Deterrence

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shiv
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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 13 Nov 2009 17:55

Tanaji wrote:Naive question:

Why do you need 25 Kt or 15Kt bombs for deterrence? These bombs will not cause infrastructure damage as Shiv himself is pointing out. So why not build weapons that release massive amounts of radioactivity designed to kill living things and make things inhabitable for near and medium term future? So, basically just load up some Co60 type of things that will release massive radioactivity. Will kill a lot of people...

Dont know how much "KT" is required for the above. Why isn't the above deterrence?


Tanaji even 15 kt (at the optimum height) will demolish all residential buildings for a radius of 1 km and kill 90% of people in the area. Most modern and congested city centers have a population of 25,000 people per sq km and you can guarantee at least 100,000 immediate deaths and maybe another 50,000 dying within a few days, with 100,000 injured.

Co 60 apparently has to be generated by your bomb itself by putting a "tamper' of Cobalt 59 around your bomb. But you can use good old Plutonium as a dirty bomb. Inefficient fizzles are by definition dirty bombs. But apparently the problem with radioactivity fallout is that its effect is very slow and does not give immediate satisfaction. But that does not mean that you can't have a dirty mind and plan something dirty :mrgreen: I mean put a 15 kt to make people run and put some dirty bombs in the areas they are running towards :evil: :evil:

But yes a dirty bomb seems to be the easiest thing if you have the material. Unkil gives you RDX. Chinkil gives you Pu and you give everyone diarrhea from fallout.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Tanaji » 13 Nov 2009 18:12

Yes, hit the city with 1 -2 15 KT ones and then hit the likely escape routes, there would HAVE to be some choke points somewhere, with dirty bombs. Reminded of the Ajit joke:

Use liquid aaxygen me daal do.. liquid use jeene nahi dega aur oxygen use marne nahi dega...

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 13 Nov 2009 18:36

Actually Tanaji - after you asked your "naive question" I found an interesting link that downplays the hazards of fallout (and megaton bombs for that matter) :lol:

http://www.uow.edu.au/~bmartin/pubs/82cab/

In the immediate vicinity of a nuclear explosion, most casualties result from blast, heat and fallout during the first few days.[3] The blast or heat from a one megatonne bomb - about 75 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb, and a size often found in nuclear arsenals - would kill almost all people, even those in shelters, out to a distance of two kilometres. Beyond ten kilometres the chance of death even for people without special protection would be very small. If the bomb is exploded at an altitude higher than the radius of the fireball from the explosion, as happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, local fallout is minimal. If exploded at or near the earth's surface, fallout lethal to unprotected people will be deposited downwind - most often to the east toward which prevailing upper atmospheric winds blow - for a distance of up to hundreds of kilometres. After a fortnight the radiation levels will have dropped to about one thousandth of what they were one hour after the blast.



Nuclear war would also result in various long range effects, beyond the range of blast, heat and local fallout. These effects - effects hundreds or thousands of kilometres from nuclear explosions - are known as 'global' effects. The most well known is global radioactive fallout. Many people believe that this fallout, or some other effect, would cause the death of most or all the people on earth in the event of major nuclear war. This is the idea portrayed in the popular novel On the Beach.[8] However, the available scientific evidence provides no support for such a doomsday scenario


If the bomb is exploded at or near the surface of the earth, a large amount of dust, dirt and other surface materials will also be lifted with the updraft. Some of the fission products will adhere to these particles, or onto the material used to construct the bomb. The very largest particles - stones and pebbles - will fall back to earth in a matter of minutes or hours. Lighter material - ash or dust - will fall to earth within a few days, or perhaps be incorporated in raindrops. The radioactive material which returns to earth within 24 hours is called early or local fallout. It is the most dangerous.

----

By the time stratospheric fallout reaches the earth, its radioactivity is greatly reduced. For example, after one year, the time typically required for any sizable amount of fission products to move from the northern to the southern stratosphere, the rate of decay will be less than a hundred thousandth of what it was one hour after the blast. It is for this reason that stratospheric fallout does not have the potential to cause widespread and immediate sickness or death.


read the whole article if you like - pretty interesting

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Re: Deterrence

Postby D Roy » 13 Nov 2009 18:49

Chernobyl today is a nature park reserve. Animals are far less scared of radiation than humans are.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Manish_Sharma » 13 Nov 2009 19:34

^^DRoy, there is a novel called "Wolves Eat Dogs" by Marting Cruz Smith (Gorky Park, Polar Star author). This novel is written on Chornobyl and its effects upto 2007. There is a lot of mention about Cesium 137 and how upto now it is causing cancer to humans. But somehow animals have been safe from its effects wolves, deer etc. and how they have lost their shyness of humans. Very interesting read. :)

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Re: Deterrence

Postby D Roy » 13 Nov 2009 20:03

Thanks Manish,

I will look that one up certainly.

On a different note the UNSCEAR report on chernobyl states that the number of fatal cancers attributable to the disaster is about 4000 in addition to the 100000 or so ( due to all other causes) fatal cancers expected in the population living around chernobyl.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Tanaji » 13 Nov 2009 20:12

D Roy wrote:Chernobyl today is a nature park reserve. Animals are far less scared of radiation than humans are.


But the point is of "deterrence" NOT actual damage. If you are forced to use a weapon, deterrence has broken down as others have said on the thread.

