Deterrence

amit · Post by **amit** » 20 Oct 2009 07:43

Manish_Sharma wrote:India set a target of producing 10000MW Bijlee by 2000, in '95 MMS cuts the planned budget by whopping 7 times. So target is reduced to 3200MW by 2004. Now the same MMS as PM is even ready to risk his govt. for the sake of nuclear electricity generation. He wants to make nuke generated power the high point of his achievment as PM?

First of all this is seriously OT on the Deterrence thread. Second this has been debated to death in the Nuclear deal threads and so I suggest you trawl the archives.

However, to give a brief answer to you questions, you make is sound that every decision is taken in vacuum. Do you remember the economic and geopolitical conditions in 1995? If you do, do you think they are the same as that in 2004? I think you need to think of this point before drawing a direct correlation between actions of the FM in 1995 with the actions of the PM (same person) in 2004.

Besides, if assuming MMS was grievously wrong in 1995 are you trying to say that he was also wrong in 2004 in pursuing the nuclear deal? Because if you are then I don't get it. If he was wrong in 1995, he must be right in 2004. However, if you are saying he was wrong in 2004 he must have been right in 1995. You can't have it both ways.

And I see you've made a slight change in your POV in the two responses. First was MMS was/is interested in spending billions on American reactors. Now it's that he staked his govt on the nuclear deal. You got to clarify what bugs you, buying American reactors or the India-US nuclear deal.

We can discuss in the nuclear thread if you so wish.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 20 Oct 2009 07:47

shiv wrote:
Semantic hairsplitting made on a non serious reply. My reply has the word "when". The words "whether" and "how" do not feature anywhere in my reply.

Hair splitting or not, this difference in how I see it represents the basis for my differing view from you on these issues.

Are the Americans and Russians planning on fighting a nuclear war? The original statement makes that assertion. Do you have a take on the original assertion?

The assertion that the Americans and Russians are planning to fight a nuclear war is a different take on the subject. Planning to fight a nuclear war is totally different from planning not to fight a nuclear war which is different from not planning to fight a nuclear war

There is another view. They were planning to fight a nuclear war but trying to avoid war - which is what it was then.

In simpler terms, if there is a war, it will be a nuclear war. The question is not on whether it will be a nuclear war or not. The question was on whether there will be a war or not.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 20 Oct 2009 07:56

self deleted as redundant

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 20 Oct 2009 08:21

OK ravi - after re reading I have managed to figure out what you were saying.

You are saying that the US and "Russia" (sic) were not planning to start a war being certain that if war started it would be nuclear.

First I would hesitate in using the names US _and_ USSR/Russia together as if their intentions and plans were exactly the same. We know far faar more about US intentions than Russian plans. The latter were opaque and the former were either stated openly or revealed at a later date. What we speak of as "The USSR's plans" are often a US take on the issue - and we have little inside knowledge to rebut or support the US take on Soviet intentions.

For this reason let me stick to how the US behaved. I will now type from memory and am willing to be corrected if I have got my facts mixed up with fiction.

It is not true that the US did not want to start war because it would inevitably turn nuclear. The powers that be in the US were initially convinced that a nuclear war was winnable. In fact the massive increase in the number of warheads the US built was based on a plan to destroy every single warhead that the USSR built. The USSR responded to this with matching proliferation (and after having trailed the US for years - the USSR eventually overtook the US in number of warheads)

Somewhere along the way some US president asked his advisers if a first strike on the Soviet Union would guarantee that the USSR would not be able to retaliate against the US with a nuke. Nobody could give such a guarantee.

From this was born the doctrine of deterrence from the promise of MAD. It followed the realization that a nuclear war between the US and USSR could not be declared "won" if the US had to absorb a nuclear strike in return. I don't know what deterred the USSR but the US has consistently been deterred by the thought of even one nuclear strike on the US. I happen to think that this thought process of the US is very very civilized and reflects the respect the US has for its own people. But that is a different issue.

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 20 Oct 2009 08:40

amit wrote:
Manish_Sharma wrote:India set a target of producing 10000MW Bijlee by 2000, in '95 MMS cuts the planned budget by whopping 7 times. So target is reduced to 3200MW by 2004. Now the same MMS as PM is even ready to risk his govt. for the sake of nuclear electricity generation. He wants to make nuke generated power the high point of his achievment as PM?
First of all this is seriously OT on the Deterrence thread. Second this has been debated to death in the Nuclear deal threads and so I suggest you trawl the archives.

However, to give a brief answer to you questions, you make is sound that every decision is taken in vacuum. Do you remember the economic and geopolitical conditions in 1995? If you do, do you think they are the same as that in 2004? I think you need to think of this point before drawing a direct correlation between actions of the FM in 1995 with the actions of the PM (same person) in 2004.

Besides, if assuming MMS was grievously wrong in 1995 are you trying to say that he was also wrong in 2004 in pursuing the nuclear deal? Because if you are then I don't get it. If he was wrong in 1995, he must be right in 2004. However, if you are saying he was wrong in 2004 he must have been right in 1995. You can't have it both ways.

And I see you've made a slight change in your POV in the two responses. First was MMS was/is interested in spending billions on American reactors. Now it's that he staked his govt on the nuclear deal. You got to clarify what bugs you, buying American reactors or the India-US nuclear deal.

We can discuss in the nuclear thread if you so wish.

