Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

[putnanja]

AP Interview: Karzai willing to talk to Taliban

KABUL – Afghan President Hamid Karzai said Thursday he's willing to talk with the Taliban chief in a bid to bring peace to the country if the move has the backing of the United States and other international partners.

Karzai had previously offered to talk with Taliban leader Mullah Omar, but the Bush administration opposed such contacts. President Barack Obama has said the U.S. must "open the door" to Taliban members who abandon violence.
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But Karzai said the effort must have the full backing of the United States and its international partners. He said "sections of the international community" had undermined previous peace overtures by harassing former Taliban members "even though they had quit the insurgency."
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In Brussels, Belgium, U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, said reconciliation talks had been "on the backburner" but were now "moving to the frontburner.

"There's an open door for any people fighting with the Taliban to renounce al-Qaida, lay down their arms and are processed peacefully," Holbrooke said. "But let me be clear, this takes a little time. It has to be Afghan-led and it requires resources."

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[SwamyG]

The United States has strong partners in the effort to stabilize Afghanistan. The NATO alliance has made Afghanistan its first ever ground war and the alliance’s future will now be decided in the Hindu Kush, the mountain range between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Over forty countries have troops on the ground in Afghanistan. India has already provided $1.2 billion in economic aid to the effort of building a new Afghan parliament and a critical road project linking Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea via Iran. Japan has provided key aid to the police. Australia, Sweden and the United Arab Emirates all have sent troops.

Source: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/ ... iedel.aspx

In his famous write up "Kabliwala", he eloquently highlighted the centuries old political, cultural and economic relationship between India and Afghanistan. He even declared Afghanistan as the 'cultural province of India'. In the post-colonial period, the first Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru once said that; "the normal strategic frontiers of India are the Hindukush Mountains".

Source: http://www.thefrontierpost.com/News.asp ... ar&nid=778 {India Afghan Nexus article}

[putnanja]

US feelers on Afghan army - Admiral sounds India on training

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The commander of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Robert F. Willard, met senior officers in the capital today and enquired if Indian special forces’ instructors could be deployed in select Afghan National Army (ANA) academies to train troops in commando operations.

“We have not said yes or no. We are assessing and we will take everything into consideration,” a defence ministry official told The Telegraph. “This is not quite the same as deploying troops. So we shall see. We do have good relations with the Afghan military.”
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Between 50 and 100 Afghan officers and soldiers are trained in Indian military institutions, such as the National Defence Academy and the Indian Military Academy, every year. India runs a medical mission in Kabul that is manned by army doctors.

It also trains Afghan soldiers in India to play martial music and has sent a team to teach Afghan army officers to read, write and speak in English so that they may communicate better with the Americans. Indian military efforts in Afghanistan since 2001 have included the supply of 300 troop carriers (trucks) and consignments of bullet-proof jackets and helmets.
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[NRao]

Re-posting a Nov 29, 2009 article to just make sure we are on the same page (do not have to agree):

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... 34_pf.html

By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, November 30, 2009

President Obama has offered Pakistan an expanded strategic partnership, including additional military and economic cooperation, while warning with unusual bluntness that its use of insurgent groups to pursue policy goals "cannot continue." {So, lying low - as practiced many a time by Pakistan, does not seem to be an option}

The offer, including an effort to help reduce tensions between Pakistan and India, was contained in a two-page letter delivered to President Asif Ali Zardari this month by Obama national security adviser James L. Jones. It was accompanied by assurances from Jones that the United States will increase its military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan and that it plans no early withdrawal.

Obama's speech Tuesday night at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., will address primarily the Afghanistan aspects of the strategy. But despite the public and political attention focused on the number of new troops, Pakistan has been the hot core of the months-long strategy review. The long-term consequences of failure there, the review concluded, far outweigh those in Afghanistan. {Thus the BR move: Af-Pak -> Pak-Af}

"We can't succeed without Pakistan," a senior administration official involved in the White House review said. "You have to differentiate between public statements and reality. There is nobody who is under any illusions about this."

This official and others, all of whom spoke about the closely held details of the new strategy on the condition of anonymity, emphasized that without "changing the nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations in a new direction, you're not going to win in Afghanistan," as one put it. "And if you don't win in Afghanistan, then Pakistan will automatically be imperiled, and that will make Afghanistan look like child's play."

Proffered U.S. carrots, outlined during Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's October visit to Islamabad, center on a far more comprehensive and long-term bilateral relationship. It would feature enhanced development and trade assistance; improved intelligence collaboration and a more secure and upgraded military equipment pipeline; more public praise and less public criticism of Pakistan; and an initiative to build greater regional cooperation among Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.{The plan from an Indian PoV}

Obama called for closer collaboration against all extremist groups, and his letter named five: al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Pakistani Taliban organization known as Tehrik-e-Taliban. Using vague diplomatic language, he said that ambiguity in Pakistan's relationship with any of them could no longer be ignored.

Jones, a retired Marine Corps general, was more precise in conversations with top Pakistani government and military leaders, U.S. and foreign officials said, stating that certain things have to happen in Pakistan to ensure Afghanistan's security. If Pakistan cannot deliver, he warned, the United States may be impelled to use any means at its disposal to rout insurgents based along Pakistan's western and southern borders with Afghanistan.

Current U.S. policy includes the use of missiles fired from unmanned drones on insurgent locations limited to roughly 50 miles inside the western border; training in two military camps for the Pakistani Frontier Corps; and intelligence exchanges. It prohibits kinetic, or active, operations by U.S. ground forces inside Pakistan.

While praising Pakistani military offensives against groups that pose a domestic threat -- primarily the alliance of groups known as Tehrik-e-Taliban, in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan -- Jones made it clear that the administration expects more.

The rollout of the new strategy is being coordinated with principal U.S. allies, including Britain, whose prime minister, Gordon Brown, said Sunday, "People are going to ask why, eight years after 2001, Osama bin Laden has never been near to being caught."

"Al-Qaeda has a base in Pakistan," Brown said in an interview with Sky News. "That base is still there -- they are able to recruit from abroad. The Pakistan authorities must convince us that they are taking all the action that is necessary to deal with that threat."

Expansion of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship will require overcoming significant public and political mistrust in both countries. Officials said that they recognize the difficulty in delivering on either U.S. promises or threats, and that "our leverage over Pakistan is very limited," the senior administration official said.

At the same time, although the administration's goal is to demonstrate a new level and steadfastness of support, short-term U.S. demands may threaten Pakistan's already fragile political stability.

................................................................

Senior U.S. officers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Adm. Mike Mullen, have made repeated relationship-building trips to Pakistan, and training programs in this country for Pakistani officers are expanding after being moribund for years.