Shiv, that report talks about a conventional nuke. What if someone designed an extremely dirty nuke, with size of fallout particles optimally designed so that they fall > 24 hours after explosion, using elements that have a longer half life. I would guess the impact would be far greater than the fallout of a conventional nuclear device.

Would someone be deterred by the prospect of having millions dying slowly by radiation, thousands of aborted still births, and births with major defects due to radiation related mutations, similar damage to crops and lifestock? Even though the actual physical damage is comparatively small? I dont know, but to me its scary? This is similar to the 5.56 mm vs 7.62 mm round argument....

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Re: Deterrence

Postby samuel » 13 Nov 2009 20:14

This book was great:
Frank C. Zagare, D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence.
This link may get one started or jazzed:
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=w ... uvT0ZwIZ9A

The Escalation game and backtracking (authors call it backward induction -- to determine deterrence).
Image

Added: Also, see
http://www.springerlink.com/content/k074x38000660644/
Connecting sizzle-e-fizzle with deterrence:

A challenger initiates for certain if the pawn is valuable enough to it and never challenges otherwise, Likewise, a defender always resists if the pawn is valuable enough and never resists otherwise.
In addition to identifying threshold values for optimal strategic choice, we provide existence conditions for the two distinct types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. This permits us to identify the exact set of conditions associated with bluffing strategies and to develop a theory of the necessary and sufficient conditions for extended deterrence crisis initiation and its resolution

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 13 Nov 2009 20:45

Sam that is a great flow chart - I have taken the liberty of adding numbers in red to the paths so that we can trace what happened in the past. eg Kargil

I think Kargil took the path 2, 5, 8 with Pakistan as "Challenger"
The 1965 war was 2, 4, 7, 11, with Pakistan as challenger.

Image

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Re: Deterrence

Postby D Roy » 13 Nov 2009 20:50

But the point is of "deterrence" NOT actual damage



Thank You. That's exactly the point.

whether you should be 'scared' or 'not'.

Radiation has been additionally turned into a psychological phenomena as revealed by animal behaviour and that is the context in which that post was made.

1 kiloton of nuke is less in terms of blast effects than 1 kt of TNT, since a part of the energy is released as radiation. ( hence all the rona dhona about the possibility of puuure phusion astra.)

An area hit by a salted bomb can in theory be decontaminated over time.

explosive destructive capability is important. No point denying that.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Umrao Das » 13 Nov 2009 21:03

But I can't believe in what has not been tested, especially once Doubt has been cast.


In a land where Raja Ram used to frequent and keep order... The Raja on hearing that drunken washerman in brawl questioned the integrity of the first lady Sita and doubts were seeded, he ceeded his wife unilateraly and banished her divorce....

Once doubt has been cast of all people not a waherman but "Santanam" (which means progeny) of the system is ot time for Agni pareeksha?

By the way to resolve all these Nuclear matters one should read American publications or Australian study eapecially Aussies what do they know they did even explode a bum.

Best aand authentic sources are Hollywood or Bollywood movies wher Atr mimics or merges with science.

I strongly recommend this movie to solve all lingering suspecions and yield to truth ye shall

Image

once you watch this you are no longer at cross roads and in doubt, you will yield to the right path.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby D Roy » 13 Nov 2009 21:09

I "doubt" if you have actually seen the movie yourself. :wink:

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Umrao Das » 13 Nov 2009 21:17

D Roy wrote:I "doubt" if you have actually seen the movie yourself. :wink:


I have
I had no Doubts
That it would win Oscars.
There rests your doubt.

Your suspicion is no doubt but an imagination.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby D Roy » 13 Nov 2009 21:29

He He.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby samuel » 13 Nov 2009 21:36

Right, the danger with China is that we seem to be going your path 2 - 4 (China's "demanding" and we're "defying").
Of the possible leaf nodes post 2-4, in an "all out" we lose because of asymmetry. So, either we "escalate" (2-5, tibet now, reverse encirclement, robust nuclear posture) or prepare to win a limited
conflict (2-4-6) for successfully defying. Covering these two options might be the deterrence we seek, in the sense of these authors. Of course, their game is also a little idealized. There are other deterrence games (third party games) that we can include, all of which end up with a Kennedyesque recipe for success. "eint-ka-javab-pathar" type of argument.

S

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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 13 Nov 2009 21:50

But I can't believe in what has not been tested, especially once doubt has been cast.


True. I would agree.

However, the doubt has been cast ONLY only WRT to the TN. NOT on other types of nuclear weapons AND deterrence - per Santhanam Himself.

Santhanam claiming that a test was an outright failure goes beyond this.


Again, and only for greater clarification, this pertains to ONLY the TN device.

(Point being India - per Santhanam - has the "smaller" Kt weapons. The capability to build these weapons in the 100x Kt range exists. That is NOT an issue. AND deterrence exists.)

It's a long way from that to achieving reliable weaponization and operational readiness.


Perhaps WRT to the TN weapon.

The rest is in place (again, per Santhanam) and there is deterrence.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby anuj » 13 Nov 2009 23:45

Hmm. seems like you people are going in circles.
Deterrence is a strategy by which governments threaten an immense retaliation if attacked, such that aggressors are deterred if they do not wish to suffer great damage as a result of an aggressive action. Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), conventional weapons strength, economic sanctions, or any combination of these can be used as deterrents.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deterrence_theory

Here immense retaliation could just well mean "preparing for a war" and great damage could just well mean "maximum possible damage" one could inflict if not equivalent damage.