Sorry for the OT. No no need to discuss it, I need to read the Nuclear Deal thread. Just got carried away reading the nti thread and totally forgot this would be OT.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 20 Oct 2009 08:56

Shiv,

Now that you have started to understand how I am looking at things. Let me take it a little bit further. We have agreed that there is a difference between "whether" -pure simple deterrence and "how" a nuclear war is fought.

However, in India's case, with the NFU and CMD in place, we have mixed them up- "whether" and "how". In other words, pure simple deterrence is only a hypothetical concept when studied wrt India. In short, I am saying that "whether" we have deterrence or not is intimately linked with "how" and thus my proposition, in the Indian scenario, a binary question of whether we have deterrence or not is the wrong question to ask.

shiv wrote: I happen to think that this thought process of the US is very very civilized and reflects the respect the US has for its own people. But that is a different issue.

OT alert:
What made the soviets soooooo uncivilizied? I know you didnt put it in as much words, I am just curious as to why the difference in respect between US and Soviets increased for you, even though you yourselves agreed that you only know the US side of the story.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 20 Oct 2009 09:48

ravi_ku wrote:. We have agreed that there is a difference between "whether" -pure simple deterrence and "how" a nuclear war is fought.

Er I don't recall agreeing to any such proposition. Please explain this. You are conjuring up something I haven't said.

I am saying that "whether" we have deterrence or not is intimately linked with "how" and thus my proposition, in the Indian scenario, a binary question of whether we have deterrence or not is the wrong question to ask.

The how is very clear as far as India is concerned. Whether is left to the attacker. I find it easy to understand even if you have your doubts. There are two mutually exclusive "whethers" here in case you haven't figured that out

1) Whether someone will initiate nuclear war: yes/no
2) Whether he is deterred: yes/no

India remains deterred enough to not initiate nuclear war against anyone.

The initiation must come from the attacker. If the answer to point 2 is yes, point 1 does not come into play. If point 2 fails (answer="no"), then point 1 comes into play, The question of "how" needs to be put into action. How has already been spelt out clearly by India. How will not be put into action until deterrence fails.

If the "how" is insufficient, deterrence cannot work. Some people are saying that it is insufficient. I am saying it is sufficient (at least in theory and ongoing plans of acquiring a triad) . There is no doubt in my mind.

What made the soviets soooooo uncivilizied? I know you didnt put it in as much words, I am just curious as to why the difference in respect between US and Soviets increased for you, even though you yourselves agreed that you only know the US side of the story.

Again conjuring up something I haven't said. I do not have enough info about Soviet motives to reach any conclusion. I did say that but you have ignored it. Respecting my father does not mean that I disrespect my mother and knowing you as a master of rhetoric who will get me into trouble I have to be cautious about what I say to you.

And I am.

There are a few rhetoric masters. I am one and so are you. There are a few others but I will not name them so they don't know that I know until I choose to let them know.

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 20 Oct 2009 10:01

ravi_ku wrote: However, in India's case, with the NFU and CMD in place, we have mixed them up- "whether" and "how". In other words, pure simple deterrence is only a hypothetical concept when studied wrt India. In short, I am saying that "whether" we have deterrence or not is intimately linked with "how" and thus my proposition, in the Indian scenario, a binary question of whether we have deterrence or not is the wrong question to ask.

Sorry for butting into this fascinating thread but I dont think there is any mixing up from India's standpoint. Read what I have posted below with reference to China:

http://tinyurl.com/yf3zmhc

There is much speculation that China's nuclear modernization program may be geared toward developing the capacity to move from a strategy of minimum deterrence to one of limited deterrence. "Limited deterrence" entails the capability to deter conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear war, and to control escalation in the event of a nuclear confrontation. Under a "limited deterrence" doctrine, China would need to target nuclear forces in addition to cities, which would require expanded deployments.

i.e. India is at the CMD stage, so is China at the moment, at least according to the author of the article above. China is attempting to move from CMD to Credible Limited Deterrence. So there is no mixing up. What India is doing is correct at this point of time i.e. credible minimum counter value deterrence while China may be attempting to move from credible minimum counter value deterrence to credible limited deterrence.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 20 Oct 2009 10:07

shiv wrote:
ravi_ku wrote:. We have agreed that there is a difference between "whether" -pure simple deterrence and "how" a nuclear war is fought.
Er I don't recall agreeing to any such proposition. Please explain this. You are conjuring up something I haven't said.

This was your particular quote.

OK ravi - after re reading I have managed to figure out what you were saying.

I hadnt said until then anything else apart from trying to bring out the above difference. So I took your statement as an agreement to that particular statement

I am saying that "whether" we have deterrence or not is intimately linked with "how" and thus my proposition, in the Indian scenario, a binary question of whether we have deterrence or not is the wrong question to ask.
The how is very clear as far as India is concerned. Whether is left to the attacker. I find it easy to understand even if you have your doubts. There are two mutually exclusive "whethers" here in case you haven't figured that out

1) Whether someone will initiate nuclear war: yes/no
2) Whether he is deterred: yes/no

my point is a bit deeper. He is deterred for what? Nothing in our nuclear doctrine stops another to start a war- NFU. So 2 should be differentiated as, whether he is deterred for a war and whether he is deterred to make a war into a nuclear war.

This is the difference. A war between Soviets and Americans would have gone onto a nuclear war (most probably) and the
choice is with both. Whereas, with our NFU, that particular choice is dependent on only one side, the other.

India remains deterred enough to not initiate nuclear war against anyone.

A subsection of our NFU

The initiation must come from the attacker. If the answer to point 2 is yes, point 1 does not come into play. If point 2 fails (answer="no"), then point 1 comes into play, The question of "how" needs to be put into action. How has already been spelt out clearly by India. How will not be put into action until deterrence fails.