U.S. officials have long referred to Pakistani military and intelligence officers who are sympathetic to or actively support insurgent groups fighting in Afghanistan as "rogue elements." More recently, they have described those relationships as more direct and institutional within a divided military. "For the things that we care about," a U.S. official said, "the real decision-maker is the military." It has long been hedging its bets in Afghanistan; the military has positioned itself to prevent inroads by India in the event of a U.S. withdrawal, and against a 30-year history of being used and then rejected by shifting U.S. policy aims.

"Our game is to convince them that our commitment to Afghanistan and the region is long-term," the official said of the military. "We're not going to pack up our bags and leave them as soon as we're done. We have to create a situation in which they see a much more positive interest in closer relations with us than they do in trying to play us. But it requires time." {The drawdown date is not meant for the region and as Gates mentioned is revisable}

India is skeptical of any U.S. involvement in its relationship with Pakistan. Bilateral attempts to resolve the long-standing border dispute in Kashmir were put on hold after last year's terrorist attacks in Mumbai, which were blamed on Lashkar-e-Taiba.

The group has long been active in the Kashmir conflict and is said to have close ties to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency.

Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh treaded carefully on the issue in public during Singh's state visit to Washington last week. "It is not the place of the United States to try to, from the outside, resolve all those conflicts," Obama said during their news conference here. "On the other hand, we want to be encouraging of ways in which both India and Pakistan can feel secure."

Correspondent Pamela Constable in Islamabad contributed to this report.

[shyamd]

Afghanistan Moves on
US Troops Begin Pulling out of Taliban-Controlled Areas

Whereas Friday, Oct. 30, President Barack Obama goes into his seventh round of deliberations on Afghanistan - still undecided where to go, the US military has begun marching backward, in retreat from areas partially controlled by the Taliban.

US Headquarters in Kabul announced that Gen. Stanley McChrystal had shut down half a dozen military outposts, freeing nearly 1,000 troops for other missions. Other US military sources explained that the pullbacks are necessary to adapt deployments to winter conditions. Most remote bases will be cut off by heavy snowfall and exposed to Taliban attacks.

But, according to DEBKA-Net-Weekly military sources, Taliban forces moved in on these outposts this week. As a result, they enjoy greater freedom of movement in at least four districts neighboring Kabul from the north - Nuristan, Kunar, Kapisa and Raghlam - and access to areas closed to them before.

In Nuristan, for instance, Taliban is so sure of its authority that its local commanders are releasing fighting strength for South Waziristan to help fellow Taliban forces resist the Pakistani military assault in its second week. Taliban and al Qaeda fighters can also move freely from Jalalabad through Nuristan to reach the Wardak region southeast of Kabul.

Taliban chiefs and many Afghans have stopped waiting for a Washington decision, taking it for granted that future strategy will have to factor in the realization that the US is incapable of totally eradicating an indigenous insurgency. They expect future US efforts to focus on preventing al Qaeda rebuilding its power base in Afghanistan, while keeping Taliban at bay long enough for the formation of an effective Afghan security force capable of taking over from NATO and shouldering the campaign in its place.

As it becomes stronger, Taliban views any decision the White House may reach as a victory and a step bringing the US departure from Afghanistan closer. This perception is shared by many Afghans and circles in New Delhi and Southwest and Central Asia.

Our Afghan sources stress that the Afghan people are now waiting for America's program of economic development and reconstruction which they hope will lift the abysmal living conditions of the population at large and attract manpower to security forces that will take the place of foreign troops.

For this program to work, they say, central government in Kabul must inject economic aid into the local economies through the provincial governors.

The trouble today is that very few regions are under government economic oversight, whereas the Taliban holds sway either directly, through corrupt Afghan officials or sympathetic clan and tribal chiefs.

In these places and in the areas abandoned by US forces, it is impossible to embark on economic projects without co-opting the local Taliban or its agents.

Clinton Battles Anti-US Tide
Pakistani Generals Balk at US War Goals

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton landed in Islamabad on Wednesday, October 28 for an unusually long three-day visit. The strains of a Pakistani military band accompanying her warm handshakes with a long line of Pakistani dignitaries, many of them military officials, jarred badly with the diabolical sounds of Taliban bombs sowing death and devastation in the Afghan capital of Kabul and Pakistan's Peshawar.

Her carefully prepared speech at a joint news conference with the Pakistani foreign minister Mohammed Quraishi was shouted down by the volatile reality in and around Islamabad.

Before she landed, Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) greeted her with a threat to make the country a graveyard for Westerners if the Pakistani army failed to desist from its offensive "at Washington's behest" on the Mehsud fiefdom of South Waziristan.

As she sat down for talks with Pakistani officials, the death toll from a huge car bomb explosion that ripped through the crowded women's market in the northern Pakistani Peshawar climbed past 100, with hundreds critically injured and many more trapped under the rubble.

She will need every ounce of diplomatic acumen to carry through the tough tasks confronting her:

The first is to ascertain that the big Pakistani offensive in the lawless region athwart its border with Afghanistan does not flag before the Taliban leadership is wiped out and its following broken as a viable military force.

At the very least, she must keep the Pakistani operation turning over at full strength.

Her second goal, with the help of Barack Obama's $7.5 billion aid pledge, is to try and stem the rising anti-American tide on the Pakistani street and inside the armed forces.


"The US Dollars War"

Most of DEBKA-Net-Weekly"s sources in Afghanistan and Pakistan are deeply skeptical of her chances of pulling off any of her objectives owing to three formidable impediments:

1. Pakistan president Asif Ali Zardari and prime minister Yousef Raza Gilani are fast losing credibility at home for sending the Pakistan army to fight an increasingly unpopular war against the Taliban in South Waziristan. The street calls it “The US Dollars War,” alluding to the stream of American aid dollars commonly believed to be lining the pockets of corrupt politicians in Islamabad. Pakistanis say the army is being pushed by American intervention to fight fellow countrymen, lighting a match that could ignite civil war and mire their country in the same predicament as Afghanistan, i.e. never-ending hostilities.

2. A rift is widening between the top echelons of the Pakistan military, headed by Chief of Staff Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and the president and government.

While the politicians brush off popular rancor, the military cannot afford to, because the disaffection is permeating the ranks. The officer corps, furthermore, especially the powerful Inter-Service Intelligence service (ISI), maintains that the South Waziristan campaign against Taliban is detrimental to Pakistan's position vis-à-vis India. Their argument is that special US envoy Richard Holbrooke's failure to bring India to the negotiating table on the Kashmir issue has forced them to redirect their energies: Weakening Taliban would strengthen India's hand in Kashmir and Afghanistan and is therefore against Pakistan's vital interests.

Pakistan strength in South Waziristan is kept below par

3. Pakistani government heads may smoothly promise Clinton the troops will fight until Taliban is routed; but our military sources report the generals have no intention of delivering on that pledge. In fact, the army is consciously planning to avoid engaging South Waziristan's two main tribal groups, the Pashtun Mehsud and the Waziris, as well as the Burkis tribe, the Taliban's main purveyor of intelligence and arms. They may target their Taliban chiefs to render the insurgent groups headless, but that's as far as they will go.