I think we already have deterrence since we already have nuclear weapons and can kill millions of there citizens, that is deterrent enough. But we need to keep building more nukes just to make the opposite party sure that we can infact make there yard more unlivable in case of a nuclear war.

I however doubt that there will be any nuclear war between india and china. Though china may put more bombs on india, china will still receive it's share of bombs on it's soil and the aftermath will leave it preparing for the fallout, evacuation of people etc etc. US and russia will no doubt use this opportunity and china knows that.

Hence i think india and china have moved towards diplomacy, the who has the longer d1ck theory.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 14 Nov 2009 00:00

That is true.

But, it is because we have not been able to stick with the word "deterrence".

Perhaps, just for the heck of it, we should have another thread "Post-deterrence" (where we can discuss 3 Mt vs. 25/50 Kt, etc) and then we will get some convergence.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby anuj » 14 Nov 2009 00:37

Preparing for post-deterrence is deterrence. If is not the number of nukes you have at your disposal. It is letting your enemy know how much lethal you will prove to be once or if he provokes you.

For to be lethal, i will have to build an arsenal of weapons. It is NOT because im scared of you or because i like a cold war. It is to keep you in your place. I have a small gun but since you are so big in size, you think you can came at me and believe you'll survive my retaliation with an injury and can recover from. This time i will keep a tank with me. Sure it is not a war ship or anything bigger but it is enough to take you down brother.

Deterrence is hence preparing for the show down. Deterrence isn't measured in terms of numbers or a stockpile. It is measured in terms of lethality. Numbers and stockpile are a byproduct of lethality. And lethality and post-deterrence are a byproduct of deterrence.

The above is after assuming that Country A doesn't care if a few million of it's citizens gets killed because of it's misadventure.

If a country does care about it's citizens or is a responsible country then a 5kt nuke will be enough to deter it from launching a nuclear attack.
Last edited by anuj on 14 Nov 2009 00:43, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby samuel » 14 Nov 2009 00:42

If we work with China towards a positive, mutually assured existence, is that not deterrence? If we accept their leadership in many matters, is that not deterrence? If we get under Unkil's protection, will that not be deterrence?

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Rudradev » 14 Nov 2009 00:44

samuel wrote:If we work with China towards a positive, mutually assured existence, is that not deterrence?


This is what we thought we were doing with "Panchsheel".

We should know by now, that the Chinese will not respond to appeals to their "higher selves", unless we are simultaneously able to deter their "lower selves" beyond any doubt of disastrous retaliation in the event our faith is betrayed.

If we work with China towards a positive, mutually assured existence, is that not deterrence? If we accept their leadership in many matters, is that not deterrence? If we get under Unkil's protection, will that not be deterrence?


All those things are forms of "deterrence" and each comes with an associated cost in opportunity, freedom of action and independence (or "sovereignty" if we want to sound righteously indignant about it). If deterrence is an end that any means will justify, then any of these methods will do. If it is itself only the means to a greater end, then we must carefully consider what is being given up in order to secure it.
Last edited by Rudradev on 14 Nov 2009 00:47, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby samuel » 14 Nov 2009 00:46

Just because it did not work once, should we be shy the second time? After all Mao is gone and China has much to lose too. To get out of the cycle of escalation, war, death and destruction, should we not push and sell peace through economic stimulus and better people-to-people connections? My pulao for your kung-pao, hey?

S

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Rudradev » 14 Nov 2009 00:54

samuel wrote:Just because it did not work once, should we be shy the second time? After all Mao is gone and China has much to lose too. To get out of the cycle of escalation, war, death and destruction, should we not push and sell peace through economic stimulus and better people-to-people connections?

S


But we ARE trying all those things, and more besides. We have completely reconciled ourselves to an official position that Tibet is a part of China, and do not argue with the "One China" policy, maintaining only very low-key diplomatic relations with Taiwan. All this is being done to appease the Chinese in the hope that a sincere desire to coexist peacefully and prosperously will prevail over their attitude to India.

All indications are that the Chinese are not more likely to keep good faith now than they were in 1962. They hold out the promise of resolving border issues in exchange for better trade and diplomatic relations, and then at a convenient time redact their position and rattle sabers over Arunachal Pradesh. Their proliferation and assistance to Pakistan, and assistance to anti-India terrorist groups all over the Indian subcontinent continue unchecked. At some point the evidence of our senses must count for something however noble our intentions may be.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby anuj » 14 Nov 2009 00:55

samuel wrote:If we work with China towards a positive, mutually assured existence, is that not deterrence?

If A is responsible of starting a war with B in the past, will A feel "secured" with B that it won't be hostile to it the coming future, even if both have agreed to live peacefully. There will always be a guilty feeling in A that B might take revenge. And hence it will always remain vigilant and paranoid.
samuel wrote:If we accept their leadership in many matters, is that not deterrence?

That is equal to surrender. That will never happen and they know that hence they are trying to limit us in south asia because they know this is own town.
samuel wrote:If we get under Unkil's protection, will that not be deterrence?