It has been spelt out but can we actually do it?

If the "how" is insufficient, deterrence cannot work. Some people are saying that it is insufficient. I am saying it is sufficient (at least in theory and ongoing plans of acquiring a triad) . There is no doubt in my mind.

Just a question, Have you assumed that we have developed a nuclear fusion bomb while removing this particular doubt and against whom, will it be sufficient?

What made the soviets soooooo uncivilizied? I know you didnt put it in as much words, I am just curious as to why the difference in respect between US and Soviets increased for you, even though you yourselves agreed that you only know the US side of the story.
Again conjuring up something I haven't said. I do not have enough info about Soviet motives to reach any conclusion. I did say that but you have ignored it. Respecting my father does not mean that I disrespect my mother and knowing you as a master of rhetoric who will get me into trouble I have to be cautious about what I say to you.

And I am.

There are a few rhetoric masters. I am one and so are you. There are a few others but I will not name them so they don't know that I know until I choose to let them know.

well your words of "very very civilized" were too tempting

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 20 Oct 2009 10:08

Idev,

Please read my posts above. The mixing up of whether and how is done not by the CMD, but the NFU.

and also what is for China, Credible Minimum Deterrence(CMD) against one (US,Russia) could be credible Maximum Deterrence(CMD

) against other(India). So whenever one says, CMD is CMD with respect to whom?

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 20 Oct 2009 10:19

ravi_ku wrote:Idev,

Please read my posts above. The mixing up of whether and how is done not by the CMD, but the NFU.

NFU has got nothing to do with it. The ability to control escalation means the ability to have enough reserves left over after a limited nuclear exchange to deter further escalation up the curve. It does not matter who fires the first shot. The scenarios of the US and the former USSR are not applicable so far in the India-China-Pakistan case because the former had reached multiple levels of MAD e.g. I remember reading that one study had reached the conclusion that 200MT equivalent was all that was needed by each of those two countries for MAD. And yet at its peak both stockpiles had reached levels of something like 20,000MT each. Even currently according some net sites the US has deployed and ready to fire the equivalent of 2000MT.

Has the China+ Pakistan stockpile reached those levels of assured destruction of India? I dont know the answer to this question. But for India to maintain deterrence in the future vis a vis the China Pakistan combine, it has to ensure that China should be deterred from believing that its policy of credible limited deterrence will work against India.

Added later: Clearly Indian planners have already factored the shift in the Chinese strategy in their planning e.g. The survivability of the Indian nuclear forces will be enhanced with part of the deterrent in SLBMs or SLCMs in the Arihant class of submarines. Similarly the Agni V being a roadmobile, cannister launched missile will have greater survivability compared to fixed silo or rail mobile missiles. So these Indian moves will nullify the Chinese efforts towards a credible limited deterrence strategy attempting to target Indian nuclear forces.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 20 Oct 2009 10:34

ldev wrote:
NFU has got nothing to do with it.

You mean NFU doesnt state that it will not start the nuke exchange(whether) and will be used only after the first nukes are used by other(how)? Isnt this mixing both of them? I dont know what else it is.

The ability to control escalation means the ability to have enough reserves left over after a limited nuclear exchange to deter further escalation up the curve.

I am thoroughly confused only by this statement. You mean to say that after China has nuked us, we will wait for another escalation step? What are the steps of escalation after the first nuke has been used? I thought with the NFU in place, we have completely yielded the last step of escalation to the other.

*In say, Indo-China exchange, The reserves after the nukes are not for Indo-China but for say, China-US or Indo-Pak and so on. So pardon me for asking what reserves are you talking about?

It does not matter who fires the first shot.

It matters a lot. The recieving country will need to enough stockpile AFTER the hits take out some nukes. whereas the "giving" country doesnt need to.

The scenarios of the US and the former USSR are not applicable so far in the India-China-Pakistan case because the former had reached multiple levels of MAD e.g. I remember reading that one study had reached the conclusion that 200MT equivalent was all that was needed by each of those two countries for MAD. And yet at its peak both stockpiles had reached levels of something like 20,000MT each. Even currently according some net sites the US has deployed and ready to fire the equivalent of 2000MT.

Has the China+ Pakistan stockpile reached those levels of assured destruction of India? I dont know the answer to this question. But for India to maintain deterrence in the future vis a vis the China Pakistan combine, it has to ensure that China should be deterred from believing that its policy of credible limited deterrence will work against India.

Idev,
I think you are confusing China's policy with respect to US/Russia with respect to India. Does China have CLD with India? What is China's nuke policy wrt India? Does it wish for CLD with others after nuke exchange with India.

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 20 Oct 2009 10:51

ravi_ku

You mean NFU doesnt state that it will not start the nuke exchange(whether) and will be used only after the first nukes are used by other(how)? Isnt this mixing both of them? I dont know what else it is.

If somebody fires the first shot that means deterrence has broken down. And therefore it does not matter who fires the first shot. Because if the side wanting to fire that first shot believes that the other side has a cmd (which means a survivable cmd) it will not fire the first shot. So does it matter if the side not wanting to fire first has a NFU?

I am thoroughly confused only by this statement. You mean to say that after China has nuked us, we will wait for another escalation step? What are the steps of escalation after the first nuke has been used? I thought with the NFU in place, we have completely yielded the last step of escalation to the other.