Islamabad feels it is getting crossed signals from Washington: relentless pressure to keep on fighting terrorists and insurgents contrasting with the leisurely pace of the White House decision on strategy for the Afghan/Pakistan arena. Pakistan's war planners are accordingly reluctant to commit the army to a course that might turn out to be irrelevant at the end of Washington's decision-making process.

This uncertainty has direct bearing on the number and types of Pakistani forces consigned to the South Waziristan offensive. They are officially put at 28,000, when no more than 9,000 to 10,000 fighting men are deployed on the ground, and none have been drawn from Pakistan's elite combat units. They are therefore outnumbered by the Taliban's 10-12,000 fighting strength.

Pashtuns here, there and everywhere

Tribal considerations were pronounced in Islamabad's military planning. Elite units were kept out of the fray because they are dominated by tribal compatriots of the Pashtun enemy, Hakumullah Mehsed, the Pakistan Taliban's chief. Pashtun troops were in general replaced by soldiers of Punjabi origin.

The high command in Islamabad explains the inadequate fighting strength in South Waziristan by pointing at the Obama administration's current policy for Afghanistan, which is to field enough combat troops to keep the Taliban under pressure, but not enough to win the war. To defeat the Taliban and its associates, Western military experts estimate, at least 50-60,000 Pakistan troops would have been needed.

Because Washington and the Pakistan military are at cross-purposes, the Obama administration is maintaining a watchful presence of high US officials rotating in Islamabad. Clinton follows in the footsteps of US Chief of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus, and Afghanistan theater commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal. Senate foreign relations committee Chairman, John Kerry was there in mid-October.

[NRao]

President Obama's Secret: Only 100 al Qaeda Now in Afghanistan

[Jarita]

Is it true there is a lot of DU beings used in Afghanistan? If so, we should keep our troops in India.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kbemwchZTRI


German Bundeswehr manual challenges US and UK denials over depleted uranium use in Afghanistan
A military manual that was handed over to German campaigners has reignited allegations that the US used DU ammunition in Afghanistan. If true, it runs counter to repeated assurances given by the US military that no DU was used. The manual, a war-fighting guide for Bundeswehrcontigents in Afghanistan is marked classified and for official NATO use only. It was written by the Bundeswehr's Centre for Communication and published in late 2005.
http://www.wise-uranium.org/dissaf.html

http://www.xs4all.nl/~stgvisie/VISIE/afghanistan4.html
With now over 10 trillion doses of DU in Iraq and Afghanistan, it comes as no surprise that widespread field studies in Afghanistan point to the existence of a large scale public health disaster. UMRC is the first independent research organization to find DU in the bodies of US, UK and Canadian Gulf War I veterans and following ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, they found DU in the water, soils and atmosphere of Iraq as well as in Iraqi civilians. In May/02, the UMRC examined hundreds of people with acute symptoms characteristic of radiation poisoning along with chronic symptoms of internal uranium contamination including deformity in newborns. Two additional scientific study teams were sent to Afghanistan in June/02 and Oct/02. The teams found that in both Jalalabad and Kabul, DU was causing high levels of illness with tests showing radiation concentrations 400% to 2000%
http://www.countercurrents.org/us-paulinson161106.htm

[Jarita]

Another website that details DU but it also has some interesting maps on Brezinski's chessboard

http://www.mindfully.org/Nucs/2004/DU-T ... 1jul04.htm

SOUTH REGION: “This huge region, torn by volatile hatreds and surrounded by competing powerful neighbors, is likely to be a major battlefield, both for wars among nation-states and, more likely, for protracted ethnic and religious violence. Whether India acts as a restraint or whether it takes advantage of some opportunity to impose its will on Pakistan will greatly affect the regional scope of the likely conflicts. The internal strains within Turkey and Iran are likely not only to get worse but to greatly reduce the stabilizing role these states are capable of playing within this volcanic region. Such developments will in turn make it more difficult to assimilate the new Central Asian states into the international community, while also adversely affecting the American-dominated security of the Persian Gulf region. In any case, both America and the international community may be faced here with a challenge that will dwarf the recent crisis in the former Yugoslavia.” Brzezinski

[Amber G.]

Pak maintaining ties with militants as a hedge: Gates

Same story in Dawn:
Al Qaida will try to provoke India-Pakistan war: Gates

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates warned on Thursday that Al Qaida would try to provoke a war between India and Pakistan with the aim to destabilising Pakistan and gaining access to its nuclear arsenal.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton backed the US defence chief, saying that Al Qaida and like-minded terrorist groups were determined to seek nuclear weapons.

The two senior officials told a hearing on President Obama’s new Afghan policy at the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that they had taken such threats very seriously.

Secretary Gates said that Al Qaida was also supporting Lashkar-i-Taiba, the group responsible for the Mumbai terrorist attacks.

‘Al Qaida is providing them with targeting information and helping them in their plotting in India — clearly with the idea of provoking a conflict between India and Pakistan that would destabilise Pakistan,’ he said.

[abhishek_sharma]

Should India train Afghan troops?

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2 ... s_to_india

[NRao]

K Subrahmanyam :: The speech within the speech

The crux of the strategy is: during the surge of US troops in 2010-11, to build the Afghan capacity “that can allow a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan”. There are speculations that India may be asked to shoulder this responsibility and Obama’s telephone conversation with the Indian prime minister just before his speech might be related to this. It may be recalled that Pakistanis have expressed concern about an expanding Indian presence in Afghanistan and General McChrystal in his report had expressed his understanding of Pakistani concerns. However in the Indo-US joint statement, Obama appreciated India’s role in reconstruction and rebuilding efforts and the two leaders agreed to enhance their respective efforts in this direction in Afghanistan. It is obvious that Obama has rejected Pakistan’s concerns on the Indian presence in Afghanistan. Whether he will now go further and request Indian help to train Afghan troops, overriding Pakistani objections, remains to be seen. If he were to do so and if India were to respond positively, that will constitute a material change in the situation and a radical change in US strategy. At the same time, it is difficult to envisage alternative options for Obama to train such a large Afghan force in such a short period.

[ramana]

K Subrahmanyam :: The speech within the speech

The crux of the strategy is: during the surge of US troops in 2010-11, to build the Afghan capacity “that can allow a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan”. There are speculations that India may be asked to shoulder this responsibility and Obama’s telephone conversation with the Indian prime minister just before his speech might be related to this. It may be recalled that Pakistanis have expressed concern about an expanding Indian presence in Afghanistan and General McChrystal in his report had expressed his understanding of Pakistani concerns. However in the Indo-US joint statement, Obama appreciated India’s role in reconstruction and rebuilding efforts and the two leaders agreed to enhance their respective efforts in this direction in Afghanistan. It is obvious that Obama has rejected Pakistan’s concerns on the Indian presence in Afghanistan. Whether he will now go further and request Indian help to train Afghan troops, overriding Pakistani objections, remains to be seen. If he were to do so and if India were to respond positively, that will constitute a material change in the situation and a radical change in US strategy. At the same time, it is difficult to envisage alternative options for Obama to train such a large Afghan force in such a short period.

