him for dinner at the House of the White man.If India declines,Pak will do the needful.Watch this space!

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/w ... 875642.ece

Japan to withdraw ships from Afghanistan support role
Richard Lloyd Parry, Tokyo

Japan will withdraw its naval ships from their support role in the war in Afghanistan, in the first concrete sign of the new government’s willingness to say no to the United States.

The country’s defence ministry confirmed this morning what had been expected since the election victory of the prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama – that Japan will withdraw its naval forces from the Indian Ocean in January after eight-years in support of anti-terrorism operations.

The announcement comes six days before the visit to Japan of the US defence secretary, Robert Gates, and a month before that of President Barack Obama, and underlines the new tone adopted by Mr Hatoyama’s centre-left government in its dealings with the US.

Japan’s Maritime Defence Forces deploy a supply ship and a destroyer to provide fuel and water to US and British naval vessels in the Indian Ocean. Compared to other international contributions, the “floating petrol station”, as it was cynically called, is small. But for Japan, which has taken part in only a handful of overseas military operations since the Second World War, it is an important and controversial commitment.

Related Links
Yukio Hatoyama can't afford to ditch the US
Japanese PM seeks change, but will he fade away?

Throughout his campaign for August’s election, which was won overwhelmingly by his Democratic Part of Japan (DPJ), Mr Hatoyama repeated his wish for a “more equal” relationship with the US. In essays and speeches, he acknowledged the importance of the Japan-US alliance, but insisted that East Asia “must be recognised as Japan’s basic sphere of being” and that Japan and its smaller Asian neighbours must “restrain US political and economic excesses”.

He appointed as defence minister Toshimi Kitazawa, an opponent of the country’s military support for the US. The question is now what Japan will offer its ally in place of ships and troops, and how Mr Hatoyama will reconcile his new approach to the US with his stated wish for a close and friendly relationship with Mr Obama.

The answer is likely to be a combination of grass roots aid projects and the dispatch of civilian personnel such as aid officials and trainers. “Sending troops is not necessarily the only way to provide support,” Japan’s foreign minister, Katsuya Okada, said this month. “There are many people that are joining the Taliban because they have no other ways to support their livelihoods. To allow them leave the Taliban, I think it is effective to guarantee their livelihoods.”

According to Akihisa Nagashima, a junior defence minister who officially informed his American counterparts, the US department of defence accepted the decision. Much trickier will be another item in Mr Hatayama’s manifesto – the question of where to relocate Futenma airbase on the island of Okinawa.

The current site is close to densely populated civilian areas. Previous Japanese and US governments negotiated and finalised a plan to relocate it to another part of Okinawa. But Mr Hatoyama has indicated that he wants to review the scheme, and to consider moving out of Okinawa and onto the Japanese mainland, an idea which is causing quiet consternation among US defence officials.

[SSridhar]

Amrullah Saleh. Impressive man, . . .

KV Rao, I didn't see the program. But, I totally concur with you. I had posted in BR many, many months ago about him along the same lines.

[Philip]

New Italian opera,"Il Briber di Silvio".Starring in the lead role Silvio the briber baron.

The plot:Baron Berlusconi bribes Afghan Taliban warlords not to take pot shots at his magnificently dressed troops as they proudly parade around Afghanistan's polo grounds to the martail strains of,"the march of the toreadors" from Carmen.Silvio's moneybags was meant for the warlords and their fighters to instead play their national sport called Buzkashi with the heads of Yanqui soldiers singing "Nessum Dorma".However,the briber baron did not tell the replacement French troops of his secret arrangement with the Taliban,who fell dying singing "sola perduta abandonata" while emperor Sarkozy lamented "o mio babbino caro".The curtain falls with the briber baron Silvio desperately trying to prevent his arrest by the Italian police singing "sempre libera".

Silvio Berlusconi attempts to duck Afghanistan bribe scandalTom Coghlan and Nico Hines

5 Comments
Recommend? (21)
(Alberto Pizzoli/AFP)
Silvio Berlusconi
Silvio Berlusconi today sought to duck the blame for a series of secret Italian payments to Taleban fighters that left French soldiers exposed in Afghanistan.

The Italian Prime Minister denied any knowledge of money paid to Afghan warlords in an apparent attempt to divert attention over the clandestine deals to his predecessor’s administration.

The Times has learnt that when French soldiers arrived to assume control of the Sarobi area, east of Kabul, in mid-2008, they were not informed that the departing Italians had kept the region relatively peaceful by paying local Taleban fighters to remain inactive.

Western officials say that because the French knew nothing of the payments they made a catastrophically incorrect threat assessment.

Related Links
Victims' parents criticise French army
Japan to end naval support for Afghanistan war
Brown deploys 500 more troops for Afghanistan
Within a month, ten French soldiers had been killed in an ambush by the insurgents. It was one of the biggest single losses of life by Nato forces in Afghanistan. The French public was horrified to learn that the soldiers had been mutilated and photographs were later published showing the militants triumphantly sporting their victims’ flak jackets and weapons.

In a statement this morning, the office of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said The Times report had made “totally baseless accusations”.

“The Berlusconi government has never authorised any kind of money payment to members of the Taleban insurrection in Afghanistan and has no knowledge of initiatives of this type by the previous government,” said the statement.

“It should be highlighted that in the first half of 2008, Italian contingents in Afghanistan came under attack numerous times, including one in the Sarobi district, on February 13, 2008, which cost the life of Lieutenant Francesco Pezzulo."

Mr Berlusconi, defeated Romano Prodi at elections in April 2008 and had been in power for around three months when the handover of Sarobi was completed.

US intelligence officials discovered through intercepted telephone conversations that the Italians had been buying off militants in other areas, notably in Herat province in the far west.

In June 2008, several weeks before the ambush, the US Ambassador in Rome made a démarche, or diplomatic protest, to the Berlusconi Government over allegations concerning the tactic.

A number of high-ranking officers in Nato have now told The Times that payments were subsequently discovered to have been made in the Sarobi area as well.

“One cannot be too doctrinaire about these things,” a senior Nato officer in Kabul said. “It might well make sense to buy off local groups and use non-violence to keep violence down. But it is madness to do so and not inform your allies.”

On August 18, a month after the Italian force departed, a lightly armed French patrol moved into the mountains north of Sarobi town, in the district of the same name, 40 miles east of Kabul. They had little reason to suspect that they were walking into the costliest battle for the French in a quarter of a century.

Operating in an arc of territory north and east of the Afghan capital, the French apparently believed that they were serving in a relatively benign district. The Italians they had replaced in July had suffered only one combat death in the previous year. For months the Nato headquarters in Kabul had praised Italian reconstruction projects under way around Sarobi. When an estimated 170 insurgents ambushed the force in the Uzbin Valley the upshot was a disaster. “They took us by surprise,” one French troop commander said after the attack.

