Future strategic scenario for the Indian Subcontinent

[brihaspati]

TSP maintains terrorist groups officially focused on Kashmir, such as LET and JEM. Both groups are allowed to operate under new forms and preserved. Same goes for anti-Shia terrorists, such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipha-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan. It is significant to note that these groups derive their support and recruitment from the backone founding population and region of Pakistan - the Punjab. The terror groups are flourishing in spit of six army corps being stationed in Punjab. Apparently Dr Usman, the leader of the nine man group that attacked the army’s general headquarters on October 10, was himself a member of the army’s medical corps. It is difficult to imagine that the recent attacks on Rawalpindi and Lahore military installations could happen without insider help for the terroists must have needed to breakup or bypass the security measures and also needed intimate knowledge of the layout.

Only two possiilities (or a combination of both) can explain the observed trends. First, all the terror groups are coordinated by a common organization connected to the PA and having innermost access to military command as well as intelligence. Second, the militants themselves have been able to penetrate the army and MI. There is of course a third possibility in that such coordination has been voluntary - by middle or lower level members of both the militants as well as the army and the MI. This is not entirely impossible if the Punjabi society itself has been radicalizing at an accelerating rate. Since both militants and soldiers are eing recruited from this same society - the radicalization would reflect in mutual penetration.

The Punjab provincial government is run by Shabaz Sharif, the brother of Nawaz Sharif and leader of the opposition in the country. The Sharif's are supposed to have close links with the leaders of several militant groups, including Hafez Saeed, the leader of LET. The Sharifs have blocked US, Indian and the federal government pressure to crack down on militancy in the poverty stricken south Punjab Talib-recruitment ground.

The army began to loudly complain and lobby against restrictions in the 7.5 billion dollar five year aid package from the US for civilian and developmental purposes - at exactly the same time when the attacks on the army began increasing. The main contentions seems to be the demand for control over the army by the civilian wing. Now why is that a problem over non-military aid packages? This can only happen if the overall economy of the country is on the point of bankruptcy and these aid packages are the only lifeline of support for the army to survive. The army can only survive by keeping the various separatist and militant conflicts alive.

The signs of hesitation and potential withdrawal by the USA (the latest twist being the contentious issue of disputed presidential elections and delayed declaration of results) implies that all the interested powers other than USA and with regional presence - Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan to plan and hedge on their respective "strategic assets". The latest attacks on the Revolutionary Guards of Iran in Seistan is perhaps a last ditch coordinated attempt to prevent Iran from activating its "stratgeic" assets. This could have come from the USA or even from within TSP. In either case, it could be a reaction against possible activation of "Shia militants" within TSP.

TSP itself cannot afford to destroy the Talib leadership and their capacity to carry out mayhem within AFG and against India. None of the spectacular casualtiesof Talib leadership have come from direct TSPA action or on factions apparently still professing loyalty (public declarations of being against attacks on the PA) to the PA.

If the TSPA action gets bogged down in the winter over the mountains, then the retreat of the TSPA will also be in the classical fashion. There will be several surges, going back and forth from spring over the next year. Unless massive aid flows in, it will be the heartland back in Punjab that will be the reason for overthrow of the current form of the TSP state. The middle and lower portions of the Punjabi dominated increasingly radicalized army will lean towards a Talibani form of the state. In fact the real difference between the core principles, attitudes and foundational values of TSP are not that different from the aims of the Taliban - only the latter are less hypocritical and free of the restrictions for "appearances sake" imposed by the climate of the 40's geopolitics.

[paramu]

Sanku,
Only while doing puja at home.

Thanks, ramana

In Bengal one has to wear Goroder dhuti!

Brigadier-saab, do you proudly wear lungot inside your dhoti? or is that modern undie?

Sorry for the OT, couldn't resist... Ducking for cover from our mighty brigadier.

[brihaspati]

Actually the king in waiting for a certain kingdom was the centre of a scandal a long while back, when someone apparently caught sight of modern undies below his wrap-around skirt on a ceremonial occasion. The locals felt mighty insulted - as it was their dress of pride and as a man-o-man, they are supposed to bear the cold. But why bring this up on this thread! Traditionally Bengalis engaged in physical activity would be wearing a version of "lungots", or a tight version of the "malla-kachcha" (now reduced to "maalkocha").

[brihaspati]

It is possible that we may say the so-called war in Waziristan actually being replicated on multiple fronts and multiple centres in and around TSP. The war will become a sequence of surges going forward etween the two "sides" reaching a virtual stalemate over the winter. The TSPA will show its plan as well as vulnerailities once multiple centres of conflict are created to draw TSPA out. Elements within the TSPA opposed to US action, and pro-Jihad can create conditions for this - their best hope is to use "strategic assets" in India, AFG and the no-mans land of Balochs where TSPA maintains significant military establishment.

Keeping fingers crossed, that all political energy is not going into ensuring "absolute" electoral dominance in the most vulnerable and targeted areas of India.

[Abhi_G]

Elements within the TSPA opposed to US action, and pro-Jihad can create conditions for this - their best hope is to use "strategic assets" in India, AFG and the no-mans land of Balochs where TSPA maintains significant military establishment.

That is an interesting observation. Bottomline is 26/11 Mumbai seems to be a test balloon. TSPA is just waiting for an opportunity to unleash another round of attacks on India.

[brihaspati]

Abhi_G-ji,

I had always been intrgued and amused by the total lack of attacks by Jihadis or Maoists on EJ's within India. Their target has always been predominantly "Hindu" populations. Of course when large scale public violence takes place, there is less guarantee of ensuring community specific violence. Even then, the law of averages can perhaps work in these minds to think that - by proportion, the EJ's are less likely to be affected.

The key features of the "actions" should be noted geo-politically. China activates the NE in more ways than one - including AP, ULFA in Assam and the various dubious militias in the seven sisters. Pakistan has activated its North-North West sector through the Jihadis and the highlighting of the Taleb threat. Maoists have activated their central-south-east sector. Gujarat, and Maharashtra has always been a target. Positionally this means a surrounding of the northern river plains arc - stretching from Gujarat through Rajasthan and Punjab to UP and then to Bihar and Bengal. This is clearly an encirclement strategy.

Gujarat and Maharshtra are the weak points in this encirclement. The very fact of their weakness in resisting Jihadi+Maoists+PRC type probing comes from their key role in trade and financial networks that connects the northern arc with external trade. The key elite groups controlling these networks will consider buying off "marauders" rather than liquidating. But this same attitude makes these elite unreliable for permanent reliability. Greater pressure and "buying power" could equally make these elite resistant to "encirclement".

This is the reason, the capacity of the encirclers to inflict "trauma" needs to be demonstrated to keep the "baniafication" process happily going in encircler's favour. No traumatic public atrocity in Andhra will take place unless it can be assigned to "Hindu fanatics" or it affects mostly "Hindus". Andhra serves a very useful role in becoming a support buffer zone for the encirclement of the north and cannot be jeopardized. Karnataka needs to be punished from time to time for having deviated from the Jihadi+EJ+Maoist agenda, and also to prevent it from intervening in the encirclement campaign by its geographical position. Also for the future success of the campaign, strong economic and technological hub cannot be left in the "south" around which opposition could crystallize - which means Bangalore should repeatedly be target.

As long Tamil Nadu can be kept firmly within "distrust everything Northern unless it is the Nehru Gandhi dynasty" mindset, even Tamil Nadu is quite safe I think - for they will not be assumed to be sympathetic to the plight of those encircled if they are not "Dravidians".