If this happens expect the pakis to go berserk. This is their worst nightmare and return of Hindushahi rule to Kapisa.

[JE Menon]

We should not take this "America is going to leave in 18 months" BS at face value, or any value. They are there to stay for a while. This protestation of difficulty with staying is targeted least of all to the Taliban and the Paks. There is a more powerful audience which, however, will not be fooled.

[Y I Patel]

Framing the 2011 deadline as part of some well thought out broader strategy is window dressing. The unpalatable truth is that most Americans no longer support an indefinite war in Afghanistan. If Obama had the courage of his convictions, and if he were honest to his base, he would have quit now. But he and his Democrats do not want to be branded as those who lost Afghanistan, hence the grand show of shock and awe that is about to commence. This 'surge' is no parallel to the ballsy gamble that Bush went for in Iraq. It is a slick talker's prelude to a slick exit.

This is what Nixon did by escalating the bombing, just as he started secret talks to abandon Vietnam. This is what Gorbachov did while he started talks to end Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This is Obama shaping the environment by setting the benchmarks of victory so low that he can guarantee himself a 'victorious' exit before he fights the next elections. After all, how much would it take for an Afghan to declare that he is a 'good' Taliban?

This is not to say in any way that American involvement in the region will be over. The cold calculation is that a large and overt military footprint is unsustainable and counterproductive. Much better, the new reasoning goes, to recede into the background and manipulate the clients in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Keep them on edge by playing them off against each other; in Pakistan's case by playing on their fears of greater Indian influence over Afghanistan. The Great Game, my friends, has just commenced a new Act. And the Americans are going by the British playbook, chapter and verse. And the denouement will likely be the same - in previous versions of the Great Game, Afghanistan was like the 'ball' in a game of Buzkashi. Now, Pakistan will join it in that role.

Not that I am unhappy, mind you. Just a wee bit cynical about all this grand talk about reviews and ultimatums and pledges of undying support... Sounds a lot like 'Of course I love you. And I will still respect you in the morning!'

Finally. Should I take pride or feel intensely embarrassed that some towering intellects have joined me in pondering whether Pakistan is likely to become the next Cambodia?

[Malayappan]

Keep them on edge by playing them off against each other

In the context of this, I am just wondering - all this talk about Indian involvement in Baluchistan, Waziristan not to speak of the 1500 consulates we have in Afghanistan - all these have to do with keeping us on the edge?

[SSridhar]

From Najam Sethi's edit in TFT

President Obama’s Afghan Package aims to please all the major “home” constituency “principals” in the game. The 30,000 troop surge costing US$10 billion a year should satisfy the Pentagon. The 18-month deadline for the process of troop withdrawals should appease American and European liberals opposed to the war. It should nudge dithering NATO governments in Europe to pitch in with troops when public opinion is against any long term involvement in Afghanistan. It might help also dilute the anti-war backlash in America when Congressional elections are held next year. Finally, it would give President Obama another eighteen months to firm up or change course for more effective results before the next presidential election in 2012.

But some regional “principals” will remain disgruntled. President Hamid Karzai is tasked to deliver the agenda of building the state (army and police) and nation (reconstruction and reconciliation). However, he is not going to be able to deliver in eighteen months what he has not been able to deliver in eight years. Indeed, the very idea of a quick “exit strategy” is dangerous from his point of view. All guerilla warfare manuals revolve around the idea of time, space and will. Time is to be traded to create the will of the people to resist occupation forces and thus capture space and oust them. This is exactly what the Taliban-Al Qaeda network has done so effectively until now. Waiting out the Americans for another few years will be no problem. They will dig in, protect, preserve and strengthen themselves. Since no Afghan wants to be on the eventual “losing” side, the idea of a given timeframe for exit based on American domestic compulsions should spur the Taliban to resist even more fiercely.

Pakistan’s security establishment, too, is not likely to be pleased. President Asif Zardari and PM Yousaf Raza Gilani have said that Pakistan hasn’t seriously been involved in the strategic review. This is significant since Pakistan’s stand on the war against terror has shifted critically. Originally, during General Pervez Musharraf’s time, Pakistan’s stated position was that of a “supporter” or “facilitator” of the US war effort in Afghanistan. However, now, under General Ashfaq Kayani, Pakistan views itself as one of the “principals” in the great game because the Afghan backlash has engulfed Pakistan and sucked its army into military operations in its own areas. Therefore it is not good enough for President Obama to inform the Pakistani security establishment of US goals and seek its backing with offers of economic and military assistance. What is needed is a definite Pakistani input and component of the strategy that protects and enhances Pakistan’s security environment and secures American anti-terror interests in the long term while enabling it to “get out” asap.

Several Pakistani security interests are at stake. Islamabad would like any future political dispensation in Kabul to be “favourably” disposed or “friendly” towards it. The reason is obvious: the Pakhtuns of Afghanistan constitute a majority there and the Pakhtuns of Pakistan occupy a significant chunk of Pakistan’s state and society, therefore Islamabad would like the Pakhtuns of Pakistan to look toward it, and the Pakhtuns of Afghanistan to look to Kabul, for sustenance. Indeed, the last thing Pakistan would want is a government in Kabul that covets Pakistan territory in the NWFP and tribal areas. The fact that the US-backed Karzai government has not been interested in diffusing Pakistani fears of irredentism by recognizing the Durand Line in the last eight years as the international border between the two countries is one good reason for distrusting it. The other is President Karzai’s inability or unwillingness to build a domestic Pakhtun consensus based on national reconciliation policies that reflect the ethnic balance in Afghanistan and also build trust and confidence with Pakistan based on its “fear” of Indian hegemony in the region. Indeed, the fact that India occupies significant space in the Kabul-Washington alliance aimed at building the Afghan state and nation is cause for Pakistani concern. It is no secret that India is being encouraged to carve out a stake in reconstruction activity – roads, schools and hospitals – even as its security establishment is increasingly involved in the training and schooling of the nascent Afghan police and army. Kabul and Delhi’s alleged involvement in the Baloch issue, which figured in the joint statement at Sharm al Shaikh recently, remains a destablising factor. Certainly, the joint Obama-Manmohan recent statement from Washington emphasizing a joint strategy to uproot “terrorist safe havens” in the neighbourhood (read Pakistan) without even alluding to the resolution of outstanding disputes that have provoked intel-proxy wars in the region and created de-stabilising non-state actors {Of late, I find that Najam Sethi has started to justify the strategy of using the non-state actors}, has peeved security experts in Pakistan. In fact, the US threat to extend Drone attacks on the Al-Qaeda-Taliban networks in Balochistan or unleash boots-on-ground operations without the approval of the Pakistani military, could trigger serious strains in the US-Pakistan relationship. Worse, it could destabilize the Zardari government by provoking a severe anti-American popular backlash.