A Nato post-operations assessment would sharply criticise the French force for its lack of preparation. “They went in with two platoons [approximately 60 men],” said one senior Nato officer. “They had no heavy weapons, no pre-arranged air support, no artillery support and not enough radios.”

Had it not been for the chance presence of some US special forces in the area who were able to call in air support for them, they would have been in an even worse situation. “The French were carrying just two medium machine guns and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. They were asking for trouble and the insurgents managed to get among them.”

A force from the 8th Marine Parachute Regiment took an hour and a half to reach the French over the mountains. “We couldn’t see the enemy and we didn’t know how many of them there were,” said another French officer. “After 20 minutes we started coming under fire from the rear. We were surrounded.”

The force was trapped until airstrikes forced the insurgents to retreat the next morning. By then ten French soldiers were dead and 21 injured.

The French public were appalled when it emerged that many of the dead had been mutilated by the insurgents— a mixed force including Taleban members and fighters from Hizb e-Islami.

A few weeks later French journalists photographed insurgents carrying French assault rifles and wearing French army flak jackets, helmets and, in one case, a dead soldier’s watch.

Two Western military officials in Kabul confirmed that intelligence briefings after the ambush said that the French troops had believed they were moving through a benign area — one which the Italian military had been keen to show off to the media as a successful example of a “hearts and minds” operation.

Another Nato source confirmed the allegations of Italian money going to insurgents. “The Italian intelligence service made the payments, it wasn’t the Italian Army,” he said. “It was payments of tens of thousands of dollars regularly to individual insurgent commanders. It was to stop Italian casualties that would cause political difficulties at home.”

When six Italian troops were killed in a bombing in Kabul last month it resulted in a national outpouring of grief and demands for troops to be withdrawn. The Nato source added that US intelligence became aware of the payments. “The Italians never acknowledged it, even though there was intercepted telephone traffic on the subject,” said the source. “The démarche was the result. It was not publicised because it would have caused a diplomatic nightmare. We found out about the Sarobi payments later.”

In Kabul a high-ranking Western intelligence source was scathing. “It’s an utter disgrace,” he said. “Nato in Afghanistan is a fragile enough construct without this lot working behind our backs. The Italians have a hell of a lot to answer for.”

Haji Abdul Rahman, a tribal elder from Sarobi, recalled how a benign environment became hostile overnight. “There were no attacks against the Italians. People said the Italians and Taleban had good relations between them.

“When the country [nationality of the forces] changed and the French came there was a big attack on them. We knew the Taleban came to the city and we knew that they didn’t carry out attacks on the Italian troops but we didn’t know why.”

The claims are not without precedent. In October 2007 two Italian agents were kidnapped in western Afghanistan; one was killed in a rescue by British special forces. It was later alleged in the Italian press that they had been kidnapped

[arun]

X Posted.

Davood Moradian also says that the US and UK full well know the malign role of the ISI in fomenting terrorism in Afghanistan but lack the “courage” to confront the Islamic Republic of Pakistan :

INTERVIEW - Pakistan spies stoke violence - Afghan advisor

Thu Oct 15, 2009 6:50pm IST

By William Maclean

LONDON (Reuters) - A Pakistani spy agency is helping anti-Western militants mount attacks including suicide bombings in Afghanistan, a reality the West lacks the resolve to confront, an advisor to the Afghan government said on Thursday.

Davood Moradian, senior policy advisor to Foreign Minister Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, told Reuters the motive of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency was to arouse Western concern for stability in neighbouring nuclear-armed Pakistan and use it to obtain financial support for Islamabad. ...............................

"We produced such proof in respect of the Indian embassy bombing in Kabul last year. There were telephone records of the ISI officers directing, and we shared that information with the intelligence community," Moradian said.

"The intelligence community in Washington and London agree (with the allegations) but they are not in a position to make policy," said Moradian, speaking on the sidelines of a seminar at Britain's International Institute for Strategic Studies.

"They have passed that (information) to their political masters to make decisions, but their political masters do not have that courage. When it comes to the ISI we do not see that bravery on the part of the international community." ...............................

Reuters

[surinder]

KV Rao, I didn't see the program. But, I totally concur with you. I had posted in BR many, many months ago about him along the same lines.

SS,
Can you tell me more about him & why you thought highly of him?
Thanks.

[kmkraoind]

French outcry over claim Italian payments masked Taliban threat

The French government came under pressure today to investigate allegations that a failure by Italy to disclose the full nature of the Italian strategy in Afghanistan inadvertently led to one of the deadliest attacks on France's army in decades.

Reports that Italian intelligence officers had been paying Taliban fighters not to attack their troops – and that France's ignorance of this tactic left it unaware of the true security risk in the Sarobi district of Afghanistan when it took over last summer – were dismissed as "rubbish" by Italy's defence minister. But the allegation sparked outrage in France.

Definitely a strain relationship between Atlantisists (Francogermanrusso versus Anglosaxans and their European allies)

[kmkraoind]

4 Americans die in Afghanistan blast

Is it TSPA retaliation?

[SwamyG]

Pak scuttles biased Indian influence. Completes 70 per cent projects plan in Afghanistan

Shah Hasan

Islamabad—Pakistan in a smart move has managed to reduce the biased influence of India among the people of war-ravaged country – Afghanistan, as Islamabad has completed the projects of paramount importance valuing $ 300 to $ 500 million.

In addition, Pakistan has also reduced the PIA fare to Rs 31500 from Rs 34000 apart from increasing the number of flights to Kabul to provide ease to Afghan people.{Now how does reducing airfares to-fro Afg help the aam abdul in Afg?}

The Islamabad administration will also provide ease to the Afghan students, who have completed their graduation in Pakistan {maadrasas?} in getting jobs in the faculties, which have been completed by Pakistan in various universities of Afghanistan.

This will offset the increasing influence of India in Afghanistan to a reasonable extent,” said Gen (Retd) Zubair, Member Monitoring in Planning Commission who recently visited Afghanistan to monitor the pace of the ongoing projects that Pakistan has initiated for the welfare of masses of Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s largest company—National Logistic Cell, which was assigned to complete the project of Allama Iqbal Faculty in Kabul University, has accomplished the project within the contracted value.

Likewise Pakistan is also constructing an Engineering faculty with Rs 1 billion cost in Engineering University at Mazar Sharif. The quality of the project was up to the mark. Even the Governor of Bulk province also praised the quality of the Pakistani work,” Zubair maintained. “The pace of the work is slow, but the quality is matchless.” { }

He said that owing to the poor logistic facilities and security risk in Mazar Sharif, the construction work has considerably slowed down.

To a question he said that Pakistan had initiated 29 projects in Afghanistan from its own funds{huh, where do these funds come from?}, out of which 9 projects have been completed and 4 projects got dropped.

We have also completed 50-bed hospital in Kugar province of Afghanistan which will cater to sizeable population of the area.” Pakistan’s ambassador Ahmad Sadiq is working tremendously to improve the image of Pakistan in Afghanistan. However, there is a dire need to construct small projects but of paramount importance, which are completed in short span of time such as the basic health units. “Such projects are easily visible and play pivotal role in improving the image of Pakistan among Afghan masses.”