Protection under unkil is a misconception. If i understand the amirkhans better, it will be in there interest to watch both india-china slug it out and mutually go back a 100 years.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby samuel » 14 Nov 2009 01:06

That's what I find amazing. We can take some very conservative, if I can use that word, people of India who could be "hawks" and talk to them about love, brotherhood, harmony, and they are willing to pursue, acknowledge that option. Rudradev, who chose to respond to me, did not e-slap me and say, are you nuts? He said, we are trying that, we need to look at cost and benefit; he did not say these are stupid ideas. I believe our people are prone to see good in this openness approach. We like it. But, if we, as a people, have in recent times been telling ourselves to be cautious, to be prepared, to make sure we are covered, then the problem isn't with our mental state going postal, it's our collective experience, which is as valid as anything can be.

To me that means this history of Mutually Assured Existence that has become the boiler plate of our interaction with the world is not sufficient for deterrence for India any more. It won't work. We need to ensure we come out top on an escalation (e.g. tree posted above), we need to ensure we come out top in other scenarios. China isn't deterred by India, China is just doing what it does. When the time is right, it will come down to the plains and that won't be because it stopped being deterred, it would be because we never sent them to the deterrence corner.

S

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Umrao Das » 14 Nov 2009 06:10

Capability is late nt, even Ghana has capability to build H bum.
Everybody has capability to build bum even Taliban...

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 14 Nov 2009 07:21

samuel wrote: China isn't deterred by India, China is just doing what it does. When the time is right, it will come down to the plains and that won't be because it stopped being deterred, it would be because we never sent them to the deterrence corner.

S


True.

And China is unlikely to be deterred by India trying to build more bombs, They too will build more bombs and gift bombs to Bangladesh and Myanmar. And as long as we have Indians wanting to go back to the glory days of Somnath and Hampi where we allowed cities to be ransacked by invaders and now rationalise that "It is OK to lose cities in a war" we will have business as usual. :roll:

If India and china are willing to lose cities in a war neither civilization will win. If India is wiling to lose cities and China isn't deterrence will hold. If China is willing to lose cities and India thinks it can get away - India is screwed no matter what it does. Chinese rationality is a fundamental requirement here. So is Indian rationality for that matter.

Cities define a civilization - not poverty stricken iron age villages. Both nations must be unwilling to lose cities for deterrence to hold.
Last edited by shiv on 14 Nov 2009 07:28, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Kanson » 14 Nov 2009 07:27

Rudradev wrote:
kanson wrote:Nice cogent argument. Infact i prepared to reply is becoz it appears so cogent. But i ask you a question. In a fight which appears you are not winning, with your back to the wall, what you do of these two choices ?
a. Surrender; accept disgrace, suzerainty etc
b. fight back with whatever you have and whatever you can throw against.

If your choice is 'a' then our discussion ends here and pls dont proceed to read further.

Coming to the discussion, accepting 25 kt or 200 kt comes only if deterrence fails. I think you can easily agree with that. If deterrence holds there is no war and B country fallout etc.

When deterrence fails and nuclear war progress, as you talk about nuking the B country with megaton dont you think, we having sitting on the stockpile of huge Pu will throw everything at them ? As Shiv talks about theoretical TN, let say suppose, our weapon can give only 60% yield as Santhanam claims, if we make 3 MT bomb, with 60% yield only, can it give in MT yield, theoretically speaking. So dont you throw these theoretically 60% MT bomb at the B country which you talk about(like the Americans did to Japan)when your back is against the wall. Whether it is going to give 60% or 80% or 30% is moot. Question is will you throw whatever you have at them or not. Even at 30% it will give a same fallout effect that you talk about to B country. Agreed ?


If it was tested, it wouldn't be moot.

It was tested, otherwise why would someone call the test as "half-burn". So if it is going to be only a "half-burn" as suggested, you can think about all possiblities. If it works it is fine. Otherwise we are going to have the same fallout as suggested with MT bombs, if only primary detonated, as it acts similar to "dirty bomb".
Of course in a war we will throw everything we have... we can throw chappals at them too. But the question is how reliable is our capacity to damage them?

Why stop at chappals, you can throw in towels too. Thats why i asked to select your choice. No point in discussion on this if your idea is (cross posted from Afghan thread)
Rudradev wrote:We might have to give up Aksai Chin and Ladakh to the Chinese.
Thanks but no thanks.

A 3 MT device may give us only 50 kT per Santhanam's allegations. You can't assume 30% fusion yield with any more confidence than you can assume 100%.

There is no proper statement from Santhanam and he is not talking anything abt MT weapon. When there is full blown N war, confidence etc are going to be of least consideration in your mind.

We may be able to develop a theoretical TN, but banking on that for deterrence is like assuming our assets to already include squadrons of LCAs, Arjuns, Agni Vs, and super-duper nuclear powered aircraft carriers when making operational plans for a conventional war. We can do lots of things in theory. It's a long way from that to achieving reliable weaponization and operational readiness.

I guess i dont know whether the person i'm talking to know the difference btwn Deterrence and full blown N war. While we are talking abt N war in B country you are talking about Deterrence.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Jarita » 14 Nov 2009 07:37

Kanson wrote:
Rudradev wrote:We might have to give up Aksai Chin and Ladakh to the Chinese.
Thanks but no thanks.