[brihaspati]

Should we celebrate the supposed fall of Hakeemullah's hometown to the TSPA? Its too early. The Taleban are applying the Maoist strategy of drawing the enemy in into "base areas" with difficult surrounding terrain - before winter. The time for chewing up TSPA units occupying the "town" niches will come later. The supply lines for Talebs run all over the place and need not pass through the "towns".

[svinayak]

Bji,
Need you comments here.


http://www.stanford.edu/~dossani1/Polit ... uction.pdf

Does South Asia Exist? (Brookings Institution, 2009)
Rafiq Dossani, Daniel Sneider and Vikram Sood
Introductory Chapter


Introduction
The goal of collective regional action, or regionalism, is to enhance each member state’s
development and security.1 South Asia has, so far, achieved neither outcome. A region
that was, for the most part,2 a single state prior to 1947 became multiple states that moved
apart politically, culturally and economically – to the extent that one state, Pakistan, deintegrated
with the creation of Bangladesh, in 1971.
Failures – both on development and security cooperation – have hurt South Asia, which
contains two nuclear-armed states and among the worst incidence of cross-border human
trafficking3 and terrorism. It ranks among the regions with the world’s lowest human
development (on infant mortality, it ranks below sub-Saharan Africa). Regional trade is
only 5% of total trade, compared with 26% in ASEAN and 22% in COMESA countries.
The recently approved South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) contains a ‘negative
list’, i.e., items not covered by SAFTA, that constitute 53% of total current trade.
As of 2009, it is almost as if South Asia is alive only in the memories of those who
remember or study colonial times; absent the memories and the study, it would not be
necessary to invent a region called South Asia. Understanding the historical and
institutional contexts of the failure is one goal of this book.

[brihaspati]

Acharya-ji,
seems to be an interesting attempt. On a first glance through this brief introduction - it is indeed heartening to see that they come very close to the real issues of contention. Without reading the rest of the book - however, my impression is that they cannot reach at a reasonable solution because they cannot recognize or discuss the key difficulties.

These would be the fundamental requirements for socio-economic-political homogenization - what they term "regionalism" - that is some degree of commonality of objectives and criteria in social, economic and political structures and processes.

The key requirement is homogenization of "identity". As long as identities are seen to be competing and contradictory, values to evaluate what can become "common objectives" will be seen to be contradictory. For example, even such an innocent looking objective of purely "economic" growth could be seen to be problematic. For, identity A may see economic growth in identity B as a threat - from several different angles. First more growth in B may attract members of B to switch to A. Second, B may use its economic superiority to militarily coerce A to subscribe to B.

There can also be perception of threat, if the given supposed common objective - say economic growth - may have a prerequisite and a consequence that is damaging for the identity. Thus if the economic growth is based on pursuit of modern science and technology, this will need educational grounding that crucially encourages independent thought and exploration or questioning of existing views. This could be seen as a threat by religious identities which survive on implicit obedience and unquestioning belief. On the other hand, the consequence of economic growth could lead to substitution of older values thought of as integral to the survival of the identity. For example by giving higher monetary value, purchasing power and decisionmaking to women in an identity that has made virtual (there can be tall claims otherwise but the identity could insist on priorities that actually make the claim unrealizable) economic disempowerment of women a necessary feature of that identity.

Almost all the methods they hint at, will come up against the same wall. Any act of achievement of "growth" - including "economic" - will only mean greater conflict in the arena of identity based mobilizations. Power centres based on these identities will try to sharpen their exclusivity to balance processes of homogenization.

The only method that remains in the given situation of perception of contradictiry identities - is the formation of a single state encompassing all the "regions" - that also ensures homogenization of identity. I will leave the method to imagination.

I will try to answer in greater details to the methods and issues they raise.

[brihaspati]

SG has finally made her stance clear that "there is nothing that can't be solved through dialogue" as per NDTV, in the context of Indo-Pak proposed discussions. After a cautious period of sleeping on it, until the media outrage about S-E-S dies out and loses steam. Now the J&K speech of MMS-ji on the back of SG's comment and Hilllary Clinton's urging of dialogue - means that the timeline for a new arrangement in the "north" cannot be delayed anymore.

It will be most interesting now to see all the deceptive parties in this game put on their deceptive colours. And how much the leaders of India play with the lives and dreams of the people as bartering pawns for their own overwhelming need to stay on in power.

[Sanku]

There was program on NDTV last night where Amitabh Matoo was saying that the current peace moves are extension of SeS, unfortunately he meant that positvely.

Any which way it is now clear that neither was SeS an inadvertent error (including Balochistan) and the next steps of the same game are already underway.

http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/ne ... =435#VPlay

So while there is a lot of smoke screen of business as usual and no big deal around it, it is clear that a section of Political leadership is pushing for a agenda which is very different from the past actions of GoI

The effort primarily seems towards giving Pakistan breathing space1
1) Being able to berate India on terror use as well -- as we can see from the continuing statements from Pak civilian establishment
2) Space to NOT ACT on real issues which hurt India i.e. avoid turning off the tap on the Jehadi elements targeting India
3) Space to play out the game of succession of power in Pakistan, i.e. who owns and implements the next iteration of definition and implementation of idea of Pakistan and how.

--------------------------

I replied to the above in S e S thread as well since a lot of things here tie up with S e S.

Meanwhile part two of the two step process, (India eases up on Pakistan and US uses that window to get out of Afgn) is underway

US set to pay Taliban members to switch sides
http://ibnlive.in.com/news/us-set-to-pa ... ml?from=tn

[brihaspati]

USA will need to support India in a limited way - just enough to keep the chain firmly on TSP neck to toe US lines. But they are hedging their bets on something they really do not understand from their highly shortsighted, racist and religious biases. They think that the TSP and Talebs are only out for consumptive resources and have no ideological drives intertwined.

They also want to pay for this via India. So it will be India which will have to give concessions to Pakistan and practically be the whipping boy for anything that goes wrong in TSP. This fits in with the picture that apparently the current regime has been officially shown to be enjoying overwhelming popular support. I would see that massive electoral success would become a precondition for taking up measures and policies that may turn out to be damaging for India in the future. The legitimacy afforded y electoral support can be used to justify such potentially damaging steps - "after all they had popular mandate. They could not have foreseen that other parties involved would betray or deceive - there has to be a certain degree of trust in any international initiative", etc etc. "They could not have been insincere as people laid their trust in this grouping".

[brihaspati]

NIC 2009 report

Incentives for the Pakistani government to secure the border region and fight violent extremism include developing mutually beneficial intelligence sharing, increasing non-military aid to Pakistan with stipulations that there will be improvements in border security, and shoring up specific deficiencies in the Pakistani military rather than providing blanket military aid. Diplomatic overtures to address the Kashmir dispute with India would be a critical incentive for Pakistan to redeploy troops from areas in eastern Pakistan to lines along the Afghani-Pakistani border.

Noting the source from which this comes, and the previous passage in the main report linked above ("military surge" in AFG) it is easy to see the way American security agencies ambitions lean on certain directions. But note that a crucial component in the success of this plan is also dependent on overt military success in AFG. There is not much actually being thought openly about what happens if the military op in AFG doesn't succeed.