Now Pakistan delegation comprising 4 to 5 officials will again leave for Afghanistan and visit Jalalabad to monitor more projects that Pakistan has initiated. “Though the progress on 97 kilometres Jalalabad-Torkhum road is very slow, yet the authorities concerned have decided to expedite the project to further increase the influence in Afghanistan that will really help erase the influence of India.”

[SSridhar]

US having second thoughts on Af-Pak strategy: US Expert
Excerpts

The U.S. government is having second thoughts about its “Af-Pak strategy,” says Rodney Jones, president of Policy International.

This strategy, promoted strongly in the early days of the Obama administration, essentially recognises that whatever is done to resolve issues successfully in Afghanistan can’t be done without working with Pakistan.

American objectives in Afghanistan have now been limited; rather than aiming for a thriving democracy and modern state, the U.S. just wants to curb the Al Qaeda and Taliban and ensure they do not regain their power, he said. “There is recognition that whatever is done in Afghanistan needs to respect public sentiment and have public support in the U.S.,” he said, admitting that such public support was dwindling for the counter-insurgency campaign.

In a discussion with The Hindu after the lecture, Dr.Jones said that India’s role in Afghanistan is focussed solely around its own advantages, rather than considering the needs of the local people. “India needs to think about its responsibilities, not only its advantages…if it wants to become a true global power,” he said. He also felt that if India wanted the U.S. to stop hyphenating it with Pakistan, New Delhi should not link all its concerns with its neighbour either.

[SSridhar]

Can you tell me more about him & why you thought highly of him?
Thanks.

I happened to see four interviews of him, one after Hotel Serena bombing, another after Indian Embassy attack (2008), the third after the assassination attempt of Karzai and the fourth a general one. In all these interviews, he was clear headed about terrorism, spoke with self assurance, was categorical about the sources of terror, had all the information including phone numbers of Haqqanis and ISI officers !

[SwamyG]

Here is a 2008 interview of him with Spiegel. clicky

[RayC]

Excerpt:

Poised on a seesaw

.............

Yet, too obvious involvement can be counter-productive. Zia ul-Haq gloated that Kunwar Natwar Singh’s advocacy for the exiled Zahir Shah was “the kiss of death” for a proposal to restore the exiled monarch as head of an all-party coalition. Without sharing Zia’s malice, Stanley A. McChrystal, commander of the America-led Western forces in Afghanistan, may have been stating the bald truth when he warned that India’s $1.5 billion programme of building schools, hospitals, roads and other civil infrastructure was “likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani counter-measures in Afghanistan or India”.

India’s imprint marked the Gandhara School and the Kushan Empire centuries before the imperial government in Calcutta was said to be “mervous” because Tsarist Russia had occupied Merv between Herat and Khiva. That was a move in the Great Game that Pakistan’s insecurities and ambitions have revived. But there’s a difference. Rudyard Kipling’s Great Game concerned external danger — Russia creeping towards the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and threatening British rule in cahoots with a hostile Persia. This time, the peril is a festering sore that must be lanced to save Afghanistan, India and — if only they knew it — Pakistan.

Blaming jihadi fundamentalism for every kind of violence is rather like Monaco cabling France at the end of World War II to send some communists as the principality would not otherwise qualify for Marshall Aid. Whatever contacts the brutal and fanatical Taliban later developed with Osama bin Laden, the indigenous movement grew out of the mujahideen created to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. That creation was as much the handiwork of the American Central Intelligence Agency as of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence department.

The reason for mentioning this is to advance the unfashionable view that there are more things in heaven and earth than were dreamt of in George W. Bush’s simplistic creed. A joint front against “terror” is nonsensical because the same bunch of criminals is not attacking India and Pakistan for the same reasons. Even an accommodating Pakistan (Pervez Musharraf’s government was one of only three to recognize the Taliban regime) can be under fire for any number of social, tribal, political, personal, factional and — yes — also religious rivalries. Pakistan’s civil and military authorities are engaged in a deadly contest.

If Pakistan sponsored the Mumbai and Kabul attacks, as all Indians and many Afghans believe, it was for the same reasons that have provoked three subcontinental wars. Shah Mahmood Qureshi’s outrage at India’s “level of engagement” and “large presence” in Afghanistan is born of the fear that Afghanistan might join Kashmir and Bangladesh as another gain for India and setback for Pakistan. Qureshi’s expectation of a monopoly over Afghanistan is not unexpected since Zia was cast in the role of saviour of freedom and democracy.

Despite their participation (under compulsion) in Operation Enduring Freedom, Pakistan’s rulers will gain a signal victory if McChrystal’s gloomy assessment — “the insurgents currently have the initiative” and “the overall situation is deteriorating” — comes true for whatever reason, including Barack Obama’s apparent reluctance to accede to McChrystal’s request for additional support in full. Not many Pakistanis will stop to consider the damage that the triumphant return to Kabul of the Taliban’s one-eyed emir, Mullah Muhammad Omar, would do in the long term to their country’s fragile stability and hope of nursing a liberal democracy. Instead, most would regard it as cause for jubilation, not only because official connivance has already Talibanized parts of Pakistan but because an Afghanistan without American strings would again be seen as providing strategic weightage against India.

On the other hand, a Taliban defeat would enable Asif Ali Zardari to boast that the American forces would not have won the war without Pakistan’s political support and physical facilities. Not only will Pakistan expect (and probably get) reimbursement of the $35 billion to $50 billion it claims to have spent on the so-called war on terror, but it will also demand as reward a say in Afghanistan’s future governance and restoration of the privileged position Pakistan has traditionally occupied in American policy-making in the subcontinent. As for the secretary of State’s certification of “reasonable progress” in “preventing al Qaida, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad from operating in the territory of Pakistan” for the Kerry-Lugar Act’s $7.5 billion grant, we know how readily successive American presidents ignored the evidence even of American agencies to certify year after year that Pakistan was not making the bomb.

If it looks like a “heads I win, tails you lose” situation for Pakistan, it is no less so for China, which backs Pakistan as part of its strategy of isolating and upstaging India. A Taliban defeat would reduce Afghanistan’s role as a base for moral and military support for secessionist Muslim Uighurs in Xingjian. A Taliban victory would compound India’s discomfiture though it would also enable jihadis worldwide to claim the scalps of both superpowers.

Geopolitics apart, China is eyeing the untapped deposits of copper, iron, gold, uranium and precious gems that comprise Afghanistan’s mineral wealth. A Chinese State-owned company is already active in the Aynak copper reserves, worth tens of billions of dollars, in Logar province south of Kabul. Moreover, China sees Afghanistan as a secure conduit for roads and energy pipelines to transport natural resources from the Indian Ocean and elsewhere. These can also be negotiated with a Taliban regime. Bill Clinton was initially well-disposed towards the Taliban, seeing it as a check on Iran (Ronald Reagan backed Saddam Hussein for the same reason), and the 12th largest American oil company, Unocal, began discussing a Central Asian oil pipeline with the Taliban. The State department blessed the negotiations until other geopolitical factors intervened.