If China moves to a CLD and India is at CMD and China believes that India's nuclear forces are vulnerable to a Chinese first strike which could be part of its strategy in a CLD, then China may order a first strike on India's nuclear forces and not on Indian cities. If the Chinese attack is largely successful leaving say 6 Indian missiles intact, then the Indian leadership is left with a choice of either firing those 6 at Chinese cities (India's counter value strategy) and then waiting for the Chinese to fire back 60 missiles at Indian cities or deciding to surrender. The same example could be given if India has the numerical superiority vis a vis China or Pakistan and China will have the choice of firing its 6 missiles or surrendering to India.

In say, Indo-China exchange, The reserves after the nukes are not for Indo-China but for say, China-US or Indo-Pak and so on. So pardon me for asking what reserves are you talking about?

The reserves could be for both purposes, further escalation with the same counterparty or for other interested parties who may want to jump into the fray to take advantage.

I think you are confusing China's policy with respect to US/Russia with respect to India. Does China have CLD with India? What is China's nuke policy wrt India? Does it wish for CLD with others after nuke exchange with India.

What matters are Chinese capabilities not intentions. Because if capabilities exist, intentions can change. The question is," Does China have or does it intend to have a CLD policy?"

Instead of railing blindly, we should do some serious research in terms of what will constitute Chinese CLD capability in terms of delivery systems and megatons. If directed against India, how many MRBMs do they need to station in Tibet with what throwweight?

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 20 Oct 2009 11:09

ldev wrote: If somebody fires the first shot that means deterrence has broken down. And therefore it does not matter who fires the first shot. Because if the side wanting to fire that first shot believes that the other side has a cmd (which means a survivable cmd) it will not fire the first shot. So does it matter if the side not wanting to fire first has a NFU?

This is where I have a quibble. IMHO, It matters a lot. Say you are China and we are at war. With India having an NFU, you are quite sure that ANY escalation, short of actual use of nukes, isnt an nuke escalation. and China can choose a convenient time for it for the final escalation. Whereas, India will have to consider every step it takes as an escalation in the nuke order.

The difference is before the nukes are used and after the nukes are used. At the precise moment when the first nuke is used, there is no difference for NFU and no NFU. It is the same as having CMD in place, with the first nuke hurled by other.

If China moves to a CLD and India is at CMD and China believes that India's nuclear forces are vulnerable to a Chinese first strike which could be part of its strategy in a CLD, then China may order a first strike on India's nuclear forces and not on Indian cities. If the Chinese attack is largely successful leaving say 6 Indian missiles intact, then the Indian leadership is left with a choice of either firing those 6 at Chinese cities (India's counter value strategy) and then waiting for the Chinese to fire back 60 missiles at Indian cities or deciding to surrender. The same example could be given if India has the numerical superiority vis a vis China or Pakistan and China will have the choice of firing its 6 missiles or surrendering to India.

After the nukes have been used by China, our babus will still be thinking whether or not to use the nukes!!!

I will say, they deserve it, as the bluff of our CMD would have been called. So you are talking whether CMD is a bluff or not?

The reserves could be for both purposes, further escalation with the same counterparty or for other interested parties who may want to jump into the fray to take advantage.

if the reserves are for any other purpose, the CMD bluff has been called.

What matters are Chinese capabilities not intentions. Because if capabilities exist, intentions can change. The question is," Does China have or does it intend to have a CLD policy?"

Instead of railing blindly, we should do some serious research in terms of what will constitute Chinese CLD capability in terms of delivery systems and megatons. If directed against India, how many MRBMs do they need to station in Tibet with what throwweight?

I am guessing they have atleast 2-3 megaton fusions directed at newdelhi as of today

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 20 Oct 2009 11:14

ravi_ku

Let me elaborate on this point of mine:

If China moves to a CLD and India is at CMD and China believes that India's nuclear forces are vulnerable to a Chinese first strike which could be part of its strategy in a CLD, then China may order a first strike on India's nuclear forces and not on Indian cities. If the Chinese attack is largely successful leaving say 6 Indian missiles intact, then the Indian leadership is left with a choice of either firing those 6 at Chinese cities (India's counter value strategy) and then waiting for the Chinese to fire back 60 missiles at Indian cities or deciding to surrender.

If on the other hand, India has been successful in developing its nuclear submarine forces and its roadmobile Agni V cannister launched missile i.e. its nuclear forces have a high degree of survivability to a first strike. But the Chinese mistakenly still believe that under their CLD policy and with their force levels they have a high probability of destroying a majority of Indian nuclear forces and they launch a first strike using say 20% of their missiles. Let us further assume that this results in the destruction of 30% of India's nuclear forces. The Chinese then have expended 20% of their warheads and destroyed 30% of Indian capability. The Indian leadership then has options. One option could be to fire a single missile with say a 200 kt warhead (assuming that as RC says, India has the capability to build a 200kt warhead) over a Chinese city. This is India's demonstration that with 70% of its nuclear forces intact, that it is prepared for a counter value exchange if the Chinese want to escalate this process.

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 20 Oct 2009 11:22

ravi_ku

With India having an NFU, you are quite sure that ANY escalation, short of actual use of nukes, isnt an nuke escalation. and China can choose a convenient time for it for the final escalation. Whereas, India will have to consider every step it takes as an escalation in the nuke order.