President Obama’s Af-Pak strategy is full of misgivings. It is a case of too-little, too late. Worse, it doesn’t give Pakistan due weight. Without critical adjustments on the ground quickly, it is not likely to succeed in its ambitious objectives.

[NRao]

India welcomes Af-Pak strategy

Broadly endorsing the United States President Barack Obama’s new Af-Pak strategy, India on Thursday said that it welcomed the US expectation that terrorists won’t find safe havens in Pakistan.

In its reaction to the Obama plan, the External Affairs Ministry said that it welcomed the US strategy of strengthening the Afghanistan Government and Afghan security forces.

“We also welcome President Obama’s reiteration of the need to squarely tackle terrorism and for Pakistan to ensure that terrorists do not enjoy safe havens on its territory,’’ Foreign Office spokesman Vishnu Prakash said.

[NRao]

Did Obama forget to consult with Pakis?

Pak for greater clarity, coordination on Af-Pak strategy

I like that "coordination" word out there. "clarity" is not an issue - Pakis will never get it.

[NRao]

THE crux of the only problem.

Af-Pak policy: ISI must fall in line

NEW DELHI: The Manmohan Singh government on Thursday said it was imperative for the international community to continue putting pressure on
Pakistan to dismantle the safe havens that export terror into the neighbourhood.

Responding to President Barack Obama’s Afghan policy, MEA spokesperson Vishnu Prakash said Pakistan has to be persuaded to root out these safe havens. `` India believes that it is in the interest of the international community to impress upon Pakistan that it must use all its influence and resources to implement its commitments to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism and to deny sanctuary to all terrorist groups who operate from its soil,’’ he said.

Welcoming President Obama’s `` reiteration of the need to squarely tackle terrorism,’’ the spokesperson said that it was essential for the international community to oppose `` those who nurture , sustain and give sanctuary to terrorists and extremist elements.’’

But for the US, Pakistan is the core of its Afghan strategy. With Taliban and al-Qaeda safe havens flourishing in Pakistan, the quality of cooperation from the Pakistani military is expected to determine the future course in Afghanistan and the success of the Af-Pak policy. And the ISI in particular is seen as key to the success of the American and Nato troops in countering the Taliban.

A Stratfor report has argued that the ISI remains the centre of gravity of the entire problem in Afghanistan, and that the US success is dependant on the quality of help it gets from the ISI. `` The ISI remains the centre of gravity of the entire problem. If the war is about creating an Afghan army, and if we accept that the Taliban will penetrate this army heavily no matter what, then the only counter is to penetrate the Taliban equally. Without that, Obama’s entire strategy fails as Nixon’s did,’’ the report warned. But the report also raised questions about the motivations of the spy agency and the viability of an Afghan policy which is dependant on help from quarters known to be sympathetic to the Taliban.

The US President in his recently unveiled Afghan strategy had chalked out an 18-month timeline for initiating troop withdrawal and slowly handing over the reins to the Afghan government and army. This is being interperted to mean that the US strategy will focus more on creating the right atmosphere for a US exit from a problem that has only worsened in the last year and not in pushing through a lasting solution.

`The extra forces that will be deployed to Afghanistan are not expected to defeat the Taliban. Instead, their mission is to reverse the momentum of previous years and to create the circumstances under which an Afghan force can take over the mission. The US presence is therefore a stopgap measure, not the ultimate solution,’’ said the Stratfor report.

And the only entity that can provide intelligence input on the Taliban and remain secure is the ISI. “The only entity that could conceivably penetrate the Taliban and remain secure is the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). This would give the Americans and Afghans knowledge of Taliban plans and deployments,’’ said the report. But the report also raised questions about Taliban sympathisers in the ISI.

[SaiK]

When ISI<=>AQ seamlessly integrate and disappear and appear, where is the question of keeping the ISI as a separate entity arise? I think we should consider them as part of AQ network, and go for the kill, from an Pak-Af angle.

[Mort Walker]

Framing the 2011 deadline as part of some well thought out broader strategy is window dressing. The unpalatable truth is that most Americans no longer support an indefinite war in Afghanistan. If Obama had the courage of his convictions, and if he were honest to his base, he would have quit now. But he and his Democrats do not want to be branded as those who lost Afghanistan, hence the grand show of shock and awe that is about to commence. This 'surge' is no parallel to the ballsy gamble that Bush went for in Iraq. It is a slick talker's prelude to a slick exit.

This is what Nixon did by escalating the bombing, just as he started secret talks to abandon Vietnam. This is what Gorbachov did while he started talks to end Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This is Obama shaping the environment by setting the benchmarks of victory so low that he can guarantee himself a 'victorious' exit before he fights the next elections. After all, how much would it take for an Afghan to declare that he is a 'good' Taliban?

This is not to say in any way that American involvement in the region will be over. The cold calculation is that a large and overt military footprint is unsustainable and counterproductive. Much better, the new reasoning goes, to recede into the background and manipulate the clients in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Keep them on edge by playing them off against each other; in Pakistan's case by playing on their fears of greater Indian influence over Afghanistan. The Great Game, my friends, has just commenced a new Act. And the Americans are going by the British playbook, chapter and verse. And the denouement will likely be the same - in previous versions of the Great Game, Afghanistan was like the 'ball' in a game of Buzkashi. Now, Pakistan will join it in that role.

Not that I am unhappy, mind you. Just a wee bit cynical about all this grand talk about reviews and ultimatums and pledges of undying support... Sounds a lot like 'Of course I love you. And I will still respect you in the morning!'

Finally. Should I take pride or feel intensely embarrassed that some towering intellects have joined me in pondering whether Pakistan is likely to become the next Cambodia?

Y I,

That is a very good and accurate analysis. As they say, follow the money trail. The administration, now more than anytime before, is in a serious current account deficit and high public debt that is due to the previous administrations and current policies. If this situation is not controlled, everyone knows it can cause a serious decline in the US standard of living. By spending $30 billion plus, and then pulling out, political goals will have been accomplished, but the problem will still remain.

[ramana]

YIP and Mort, Please read the Niall Fergusson article in Newsweek where he shows how important it is for US not to get into an open ended commitment in Af-Pak as it could end up costing/collapsing the system.

Yes it's about the money for its the lifeblood of ancient and modern nation states. And BO has recognized it and taken that into the Plan.

What could he have done differently other than general war on TSP?

[svinayak]

Keep them on edge by playing them off against each other

What is better. Keep them occupied from all sides from the border or keep them occupied inside the IED border.

[ShauryaT]

YIP and Mort, Please read the Niall Fergusson article in Newsweek where he shows how important it is for US not to get into an open ended commitment in Af-Pak as it could end up costing/collapsing the system.