So, while Pakistan and China can both look to some dividends no matter who wins, India must view with dismay any prospect other than the Taliban’s total liquidation. For, with the Taliban controlling Afghanistan and militant Islam stretching deep into central Asia, Pakistan would feel emboldened to make more bids to get its own back not only for Kashmir and Bangladesh but also for a long string of grievances against India including water sharing, division of military assets, Junagadh, Hyderabad and just the fact that India is bigger, richer and more powerful. The consequent disruption of India’s communal harmony and diversion of resources from the economy would not displease China.

No wonder India is Afghanistan’s fifth largest donor country. No wonder, too, that Pakistan resents this interaction and is pressuring the United States of America to end it. But the Afghans welcome Indian help, especially installations like the 202-kilometre electrical transmission line to Kabul and the 218-km highway to the Persian Gulf port of Chahbahar which broke Pakistan’s monopoly on Afghanistan’s access to the outside world. But goodwill is not enough. Afghanistan needs political stability and the military capability to defend it. India, the world’s largest democracy with one of the world’s biggest (1.35 million) militaries, is better equipped than any other regional country to help in both respects. Sending fighting troops would deplete India’s defence, incite domestic controversy and invite international complications. But the Indian Military Training Team in Bhutan has offered an example of unobtrusive effectiveness for about 50 years.

It is essential for India’s future to rescue Afghanistan from the uncertainties of the battle between Ram and Ravana. Ironically, and in the long term, that would also benefit Pakistan.
[email protected]
Seesaw

[pgbhat]

Here is a 2008 interview of him with Spiegel. clicky

His interview on Al Jazeera is epic though. ..... last year after Indian Embassy bombings.

[Paul]

If it looks like a “heads I win, tails you lose” situation for Pakistan, it is no less so for China, which backs Pakistan as part of its strategy of isolating and upstaging India. A Taliban defeat would reduce Afghanistan’s role as a base for moral and military support for secessionist Muslim Uighurs in Xingjian. A Taliban victory would compound India’s discomfiture though it would also enable jihadis worldwide to claim the scalps of both superpowers

A very shallow arguement.

Completely ignores the ethnic conflict which will intensify between Pakjabis and Pakhtuns should the Taliban be victorious. The Taliban will have to consolidate their hold on Pakjab before they even think of turning their Kalashnikovs on India.

The Taliban simply cannot lose.....it is always the hardline version of Islam which holds the upper ground and comes out on top.

[RayC]

If it looks like a “heads I win, tails you lose” situation for Pakistan, it is no less so for China, which backs Pakistan as part of its strategy of isolating and upstaging India. A Taliban defeat would reduce Afghanistan’s role as a base for moral and military support for secessionist Muslim Uighurs in Xingjian. A Taliban victory would compound India’s discomfiture though it would also enable jihadis worldwide to claim the scalps of both superpowers

A very shallow arguement.

Completely ignores the ethnic conflict which will intensify between Pakjabis and Pakhtuns should the Taliban be victorious. The Taliban will have to consolidate their hold on Pakjab before they even think of turning their Kalashnikovs on India.

The Taliban simply cannot lose.....it is always the hardline version of Islam which holds the upper ground and comes out on top.

How is it shallow argument?

1. A Taliban defeat would reduce Afghanistan’s role as a base for moral and military support for secessionist Muslim Uighurs in Xingjian. Is that incorrect?
2. A Taliban victory would compound India’s discomfiture though it would also enable jihadis worldwide to claim the scalps of both superpowers.
A Taliban defeat is a win win for Pakistan. They will claim that their ‘help’ destroyed the ‘base’ of the Taliban activities (which the US claims it does) and Pakistan will claim their ‘pound of flesh’. And surely that would not be to India’s interest since it would mean bolstering Pakistan financially and militarily.

A Taliban win will mean Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s grip. Hardly encouraging for India!

What is the input that suggests that in a situation where the Taliban is paramount, they will contest the Pakistani Punjabis?

[Paul]

The argument implies Taliban will follow orders from Rawalpindi after coming to power in Kabul. False argument.

Taliban victory in Kabul has profound implications for the entire region between Amu Darya and Indus. The reconquesta this time is not going to be a rerun of the pre 9/11 period when Taliban was on the rampage in Mazar(north), Herat (west) , Panjshir valley (NE) parts of Afghania. Afghanistan of Durrani’s creation will fracture along ethnic lines.
The Tajiks, Uzbegs, Hazaras, and the Persians will gird their loins under the leadership of their warlords. Dostam has the backing of the Russians and Turks. The Tajik alliance under Gen Fahim has consolidated it’s hold on the Afghan national army. Iran will not sit quietly watching their ideological rivals take control of regions adjoining Iran and will activate their Hazara allies.

These regions will break away from Kabul’s control leaving leaving the Taliban in control of a thin strip of land along Pakistan and Southern Afghanistan which is the Pakhtun heartland.

So will Taliban take them on again? I think not.

Pakistan represents a softer target . The Taliban already have access to their TTP allies(attacks on Pak army HQ was by Punjabi Taliban ) , there is considerable sympathy amongst the middle classes and the possibility that they will get Pakistan the fabled vale of Kashmir (which their Pakjabi army has been rying for for the past 60+ years) and will do the utmost to ensure they come to power. Sarkari Mullahs like Fazzlur Rehman, Qazi etc. who do the army’s bidding will have to come around or they will be replaced.

The implications point to a tectonic shift in Pakistan’s power set up. The Pakjabi elite who consolidated their hold on power with AYub’s defeat of the Mohajir candidate Fatima Jinnah will have to make way for the Pakhtun mullacracy. The Pakhtun mullah will appoint the Punjabi taliban as the mansabdar for Lahore....what wil the Paki RAPE do then?

The Taliban will have to settle this question first before they turn their guns on India. Please read the Pakhun civil
ar thread for details.

Hope it makes sense…..this has been discussed to death in this forum.

My post on October 23rd, 2008 and Khaled Ahmed’s article in TFT.

Based on Khaled Ahmed's latest article in TFT, I am thinking that the formation a pushtun state with it's eastern borders on banks of the Indus river is a certainty...only question is who will control this state, The Ghilzais(Taliban) or the Saddozais branch (nominally headed by Karzai). This will happen irrespective of whther the west stays or leaves Afghanistan. The western parts of Afghanistan will also change as in the rump NA controlling the Tajik territories, DOstam in charge of Mazar Sharif, and Iran or post-Iran influence over Herat.

This will happen for sure... within +/- 10 years for sure.