Further at least officially, (pp 33-34)

The best strategy for the United States to pursue in order address the threat of a breached Pakistani nuclear program will involve the following:
• Negotiate a 123 Agreement with Pakistan that would shore up security for its nuclear arsenal. Due to past transgressions, (including the AQ Khan proliferation network) current law in Washington denies high technology nuclear trade. The idea that Pakistan is somehow more of a risk without these technological safeguards is not only antiquated, it is logically unsound. The US should reiterate that it does not seek to control Pakistani nuclear weapons but rather shares a mutual interest with Pakistan in its nuclear security integrity.
• Persuade Pakistan to take a more comprehensive approach to countering insurgents within its borders. Pakistan is heavily dependent on foreign aid and receives considerable sums from the US for its support in Operation Enduring Freedom. The United States should use military aid as a bargaining tool to compel
Pakistan to deal more effectively with domestic sources of terrorism. Both India and the United States have implicated Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency in the recent Mumbai terror attacks that killed hundreds of civilians.
• Mediate the Pakistani-Indian Kashmir dispute. Formulating a plan for stability over the Kashmir territorial dispute that has plagued inter-state relations between India and Pakistan since their independence is likely to be met with some resistance from India. However, it is unlikely that the US will achieve significant Pakistani support in combating al Qa’ida safe havens in its Northwest Frontier while Pakistani domestic politics would prefer to have the military facing eastward.

At long last even the USA is beginning to recognize the fundamental ideological nature of the danger : (p54)

The Al Qa’ida fundamentalist ideology remains appealing to a significant number of individuals, its attacks have increased in frequency and sophistication, its resources network has expanded, and its organizational structure has also evolved, consisting of both top down and bottom up leadership.3 These realties are the current challenges faced in dismantling the Al Qa’ida organizations. Such resolute religious ideology is difficult to deter. Clearly, al Qa’ida can adapt to new battlefields, recruits members, evolve its tactics, and support operations. A more traditional top-down approach involves issuing strategy and operations from a central hub in Pakistan while the bottom up approach encourages independent action from low level operatives.4

Note that this indicates an important confusion in US strategic thinking and a dilemma. They could be scared that coming down too hard on Pakistan may actually force the Jihadis to go for further decentralization away from Pakistan into Africa etc., where it can get even more diffuse and uncontrollable. It is likely that idea of allowing TSP to survive as a kind of local trap that contains an infection away from "home" - must have tempted one or more of the strategists driving White House.

At least recognizing the ideological nature of the danger is allowing the USA to consider the real limitation of US effectiveness: (p55)

Most terrorist organizations (43 percent) dismantle as a result of incorporation in to a state’s political process.6 However, al Qa’ida primary political goals of instigating a Islamic confrontation with the US and its allies, overthrowing Western friendly governments, and establishing a Salafist pan-Islamic caliphate in the Middle East and North Africa is irreconcilable with all affected governments.7

I willf ollow this post with an analysis to show from the same doc, how such glimmers of correct realizations are however producing the wrong tactics and strategies to deal with Jihadis in US minds.

[brihaspati]

The consequence of "western" thinking on Jihad and the blunders - 1

From the previous NIC link (p79)

Militant Islamic groups use religion to justify the use of violence as an effective means of demanding attention to their cause.102 This allows them to proclaim they are engaged in a global war on behalf of all Muslims.103 They are also deeply unsatisfied with secular politics as they see them as being unable to promote good governance and economic advancement in Muslim countries104. These extremists recognize their ability to take advantage of these weak secular governments’ inability to provide for even the most needy of citizens.105 They see it as imperative that governments are inseparable from religion. 106 Herein where, these radicals view the US’ promotion of church and state separation as an obstacle to the betterment of their governments.

Note that USA is thinking that the basic objectives of the Jihadis are the same as "west" expects of all societies - "good governance" and "economic advancement". But here lies the confusion - for in one line the strategists are showing a lack of awareness of the possibility that the meaning of those words to the Jihadis could be radically different from that of "west". "good governance" to a Jihadi and "economic advancement" need not mean the same thing as an US sociologist or economist understands it to be. The Jihadi essentially wants to reproduce a medieval Arab bedouin nomadic social structure with all its power relations as modified by Muhammad. Here all else, including technology is only accepted if it helps in reinforcing that social structure.

(p80)

These fundamentalists can also be seen as reacting to a crisis within Islam, frantically trying to assert Islam’s place in this ever-globalizing world.107 They feel like Islam is threatened within the current world system viewing it as “anti-Muslim, deeply unjust, and unchallengeable.”108 Some even argue that to preserve its power the US is working to undermine the creation of a united Arab force.109

Here "globalization" is acknowledged to be seen by Islam as "threatening" and that the current world system is "anti-Muslim". Now why is globalization a threat to Islam - it is claimed to be a humanitarian, peaceful, and progressive theology? Globalization increases mutual exposure and communication of ideas which should actually then help Islam to flourish and spread? On the other hand, why should any ideological framework that is against Islam and therefore not beneficial to humanity, be popular and not resisted by the non-Muslim world? There is also the subconscious impression that Arab==Islam! Why is USA failing to recognize the two fundamental thrust of Islam - global dominance under a reproduction of societal structure at the time of Muhammad, and complete destruction of all possibility of any alternatives?

Contrary to common perception, these actors are from middle to upper classes, hold jobs and have consciously made the decision to use the form of terrorism to bring attention to their cause.110 They are not mentally unsound or acting without logic.111 They rely heavily on mass media and modern technology rather than traditional political institutions to mobilize support, while simultaneously rejecting cultural modernity.112 The essential use of media to establish prosperous public relations has been crucial to their appeal to the wider society. It fact, “In recent years, the emergence of videotapes and satellite television has popularized Islamic fundamentalist views [which] in some cases have fueled outbreaks of terrorism.”113 An increased access to technology has given widespread voice to resentment and has thus made terrorism even easier. In Pakistan specifically, the principle strategy by radical Islamists is to gain control over civil society institutions (media, education etc.) in additional to the legal system, to eventually capture the state.114

Thus Jihad is not coming out of "illogical" or "unsound" minds. So these people must be using some kin d of logic to arrive at Jihad. If the logical process is alright then the fault must lie in the starting axioms? Obviously then these axioms are not coming from "western" philosophies (for then they would have reached "sane" western non-Jihad!) but Islam proper? If modern processes of education, media are unable to displace these axioms but on the other hand simply reinforce them to greater heights of sadism - then one of the key arguments for "development" as a tool to combat "Jihadi terror" falls flat!

Muslim extremists strongly believe that Western societies, especially the American, are innately hostile to their religion and way of life, and therefore these they cannot co-exist.116 This fundamental guiding principle allows them freedom from constraint in using violence- as they view themselves as preserving their way of life.

What in western or American societies are so strongly and innately hostile to Islamic "way of life"? The western lifestyle is based on affluence and a super-abundance of material consumption with consequent necessary good-governance and blurring of many types of discriminatory barriers that existed in previous societies - including gender based interpretations of rights and freedoms. But in the starting lines of this same article - it was claimed that Jihadi violence is aimed at establishing "good governance" and "economic advancement"? What is the reality of Islamic way of life that is sought to be protected? Religiously guaranteed and sanctified slavery, and draconian treatment of what any arbitrary powerful group can claim as going against laws of "sexual behaviour"?

It should be noted that a small percentage of Muslims can be classified as nonnegotiable extremists, and rather many value family, seek justice, accountable governments, and do not believe Islam requires violence.117 However, these few radicals find support as everyday life is hard for citizens, and resentment towards the US goes unchallenged.

This is a most interesting claim. The fundamental confusion of disjointing individually expressed sentiments with that of collective passivity or switching over to active support to fundamentalist Islamic memes as and when conditions ripen (Iranian "revolution" for example). After devoting pages and passages in pointing out the ideological mindset even in the educated and "logical/sound mind" Islamist, here comes the crushing illogicality of the US argument.