??? What sort of mindset is this

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Rudradev » 14 Nov 2009 08:46

Kanson wrote:Why stop at chappals, you can throw in towels too. Thats why i asked to select your choice. No point in discussion on this if your idea is (cross posted from Afghan thread)
Rudradev wrote:We might have to give up Aksai Chin and Ladakh to the Chinese.
Thanks but no thanks.


Kanson: you are a moron and a troll.

Feeble minded posters such as yourself, who can't hope to win an argument without attacking or slandering your opponent on a personal level, embody the reason why BRF has followed the same trajectory (for the most part) as the Indian Media, or American cable news over the last decade. Too much of it has become a morass of braying opinion-cliques that shout down independent thinking by trying to force their own petty classifications on any original thought that a poster might express.

To those such as yourself, winning a cheap little internet squabble by tarnishing your opponent is the entire purpose of spending time and effort here. How very sad that this is all you're capable of getting out of this site.

I made a post in the Afghan thread, yes, and I made it in the context of a thought-experiment. You know, "thought", like members of BRF used to do with their minds before the likes of you came along to ruin it for us? I made a postulate, not because I personally believe in it, but because thinking along the lines of an SCO-based Afghan solution has not even been discussed and I wanted to open it up as an avenue of debate. But you looked at my post there, and didn't even register the possibility of ideation... you merely saw the opportunity to score a cheap shot somewhere else.

Kala akshar bhains barabar, as they say. I'm not surprised.

You are quoting one line of my post, out of context, in a completely different thread, because you think it will earn you brownie points with the sort of brain-dead, attention-deficit jingo-vadis who would rather look at the "headline crawl" on a cable TV news channel than read and analyze an actual news item. Much less, the gods forbid, a real book.

After all, where you come from, debate is won solely by the decibels of crony applause you can manage to drum up... correct?

Please go ahead and address whoever else you want... I will be ignoring your posts from now on.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Kanson » 14 Nov 2009 17:47

Rudradev,

Since you have nothing to do with me, you leave me with no other choice other than returning your compliments back.
Kanson: you are a moron and a troll.


made it in the context of a thought-experiment. You know, "thought", like members of BRF used to do with their minds before the likes of you came along to ruin it for us? I made a postulate, not because I personally believe in it, but because thinking along the lines of an SCO-based Afghan solution has not even been discussed and I wanted to open it up as an avenue of debate.
I see ! Let say why not start this thought process with the families of thousands of people who laid their lives in 1962 ? or with these people. People say charity start at home. Why dont let start the thought process from your home town. If AP is not seen as a god damn commodity and all this for Afghan solution then we could even start from Kashmir and Punjab, na?. And I'm seeing from childhood representing your home country as "Mother". Would you allow your "thought" process to....just for discussion only na ?

Feeble minded posters such as yourself

Arre "stable minded" professor, if you r saying this in India publically, you can be booked under the charges of sedition. I'm saying all these things becoz of ur reply. Enjoy your stay.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 15 Nov 2009 07:15

On the issue of deterrence, it is well worth revisiting an article by Adm Arun Prakash that was posted earlier and has appeared in a recent issue of FORCE magazine :D
http://www.maritimeindia.org/pdfs/STRAT ... MAKING.pdf
Lack of Independent Advice

A situation wherein the nation’s complete nuclear weapon programme is
largely conceptualized controlled and operated by civilians, may have been
understandable when we were in an evolutionary era of testing or
technology demonstration, but 10 years after Pokhran II, such an
arrangement loses its validity in the context of a nuclear weapon state with
a growing arsenal. While the nation can fervently hope that it will never be
faced with a nuclear conflict, it is courting disaster to keep the armed forces
isolated during peacetime, from the systems and weapons which they may
have to deploy at extremely short notice, during the fog and turbulence of
war.

India’s unique policy of continued separation of the military from nuclear
policy and decision-making is an open secret internationally. This issue not
only receives frequent media attention and is analyzed at great length in
writings on India’s nuclear programme, but invites incredulous comment
and speculation; all of which serves to erode the credibility of the nuclear
deterrent.

This methodology has remained more or less unchanged since
independence, and the Santhanam controversy should induce us to cast
our mind back over events of the past decade.

Deterrence Credibility

Deterrence certainly lies in the mind of the opponent, and unless the
potential adversary is thoroughly convinced of its credibility (in all its
aspects) there is a very real danger of “deterrence breakdown”, an issue, of
which we have not yet taken full cognizance. The deafening silence that
followed Pokhran I for the next 24 years exposed the total lack of a military,
political or technological strategy to guide India’s subsequent actions in the
arena of nuclear weapon development.

Equally unfathomable was the logic and timing of Pokhran II, as well as
some of the actions that followed this defining event. Having voluntarily and
gratuitously declared (without consulting a single military person), a
“moratorium on testing” and offered a “no first use” guarantee within days
of the 1998 tests, the Indian Nuclear Doctrine then bravely threatens to
inflict “unacceptable damage” on the originator of a first strike. Mr.
Santhanam’s skeptical views have a significant bearing on the existing and
future India-China-Pakistan nuclear equation.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 15 Nov 2009 07:41

Preparing for post-deterrence is deterrence.


A well prepared post-deterrence is a (significant?) part of a deterrence.

However, a deterrence should be targeted at the opponent's decision makerS. "Decision makerS" should make up a team - consisting of people that represent the entire spectrum within the politico-economic spread.