:
Khaled Ahmed
The united Pakhtun 'nation' in control of the south of Afghanistan will be even less willing to recognise the Durand Line as a frontier between the two countries. And it will draw the new line along the Indus River at Attock

Adjust Font Size The Friday Times The Friday Times




An Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier keeps watch at a checkpoint in the Arghandab District of Kandahar on June 18, 2008. Afghan and NATO troops backed by helicopter gunships have launched a massive “clean-up” operation to drive Taliban militants from villages near Kandahar – AFP

On June 13, 2008, the Taliban did something that shook the confidence the NATO-ISAF forces in Afghanistan had developed over a period they characterised as one of reversal for the Al Qaeda-Taliban invaders. They attacked the Sarposa prison in Kandahar and sprang the entire population of the main prison, forcing the Afghan government to believe the rumour that the Taliban may be about to take Kandahar and mount a serious challenge to the Afghan government in the south.

The Taliban had used a combination of suicide-bombers, many of them Pakistanis, and heavily armed fighters, many of them Arabs, that blasted the mud walls of the prison open and sent more than a thousand inmates scurrying into the countryside. There was a fleet of mini-buses outside with their engines running ‘to collect the 450 Taliban militants housed in the jail’. This was heart-breaking for Kabul and the NATO commanders: they had thought that since the Taliban had not attacked much after the summer snowmelt, they must be in retreat.

That is when President Karzai lost his cool and delivered the famous threat of June 15, 2008. He said Afghanistan would target locations inside Pakistan to end terrorist infiltration into Afghanistan. Karzai certainly lowered the bar on negative exchanges and said something serious, but he specifically named warlords Baitullah Mehsud, Maulvi Umar and Maulana Fazlullah, for whom he will “send troops across the border”. He also specified that their houses would be targeted, which implied the use of air power too.

Suddenly the enemy is across the border. A TV anchor queried the Afghan ambassador in Islamabad on when the Afghan government would start getting the Americans out of Afghanistan since the Americans tended to destabilise any region they enter. But what about the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) inviting Islamabad to make peace with the ‘emirate’ of Baitullah Mehsud and his Al Qaeda masters on their terms?

Islamabad has a stance towards Afghanistan based on legal jurisprudence. Pakistan accepted the 2001 Resolution 1373 of the UN Security Council and thus the NATO-ISAF presence there. If it has problems with these forces, there is a mechanism of regular consultation provided by the UN.

Now contrast the enemy in Afghanistan with the enemy in South Waziristan which has annexed territory in the Tribal Areas and invades the settled areas of the NWFP to impose its writ there too. There is no mechanism of resolution of disputes with the ‘emirate’ and all the talking is done through raids and through suicide-bombings from Peshawar to Karachi. This ‘talking’ tames the politicians and TV anchors alike and makes them act hostile towards the American presence in Afghanistan, and terms any counter-measure to the terrorism of the ‘emirate’ as war ‘against our own people’.

The usual stereotypes are being deployed: the continuing disorder in Afghanistan, the lopsided representation of different ethnicities in its democratic system, the failure of the NATO-ISAF forces to provide security to the population, and the “puppet” nature of the presidency whose incumbent doesn’t feel secure a few miles outside Kabul. Add to that the ‘theorising’ about the advance into Afghanistan of the United States to secure the supply of strategic oil and gas resources of Central Asia, and you have the sum total of what Pakistanis have to say about the current political order in Afghanistan. The man who used to fling accusations from our side, President Musharraf, is about to bite the dust, but President Karzai is still there. The question very soon will be which state is more chaotic?

General Dan K McNeill, who left Afghanistan after 16 months of commanding the NATO-ISAF forces in Afghanistan, has said in Washington that raids into Afghanistan arose by 50 percent in April, and the reason was lack of ‘a more robust military campaign against insurgents in Pakistan’. He pointed to collusion between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani tribals and even indirectly explained the recent killing of Pakistani border guards together with the Taliban raiders by criticising a US-funded programme to train and equip Pakistan’s Frontier Corps (FC), and questioning ‘the effectiveness and loyalty of the tribally recruited guards’.

While Pakistan was busy witnessing the mammoth Long March in Islamabad on June 14, 2008, the Taliban had broken free of all peace deals and attacked half a dozen checkposts in the Tribal Areas, bombing the paramilitary forces there. Attacks on music shops, cell-phone shops and girls’ schools continued in the settled areas on which there was an agreement of truce with the NWFP government. Making clear who the Taliban were after, they even tried unsuccessfully to kidnap the son of Mr Amir Muqam, a prominent member of the PMLQ in the NWFP. So unsure is the provincial government of the capacity of the federal government to defend the country against the Taliban that when the federal government tried to wriggle out of the peace deals, the NWFP government refused to go along.

The problem is that Pakistan is finding it politically difficult to face the enemy in the Tribal Areas. The political parties now in government had rejected the policy of confrontation adopted by President Musharraf and cannot own it after coming to power. President Musharraf’s policy of facing up to the Taliban in Pakistan also lacked conviction because he sought repeatedly to strike the emotional chord among the Pakhtun of Pakistan by criticising how the Americans had botched another operation after Iraq in Afghanistan.

So flimsy was the resolve behind taking on Baitullah Mehsud after declaring that he had killed Ms Bhutto, that the caretaker government under Musharraf actually declared, through its interior minister General (Retd) Hamid Nawaz, that the attacks inside Pakistan, including suicide-bombings, were being organised by the United States!

Pakistan is faced with two enemies. The one in the Tribal Areas it is in the process of disowning as an enemy inside its own territory. It feels more comfortable having just one enemy across the border in Afghanistan. That harmonises with the prevailing emotion of the people. This strategy is that of subterfuge. If it was clever, one would support it even at the risk of accepting something immoral. It is a subterfuge that is going to harm Pakistan, and that may be sooner rather than later.

Islamabad will have to decide to deal with the ‘emirate’ of the warlords in South Waziristan whether it likes it or not. The TV anchor who asked the Afghan ambassador to get rid of the Americans from Afghanistan had not weighed the post-exit situation in Afghanistan and how it would benefit Pakistan.

Let us assume that the NATO forces leave Pakistan. (The non-Americans always wanted to leave till the French changed tack under President Sarkozy.) That will be followed by the flight of Karzai to possibly India and the retreat of the Northern Alliance to the North, to lick its wounds in what is considered the area of influence of Uzbekistan, backed by Turkey among others. The Taliban will form the next government and this time the effects of what happens in Kabul will be palpable inside Pakistan.

It will be found to the shock of all Punjabi patriots of PPP and PMLN that this united Pakhtun ‘nation’ in control of the south of Afghanistan is even less willing to recognise the Durand Line as a frontier between the two countries. And it will draw the new line along the Indus River at Attock.

[Paul]

If Talibs lose (cannot happen), Pakistan haters Karzai/NA stay in power, strategic depth denied to Pakistan. Afghania become a multi ethnic stable state.