War fighting capability both nuclear and otherwise is directly related to the size of the underlying economy. Escalation in nuclear forces necessarily means having the economic wherewithal to support such moves. A move from CMD to CLD means the ability to spend more money. If a country cannot afford to spend that money, it is better to stay at CMD. The Chinese have been smart. Vis a Vis the US they have consistently stayed at CMD, they have not forgotten how the US bankrupted the former USSR. It is only now with the size of their economy having grown so large that they are making tentative moves to CLD. Can India afford a CLD posture now? Again, I dont know if there is one answer to this question.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 20 Oct 2009 11:31

Idev,

I am sure, you know that I dont know the answers nor does anybody else. What is the precise % of GDP which should be used for defence and of it what % should be used for nukes at a particular level of GDP? I dont know.

But shouldnt this be taken care while formulating the nuke policies? NFU is THE most costliest of all policies. Having NFU means, we cant have anything else except CMD, as NFU means one has already lost a lions share of nukes even before he can contemplate using them. and thus even at the start has to maintain a MUCH more level of nukes so that it can atleast do CMD after the first strike.

I agree with your assessment that only capabilities matter. Idev, the move for China from CMD to CLD is vis-a-vis US. I have no idea at what state it was before and to what level it is progressing today. However I am guessing(wag) vis-a-vis India, China had more than CLD and trying to move towards one-sided destruction, i.e. first kill capability. I see India's acquistions as a move to avoid it, i.e. act as a status quoist power wrt China.

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 20 Oct 2009 11:42

ravi_ku

NFU is THE most costliest of all policies. Having NFU means, we cant have anything else except CMD, as NFU means one has already lost a lions share of nukes even before he can contemplate using them. and thus even at the start has to maintain a MUCH more level of nukes so that it can atleast do CMD after the first strike.

Abrogating NFU means the ability to intiate a nuclear war in the eyes and perception of your opponent. This initiation cannot happen if you do not have the ability to destroy enough of your opponents warheads that you are prepared to live with the surviving warheads exploding over your country. What is your level of pain? one warhead, two, five , ten , twenty? And what will it take to ensure that out of say 400 Chinese warheads, India can develop the capability to destroy 380 of them? And do you think that the Chinese are going to do nothing while they see this Indian effort to develop more and bigger warheads and more accurate delivery systems. They will obviously respond upto a point where they believe that India can never destroy all their warheads and they will always have enough after an Indian first strike to deliver unacceptable damage to India. Arms races are born this way. The question then becomes, who will become bankrupt first.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 20 Oct 2009 11:56

ldev wrote: Abrogating NFU means the ability to intiate a nuclear war. This initiation cannot happen if you do not have the ability to destroy enough of your opponents warheads that you are prepared to live with the surviving warheads exploding over your country.

You mean that all the rest of N-8, i.e. US,UK, China, Israel, Russia, Pak, France do not have it? Does any country other than India have it?

What is your level of pain? one warhead, two, five , ten , twenty? And what will it take to ensure that out of say 400 Chinese warheads, India can develop the capability to destroy 380 of them? And do you think that the Chinese are going to do nothing while they see this Indian effort to develop more and bigger warheads and more accurate delivery systems. They will obviously respond upto a point where they believe that India can never destroy all their warheads and they will always have enough after an Indian first strike to deliver unacceptable damage to India. Arms races are born this way. The question then becomes, who will become bankrupt first.

Abrogating NFU doesnt mean going to more warheads. It actually means less. I think you are confusing CMD with NFU. I didnt say abrogate CMD. So can you please rephrase your above questions?

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 20 Oct 2009 11:57

ravi_ku,

For a very long time, maybe even now, the Chinese have only 20 ICBMs capable of reaching the US. Cant the US with its 2000MT deployed nuclear strike forces take out these 20 Chinese ICBMs and once and for all eliminate the Chinese threat against the US mainland? Why havent they done it? What deterrence is a work here. Let me guess

1. US generals cannot guarantee that all 20 ICBMs will be destroyed.

2. Maybe the US can destroy all Chinese missiles capable of reaching the US but they will be powerless to ensure that 100 or more Chinese warheads do not rain down on Japan, Korea the Middle East oilfields Taiwan and some on India and Europe for good measure thereby destroying the global economic system as we know it.

We need to examine whether classical nuclear war fighting deterrence is the only deterrence valid against China. Or do Chinese economic aspirations make the task of Indian deterrence more varied.

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 20 Oct 2009 12:03

ravi_ku

Abrogating NFU doesnt mean going to more warheads

The road to hell is paved with good intentions!

You may have no intentions of building more warheads. But because your posture has changed to a potential first strike, your opponent then wants to build in a margin of safety on his side to ensure that your potential first strike does not leave him below his safety margin to inflict unacceptable damage to you. So he builds up his arsenal a little. You then notice his increased arsenal and say that should he launch a first strike your reserves are below where they should be and so you build up your forces a little. And this process of building up your respective arsenal a little more goes on and on. Pretty soon instead of 200MT, the US and the USSR had 20,000MT each, about a 100 times more than they needed for Mutally Assured Destruction of each other.

amit · Post by **amit** » 20 Oct 2009 12:48

Rahul M wrote:amit, really, the ignorance of people like you amazes me !
how dare you question the validity of MAD, (you ignorant SDRE kufr) the americans did it !

of course it is correct !

Boss,

Just saw this, was engrossed in the very interesting discussion going on between Ravi and LDev.

But this one's a keeper!