I am more than sure that in China there are those in this spectrum that are itching to "teach India" the next lesson (or was it the 1962 lesson). India I think will rely on those within that group that are not itching to convince these itchy guys to hold. IF I am not mistaken we are actually witnessing some of these dynamics as we post - at the conventional level.

Conversely China did depend on CPI to influence Indian decision making too. And, today you can actually witness the absence of the CPI in the UPA's decisions. Granted this is not nuclear realted, but to a great extent that is how it works.

If is not the number of nukes you have at your disposal. It is letting your enemy know how much lethal you will prove to be once or if he provokes you.


Post-deterrence is very different. It has to be dominated by force and therefore destruction.

Teh decision making should by now be relegated to a very, very narrow thinking: what has survived and how effectively can we use what has survived.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 15 Nov 2009 11:10

NRao wrote:
Post-deterrence is very different. It has to be dominated by force and therefore destruction.

Teh decision making should by now be relegated to a very, very narrow thinking: what has survived and how effectively can we use what has survived.


Nrao - I was reading a very interesting article from 1980 which basically argued that the "counter force" doctrine (of knocking out an enemy's nuclear forces) was complete rubbish because the missiles (up to time of writing - 1980) were too inaccurate to be relied on to actually destroy an enemy's nuclear force even with megaton warheads. (The article is here - kelik). The author argued that ships and subs need to know their exact position at launch to achieve accuracy and that was the problem (then)

Obviously the problem has now been solved (for the US) with GPS. But if you cannot rely on GPS you have little chance of hitting a known silo, and less chance of hitting a mobile enemy warhead in a counter force strike especially from a mobile launch platform whose launch coordinates are themselves not exactly known.

That is why a post deterrence scenario talks of the simplest and easiest thing to do - a counter value strike on soft civilian targets - cities.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby wig » 15 Nov 2009 15:26

moderators, rakshaks,
my apologies if this has already been posted.
this article is of immense topical importance and appears in today's print edition of the Tribune.
i am unable to post a link. computer savvy rakshaks or mods may please post the headline and attach/ edit the rest as i am not aware of the protocols/ copyright issues involved.


A Tribune Special
To test or not to test
K. Santhanam and Ashok Parthasarathi join the scientists’ debate

WE respond to R. Ramachandran’s article, “Why There is No Case for Further Nuclear Tests” (The Hindu, September 25, 2009). His main points are: “technical information published by the Department of Atomic Energy does not show Pokhran-II (P-2) was unsuccessful”; (b) an assertion: there are compelling arguments against need for resuming (thermonuclear (H-bomb) device testing). Even if it was so i.e. even if the thermonuclear test was a failure (c) “the DAE employed different techniques to estimate test yields (i.e. power outputs); (d) yield values from other five tests “are stated to be”! (by BARC) consistent with its original estimate of 60 kilotonnes (a bomb’s output equal to 60,000 tonnes of TNT) for the two main tests on May 11, 1998, i.e. a 45-kt (thermonuclear or TN) device and a 15 kt A-bomb exploded simultaneously. Of these, post-shot Radio-Chemical Method (RCM) (of device yield measurement) considered most accurate; (e) both A-bomb “trigger” and main H-bomb produce a type of nuclear particles called Neutrons.

However, H-bomb devices, produce more Neutrons than A-bombs. This leads to considerably larger amounts of two artificially created radio-isotopes — Manganese 54 and Sodium 22 — being produced by the TN device than the A-bomb. This higher ratio of Manganese 54: Sodium22 in the H-bomb explosion does provide an “idea” of the A–vs – H-bomb/device yields (no numbers at all; only “an idea” of relative yield magnitudes); and this is supposed to be nuclear “physics”!).

The writer’s justification: “The absolute values and scale of this higher ratio, (in TN device case) withheld for “obvious” sensitivity reasons, but qualitative difference in levels is evident”. The writer’s source: a BARC Newsletter article (July 1999). It is not a peer-reviewed scientific journal.

(f) His last technical “scoring-point” is a “desperate explanation” of why and how, while the “pure” A-bomb of the BARC-claimed yield of only 15 kt – when its collaborator in P-2 – DRDO, and our top scientific institutions, as also numerous top nuclear weapons laboratories worldwide, have rated it at much higher 20-25 kt, produced a crater 25 meters in diameter — which the BARC dishonestly-claimed yield of only 15 kt could never have produced — the BARC–claimed -to-be-“successful” -H-bomb-of-45 kt, – thrice as powerful – even at BARC de-rated 15 kt yield pure ‘A’ bomb – produced no crater at all when a genuine 45 kt TN device, even common sense tell us, should have produced a gigantic crater. He says “at some low enough TN device emplacements, i.e. deep enough shafts, there would (only be) upheaval within the shaft) but no material... There would be no crater”!

Here is our response. As regards Mr Ramachandran’s regurgitation of the BARC argument that it used different techniques in yield estimation, he was not personally involved in the tests. Mr Santhanam was one of the four key scientists directing P-2 from day 1. So, he can only say “45 kt fusion device and 15 kt fission bomb “are stated to be” (by BARC) “consistent with original estimates”. On what basis can he say this when those estimates are highly classified?