Yes it's about the money for its the lifeblood of ancient and modern nation states. And BO has recognized it and taken that into the Plan.

What could he have done differently other than general war on TSP?

General war on TSP, presumes that TSP is a legitimate and normal nation state! What could be done different is to recognize that first, the Durand line is an artificial line, which was never respected and likely to be not respected on the ground. For, the US to give that line a sense of respect is similar to the US not covering its flanks very well in Cambodia against North Vietnam. Recognize that for Afghanistan to be a normal functioning state, the Durand line has to go and Afghanistan needs access to the Sea, through Baluchistan. Obviously, this cannot happen overnight, however, the US could institute policies, which help towards these end goals. There are many things that can be done, before the Pakjab army will absolutely refuse to cooperate.

- Allow cross border raids by US forces in hot pursuit
- Allow air strikes, across the border, on actionable intelligence
- Message to Pashtuns that they have a fair chance to dominate the affairs of Afghanistan
- Train the Pashtun dominated Frontier Corps directly and build relationships
- Move most of the supplies through the Baluchistan route, benefitting the Baluchs and the Pashtuns of the south
- Involve the Pashtun tribes in Pakistan, in policies for Afghanistan and Vice Versa

In general ignore the Durand line to the maximum extent possible. A quick end to the Afghanistan quagmire is through the Pashtun heart. But, it does require some bold actions and out of the box (the box being that of the lines of artificial and abnormal nation states) thinking. Something, I do not expect the Democrats to seize upon, unless there is a direct and immediate benefit to such a policy in the home front, that can be politically sold.

[Mort Walker]

Ramana,

Can you provide the link, if not, I'll search in Newsweek.

BHO's options did not have to become public in a policy speech. He could have done much behind the scenes and all of us would have seen results. To some degree this may be working, as so far we haven't seen a major TSP terror attack in India since Nov. 2008; however, this will quickly change now that TSP has more discretionary funds thanks to BHO.

AQ = LeT = ISI = TSPA

If terror attacks in India are diminished = BHO Pak-Af success.

[NRao]

BO is not your run-of-the-mill politician, although he is very, very comfortable with that aspect too. Very briefly, there are three things that differentiate him: he is a great listener (listens to anyone without exception), he actually has the interest, capability and capacity to "learn" (gets into great details and can actually retain that info for intelligent decisions)(one may not like his decisions, but that is another matter), and is decisive (within his capacity).

Although there is ever present component of "re-election", WRT BO there is also the component of getting it right - for which there is more than a 50% chance that he will give up on "re-election".

Having said that I am more than confident that the game plan calls for something that the 'Nam, etc plans did not call for. His is not an exit strategy to leave the region, it is one to hand over the region to meaningful and responsible players. The more I read the more I seem gather that each player (in the region) and their sub components (such as the ANA, ISI, PA) must do their parts, act their proper role in a proper political and economical environment. Anyone not doing their part will tip the cart for sure - as has happened over the decades.

Will all these things fall into place - A'stan and Pakis in particular? Do not know. But that is the plan and it seems to me that BO is about to force the issue from all directions. The draw down date being the least of his problems.

[NRao]

NYTimes :: Take the War to Pakistan

[KaranR]

[RamaY]

The brophet in my brain (who says I am that) says this –

Ombaba’s 2011 plan could be this
- Start with a surge. Pacify the Phuk-Af border areas.
- Nato surge will keep the peace in heart-lands
- India will train INA

In 2011, Amrikhan will hand over the control to UN, while keeping a couple of military bases for himself and NATO. Indiski will enter the theater under UN aegis as the commanding partner, and uses INA as the front end.

For this strategy to work, India must be ensured about three things by unkil khan.
- Complete control and lock out of puki crown jewels under Amrikhan’s Musharraf. I see 10%’s handover of the (unworthy) keys to groper from this angle.
- Pacification of Paki claims on POK.
- Destruction of terrorist infrastructure in Paki heart land. Would this include ISI?

[SaiK]

IAF should consider strengthening further the Tajik Air Base.. perhaps with Sukhois after it comes in with much needed lethal brahmos.

[shyamd]

message for people of Pakistan from Sec Clinton:
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/12/133087.htm

[ramana]

Another thing NRao. Unlike previous leaders who got the samosa treatment (Legend has it Begum Zia used to fry up samosas for visiting US interlocutors!) from the Paki leaders, BO has seen TSP in its true light as a student. He didnt get the green colored outlook from interacting with RAPE and jernails. He might fix the problems.

[SaiK]

af-pak could clean up many evil things.. but we don't want them to transgress that problem within our boundary.. for example madrassas.

if they are talking people-people, then madrassas must be the #1 plan.

[ramana]

More relevant here

From Nightwatch, 11/3/09

Pakistan: The Daily Times ran an item on 4 December that claimed Pakistan was not consulted about the new US strategy in which Pakistan’s cooperation is vital to success in one of its three major objectives. The implication was that this was a serious oversight.

Prime Minister Gilani said he wanted more clarity on the parts that affect Pakistan.

Pakistanis also are displeased that their border region was singled-out as the safehaven for al Qaida, the epicenter of international terrorism. They know it; but just don’t like it broadcast.

The Afghan Taliban leadership under Mullah Omar is often referred to as the Quetta Shura … because it operates with impunity from Quetta, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan. Every body knows it.

Comment: The Quetta Shura is known to every one in Pakistan leadership circles. Of all the Afghan anti-government groups operating out of Pakistan, it is arguably the easiest to close down. Of all the actions that might have been taken to improve security in Afghanistan, the one never attempted was shutting down the Quetta Shura, not in nine years.

Consider: Pakistan and the NGOs relocated up to 4 million Afghan refugees back to Afghanistan in the early 2000s, after the Taliban leadership ran away from Kabul to Quetta. It would seem a small thing to arrest and deport Mullah Omar’s crew in Quetta. There really is no explanation for the obvious protection of Omar and company, and blame lies in Washington as well as Islamabad.

Nothing the US and Pakistan have done in Pakistan’s frontier regions has helped improve the security situation in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s Actions in Swat and South Waziristan have had no measurable impact on the Afghanistan fighting. The way those operations have progressed shows they were shaped primarily by Pakistani concerns.

Al Qaida is not a significant actor in Afghanistan, according to the testimony this week before the US Congress and in statements through the year by the National Security advisor and others.

Moreover, all the Remotely Piloted Vehicle attacks for the last four years against al Qaida in Pakistan also have had no demonstrable impact in improving security in Afghanistan.

A new strategy has been announced. All the winks and nods plus the unspoken understandings of the past eight years that have passed for policy can be dumped. Omar should no longer get a pass from the US or Pakistan.

Afghan, American, NATO and Pakistani soldiers have died by the hundreds, while Omar and company thrive in Quetta. This is the functional equivalent of refusing to bomb Hanoi during most of the Vietnam War.