It Talibs win, the new Amirate will tear Pakistan to pieces.

So again.....Heads I win, tails you lose. Applies to who?

[RayC]

The argument implies Taliban will follow orders from Rawalpindi after coming to power in Kabul. False argument.

What was it in the Mujahideen days?

Took orders from Allah?

[arun]

:

$400 per gallon gas to drive debate over cost of war in Afghanistan

By Roxana Tiron - 10/15/09 08:34 PM ET

The Pentagon pays an average of $400 to put a gallon of fuel into a combat vehicle or aircraft in Afghanistan. ............

The Hill

[harbans]

INDIANS are flocking to join the British Army to fight the Taliban.

They are entitled to sign up, as nationals of the Commonwealth.

Army sources say there has been a surge recently because of the threat of a Taliban victory in Afghanistan, which would have serious consequences for India’s Muslim neighbour, Pakistan.

Sharat S. Mulchandi, 18, from Karnataka, is undergoing army cadet training at home and plans to join a British infantry regiment when he flies into the UK.

http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/134 ... he-Taliban

[AjitK]

UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission(ECC)expected to cut Karzai’s lead to 47%

Western officials are putting pressure on Mr Karzai to form a coalition government with Dr Abdullah. “The maths is incontrovertible,” a British official said. “Karzai has got below 50 per cent, necessitating a second round. The only way he could win outright is through political interference.”

There is little support for a second round among Afghans and although some analysts believe that it is the only way to bring credibility, others insist that it would be worse than the first, with apathy, insecurity and snow keeping people away.

“Why would it be any different?” said an American election observer who took a dim view of Karzai, Abdullah and the ECC. “I think come Sunday we’re going to get an announcement of a second ballot. But before that happens we’ll get a deal between the two candidates that will satisfy one of them enough to pull out.”

Four low-ranking election officials were dismissed for their involvement in the fraud but the UN said that more than half of almost 380 district election chiefs were being replaced in preparations for a second round.

[chanakyaa]

INDIANS are flocking to join the British Army to fight the Taliban.

They are entitled to sign up, as nationals of the Commonwealth.

Army sources say there has been a surge recently because of the threat of a Taliban victory in Afghanistan, which would have serious consequences for India’s Muslim neighbour, Pakistan.

Sharat S. Mulchandi, 18, from Karnataka, is undergoing army cadet training at home and plans to join a British infantry regiment when he flies into the UK.

http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/134 ... he-Taliban

British Raj all over again, but this time with outsourcing of her war. I'm sure many people like Mr. Mulchandi are lured by possible fast track U.K. residence upon completing services for her Majesty. On a side note.

Iraq and Afg. wars have a higher percentage of outsourcing in it (a trend anticipated to accelerate in the future wars). By outsourcing, I mean not delegating responsibilities to other countries but actually hiring foreign citizens to work for british and yankee troops. Can't remember the name of the nation, but one of the African nations banned its citizens from joining yankee brigades in Iraq. As western countries see strong opposition from its citizens against sending their sons and daughters in harm's way, the outsourcing of soldier's duties are gaining momentum. Question is should GoI allow her citizen to participate?

[SSridhar]

A Variety of Sources Feed into Taliban's War Chest - NY Times

[Gagan]

Does this mean a re-election between the two main contenders?
Nearly a third of Afghan president's votes voided

KABUL – U.N.-backed fraud investigators on Monday threw out nearly a third of President Hamid Karzai's ballots from Afghanistan's disputed August election, setting the stage for a runoff.

The rulings dropped Karzai's votes to 48 percent of the total, below the 50 percent threshold needed for him to avoid a runoff with his top challenger, according to calculations by independent election monitors.

It was unclear, however, whether the Afghan-led Independent Election Commission would accept the findings of the fraud panel and announce a runoff.

...

That could mean a further delay in forming a new government that the U.S. believes is needed to help combat the growing Taliban insurgency. A protracted crisis could also lead to political unrest.

...

An independent calculation by an election monitoring group, Democracy International, showed Karzai with 48.3 percent, or about 2.1 million votes, after more than 995,000 of his votes were thrown out for fraud.

Overall, about 1.3 million votes of the more than 5 million ballots cast were voided. Abdullah lost more than 201,000 votes, but his percentage rose to 31.5 percent from 27.8 percent previously.

Preliminary results released last month showed Karzai winning the Aug. 20 election with more than 54 percent. However, allegations of voter coercion and ballot box-stuffing prompted the fraud investigation and held up a final proclamation of a winner.

...

Afghan law declares the U.N.-backed panel the final arbiter on fraud allegations. However, Karzai supporters on the election commission have argued that the partial recount is beyond the normal complaint process and that they must have a say in whether the findings are accepted.

Grant Kippen, chairman of the Electoral Complaints Commission, said he did not see any legal way for the IEC to reject the results.

...

[Rudradev]

The argument implies Taliban will follow orders from Rawalpindi after coming to power in Kabul. False argument.

Taliban victory in Kabul has profound implications for the entire region between Amu Darya and Indus. The reconquesta this time is not going to be a rerun of the pre 9/11 period when Taliban was on the rampage in Mazar(north), Herat (west) , Panjshir valley (NE) parts of Afghania. Afghanistan of Durrani’s creation will fracture along ethnic lines.
The Tajiks, Uzbegs, Hazaras, and the Persians will gird their loins under the leadership of their warlords. Dostam has the backing of the Russians and Turks. The Tajik alliance under Gen Fahim has consolidated it’s hold on the Afghan national army. Iran will not sit quietly watching their ideological rivals take control of regions adjoining Iran and will activate their Hazara allies.

These regions will break away from Kabul’s control leaving leaving the Taliban in control of a thin strip of land along Pakistan and Southern Afghanistan which is the Pakhtun heartland.

So will Taliban take them on again? I think not.

Pakistan represents a softer target . The Taliban already have access to their TTP allies(attacks on Pak army HQ was by Punjabi Taliban ) , there is considerable sympathy amongst the middle classes and the possibility that they will get Pakistan the fabled vale of Kashmir (which their Pakjabi army has been rying for for the past 60+ years) and will do the utmost to ensure they come to power. Sarkari Mullahs like Fazzlur Rehman, Qazi etc. who do the army’s bidding will have to come around or they will be replaced.

I tend to agree with Paul here.

Many times I've asked myself... why did the Taliban (having gained control of most of Afghanistan with Pakistani help and US backing in 1996)... do something as apparently suicidal as inviting OBL to Kabul and allowing him to plan a global jihad that culminated in 9-11?

And even more weird... why did the Pakis not only allow the Taliban-IIF cooperation to scale such heights, but even get involved in financing the 9-11 terror attacks? Didn't they realize that the Americans were going to be furious?

Now it becomes clear why. The TSPA/ISI had no choice.