As for post-shot RCM being “most accurate” (for nuclear explosions yield (power) estimation), former BARC Director’s Radiochemistry Division (RCD) told us: “I measured yield of (P-I) (1974) using Mass Spectrometry (MS) method. A microgram of plutonium was separated from sample taken near core of device, and its isotopic composition — which does not change with various transformations caused by nuclear tests — measured.

The MS technique considered internationally the most accurate and reliable method for yield estimation even more accurate than RCM (which the writer tomtoms about, without knowing about nuclear weapon yield measurement). The MSM is far less sensitive to major weakness of the RCM. That’s why Dr Ramanna, former BARC Director, former AEC Chairman, and Mission Director P-1, insisted on the MS method for (P-1) yield estimation in 1974. If the MS method was used in (P-2) also, why exclude it in the BARC’s briefing to Mr Ramachandran?

Using S.B. Manohar’s article (BARC Newsletter, July 9, 1999) on RCM to determine TN device yield lacks credibility as it is an inhouse publication.

As for the BARC argument, the TN device produced “copious amounts” of Sodium-22 and Manganese-54 isotopes “characteristic of fusion reactions”, in the absence of exact numbers, it is an unsubstantiated assertion. A “fizzled” TN device also produces “copious amounts” of these isotopes.

Moreover, mere presence of isotopes is not a quantitative yield measure. It can at best be a qualitative indicator. This obfuscation becomes worse when the writer said, “…it does provide an idea of the comparative (i.e. H-bomb vis-a-vis A-bomb) yields”! As a scientist, he ought to know that precise quantified statements are core of science and scientific credibility. Using an imprecise phrase like “copious amounts” begs the question.

“The classified exact plutonium mass in the core of the (P-1) device may not have been known to the RC Division of BARC after P-1. However, RC measurements in RCD’s report indicated yield are significantly lower than Ramanna’s and Chidambaram’s claim. So, RCD’s report on yield of (P-1) was frozen by Ramanna and Chidambaram and consigned to the archives”!

The writer then moves to our statement that had TN test really worked, the 120-meter deep shaft at the bottom of which the TN device was emplaced, would have been totally destroyed and its deepest portions even vapourised. There would, in addition, have been enormous surface damage to even massive 2-tonne and 8-meter high tripod “A-frame” astride the shaft’s mouth. This “A-Frame” has a complex set of winches and pullies connected at their bottom to a lift-like “container” to lower and raise personnel, equipment and materials to and from the bottom of the shaft when the TN device is being assembled would have been shattered.

Both were totally intact after the TN device test. Mr Ramachandran has ignored this damning evidence that the TN device failed! He moves to the issue of cratering, using the BARC’s arguments on geological and TN device-related factors preventing crater formation by 45 kt yield TN device. Based on 25 metre diameter crater formed by 20-25 kt “pure” A-bomb (which BARC rates at only 15 kt yield), the DRDO calculated a 60-70 meter diameter crater should have been formed by the latter fully confirmed by the ARC. Thus, one needs a cogent response from Mr Ramachandran why and how such a phenomenon is supposed to have occurred.

The super hi-tech ARC, independent of both BARC and DRDO with a 365 x 24 x 7 operated very large seismic array, 10-15 per cent more sensitive and accurate than DRDO’s, measured all the seismic signals from all P-2 tests. Their calculations, far more sophisticated than BARC’s, indicated a TN device yield at only 20 kt max.

Mr Ramachandran then moves to the article by former DRDO chief and strategic affairs analyst, V.S. Arunachalam and K. Subramanian, respectively (The Hindu, September 21). They say, even a 25 kt A-bomb’s damage on enemy city targets with large populations would be ‘unacceptable’ to any adversary and so such A- bombs would be enough for us to deter even China having 200 deployed H- bombs of 3.3-5 megatons yields each.

Surprisingly, though they argued for decades that H-bombs were central to our Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD), they suddenly say A-bombs (which cannot yield more than 80 kt max) are enough. Why? Sour grapes following the TN device failure and no weaponisation for the last 11 years! China would be totally undeterred by our piffling A-bomb “arsenal” of yields.

We reiterate our view, fully shared by the overwhelming majority of our nuclear scientists, strategic analysts and, above all, our military, that a sole A-bomb arsenal is grossly inadequate to be a CMD against China; only TN bombs can do so. Otherwise, why did four Prime Ministers (including Mr Vajpayee and his NSA Mr Brajesh Mishra) direct the top of BARC-DRDO leadership — Mr Kalam, Mr Chidambaram, Mr Santhanam and Mr Kakodkar — that one Pokhran-II test at least must be a TN device?

The current “controversy” over the failure of the sole H-bomb test of P-2 is the only case of the long history of DAE, BARC being “highly economic with truth” and using such “economy” to protect themselves from public criticism of major failures in various programmes and projects. The failures have been screened from public gaze on unwarranted and secrecy grounds.

Worse, the DAE has tried to hide facts from successive governments, Parliament and the people, causing damage to our nuclear programme and national security. The Prime Minister and the Union Cabinet must help stop this. The nation waits with bated breath if they can or will.

K. Santhanam is a former Chief Adviser (Technologies), DRDO and Programme Director, Pokhran II; and Ashok Parthasarathi is a former Scientific and Technology Adviser to late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 15 Nov 2009 16:12


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Re: Deterrence

Postby NRao » 15 Nov 2009 16:51

In his article, I am not sure where Santhanam got:

The writer then moves to our statement that had TN test really worked, the 120-meter deep shaft at the bottom of which the TN device was emplaced, would have been totally destroyed and its deepest portions even vapourised.