Masaru · Post by **Masaru** » 20 Oct 2009 13:55

ldev wrote:
You may have no intentions of building more warheads. But because your posture has changed to a potential first strike, your opponent then wants to build in a margin of safety on his side to ensure that your potential first strike does not leave him below his safety margin to inflict unacceptable damage to you. So he builds up his arsenal a little. You then notice his increased arsenal and say that should he launch a first strike your reserves are below where they should be and so you build up your forces a little. And this process of building up your respective arsenal a little more goes on and on. Pretty soon instead of 200MT, the US and the USSR had 20,000MT each, about a 100 times more than they needed for Mutally Assured Destruction of each other.

Idev granted that your argument holds in the Sino-Indian context; but how does this argument play out in the Indo-Pak concept where Pakis have an explicit no NFU policy.

Why does the Indian arsenal still remain comparable or may be less than the Pak arsenal while logic should dictate otherwise given that Pakis have proven credible delivery systems to boot? Is it due to Indian strategists have hit upon some yet-to-be-found game theoretic equilibrium which with NFU and un-deployed first-gen fission devices ensures deterrence against a P-5 adversary and a fanatic neighbour on hair-trigger alert?

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 20 Oct 2009 18:32

Masaru,

Idev granted that your argument holds in the Sino-Indian context; but how does this argument play out in the Indo-Pak concept where Pakis have an explicit no NFU policy.

If you treat the Pakistani stockpile as an extension of the Chinese stockpile, then you get the same escalation paradigm. A conservative Indian nuclear war planner should treat the Pakistani stockpile as a forward based element of the Chinese stockpile. An Indian repudiation of its NFU will result in more clandestine transfers of Chinese fissile material to Pakistan and the result will be that India will get into a nuclear arms race with China with Pakistan being the proxy.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 20 Oct 2009 19:27

Imagine a war between Sri Lanka and Pakistan (perhaps over a piece of land in between). Only Pakistan has nuclear arms, not Sri Lanka.

Can deterrence exist between the two? It is easier to answer this question if you ask if deterrence can break down.

Can Sri Lanka break deterrence? No. because it has no nukes.

Can Pakistan break deterrence. Yes because it has nukes. Technically there is no way in which Sri Lanka can punish Pakistan, should Pakistan choose to use nukes against Sri Lanka. Deterrence in this case is totally one sided. Pakistan has to voluntarily choose not to use nukes, and as long as Pakistan voluntarily chooses not to use nukes "Deterrence" can be said to hold.

So deterrence itself can be defined as the non use of nuclear weapons by a state armed with nuclear weapons.

Now it is a commonly stated belief that "Mutually Assured Destruction" (MAD) was the reason why the US and USSR never fought a nuclear war. The story that is told over and over again is that if either the US or the USSR started a war that was suspected of being a nuclear strike, the other nation would launch a massive retaliation to devastate the entire opposing nation. It seems to be generally believed that deterrence between the US and USSR held ONLY because each was assured of TOTAL "assured" destruction, many times over. The suggestion here is that deterrence would not have held if the US was only half-destroyed or 1/3rd destroyed.

But that belief is patently untrue because the US itself (under Kennedy IIRC - I may have the wrong name here) is on record as deciding NOT to start a nuclear war (pre-emptive strike) against the USSR because even with overwhelming nuclear superiority over the USSR the US could not be reassured that the USSR would not be able to strike back. This was back in an era when the US had far many more nukes than the USSR. That means the US was deterred even before the era of MAD. After the Soviet Union caught up in the numbers game the question of the US initiating nuclear war did not arise because the US was already deterred.

So why did the USSR not start a nuclear war? Especially in the early days the US did not have as many weapons as it would take to devastate the whole USSR. Whatever the reason - whether it was "voluntary" or whether it was fear of destruction by the US, the USSR was deterred. And the USSR was deterred even in the era before MAD. MAD came later and the cold war ended in that state. Again the USSR it appears was deterred by something less than total destruction.

Although both the US and the USSR were deterring each other before the era of MAD, they kept on building nuclear weapons in numbers sufficient to destroy each other many times over. But that fact is forgotten when people say that it was MAD that caused deterrence. Deterrence existed long before MAD and that deterrence was a fear of severe damage, not even total destruction. The message is clear: A threat of total destruction of the other side was not necessary to deter the US and the USSR. Both deterred each other for years before each acquired the ability to totally destroy the other.

So I would say two things:

1) Total destruction of the other side is not a necessary condition for deterrence even if it is considered desirable.
2) A voluntary decision not to start a nuclear war by a nuclear armed nation is a necessary condition for deterrence.

JMT.

Over to you - you know who..it's for you to bite

Rien · Post by **Rien** » 20 Oct 2009 20:15

Isn't an arms race building more and more warheads a very good idea? I would rather we had a cold war with China than one fought with actual weapons. There is one way for India to win a cold war against both China and Pakistan.

Thorium/U-233 weapons. The entire idea is to start an unaffordable arms race, while will crush Pakistan early. Thorium does not need expensive billion dollar facilities to be purified, as compared to uranium/plutonium. U233 is something that with laser isotope seperation can be seperated now. Now this would allow an arsenal that would be 1/10th the cost of what China can do. If we can build weapons for much less than China, shouldn't we at least try to arms race them?

This is why the USA is so keen to sign nuclear agreements with India. They want to make sure India doesn't go down the route of cheap thermonuclear weapons, which is why the CTBT is so important to them. Also notice their bans on reprocessing and enrichment technology. India should be able to produce nuclear weapons at a much lower cost than China.