[brihaspati]

The consequence of "western" thinking on Jihad and the blunders - 2
From the previous NIC link (p207)

The United States’ national security goal specific to Pakistan is: A politically stable State able to effectively contain violent extremism domestically, and able to guarantee the United States’ security expectations regarding material relevant to nuclear weapons. This is the most realistic achievable goal that has the greatest ability to meet or exceed the United States’ national security objectives. It acknowledges that Pakistan is where the combination of strengthening non-state actor terrorist organizations and unregulated nuclear fission material is greatest.

There goes any hope for any forumite here that TSP will not be kept afloat and will be allowed to implode - at least until USA can protect it.

[the article will analyze] the conflict in priorities between Pakistan and the United States by identifying Pakistan’s security priorities:
• Protecting nuclear weapons from India and/or the United States
• Control of Kashmir
• Prevention of US or Indian control in Afghanistan
Finally it will acknowledge that terrorist organizations, anti-American sentiment and nuclear weapon technology will never be completely eliminated. However America’s new national security strategy is the United States’ best opportunity to achieve the stated goal.

The latter half will identify and analyze establishing transparency and an agreement on Pakistan’s security priorities and the United States’ priorities for Pakistan as the best strategy to best effectively execute the following means:
• Securing Pakistani nuclear weapons and materials relevant to nuclear programs
• Denying the use of nuclear weapons by extremist organizations
• Securing the Pakistani-Afghani border from arms and drug trade, and migration of terrorists
• Eliminating known Islamic extremist headquarters and training camps
• Strengthening the legitimacy, monopoly of power and ability to provide basic civil services of a civilian Pakistani government
• Improving socioeconomic conditions that breed violent instability
These means will best achieve the responsibilities of securing the Homeland and American citizens. Without Pakistan’s active and full cooperation, the United States and the broader international community cannot reconstruct Afghanistan, defeat the Taliban, and work towards eliminating international terrorism.

All of these methods (look at the details within the article) are geared towards an aim (not necessarily realizable) of stabilizing TSP - which combined with the intentional or unintentional confusion over the nature of Jihad, means continued trauma for India.

As for Kashmir : here is the cautious hint of the Good Friday Agreement type underlying strategy -

Third, initiate structured talks again with India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Though this may bring political concentration away from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the results of open communication allows for less military concentration. The United States’ Secretary of State Clinton and China should mediate peace talks by pigging (!sic - which American was editing this report??) backing on recent successes. In fall of 2008, trade routes opened in Kashmir, and Pakistan vowed to prosecute those responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. One route of compromise is founded upon former President Musharoff’s four part solution. It involves, “keeping the current boundaries intact and making the Lind of Control that divides Kashmir irrelevant, demilitarizing both sides of the LOC, developing a plan for self governance of Kashmir, and instituting a mechanism for India and Pakistan to jointly supervise the region324.”

Unfortunately, based on sixty years of history, and many foreign policy exports, “There really isn't a game plan, other than just hoping something like American pressure will work over time325.” Both soft and hard power have been used to solve the situation but to no success. However, the United States goal is not solving the problem. Its only intention is to allow an opportunity for any forward progress concerning the region to be made which makes the reallocation of some Pakistani troops possible.

[...Conclusion]
Requests for increased multilateral cooperation from the European Union, Russia and China are centered around the idea that violent extremists in a failing nuclear weapons state are not an American predicament, but a global concern. It recognizes Pakistani focus on Kashmir, and understands the inevitable link that progress in Kashmir, means progress along the Afghanistan border.

The United States’ needs full Pakistani cooperation in order to guarantee stability in nuclear South Asia, and prevent the complete collapse of Pakistan as a state itself. This strategy is focused to do just that.

Thus the line that the entire Jihad problem in AFPAK- "South Asia" - and then the world - is fundamentally dependent on "solving the Kashmir" problem has already been framed. And the methods suggested in the article shows the soundness of "information gathering" achieved by US heads heated up over AFPAK. But they also show the infantility of their understanding of Islam and the naivete of their own proposed solutions. Even when recognizing that education or socio-economic development actually intensifies Jihad - they suggest exactly those methods in Pakistan. They want China to come into mediating between India and TSP - where both USA and PRC are keen to protect Pakistani interests only.

An interesting question arises - if a destabilized or destroyed Pakistan is horrific for the world - what will a destabilized India resulting from the overwhelming eagerness of USA and PRC to protect their strategic asset and lapdog be causing to the world? Do the USA and PRC realize how much the "educated" and tech-savvy Indians under Islam can be a pain for them? Just a few Islamists from Deoband in India could stir up a Pakistan - what will happen when all the hated "Hindu" disappears to become the purer Mumin!

[Johann]

Brihaspati,

US policy is achieving the very opposite of what it hopes to do - stabilise Pakistan.

That is because its primary objective (preventing further terrorist attacks in the US at minimum cost) overrides its flawed institutional conceptualisation of the strategic situation.

That is not to say that there aren't significant numbers of senior people in the USG who recognise this dichotomy. Some of them are fine with it, and others are trying to change the way its implemented in order to relieve the friction.

None of it will make much difference to the outcome. The bottom line is that the USG can not relieve its pressure on Pakistan or the PA even if it wants to. That is the fundamental driver in the civil war within Pakistan and the PA.

[surinder]

DC's problems with TSP are because of its desire to simultaneously acheive two diametrically opposing goals: On one hand it does not want to see TSP crippled, collapsed or seriously decapitated. On the other, it has all the reason to wage war on it, and is already doing it.

Uncle-TSP relationship is like that of a rich man and his local hired goon who does his dirty work. The muscled goon has gone mad and is now hurting the rich master. The rich Don does not wish to liquidate his erstwhile goon as he would to someone else who hurt him, but at the same time he cannot let the goon continue to hurt him either. The Don will make all attempts to nurture the goon back to health to revert back to the previous relationship.

TSP has been an important a source for U S force projection, and has been a very very useful ally who has done a lot of dirty work for U S G. Its military-dominant setup is an ideal setup for U S. TSP provides strategic depth to USG, similar to the depth provided by Talibum to TSP. The irony is that US-TSP relationship is == TSP-Talibum relationship.

The folks in DC think both the goals are achievable, and that is why they are following a policy of a very carefully calibrated response to turn the rudder of TSP & TSPA in the direction more to their liking. Unfortunately, TSP is no longer amenable to this fine tuning; it is a nation gasping for oxygen, not a healthy state seeking to refine its direction.

[brihaspati]

Johann-ji and Surinder,
both of you express the dilemma in a very compact way. My point is that given such a self-defeating strategy pursued y the USA - the consequence for Indian people is at th very least traumatic, and quite possibly disastrous.

There is no place for emotion in politics between cynical nation powers. Realizing the power of USA to be a national nuisance for us through its attempts at shoring up and "managing" both TSP and PRC egos - I would rather propose an alternative which should be much more attractive for US interests if their racial and religious instincts can be "bought" off.

Part of US trust in TSP stems from the Abrahamic foundations of USA's dominant world-view (at least among the continuing structures of various secret services and elite groupings that provide most of the actual twists to US state policy).

But on the otherhand - maybe because they stem from the farthest branch of the immigrating "Germanic" - they are also quite conscious of "costs". USA has time and again shown the flexibility of "cutting costs" when it became apparent that their Abrahamic worldview was causing "too much expense" (in life, money and costs of potential enmity).