Why not try a few RPV attacks, or better, some Pakistan Army Special Security Group operations against the Quetta Shura at long last and see whether they have an effect on the insurgency. Get Musharraf’s old command into the action, the SSG, and let the world see whether they are as good as their boasting.

The NightWatch view is that the Quetta Shura is less in command than in coordination of operations and finances. Communications are too poor and Pashtun commanders too independent to obey Mullah Omar unless the Shura sends an emissary, apparently. However, The Shura’s operation appears to be essential as the channel for distributing money from mainly Arab donors.

Omar and his men already have shown that they run away when their personal safety is at risk. So put him and his cohorts at risk, put them on the run and disrupt the coordination and distribution operation. That will not end the fighting, but, in a month, almost all southern groups will run out of key bomb making ingredients and ammunition. The unclassified reporting on the clashes suggests resupply from Pakistan or Iran is cyclical, probably from a few weeks to a month, depending on the province, the size of the fighting groups and the complexity of the operations they execute.

If a person digs hard enough on the Net, he could probably find a good telephone number and address for Omar’s family. So, Pakistani SSG, how hard could this be? And while you are at it, lean on the Haqqanis and Hekmatyar who also have had a pass for nine years, killing Americans, Afghans, NATO and Pakistani soldiers.

[SwamyG]

Pakistan's macabre association with the Taliban stems mostly from its constant effort to pressure its mortal enemy, India. A stable and secular Afghanistan is therefore a vital strategic necessity for India. Indeed, India was alone in the non-aligned movement in supporting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980's, and it also desperately supported the secular Northern Alliance after the Taliban victory of the 1990's.

Afghanistan is the recipient of the largest assistance program that India has for any country in the world. That program focuses on the Afghanization of the development process, as well as on allowing the security forces to operate autonomously.

China's diplomatic recipe for Afghanistan and Pakistan is the right one, and the US should focus on it. A settlement over Kashmir is the key to stability in Afghanistan, which would then no longer be a strategic playground for India and Pakistan. Instead of persisting in a counterproductive war effort, the US should use its leverage on India and Pakistan to bring them back to peace negotiations.

Source - Gautemala News

[SwamyG]

India, a strategic ally of the United States, cannot and will not tolerate an Islamist power on its border backed by China. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh certainly conveyed this message to Obama during his recent visit to Washington.

Afghanistan as the historic gateway to the Indian subcontinent will take on greater importance than ever if it is free to build its own democracy with the military and economic help of western democracies -- or if it is abandoned to the mercies of forces with little or no interest in democracy and self-determination.

Source - Ottawa Citizen

[Johann]

There are many things that can be done, before the Pakjab army will absolutely refuse to cooperate.

- Allow cross border raids by US forces in hot pursuit
- Allow air strikes, across the border, on actionable intelligence
- Message to Pashtuns that they have a fair chance to dominate the affairs of Afghanistan
- Train the Pashtun dominated Frontier Corps directly and build relationships
- Move most of the supplies through the Baluchistan route, benefitting the Baluchs and the Pashtuns of the south
- Involve the Pashtun tribes in Pakistan, in policies for Afghanistan and Vice Versa

- Allow air strikes, across the border, on actionable intelligence

That is exactly what the drone strikes represent. There has been a *massive* expansion of Predator strikes over Pakistan since the summer of 2008. The Obama administration has agreed to expand it even further. Understand too that for every strike you're talking about hundreds, often thousands of hours of surveillance before hand.

What is the role of Pakistan here? The PAF can shoot down these drones, and its come close to that a few times. At this time the US considers it cheaper to pay the Pakistanis for access rather than have to fight a war just to get the drones overhead.

There is essentially a payoff being negotiated right now for the expansion of access (for strikes, not just surveillance) over the Pashtun districts of Baluchistan - Zhob, Pishin, Quetta, etc, as well as deeper in to NWFP.

The PA doesnt like it of course - this will strain their relationship with the most PA-friendly elements of the Taliban, the Quetta Shura, but between a civilian government and Pakistan's overall financial situation, and the Obama adminstration's urgency, its a rearguard fight.

- Allow cross border raids by US forces in hot pursuit

this was something that the Bush administration also increased in 2008, and it also produced confrontations.

I'll just say that unless they are *completely* black, the confrontations that result will produce either an escalation in to general war, or a disruption of drone surveillance and strikes. Unless you really need someone alive, or there's an opportunity to recover documents, hard drives, etc, its not clear why one would prefer an SF raid over a drone strike. Who is to day they aren't complementary?

The same goes for punitive artillery strikes - although the Taliban doesnt try to fire rockets from behind PA/FC posts, or retreat behind them after attacks after the Coalition returned the compliment with 155mm fire, and unfortunately there was collateral damage to the PA.

Train the Pashtun dominated Frontier Corps directly and build relationships

- As for training the FC, that is something the Americans are very interested in expanding. The problem remains of course that it is officered by PA types on secondment, many of whom are you might call Sarkari Pashtuns.

Move most of the supplies through the Baluchistan route, benefitting the Baluchs and the Pashtuns of the south

- Overland NATO 'non-lethal' supplies do travel through Baluchistan to the Bolan pass along the Karachi-Quetta route. They too are targeted for attack by the Pakiban - yet another reason why the US is keen on hitting jihadi leadership in the area with Predators.

In any case, the northern route is developing, and the hope is it will take some of the pressure off the south. However with the increases in numbers and required supplies that the surge brings, the logistical demands will remain heavy.

[NRao]

Hillary Clinton praises Nato allies' Afghanistan pledge

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has welcomed a pledge by Nato allies to send at least 7,000 extra troops to support the US surge in Afghanistan.

She said beating the Taliban insurgency there was a "crucial test" for Nato.

She spoke in Brussels after talks with Nato foreign ministers and other partners with forces in Afghanistan.

Nato's top official, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said at least 25 countries had promised more forces in 2010, providing at least 7,000 more troops.

He suggested there would be "more [troops] to come" over and above that number once other nations had reached decisions on deployments.

The US has called on allies among the 43 nations with troops in Afghanistan to send about 10,000 extra soldiers.

Some major countries are holding back, however. France and Germany, for instance, have not yet committed themselves to sending extra troops.

'Lives and treasure'

Mrs Clinton welcomed what she described as a "significant commitment" by Nato allies, saying she was extremely heartened by their positive response.

AFGHANISTAN SURGE
# US calling for about 10,000 extra foreign troops
# Nato expects 7,000 troops from 25 of 43 nations in Afghanistan
# Not all have gone public with their intentions
# Britain has pledged extra 500; Italy "about 1,000"; Poland 600; Portugal 150; Spain 200; Slovakia 250; Macedonia 80
# Non-Nato member Georgia sending 900, South Korea 500
# France still considering response; Germany may delay decision until January 2010

"This is a crucial test for NATO, which has been the greatest and most successful military alliance in history," she said.

"It is crucial that we remain firm in our resolve and see this mission through."