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf75.html

India 73,000 1.3%
China 68,000 1.2%

India 319,000 tonnes .. China isn't even on the list. Does anyone know what China's thorium reserves are? So a new nuclear testing programme might be good, because anything that forces China to test again and places Pakistan under sanctions is worthwhile. Unlike India, Pakistan will be bankrupt without foreign financial aid.

negi · Post by **negi** » 20 Oct 2009 20:16

Shiv ji the NATO's arsenal was stocked keeping in mind not only the entire WARSAW block but in fact other potential SU sympathizers (including PRC and India) .

The sheer size of the nuclear stockpile can also be attributed to other factors i.e. missiles were inaccurate and expensive delivery platforms hence the reliance on strategic heavy bombers which obviously ran a risk of being shot down so numbers and yield had to be pushed higher .Lastly Cold War witnessed loads of money being pumped into building Military muscle including R&D in relevant areas this obviously included the bomb making initiative in respective blocks where the scientific lobby supporting the latter was quite strong (just look at the sheer number and nature of tests conducted by SU and US and literally in every possible nook and corner).

The SSBNs, ICBMs/SLBMs with MIRV and acceptable 'cep' arrived later and by this time the P-5's BOMB making initiative was in overdrive.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 20 Oct 2009 20:58

Isn't an arms race building more and more warheads a very good idea? I would rather we had a cold war with China than one fought with actual weapons. There is one way for India to win a cold war against both China and Pakistan.

Sightly OT perhaps.

IF in the nuclear arena - India has a doctrine: CMD.

Besides China has $ 2Trillion, 200 Billion in reserve - per FT this morning.

The last think India needs is an economic war. With her economic might I just do not see a cheap option for India. It may cost China 5x to compete, Chine should be able to survive that.

Besides India does have huge infrastructure issues that she should and must tend to right now, else face the consequences for that decision.

ldev · Post by **ldev** » 20 Oct 2009 21:06

Rien,

Thorium/U-233 weapons. The entire idea is to start an unaffordable arms race, while will crush Pakistan early. Thorium does not need expensive billion dollar facilities to be purified, as compared to uranium/plutonium. U233 is something that with laser isotope seperation can be seperated now. Now this would allow an arsenal that would be 1/10th the cost of what China can do. If we can build weapons for much less than China, shouldn't we at least try to arms race them?

Firstly engaging in an arms race is crazy IMO. But if India did want to get into one, why would one go about it in the round about inefficient way you have described above.

Way more simpler is to launder the stockpile of reactor grade Pu through the FBR and get Pu-239. The FBR is being built - Pu239 has a lower critical mass. The AHWRs are a concept as of now. Even after they are built, it will take 8-10 years for them to become U-233 neutral let alone breed additional U-233

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 20 Oct 2009 21:13

Going NFU may be very painful since the scope of second use is so large.. (at least w.r.t Indian NFU *citation needed on the scope), There is again the problem with MAD too., especially with the "A" in the madness. Who guarantees its assurance?

There is no guarantee again the second striker survives the first strike.. hence MAD., but unless we have the infrastructure to safe guard important installations and importment men and devices, to survive say a megaton weapon be dropped on us, on MAD basis.

Neither NFU (as it is now), nor the MAD, does really work... these are only for paperworks for the purpose of P5 to remain, in synch.

IMHO, it was wrong on India to declare these:-
- voluntary moratorium so soon (it does not satisfy any type of deterrance - mad/nfu/?)
- declare NFU so abstract to hit any nation* (this clearly exposes the subliminal message, we are trying to deliver)..

we all know, what it takes to be "the P", to counter any of the P5 (any nation*) beit MAD or NFU.

All this political game.. yes, but it adds tremendous pressure to S&T folks when it comes to deliver. somethings are better done on natural progression. if the political reflection is true that sounds something to originate with obfuscation from s&t folks, then we all can be happy. But, the fact remains.. always hidden.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 20 Oct 2009 21:24

K. Subrahmanyam wrote:In India, the credible minimum deterrent was always envisaged in three-digit numbers; that itself gives sufficient flexibility.

Kanson · Post by **Kanson** » 20 Oct 2009 21:30

With the increasing accuracy of the Indian strategic missiles repeatedly stated in single digit accuracy, will the nuclear doctrine moves from Counter-Value to Counter-Force?

If that happens, will there be changes to CMD and NFU? ( atleast in theory?)

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 20 Oct 2009 21:32

Kanson wrote:
K. Subrahmanyam wrote:In India, the credible minimum deterrent was always envisaged in three-digit numbers; that itself gives sufficient flexibility.

K. Subrahmanyam Posted online: Tuesday , Sep 08, 2009 at 0302 hrs
The Chief of the Army Staff, General Deepak Kapoor, is reported to have suggested that the country may have to revisit its “No First Use” (NFU) policy in the light of reports from some credible US sources that Pakistan may have an arsenal of 90 nuclear weapons and may be building up further stocks.

When NFU was formulated ( I was the convenor of the National Security Board that drafted it) there were no assumptions on the size of the Pakistani arsenal. The doctrine stands by itself irrespective of the size of the potential enemy’s arsenal. There is a second component of the nuclear doctrine: the credible minimum deterrent. It is that component that may call for some adjustments if the potential enemy’s arsenal were to increase. Even that is not a necessity from the point of view of deterrence, but a question of influencing the perception of the adversary. The crux of deterrence is the survivability of the retaliatory force and the aggressor’s calculation as to whether the casualties and damage likely to be inflicted by the survived retaliatory force on his population and cities can be justified by the strategic gain the unleashing of the nuclear attack will secure for the aggressor. Very rarely, if at all, can the answer to that question be in the affirmative. In such circumstances deterrence will prevail.