So my proposal would be a very simple one. That USA considers dissolution of TSP (helping in the locating and elimination of its nukes) as a rashtra, and allow the amalgamation of its people into provinces under Indian government. In return, India guarantees land access to CA, infrastructure and business opportunities in these regions. The benefits to USA and the world is immense. Henceforth, they will need to give little or no money at all to shore up a dubious TSP and TSPA. India eliminates terror export to the world - as the terror networks can no longer find an internationally acknowledged rashtra (as TSP was serving) to cover for them. TSP economy gets integrated with a much more efficient economy. Even the stated goals of "education" and "development" of the "communities" gain a much more efficient tool close at hand. On the other hand India becomes a strong buffer to Russian, Iranian and Chinese expansion plans into IOR and hold these powers at bay on behalf of USA.

Thus it is all "gains" for the USA (with no apprehension of India becoming a "rogue") given that the fundamental need in Indian elite to find a "guru" among the Anglo-Saxonic and find intense solace in ecoming a protege of such entities - is likely to continue over several more gnerations to come. Who knows, even the 'Indian"-American community may be able to reassure providing a strong guarantee for such behaviour!

[Sanku]

In return, India guarantees land access to CA, infrastructure and business opportunities in these regions. The benefits to USA and the world is immense.

Lucid post.

However and please do take this query frankly -- irrespective of the "practicality" and "inevitability" and "real politic" considerations you have alluded (quite rightly) including the quest of Indians to look for anglo-saxon gurus --

do you really find this situation of Indian guaranteeing benefits to US as palatable?

That is -- the much mocked at -- Japan model roughly speaking (extrapolated for India) -- In the era of a dying hyper power what purpose does this serve from the point of a 400% Jingo?

Other than a temporary Chankian move of course. That I will understand (if not accept or think of as the best alternative)

[svinayak]

On the other hand India becomes a strong buffer to Russian, Iranian and Chinese expansion plans into IOR and hold these powers at bay on behalf of USA.

Pakistan was designated by Caroe in 1947 to take up that job to hold other countries at Bay.
This arming of Pakistan for 60 years was part of this strategy.

[A_Gupta]

Off-topic:
Shiv, the thread on bharatiya point of view, etc., is locked. Just to say that no one is trying to tell the mango-wallah anything. The point is that unlike the physical sciences - where Indian knowledge will match Western knowledge - the social sciences, including economics, are necessarily permeated with assumptions about the nature of humans - the nature of the psychological self, morality, what humans strive for, etc., etc., - and yet they are presented as presenting universal truths. Cultural differences however, may be undergirded by different assumptions of human nature. We have a very facile and shallow understanding of the West, and hence of western social sciences, and hence of ourselves, as well.

PS: for some more of this type of thinking, this from within the West, see the Systems of Obedience series, by Arthur Silber, starting with
http://powerofnarrative.blogspot.com/20 ... e-and.html
One doesn't have to agree with Silber to see that there is a kernel of truth that has remained unexamined.

[Johann]

Brihaspati

Part of US trust in TSP stems from the Abrahamic foundations of USA's dominant world-view (at least among the continuing structures of various secret services and elite groupings that provide most of the actual twists to US state policy).

The US has not trusted Pakistan for several years now.

However, it continues to need access to Pakistan to
a) thwart jihadi terrorist plots
b) support US forces in Afghanistan
c) maintain contingency options in the event of a takeover by openly hostile forces

The real foundation of the previous era of trust was not so much about religious/theological congruency, as it was the Subcontinent's Muslim temporal ruling classes strategic decision to stop fighting the West after the disastrous attempt at jihad in 1857 and the enormous human, economic and political price they paid for it. If you cant beat 'em, join 'em was what it amounted to.

The Muslim religious classes unlike the political and economic elites never gave up on the idea of Islam's ability to triumph against the West and re-establishing dar-ul-Islam. Some of them retreated to places like Deoband to insulate themselves against modernity, others like Maududi sought to harness modernity in the cause of restoring Islamic power.

The Muslim ruling classes increasing reliance on the most hostile elements of the religious class (mostly the result of the ruling classes venality and misgovernance) is the fundamental source of the progressive unravelling in the alliance which held through WWI, WWII and the Cold War.

But on the otherhand - maybe because they stem from the farthest branch of the immigrating "Germanic" - they are also quite conscious of "costs".

In a democracy it is not strategists that set the bar for the acceptable costs of policy- it is public opinion.

Politicians lose when the public is unhappy with them. No long term strategy can survive unless its short term (i.e. political cycle) costs and risks are manageable. When it comes to national security failures that cost American lives, the US voting public is willing to forgive an incumbent only once.

Losing intelligence access to Pakistan and Afghanistan will result in successful terrorist attacks in the mainland US. Whatever policy the US pursues will be the one that preserves it at what they hope is acceptable cost to the American public.

Even highly experienced American politicians can misjudge both the cost of a policy, and the public's tolerance for those costs. Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam was the most spectacular. The Republican party has paid heavily for the miscalculations of veterans like Cheney and Rumsfeld. They serve as cautionary tales for every President who wants to be a Roosevelt or a Reagan. Truman was hailed for concluding WWII and building the post-war architecture, and then left power with record lows in popularity for the bloody stalemate in Korea. Eisenhower and Nixon both came to power on the promise to end wars begun by their predecessors *without* throwing in the towel in the Cold War.

[surinder]

When it comes to national security failures that cost American lives, the US voting public is willing to forgive an incumbent only once.

Only once? Because the president can be an incumbent only once (2-term limit). Among those who do face as incumbents more than once---senators, congressmen---public opinion seems to be more forgiving.

How many Senators lost their seats for supporting Iraq war II ?

[Johann]

Hi Surinder,

I was largely talking about the Presidency which is what most Americans hold ultimately responsible for foreign and defence policy.

In terms of what the Iraq war cost the Republican party in the House and Senate, you can look at the Congressional elections of 2006 when the Republicans lost control, as well as the growth in the number of 'purple' states that had gone from quite red to red and blue.

This is well before the economic crisis of summer-fall 2008 tipped the Presidential race towards Obama.

[surinder]

None of the key senators who voted & rooted for Gulf war II got booted out.

U S President cannot be an incumbent more than once, as per the law. Anyways, in 2004 the public voted Bush in for the 2nd time even though at that time the cost of war was evident, and the WMD were proven to be a false pretext. They went in to the 2nd term with eyes wide open. While GWB was not that popular, what got him & the republians was not wars, but economy, the specter of an immenent & complete collapse.

(Perhaps OT for this thread. Perhaps I am just nitpicking; as I am sure I am not saying something which you do not know, given your vast encyclopediac knowledge.)

[brihaspati]

Johann ji,
I had written before about the progressive increase in flexibility with regards to ideological commitments versus "costs" - as the Germanic migrated from Northern Europe, through to colonizing the fringes of Roman Empire, to forming the Anglo-Saxon to America. At each stage the extremists at either ends of the society migrated - leaving behind a more "rigid" society as far as ideological obsessions are concerned (the middle orders are most "conservative" - the "top" wants to change because they have "everything" and are bored, and the "bottom" wants to change because they have "nothing" and any change means gains. The middle has something to lose and changes always appear risky initially).

The US represents this dynamic of extremes - and the ideological commitment side of the foundations of the nation. Its national projections are always a dynamic compromise between these two forces of "idealism" and "profiteering". The latter is quick to "cut losses" when the going gets rough but equally eager to shar in the booty when the going appears safe. The idealists are the longer term warriors in this game - and over the long term it is they who determine the course of US policy. They perhaps do compromise temporarily on their long term objectives to the more "profit" oriented section.