This is the very first time I am seeing "120" meters as depth by any author.

The R. Ramachandran article (that Santhanam mentions) does not have it. Just for the record Chengappa had it at greater than 200 meters and the first Ramachandran article had it at about 230 meters.

[However, a few observations about this very, very interesting "120-meter deep shaft at the bottom of which the TN device was emplaced", that Santhanam now has placed on the table. This depth could produce a crater of about 70 meters radius. However, from my observations it will not be in "granite" - it will be in a alluvial soil. And, that changes a constant in the equation that is used to compute radius, etc.

Added l8r: I get a radius of about 130 meters @ 120 meter deep assuming granite.
]

Then:

Surprisingly, though they argued for decades that H-bombs were central to our Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD), they suddenly say A-bombs (which cannot yield more than 80 kt max) are enough.


DecadeS?

Also, whey is he distorting the scene? A-bombs perhaps cannot exceed 80 Kt in yield, but FBF should be able to go much, much higher?

Then too he seems to have gone from the 20ish Kt range to accept at least 80 Kt range for Indian capabilities?

Then:

Santhanam on Nov 15, 2009 wrote:We reiterate our view, fully shared by the overwhelming majority of our nuclear scientists, strategic analysts and, above all, our military, that a sole A-bomb arsenal is grossly inadequate to be a CMD against China; only TN bombs can do so.


And, from The Myth Bomber:

Santhanam on Oct 5, 2009 wrote:But the failure of the TN device bothers you?

It bothered me then, it bothers me now. But it does not bother me to the extent that I spend sleepless nights, because in some sense the deterrence with the fission bomb is available. But obviously, India’s nuclear arsenal is incomplete without a TN weapon. India’s minimum credible deterrent remains untouched because the fission bomb certainly worked like a song and, therefore, the minimum part of our deterrent is fully addressed. (But) certainly, we need a thermonuclear bomb, especially for the Agni class of missiles which have a range of 3,000 to 4,000 km. It really doesn’t make sense that you fly the Agni missile 4,000 km and deliver a 20 KT bomb. This will certainly not be in the category of what we call inflicting unacceptable damage on the adversary who attacks us. For sure, we need to carry out a proper thermonuclear test.


So, what changed between Oct 5 and Nov 15 of 2009 I wonder.
Last edited by NRao on 15 Nov 2009 20:48, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 15 Nov 2009 18:44

There is the same consistent problem in the last 2 articles by Santhanam as in the earlier articles I used for my SRR piece. There were 3 tests on May 11 1998. All three were simultaneous and produced only one seismic signal. So anyone outside BARC/DRDO (who both presumably had close in measuring instruments to figure out individual yields of S1, S2 and S3) would have seen only one seismic signal. That means that the US agency named by Santhanam/Partha as well as the ARC would have received only one signal which represented the sum total of all three blasts. It is claimed that both these agencies detected a signal that amounted to only 20-25 kt. This figure should represent the total yield of all 3 devices on May 11.

But for some reason Santhanam and Parthasarathi choose to say that the US agency and ARC detected a " TN device yield at only 20 kt max.". But how can a US seismic agency or the ARC say that 20 kt came from the TN device? Unless they were monitoring close in they would have got only one signal.

The "consistent problem" created by Santhanam's claims is that he quotes agencies that he says got a total yield of 20-25 kt. He then goes on to say that TN was only 20 kt but the fission test S2 was 25 kt. That adds up to 40-45. Why is Santhanam doing this? Why can't he just say the TN fizzled without obfuscating with contradictory facts? That would be easier to swallow. The problem could be that there is no unequivocal proof that it fizzled, making him resort to the same roundabout statements that he says BARC is making.

Why not just say that fission atom bomb (S2) gave 20 kt and TN fizzle gave 5 kt. Or say that S2 fission gave 20-25 kt and TN gave zero yield? The man is actually obfuscating.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby Kanson » 15 Nov 2009 20:19

NRao wrote:In his article, I am not sure where Santhanam got:

The writer then moves to our statement that had TN test really worked, the 120-meter deep shaft at the bottom of which the TN device was emplaced, would have been totally destroyed and its deepest portions even vapourised.


This is the very first time I am seeing "120" meters as depth by any author.

The R. Ramachandran article (that Santhanam mentions) does not have it. Just for the record Chengappa had it at greater than 200 meters and the first Ramachandran article had it at about 230 meters.

[However, a few observations about this very, very interesting "120-meter deep shaft at the bottom of which the TN device was emplaced", that Santhanam now has placed on the table. This depth could produce a crater of about 70 meters radius. However, from my observations it will not be in "granite" - it will be in a alluvial soil. And, that changes a constant in the equation that is used to compute radius, etc.]


If S2( fission) device with expected yield of 12 kt was placed at the depth of ~150m, only a fool will place a device with the expected yield of 45 kt at the depth of 120m.

POK-I DOB is ~ 107m, yield stated is ~ 12kt.

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Re: Deterrence

Postby shiv » 15 Nov 2009 20:31

Could we all please stop rehashing what could not be settled without infighting in 150 pages of acrimonious discussion? There is no other shoe to drop. No point taking metaphors literally.


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