The TSPA/ISI had released the Taliban Djinn from the bottle of its Madrassas, and unleashed it against Afghanistan. Once the Taliban had dominated almost the entirety of Afghanistan, which they had by the late '90s, the TSPA/ISI had two very stark choices:

1) Encourage the Taliban to "broaden the horizons of their jihad", making common cause with Bin Laden's IIF in a war against the West, or

2) Expect the Taliban to fall upon Pakistan, perhaps with the active cooperation of Islampasand TSPA/ISI officers like Hamid Gul, Mohammed Aziz etc., and forcibly replace the Pakjabi order with a jihad-brained, Pashtun-muscled new Islamic order.

It was one or the other. The TSPA/ISI realized that Kashmir (another valve to send off jihadis) was not going to be easily won despite a whole decade of infiltrating "invincible" jihadis over there. Kargil was the ultimate proof of this... and attempting more stunts like that was going to get Pakistan nuked for sure. That closed the Kashmir option.

So Islamabad's choice was either to go all-out against the West in cahoots with OBL, or resign themselves to a Pashtun domination of Pakjab. The TSPA/ISI being mostly Pakjabis, the latter option was out of the question.

And that's why 9-11 happened.

Today, if the Taliban... good bad or ugly... seize power in Kabul again, either by defeating NATO/US or by being "accommodated" per British and Saudi designs, Pakistan is immediately in the same state of peril as it was in the late '90s. That is exactly what will happen if Joe Biden or James Jones have their way, and the Americans pull-out in favour of a limited predator-war against the phantom punching-bag "Al-Qaeda in Pakistan".

The Taliban, vengeful for the double-crossing they received from the TSPA/ISI over the past decade, will almost certainly descend on Pakistan in force. And in their attack, they will be successful, as the harder-line Islamists always are against the "en-mo" Islamists.

The ONLY thing the TSPA/ISI can do to save themselves is to channel the rage of the Taliban once again into a joint project of Global Jihad, as it did between 1996-2001. But this time the West is wise to the plan, and with the huge intelligence presence that the CIA is building up in Pakistan even now, a repeat of the circumstances that led to 9-11 will no longer be tenable. TSPA/ISI will not, this time, be able to co-opt the Taliban into any jihad that targets the West or its interests.

So the new Global Jihad that the TSPA/ISI incorporate the Taliban into, will be against Iran (witness the Jundullah attack already laying the groundwork for this), Russia (expect a re-heating of the Caucasus), and of course against India in Kashmir. All these are targets that the West is perfectly happy with, and the West will cooperate with TSPA/ISI in order to channel the Taliban against them. China will go along in exchange for assurances that Uighur jihad will not be one of the officially-approved Jihads that the victorious Taliban is allowed to wage.

That is why the Pakis are doing everything they can right now, to get the US to pressure India to make concessions on Kashmir. They want us to withdraw from Siachen, pull out of J&K, engage in discussions about "political solutions/joint control" that are *not linked to terrorism*, recognize that terrorism is the work of "non-state actors" etc. etc. All these concessions, if the GOI makes them, will only serve to denude our COIN capability in Kashmir... making it much easier for the Taliban to be channeled into J&K now as compared to the '90s.

That is also why it's in the West's interest to keep the Kashmir question open, and festering, no matter how hostile US-Pakistan relations get. The West will not support a resolution of Kashmir in India's favour no matter what. That's because the Americans, too, see Kashmir as the safety-valve for these Taliban Pashtuns, once they seize power in Kabul, to be diverted away from resuming their anti-Western jihad of 1996-2001.

[Sridhar]

Does this mean a re-election between the two main contenders?

Yes, as per the law. However, there is a parallel attempt underway to come up with a political solution so that Karzai is President and Abdullah is accommodated in some other role and with control over the administration (or what there is of it) and other sops. Not clear if either party will accept the arrangement. Holding another election is a nightmare scenario for the coalition.

[KLNMurthy]

If it looks like a “heads I win, tails you lose” situation for Pakistan, it is no less so for China, which backs Pakistan as part of its strategy of isolating and upstaging India. A Taliban defeat would reduce Afghanistan’s role as a base for moral and military support for secessionist Muslim Uighurs in Xingjian. A Taliban victory would compound India’s discomfiture though it would also enable jihadis worldwide to claim the scalps of both superpowers

A very shallow arguement.

Completely ignores the ethnic conflict which will intensify between Pakjabis and Pakhtuns should the Taliban be victorious. The Taliban will have to consolidate their hold on Pakjab before they even think of turning their Kalashnikovs on India.

The Taliban simply cannot lose.....it is always the hardline version of Islam which holds the upper ground and comes out on top.

Seems like the main point of the article is to argue for a more proactive military policy by India in the shape of intensified military training imparted to the Afghan army. Interestingly, Gen. (retd) Shankar Roychoudhary also advocated something similar in another article (sorry I don't have the link to hand).

A stable and increasingly stronger Afghan govt. with a strong Tajik component is probably India's best bet.

[Paul]

A stable and increasingly stronger Afghan govt. with a strong Tajik component is probably India's best bet.

The statement is contradictory. A strong Afghanistan with a Tajik population on the top will be unacceptable to the Pakhtuns. OTOH, the Tajiks will never accept the old arrangement with Pakhtuns in power in Kabul. The Afghanistan created by Ahmed Shah Durrani will fracture permanently as soon as NATO scoots, never to become a state again. If you think some more, even the old Afghania stayed as one country due to British intrigue as a outer buffer state for British India (tacit russian acceptance).

So most likely, the state will split leaving the Ghilzai in control of the rump state with secure control of Southern Afghanistan and tentative control of Kabul’s adjoining areas.

Wrt to Rudradev’s point on AQ, they need a global base to carry on their operations…rather than expend their energies battering the NA in Panjshir or raping Hazara women, they will turn their attention to Pakistan. With access to well developed seaports and international airports it is far more suitable to carry on the global Jihad from there.

[KLNMurthy]

A stable and increasingly stronger Afghan govt. with a strong Tajik component is probably India's best bet.

The statement is contradictory. A strong Afghanistan with a Tajik population on the top will be unacceptable to the Pakhtuns. OTOH, the Tajiks will never accept the old arrangement with Pakhtuns in power in Kabul. The Afghanistan created by Ahmed Shah Durrani will fracture permanently as soon as NATO scoots, never to become a state again. If you think some more, even the old Afghania stayed as one country due to British intrigue as a outer buffer state for British India (tacit russian acceptance).

So most likely, the state will split leaving the Ghilzai in control of the rump state with secure control of Southern Afghanistan and tentative control of Kabul’s adjoining areas.

Wrt to Rudradev’s point on AQ, they need a global base to carry on their operations…rather than expend their energies battering the NA in Panjshir or raping Hazara women, they will turn their attention to Pakistan. With access to well developed seaports and international airports it is far more suitable to carry on the global Jihad from there.