Without going too much into the historical options available to the Anglo-Saxon at 1947 - the linkages built up by Mountbatten and others with the Congress leadership and especially JLN, should have immediately made them realize the utility of relying more on India to serve its strategic interests than on TSP. The long term projections of the future of TSP could not have been obscure for people who had intimately mixed and manipulated ML for decades. We can see a consistent pattern of admiration and reliance for the Islamic in the Anglo-Saxon that persisted from the days of "orientalism" to Himmler and post WWII. Time and again, yes maybe for purely Chankyan tactical stimulation of egos, but yet a sense of shared affiliation from the Judaeo-Christian framework and world-view. It was this shared sense of common purpose and objectives, suitably modified by racial reconstructions, that leads the Anglo-Saxon to rely (even if cynically in the hope of appealing to common "heritage") more on the Abrahamic than on any other ideological framework.

What is interesting to note is that US ideologues have shown sufficient flexibility to toy with alternatives to the classical Abrahamic - which means they have advanced to the stage of recognizing religion or faith as a strategic tool. This is what tickles the Chankyan SDRE side of me to project the potential of India for such flexibility.

[brihaspati]

Sanku ji,
I sometimes cannot hide my sarcasm. But I have mostly got rid of the habit. The last part of my post was in bitter self-accusation. Example of Japan can be naughty - if you think of the latest PM. If people want to learn from their example, who am I to stop them with my limited impact!

Seriously, even a dying hyperpower can be useful - especially when it is on the brink of losing its status as the dominant one. I have nothing but national interest at the deeper level in my heart and for the longer term. Time is on our side. Hopefully that answers your question - the most I can do on an open thread.

[Johann]

Surinder,

Its a fair question.

+ Although many Democrats initially supported Iraq, it was the Republican Party that was most closely associated with it not only because of Bush, but the vigour with which the Republican party continued to defend the decision to go to war, as well as the conduct of the war.

In the 2006 elections the Republicans lost *30* seats to the Democrats, and the consensus is that Iraq was the single biggest issue of the elections.

You can take a look at these for details.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Sta ... ions,_2006
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Sta ... ions,_2006

+ A President needs to win re-election only once, but they care a *great* deal about their legacy.

More than that the President's party still needs to worry about the next election. Korea cost the Democrats in 1952, Vietnam cost them in 1968, and Iraq was part of the Republicans problem in 2008 even though the same individuals did not stand for re-election.

[Johann]

Brihaspati,

Have you counted the sheer number of anti-Islamic polemics written in West in the same period? If you did you might start to think that Islamic paranoia about the West had a point.

There was a fascination with the Muslim world in the West that is about much more than religion.

For 800 years the Muslim world was the only other civilisation that the West had direct contact with, even as it fought desperately to avoid being overwhelmed while coping with the disruption from the collapse of the Western Roman empire.

Everything that came in or out of the West came through them. The Muslim world had profited enormously from being the intellectual and trade crossroads of the world, and the West was acutely aware that it had to catch up before it could overtake them.

The Muslim World for the colonising West was the intimate enemy - something they through contact knew better and longer than any other civilisation.

The first British colonies in India were in Bengal, Madras and Bombay. These were the anchors of inward expansion. Neither the running of these presidencies, nor the means of expansion were anchored on any alliance with Muslims.

It was not until the aftermath of 1857 that the Muslim ruling classes offered an alliance. The model they looked to had already been established by Nepalese with the Gurkhas, and Sikh troops.

One of the European conceits, shared by the Americans is that there is a Westerner struggling to get out of every non-Westerner.

Those who seem to agree and expedite the process are to be trusted, praised and supported - those who resist it are to be condemned and fought.

Amongst the Colonised those who had converted to Christianity were trusted to a certain extent, but the most liked were those of the elite who seemed to have wholesale adopted Western manners and/or language.

Muslim elites in the Subcontinent after 1857 played to this conceit right to the hilt. By enthusiastically adopting certain external elements of lifestyle, language and dress and they won a great deal of trust and affection.

It wasn't just the British who were affected by this. On my last visit to India a few months ago, I was talking to a Sikh businessman in his 40s who was very unhappy about the increasing numbers of Muslims in his area. He said that as a Sikh he had been brought up with very negative feelings towards Muslims as whole. Yet he talked nostalgically of 'a different class of Muslims' - and the wonderfully posh parties they threw on immaculate grounds, even if the hosts themselves never touched a drop. The remarkable thing is that he didn't see that this class of Muslims he liked and made an exception for was the very same one that supported, created and ran Pakistan, which he hated with a passion.

These are the guys who ran Pakistan, and after 1947 they continued the same post-1857 approach of offering the West assistance in its struggles, and emphasising their 'Westernisation' in addition to their identification with Western interests.

None of this changed the underlying incompatibility between dreams of Islamic greatness and the materialism and diversity of globalisation, or the dependence on militant Islamists for internal power, and the West for external support.

In any case between the cultural and economic forces of globalisation (going both ways with Bollywood), at a people to people level the West increasingly has far more in common with India than Pakistan.

[brihaspati]

Johann ji,
I am indeed aware of the anti-Islam polemics in the period. But what matters to me more is the stance of those closely linked with the official and administrative setup on the AS side (simply stated the power elite). The general intellectual or religio political polemics would be strongly anti-Islamic in terms of culture etc. But when strategic interests are in context there is almost inevitably a strong sweet flavour in favour of Islam. In fact AS encourages the "purer" Wahabi form from Arabia against the supposedly "decadent" version of Islam practised by the Ottomans. It can obviously be interpreted as a cynical strategic ploy to undermine the Ottoman, and safeguard the "Indian empire" by securing the ME. But what can happen realistically is that in the process, some in AS will "discover" the "purity" of the Abrahamic flavour in Islam. Or those who were already in search for a "puritanical" version of the Abrahamic will find echos. Between strategic cynical manipulation and a puritanical Abrahamic ideal, they can intensify each other.

So many sent out to repress an "ideology" have "converted" or been strongly modified in favour of such ideologies. "Saul/Paul" himself is perhaps an example of such a narrative.

My hope is that from almost 200 years of manipulating religions as strategic weapons, the AS in USA has at last begun to realize that there could be options outside of the traditional "Abrahamic" to serve the same "interests".

[Johann]

Brihaspati,

+ I appreciate what you are saying, but there are strategic problems about the Pakistan situation that have nothing to do with the use or abuse of religion.

+ Have you read the government correspondence, or the accounts of the 'Wahabee trials', aka the 'Hindustan Fanatics'? The British and radical Islam were at war on the subcontinent from 1829 to 1870.

For the British as well as the Islamists, 1857 was not a nationalist Indian war, but a religious war between Islam and Christianity with no quarter given or taken which Islam decisively lost.

There were no Syed Ali Khans or Anglo-Oriental Muslim Colleges until that defeat.

+ Britain's chief rivals certainly paid attention to that conflict

During the Anglo-German rivalry that took off in the 1890s it was the Germans and the Ottoman Empire (both under Abdul Hamid II and the CUP) that sought to sought to play the Pan-Islamic card against the British in particular

During Wilhelm II's visit in 1898 he paid for the renovation of Saladin's tomb, whose renovation he paid for, and declared that if he was to be anything other than a Christian he would be a Muslim.

In 1914 the fatwa of the grand mufti of Istanbul declared jihad on the British, Russians and French as infidels who had encroached on dar-ul-Islam, and praised the Germans as friends of Islam.

The Germans and Ottoman Empire put an enormous amount of effort in to stirring up jihad from Egypt to Iran to Afghanistan and India, which ultimately produced the third Anglo-Afghan war and pro-Caliphate movements of the 1920s.