Deterrence is not a question of having the ability to inflict much larger casualties and damage on the adversary than, according to one’s own calculation, one is likely to suffer in retaliation.

.....................................................................

The more robust the deterrence, the stronger the justification for the NFU strategy.

A very well written (obviously) article.

A must read IMHO.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 20 Oct 2009 21:37

shiv wrote:..............
But that belief is patently untrue because the US itself (under Kennedy IIRC - I may have the wrong name here) is on record as deciding NOT to start a nuclear war (pre-emptive strike) against the USSR because even with overwhelming nuclear superiority over the USSR the US could not be reassured that the USSR would not be able to strike back. This was back in an era when the US had far many more nukes than the USSR. That means the US was deterred even before the era of MAD. After the Soviet Union caught up in the numbers game the question of the US initiating nuclear war did not arise because the US was already deterred.

So why did the USSR not start a nuclear war? Especially in the early days the US did not have as many weapons as it would take to devastate the whole USSR. Whatever the reason - whether it was "voluntary" or whether it was fear of destruction by the US, the USSR was deterred. And the USSR was deterred even in the era before MAD. MAD came later and the cold war ended in that state. Again the USSR it appears was deterred by something less than total destruction.
.............

excellent post shiv ji. I started writing something on these lines yesterday but couldn't complete it. saved the draft in stead.
anyway, will complete it now.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 20 Oct 2009 21:41

Isn't an arms race building more and more warheads a very good idea?

Conventional, perhaps to yes.

Nuclear, not necessarily. Specially in the current environment, with India in mind, I really cannot justify it. What others do they do.

India has MCD.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 20 Oct 2009 21:46

Rahul M wrote:
shiv wrote:..............
But that belief is patently untrue because the US itself (under Kennedy IIRC - I may have the wrong name here) is on record as deciding NOT to start a nuclear war (pre-emptive strike) against the USSR because even with overwhelming nuclear superiority over the USSR the US could not be reassured that the USSR would not be able to strike back. This was back in an era when the US had far many more nukes than the USSR. That means the US was deterred even before the era of MAD. After the Soviet Union caught up in the numbers game the question of the US initiating nuclear war did not arise because the US was already deterred.

So why did the USSR not start a nuclear war? Especially in the early days the US did not have as many weapons as it would take to devastate the whole USSR. Whatever the reason - whether it was "voluntary" or whether it was fear of destruction by the US, the USSR was deterred. And the USSR was deterred even in the era before MAD. MAD came later and the cold war ended in that state. Again the USSR it appears was deterred by something less than total destruction.
.............
excellent post shiv ji. I started writing something on these lines yesterday but couldn't complete it. saved the draft in stead.
anyway, will complete it now.

Forget US-USSR. US- NoKo is a far better example. The US is STILL deterred!!!

Masaru · Post by **Masaru** » 20 Oct 2009 22:11

NRao wrote:
Forget US-USSR. US- NoKo is a far better example. The US is STILL deterred!!!

With all due respect, really! Does NK have a delivery system to reach US, forget US mainland?
Does NK have deliverable devices in sufficient numbers to penetrate the BMD that SK, Japan and
US will put in its way? Have you seen any credible reference which ascribes to this deterrence being achieved after the tests by NK? They may use it as a ploy to get funding for BMD but to claim that they are deterred is pushing things too far. By this logic every country except the 3 that US had military action against would have deterrence against it.

IMO the US sees no potential benefit in militarily engaging NK, and is happy with the status quo. The only
possible deterrence that NK has existed since the end of Korean war i.e. the possibility that it can devastate
Seoul with conventional arty which is a mere 40 km from the DMZ. The other one of course is nobody is interested
in invading a country with no resources except brain washed malnourished people. War is expensive; why waste
resources when there is no possible gain and you have to pay the bill for feeding 20 mil people?

abhiti · Post by **abhiti** » 20 Oct 2009 22:12

NRao wrote:The last think India needs is an economic war. With her economic might I just do not see a cheap option for India. It may cost China 5x to compete, Chine should be able to survive that.

Not really sure what you referring to "economic war" but if your point was about cost of deterrence then think about it in comparision to cost to acquire MRCA. Nuclear deterrence is cheaper than MRCA.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 20 Oct 2009 22:31

abhiti wrote:
NRao wrote:The last think India needs is an economic war. With her economic might I just do not see a cheap option for India. It may cost China 5x to compete, Chine should be able to survive that.
Not really sure what you referring to "economic war" but if your point was about cost of deterrence then think about it in comparision to cost to acquire MRCA. Nuclear deterrence is cheaper than MRCA.

It may (I would like some figures IF POSSIBLE).

BUT, again, for the nth time - one is conventional the other is strategic. The two buckets are different as far as funding (and actually thinking too) is concerned. But, I will play along - still waiting for the other shoe to fall.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 20 Oct 2009 22:39

NRao wrote:
abhiti wrote:
Not really sure what you referring to "economic war" but if your point was about cost of deterrence then think about it in comparision to cost to acquire MRCA. Nuclear deterrence is cheaper than MRCA.
It may (I would like some figures IF POSSIBLE).

BUT, again, for the nth time - one is conventional the other is strategic. The two buckets are different as far as funding (and actually thinking too) is concerned. But, I will play along - still waiting for the other shoe to fall.

Sorry. I did not pay attention to your post.

Yes. nuclear deterrence is cheaper. (Under current discussions WRT Santhanam - India need not test since she has deterrence.)