Well, perhaps. But under Zahir Shah, and at various times before that, there was some sort of uneasy coexistence between Pakhtuns and Tajiks under the same banner. What is clear is that Afghanistan will have to make a kind of social progress as well, in the sense that the various groups have to find a way to live together. Other than the Taliban (and maybe not even them) Pakistan is not too well-liked or respected in afghanistan. Protection from a common enemy is a good motivation to learn to live together. Again, other than the Taliban, opposition to US presence itself has been relatively muted in Afghanistan, perhaps because they understand that the ISAF stands between them and Paki occupation. There is now talk of a Karzai-Abdullah coalition govt. in Kabul. None of these things were possible under either the Soviets or under the Pakiban.

My point is to try and define a 'best-case' scenario for India to succeed in afghanistan. If there other 'better-case' scenarios than the major Afghan ethnic groups learning to live together and share power, we could perhaps discuss those. The scenario of Taliban winning and then taking over Pakistan is not a good one for India, since we know that essentially represents the jihadi destiny of Pakistan united with Afghanistan.

India is spending a lot of money and human resources in Afghanistan; Nirupama Rao is on record as saying that India wants a pluralistic democratic Afghanistan. On the face of it, India's strategic goal in Afghanistan seems to be to promote that outcome. It has a high probability of not succeeding, but India has silent allies in Iran, Russia and the CARs in pursuing this goal. For once, at least we have some apparent strategic intent that is also consistent with our civilizational values.

[Pranav]

Taliban's Afghan allies tell Barack Obama: 'Cut us a deal and we'll ditch al-Qaeda' : http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... Qaeda.html

Apparently a deal is being sought with Mullah Mutawakkil. Wasn't he involved with the Indian Airlines hijack?

[Malayappan]

But under Zahir Shah, and at various times before that, there was some sort of uneasy coexistence between Pakhtuns and Tajiks under the same banner.

True, but that world is probably lost for good. The institutions that facilitated inter-tribal dialogue are all lost now. Either one totally submits to the Taliban / Salafists or one doesn’t. And it is difficult to see how the non Pashtun tribes (NA) will submit. Temporary truce is possible but a long term national reconciliation can be ruled out as a working assumption.

India's strategic goal in Afghanistan seems to be to promote that outcome. It has a high probability of not succeeding, but India has silent allies in Iran, Russia and the CARs in pursuing this goal.

Important among the points you make, but in reality India will have little choice in these issues. Eventually Pakistan will be run over by this force and we will lose it as a buffer state. From Amritsar to Jamnagar we will need to review defence arrangements, not to speak of defending Kashmir.

A lot of statecraft will be required on our side - Obama will quit Afghanistan as soon as it is politically convenient for him!

[Malayappan]

they need a global base to carry on their operations…rather than expend their energies battering the NA in Panjshir or raping Hazara women, they will turn their attention to Pakistan. With access to well developed seaports and international airports it is far more suitable to carry on the global Jihad from there.

Destabilisation of Pakistan and occupying it, converting it into a Caliphate makes eminent sense for Al Qaeda/ OBL / Wahabis. The actual payoffs are better than Somalia, Yemen or Sudan. KSA will be a better prize but a little too difficult in the immediate.

[SSridhar]

Karzai said to accept Run-off after election audit

It would be difficult to hold a new election quickly, as the Afghan winter approaches, and delaying the selection of a new government until the spring could allow the Taliban to make further gains across the country.

The bolded part is ridiculous. Whomsoever comes to power (except the Taliban) will not be able to govern large sections of the country. Democracy is not what Afghanistan wants. No one sees peace in the region for a long time to come. One of the precursors for peace and stability in large areas of Afghanistan would be the dismembering of Pakistan and defanging of the TSPA. As long as Pakistan exists in its current form, the US cannot resist its temptation of somehow 'working with them' by bribing them or arming them, both of which go against the interests of Afghanistan & India. The US has a fatal attraction for TSP. Then, the stakeholders such as the US, India, China, Russia, Iran etc. will have to come together to help Afghanistan stand up on its feet. Anything else is unworkable.

[SSridhar]

Afghan Election Commission orders run-off

Afghanistan’s election commission has ordered a runoff election for Nov. 7. . .Mr. Karzai accepted the fraud panel finding in a press conference and endorsed a runoff election.

[Dilbu]

US thumbs-up for Indian work in Afghanistan

WASHINGTON: The Obama administration has given a thumbs-up to India's developmental work in Afghanistan, rejecting Islamabad’s complaints that New Delhi's activities there are detrimental to Pakistan’s security.

"I don't see how helping Afghanistan develop its economy and its infrastructure could be seen as a security threat to any other country in the region," State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said on Monday when asked about Pakistan’s persistent protests on the matter.
"On the contrary, a stable and more prosperous Afghanistan is only going to contribute to regional stability," Kelly added, as Washington continued its efforts to address Pakistani fears on the issue that some experts say prevents Islamabad from fully disengaging from terrorist proxies such as Taliban and other militant elements it uses to counter India.

India has invested nearly $1.5 billion in developmental and infrastructure works in Afghanistan, including building roads, hospitals, schools, and the Afghan Parliament building. The effort, which is widely seen as a sharp contrast to Pakistan’s export to that country of Taliban and terrorism, has drawn universal praise. But Pakistan sees it as a pernicious Indian attempt to outflank it and counter its effort to gain strategic depth against India.

[Paul]

"Kabul under Taliban" is a ploy to scare India to align with western (anglo-saxon) interests.

Even if they come to power again, it cannot get any worse than the 89-98 period when tens of thousands of Afghan Mujahideen to put to work to take on Indian security forces in J&K. India has seen the worst and come out on top through the grit of the establishment. All the different arms of the govt, MEA, MHA, army, police, civil society etc. came together to wardoff the threat to India.

EVery whiskey swilling Paki diplomat, polictician or General has said time and again, even if Iran nukes them...they will target India. How can the Taliban be more threatening to India than this current dispensation. This is why articles by DIEs like Sunanda Ray have no credibility. The establishment knows this.

If we can do business with Mush, why not Mullah Omar or Jalaluddin Haqqani.

As far as India is concerned, the Pakistan army is the same or worse than the Taliban.....it will take time but soon the west will have to come around to this point of view.

[Rudradev]

For that matter, even when the Taliban acted as India's enemies during the one direct altercation we had with them... the Kandahar hijacking... they acted as enemies with some measure of izzat. They were of course on Pakistan's side in abetting the terrorist hijackers, but after the hostage deal was brokered they ensured that the passengers were unharmed and picked up safely.

Compare this with the "izzat" shown by Punjabi tanzeems sponsored by ISI... Nov.26 and Kaluchak being just two examples where the deliberate mass-murder of Indian civilians, men women and children, was the *objective* in itself. People like Ajmal Kasab might very well have taken Jaswant Singh's Mithai, accepted the release of Masood Azhar and then killed all the hostages anyway.

Not that I am any fan of the Taliban... I'd like to see them nuked... but compared with the TSPA/ISI they are at least one shade better to do business with IMHO.