I would very strongly recommend Peter Hopkirk's "Like Hidden Fire" and John Fisher's "Gentleman Spies" about the extent to which the Imperial government feared the Pan-Islamist threat.

John Buchan, one of the first modern spy thriller writers was an intelligence officer himself in this period, and wrote a novel that reflected those fears called 'Greenmantle'.

The Germans attempted to play a similar card in WWII through the support of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who broadcast calls to jihad from Rome and Berlin.

In both World Wars the British defused the threat of Pan-Islamism in the Middle East by supporting Arab nationalism.

The case of the Subcontinent was trickier. There was no absolute way to guarantee Muslim loyalty, other than promise to protect their privileges and political interests.

Today its the same story. As long as the US depends on Pakistan's cooperation, it must pay a price.

[brihaspati]

Johann ji,
as far as I know, it is on record that the British used the offices of Turkish Caliph when dealing with Tipu Sultan’s opposition
to the British presence in Southern India. Wellesley, the Governor General of the EIC produced a letter from the Ottoman Caliph
Salim III in the name of Tipu Sultan asking him not to oppose the British, but should make friendship with them. (Admitted, could e a forgery) The British also used the office of the Caliph to pacify Islamic resistance during the conflict of 1857. [Ali Ashraf, “Khilafat Movement: A Factor in Muslim Separatism” in Mushirul Hasan ed., Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India, New Delhi, Manohar, 1985, p. 85].

In this game, things perhaps were not always very black and white. The students of Aligarh College responded positively to fundcollection drive for Turkey and the Caliphate. Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan, was reputedly once a great admirer of Turkey and adopted the Turkish Fez as part of early Aligarh uniform. His later life statements and qualifications about the fine points of religious etymology of the term "Caliph" to align Indian Muslim support towards the British represents a very late shift. In fact the level of sympathy and support from students of this pro-British instiution is exemplified by Abdur Rehman Peshawari, a senior student in Aligarh, from NWFP. He quit his studies, sold all his belongings to meet costs and went to Turkey as part of a medical mission without informing his wealthy father.

Even the history of the various Turkish missions, (some led by German officers), or the "silk conspiracy", etc, the 1917-1918 internecine conflict in the Muslim theologians internecine fight over pro-Brit or pro-Caliphate positions - all point to a rather muddled alignment.

As for the Grand Mufti, I think he was initially a recruit of the Brits. Musa Kasim Pasha al-Husseini, the mayor of Jerusalem was given a copy of the Protocols by a British officer in 1918 after the British Mandate was established in 1917. (Kenneth Timmerman, "Preachers of Hate", Crown Forum 2003 p. 101). His nephew, (the later Grand Mufti) Haj Amin al-Husseini reportedly came across the Protocols. Haj al-Husseini organized Arabs for a pogrom on the Jews at the Western Wall on April 4, 1920. Jabotinsky's Jewish militia quelled the riot. Haj Amin immediately fled to Transjordan to seek asylum while the British courts in Jerusalem sentenced him to 10 years in prison. Then the British High Commissioner of Palestine, Herbert Samuel, pardoned him.

Besides the British pardon, it is now known that the British administration was collaborating with the young Haj al-Husseini with inside intelligence and advice on how to sabotage the Jews. According to Joan Peters, former White House consultant to the Middle East, "From Time Immemorial" - "British Officer Meinertzhagen reported later that Haj Amin had been informed by British Colonel Waters-Taylor four days before the Easter pogrom in Jerusalem that 'he had a great opportunity at Easter to show the world that the Arab of Palestine would not tolerate Jewish domination in Palestine; that Palestine was unpopular not only with the Palestine Administration but in Whitehall; and if disturbances of sufficient violence occurred in Jerusalem at Easter, both General Bols and General Allenby would advocate the abandonment of the Jewish Home.'" (Joan Peters, "From Time Immemorial" JKAP Publication, Chicago, 1984 quoting Colonel R. Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, 1917-1956 (London, 1959, pg 81-82)

When Jerusalem was conquered by the British in 1917 and General Allenby entered the city of Jerusalem, the mayor of the city of Jerusalem was Musa Kasim Pasha al-Husseini, the uncle to Haj Amin al-Husseini. The al-Husseinis and the Nashashibis clans were the ruling families in Jerusalem at that time. Musa al-Husseini was removed from office, and a Nashashibis was appointed the new mayor of Jerusalem. Since the mayor of the city was of the Nashashibis clan, the British decided to appoint an al-Husseini to be the Mufti of Jerusalem. Haj Amin al-Husseini became the preferred British candidate. But he ranked fourth with only 7% of the vote in the electoral college. Arab leaders apparently considered him too young and lacking religious training to prepare him to be the Mufti of the Arabs of Palestine.

The top three candidates were from the Nashashibis family. The British forced the leading Nashashibis candidate, Sheikh Husam al-Din to resign with al-Husseini now in third place. When the vote was retaken, al-Husseini suddenly became the most powerful Iman and cleric in the city of Jerusalem. In December, 1921, the administration of the British Mandate established a Supreme Muslim Council. The purpose of the Council was to have full control of the Waqf, the Muslim trusts and to administer the Shariah, the Muslim religious courts. Husseini, within seven months of becoming the Grand Mufti, organized another pogrom of Jews and was then appointed the President of the Supreme Muslim Council. As a Sunni, Haj Amin al-Husseini now had complete control of: the religious life of the Arab (Mufti), the legal administration of the Arab (Shariah) and the financial administration of the Arab (Waqf). According to the 1937 Royal Commission, Husseini had "no legal limitation of his power."(Joseph Schechtman, "The Mufti and the Fuehrer" p. 26)

The New York Times reported on June 14, 1936: "(Mufti) al-Husseni had succeeded ' in convincing experienced high British civil servants that he is working for the government's interests [and that] it was in the interest of the government that he should also be president of the new Arab High Committee," so that "Haj Amin el-Husseini enjoys the government's complete confidence as its unofficial adviser on the Arab side of the situation . . . . The government believes that he and only he is in a position to appease the Moslem masses; therefore it gives him every support while at the same time playing into his hands." (Joseph Schechtman, "The Mufti and the Fuehrer" p. 44-46)

When finally the British cracked down on Arabs for causing the massacres, they began to arrest members of the Defense Party which were mostly Nashashibi. Over 90% arrest were from the rival clan of the al-Husseini's who were sent to a concentration camp in the Sinai. None of the family clan members of the al-Husseini were arrested. (Joseph Schechtman, "The Mufti and the Fuehrer" p. 46)

[Johann]

In this game, things perhaps were not always very black and white

...Even the history of the various Turkish missions, (some led by German officers), or the "silk conspiracy", etc, the 1917-1918 internecine conflict in the Muslim theologians internecine fight over pro-Brit or pro-Caliphate positions - all point to a rather muddled alignment.

That is precisely my point.

In an uncertain and shifting world loyalty was something you could name your own price for.

And that is precisely what the Muslim political elites of the subcontinent did after their catastrophic and bloody defeat in 1857. They stuck to their end of the bargain, and the British, and later American stuck to theirs.

Its been coming apart since the end of the Cold War. Mostly because the ulema have regained political power and part of the agenda is rolling back Western influence and the steady de-islamisation of public life since the 19th century particularly in law and education. The Pakistanis insist of course that the real cause of the strains are "American betrayal and abandonment" after 1990.

Pakistan is set on its course, and I don't believe anyone can change it. Pakistan still needs American money, and America still needs Pakistani cooperation, but there is no mutual trust or mutual loyalty. How can there be in a situation where Pakistan breeds threats, and America pays Pakistan to help contain those threats, including the threat of murder-suicide?