She also acknowledged the sacrifices made by Nato allies "in lives and treasure", as they promised military forces and civilian resources to back the new US Afghan strategy.

Earlier this week, US President Barack Obama announced he was sending an additional 30,000 troops to help battle the Taliban insurgency.

Speaking earlier in the day Mrs Clinton had said the need for additional forces was "urgent, but their presence will not be indefinite".

However, she stressed that the US would continue to provide civilian assistance to Afghanistan long after the military mission ended, saying the US and its allies had an "enduring commitment" to the region.

Speaking to the BBC in Washington, US National Security Adviser Gen James Jones echoed that message, saying the US did not intend to withdraw fully from Afghanistan in 2011 - the date set by Mr Obama for troops to start pulling out - and leave Afghans to their fate.

He said: "It's very important that people in Afghanistan hear this very clearly, this is not a withdrawal of the United States in Afghanistan in 2011.

"It is a decision to turn over to the Afghans some of the responsibility when they are ready to accept that responsibility, and in no manner, shape and form is the [United] States leaving Afghanistan in 2011."

Earlier, Mr Rasmussen told delegates at Nato HQ that the coming year would "see a new momentum in this mission".

The BBC's Nick Childs, in Brussels, says the main thrust of Mr Rasmussen's speech was to insist on a message of solidarity, despite the challenges, and of unity behind the mission.

"In addition to the clear pledges already tabled, we have heard indications... that other allies and partners will probably be in a position to announce contributions in the coming weeks and months," Mr Rasmussen said.

"Isaf [International Security Assistance Force] will have at least 37,000 more soldiers in 2010 than it did this year. That is solidarity in action."

Warning for Kabul

But many Nato governments face publics even more sceptical about the mission than those of the US and Britain.

Even if more public announcements are forthcoming, turning these into firm pledges of the right troops at the right time and for the right missions may take longer, our correspondent adds.

Mr Rasmussen said several countries had pledged additional funds for development assistance as part of the mission's new approach in providing basic services to benefit the local people in Afghanistan.

But he warned that Kabul had to play its part in the reconstruction process.

Meanwhile more than 1,000 Nato soldiers, most of them from the US, as well as Afghan troops, launched a major offensive in southern Afghanistan on Friday.

A US military spokesman said Operation Cobra's Anger in the northern part of Helmand province was aimed at cutting off insurgent supply and communication lines.

[ramana]

Niall Fergusson in Newsweek.

Empire at Risk

[NRao]

Are we witnessing the near total collapse of Pakistan in some ways - if it has not already happened? Does this country need a caretaker?

Af-Pak --> Pak-Af --> Pak!!!

Pakistan conspiracy theories stifle debate

Switch on any of the dozens of satellite news channels now available in Pakistan.

You will be bombarded with talk show hosts who are mostly obsessed with demonising the elected government, trying to convince viewers of global conspiracies against Pakistan led by India and the United States or insisting that the recent campaign of suicide bomb blasts around the country is being orchestrated by foreigners rather than local militants.

Viewers may well ask where is the passionate debate about the real issues that people face - the crumbling economy, joblessness, the rising cost of living, crime and the lack of investment in health and education or settling the long-running insurgency in Balochistan province.

The answer is nowhere.

One notable channel which also owns newspapers has taken it upon itself to topple the elected government.

Another insists that it will never air anything that is sympathetic to India, while all of them bring on pundits - often retired hardline diplomats, bureaucrats or retired Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) officers who sport Taliban-style beards and give viewers loud, angry crash courses in anti-Westernism and anti-Indianism, thereby reinforcing views already held by many.

Collapse of confidence

Pakistan is going through a multi-dimensional series of crises and a collapse of public confidence in the state.

Suicide bombers strike almost daily and the economic meltdown just seems to get worse.

But this is rarely apparent in the media, bar a handful of liberal commentators who try and give a more balanced and intellectual understanding by pulling all the problems together.

The explosion in TV channels in Urdu, English and regional languages has brought to the fore large numbers of largely untrained, semi-educated and unworldly TV talk show hosts and journalists who deem it necessary to win viewership at a time of an acute advertising crunch, by being more outrageous and sensational than the next channel.

On any given issue the public barely learns anything new nor is it presented with all sides of the argument.

Every talk show host seems to have his own agenda and his guests reflect that agenda rather than offer alternative policies.

Recently, one senior retired army officer claimed that Hakimullah Mehsud - the leader of the Pakistani Taliban which is fighting the army in South Waziristan and has killed hundreds in daily suicide bombings in the past five weeks - had been whisked to safety in a US helicopter to the American-run Bagram airbase in Afghanistan.

In other words the Pakistani Taliban are American stooges, even as the same pundits admit that US-fired drone missiles are targeting the Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan.

These are just the kind of blatantly contradictory and nut-case conspiracy theories that get enormous traction on TV channels and in the media - especially when voiced by such senior former officials.

The explosion in civil society and pro-democracy movements that brought the former military regime of President Pervez Musharraf to its knees over two years has become divided, dissipated and confused about its aims and intentions.

Even when such activists do appear on TV, their voices are drowned out by the conspiracy theorists who insist that every one of Pakistan's ills are there because of interference by the US, India, Israel and Afghanistan.

The army has not helped by constantly insisting that the vicious Pakistani Taliban campaign to topple the state and install an Islamic emirate is not a local campaign waged by dozens of extremist groups, some of whom were trained by the military in the 1990s, but the result of foreign conspiracies.

Economic crisis

Such statements by the military hardly do justice to the hundreds of young soldiers who are laying down their lives to fight the Taliban extremists.

Nor has the elected government of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) tried to alter the balance, as it is mired in ineffective governance and widespread corruption while failing to tackle the economic recession, that is admittedly partly beyond its control.

Moreover the PPP has no talking pundits, sympathetic talk show hosts or a half decent media management campaign to refute the lies and innuendo that much of the media is now spewing out.

At present, the principal obsession is when and how President Asif Ali Zardari will be replaced or sacked, although there is no apparent constitutional course available to get rid of him except for a military coup, which is unlikely.

The campaign waged by some politicians and parts of the media - with underlying pressure from the army - is all about trying to build public opinion to make Mr Zardari's tenure untenable.

Nobody discusses the failure of the education system that is now turning out hundreds of suicide bombers, rather than doctors and engineers.

Or the collapsing and corrupt national health system that forces the poorest to seek expensive private medical treatment, or the explosion in crime or suicides by failed farmers and workers who have lost their jobs.

Pakistan cannot tackle its real problems unless the country's leaders - military and civilian - first admit that much of the present crisis is a result of long-standing mistakes, the lack of democracy, the failure to strengthen civic institutions and the lack of investment in public services like education, even as there continues to be a massive investment in nuclear weapons and the military.

Pakistan's crisis must first be acknowledged by officialdom and the media before solutions can be found.

The alternative is a continuation of the present paralysis where people are left confused, demoralised and angry.