I don't believe that there is anything India can directly offer that will change the complex and twisted nature of the US-Pakistani relationship. It must play itself out. The best India can do is to continue to prepare itself for Pakistan's violent decline and dying spasms as well as the messy, dangerous aftermath.

[Rudradev]

The first British colonies in India were in Bengal, Madras and Bombay. These were the anchors of inward expansion. Neither the running of these presidencies, nor the means of expansion were anchored on any alliance with Muslims.

Incorrect.

Throughout the 18th century, the most successful inroads of British EIC expansion were centred around political alliances with various Muslim rulers or contenders to power. Typically these contests occurred in vestigial remnants of the Mughal and Bahmani empires, fragmented in the previous and current centuries by the Maratha and Sikh ascendancy.

The very conquest of Bengal was predicated on the EIC's alliance with a Pakjabi (yes indeed!) adventurer, Mir Jafar Ali Khan, who sought to depose the nominated successor of the Afshari Nawab Alivardi Khan. The EIC's subsequent depradations in this theater were very often founded on subsidiary alliances with members of Muslim ruling classes, or sometimes outright annexations, all the way up to the seizure of Avadh and the ouster of Wajid Ali Shah.

In the Carnatic wars, whereby the British in Madras consolidated their base for expansion, both of the proxies backed by the EIC were Muslim... Muzaffar Jang of Hyderabad and Muhammad Ali Khan Walajah of Arcot.

By contrast, the Bombay Presidency, which had relatively little opportunity to ally itself with Muslim ruling classes because of its proximity to the Maratha Empire, was arguably the least successful at inward expansion through most of the 18th century. The Bombay Presidency's defeat by Mahadji Shinde at Wadgaon reversed nearly all of its efforts at expansion by 1779, forcing it to relinquish all the territories it had painstakingly usurped over the past six years. Finally, Warren Hastings had to save the Bombay EIC's bacon by sending large detachments of troops from Bengal, eventually fighting the Marathas to a standstill with great difficulty. Panipat notwithstanding, the Marathas' sense of genuine nationhood remained a potent impediment to British EIC expansion; backing the hapless Raghunathrao did the British little good, as compared to the various robber-barons who were the agents of British expansion in the tattered remains of the Mughal and Bahmani kingdoms.

[Johann]

Rudradev,

The greatest asset of the Bengali presidency was the civil service, which was overwhelmingly Hindu in origin.

The troops of the Bengal presidency were Rajputs and Bihari Brahmins, and as the EIC advanced north, increasingly Awadhi Shia.

Similarly the Madras Presidency army was overwhelmingly Hindu, as was the locally recruited administrative class.

In the Madras Presidency there was an alliance with the Nizam, a Muslim certainly, to fight Tipu Sultan, another Muslim. Tipu Sultan was then replaced with the Hindu Wadeyars.

The point is that while Muslims were a large part of the ruling political class in much of India at the time, there was no particular collective alliance with Muslims as a whole. Not until after 1857.

[Airavat]

"We have no ancient constitution or laws to overturn, for there is no law in India but the will of the sovereign ; and we have no people to subdue, nor national pride or animosity to contend with, for there are no distinct nations in India, like French and Spaniards, Germans and Italians. The people are but one people; for whoever be their rulers, they are still all Hindoos; it is indifferent to them whether they are under Europeans, Mussulmans, or their own Rajahs."

Major-General Sir Thomas Munro (27 May 1761 – 6 July 1827)

[Manish_Sharma]

I have been reading this very illuminating thread for some time now with so many insight into our subcontinent's past and present situations. Seeing such high level of series of articles here I have been feeling hesistant, in fact little embarrased at my very very simpleton questions. It's been bothering me for quite some time :
Whatever policy is deviced, isn't it a losing situation for India as a non Islamic country. Whether we contain TSP or BD or Taliban for 10-20 or 30 years? Inspite of all Chankian moves whether by brits/US or India, aren't Ullemas winning the whole game by the simple strategy of population. I mean today let's see:
1.) TSP population = 17 crore
2.) BD population = 18 crore
3.) Indian muslim population = 14 crore
So we have here 49 crore population practicing an expansionist religion very very rigidly. Now taking the example of last 60 years in all the three above places this population has doubled. So if we take the year 2070 we will have this figure doubled to 98 crores. Also this is the only religion which remains as rigid as IT WAS 1000 years before inspite of advances in thinking, technology and globalisation, while other religions have become moderate or not so rigid.

A couple of years before while travelling through train I had a chat with a very learned gentleman, who talked in detail about the population game being played, he was very impressed with the theories of Mr. K.R. Malkani. He said that Nawaz Sharif in last 10 years has started a theory of having a soft border with India. With this his idea is to exploit the soft border in same way like nepal and BD for injecting in lots population in india. With this theory after few decades they can start talking of unification of India(we will start hearing about it soon). And of course we can guess who will be the majority in this unified subcontinent. And this majority will be funded with billions of fellow islamists and arab oil money. I read somewhere here on the BRF or on net that it took 20 years to convert the 45% hindus in BD.
Is their a countermove to this POPULATION MOVE?

[Sanku]

Is their a countermove to this POPULATION MOVE?

Some of us for a long time have been talking about a coming war, and this is precisely the sort of issue that we envisage long term.

I personally think that moves and counter moves will help a bit but only prolong the status quo for a while, we are due for some cataclysmic war type of scenario sooner than later.

This is what Brih also alludes to when he says he expects a shake up of NI.

However, I expect the next 15-20 years to redefine the world, and to the victors will belong the spoils.

I do hope (unlike Brih) that now the Indic NI population wont take it lying down. A lot of people are itching for a fight and a suitable target only needs to materialize and present itself.

Thanks to RSS-BJP and various experiments, the pacifist tendencies (if any) built in by the Gandhi and misused by Nehru are almost all wiped out.

The peace is a deceptive peace.

The support from all sections (including die hard Congressites) for Aaar paar kee ladai was tremendous. ABV missed big time by not striking out then -- would have changed the world -- some times risks have to be taken -- post the Parakaram fizzle (due to the other fizzle no doubt ) a lot of folks who wanted that the matter be sorted out once and for all went into "oh all the India is like this onlee" mode. No one could see the Chankian-ness of not attacking.

That war should have been fought -- just like operation Brass tacks should have been taken to its logical conclusion.

(Note I am talking about is things in Indo - Pak/BD equation, unlike the question which you posed in Civilization terms that is because I am aware that only certain discussions will be allowed on the forum and thus have no inclination to have the discussion curtailed because it then goes on to verboten areas)

[Abhi_G]

I read somewhere here on the BRF or on net that it took 20 years to convert the 45% hindus in BD.

Manish_Sharma, this is incorrect. The majority of Bengali Hindus left their homes in East Bengal during partition, 1965 and 1971. 1971 was the culmination of genocide of Bengali Hindus along with Bengali Muslims by the paki army. Coercive conversion (like kidnapping of girls) in current BD is definitely there but I doubt whether the demographic change is just only due to that. The partition of Bengal is not highlighted that much in Indian media. There has been also a steady stream of Bengali Hindus into India and EU/US from BD. Hindus in BD do not see any future there. No guesses why. GoI many a times acts without sympathy for Bengali Hindus and repatriates them back to BD.

[Jarita]

Saudi Arabia is leasing land (long term lease) from Indonesia, and Ethiopia ( ) to feed it's people.
I wonder if their long term strategy is to do the same with India. It might explain concentration of effort in regions.